ABSTRACT
AFRICANA WOMEN'S STUDIES
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GLASS CEILINGS AND GLASS WALLS:
HISTORICAL IMPASSES AFFECTING THE PROFESSIONAL
ATTAINMENTS OF AFRICANA FEMALE NAVAL OFFICERS

Advisor: Dr. Jacqueline Howard-Matthews
Dissertation dated July, 1997

This study examined the history of Africana Female Naval Officers to determine what human or institutional forces have affected their professional attainments. This study was based on the premise that some unique factors, institutional and human, constituted professional systemic obstacles, which made it more difficult for this population to achieve any sustained professional progress. A secondary premise suggested that Africana Female Officers had to employ some type of coping behaviors in order to survive in their work place, the United States Navy.

Content analysis was used to analyze data extracted from historical and current documents, as well as in depth oral interviews. An interview questionnaire, and interview coding and analysis system was developed.

The conclusions drawn from the findings indicated that multiple variables constructed the systemic obstacles which have historically affected the professional attainments of Africana Female Officers. The results clearly identified that Glass Ceilings and Glass Walls, which peculiarly impact Africana Female Officers, have been erected and maintained by the Navy's hierarchy. The afflicting components that configured the Glass Ceilings and Glass Walls rest fundamentally on entrenched and well preserved columns of racism and sexism.
GLASS CEILINGS AND GLASS WALLS: HISTORICAL IMPASSES AFFECTING THE PROFESSIONAL ATTAINMENTS OF AFRICANA FEMALE NAVAL OFFICERS

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF CLARK ATLANTA UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF ARTS

BY
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I wish to acknowledge the honored legacy that all Africana Women Officers in all branches of the Military created in an effort to demonstrate their commitment to the pursuit of one nation under God with liberty and justice for all. My mother, Mrs. Inell Willcox Ware, instilled in me from day one the philosophy to always walk with my head held high, to dare to dream and to dare to be different. My deceased Daddy's omnipresence told me daily that the road was not easy, but I could do anything because he believed in me. My eighteen year old son, Tariq, still unabashedly stops total strangers on the streets and unsolicitedly tells them about his "Mom," the retired Navy Commander who is working on her Doctorate at "Clark Atlanta University" and is also a member of Zeta Phi Beta Sorority, Inc. Lelia Gaines, M.D. has been, for the past ten years, extremely supportive of my pursuit of this dream. Without Carole Payne's special friendship and hands on support, this dream may not have been realized. She unselfishly gave my dream a configuration via the typed word. Pamala Lake Swan, Schuyler Webb, Ph.D. and Larnell Flanagan, Ed.D. consistently provided essential moral support. The guidance of my committee, Doctors Jacqueline Howard-Matthews, Gretchen Maclachen and Alma Vinyard, kept me on course and encouraged me to go where no one has gone before. Dr. Josephine Bradley unselfishly supported me academically and emotionally. With this powerful level of unmitigating support, I know that now...I can exhale.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Researchers of American Military history have not necessarily denied that women have made major contributions to the military successes of this nation. They have just historically presented women as non essential members of the military performing stereotypical women's jobs. Primarily these jobs showed women working in service oriented or supportive roles. Some scholars researching women's roles in the military have gone so far as to portray some women as being masculine and wanting to do a man's job or marking time looking for a husband. A serious military history scholar can objectively delineate a time line which depicted women's direct involvement in all of America's major military crises. The level of involvement has increased to the extent that during the recent Persian Gulf War women were engaged in combat. One, indeed, withstood the trauma of being taken prisoner-of-war.

In 1973 the draft ended and new opportunities arose for women. All of the armed services were forced to consciously address the subject of women because their personnel numbers were significantly decreasing. At the same time, more women were entering the military, and typically, they were better educated than their male peers, a factor which posed a threat to the job security of some men. These changes generated a restructuring of military personnel. This new personnel configuration forced the military services to
address several germane issues: (1) How would women be effectively utilized? (2) How would women be treated professionally and socially as peers, juniors, leaders and seniors? (3) How would the services change their previous perceptions and utilization policies regarding this valuable new resource?

The basic patriarchal nature of the military services allowed decision makers to slowly precipitate changes that embraced women. To many leaders and members of these organizations, the idea of women as sailors, soldiers, marines or commanding officers was incongruent with their perception of the composition of the military. It is this conceptualized incongruency that has provided scholarly substance to the research of this subject matter. Often with preconceived ideas, notions and hopes, military leaders sought the help of researchers to find answers to their prevailing "women problem."

More recent incidents and changes in the Navy, such as "Tailhook" and other sexual harassment cases, as well as more women assuming non-traditional positions, have prompted the interest of scholars to study the effective military utilization of women. It appeared that gender issues have been the prime variable that galvanized researchers into action. This gender issue phenomenon seemed to occur even when Africana women have conveyed over a period of time that they have other concerns. Research suggested that the Navy has yet to demonstrate that it truly understands that women are not monolithic, and that all women in the Navy do not have the same experiences nor do they experience the Navy in the same manner. The Navy has failed to recognize Africana women's involvement in the organization. This discovery gave impetus to this research project.
Africana females have historically viewed the military as a respectable avenue for achieving professional success as well as making significant economic, social, political and patriotic contributions to the development and growth of the United States. Close scrutiny of American history revealed that from the beginning of America's participation in warfare, Africana females have actively participated in military activities. They assumed a variety of roles and executed numerous duties that directly and positively impacted America's military success. These females are some of the nation's unsung heroines.

During the pre-colonial period, Africana females assumed responsibility for managing the plantation houses while the slaveholders actually fought. In the Revolutionary War, Africana females not only acted as spies they also disguised themselves as men and actually engaged in combat against the British. During the War of 1812, the Civil War, and the Spanish American War the individual activities of Africana females replicated those of the past. The quality of these women's involvement clearly identified them as major participants and contributors to America's military history. The first major American conflict in which Africana females were represented as a collective entity was World War I. During this crisis, the commanding officers of the National Association of Colored Graduate Nurses urged Africana nurses to join the


2 Ibid.
American Red Cross. The Red Cross refused to accept any Africana nurses until two
months before the war ended in November 1918.

World War II was the first time Africana females served in significant numbers in
the United States military. This opportunity occurred after the signing of Public Law 554,

on May 4, 1942 by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The law created the Women
Auxiliary Army Corps (WAAC). On July 20, 1942, legislation created the Navy's
Women's Reserves known as WAVES -- Women Accepted for Voluntary Emergency
Service.3 During World War II more than 400,000 American females served in the
Armed Services. Of that total 8,400 were naval officers and 73,000 were naval enlisted.
However, only seventy-two of these females were Africana, two officers and seventy
enlisted.4 In 1948, females were granted permanent status in the Regular and Reserves of
the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force.

When the military draft ended in 1973, all services began to seriously focus on
recruiting more females. Service policies changed, requiring females to be treated
equally with males in all matters of dependency entitlement. Entry criteria were
standardized for females and males. For example, the physical entrance standards, such
as height and weight requirements, were lowered to accommodate identified physical
limitations of women. Conversely, the female high mental or academic entrance criteria
were decreased to adjust for the traditionally lower test scores of males. Non-traditional

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3 Carolyn Alison, Women in the Navy: World War II Fact Sheet (Washington: Navy Office of
Information, undated).

4 Kathryn Sheldon, Highlights of Women in the United States Armed Forces (Washington: Women
in Military Service For America Memorial Foundation, Inc., 1988).
job opportunities were opened to females in all services. During the 1970's through the late 1980's, all branches of the military experienced marked growth and change because of the increased presence of women. To further fortify this progressive movement, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) published a navywide official policy in which he declared his highest level of commitment to equal rights and opportunities for females.

Analysis of current navy manpower data indicated that the Navy succeeded in its efforts to significantly increase the numbers and percentages of women. According to Hazard, "from 1988 to 1990 these numbers increased from 57,707, or 9.1 percent to 60,473, or 10.1 percent." Most of the growth of women's opportunities occurred in 1988 when the Navy began permanently assigning women to Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadrons, oiler ships, ammunition ships, and combat store ships. These expanded opportunities increased women officers' billet inventories by 646 billets. By 1990 the number of women officers had grown to 8,004 from 7,379 in 1987. At the end of the Fiscal Year 1990, senior women officers end strength had significantly increased. As Hazard notes, "women officers had been selected for the grade of commander in eighteen of the twenty-two officer communities open to women and there were one hundred

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6 Ibid.

7 Ibid., 1-1.

8 Ibid., 1-6.
twenty-four captains in seven different career communities." Women officers promotion selection rates became generally comparable to those of their male counterparts.

It has been assumed that the aforementioned progress impacted all naval female officers equally. This current and prevailing assumption suggested that generally addressing female officers professional issues and concerns would in fact embrace "all groups" of female officers. According to Daniels, however, "the military experience differs for Black and white women for a number of reasons." She added "not only do Black women have to contend with a society that view her [sic] as being inferior because of her [sic] gender, but also with a society that refuses to recognize her [sic] as a human being because of her [sic] race." Daniels further argued that "the military, a socially and politically masculine organization, has confronted the Black woman with both racism and sexism -- the sum of which is greater than its parts."

Only within the past few years have specific questions been raised about the professional welfare of Africana Female Naval Officers. In the past, information gathered by the Navy regarding Africana Male Officers and European American Female Officers was summarily applied to Africana Female Officers. Daniels stated that "the military has been guilty of gender uniformity for years."

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9 Ibid., 1-59.


11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid., 7.
as well as dated ones, distinguish race as an ardent factor in the lives of men but have yet to see it as a factor in the diverse lives of women. Further review of the Navy's published studies revealed that most still categorize men as either Black, Hispanic, Asian, and others. Women are categorized as women. As noted by Daniels, "whether this is the intent or not, all women are perceived as being white, and all blacks are perceived as being men."\textsuperscript{14}

For the purposes of this study, the following are specific reference groups: Africana Female Officers, Africana Male Officers, and European American Female Officers. These groups share a common time frame and similar circumstances which propelled their entrance into the U. S. Navy as commissioned officers. A review of the professional histories of these three groups indicated that European American Female and Africana Male Naval Officers professional attainments have significantly exceeded those of Africana Female Naval Officers. To date, few factors explain this phenomenon.

\textbf{Purposes}

The pivotal motivation for this study was predicated on the discovery that there is presently no available compiled historical documentation of Africana women's contributions to the US Navy. Prior research supported that recorded historical contributions existed for Africana women in other branches of the armed services. This study captured the invisibility of Africana women in one of America's premier work places. Further, this study surfaced and highlighted the extreme degree of marginalization and oppression experienced, and being experienced, by Africana women

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
in one of this nation's alleged paragons of equal opportunity. The military, inclusive of all branches has been lauded as the ultimate milieu wherein diversity is not only appreciated but more importantly is accepted unconditionally and contributes significantly to the achievement of the organization's mission. The prevailing propaganda embraced by the existing hierarchy implies that with hard work, dedication and perseverance anyone can succeed in the Navy by one's own merit without any limitations or barriers. It was suspected that this organizational articulation did not accurately describe the current nor the half century of actual experiences of Africana Female Officers.

Specifically, the purposes of this study were to (1) produce a descriptive history documenting and describing the professional experiences, contributions and accomplishments of Africana Female Officers from 1944 to 1996; (2) determine the degree of disparity in professional attainments that historically existed and currently exists between Africana Female Officers and those of Africana Male and European American Female Officers; (3) identify the major factors that constitute the glass ceiling and glass wall phenomena experienced by Africana female naval officers, and (4) determine how the glass ceiling and glass wall phenomena have affected Africana Female Officers' perceptions of themselves as an aggregate group and the perceptions of the Navy.

**Focus of the Study**

The historical and contemporary professional attainments of Africana Female commissioned Officers in the United States Navy were the focus of this study. The target
population was active duty, retired and prior active duty Africana female officers in the ranks of Ensign (0-1), Lieutenant Junior Grade (0-2), Lieutenant (0-3), Lieutenant Commander (0-4), Commander (0-5), Captain (0-6), and Admiral (0-7 thru 0-10). The comparison groups were Africana Male and European American Female Officers in the same rank and duty status. These two populations were selected as comparison groups because their accession into the Navy as commissioned officers occurred during the same time frame and as a result of similar executive acts or political decisions. In addition to sharing commissioning circumstances, the comparison groups too have experienced various systemic obstacles that have affected their levels of professional attainments.

Research Questions

The research questions that guided the study were (1) what systemic obstacles have historically affected the professional attainments of Africana Female Officers? and (2) how have Africana Female Officers contended with the systemic obstacles?

Methodology

For the purpose of this research both quantitative and qualitative approaches were employed. The major focus of this research was historical in nature, thus, the quantitative method of historical analysis was primarily used. This method provided a conventional research approach that incorporated the re-analysis of previously collected descriptive and statistical data. Analysis of readily available data enabled the researcher to immediately detect past events that contributed to the current research problem. It also revealed new information that could potentially identify future trends or events if current situations remained static. The causal-comparative quantitative method was used. As noted by
Mugendo and Mugendo, this approach allowed for the exploration of the relationships between variables.\textsuperscript{15} This approach afforded the researcher the opportunity to determine whether race, gender, color, social class, and race plus gender were the interlocking forces of oppression that have historically affected Africana female naval officers level of professional attainment. Further, it afforded the option to conduct inter-group comparisons between the target group and the two comparison groups. One qualitative method, in-depth oral interviews, was employed. It was used to obtain and gain insight into the attitudes, beliefs, motives and behaviors of members of the target population regarding the Navy and their professional attainments. To gather this information the respondents were asked to answer thirty open ended questions. They were not coached on the contents of the questions. The selected sample participants were interviewed, either in person or by telephone. Prior to conducting the oral interviews it was necessary to determine the appropriate size of the interviewee sample population and identify potential sources for locating members of the target population. Because of the mixed composition of the desired target population, active duty, prior active duty and retired Africana Female Officers, it was determined that the most effective sampling selection method was the snowball sampling process.

Procedurally, snowball sampling was conducted in several stages. The first stage commenced with a few identified subjects who met established criteria and were subsequently interviewed.\textsuperscript{16} These individuals identified others who were then


interviewed. This interviewee-informant process continued until the desired number of subjects had been obtained. All participants were volunteers.

The researcher found data that verified that at the end of the third quarter 1996, there were 719 Africana female naval officers on active duty. However, this figure excluded the retired and prior active duty officers population figures. The snowball sampling process helped to include those two populations. The number twenty was determined to be a realistic goal. The selected officers' ranks ranged from Ensign through Captain. Those selected included representation from line and staff corps designators.

Limitations and Obstacles

The following issues were foreseen as potential problems: (1) Inadequate available data; (2) limited accessibility to data held by the Navy; (3) geographical isolation of the researcher; (4) sensitivity of research topic in the eyes of the target population caused hesitation to participate because of fear of reprisal from the Navy; (5) the sensitivity of research topic also limited Navy support for the research, thus restricted access to existing data; (6) the researcher's objectivity could be questioned because the researcher was a member of the target population. Early historical data was requested and sought from numerous sources to no avail. Data covering a period of twenty-three years -- 1973 to 1996 -- were available.

Expected Results

Primarily, this researcher expected to find that the presence and maintenance of highly dominant systemic obstacles have historically negatively impacted the professional progress of Africana Female Naval Officers. Signs of this lack of progress were
documented in data which revealed overall chronically low aggregate levels of professional attainment. These obstacles converged and formed an oppression that is based on race, gender, class and color. This historical and contemporary oppression created and maintained the glass ceilings and glass walls and were the major factors that have affected Africana female naval officers professional attainments. Further, this researcher expected to find that these systemic obstacles rest fundamentally on the columns of racism and sexism. However, combined they provide an infrastructure for maintaining controlling images. Controlling images were, and continue to be, covert ingredients in the glass ceiling and glass wall phenomena. This researcher anticipated the validation of the perception that the phrase "women officers" in the Navy had and continues to evoke the imagery of European American females, and the phrase "minority officers" evokes imagery of Africana males.

This researcher expected to find that the magnitude of the internalized oppression experienced by Africana Female Officers was so severe that it created and became an occupational hazard, producing the self-fulfilling prophecy effect. This researcher expected to make a secondary level of findings which will be explored in future research. These findings were related to the internalization of race, gender, class, and color oppression experienced by Africana female officers.

**Definition of Terms**

The following terms will be used in the study:

1. **Africana**: Persons of African descent; specifically, for this study, African-Americans from Africa, North America, South America, and the Caribbean islands.
2. **Billet**: A position or job assignment in the Navy.

3. **Black feminism**: A philosophy and concept which advocates an active commitment to eradicate the multiple and simultaneous oppressions that confront Africana women.

4. **Chain of Command**: The hierarchic succession of officers to command.

5. **Command**: Navy organization under the control of a designated officer.
   
   Commands are tasked with the responsibility of achieving designated missions for the Navy.

6. **Commanding Officer**: Designated officer who has been granted ultimate authority and control over a specific Navy organization. The most senior officer in the command. To assume this position, the designated officer has met certain established professional criteria and has been approved by the Chief of Navy Personnel.

7. **Commissioned Officer**: An officer who the Congress has individually granted certain powers or the authority to execute various tasks and duties. The range of duties and authority conferred on an officer is commensurate with the officer's commissioned rank.

8. **Controlling Images**: Historical or contemporary stereotypes that have been ascribed to Africana women.

9. **Degree of disparity**: Amount of difference or a measurable gap.

10. **Designator**: The term used to identify an officer's primary job specialty or occupational field.
11. **Empowerment**: Involves rejecting the dimensions of knowledge, whether personal, cultural, or institutional, that perpetuate objectification, dehumanization, and internalized oppression.\(^{17}\)

12. **End Strength**: Actual number of individuals on active duty at the end of the fiscal year; a raw body count.

13. **European American**: A person of European ancestry born or naturalized in the United States.

14. **Feminism**: The philosophies and actions which seek to end sexist oppression. This struggle specifically addresses the goal of eradicating the ideology of male domination that permeates western culture on various levels.

15. **Fiscal Year**: The expenditure year in which the navy uses the financial resources of its Congressional approved budget. It commences 1 October annually and ends 30 September of the following year.

16. **Fitness Report**: Principal standardized evaluation document used in the career management of officers. This evaluation is maintained in the records of each officer at the Naval Military Personnel Command and is the primary tool used for comparing officers and arriving at career decisions with respect to relative merit for promotion, assignment, retention, selection for command, term of service, professional development training, and other career actions as required.

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\(^{17}\) Patricia Collins, 230.
17. **Gender**: The cultural definition of behavior that is appropriate to the sexes in a given society at a given time. It is a set of cultural roles. Gender is utilized as a military concept primarily. As deemed necessary the social/cultural definition is used. The Navy used the terms female and male, instead of women and men when referring to personnel and their gender.

18. **Glass Ceiling**: Artificial barriers, based on attitudinal or organizational bias, that prevent qualified individuals from advancing within their organization and achieving their potential.

19. **Glass Wall**: Artificial barriers that deprive an individual from gaining essential billet related lateral experience for vertical advancement.

20. **Internalized Oppression**: Inwardly directed negative feelings. To feel responsible for and powerless to change instances of mental, physical, sexist, spiritual or professional abuse. The victims suffer in silence and accept their assigned position in life without visible question, without organized protest or without collective anger or rage.

21. **Junior Officers**: Naval officers who hold the commissioned rank of Ensign (0-1), Lieutenant-Junior Grade (0-2), Lieutenant (0-3), and Lieutenant Commander (0-4).

22. **Major**: Primary: A fundamental basic part of an organized whole.

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19 Hooks, 1.
23. **Marginalized**: To be a part of the organization but operating outside its main body. Allowed to enter the organization but not fully embraced or recognized by the power brokers.

24. **Naval Social class**: A category of individuals who are similar in income level, educational attainment however the difference occurs in the value assigned to various groups of officers, and their occupational prestige rank.

25. **Navy**: Military organization that consists of the ships, crews, and related personnel and equipment maintained by a country for the purpose of war.

26. **Oppression**: Subjugation that results from the sum total of public or personal discriminating practices because of one's race, gender, or class. The result of this power based practice impedes the individual's or group's personal or professional growth, and limits their access to basic human rights, privileges, and opportunities.

27. **Paternalism**: Describes the relationship of a dominate group - European Americans - to a subordinate group - minorities. The dominate group operates from a vantage point of superiority mitigated by mutual obligations and reciprocal rights. The dominated minorities exchange submission for protection, and unpaid labor for maintenance.²⁰

28. **Patriarchy**: A system of social structures, relations and practices in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women. In America this practice describes the institutionalized system of European American male

²⁰ Lerner, 239.
domination. This domination permeates all institutions, social structures, and practices. It is projected as the only legitimate source for grounding licit rules and decisions rendered in this society.

29. **Perception**: The set of cognitive processes by which an individual becomes aware of and interprets information about the environment, i.e., workplace setting and/or culture.

30. **Professional attainment**: Degree of professional success achieved. It can be measured by aggregate totals, rank distribution, highest rank historically attained, promotion frequency, number of career fields entered, career field concentration/distribution, availability of navy sponsored training, post graduate educational opportunities, and executive level leadership and management positions held.

31. **Prospective Staff Corps Officers**: Commissioned officers undergoing specific professional training. Upon successful completion of the training they are assigned to a pre-selected staff corps.

32. **Racism and Sexism**: "In this study racism and sexism are defined as basic cultural ideologies that state people of European ancestry, and males, are inherently superior to minorities and females, solely on the basis of race, gender and that people of European ancestry have the power over social
institutions to develop, evolve, disseminate, impose and enforce the myths and stereotypes that are the basic foundation of racism and sexism.²¹

33. **Relieve**: Navy term defining the procedure of terminating or assuming one's duties for a given billet.

34. **Restricted line officers**: Commissioned officers who are specialists and are restricted to performing duties only in their areas of expertise. These communities include aviation maintenance, cryptology, engineering duty officer, oceanography, intelligence, public affairs and fleet support.

35. **Senior Officers**: Naval officers who hold the commissioned rank of Commander (0-5), Captain (0-6), and Admiral (0-7 to 0-10).

36. **Staff Corps Officers**: Naval officers who are professionally trained in a specific professional career specialty and assigned to either the Medical, Dental, Medical Service, Nurse, Chaplain, Supply, Judge Advocate General, or Civil Engineer Corps.

37. **Stereotypes**: Generalized assumptions, opinions, beliefs and perceptions applied to an individual or specific group for the purpose of gaining and maintaining various types of dominance over the target individual or groups.

38. **Systemic Obstacles**: Institutionalized social bias practiced by institutional leaders' (overtly or covertly) that impede the level of professional attainment of various demographic groups. These institutionalized biases are based on

²¹ Schuyler Webb, "Role Conflicts and Coping of African American Female Navy Officers" (Ph.D. diss., United States International University, 1994), 22.
the leaders perceptions and attitudes of such variables as race, gender, or race and gender.

39. **Unrestricted line Officers**: Naval officers who have general training and are not restricted to the performance of duties in one field. The unrestricted officers include naval aviator, naval flight officer, nuclear reaction engineer, nuclear reactor instructor, special operations officer, special warfare officer, submarine warfare officer, and surface warfare officer. They are eligible to assume command of ships afloat or ashore stations.
CHAPTER 2

CONTEXT OF THE PROBLEM

The Context

After World War I, the United States maintained a foreign policy position that reflected the ideas of a neutral isolationist. However, the political activities occurring in the international arena during the late 1930's and early 1940's posed a direct challenge to this policy. World War II initially began as a European War. Even so, the sympathy of the American public was always with the Allied causes. Americans contended that a Nazi victory posed a grave threat to the United States. As Germany became more victorious, the American position of maintaining a neutral and isolationist position significantly changed. During the early part of 1940, President Franklin Roosevelt and Congress began preparing for a possible United States entry into the war. An indication of this preparation was reflected in passage of the first peacetime draft law in U.S. history. This law provided for the registration of 17 million men.

On August 14, 1941 President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill of England held a conference off the coast of Newfoundland. The stated purpose of this conference was to develop plans for a new world. The core of this new world plan advocated the desire to end "tyranny and territorial aggrandizement, the disarmament of aggressions and solicitation of the fullest cooperation of all nations for the social and economic welfare of
all."¹ The end product of this meeting became known as the Atlantic Charter. Fundamentally, this charter was designed to preempt a possible new Hitler peace offensive as well as act as a statement of postwar aims. Eventually the USSR and fourteen other anti-Axis countries endorsed the Atlantic Charter.

As Europe became embroiled in World War II, Japan began to expand into the Southeast Asian colonies of the European powers. The United States retaliated by imposing economic sanctions against Japan. In response Japan planned and executed a focused attack on the American Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and other Pacific and Asian targets.

The United States changed its posture as a neutral isolation on December 7, 1941, after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. On December 8, 1941, the United States declared war against Japan and on December 11 Germany and Italy declared war against the United States. The European war merged with the Pacific war creating a memorable and major global conflict. America's hasty involvement in this international crisis posed a domestic question that demanded an immediate answer. The military leaders and the Congress had to determine the racial configuration of all military personnel and how the selected configuration could be effectively replenished.

According to Nalty, after World War I "white America tended to display indifference tinged with suspicion toward Black citizens, an attitude reflected by the

When the United States became involved in World War II, its domestic social climate had been firmly shaped by the racial attitude of white America.

Racism created a very high and visible degree of tension and instability within the United States. As it became more apparent that America would become involved in the European war, President Roosevelt appealed to the American public for support for the Nation's involvement. This solicitation also served as a way of preparing America for what was yet to come. In the attempt to justify America's involvement, Roosevelt warned Americans of the danger they faced and shared with the rest of the world. Roosevelt alleged that this danger was the product of strife and warfare stirred up by aggressor nations.3

African Americans heard this warning, too. Charles Houston, a World War I veteran and special counsel in 1941 for the NAACP, responded to the President by conveying several messages regarding Black America's position on the war. Houston stated that "if war should come, the 'loyalty and support' of blacks who made up perhaps 10 percent of the populace, would be 'indispensable to the United States.'"4 Houston further warned the President and the nation that "the Negro population...will not again silently endure the insults and discrimination imposed on its soldiers and sailors in the course of the last war."5 Nalty argues that Houston was publicly making the point to all

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3 Ibid., 134.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.

22
America that the "Nations's involvement in the forthcoming war would require a truly
central effort and the United States could not rally the black populace while practicing
racial discrimination."6

In December 1941, the armed services of America remained undauntedly
entrenched in an environment of racism and segregation despite the efforts made by the
Roosevelt administration. As the war began, African Americans quickly volunteered to
defend the nation's position abroad. African American service members and the African
American community clearly conveyed that they were aware of the racial discrimination
all African Americans experienced at home. The magnitude of this negative reality
provided the insight that helped African Americans to realize that shedding their blood
for America would not necessarily guarantee them equal civil or political rights, nor
would it elicit the gratitude of White America. Regardless of this realization, the national
crisis served as a unifying catalyst for Black Americans who made a united commitment
to fight. However, this populace openly conveyed that it saw a domestic war as well as
an overseas war. To dramatize their position and desire, Nalty stated that African
American service personnel "borrowing British Prime Minister Winston Churchill's 'V for
victory symbol', publicly called for a 'double V' campaign aimed at defeating America's
foreign enemies while at the same time overcoming racism in the United States."7 Nalty
further indicated that African Americans felt that "instead of assuming good will on the
part of white authority, they sought to trade military service for measurable progress

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6 Ibid.

7 Ibid., 141.
toward full citizenship, at times accepting promises, reasonably confident the pledge would be honored, but continuing to press for civil rights, economic opportunity and a useful role within the military."

The Navy and the Army entered World War II as racially segregated services, however they enforced this practice in two different fashions. The Army maintained a designated number of all Black units commanded by white officers. These units were structured in a manner that was largely self-contained and capable of being housed and employed in a way that curtailed contact with white soldiers. On the other hand, the Navy enforced a strict practice of occupational segregation. Africana sailors served with white sailors on large warships, but with very rare exceptions all Africana sailors either prepared and served food or waited on the ships' officers. Their occupational specialties were either cooks or stewards. Because of their jobs, Africana sailors were easily segregated, eating and sleeping together separate from the remainder of the crew.

In 1940 Frank Knox became Secretary of the Navy and immediately sought to justify the Navy's practice of segregation. It was his perception that Africana people could make their greatest contributions to national defense by enlisting in the Army's Black regiments. He stated that "to thrust Blacks into the overwhelmingly white Navy, except as cooks and food servers, would prove cruel rather than kind." He also indicated "that members of the racial minority would find themselves in a competitive

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8 Ibid.
9 Ibid, 185.
situation where they were certain to fail."\textsuperscript{10}

As forewarned by Charles Houston, the African American community continued to apply pressure on the White House to change Navy policy regarding its utilization of African Americans. The increased intensity prompted the Secretary of the Navy to appoint a committee to review the existing policies. After a period of consideration, the Navy and Marine Corps committee members recommended that no change be made to the personnel utilization policy. Addison Walker, the special assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy strongly disagreed. As a compromise, Walker posed a plan that would assign African Americans to a selected group of patrol craft, tenders or similar vessels under the guidance of white instructors. It was his contention that such an option would provide African Americans with all the skills necessary to operate segregated craft. Walker thought that implementing a plan of this nature would be a way of easing racial tension that could be a serious impediment to a smoothly operating Navy. The plan was rejected by the majority of the committee because it was perceived that there was not a real need to upset the status quo.\textsuperscript{11}

Despite this action, President Roosevelt continued to apply pressure to the Navy. In June 1942 the Navy finally decided to begin accepting African Americans for general service in the reserve components of the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard. The general service was loosely defined as the services comprising the occupational specialists of gunners, electricians, radiomen, machinists, or any occupation that sailed a

\textsuperscript{10}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{11}Ibid., 186.
ship or enabled it to fight. The impact of assignment to the reserves indicated that the individuals would serve for the duration of the war, rather than for a fixed period of enlistment. At the end of the war African Americans would be discharged to the inactive reserves unlike white personnel who were allowed to remain on active duty for a regular enlistment period and have the option to re-enlist for further duty and retirement.

The new plan of the Navy was not readily accepted by the African American community. In fact, very few Americans responded. Some members of the navy officer community interpreted this lack of response in part to "Negroes relative unfamiliarity with the sea or large inland water and the subsequent fear of water." Conversely, Nalty postulated that the reason was more complex and perhaps "included poor physical condition and educational attainment by African Americans compared to white volunteers, and possibly a preference for the Army because of a lurking suspicion that the Black sailor, whatever his nominal specialty, would end up waiting on tables."12 According to Nalty, "Whatever the causes, by February 1943 African Americans comprised only 2 percent of the Navy."14 By this time the Navy had acknowledged that it had a serious personnel shortage. To rectify this problem, in 1942 the Navy had begun to enlist and commission European American women. Women were allowed to come in the Navy solely because the Navy desperately needed the men at sea. It viewed replacing men ashore with women as the quickest solution. Even more reluctantly, the Navy had

12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., 189.
14 Ibid.
conceded to public pressure and announced they would consider commissioning some Africana male officers. The issue of commissioning and enlisting Africana women was still under review. According to Cheney, "for many Americans the idea of a woman replacing a man was hard enough to swallow. Having a Black woman replace a white man was beyond imagining."  

The Navy's selection criteria and procedures used for identifying the first groups of officers varied significantly. The first European American Female Officers were chosen from a pool of women who were cited as some of the nation's most accomplished professionals. Some of these women were self-identified candidates who were interviewed and selected by Navy officers. In other instances, identified colleges and university officials provided the Navy with names of potential candidates. These individuals were invited for local interviews and subsequent selections were made. All of the first 151 European American females selected for commissioning, except for one, had college degrees. This one individual had prior service experience gained during World War I as a Yeoman (Female).

According to Stillwell, "despite repeated requests for information dealing specifically with the selection and training of the first Black officers, no document has emerged from official sources such as the National Archives, Bureau of Navy Personnel and Naval History Center." He further indicated that the officers did not know how they


were chosen, "their best guess was that they had distinguished themselves by their performance and attitude while serving as enlisted men." Others have suggested that these officers were selected because they conveyed willingness to accept discipline and obey orders. Additionally, the preponderance of them were athletes, thus it was assumed that the Navy must have believed that there was a correlation between athletic achievement and leadership ability. The educational attainment of these officers ranged from no college, some college, bachelor's degrees and some postgraduate degrees.

A July 28, 1944 memorandum from James V. Forrestal, the Secretary of the Navy to the President of the United States, proposed that the following procedure be used to select Africana Female Officers. As stated in the memorandum:

"If and when Negro women are admitted to the Women's Reserve, it is proposed to adopt the following procedure. Nomination of Negro women officers will be requested from a selected list of Negro and white men and women. To start the program not more than ten women will be appointed as officer candidates and will be sent for training to the Naval Reserve Midshipmen School (WR) at Northampton. They will assist us in the subsequent planning and supervision of the program for Negro women, which will be administered as an integral part of the Women's Reserves."

Maisels and Gormley state that "since 1973, when the male draft ended and the all volunteer force began, the percentage of women among U. S. military personnel has increased dramatically, from 1.6 percent in 1973, to 8.5 percent in 1980, to 10.8 percent

17 Ibid., xxii.
18 James Forrestal. Secretary of the Navy World War II Correspondence Files (Washington: United States National Archives, 1944).
in 1989."19 They further disclosed that currently, over 229,000 women serve on active
duty in the military services of the Department of Defense (DoD): the Army, Navy,
Marine Corps, and Air Force. About 15 percent of these women are officers; this is about
the same percentage as military men overall. Although officers account for a larger
population of total personnel in some services more than others, only in the Marine Corps
are the women noticeably less likely than the men to be officers -- 7 percent vs. 10
percent.20

These researchers additionally revealed that a substantial proportion of all military
women are minority women, in fact, minorities account for considerably larger
percentages of military women than of military men -- 38 percent vs. 28 percent.21 The
representation of other minorities is very slightly higher among men than women.22

Their data further stated that about 38 percent of all active duty military women
are minority women: 30 percent are Black, 4 percent are of "Spanish" origin, and 4
percent are of "other" minority origin.23 This data indicated that minority women account
for 19 percent, and Black women alone for 14 percent of all female officers. There are
significant variations by service with respect to representation of both minorities and
women. For example: minority women account for one-fourth, and Black women for

19 Amanda Maisels and Patricia Gormley, Women in the Military and Where They Stand.
(Washington, D.C., Women's Research and Education Institute, 1994), 1.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., 2.

22 Ibid., 10.

23 Ibid.
nearly one-fifth of all female Army officers. However, in the Navy and Marine Corps, only one in eight female officers is a "minority woman." Women are better represented among Air Force officers of every minority group than is the case in the other DOD services; women constitute 27 percent of Black Air Force officers, 15 percent of those of Spanish origin, and 19 percent of "other" minority officers.24

Naval Personnel and Patterns

Selected historical data relevant to the research problem and the research populations have been quantified and placed in the appropriate Tables and Chart so that tangible levels of disparity among the identified groups many be ascertained.

To assist the researcher with developing an objective and historical picture of the professional development for the identified research project's populations, demographic rank, and demographic designator data on the professional development of the research identified population covering the period from 1942 to 1972 were requested from the Secretary of the Navy, however this information was never provided. The researcher was able to obtain independently, data covering the period from 1973 to the third quarter 1996. This data included end strength numbers for the demographic groups for the aforementioned periods. This graphic representation illustrated the degree of disparity that existed between the three research populations under study, thus, demonstrating the context of the problem.

Table No. 1 displays the U. S. Navy Officer Rank Structure. The source of the data was the official Chief of Naval Personnel's various personnel data reports. The data

24 Ibid., 11.
is presented in chronological order beginning with the earliest available data for the identified populations and categories, and ending with the most current data. For each reporting period, the first Table in the set of two, displays the demographic rank data (see Table 2). The second Table displays the demographic designator data (see Table 3).
Table 1. U. S. Navy Officer Rank Structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pay Grade</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Insignia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>Ensign</td>
<td>ENS</td>
<td>Gold bar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-2</td>
<td>Lieutenant Junior Grade</td>
<td>LTJG</td>
<td>Silver bar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-3</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>LT</td>
<td>Two Silver bars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>Lieutenant Commander</td>
<td>LCDR</td>
<td>Gold oakleaf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-5</td>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>Silver oakleaf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-6</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>CAPT</td>
<td>Silver eagle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-7</td>
<td>Rear Admiral (Lower)</td>
<td>RADM (L)</td>
<td>One silver star</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-8</td>
<td>Rear Admiral (Upper)</td>
<td>RADM (U)</td>
<td>Two silver stars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-9</td>
<td>Vice Admiral</td>
<td>VADM</td>
<td>Three silver stars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-10</td>
<td>Admiral</td>
<td>ADM</td>
<td>Four silver stars</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Rank is listed from most junior officer ENS (0-1) to most senior officer ADM (0-10)
Table 2. - Historical Demographic Rank Distribution (1973)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>AFO</th>
<th>AMO</th>
<th>EAFO</th>
<th>GTO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VADM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM (U)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM (L)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPT</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCDR</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTJG</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENS</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td>76</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LEGEND**

AFO = Africana Female Officers
AMO = Africana Male Officers
EAFO = European American Female Officers
GTO = Grand Totals of all Officers (AFO + AMO + EAFO)

Source: BUPER NMIS - REPORT 5310-0371-0QN21 12/31/73-01/17/74
Table 3. - Historical Demographic Designator Distribution (1973)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designator Group</th>
<th>OFFICER CATEGORY</th>
<th>AFO</th>
<th>AMO</th>
<th>EAFO</th>
<th>GTO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110X</td>
<td>General Unrestricted</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111X/116X</td>
<td>Surface Warfare Officer/or in training</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112X/117X</td>
<td>Submarine Warfare Officer/or in training</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113X/118X</td>
<td>Special Warfare Officer/or in training</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114X/119X</td>
<td>Special Operations Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12XX</td>
<td>Material Professional Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130X</td>
<td>Non flying pilot or Naval Flight Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131X/139X</td>
<td>Active flying pilot/or in training</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>95.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132X/137X</td>
<td>Active flying Naval Flight Officer/or in training</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14XX</td>
<td>Engineering Duty Officer - Ship Engineering spec.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15XX</td>
<td>Aerospace Engineering Duty Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17XX</td>
<td>Engineering-Ordinance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18XX</td>
<td>Special Duty Officer (Geophysics)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19XX</td>
<td>Prospective Staff Corps</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210X</td>
<td>Medical Corps Officer (Doctors) *</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>79.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220X</td>
<td>Dental Corps Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230X</td>
<td>Medical Service Corps Officer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250X</td>
<td>Judge Advocate General's Corps Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>290X</td>
<td>Nurse Corps Officer</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>310X</td>
<td>Supply Corps Officer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>72.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>410X</td>
<td>Chaplain Corps Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>510X</td>
<td>Civil Engineer Corps Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>90.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>76</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BUPER NMIS - REPORT 5310-0371-O1N21 12/31/74-01/01/74

* The 76 AMO's represented in this designator were a summation of designators 210X because the Navy did not separate these demographically.
The remaining Tables 4 through 21 display the same type data for the periods covered by the research project (1973-1996).

The demographic rank data displays end strength numbers for each research population group for ranks Ensign through Admiral. The demographic designator data also displays end strength numbers for each research population group. Support designators are occupational specialties that are charged with the primary function of providing direct service and support to shore and at sea personnel, as well as shore based and sea based activities. These designators include all of the staff corps, ie. dental, medical, Nurse, Chaplain, etc. The remaining designators are primarily warfare designators. These occupational specialties fundamentally plan and execute the Navy's wartime missions at sea and on shore. In each of the historical demographic designator tables, the percentage for each group is indicated.

Limited Duty Officers are commissioned officers who are commissioned solely to perform assigned duty in their skilled technical fields of expertise. These officers all have prior enlisted experience. Limited Duty Officers and Warrant Officers numbers were not included in this study.

The focus of this study was commissioned officers who are not restricted to skilled technical fields of expertise. The designators addressed in this study were those of commissioned officers who are either Unrestricted line, Restricted line or Staff Corps. To become naval officers these groups of officers must meet primarily the same basic selection criteria for commissioning.
The total number of officers in the demographic rank breakout totals differ from the totals in the designator breakout totals because the rank totals included numbers for Limited Duty officers and Warrant officers. These two groups of officers, Limited Duty officers and Warrant officers were not addressed in this research project. However, their groups numbers could not be extracted from the demographic rank numbers so that they would be consistent with the demographic designator numbers.

From 1973 to 1996 the Navy experienced a rapid growth of personnel in all the groups under investigation. This growth reflected the Navy's conscious effort to make Africana officers, and European American Female Officers a more visible segment of the total Navy population. In part this move was influenced by the rise of feminism in the United States and the institution of an all volunteer force. All of these factors contributed to the doubling of European American Female Officers, the four fold rise in Africana Male Officers, and the ten fold increase in Africana Female Officers. A Reduction In Force (RIF) following the end of the Vietnam War, markedly diminished the Navy's officer's end strength. After 20 years of relative stabilization in overall military personnel strength, another RIF began in 1993 following the termination of the "Cold War" and the Persian Gulf War. This reduction decreased the number of European American Female Officers, but also slowed the rate of growth of Africana officers as well.

In spite of having the highest rate of rise in the study populations, Africana Female Officers remained the smallest of the research groups in 1996 (7.7 percent) after having been a minute part of the study group in 1973 (1.9 percent). On the other hand,
Africana Male Officers increased from 15 percent of the group in 1973 to 23 percent in 1996. The rate of rise for both Africana Male Officers and Africana Female Officers began to level off in the year ending 1993, corresponding with the current RIF.

In 1973 (See Table 2) European American Female Officers singularly outnumbered Africana Male Officers and Africana Female Officers combined. The total number of 3356 European American Female Officers was 4.9 times greater than the total number of 680 Africana officers. The total numbers of European American Female Officers were 44.2 times greater than Africana Female Officers. Although this was the first year the researcher was able to obtain numeric personnel data, the trend of significantly greater numbers of European American Female Officers compared with Africana officers was established and continued throughout the remainder of the research periods. By far, the largest group was, and remained, European American Female Officers.

During 1974-1976 (See Table 4) the number of European American Female Officers (3305) was 3.5 times greater than the total number of Africana officers; the number of Africana Male Officers (798) was 6.4 times greater than Africana Female Officers (124); and the number of European American Female Officers exceeded Africana Female Officers (124) by 26.7. Subsequent years revealed similar data. The 1977-1979 (See Table 6) population saw European American Female Officers (3960) exceeding Africana officers by 2.98, Africana Male Officers (1148) exceeding Africana Female Officers (177) by 6.9, and European American Female Officers exceeding Africana Male Officers by 22.3.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>AFO</th>
<th>AMO</th>
<th>EAFO</th>
<th>GTO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>%</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADM</td>
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<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM (U)</td>
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<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM (L)</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPT</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCDR</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTJG</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENS</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>24.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td>124</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>798</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LEGEND**
- AFO = Africana Female Officers
- AMO = Africana Male Officers
- EAFO = European American Female Officers
- GTO = Grand Totals of all Officers (AFO + AMO + EAFO)

Source: PERS 611C AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1976
### Table 6. - - Historical Demographic Rank Distribution (1977-1979)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>AFO</th>
<th>AMO</th>
<th>EAFO</th>
<th>GTO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VADM</td>
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<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM (U)</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM (L)</td>
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<td>0%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50%</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAPT</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCDR</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTJG</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENS</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTALS 177 3.3% 1148 22% 3960 74.9% 5285 100%

**LEGEND**

- **AFO** = Africana Female Officers
- **AMO** = Africana Male Officers
- **EAFO** = European American Female Officers
- **GTO** = Grand Total of all Officers (AFO + AMO + EAFO)

Source: MAPMIS 5310-0371 AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1979
Corresponding figures for the years 1980-1981 (See Table 8) were European American Female Officers (4798) 2.9 times greater than all Africana officers, Africana Male Officers (1387) 5.4 times greater than Africana Female Officers (255), and European American Female Officers 18.8 times greater than Africana Female Officers. The total number of European American Female Officers (5795) remained 2.9 times that of Africana officers in 1982-1984 (See Table 10), while Africana Male Officers (1600) were 4.2 times Africana Female Officers (384), and European American Female Officers were 15.1 times Africana Female Officers.

The ensuing years were similar in trend with the vast majority of officers being European American Females. In 1985-1987 (See Table 12) European American Female Officers (6311) were 2.7 times the combined number of Africana officers; Africana Male Officers (1851) were 3.8 times greater than Africana Female Officers (485); and European American Female Officers were 13 times greater than Africana Female Officers. The number of European American Female Officers during 1988-1990 (See Table 14)(6834) was 2.5 times the Africana officers. Africana Male Officers (2153) exceeded Africana Female Officers (596) by 3.6, and European American Female Officers exceeded Africana Female Officers by 11.4. European American Female Officers (7004) were 2.4 times the combined strength of Africana officers in 1991-1993; (See Table 16) Africana Male Officers (2245) were 3.3 times Africana Female Officers (681); and European American Female Officers were 10.3 times the number of Africana Female Officers. This occurred during the height of the most recent RIF.
Table 8. - - Historical Demographic Rank Distribution (1980-1981)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>AFO</th>
<th>AMO</th>
<th>EAFO</th>
<th>GTO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VADM</td>
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<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM (U)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM (L)</td>
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<td>0%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPT</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCDR</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTJG</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENS</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>1387</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

LEGEND
AFO = Africana Female Officers
AMO = Africana Male Officers
EAFO = European American Female Officers
GTO = Grand Totals of all Officers (AFO + AMO + EAFO)

Source: MAPMIS 5310-0371 AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1981
Table 10. - - Historical Demographic Rank Distribution (1982-1984)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>AFO</th>
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<th>GTO</th>
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<tr>
<td>VADM</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4.1%</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCDR</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>283</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTJG</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENS</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
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</table>

LEGEND
AFO = Africana Female Officers
AMO = Africana Male Officers
EAFO = European American Female Officers
GTO = Grand Totals of all Officers (AFO + AMO + EAFO)

Source: MAPMIS 5310-0371 AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1984
## Table 12. - - Historical Demographic Rank Distribution (1985-1987)

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>EAFO</th>
<th>GTO</th>
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<tr>
<td>VADM</td>
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<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM (U)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM (L)</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAPT</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>671</td>
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<td>LTJG</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENS</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>1851</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
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</table>

**LEGEND**

- **AFO** = Africana Female Officers
- **AMO** = Africana Male Officers
- **EAFO** = European American Female Officers
- **GTO** = Grand Totals of all Officers (AFO + AMO + EAFO)

Source: MAPMIS 5310-0370 AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1987
Table 14. - - Historical Demographic Rank Distribution (1988-1990)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>RANK</th>
<th>AFO</th>
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<th>EAFO</th>
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<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VADM</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
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<td>0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>RADM (L)</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>31</td>
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<td>3.4%</td>
<td>145</td>
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<td>4.3%</td>
<td>379</td>
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<td>LT</td>
<td>270</td>
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<td>764</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTJG</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENS</td>
<td>111</td>
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<td>29.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>2153</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
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</table>

LEGEND
AFO = Africana Female Officers
AMO = Africana Male Officers
EAFO = European American Female Officers
GTO = Grand Totals of all Officers (AFO + AMO + EAFO)

Source: MAPMIS 5310-0371 AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1990
Table 16. - - Historical Demographic Rank Distribution (1991-1993)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>RANK</th>
<th>AFO</th>
<th>AMO</th>
<th>EAFO</th>
<th>GTO</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM (U)</td>
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<td>0%</td>
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<td>RADM (L)</td>
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<td>60.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPT</td>
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<td>2.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
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<td>19.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCDR</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTJG</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENS</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>681</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.9%</strong></td>
<td><strong>2245</strong></td>
<td><strong>22.6%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LEGEND**

- AFO = Africana Female Officers
- AMO = Africana Male Officers
- EAFO = European American Female Officers
- GTO = Grand Totals of all Officers (AFO + AMO + EAFO)

Source: MAPMIS 5310-0371 AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1993
End strength figures for 1994-1995 (See Table 18) showed European American Female Officers (6499) leading Africana officers by 2.1, Africana Male Officers (2332) 3.3 times more than Africana Female Officers (711), and European American Female Officers 9.1 times that of Africana Female Officers. The final year of this study, 1996, (See Table 20) again had more European American Female Officers (6405) exceeding the number of Africana officers by 2.1 times. Africana Male Officers (2396) were 3.3 times the number of Africana Female Officers (719), and European American Female Officers were 8.9 times the number of Africana Female Officers.

The rank distribution showed no discernable trends through the 23 years. It was obvious that the highest number of personnel were concentrated in the two lower ranks in all study groups in 1973. This was the last year that this phenomenon occurred. Since then, the greatest number of personnel were in ranks other than the lowest two. As in other organizations, the lower ranks (especially Ensign) reflect new accessions to the Navy structure. These officers were the least experienced and normally had the least time in the Navy before promotion to a higher rank. Of the three study groups, European American Female Officers were most likely to have the most new accessions throughout 1973-1996, and to retain personnel in higher ranks.

As the years progressed from 1973, most officers for all three groups tended to be concentrated in the third lowest rank, Lieutenant. The most revealing findings were in the senior ranks of officers (Commander, Captain, and Admiral).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>AFO</th>
<th>AMO</th>
<th>EAFO</th>
<th>GTO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td></td>
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<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VADM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM (U)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM (L)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPT</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCDR</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>910</td>
<td>25.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTJG</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENS</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>32.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>2332</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LEGEND**

AFO = Africana Female Officers
AMO = Africana Male Officers
EAFO = European American Female Officers
GTO = Grand Totals of all Officers (AFO + AMO + EAFO)

Source: MAPMIS 5310-0370 AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1995
### Table 20. — Historical Demographic Rank Distribution (1996)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>AFO #</th>
<th>AFO %</th>
<th>AMO #</th>
<th>AMO %</th>
<th>EAFO #</th>
<th>EAFO %</th>
<th>GTO #</th>
<th>GTO %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VADM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM (U)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM (L)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPT</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>22.1%</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>74.0%</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>77.7%</td>
<td>1117</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCDR</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>1325</td>
<td>72.5%</td>
<td>1827</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>943</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td>2486</td>
<td>66.8%</td>
<td>3719</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTJG</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>33.4%</td>
<td>781</td>
<td>59.3%</td>
<td>1316</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENS</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>32.2%</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>58.6%</td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>719</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.6%</strong></td>
<td><strong>2396</strong></td>
<td><strong>25.2%</strong></td>
<td><strong>6405</strong></td>
<td><strong>67.3%</strong></td>
<td><strong>9520</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LEGEND**
- AFO = Africana Female Officers
- AMO = Africana Male Officers
- EAFO = European Amerian Female Officers
- GTO = Grand Total of all Officers (AFO + AMO + EAFO)

Source: CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL (PERS - 61) DATED 3 SEPTEMBER 1996
Africana Female Officers had no representation in the ranks above Commander until 1977-1979, when two Africana Female Nurse Officers were promoted to Captain, representing 2% of the total number of Captains (102) - the comparable percentages for Africana Male Officers were 25% in the years 1977-1979. Africana Male Officers had 11 Captains in 1973 (22.4%) of the total 49 Captains. In addition, both Africana Male Officers and European American Female Officers each had one Admiral at the top of the rank distribution. During the years 1974-1976 and 1977-1979, Africana Male Officers and European American Female Officers had two Admirals in each of those years. To date, no Africana Female Officer has ever achieved the rank of Admiral in the Navy.

In 1980-1981 the same two Africana Female Captains remained in their positions, but their percentage of total Africana Female Captains was reduced to 1.8% of the 113 Captains. Africana Male Officers increased their Captains by six, to achieve 28% of the total, and European American Female officers gained five Captains. Two Africana Male Admirals and two European Female Admirals completed the upper rank distribution. There was essentially no change in the Admirals from 1982-1984, with both Africana Male Officers and European American Female Officers having two Admirals. However, Africana Female Officers acquired an additional three Captains to bring the total to five, representing 4.1% of this rank. Africana Male Officers lost four Captains (28 total or 23%) and European American Female Officers gained three. In the following reporting period, (1985-1987) Africana Female Officers were stable in number (5), and percentage (4.0%) from the prior report. Africana Male Officers lost an additional four Captains (124 or 19% of the total), but gained three Admirals, making Africana Male Officers the
most populous of the study group Admirals. European American Female Officers gained eight Captains and one Admiral (for a total of 3) in these years.

The years 1988-1990 showed a decrease in Africana Female Captains to three. However, one of the three was the first Africana Female line officer (other than a Nurse) promoted to Captain. These three represented 2.1% of the total 143 Captains. Africana Male Officers gained seven Captains (21%) and European American Female Officers gained thirteen Captains, to bring the European American Female Officers total Captains to 109. Africana Male Officers lost two Admirals (3 total), and European American Female Officers lost one Admiral (2 total), but Africana Male Officers retained the majority (60%) of the five research group Admirals. Rank distribution in 1991-1993 was unchanged from the prior reporting period in percentage distribution. There were 4 Africana Female Captains, 49 Africana Male Captains, and 146 European American Female Captains. Africana Male Officers increased by 18 Captains, and European American Female Officers increased by 37 Captains. The Admiral rank was unchanged.

The reporting years 1994-1995 saw a dramatic rise in Captains for all groups. Africana Female Officers increased by 7, doubling the number to 11, and doubling the percentage to 4.2%; Africana Male Officers increased by 37, to 189 Captains. Both Africana Male Officers and European American Female Officers had four Admirals each, an increase by one for Africana Male Officers, and two for European American Female Officers. The final year of the study (1996) revealed that Africana Female Officers had the same number of Captains (11), but the percentage had decreased to 3.9% of the total, because of the increase in European American Female Captains by 19 (to 208). Africana
Male Officers lost two Captains. Both Africana Male Officers and European American Female Officers had five Admirals at the end of the third quarter 1996.

The most revealing trends from Tables 2 through 21 were found in the Designator Distribution Tables. Of the 22 designators from 1973 through 1993 (23 from 1994-1996), nine are operational designators. These designators are: 111X/116X (Surface Warfare), 112x/117x (Submarine Warfare), 113X/117X (Special Warfare), 114X/119X (Special Operations), 130X (Nonflying Pilot), 131X/139X (Active Flying Pilot), 132X/137X (Active Flying Naval Flight Officer), 14XX (Engineering Duty Officer), and 17XX (Engineering-Ordinance). All others officers do not actively engage in warfare and are in support designators.

In 1973, 100% of Africana Female Officers were in support designators, and were represented in only five of the 22 officer categories. Nurses comprised 58% of the Africana Female Officers, and General Unrestricted Line (GUL) officers were 34% of the total Africana female population. Africana Male Officers were represented in eight of the 22 categories. However, 28% of the Africana Male Officers had operational designators (95% of the total pilots, and 100% of the 38 Ordinance Engineers). The top designators for Africana Male Officers (as noted in Table 3) cannot be determined, because during 1973 Africana Male Officer GUL (a support designator) included Surface Warfare Officers (an operational designator). European American Female Officers occupied twelve of the 22 categories, but had 99% of the officers in support designators (six pilots were European American Female Officers). The most populous European American Female groups were Nurse Corps (67%), GUL (25%), Prospective Staff Corps (6%), and
Medical Service Corps (2%). Even though Africana Male Officers were concentrated in three occupational areas, they were in four designators where there were no Africana Female Officers and European American Female Officers represented: Pilot, Medical Corps, Judge Advocate Corps, Chaplain Corps, and Civil Engineering.

The period 1974-1976 (See Table 5) saw little change for Africana Female Officers, who remained concentrated in support designators (100%). Nurses remained the top designator (56%), GUL the second (33%), and the medical field (doctors and Medical Service Corps) the third (7%). Africana Male Officers now had 68% of the population in operational designators, and occupied twenty of the 22 career fields, (as compared with seven by Africana Female Officers, and fifteen by European American Female Officers). Africana Male Officer's top fields were Surface Warfare (29%), pilots (15%), Supply Corps (11%), and flight officers (8%). European American Female Officers were primarily nurses (60%), GUL (32%), Medical Service Corps (3%), and Medical Corps (1.9%). However, European American Female Officers now had seventeen officers in operational designators, one of which was Surface Warfare, which had been previously closed to women. Like Africana Male Officers, European American Female Officers served in eight designators where there were no Africana Female Officers. The number of European American Female Officers in the Judge Advocate General Corps, the Medical Service Corps, and the Medical Corps exceeded the number of Africana Male Officers in those fields, when they had not previously. This trend continued throughout the remainder of the research years.
Table 5. -- Historical Demographic Designator Distribution (1974-1976)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designator</th>
<th>OFFICER CATEGORY</th>
<th>AFO</th>
<th>AMO</th>
<th>EAFO</th>
<th>GTO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110X</td>
<td>General Unrestricted</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111X/116X</td>
<td>Surface Warfare Officer/or in training</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112X/117X</td>
<td>Submarine Warfare Officer/or in training</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113X/118X</td>
<td>Special Warfare Officer/or in training</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114X/119X</td>
<td>Special Operations Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12XX</td>
<td>Material Professional Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130X</td>
<td>Non flying pilot or Naval Flight Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131X/139X</td>
<td>Active flying pilot/or in training</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>90.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132X/137X</td>
<td>Active flying Naval Flight Officer/or in training</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14XX</td>
<td>Engineering Duty Officer - Ship Engineering spec.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15XX</td>
<td>Aerospace Engineering Duty Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>71.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16XX</td>
<td>Special Duty Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>96.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18XX</td>
<td>Special Duty Officer (Geophysics)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19XX</td>
<td>Prospective Staff Corps</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210X</td>
<td>Medical Corps Officer (Doctors)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>38.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220X</td>
<td>Dental Corps Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>73.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230X</td>
<td>Medical Service Corps Officer</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250X</td>
<td>Judge Advocate General’s Corps Officer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>290X</td>
<td>Nurse Corps Officer</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>310X</td>
<td>Supply Corps Officer</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>60.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>410X</td>
<td>Chaplain Corps Officer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>84.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>510X</td>
<td>Civil Engineer Corps Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td></td>
<td>124</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>745</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PERS 611C AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1976
Africana Female Officers had two operations officers in the years 1977-1979, who accounted for 1% of the total Africana Female Officers. GUL became the most populous designator (44%), followed by nurses (41%), and the medical designators (Medical Corps and Medical Service Corps, with twelve officers and 7% of the total). Africana Female Officers now had representation in eleven career fields (as compared with 17 for European American Female Officers, and 21 for Africana Male Officers). Of the 1036 Africana Male Officers, 676 (65%) were in operational designators. Surface Warfare had 39%, pilots constituted 11%, Supply Corps had 10%, and flight officers had 8% of the total Africana Male Officers. European American Female Officers were in all but two specialties, with 133 (3%) in operational designators. For European American Female Officers, nursing remained the top designator (75%), followed by GUL (38%), Medical Corps (3%), and Medical Service Corps (3%). (See Table 7).

During 1980-1981, Africana Female Officers were represented in twelve designators, Africana Male Officers in eighteen, and European American Female Officers in twenty one. Africana Female Officers now had twelve officers in operational fields (4%), compared to Africana Male Officers (66%), and European American Female Officers (7%). The numbers were 12, 832, and 357 for the research groups respectively. GUL again was the most populated designator (48%), followed by nurses (33%), and Medical Corps (4%). For the first time the Supply Corps became the fourth highest designator (3%), and remained the fourth through the remainder of the years. Africana Male Officers established Surface Warfare (37%), pilots (12%), Supply Corps (9%), and flight officers (8%) as their top designators.
Table 7. - - Historical Demographic Designator Distribution (1977-1979)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designator Group</th>
<th>OFFICER CATEGORY</th>
<th>AFO</th>
<th>AMO</th>
<th>EAFO</th>
<th>GTO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110X</td>
<td>General Unrestricted</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111X/116X</td>
<td>Surface Warfare Officer/or in training</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>94.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112X/117X</td>
<td>Submarine Warfare Officer/or in training</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113X/118X</td>
<td>Special Warfare Officer/or in training</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114X/119X</td>
<td>Special Operations Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12XX</td>
<td>Material Professional Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130X</td>
<td>Non flying pilot or Naval Flight Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131X/139X</td>
<td>Active flying pilot/or in training</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>73.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132X/137X</td>
<td>Active flying Naval Flight Officer/or in training</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14XX</td>
<td>Engineering Duty Officer - Ship Engineering spec.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15XX</td>
<td>Aerospace Engineering Duty Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16XX</td>
<td>Special Duty Officer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>32.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18XX</td>
<td>Special Duty Officer (Geophysics)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19XX</td>
<td>Prospective Staff Corps</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210X</td>
<td>Medical Corps Officer (Doctors)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220X</td>
<td>Dental Corps Officer</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>42.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230X</td>
<td>Medical Service Corps Officer</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250X</td>
<td>Judge Advocate General's Corps Officer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>34.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>290X</td>
<td>Nurse Corps Officer</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>310X</td>
<td>Supply Corps Officer</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>50.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>410X</td>
<td>Chaplain Corps Officer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>87.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>510X</td>
<td>Civil Engineer Corps Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>42.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td></td>
<td>177</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>1036</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MAPMIS 5310-0371 AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1979
This order was to remain until 1994-1995 when Medical Service Corps replaced flight officers as the fourth most common designator. The other three designators remained in the same order throughout the reporting period. European American Female Officers top four designators were GUL (40%), Nurse Corps (37%), Medical Corps (4%), and Supply Corps (3%). European American Female Officers exceeded Africana officers in three operational designators (Special Operations, Engineering Duty Officer, and Special Duty Officer). (See Table 9).

Africana Female Officers in 1982-1984 had fifteen officers (4%) in operational designators, while Africana Male Officers had 985 (67%), and European American Female Officers had 542 (9%). GUL (52%), Nurse Corps (30%), Supply Corps (3%), and Medical Service Corps (3%) accounted for the top designators among Africana Female Officers. Africana Male Officers had 532 in Surface Warfare (37%), 162 pilots (11%), 129 in supply (9%), and 122 Naval Flight Officers (8.5%). European American Female Officers top designators were GUL 2247 (39%), Nurse Corps 1906 (33%), Medical Corps 280 (5%), and Medical Service Corps 220 (4%). (See Table 11).

There was little percentage change in operational designators in the research groups during 1985-1987 except that European American Female Officers, for the first time, had more than 10% of the population in operational areas. Africana Male Officers had 21 (4%) in an operational designator. The top designators for Africana Female Officers were GUL 226 (47%), Nurse Corps 135 (28%), Medical Service Corps 30 (6%), and Supply Corps 20 (4%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designator Group</th>
<th>OFFICER CATEGORY</th>
<th>AFO</th>
<th>AMO</th>
<th>EAFO</th>
<th>GTO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110X</td>
<td>General Unrestricted</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111X/116X</td>
<td>Surface Warfare Officer/or in training</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>79.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112X/117X</td>
<td>Submarine Warfare Officer/or in training</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113X/118X</td>
<td>Special Warfare Officer/or in training</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114X/119X</td>
<td>Special Operations Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12XX</td>
<td>Material Professional Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130X</td>
<td>Non flying pilot or Naval Flight Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131X/139X</td>
<td>Active flying pilot/or in training</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>68.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132X/137X</td>
<td>Active flying Naval Flight Officer/or in training</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>85.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14XX</td>
<td>Engineering Duty Officer - Ship Engineering spec.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>42.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15XX</td>
<td>Aerospace Engineering Duty Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16XX</td>
<td>Special Duty Officer</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18XX</td>
<td>Special Duty Officer (Geophysics)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19XX</td>
<td>Prospective Staff Corps</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210X</td>
<td>Medical Corps Officer (Doctors)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220X</td>
<td>Dental Corps Officer</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230X</td>
<td>Medical Service Corps Officer</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250X</td>
<td>Judge Advocate General's Corps Officer</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>290X</td>
<td>Nurse Corps Officer</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>310X</td>
<td>Supply Corps Officer</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>41.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>410X</td>
<td>Chaplain Corps Officer</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>80.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>510X</td>
<td>Civil Engineer Corps Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>32.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>1253</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
<td>4792</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MAPMIS 5310-0371 AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1981
Table 11. - - Historical Demographic Designator Distribution (1982-1984)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designator Group</th>
<th>OFFICER CATEGORY</th>
<th>AFO</th>
<th>AMO</th>
<th>EAFO</th>
<th>GTO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>% #</td>
<td>% #</td>
<td>% #</td>
<td>% #</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110X</td>
<td>General Unrestricted</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111X/116X</td>
<td>Surface Warfare Officer/or in training</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>78.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112X/117X</td>
<td>Submarine Warfare Officer/or in training</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113X/118X</td>
<td>Special Warfare Officer/or in training</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114X/119X</td>
<td>Special Operations Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12XX</td>
<td>Material Professional Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130X</td>
<td>Non flying pilot or Naval Flight Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>89.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131X/139X</td>
<td>Active flying pilot/or in training</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132X/137X</td>
<td>Active flying Naval Flight Officer/or in training</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>73.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14XX</td>
<td>Engineering Duty Officer - Ship Engineering spec.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15XX</td>
<td>Aerospace Engineering Duty Officer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16XX</td>
<td>Special Duty Officer</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18XX</td>
<td>Special Duty Officer (Geophysics)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19XX</td>
<td>Prospective Staff Corps</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210X</td>
<td>Medical Corps Officer (Doctors)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220X</td>
<td>Dental Corps Officer</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230X</td>
<td>Medical Service Corps Officer</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250X</td>
<td>Judge Advocate General's Corps Officer</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>290X</td>
<td>Nurse Corps Officer</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>310X</td>
<td>Supply Corps Officer</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>410X</td>
<td>Chaplain Corps Officer</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>71.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>510X</td>
<td>Civil Engineer Corps Officer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>383</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>1434</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MAPMIS 5310-0370 AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1984
These top designators remained the same for the remainder of the research period. Africana Male Officers had 664 Surface Warfare officers (40%), pilots 167 (10%), Supply Corps officers 161 (9.7%), and Naval Flight officers 136 (8%). Of the 6239 European American Female Officers, the primary designators were GUL 2211 (35%), Nurse Corps 2038 (33%), Medical Service Corps 311 (5%), and Medical Corps 260 (4%). The only designators closed to women were Submarine Warfare and Special Warfare. Africana Female Officers held 16 of the 22 designators, Africana Male Officers had 22, and European American Female Officers held 20. (See Table 13).

The year 1988-1990 (See Table 15) produced little change in the research populations in designator distribution. Africana Female Officers had 32 officers in operational designators (5%), Africana Male Officers had 1269 (65%), and European Africana Female Officers had 892 (13%). Africana Female Officers were represented in 15 designators, Africana Male Officers in 21, and European American Female Officers in 20. The top designators were Africana Female Officers were GUL 250 (42%), Nurse Corps 158 (27%), Medical Service Corps 51 (9%), and Supply Corps 34 (6%). Africana Male Officers had 725 in Surface Warfare (37%), 226 pilots (12%), 198 Supply Corps officers (10%), and 161 Naval Flight officers (8%). The corresponding distribution for European America Female Officers were GUL 2171 (32%), Nurse Corps 2004 (30%), Medical Service Corps 471 (7%), and Medical Corps 354 (5%). During this period, the number of European American Female Officers exceeded the number of Africana Male Officers as active pilots for the first time, which continued through the remainder of the reporting periods. (See Table 14).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designator</th>
<th>OFFICER CATEGORY</th>
<th>AFO</th>
<th>AMO</th>
<th>EAFO</th>
<th>GTO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110X</td>
<td>General Unrestricted</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111X/116X</td>
<td>Surface Warfare Officer/or in training</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>80.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112X/117X</td>
<td>Submarine Warfare Officer/or in training</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113X/118X</td>
<td>Special Warfare Officer/or in training</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114X/119X</td>
<td>Special Operations Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12XX</td>
<td>Material Professional Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130X</td>
<td>Non flying pilot or Naval Flight Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>87.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131X/139X</td>
<td>Active flying pilot/or in training</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>49.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132X/137X</td>
<td>Active flying Naval Flight Officer/or in training</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>64.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14XX</td>
<td>Engineering Duty Officer - Ship Engineering spec.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>39.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15XX</td>
<td>Aerospace Engineering Duty Officer</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>32.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16XX</td>
<td>Special Duty Officer</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18XX</td>
<td>Special Duty Officer (Geophysics)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19XX</td>
<td>Prospective Staff Corps</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210X</td>
<td>Medical Corps Officer (Doctors)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220X</td>
<td>Dental Corps Officer</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>29.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230X</td>
<td>Medical Service Corps Officer</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250X</td>
<td>Judge Advocate General's Corps Officer</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260X</td>
<td>Health Care Professionals</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>290X</td>
<td>Nurse Corps Officer</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>310X</td>
<td>Supply Corps Officer</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>39.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>410X</td>
<td>Chaplain Corps Officer</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>68.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>510X</td>
<td>Civil Engineer Corps Officer</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals: 483 5.8% 1656 19.8% 6239 74.5% 8378 100%

Source: MAPMIS 5310-0370 AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1987
Table 15. Historical Demographic Designator Distribution (1988-1990)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designator</th>
<th>OFFICER CATEGORY</th>
<th>AFO</th>
<th>AMO</th>
<th>EAFO</th>
<th>GTO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110X</td>
<td>General Unrestricted</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111X/116X</td>
<td>Surface Warfare Officer/or in training</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>76.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112X/117X</td>
<td>Submarine Warfare Officer/or in training</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113X/118X</td>
<td>Special Warfare Officer/or in training</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114X/119X</td>
<td>Special Operations Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12XX</td>
<td>Material Professional Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130X</td>
<td>Non flying pilot or Naval Flight Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131X/139X</td>
<td>Active flying pilot/or in training</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>48.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132X/137X</td>
<td>Active flying Naval Flight Officer/or in training</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>61.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14XX</td>
<td>Engineering Duty Officer - Ship Engineering spec.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15XX</td>
<td>Aerospace Engineering Duty Officer</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16XX</td>
<td>Special Duty Officer</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18XX</td>
<td>Special Duty Officer (Geophysics)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19XX</td>
<td>Prospective Staff Corps</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210X</td>
<td>Medical Corps Officer (Doctors)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220X</td>
<td>Dental Corps Officer</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230X</td>
<td>Medical Service Corps Officer</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250X</td>
<td>Judge Advocate General's Corps Officer</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>290X</td>
<td>Nurse Corps Officer</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>310X</td>
<td>Supply Corps Officer</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>42.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>410X</td>
<td>Chaplain Corps Officer</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>63.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>510X</td>
<td>Civil Engineer Corps Officer</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td></td>
<td>592</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MAPMIS 5310-0371 AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1990
The years 1991-1993 were also unremarkable in designator distribution. Africana Female Officers had 33 operational officers (5%), Africana Male Officers had 1251 (63%), and European American Female Officers had 946 (14%). Africana Female Officers were represented in 16 designators, Africana Male Officers in 21, and European American Female Officers in 20. Africana Female Officers had 271 officers in GUL (40%), 185 in Nurse Corps (28%), 52 in the Medical Service Corps (8%), and 40 in Supply Corps (6%). The top designators for Africana Male Officers were Surface Warfare 688 (34%), Supply Corps 248 (12%), pilots 205 (10%), and Naval Flight 160 (8%). Nurse Corps 2127 (31%) became the top designator for European American Female Officers, replacing GUL 1885 (28%) for the rest of the reports. Medical Service Corps 541 (8%), and Medical Corps 480 (7%) followed. (See Table 17).

The designators for 1994-1995 reflected important shifts in the Navy population in the research groups. Specifically, the operational officers for all groups increased while support categories decreased. Africana Female Officers had 62 operational officers (9%), Africana Male Officers had 1223 (60%), and European American Female Officers had 1041 (16%) of the total number of officers. Africana Female Officers were represented in 18, Africana Male Officers in 20, and European American Female Officers in 21 designators, which had grown to 23. It is noted that the new designator added was Fleet Support Officer. This designator encompassed a majority of the designator GUL. For clarity, the review of top designators continued to include the Fleet Support Officer in the category of GUL. Africana Female Officers had 220 in GUL (32%), 197 nurses (29%), 61 in Medical Service Corps (9%), and 50 supply officers (7%).
Table 17. Historical Demographic Designator Distribution (1991-1993)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designator Group</th>
<th>OFFICER CATEGORY</th>
<th>AFO #</th>
<th>AFO %</th>
<th>AMO #</th>
<th>AMO %</th>
<th>EAFO #</th>
<th>EAFO %</th>
<th>GTO #</th>
<th>GTO %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>110X</td>
<td>General Unrestricted</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>1885</td>
<td>86.7%</td>
<td>2175</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111X/116X</td>
<td>Surface Warfare Officer/or in training</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>74.7%</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
<td>921</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112X/117X</td>
<td>Submarine Warfare Officer/or in training</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>98.5%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113X/118X</td>
<td>Special Warfare Officer/or in training</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114X/119X</td>
<td>Special Operations Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>68.0%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12XX</td>
<td>Material Professional Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130X</td>
<td>Non flying pilot or Naval Flight Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131X/139X</td>
<td>Active flying pilot/or in training</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>42.3%</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>57.1%</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132X/137X</td>
<td>Active flying Naval Flight Officer/or in training</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>60.2%</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>38.3%</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14XX</td>
<td>Engineering Duty Officer - Ship Engineering spec.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>64.8%</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15XX</td>
<td>Aerospace Engineering Duty Officer</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>32.8%</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>61.2%</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16XX</td>
<td>Special Duty Officer</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>73.9%</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18XX</td>
<td>Special Duty Officer (Geophysics)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>89.1%</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19XX</td>
<td>Prospective Staff Corps</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>94.9%</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210X</td>
<td>Medical Corps Officer (Doctors)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>82.9%</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220X</td>
<td>Dental Corps Officer</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>71.5%</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230X</td>
<td>Medical Service Corps Officer</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>73.8%</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250X</td>
<td>Judge Advocate General's Corps Officer</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>77.3%</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>290X</td>
<td>Nurse Corps Officer</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>2127</td>
<td>90.7%</td>
<td>2345</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>310X</td>
<td>Supply Corps Officer</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>47.8%</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>44.5%</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>410X</td>
<td>Chaplain Corps Officer</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>60.5%</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>510X</td>
<td>Civil Engineer Corps Officer</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>71.5%</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>668</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>6812</td>
<td>71.9%</td>
<td>9479</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MAPMIS 5310-0371 AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1993
The distribution of Africana Male Officers were Surface Warfare 630 (31%), Supply Corps 259 (13%), pilots 245 (12%), and Medical Service Corps 144 (7%). Of the top designators for Africana Male Officers 2 of the 4 were now support groups. This had not been the case since 1974, the second year of the reporting period. European American Female Officers had the top designators of Nurse Corps 2005 (32%), GUL 1352 (21%), Medical Corps 570 (9%), and Medical Service Corps 540 (8.5%). (See Table 19).

The final reporting period (1996) disclosed that operational officers again increased in numbers. Africana Female Officers had 79 (11%), Africana Male Officers 1267 (61%), and European American Female Officers 1120 (18%) of the population in operational designators. Africana Female Officers were represented in 16 designators, as compared with 22 for Africana Male Officers, and 20 for European American Female Officers. Africana Female Officers had 199 in the designator GUL (29%), 199 Nurse Corps (29%), 60 Medical Service Corps officers (9%), and 48 Supply Corps (7%). Africana Male Officers were concentrated in the fields of Surface Warfare 653 (32%), pilots 255 (12%), Supply Corps 252 (12%), and Medical Service Corps 145 (7%). European American Female Officers had 1924 nurses (31%), 1256 as GUL (20%), 595 Medical Corps officers (10%), and 533 Medical Service Corps (8.6%). At the end of 1966 European American Female Officers had more officers in 15 designators than Africana officers (Nonflying pilot/naval flight, Special Operations, Active Flying Pilot, Engineering Duty Officer, Aerospace Engineering Duty Officer, Special Duty Officer, General Unrestricted Line/Fleet Support Officer, Prospective Staff Corps, Medical Corps,
Dental Corps, Medical Service Corps, Judge Advocate General Corps, Nurse Corps, Special Duty Officer-Oceanography, and Civil Engineer Corps). Africana Male Officers exceeded both Africana Female Officers and European American Female Officers in six designators: Surface Warfare, Submarine Warfare, Special Warfare, Active Flying Naval Flight Officer, Supply Corps, and Chaplain Corps. (See Table 21).
Table 19. -- Historical Demographic Designator Distribution (1994-1995)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designator</th>
<th>OFFICER CATEGORY</th>
<th>AFO</th>
<th>AMO</th>
<th>EAFO</th>
<th>GTO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110X</td>
<td>General Unrestricted</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111X/116X</td>
<td>Surface Warfare Officer/or in training</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>65.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112X/117X</td>
<td>Submarine Warfare Officer/or in training</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113X/118X</td>
<td>Special Warfare Officer/or in training</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114X/119X</td>
<td>Special Operations Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12XX</td>
<td>Material Professional Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130X</td>
<td>Non flying pilot or Naval Flight Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131X/139X</td>
<td>Active flying pilot/or in training</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>46.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132X/137X</td>
<td>Active flying Naval Flight Officer/or in training</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14XX</td>
<td>Engineering Duty Officer - Ship Engineering spec.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15XX</td>
<td>Aerospace Engineering Duty Officer</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16XX</td>
<td>Special Duty Officer</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1700</td>
<td>Fleet Support Officer</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18XX</td>
<td>Special Duty Officer (Geophysics)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19XX</td>
<td>Prospective Staff Corps</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210X</td>
<td>Medical Corps Officer (Doctors)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220X</td>
<td>Dental Corps Officer</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230X</td>
<td>Medical Service Corps Officer</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250X</td>
<td>Judge Advocate General's Corps Officer</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>290X</td>
<td>Nurse Corps Officer</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>310X</td>
<td>Supply Corps Officer</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>48.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>410X</td>
<td>Chaplain Corps Officer</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>62.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>510X</td>
<td>Civil Engineer Corps Officer</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals: 689 7.6% 2030 22.5% 6320 69.9% 9039 100%

Source: MAPMIS 5310-0370 AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1995
**Table 21. Historical Demographic Designator Distribution (1996)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designator Group</th>
<th>OFFICER CATEGORY</th>
<th>AFO</th>
<th>AMO</th>
<th>EAFO</th>
<th>GTO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110X</td>
<td>General Unrestricted</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111X/116X</td>
<td>Surface Warfare Officer/or in training</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>61.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112X/117X</td>
<td>Submarine Warfare Officer/or in training</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113X/118X</td>
<td>Special Warfare Officer/or in training</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114X/119X</td>
<td>Special Operations Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12XX</td>
<td>Material Professional Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130X</td>
<td>Non flying pilot or Naval Flight Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131X/139X</td>
<td>Active flying pilot/or in training</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>47.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132X/137X</td>
<td>Active flying Naval Flight Officer/or in training</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14XX</td>
<td>Engineering Duty Officer - Ship Engineering spec.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15XX</td>
<td>Aerospace Engineering Duty Officer</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>35.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16XX</td>
<td>Special Duty Officer</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1700</td>
<td>Fleet Support Officer</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18XX</td>
<td>Special Duty Officer (Oceanography)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19XX</td>
<td>Prospective Staff Corps</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210X</td>
<td>Medical Corps Officer (Doctors)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220X</td>
<td>Dental Corps Officer</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230X</td>
<td>Medical Service Corps Officer</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250X</td>
<td>Judge Advocate General's Corps Officer</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>290X</td>
<td>Nurse Corps Officer</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>310X</td>
<td>Supply Corps Officer</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>410X</td>
<td>Chaplain Corps Officer</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>63.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>510X</td>
<td>Civil Engineer Corps Officer</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Totals:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AFO</th>
<th>AMO</th>
<th>EAFO</th>
<th>GTO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>691</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>2066</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL (PERS - 61) DATED 3 SEPTEMBER 1996
CHAPTER 3

LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Literature Review

This chapter offers a general historical overview of Africana women in the work force in this country. Historically, Africana women's employment practices in the American work force revealed that they have mostly been placed in domestic, support and service type positions. This research project demonstrates that Africana Female Naval Officers have been placed in positions that tend to reinforce this practice.

When professional problems arose for Africana women in the civilian and military work places, researchers have chosen to view research of these prevailing problems from a myopic perspective. Race issues primarily focused on African Americans as a monolithic group. Gender issues also have been researched as monolithic entities. Very seldom have researchers acknowledged or specifically addressed the professional problems of Africana women in the general work force or in the military. This practice tended to convey the idea that addressing the issues of race and gender collectively improved the status of all members of a specific demographic group. The sources used in the literature review of this project corroborated this perception.

Africana women have a long legacy of being marginalized in the American work force. When they arrived on this continent in 1619, this legacy of inequality,
psychological and physical abuse, as well as overt discrimination, commenced.\footnote{Schuyler Webb. Role Conflicts and Coping of Female Navy Officers. Ph.D. Dissertation, United States International University, San Diego, 1994,27.}

Contrary to common beliefs, contemporary data disclosed that Africana women's work force legacy began in conditional freedom, as opposed to slavery.\footnote{Ibid.} Some of the first Africana immigrants arrived in this country in a similar fashion as most European immigrants. Most European immigrants "were contracted in indentured servitude for several years and then freed."\footnote{Ibid.} The term slave had not been operationalized during this time frame.\footnote{Ibid.} It is noted that during the first forty years, Africana immigrants worked in industrial occupations, owned property, accessed the justice system, and also owned plantations.\footnote{Ibid., 28.} A number of social and societal factors changed this situation. Webb argued that the variables which caused the change in the status quo were European greed, and the institutionalization of the ideology of white supremacy, both actions justified by religious rationalization.\footnote{Ibid.} These factors, coupled with the unprotected status of the African immigrants, provided the power base to enact laws that subsequently reduced most Africans to a life of perpetual slavery.\footnote{Ibid.}
This change in status immediately placed Africana women in the work force. They had no choice but to work. Africana women were forced to work during a period when the prevailing ideology, the cult of true womanhood, confined women to the private sphere of society. The institution of slavery demanded that Africana women perform both traditional female work, and simultaneously assume the responsibility of performing "the same arduous work as men." 

Post Civil War policy and practice confined Africana people to agriculture roles and laboring occupations in other sectors. Typically, Africana men were not confined to agriculture work as laborers. They worked in transportation and service industries, while Africana women were primarily restricted to domestic services as laundresses, cooks, and domestic servants in private households. It appeared that Africana women's work opportunities were restricted to these two areas until the early part of the twentieth century. At that time there was a significant reduction of Africana women in the agricultural sector. This shift in job resources led a larger group of Africana women to seek employment in "steam laundries, as sweepers, cleaners, rag pickers, pressers in produce processing, labeling, and stamping." From Post World War II until the mid 1970's, the masses of Africana women were basically employed in domestic and service

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9Webb. 29.

10Ibid., 30.

11Ibid.

12Ibid., 31.
sectors. Only in the last past twenty-five years have Africana women begun to achieve positions of upper level leadership and management positions in the civilian corporate and military sectors.

Racial strife and animosity have been inherent constructs of American history since the arrival of the first Europeans. First these outsiders established a very hostile relationship with the Native Americans. As the Africans arrived on this continent, this prevailing hostility was directed toward the new arrivals. In most cases they came by force, to work in a peculiar and inhuman institution called slavery. Even after slavery the social malady, racism, has continued to be an intricate part of the fabric of American culture.

In the mid 1950's a number of social catalysts forced the issue of racism to the forefront of the American social, political, economic, and religious agendas. The Montgomery Bus Boycott of 1955-1956 has been heralded as the first major incident that incited the Black freedom struggle of the 1950's and 1960's.\textsuperscript{13}

Most contemporary literature has presented Martin Luther King, Jr. as this country's first major civil rights leader. The autobiography of JoAnn Robinson revealed that prior to the actual beginning of the boycott, women, led by Mrs. JoAnn Robinson, played the "crucial but little heralded role in bringing about the Montgomery Bus Boycott of 1955-1956."\textsuperscript{14} The Boycott had actually been organized by Mrs. Robinson and her


\textsuperscript{14}Ibid.
organization, the Women's Political Council. This organization was the most active and assertive Black civic group in Montgomery, during this period. The Women's Political Council was formed for the "purpose of inspiring Negroes to live above mediocrity, to elevate their thinking, to fight juvenile and adult delinquency, to register and vote, and to improve their status as a group." On the surface this organization's purpose had a motivating quality about it. A more in depth review indicated that it had embraced some of the "Blame the Victim" ideology. Blaming the victim is an ideological process, that incorporates a set of ideas and concepts systemically motivated by the unintended distortions of reality. The purpose of the Women's Political Council suggested from one perspective that the race problems Africana people experienced could be alleviated if they took more active roles and responsibility in changing their status in life. Further, it focused on Africana people as a collective entity, but failed to acknowledge that racism impacted men and women differently. This organization failed to acknowledge that even if Africana people achieved all of the goals stated in its purpose, systemic barriers still impacted their ability to ascertain achievements and access to opportunities.

Africana women historically have played major and significant roles in the ongoing struggle for racial freedom and equality. Despite this fact, few published accounts of the civil rights era document the major role women played in the movement for social change. This oversight left the impression that the civil rights movement was

15Ibid., 23.


propelled and sustained by men. It allowed the needs and issues of Africana people to be viewed as an aggregate group.

Black Americans are often presented as a monolithic group. Such a one-dimensional view conveys that all Black Americans face the same systemic obstacles regardless whether they were male or female, children or young adults, middle aged adults or senior citizens. Pinkney, in his book *The Myth of Black Progress*, consistently addressed Africana people as a collective entity. He stated that "although racism in the United States is less pronounced, and racists are less vocal and overt since the Civil Rights Act of 1964, race continues to be an ever-present part of the American way of life."\(^{18}\) He described racism as a rationalized ideology that, in the American case, posits Blacks and other people of color as innately inferior.\(^{19}\) Pinkney further contended that "history and environment are not related to this alleged inferiority, it is a function of genetics."\(^{20}\) Whites used this alleged innate inferiority of color as justification to treat African Americans, with disrespect and as less than human.\(^{21}\) Along with that practice of racism, it produced the by-products of prejudice and discrimination.\(^{22}\)

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\(^{19}\) Ibid., 49.

\(^{20}\) Ibid., 50.

\(^{21}\) Ibid.

\(^{22}\) Ibid.
Pinkney perceived that "the most serious problem facing Black Americans is in the realm of economics."23 The argument further cited that "although affirmative action improved job opportunities, especially for the middle class, the civil rights movement never really addressed itself to the basic economic issues."24 His fundamental position stated that if progress is to be made in the general status of Blacks, economic advancement is crucial.25

Also arguing a monolithic race base, Cornel West joined W. E. B. DuBois in his perception that "the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line."26 His position clearly stated that racism forces Africana people to confront the tragic facts of poverty and paranoia, despair and distrust.27 West disclosed that an objective and in depth analysis of race matters dictated that Americans examine the core of the crisis of American democracy.28 This examination is needed, according to West, because it will present the enormousness of the problem, and will act as a critical indicator of whether the best of the democratic experience we call American, can, or will, endure.29

West concluded that as a nation, "we simply cannot enter the twenty-first century at each other's throats, even as we acknowledge the weighty forces of racism, patriarchy,

23Ibid., 178.
24Ibid.
25Ibid.
27Ibid., 156.
28Ibid.
29Ibid.
and ecological abuse around our necks." He asserted that to assume this posture would lead to certain death as a nation, and the nation's behavior would create two results: "we either hang together by combating these forces that divide and degrade us, or we hang separately."31

The preceding resources summarily focused on the variable of race exclusively. Their messages conveyed that race was, and remains, the most penetrating and divisive social menace in the American society. Even when the literature identified the potential for addressing gender issues in conjunction with race issues, the authors chose race as their focal point. This myopia creates the impression that addressing race issues would covertly, but inclusively, address and resolve other social concerns that might affect an intra-group within the race.

However, Edwards and Polite conceded that race and gender together posed a major obstacle in the lives of Africana women.32 The scholars purported that one of the major products of the civil rights era, from 1954 to 1968, was that the "integration generation," developed and sustained the belief that "the key to Black success in America lay in the assimilating into the very culture that had long denied it opportunity and equality."33 Juxtaposed to this perception lay the belief that Africana people had become

30Ibid., 159.
31Ibid.
33Ibid., 2.
unequivocally convinced that education was an "unassailable cure for all its ills. The integration of the American public school system became the logical line of scrimmage in the competition to gain access to American opportunity."

Edwards and Polite defined success as "the realization of the American promise: access to equal opportunity." These scholars also contended that the phenomenon of success in Black America not only looks at the end results, but at the hurdles that one overcomes. Specifically they stated that "success in Black America is often measured as much by what has been overcome as by what has been achieved." According to Edwards and Polite "Black achievement inevitably remains a triumph over odds, a victory over struggle . . . included in this theory is the concept that regardless whether success is the result of overcoming the debilitating effects of racism or the accompanying destructive pathology of low self esteem and self hatred, Black success is almost always the result of a peculiar kind of drama that gets played out just in the psyche."

In order to ascertain the level of achievement accomplished, Edwards and Polite used the indices of economic and occupational framework to make their assessment. They found that income is one indicator of individual worth. More importantly, their data

34Ibid.
35Ibid.
36Ibid., 3.
37Ibid.
38Ibid.
39Ibid., 3-4.
disclosed that "professional occupations, status, and influence are perhaps more
significant barometers to gauge shifts in power." \(^40\)

Amid this success surge, which was achieved in a relatively short period of time,
African Americans were confronted with numerous barriers. These scholars identified
some of these barriers as "the old demon of racism speaking in a new forked tongue
down-sizing, glass ceiling, retrenchment, last hired first fired, and twofer." \(^41\)

These authors recognized that "historically, the reality of Black women has been
one of suffering and double oppression." \(^42\) They asserted that Africana women were
doubly oppressed because they are members of "two powerless and exploited classes --
the Black race and the female gender -- which makes them two times victims, and thus
considered the least likely to succeed." \(^43\) These authors concluded that the double burden
of two negative variables which constituted oppression psychologically affected Africana
women. The most profound and crippling effect these issues created in the lives of
Africana women was that they severely diluted Africana women's perception of
themselves as being capable of achieving professional success. \(^44\) For Africana women,
"success was often a matter of surviving, of accepting responsibility, of having the
capacity for struggle and the wherewithal for sacrifice." \(^45\) To further emphasize their

\(^40\) Ibid., 4.
\(^41\) Ibid.
\(^42\) Ibid., 152.
\(^43\) Ibid.
\(^44\) Ibid.
\(^45\) Ibid.
perception of Africana women's status and condition, Edwards and Polite borrowed one of Toni Morrison's sayings..."she had nothing to fall back on, not maleness, not whiteness, not ladyhood, not anything. And out of the profound desolation of her reality she may well have invented herself."46

Lee Sigelman and Susan Welch indicated that when almost any controversial issue relating to race has been addressed, more information about white attitudes was discovered than information regarding Black attitudes. It was their assumption that this data vacuum existed simply because of the "matter of conscious priorities."47 This observation conveyed that historically "it has been considered more important to understand whites' attitudes than Blacks'."48 Secondly, it was widely known that in this society there has been the practice of just taking Black attitudes for granted.

These findings were reflective of racial prejudice and racial discrimination. Sigelman and Welch defined racial discrimination as being attitudinal, i.e., that individuals judged Blacks negatively because of their race.49 On the other hand, racial discrimination was defined as a behavioral act directed toward Blacks because of their race.50

46Ibid.


48Ibid.

49Ibid., 47.

50Ibid.
Sigelman's and Welch's findings regarding the extent to which Blacks viewed themselves as recipients of racial prejudice and discrimination revealed that Africana men were more likely to report instances of discrimination than Africana women.\textsuperscript{51} However, they alleged that the difference was not large. These scholars speculated that perhaps Africana women reported racial discrimination less frequently than Africana men because they possibly had a different reference group than Black men. No further explanation was provided for this phenomenon. Additionally, they claimed that older Blacks were more likely to report incidents of alleged discriminatory treatment than younger Blacks.\textsuperscript{52} In terms of accounting for the racial inequality in American society, Sigelman and Welch reported that "Blacks tend to see themselves largely as victims of a white dominated society."\textsuperscript{53} The major finding of this research project disclosed that Blacks did not show a homogeneous view regarding methods and options for reducing racial inequality.\textsuperscript{54} It was stressed in these findings that racial inequality caused by societal factors, external to and beyond the control of the Black community, required governmental intervention.\textsuperscript{55}

Immediately following the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960's and the well publicized race riots and other racial strife in all branches of the military during the early 1970's, scholars and researchers became more interested in exploring the issue of race in

\textsuperscript{51}Ibid., 81.
\textsuperscript{52}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{53}Ibid., 107.
\textsuperscript{54}Ibid., 145.
\textsuperscript{55}Ibid.
the military. MacGregor and Nalty stated that the Navy's most noted race riots occurred on board the USS Kitty Hawk and the USS Constellation in the early 1970s.56

Bernard Nalty and Morris MacGregor, in Blacks in the Military: Essential Documents57 presented a collective historical picture of the changing status of Africana people in all branches of the military. The population that was used to create this picture was Africana men. On a few occasions, these authors acknowledged the presence of women in the military, yet they did not devote any in depth discussion or reveal any detailed information regarding these women. Their research reflected a picture of Africana males moving from auxiliaries, useful only in emergencies, to combat soldiers who became entrusted with the most complex and deadly weapons.

In Strength for the Fight58 Bernard Nalty provided an in-depth history of Blacks (males) in the military, from the 1600's to the 1980's. Nalty examined the political policies and social practices which directed whether Blacks were included in the military and how they were utilized. The professional performance and achievements of Africana males in all branches of the military were well documented, as well as the social circumstances that existed at that time. This researcher found that both the political policies and social practices of the time were congruent in that they both strongly supported the Navy's practice of maintaining a segregated service. Blacks accepted for naval service were restricted to serving in support roles, i.e., cooks, messmen, and


57Ibid.

stewards. Even though they were assigned to support roles, Africana personnel such as Dorie Miller, an untrained messman, saved his Captain's life and shot down Japanese planes, illustrating that Africana males were capable of assuming greater responsibilities than the ones they had been relegated to.

The all Africana male Army units performed numerous feats that reflected their commitment to fostering the United States efforts. In spite of these successes, those military members were subjected to inequities because of the social practices and political decisions of the times.

Secretary of the Defense, Richard Cheney, in *Black Americans in Defense of Our Nation* acknowledged and provided a detailed historical, but primarily pictorial, documentation of the numerous achievements of Africana males and females in all branches of military service. Unlike Nalty and MacGregor's research that only mentioned women as collective entities in the Women Army Corp, or the Women Accepted for Voluntary Emergency Service, Cheney actually identified individual Africana females, including officers, as major contributors to the nation's defense and the U. S. Military history. Cheney identified Admiral Samuel Gravely as the first Africana Male Officer promoted to the rank of Admiral. The Africana Female Navy Officers identified by Cheney, were primarily serving in support and service billets. The women in the other services presented more of a cross section of occupational specialties, i.e., support,

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operation and aviation billets. The majority of the male officers were in combat and operational billets.

In *The Golden Thirteen* Paul Stillwell presented an individual as well as a collective detailed history of the first thirteen Africana Male Naval Officers. These officers overall enjoyed their tours in the Navy, however none completed a twenty year Navy career. The social conditions of the time, strongly affected how these men were treated both inside and outside of the military environment. Race appears to have played a major role in their diversion.

The present day feminist or women's movement was an outgrowth of the 1960's Civil Rights Movement, with the prime issue of this movement's agenda being gender. Consequently, the military was forced to address gender because of the mounting external pressure that was being applied by numerous women's interest groups.

Women have been entering the military, specifically the Army and the Navy, since 1942, yet their permanent presence in all of the military branches have aroused only a very modest amount of interest in the world's academic and military research arenas. Such research is a relatively new phenomenon which evolved because of substantial public pressure from various feminist focused organizations, and because of very adverse incidents that have happened to military women which could not be suppressed by the various branches and the overall military institution. Most of this modest research has focused basically on women in the Army. This Army research data inclusively addressed both officer and enlisted women, including Africana and European American females in

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both categories. On the other hand the world of academia and the United States Navy have conducted an extremely minuscule amount of research on women in the Navy, and almost none have seriously focused on Africana women.

Crossed Currents, authored by Ebbert and Hall, has been listed as the official history of women in the Navy. During the early part of 1995, Jean Ebbert, the leading author of this publication, indicated that the focus of her research was one dimensional in that it concentrated on European American females, both officers and enlisted women. This author conveyed that as a naval officer she had known no Africana Female Officers, nor did she know any as a naval officer's spouse. Furthermore, Navy Nurse Corps Officers were also excluded from her historical documentation. Fundamentally Crossed Currents, the official history of women in the Navy, is really the history of European American General Unrestricted Line Officers, and European American Enlisted females. This document presented a very thorough chronicle of the professional progress the aforementioned groups made in the United States Navy, from World War II to the mid 1990's. In recounting this progress, the authors detailed two separate, but related, accounts of Navy women's history. The history revealed how these women were affectively inserted into a very traditional male institution without the institution making any initial significant changes. In spite of the lack of organizational changes, these women not only survived, but were able to make themselves so essential to the organization's mission that the organization was forced to recognize their worth and its

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need to change. The second account highlighted how these females themselves changed and instigated institutional changes within the system.

The Navy realized that during World War II, women officers had become its experts in the areas of personnel, administration, and some facets of aviation. These were all very essential areas to the efficiency of the Navy. Military female officers, collectively, were able to get a congressional decision that made them and all succeeding military females a permanent part of the armed services. This gave military females permission to have a twenty year military career, on active duty or in the active reserves.

Jean Holm, a retired Air Force General, in *Women in the Military: An Unfinished Revolution* examined and identified numerous issues that contributed to the change in the professional status of women, primarily in the Army and Air Force. Holm's focal point in this literature acknowledged the many significant roles that women in both the Air Force and the Army had contributed to their services. She chronicled their movements from support roles to more diverse sets of occupational options. Holms argued that these changes came as a result of a tremendous amount of hard work.

What is obviously missing was a presentation and discussion of women from diverse cultural and racial backgrounds. This was is another example of people viewing women as a monolithic group. This generalization reinforced the perception that in the military the woman officers are European American females, and the minority officers are Africana males.

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Literature and research data currently available on the subject of Africana females and the military is practically non-existent. In *A Black Woman's Civil War Memoirs*, Romero and Romero provided two significant pieces of historical data. First they authenticated the early individual active involvement of an Africana female in the United States Military during a major national crisis.

These authors brought to the forefront the fact that Africana women's service in the military was not a recent occurrence, but rather was hidden in historical data. This surfaced documentation verified that Africana women have indeed had a legacy in the military. This data revealed that Susan Taylor King served in traditional roles of laundress and nurse, during the Civil War. It was not disclosed whether these assignment were a reflection of race, or race and gender discrimination.

In *Black Women in the Armed Services*, Jesse Johnson attempted to fill in the missing pages of United States military history that had been continuously excluded. In order to achieve this goal, Johnson chose to present basically, a pictorial history of the professional attainments of Africana females in all branches of the armed services. This pictorial history recognized the professional attainments of officers and enlisted personnel during the period of 1942 through 1974. Johnson stated that during his research, "from 1945 through 1968, few records were maintained by the Navy for Africana Female Officers". Johnson contended that all of the services had minimized the contributions

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that Africana women had made to all of the armed forces branches. The period of time which this piece of literature covered, was a time when it was common practice and the basis of all personnel policies to assign women to traditionally female billets.

One Woman's Army⁶⁵ told Charity Adams Early's personal story as the first Africana female to become a commissioned officer in any branch of the armed services. This event occurred in 1942. Early told her story of how and why she became an Army Officer. Early admitted that there was a nexus between race and gender. She elaborated on the struggles she was confronted with because of her race and gender. These challenges included getting junior and senior personnel to acknowledge her position as an officer as well as according her proper courtesies and protocol. This prior Army Officer discussed her responses to these challenges and disclosed how her "command" of those situations gained for her support and respect from her seniors and juniors. It appeared that many experiences in Early's past had strongly fostered her realization that the trials, challenges, and obstacles that were obvious in her life evolved from the reality that her personhood was composed of more than one sphere. Early survived because she had a support group with her seniors, she believed in herself and her abilities, and she was able to effectively confront obstacles and achieve professional results.

In a recent study, "Female Promotions in Male-Dominated Organizations: The Case of the United States Military",⁶⁶ conducted by J. Norman Baldwin at the University

⁶⁵Charity Early. One Woman’s Army. (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1989).

of Alabama, the endeavor was to determine whether "gender inequalities were even more extreme in historically male-dominated institutions." According to Baldwin's data, of the 12 percent of women officers on active duty, only 1.2 percent were Admirals or Generals. Baldwin's research demonstrated that inequalities in the military's hierarchy decreased or denied women the economic and psychological benefits associated with senior rank. The result of this impediment negatively affected the armed services abilities to access high talent pool and "feminine nuances to framing problems, designing, and implementing solutions." Baldwin based his study on the premise that "unrepresentative hierarchies and glass ceilings are the function of numerous phenomena, including recruitment shortcomings, selection inequities, occupational segregation (dead-end jobs), training disparities, and retention failures." Further, the researcher desired to determine whether particular trends or patterns existed in terms of promotions for male and female officers in certain designated ranks.

The target group of this study was line officers in the ranks of Lieutenant/Captain (0-3), Lieutenant Commander (0-4), Commander/Lieutenant Colonel (0-5), and Captain/Colonel (0-6) in the three largest branches (Army, Navy, and Air Force) of the armed services. Baldwin stated that line officers were chosen as the focal group because "they can command, they are the majority of the officers, and they constitute the core of

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67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid., 1185.
the power structure."71 Included in this study were 350,000 officers.72 The Army and Air Force officers were considered for promotion during the period of 1980 through 1993. The Navy sample group was considered for promotion during the period of 1984 through 1993. The researcher chose not to include officers in the rank of Lieutenant Junior Grade/First Lieutenant (0-2), because promotions to this rank are automatic. While "women are now eligible for promotion to General and Admiral, promotion data to these ranks are less accessible and involve limited numbers of women."73

Baldwin made several significant findings from his research project. First, the data disclosed that when compared, the numbers of officers eligible for promotion and the actual numbers of officers selected for promotion, the Army male officer rates exceeded female rates in all ranks. The opposite was true for the Air Force promotion rates. Their numbers indicated that female officers exceeded male rates at all ranks except for one, Captain (0-3). In the Navy, the male rates exceeded the female rates at all but one rank. This exception occurred at the Lieutenant (0-3) level. A weakness of this research was that it failed to identify the demographic makeup of his research population. Again Baldwin substantiated the practice of viewing people from a skewed perspective.

Baldwin's data further revealed that the differences between officers eligible for promotion and the numbers of officers actually promoted, female turnovers were

71Ibid.
72Ibid., 1186.
73Ibid.
substantially higher than male turnovers. However, there was an exception in the Navy at the 0-3 and 0-4 levels. Baldwin's findings generally showed that the promotion records of female military varied by service. It appeared that the Air Force had the highest rates of promotions for female officers. The numbers, or rates, for the Army and Navy were less, and the researcher posited that this could have occurred because of these two services deep entrenchment in male traditions.

Baldwin suggested that "despite differences between services, the findings generally indicated that female and male promotion rates are fairly similar in the U. S. Military. . . findings generally indicated that women were under represented in military promotions and the degree of under representation increased dramatically with rank."

This scholar readily acknowledged that female officers were confronted with systemic obstacles, promotions, which impacted their rate of upward mobility in the military. However, he strongly conveyed that these obstacles existed because of gender. Again, this myopic explanation reinforced the assumption that women are viewed from a monolithic perspective, thus not recognizing and acknowledging their individual differences.

74Ibid., 191.
75Ibid.
76Ibid.
77Ibid.
In 1992, Robert B. Reich, Secretary of the United States Department of Labor, was appointed the 1992 - 1995 chairperson of the National Glass Ceiling Commission. Reich defined glass ceilings as "artificial barriers based on attitudinal or organizational bias that prevents qualified individuals from advancing from within their organization and reach their full potential."

This commission attempted to develop public understanding of the glass ceiling, and to build public support for policies to eliminate it. To achieve this task, the commission chose to examine how the glass ceiling is generated at all levels of employment. Examples of the component of "glass ceiling discrimination" included pay inequities, sexual and racial bias stereotyping, and sexual and racial harassment. These types of discrimination prevent most minorities and women from ever reaching positions where they can even see a glass ceiling. The commission was specifically directed to focus interest and emphasis on the barriers faced by minority women, due to double discrimination.

The initial report was that the barriers faced by minority women appeared to be nearly impenetrable. The Glass Ceiling Commission acknowledged that the presence

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79 Ibid., 1.

80 Ibid., 2.

81 Ibid., 1.

82 Ibid., 3.

83 Ibid., 2.
of multiple variables created the invisible barriers experienced by affected individuals. The Commission did not indicate whether the simultaneity of the presence of these variables impacted the individual with a more severe form of discrimination or oppression. The operative glass ceiling places women and minorities in jobs that have short, or no, ladders attached. The absence of opportunities for promotion within a segregated job structure does not afford the few women or minorities opportunity to compete for the top managerial and professional jobs in large corporations and government agencies.84

Other references tend to see the glass ceiling as an impediment primary in the lives of women. For example, Louis Boone and David Kurtz in their book *Contemporary Business* defined glass ceiling as "an invisible barrier difficult to pass. The glass ceiling helps explain why, after years of affirmative action legislation, women hold only 6.6 percent of executive positions, and minorities only 2.6 percent.85

The authors of *Breaking the Glass Ceiling*86 directed their exclusive attention on women. Not only did they just look at women, the authors viewed women as an all inclusive entity that had no individual or group differences. The authors of this publication not only failed to recognize the differences that exists between women, they also employed a traditional model for determining the make-up of the glass ceiling which

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confronts women in the top largest American corporations. This traditional approach to exploring the problem produced traditional recommended changes. Primarily these authors encumbered women with the responsibility of making personal changes so they could fit into the existing structure. They failed to address properly the institutions' roles in assuming responsibility and accountability for making changes to alleviate the problem, as well as developing executable monitoring plans that would ensure that changes were effected and continued in a positive direction, i.e., a direction that benefitted corporate America as well as its large population of diverse personnel.

According to the Glass Ceiling Commission, this tendency to focus on women evolved from the fact that "the term originally described the point beyond which women managers and executives, particularly white women, were not promoted."87 This report further explained that heightened sensitivity to this phenomenon has determined that "ceilings and walls exist throughout most work places for minorities and women. These barriers result from institutional and psychological practices, and limit the advancement and mobility opportunities for men and women of diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds."88

According to Lisa Bennett's research, the U. S. Bureau of Labor statistics forecasted that by the year 2000, significantly higher numbers of women and minorities will make up the labor force.89 This situation will occur because there will be fewer white

87Ibid.

88Ibid.

males available. Bennett implied that as this pattern evolves, the current labor leaders need to begin preparing for tomorrow's reality. To accomplish this need, first the leaders must confront and resolve the problems that stand in the paths of the future resources. She cited a number of reasons that affected the promotions of women and minorities. It was her observation that women and minorities are very often assigned to staff positions that are not viewed as career enhancing. These types of jobs are not viewed as acceptable training grounds for top management positions. Bennett also argued that "the qualifications of woman and minorities are frequently discounted because of culture differences or differences in academic experience. These two groups of people, as a result, are given less responsibility, authority, and compensation than white men, even when they are promoted to equal ranks." Finally, another common barrier which impacted women and minorities is "limited access to informal networks of top level managers or to mentoring relationships." The Glass Ceiling Commission disclosed that "minorities plateaued at lower levels of the work force than women."

According to Bell and Nkomo, over the past decade, both Africana females and males have gained fewer management positions than white women. During this period "the proportion of African-American men and women holding management positions has

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90Ibid.
91Ibid.
only ranged between 5 and 7 percent. They continue to be invisible at the very top levels of companies."93

Bell and Nkomo maintained that while legislative mandates regarding work place racial discrimination have been created and publicized, overall they have been very ineffective. It was their finding that "African-American managers still encounter a high number of interrelated barriers that operate at the individual, group, and organizational level, to restrict their advancement."94 Bell and Nkomo disclosed that "subtle racism and prejudice was the most prevalent barrier which affected the individual African-American manager's work environment in a place where European Americans nurture negative stereotypes and attitudes about their suitability and competence for management responsibility."95 Bell and Nkomo indicated that these managers were exposed to "more overt racial slurs, racial jokes, and abusive language."96 The researchers ended their major findings with the following disclosure:

Intergroup conflicts and exclusion from formal and informal networks create dynamics on a group level that further restrict their mobility. Other barriers are embedded within organization systems. African-American managers have less access to mentors, are subjected to bias in the rating of their performance and promotability, and are functionally segregated into jobs less likely to be on the path to top levels of management. More recently, corporate efforts to downsize operations


94 Ibid.

95 Ibid.

96 Ibid.
have dampened the prospects of advancement for many African-American managers.97

The authors of the Executive Summary for the Glass Ceiling Commission presented a well documented and objective overview of the operative glass ceilings that African-Americans encounter in the work place. The authors recognition that these barriers impinged on African-American professional lives, both from an individual as well as a group perspective. However, they addressed the issue of race as if African-Americans were a single and massive group of people, void of any individual identities or characteristics. These scholars were females, thus it was expected that they would be sensitive to the issue of gender and how, combined with race, it was played out in the work environment.

It seems that the literature available about workplace inequities the primary focus was race, and the subjects were treated as minorities or non-minorities, and African-American or non- African-American. In the case of military officers, they were either female officers or male officers. Some of the research recognized a connection between race and gender issues, however it was clear that race issues took precedence over gender issues. Also, intra-racially, the agenda of the group's males solicited and garnered greater attention and support than the gender issues. Thus, research in general has overlooked race and gender issues as they relate to the oppression of Africana women.

97Ibid.
Paulo Freire defined oppression as the state of being dehumanized and submerged in the culture of silence. Bell Hooks defined the term as "the absence of choice." Hooks surmised that a pivotal doctrine in the contemporary debate of feminist thought, contends that "all women are oppressed." This monolithic view of women declared that factors such as class, race, religion, and sexual preference do not make their experiences different, nor do they determine the extent to which women experience sexism as an oppressive force in their individual lives. This grossly myopic assessment undoubtedly employed the same monolithic defective analytical approach to understanding women's concerns. Even among women...all women are the same. If this is a universally acceptable approach to researching issues of this nature, then it explains very clearly how and why the Navy does its gender focused research. This practice excluded women from having the ability, desire, or opportunity for being oppressors. Reality has proven, and is continually proving, that this indeed is not the truth. The United States Navy provides no exception to this truth or reality. Gerda Lerner had a problem with the use of the term oppression of women, and she uses the term "subordination of women." Lerner espoused that subordination conveyed less negative intent on the part of the dominate group.
This research project's definition of oppression of Africana Female Naval Officers explained oppression as personal and professional subjugation. This oppression is the direct by-product of the sum total of systemic professional and personal discriminatory policies, practices, and behaviors encountered because of the officer's race, gender, race plus gender, color, or naval social class. This power based custom has severely stunted the individual's and group's professional attainments and have staunchly circumscribed their access to professional rights, privileges, and opportunities.

According to Julia Boyd, "as Black women, our personal and collective identities have been at best hidden, and at worst warped beyond recognition by the unrelenting messages we get from society at large."\textsuperscript{103} The purposeful marginalization of Africana women have created a world of aliens on earth who have been taught to perpetually survive rather than live full and productive lives. Boyd continued her explanation of the Africana women's social position in America by acknowledging the difficulty of being able to establish one's personal identity because of the continuous flow of negative messages. These messages come from multiple sources, ie parents, relatives, friends, and mainstream society.\textsuperscript{104}

Through the years, Africana women in the general society, in corporate America, as well as members of the armed services of the United States have continued to learn that they personally had to assume direct responsibility for devising appropriate methods that ensured and vindicated their right to endure. To accomplish this life saving


\textsuperscript{104} Ibid.
necessity, these women must realize that they have to develop the ability to identify and comprehend the reality of oppression and its multiple sources that sustained its presence in their lives.

According to Boyd, "when you're given enough messages that tell us we're invisible and don't really count in the larger society, then we start believing them... then it becomes difficult to view ourselves as competent and capable."¹⁰⁵

**Conceptual Framework**

There were several feminist centered theories that could have been chosen as this researcher's project's conceptual framework. These options include Marxist feminist, Socialist feminist, Radical feminist and Liberal feminist theories. Close examination of each of these theories basic ideologies and focuses led this researcher to eliminate them as the appropriate research paradigm for this project. Though each of them had their advantages and disadvantages in terms of explaining the source or sources of women's oppression, for the purpose of this study their disadvantages outweighed their advantages. Primarily, each of these theories major disadvantage resided with their tendency to view women universally as a monolithic societal group. Parallel to this projection, neither of these theories acknowledged that culture or racial differences were possible sources for oppression of some women. Essentially, these theories translated into being very eurocentrically focused, failing to incorporated the reality of a vastly culturally and racially diverse world wherein people differ. Further, they failed to recognize that the world tends to attach positive and negative values to these differences.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., 59.
The researcher operationalized the term of feminism employed in this research project. Bell Hook's definition of this concept is the one that was adopted. She stated that "feminism is a struggle to end sexist oppression."\textsuperscript{106} In tandem with this concept review, it was necessary to look at the related concept of patriarchy. Sylvia Walby contended that it is essential in any discussion that focuses on the sources of female disadvantages or inequality that the concept of patriarchy must be addressed. Walby defined patriarchy as "a system of social structures and practices in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women."\textsuperscript{107} It was her contention that it is essential that the use of the term social structure as employed negated the idea of biological determinism and eradicated the implication that every man is in a dominant position and every woman is in a subordinate one.\textsuperscript{108} This scholar further posited that, from a generalized cultural perspective, the personification of the construct of patriarchy created society's institutions which in turn generated images of women and appropriate behavior from a patriarchal mentality. These images and behaviors are maintained via major institutions such as churches, schools, and the media. According to Walby, the theory and the concept of patriarchy were vital because together they captured the depth, pervasiveness and interconnectedness of the different aspects of women's subordination. This nexus was developed in such a fashion that it took into account all of the different forms of gender inequality over time, class and ethnic group.

\textsuperscript{106}bell hooks, Feminist Theory from Margin to Center (Boston: South Press End, 1984), 24.


\textsuperscript{108}Ibid.
The proceeding is a synopsis of several feminist centered theories that were reviewed but deemed inappropriate for this research project's conceptual framework because of their stated disadvantages.

Class, according to the general argument of Marxist feminist theory, is the source of oppression for women. More specifically, Walby argued that gender inequality is an end product of capitalism, not the institution of patriarchy. Further, it was her position that men's domination over women is an end product of capitalism and labor. The results of class relations and the economic exploitations of one class by another are the variables that generate the central features of social relations. It is the synthesis of these variables that form the timbre of gender relations.\textsuperscript{109} It was this author's perception that Marxist feminists vacillate when determining the source of women's oppression. In one instance the argument stated oppression evolved because no monetary value was associated with domestic labor. The family benefits capital because women provide cheap day-to-day care to workers, such as food and clean clothes, and also produce the succeeding generation of workers. It is cheap because women as housewives perform these tasks and are not paid. They merely receive maintenance from their husbands, thus capital benefits evolve from unequal sexual divisions of labor within the home.\textsuperscript{110} Another Marxist feminist argument simply placed the site of women's oppression in an ideological sphere, as opposed to a material one. This researcher, as does Walby, asserted that the primary drawback with Marxist feminism was its narrow focus on capitalism. This myopia

\textsuperscript{109}Ibid., 4.

\textsuperscript{110}Ibid.
precluded the examination of gender inequality in pre and post capitalist societies. Further, it inappropriately reduced gender to capitalism, rather than giving it its own identity as a separate variable.

Rosemarie Tong offers another definition of Marxist feminism. Tong's perception of this theory indicated that class accounts most appropriately for the inequalities experienced by women. This perception further stated that a woman's economic status and function will largely determine the degree of oppression she experienced. Overall, Tong cited that women's oppression is "not so much as the result of the intentional actions of individuals but as the product of the political, societal and economic structures associated with capitalism". In essence Tong's position regarding the source of women's oppression suggested that patriarchy plays a central role in sustaining the existence of gender inequality in society. The institutions that are associated and maintained with capitalism were the products of patriarchal ideology.

Unlike Marxist feminism, Socialist feminism classically identified two sources of oppression for women. Its primary argument stated that gender and class equally contribute to this oppression. Rosemarie Tong credited Allison Jagger with conceptualizing the ideology of socialist feminist theory. Tong argued that "socialist feminism is largely the result of Marxist feminists dissatisfaction with the essentially blind character of Marxist thought -- that is, with the tendency of Marxist patriarchs to


112 Ibid.

113 Ibid., 7.
dismiss women's oppression as not nearly as important as workers oppression."\textsuperscript{114}

Equally disconcerting was the projected comparison that minimized the intensity and degree of oppression of women incurred from men as compared to the degree of oppression experienced by the working class from the bourgeoisie.\textsuperscript{115} Not only did Jagger identify several sources of women's oppression, she further posited that these sources impacted each other and increased the oppression experienced. Jagger offered that there are forces in women's lives such as their work, play, friends and families that could actually enhance their full personal actualization. This patriarchal capitalism subjugates women to roles that alienate and denigrate them as individuals.\textsuperscript{116}

Radical feminism differed from the previous two theories in that it identified gender solely as the oppressive force in women's lives. According to Walby, the pivotal issue with this perspective is it gender analysis of inequality. This analysis argued that men as a group dominate women as a group, as such men are the main beneficiaries of the subordination of women. This systematic method of subordination was labelled as patriarchy and is a system independent of any other influence. It was not a by-product of any other system of social inequality ie. capitalism.\textsuperscript{117} It was Walby's perception, that within the framework of radical feminism, sexual practice appeared to be socially

\textsuperscript{114}Ibid., 9.

\textsuperscript{115}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{116}Ibid., 7.

\textsuperscript{117}Walby, 3.
constructed around male notions of desire, not female.\textsuperscript{118} Heterosexuality was socially institutionalized in modern society and organized many other aspects of gender relations. Male violence against women was considered to be part of the system of controlling women, unlike the conventional view which holds that rape and battering are isolated instances caused by psychological problems in a few males.\textsuperscript{119} Walby's understanding of critics concerns regarding radical feminism was reflected in its perceived tendency to advocate essentialism. This idea conveyed the conviction that men are men and women are women and there is no way to change either. The message directs the oppressed to accept their lot in life because that is the way it is.\textsuperscript{120}

Tong's perception of radical feminism differed from Walby's in that she defined it as "a dynamic and evolving theory moving in several directions simultaneously. Thus any attempt to define it is bound to stress some of its aspects more than others."\textsuperscript{121} Tong suggested that one approach to feminist thought is that radical feminists insistence that women's oppression is the most fundamental form of oppression. Quoting radical feminists Alison Jagger and Paula Rothenberg, this claim can be interpreted to mean

(1) Women were historically the first oppressed group;
(2) Women oppression is the most widespread, existing in virtually every known society; (3) Women oppression is the deepest in that it is the hardest form of oppression to eradicate and cannot be removed by other social changes such as the abolition of class society; (4) Women oppression causes the

\textsuperscript{118}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{119}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{120}Tong, 35.
\textsuperscript{121}Ibid., 71.
most suffering to its victims, quantitatively and qualitatively, although the suffering may often go unrecognized because of sexist practices and prejudices by both the oppressors and the victims; (5) Women oppression provides a conceptual model for understanding all forms of oppression.\(^{122}\)

Tong acknowledged that few radical feminists ascribe to all five interpretations of women oppression, however, most agree that this oppression is the first, the most widespread, and deepest form of human oppression.

Walby and Tong both agreed that radical feminists direct attention to the ways in which men attempt to control women's bodies. Whether through the form of restrictive contraception, sterilization, and/or abortion laws or of violence directed against women, oppression constitutes an especially cruel power play, to the degree that a person is deprived of her or his humanity.\(^{123}\)

Liberal feminism focuses not on social structures as sources of oppression or subordination for women. Rather, it identifies the subordination in a summation of number small scale deprivations. To give substance to its argument, Liberalism offers two possible reasons for women experiencing inequalities in society. First, it purports that the denial of equal rights to women in education and employment is a major reason. This disadvantaged position is related to specific details of prejudice against women. These prejudices, coupled with sexist attitudes, create the second source of subordination and thus sustains the situation. The situation is maintained because traditional attitudes

\(^{122}\)Ibid.

\(^{123}\)Ibid., 72.
are entrenched and resistant to the changes in society relative to gender relations. While this approach has generated empirical studies about gender relations and extensive documentation of the lives of women, it has failed in other ways. Liberal feminism, according to Walby, is often criticized because of its failure to address the deep-rootedness of gender inequality and the interconnectedness between its different forms. For instance, the origin or reasons for persistence of patriarchal attitudes are not acknowledged or addressed. Concisely, the lacking of an overall social structure that gives genesis to gender inequality provided for a skewed and incomplete picture of the prevailing issue.

Asoka Bandarage's interpretation of the Liberalism argument, conveyed the inherent goodness and usefulness of the prevailing and dominant political, economic and ideological structures, specifically, the capitalist system. This interpretation suggested that this approach acknowledges the existence of social inequalities and injustices within the status quo, yet it attributes them to individualized aberrations that can be rectified through legal procedures and attitudinal changes. Further exploration of this argument revealed that philosophically, liberal feminism positioned the subordination of women in capitalist societies as a deviation from the general norms of equality and justice for all individuals. It believes that sexual inequality can be largely corrected if women, now

124 Walby, 4-5.
125 Ibid., 5.
127 Ibid.
confined to the domestic sphere, are equals of men. Hence, the emphasis of liberal
feminism on legal measures such as the vote, the Equal Rights Amendment in the USA,
affirmative action, and attitudinal change strategies, such as assertiveness training and
achievement motivation.\textsuperscript{128}

Each of the previously discussed feminist theories, Marxist, Socialist, Radical and
Liberal recognized and acknowledged that globally all women share a universal
experience that directly impacts, to varying degrees, the quality of their lives. This
experience or phenomenon has been labelled as oppression or subjugation. While these
theories agree that this phenomenon exist, they differ in identifying its source of origin.
Each theory, based on its ideological infrastructure accounted for the evolution and
maintenance of oppression in different spheres of women's lives. The ideological basis of
each of these are Eurocentric in nature and collectively convey a perception of women as
being monolithic entities within a given society. This posture allowed women to be
dissected and separated from the essential variables that constitute the essence of their
identity as an individual or as a member of a particular societal group. According to
Patricia Hill Collins this process of separating women from the intrinsic variables such as
race, gender, and class that created the individual is known as "addictive models of
oppression.\textsuperscript{129} She further contended that these models are firmly rooted in the either/or
dichotomous paradigm that places emphasis on quantification and categorization

\textsuperscript{128}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{129}Patricia Hill Collins \textit{Black Feminist Thought} (New York: Rutledge, 1990), 225.
implicitly conveying the idea that the prevailing variables must be ranked. The Eurocentric nature of these four feminist theories inherently predisposed them to employ a "white filter". According to Rosalyn Terborg-Penn, scholars employed this filter when they "evaluate African or African-American societies in terms of European or Euro-American culture, or from the outside in, rather than from the inside out."  

This research project's target population was Africana Female Naval Officers, thus it was cardinal that the selected conceptual framework strongly embrace the ideology that potentially there are more than one source of oppression that affects the lives of Africana women. This basic perspective was imperative so that the researcher's ability to objectively identify answers to the research question was not restricted. It was equally important, that the guiding conceptual framework recognize that multiple sources of oppression were also individual sources of oppression. The conceptual framework selected had to also acknowledge that these individual variables simultaneously exist in Africana women's lives, thus they interact and collectively create a system that imposes a greater degree of intensity to the oppression experienced by these women.

The purposes of this research, coupled with the target population, helped to determine that neither of the first four feminist theories could effectively develop the perspective as well as establish the appropriate parameters for such a project.

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130 Ibid.


132 Ibid.
Further research surfaced the ideology of African feminism. This theoretical approach characteristically identifies multiple sources of oppression for Africana women. Because of the nature and the focus of this project, it was determined that the philosophy of African feminism was most congruent with this researcher's ideology and conceptualization of the research problem. Unlike other feminist theoretical approaches that identify a single source of oppression in women's lives, African feminism, according to historian Rosalyn Terborg-Penn, identified multiple sources such as gender, race, class, sexuality, religion, and culture as variables which are sources of oppression in the lives of Africana females. This researcher was ideologically aligned with this argument. Specifically, for this study the variables that were explored as sources of oppression for the target population were race, gender, color, social class, and race plus gender.

Rosalyn Terborg-Penn defined African feminism as a theoretical approach and method created to provide a scholarly infrastructure to specifically study the history of women in Africa and the African Diaspora. This characteristic particularly accommodated the major purpose of this project. It brought to the project a research structure and environment that uniformly supported its purposes, its focus, and its pivotal methodological approach. Additionally, it gave the researcher greater academic freedom to examine atypical sources to find potential answers to the research questions.

A major attribute of this conceptual framework recognized that most often traditional sources of data recorded in manuscripts or official documents excluded the female presence. Compounding this exclusion was the fact that they do not incorporate a
female perspective when analyzing data. Because of these deficits, Terborg-Penn's African feminism openly embraced the use of non-traditional methods and sources when reconstructing Africana women's history. This flexibility allowed for the re-examination of old documents and secondary sources to find the Africana female's perspective. This lack of a female perspective and presence projected a very skewed picture of history in that it did not even recognize the sheer existence of females or their contributions. This chronic exclusion from history automatically marginalized females in society and ascribed very little value to them as human beings or their contributions to their particular society.

Another valuable characteristic of Terborg-Penn's African feminism was that it did not employ a white filter. Instead, it established Africana standards for interpreting culture, values, initiatives, activities and organizations. This scholar contended that "this makes it uniquely a black woman's theory." Unlike the previously discussed theories, using this framework tasked the researcher personally to understand the cultural context and acknowledge how Africana women define themselves as well as knowing their means of expression. This requirement demanded more than an academic involvement in the research. It dictated that it was paramount that the researcher have a mature experiential or empathetic level of understanding from which she could tap into and use as a guide during the research process.

133Terborg-Penn, 43.
134Ibid., 49.
Finally, Terborg-Penn's conceptual framework allowed the researcher to conduct multiple time comparisons of women's roles and activities. This ability to conduct comparative analyses across time enabled this researcher to develop a more detailed history of Africana female naval officers' professional progress. The use of African feminism as the conceptual framework allowed for the direct integration of the voices of the Africana women who participated in this project. This data provided a critical analysis of their responses. The conceptual framework also enabled documentation of a more detailed history of Africana female naval officers. In addition, the conceptual framework proposes the concept that the historical nature of the Navy's ideology predisposed the Navy to practice discrimination.

The researcher has examined and included other concepts that provide further clarity to understanding the sources and depth of the problem. Fundamentally, the historical entrenchment of white male patriarchal ideology has permeated and been preserved at every major decision-making level in the United States Navy. This perpetual process of influence has spawned and maintained an environment where overt and covert discriminatory attitudes and practices have been nurtured and institutionalized. Because of their position, the patriarchs were empowered to establish the rules and criteria that determined what was good or bad, right or wrong and what was valued or not valued. One decision this group made early in its existence was that differences, individual or group, were not valued as much as likeness. A complex system of discrimination based on differences was developed and perpetuated. Some of the differences incorporated in this system of exclusion included race, gender, color, class and race plus gender. The
more different one is from the European American male, the more likely one's access to the same privileges and opportunities are restricted. In essence identifiable differences were sources or reasons for discrimination and oppression. The prime goal of the patriarchy has always been to reproduce itself. Individuals or groups who most closely resemble the patriarchal model were accorded fewer restrictions or less victimization. It was this practice of equating positive value to sameness or similarities, assigning negative value to differences, making decisions, and creating victims predicated on these differences within the sanction of an organization that created the phenomenon of systemic obstacles.

In relation to this project's comparison groups, Africana female officers are most unlike European American male officers, the Navy's patriarchs. The differences of gender, race, color, class and race plus gender have exposed Africana female officers to discriminatory attitudes and practices. Using Bruce Kaufman's analysis of market discrimination, the Navy is a replica of the larger labor market, its forces and discriminatory practices. It employs people based upon its missions and conceived notions of: 1) How and when to allow entrance into the Navy market; 2) Who is allowed entrance; and 3) Who is assigned to what. Its designations are based upon the prejudice of race, class and gender. Market discrimination occurs in the labor market when individuals of equal capability are given unequal job assignments, wage rates, or promotions.135 Just as there is a taste for discrimination, as noted by Francine Blau and

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Marianne Fuber, there is a similar preference in the Navy. These scholars define the term "taste for discrimination" as a "taste against associating with a particular group." Navy leaders have always displayed a taste for discrimination toward Africana females. Until it was directly confronted, the Navy maintained and protected an internal unwritten policy not to recruit Africana females. Even after this policy was successfully challenged, only perfunctory change transpired. This mentality has prevailed. The practiced discrimination was cited as an explanation for the small number of Africana Female Officers in the navy who were promoted and who were chosen for career status and for positions of major responsibility, such as command.

Discrimination occurs against Africana Female Officers when their seniors, juniors, and peers display a taste for discrimination. This taste for discrimination exists because of the preconditioning, heavy influence, and power paraded by the patriarchs regarding Africana Female Officers. Juniors and peers are two essential work groups that when prejudiced against Africana females in leadership positions, can undermine the accomplishment of these leaders. The magnitude of their prejudices may be very strong, yet very covert, thus it could significantly but unobtrusively undermine the achievement of the organization's mission. The inability to achieve the organization's mission is a serious matter. It directly affected one's professional performance appraisal.

The presence of "occupational" discrimination in the United States Navy contributed to the existence of the research problem. Occupational discrimination

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occurred when an organization or its leaders embraced the belief and practice that some occupations or jobs were not appropriate for Africana females, so these females were crowded into stereotyped occupational specialties. This practice in the Navy may explain the reason for the large number of Africana Female Officers who are in the Fleet support (previously General Unrestricted Line) or Nurse Corps career fields. The Fleet support career field required no specialized training and the Nurse Corps was a very old and traditionally female service oriented specialty. Navy data indicated that fewer Africana females were found in career fields that require specialized training and education.

Occupational discrimination produced another form of discrimination, statistical discrimination, experienced by Africana female officers. Kaufman stated that this phenomenon occurs when employers take into consideration group characteristics such as race and/or gender when screening job applicants.137 This form of discrimination has historically occurred because race and gender have been factors considered when recruiting, promoting, determining job assignments and retaining naval officers.

According to the dogma of patriarchy, differences created the very strong likelihood that an individual or group would be discriminated against or oppressed (punished) because of these variables. In this general society, of which the Navy is a microcosm, differences are not viewed independently, rather the more differences that are visible the greater the magnitude of discrimination or oppression experienced. Africana

137Ibid., 440.
females are so visibly different from the traditional European American model that the
differences were magnified exponentially.

Early in an organization's evolution its hierarchy identifies and justifies for itself,
consciously or unconsciously, why a selected population must be treated differently. It
takes its clues from the general society. This is done so that the organization's persona is
symmetric with the society's attitudes and practices. This process of operationalizing and
institutionalizing the various forms of discrimination establishes the infrastructure for
erecting and maintaining intangible impediments that impact the target population equal
access to growth within the organization. These invisible structures not only affect
upward mobility they also retard horizontal expansion that is very often paramount for
vertical growth. The invisible nature of these structures makes their existence debatable.
Singularly, this characteristic imposes on the potential victims an onerous burden of
proof. While it empowers the hierarchy with the awesome ability to disclaim or deny
what is sometimes called someone else's abstractions or perceptions.

Bell Hooks characterized Africana women as a group that have not been
socialized to assume the role of exploited oppressor, in that they had no institutionalized
other "that they can exploit or oppress". This scholar further contended that European
American women and Africana men have had it both ways. That is, these two groups
could be oppressed or they could become the oppressors. Africana men may have been
victimized by racism, but the option of practicing sexism allowed them to act as
exploiters and oppressors of women. European American women, on the other hand,

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138 Hooks, 15.
could be victimized by sexism, but the option to practice racism enabled them to act as exploiters of Africana people. Hooks further posited that European American women and Africana men have engaged in liberation movements that have fostered their specific interests and have supported the continued oppression of others. It is her position that as long as these groups, or any groups, define liberation as gaining social equality with the ruling class, European American men, they maintain a vested interest in continued exploitation and oppression of others. This researcher concurred with this posit. These two groups of officers in the Navy have historically and consciously maintained separate informal and formal networks that enabled them to survive and thrive professionally. Africana female officers have not duplicated this survival behavior. Terborg-Penn strongly advocated that in order to effectively counter oppression, Africana women must develop and maintain their own survival strategies. One of the most essential strategies was having strong networks among Africana females.139 In support of this perception, Collins postulated that "while individual empowerment is key, only collective action can effectively generate lasting social transformation of political and economic institutions."140 Somehow, Africana Female Navel Officers have either not heard or heeded these messages or have not observed how others have survived in this organization.

139 Terborg-Penn, 51.

140 Collins, 237
To survive professionally, Africana Female Officers have historically been left to individually create their own methods of, or paths to, success. These sophomoric and homespun professional development paths have never garnered institutional recognition or support. The end product has resulted in many professional and personal sacrifices.
Chapter 4
A Historical Review

The U. S. Navy's Beginning

Dudley Knox, a Navy historian, posited that the genesis of the United States Navy could be clearly traced to the maritime origin and development of the country.¹ This genesis was shaped by pioneers who were mariners. These mariners enhanced their level of knowledge and experience with the sea during the transience from their respective homelands to the new world. This relationship and interaction with the sea did not terminate once the settlers reached America. To the contrary, their dependency on the sea increased. The sea became their major connection with the outside world. It was the quickest and easiest method of transportation. More importantly, the ocean and sea were primary sources of food for those who lived nearby. As the new inhabitants became more concerned with surviving in the new world, they became more reliant upon the sea as a source of exporting goods grown in the colonies that were sent to overseas destinations. In essence the ocean and sea was the life line to the economic survival and growth for the American colonies.

The dependency on the sea created the need to establish an organized structure that could provide protection from the widespread commerce raiding and privateering that

was common occurrence of the time. Because of this reality, the nineteenth century American Navy was established as an entity composed of small ships that moved around the world in squadrons. The primary mission of these ships was to protect Americans overseas and their commerce.

Paul Stillwell suggested that the nineteenth century should be viewed as the pivotal point for tracking essential background events that led up to the commissioning of the first Africana Male Officers. During this period, the United States Navy was an integrated entity where Africana and European American sailors worked and lived together.\(^2\) This occurred because the Navy personnel policies and practices were not as rigidly structured than they became in the twentieth century. For example, it is cited that mariners often moved back and forth between the Navy and commercial services rather than making the Navy a static career.\(^3\) Even so, there were no Africana officers during this period

The Navy's primary goal was to have appropriate manning for its ships and shore stations rather than enforcing rigid segregation. According to Navy logic this urgent "need" alone justified its willingness to enlist Africana men. This decision was not a product of heightened enlightenment on the part of the Navy's hierarchy. Rather, it was because most of the easy accessibility to the essential enlisted personnel. They came


\(^3\)Ibid.
primarily from the coastal regions. The available pool of recruits was so small that the Navy was willing to take whoever was available.\textsuperscript{4}

In spite of the limited source of resources at sea the Navy tended to place the Africana sailors in cook and servant type roles or in the engineering ratings such as machinist's mates or oilers. There were a few Africana sailors in the deck specialties, but this was an exceptional practice. Regardless where Africana sailors were placed, the Navy was not progressive enough to make any of these Africana sailors officers. This was not the time for such action. The needs of the Navy increased to such a point that during the War of 1812 its composition of enlisted force"was between 6 and 10 percent Black."\textsuperscript{5} This manpower need further increased to the degree that during the Civil War "about 25 percent of the Navy's enlisted men were Black."\textsuperscript{6}

During the late 1800's, the Navy succumbed to the reality that in order to maintain its effectiveness it had to move from a wooden fleet to a steel Navy. With this reality, came the pressing responsibility for manning these new battleships.

As any organization prepares to adopt new technological advancements, it becomes necessary for it to amend many of its existing personnel policies and practices. The Navy addressed this issue when it determined its new battleship manning policy. Navy leaders chose to change its recruiting practices. A major change included the

\textsuperscript{4}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{5}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{6}Ibid.
incorporation of an occupational category called "landman for training." The program's provisions supported the practice of training civilians who did not have prior maritime experience. This provision changed the existing recruiting practice by extending the source of potential enlistees. The new provision appealed not just to the men of the coastal regions, but to men from all areas of the country. This expanded pool of resources precluded the need for the illiterate, foreign born and Black sailors.

**U. S. Navy and World War I**

This period in history placed the United States in an era where America was faced with the strong potential of becoming involved in a major international crisis. Stillwell stated that "as the nation moved into World War I, the war to make the world safe for democracy, the Navy became increasingly restrictive in its use of Black sailors." Africana men were recruited to perform food service jobs and to provide service to officers; however, the engineering options were closed. Africana sailors in that specialty were not replaced when they retired. As time progressed, the Navy decided that it would rather have servants and cooks of other races, (i.e., Chinese and Filipinos), than Blacks.

This attitude toward Africana sailors prevailed. A year after World War I ended in August 1919, the Navy completely stopped recruiting and enlisting Blacks. Even in the face of a major international crisis (World War I) the Navy chose not to consider

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7Ibid., xviii.
8Ibid.
9Ibid.
10Ibid.
Africana men as a viable manpower resource. However, this purposeful oversight did not preclude the fact that the Navy was indeed confronted with a major manpower shortage. This shortage was so severe that it threatened the Navy's operational efficiency. In order to provide a temporary solution to this problem the Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels discussed the idea of recruiting women with the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation. After much research, it was determined that no law existed that prohibited the enrollment of women. Because of its urgent need, the Navy decided to enlist women to do clerical work ashore so that the men on shore could go to sea. On March 19, 1917 "the Bureau of Navigation directed the Commandants of all the Naval districts to enroll women in the rating of Yeoman, Electrician (radio), or in such other ratings as the Commandant may consider essential to the District organization."\(^{11}\)

Even though the Navy's decision to enlist women attracted very little attention from the public media, women who became aware of this national need responded promptly. Their motivation for responding ranged the gamut of reasons. Some women reportedly volunteered for patriotic reasons. They, like their brothers, fathers, husbands, and lovers had a strong desire to bring down the enemy. Others joined to maintain a sense of family solidarity. It is reported that one woman enlisted at the age of fifteen and served with her mother. Still others joined because it was an opportunity to gain access to employment that paid a decent salary, after all, women were paid the same salary as men for the same job. Hunger drove others to answer the Navy's call. The opportunity to get fed regularly was not an offer to be ignored by some. Finally, some women chose this

opportunity to make a political statement. In 1917 women had not yet gained the right to vote in national elections. Some states permitted women to vote in state and local elections. Perceptually, some women envisioned that their service in uniform would directly influence their ability and credibility when demanding the rights to women's suffrage.¹²

After the Navy had made the decision to enlist women, it realized that because of the urgency to enlist them it had failed to establish selection criteria. As a result of this oversight, the selection procedure varied. Most recruiters attempted to tailor procedures used for men to accommodate their need to select women. A review of the procedures revealed that women who demonstrated the strongest desire were selected, and selection was primarily determined during an interviewing session. Those who were interested in becoming stenographers and typists were tested to determine their skill levels. Women who passed were given perfunctory physical examinations. The Navy's urgent need for working manpower took precedent over the need to allocate additional time to provide formal training for its new enlistees. These women were immediately tasked with learning their new jobs and the customs of the Navy on their own time.

The majority of the women enlistees were assigned to work as yeomen. A few women were assigned to the specialities of Master-at-Arms and Mess Attendant. The amount of work experience an enlistee had at the time of her enlistment determined whether she was given the rate of first class, second class or third class petty officer. A few exceptionally well-qualified women were given the rate of Chief Yeoman. In any

¹²Ibid., 8.
case the Navy chose to place (F) - for female- after every woman's name in order to keep them from being mistakenly ordered to sea. Regardless of their level of experience or how well they performed once on active duty, no woman during this period ever received a commission. The idea was discussed, but the war ended before any action could be taken.

During World War I, it is alleged that nearly twelve thousand women served in the Navy.13 Ebbert and Hall indicated that their research failed to produce any documentation that substantiated that any Africana women served in the Navy during this period.14 As such, it is assumed that Africana women did not have the opportunity to serve the country during this time. This assumption is especially taken in light of previously discussed data which highlighted how the Navy responded to Africana men during this same period.

By 1932 attrition had reduced the number of Africana sailors to 0.55 percent of the enlisted force.15 In January 1932 the Navy again began to recruit Africana males, who were strictly recruited to be messmen. This change of preference for Black messmen verses oriental servants was precipitated by the fear of a war in the Pacific that would eradicate the opportunity to further enlist oriental messmen. The Navy articulated a preference for southern Blacks as opposed to northern Blacks because it was believed that

13Ibid., 21.
14Ibid., 281.
15Stillwell, xviii.
northern Blacks were more educated and independent. Allegedly one naval officer commented on this issue in a memorandum stating that "recruiting in the South was likely to bring in the unspoiled young Negro."\footnote{ibid.}

The Navy justified the position of keeping Africana men in the messman specialty by insisting that, if Blacks advanced to petty officer status, they would not be able to exert effective leadership over junior white sailors. Even when Africana sailors were advanced to Chief Steward, their realm of leadership authority did not expand. In this senior position they could not exercise any authority over lower rank white enlisted men in general service specialties.\footnote{Ibid, xix.}

**U. S. Navy and World War II**

When World War II began, the United States Navy was a segregated service. All of its officers were European American males, all of its messmen were Africana males, and there were no females of any race in the organization. The Naval Reserve Act of 1938 had legalized the exclusion of women from the Reserves. During World War II, (as during World War I) the Navy was faced with a severe manpower shortage. In order to eradicate this problem the Navy saw the commissioning and enlisting of women -- European American -- as the viable solution. The provision of the 1938 Naval Reserve Act that embraced the exclusion of women was changed. Public Law 689, signed by
President Roosevelt on July 30, 1942, established the Women's Reserve for the Navy and was added as Title V to the Naval Reserve Act 1938.19

Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox was a very strong proponent for having European American women in the Navy. Knox did not have the same attitude regarding Africana personnel in the Navy. According to Ebbert and Hall, once the Navy had decided to include women, it was determined that they would be the best possible. This was partly a reflection of service pride and reputation, but more basically it was a matter of practicality. The Navy perceived that "since women were needed it was best to accommodate them in as handsome a manner as possible, for that would promote morale and enhance recruitment."20

In its search for the leader of the Women's Reserves (WR), which was known as the WAVES -- Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service -- the Navy identified the qualifications for female leadership:

...impeccable personal and professional reputation, a proven leader and administrator. She would also have to command respect from Navy men and the women she leads. Finally the selected candidate had to be old enough to be considered mature, yet young enough to wear a Navy uniform with style and distinction.21

U. S. Navy and European American Female Officers

The woman who was selected to serve as the Director of the WAVES was Mildred McAfee, president of Wellesley College, who became, in early summer 1992, the

19Ebbert and Hall, 35.
20Ibid.
21Ibid., 32.
first woman ever commissioned in the Navy as a Lieutenant Commander. Several months later, on August 28, 1942 120 civilian women were commissioned and sent to orientation at Smith College in Northampton, Massachusetts. Almost two months later:

On October 6, 1942 the second class reported, consisting of 900 women. One hundred and twenty-four of this group were commissioned a month later. The remaining 776 women were designated as apprentice Seamen. Once they had completed a month of training they were appointed as midshipmen and provided advanced indoctrination. When they had successfully completed eight weeks of training, they were commissioned as ensigns and lieutenants (junior grade) on December 16, 1942.22

Just before the first group of WAVE officers were commissioned in 1942, the Bureau of Navy Personnel had been established. Before this organization's responsibilities could be determined, women had been incorporated. This added to the then existing administrative turbulence, thus it became more difficult to effectively incorporate women into the organization. Disorganization in the headquarters created disorganization in the naval districts. The first female naval officers had little guidance to direct them as they executed their primary task to recruit more WAVES. Ebbert and Hall confided that "there was little to guide them other than their own good sense. WAVES out in the field often had to make local policy on the spot."23

Early on after the first European American Female Officers had been commissioned, the Chief of Navy Personnel (CNP) granted the Director of WAVES direct access to his office. The CNP made this gesture in an attempt to clearly

22Ibid., 49-50.
23Ebbert and Hall, 44.
demonstrate his sincere commitment to supporting the WAVES. Even though this was a very important gesture, it did not change the way the Navy officials had become accustomed to doing business, "a way that did not include consulting with women even on decisions that directly affected them."24 The invitation that allowed the Director of WAVES to bypass the chain of command created an atmosphere of suspicion and resentment among male officers. The male officers way of getting even with Lieutenant Commander McAfee was to exclude her from being included in other Navy plans.

As America prepared to become an active participant in the emerging European war, the alert African American communities openly applied direct pressure on the armed services to increase opportunities for African American service members. Community and national leaders informed military officials that, if African American sailors and soldiers were expected to be willing to die for the country, they should be accorded the same rights, privileges, and opportunities as other sailors and soldiers. As a testament of their level of commitment to this cause, national black organizations in the early 1940's organized a major march on Washington, D. C.. President Roosevelt took this movement very seriously and responded by directing the defense industry to immediately begin implementing equal opportunities for African Americans.

By 1942 the direct and constant pressure from the African American community, coupled with prodding from Eleanor Roosevelt, prompted President Roosevelt to begin to openly push the Navy to increase opportunities for African Americans. The Navy, which had been basically nonresponsive, responded. However, as the number of African

24 Ibid.
Americans began to increase, the Navy created base companies to accommodate the influx. Base company's personnel were assigned to overseas duty and were essentially groups of laborers: stevedores, ammunition handlers, construction workers and maintenance men.

Government regulations were a thinly designed ploy. In reality, a separate branch to absorb African American enlisted personnel that avoided the integration of the fleet had been created. This practice created massive resentment among all Navy enlisted personnel. African American sailors resented it because this arrangement was exactly like the arrangement with the messmen. They were separate from the Navy as a whole and were offered neither integration nor equal opportunity. European American sailors did not like the practice because this made them exclusively eligible for combat duty.25

U. S. Navy and Africana Male Officers

By 1943 even more pressure had been applied on the Navy by numerous African American organizations to commission some African American officers. One of the Navy's first proposed plans for commissioning a limited number of Africana Male Officers was detailed in an undated memorandum prepared for the Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP) by a staff member. An issue surfaced in this memorandum which indicated that as of December 31, 1943 there would be more than 125,000 Blacks serving in the enlisted ranks of the Navy.26 The author frankly conveyed to the CNP that it was

25Stillwell, xxi.

believed unrealistic and definitely unwise to overlook the fact that it was possible for the Navy to have 125,000 enlisted Blacks but no Black officers. Further, he stated that:

However unpalatable the idea may be, it is believed certain that unless the Navy, on its own initiative, prepares and puts into effect a program for commissioning some Negroes, the Navy would be required to do so. The disadvantage of waiting for the requirement to be imposed lies in this: if the Navy prepares a limited program there is less danger that it will be required to take much greater numbers of officers on any certain percentile basis. Furthermore, the outside pressure which is now steadily increasing, might well be checked before it reaches greater proportions.\(^{27}\) This plan specifically recommended that immediate provisions be made to select from civilian ranks of Negro college graduates a minimum of 50 officer candidates. Additionally, it recommended that an attempt be made to determine whether a minimum of 25 Africana males, that were currently enlisted could pass sufficient qualifications for promotion to officer rank. Another provision of this plan stated that once these officers were appropriately trained, they would be assigned to activities where there were already large numbers of Black enlisted personnel, at the same time avoiding problems of social admixture.\(^{28}\)

The final recommendation included in this memorandum stated that if this plan was approved "that it be effected without undue publicity. The Navy would then be in a position to state that it had Negro officers, that it had a well defined and carefully formulated policy and program on the matter, and that it should be permitted to carry out its own program without change or interference."\(^{29}\)

Prior to this internal Navy discussion regarding the likelihood of commissioning Africana Male Officers, a similar discussion had transpired in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy. Adlai Stevenson, Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy communicated in a

\(^{27}\)Ibid.

\(^{28}\)Ibid.

\(^{29}\)Ibid., 43.
memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy his concerns regarding commissioning Africana Male Officers. The memorandum dated September 23, 1943 focused on several issues. Stevenson stated that:

I feel very emphatically that we should commission a few Negroes. We now have more than 60,000 already in the Navy and are accepting 12,000 per month. Obviously this cannot go on indefinitely without making some officers or trying to explain why we don't. Ultimately, there will be Negro officers in the Navy. It seems to be wise to do something about it now. One reason we have not had the best of the race is the suspicion of discrimination in the Navy. In addition, the pressure will mount both among the Negroes and in the government as well. I don't believe we can, or should, postpone commissioning some Negroes. If and when it is done it should not be accomplished by any special publicity, but rather treated as a matter of course. The news will get out soon enough.30

In December 1943 the Chief of Naval Bureau recommended to the Secretary of the Navy that the Navy commission 12 line and 10 staff Africana officers. Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox resisted until his death, the admission of Africana women into the WAVES. However, at this juncture he had essentially come to accept the prospect that Africana males would serve as officers in the Navy Reserves.31 Initially he based his opposition on the logic that Africana officers were not needed until there were large numbers of sailors of the same race for them to command. The influx of Africana draftees that had begun in early 1943 debunked Knox's main argument and left him vulnerable to the logic of Adlai Stevenson.32 In January 1944 sixteen Africana enlisted males entered a segregated officer candidate school at the Great Lakes Naval Training

30 Ibid., 141.


32 Ibid.
Station. The choice of the number of candidates appears to be arbitrary, however it is known that allowance was made for 25 percent attrition. All sixteen men successfully completed the course, however, only twelve were commissioned. One individual was selected for Warrant Officer but the remaining three men were returned to the fleet as enlisted. The first Africana Male Officers were commissioned March 17, 1944 without the traditional pomp and circumstance that usually accompanies a commissioning ceremony. They received congratulations only from the officer who administered the oath of commissioning in his office.

**U. S. Navy and Africana Female Officers**

In theory, Africana women were not precluded from entering the Navy in 1942. However, in reality, Africana women were excluded from the WAVES for more than two years, despite endless efforts by many, both in and out of the Navy, to include them. Late in 1942, the Chief of Naval Personnel responded to an inquiry from the Young Women's Christian Association regarding the recruitment of Africana women with the following: "At this time the Navy does not have a substantial body of Negro men available for general service at sea [and] it has not occasion to replace Negro enlisted men with Negro enlisted women." It appeared that several dozen Blacks applied to enlist, but none were accepted. Ebbert and Hall revealed that "the most immediate active opponent to the

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33Stillwell, xxiv.
34Ibid.
admitting of Black women was Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox." They further disclosed that "Knox was violently opposed to the idea, although he stated publicly that the matter was under review." Bernard Nalty, stated that "Knox fervently maintained this position until his death in April, 1944." A 1970 oral interview given to the U.S. Naval Institute by Lieutenant Commander Mary Josephine Shelley, a World War II veteran, divulged that "it was an unspoken and certainly unwritten order/policy not to recruit Black women." Lieutenant Commander Shelley further announced that "Secretary Knox was strictly adverse to them being recruited...both men and women, especially women. Secretary Knox thought it improper for Black women to be WAVES." Shelley stated that "he had high standards for WAVES. He wanted them to be absolutely Mainboucher uniformed, perfect, beautiful." In another oral interview given to the same source, Mildred McAfee, the first Director of the WAVES, indeed corroborated Shelley's statement that "the Navy had and practiced an unwritten policy of not recruiting Black WAVES."

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37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Nalty, 192.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 R. E. Bouder, Recollections of Captain Mildred McAfee, USNR(Ret) Mrs. Douglas Horton (Annapolis: US Naval Institute, 1971), 44.
By the spring of 1943 the Office of the Women's Reserves had received a significant amount of external pressure regarding the recruiting of Africana women. In response to this pressure, the Navy assigned a WAVE Officer to the Planning and Controls Special Programs Unit for the sole purpose of determining opportunities for employing Africana women, as well as laying the basic plans for their utilization. On April 27, 1943, the Chief of Naval Personnel forwarded a memorandum to the Secretary of Navy proposing a plan that would accommodate the entrance of Africana women.44

The Chief of Naval Personnel's plan, in part, proposed the following recommendations:

(a) An officer should be appointed to full time duty as a supervisor for the program for Negro women. This should be a woman who has had such experience (preferably in interracial activities) that she has the confidence of Negro and white leaders.
(b) A small number of carefully selected Negroes should be admitted at first, the numbers to increase gradually. It is undesirable to set a fixed quota around which controversy can develop. The ultimate number should be flexible according to the needs of the Navy.
(c) A few highly selected Negro women should be commissioned as officers to supervise Negro enlisted women. Since they would be required to meet all requirements of any officer, it is recommended that they be indoctrinated at the U. S. Naval Reserves Midshipmen's School at Northampton. Negro students have been enrolled at Smith College.45

Simultaneous to this internal Navy planning, Mildred McAfee had been communicating regularly with members of the Urban League, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and Mary McCleod Bethune regarding

45Ibid.
the conditions and terms under which Africana women would be included in the Navy. In July, 1943, after much debate, the Director of the WAVES reported that she was prepared to recommend that Africana women be brought into the Navy on a fully integrated basis, although she was "well aware of the practical difficulty involved." The Women's Advisory Counsel, which had been created to advise the Navy on the establishment of the Women's Reserves, recommended, on August 6, 1943, full integration. To the contrary, in September, 1943 the WAVES district directors, all junior European American Female Officers, made an opposing recommendation. These junior officers were responsible for implementing whatever decisions made, recommended deferring the admission of Africana women as long as possible. It appeared that the district directors input had more influence with the Navy policy makers than the WAVE Director, the most senior woman in the Navy. After this activity, the plan to admit Africana women in the Women's Reserve received no real attention until after the death of Secretary Frank Knox in April 1944.

Ebbert and Hall declared that "two developments combined to open Navy doors to Blacks. One of the factors was the death of Frank Knox, in April, 1944, and the final positive change occurred when Knox's undersecretary, James Forrestal, succeeded him.

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46 Ebbert and Hall, 85.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
According to Ebbert and Hall Forrestal's was "as much in favor of Black women entering the Navy as Knox had been opposed."\(^{51}\) According to these historians, "on July 28 Forrestal recommended to President Roosevelt that the Navy admit and treat Black women exactly as it did white women."\(^{52}\)

Nalty viewed the situation differently than Ebbert and Hall. He disclosed that Forrestal's support did not evolve from a moral source. Related data disclosed that "had Captain Mildred McAfee, the director of the WAVES, not ignored protocol and insisted that Secretary Forrestal himself make the decision, her organization might well have remained exclusively white."\(^{53}\) It was the concept of "a more efficient use of manpower than segregation could"\(^{54}\) that motivated Forrestal to endorse racial integration in the Navy. There was a group of Naval officials that postulated that "segregation simply did not work afloat or ashore."\(^{55}\) Forrestal aligned himself with the stance of this group. Secretary Knox had enacted a practice and policy of assigning Blacks in shore billets. Forrestal changed this policy and implemented a new one. The genesis of the new policy arose from "practical rather than ethical considerations, for reasons of morale and efficiency rather than right and wrong."\(^{56}\)

\(^{51}\)Ibid.  
\(^{52}\)Ibid.  
\(^{54}\)Ibid., 192.  
\(^{55}\)Ibid., 193  
\(^{56}\)Ibid.
Comments made in his July 28, 1944 memorandum to the President of the United States regarding admitting Africana women in the Women's Reserves casted doubt on Forrestal’s true feelings regarding this issue. After having delineated the specifics of his plan, he closed the memorandum with this subjective and biased statement: "I propose to proceed with the above plan in the near future. I consider it advisable to start obtaining Negro WAVES before we are forced to take them."57 Apparently, at the time the memorandum was sent to the President he was in Hawaii participating in a meeting that was developing strategy for defeating Japan. The President did not act on the plan after his return to the White House. Instead, the matter remained in limbo until the exclusion of Africana women from the WAVES became a political issue.

Thomas E. Dewey, governor of New York, was President Roosevelt's opponent in the 1944 Presidential election. During the campaign, Dewey charged the Roosevelt administration with racial discrimination in barring Blacks from the Navy's women's auxiliary.58 Mildred McAfee asserted that this charge moved the President to immediate action. She recalled "with very little notice, indeed I think it was on a Friday afternoon, the Secretary's office called over to my office and said the President has ruled that beginning next week we will admit Negro women."59 McAfee further conveyed so when then President suddenly decided that this would happen, it was announced quickly that we would accept officers, and --

57James V. Forrestal, Memorandum For The President: Secretary of the Navy Correspondence File WWII (Washington: US National Archives), 1990.
58Ebbert and Hall, 86.
we wanted officers particularly to help supervise the women, the Negro women -- at Hunter in the basic training school, where there would be no segregation except that there would be a company of 250 women, and they would have all the privileges of the station. They would eat in the same mess, everything there, which was a simply incredible achievement from the point of view of where we'd been in the Navy.  

According to McAfee, the African American community did not respond very positively to this announcement. This World War II Navy veteran recalled "but with the word that this was what was going to happen, the whole thing was boycotted, and we got only two applicants for Negro officers, and one was a graduate of Mount Holyoke and one was the graduate of Hunter." Harriet Ida Pickens and Frances Wills were the two Africana women who responded to the Navy's search for "Negro women" officer candidates. Pickens was a summa cum laude graduate in history from Mount Holyoke and Wills had a Masters of Science degree in Social Administration from the University of Pittsburgh. At the time these two women were selected for officer candidate training, the last Women's Reserves Officer's class had already convened and had been in session for three weeks. In spite of the fact that they were almost a month behind their classmates, these officer candidates took their places with the class, caught up on the information that they had missed, kept up with the class, and graduated on time with the class on December 21, 1944. Harriet Ida Pickens graduated third in the officer candidate class of over 200 officer candidates and was commissioned Lieutenant (junior grade), and

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60 Ibid., 46-47.
61 Ibid., 47.
62 Ibid.
Frances Wills was commissioned Ensign. Phyllis May Daley, also of New York, became the first Africana female nurse commissioned in April, 1945.

Once the Navy had included Africana female officers within its ranks, it was unable to execute its proposal for utilizing them. In reality the Navy was victimized by its own poor planning and plan execution. Because there was no secondary plan in place, the Navy had to find something for the two Africana female officers to do. The two officers were stationed in New York City at Hunter College, the site for training for enlisted women. Lieutenant (junior grade) Pickens taught physical training to the recruits. Ensign Wills made several recruiting trips to predominately Black colleges, but primarily she reviewed classified examinations used to assign enlisted women to various billets. Mildred McAfee indicated that, after the Navy did not get the desired response to its appeal for Africana Female Officers and enlisted females, several of the senior members of the Navy, who had always opposed the idea, thought this was justification enough to stop recruiting Africana females.63 The Secretary of the Navy did not agree with this perception, thus the recruitment of Africana women did not stop, at least in policy.

Ebbert and Hall stated the fact that "America had more readily accepted and commissioned "three women naval officers from a foreign country, France...before this pair of Black Americans was granted the same opportunity."64 They posited that the fact

63Ibid., 47.

64Jean Ebbert and Marie Beth Hall, Crossed Currents, (Brassey, Washington, 1993), 86.
"that Black women were so few in number may have eased their entry, but it may also have engendered feelings of isolation."\textsuperscript{65}

Ebbert and Hall's data disclosed that "in the summer of 1945 the Navy had approximately 317,000 officers, of whom nearly were women."\textsuperscript{66} A more critical review showed that 308,550 (97.3\%) were European American Male Officers, approximately 8,398 (2.6\%) were European American Female Officers, 50 (.01\%) were Africana Male Officers, and 2 (0\%) were Africana Female Officers. Approximately 8,400 women officers, 8,398 (99.9\%) were European American Female Officers, 50 (.05\%) were Africana Male Officers, and 2 (.02\%) were Africana Female Officers. Other data revealed that there were 4,199 times more European American Female Officers than Africana Female Officers, and there were 168 times for European American Female Officers than Africana Male Officers.

According to Nalty's data, the numbers for the total of women, approximately 8400, did not include the Nurse Corps statistics. This scholar disclosed that a total of 11,000 nurses served during World War II.\textsuperscript{67} Of this total, Nalty stated that "only four were Black,"\textsuperscript{68} 10,996 (99.9\%) of the Nurse Corps were European American Female Officers, and 4 (.03\%) were Africana Female Officers. The data showed that 2749 times more European American Female Officers served than Africana Female Officers. At one

\textsuperscript{65}Ibid., 87.

\textsuperscript{66}Ibid., 89.


\textsuperscript{68}Ibid.
point during World War II, the Navy suffered a shortage of 500 nurses, and still would not select 500 qualified Africana women to fill the deficit.

Prior to the formal ending of World War II, the Navy established a demobilization team, who was tasked to develop plans that would direct how the demobilization process would be executed. The Navy was keenly cognizant of its need to ensure that during demobilization the value of woman as a manpower resource and their invaluable contributions could not be overlooked or disregarded. To ensure that the issue remained a core issue, the Navy consciously placed a female commander on the team, as a strong advocate and voice for women. The Navy's need for this resource did not evolve from an enlightened social mentality regarding women in the Navy. Instead, it materialized from a concern for having adequate availability to human resources in case another need emerged. Also, the Navy was aware of the political power the women had as voters, taxpayers, and veterans.

When demobilization actually began, the Navy immediately realized that it had under-estimated the manpower need to expedite the process. The results of a survey conducted in January, 1946 revealed a need for approximately 1,300 women officers.69 According to available data, neither of the two Africana Female Officers were asked to remain on active duty. One of the officers interviewed, indicated that she was not asked to stay on beyond demobilization. She also conveyed that she did not know if the second officer had been asked. In fact, she indicated that she had been discharged early in 1946, and the second officer had been discharged even earlier. Dennis Nelson, one of the first

69Jean Ebbert and Marie Beth Hall, Crossed Currents, (Brassey, Washington, 1993), 92.
Africana Male Officers commissioned, was not a part of the demobilization team, but was asked to remain on active duty.

By this time the Navy had become convinced that it was essential to have women in the regular Navy, not just the reserves. In March, 1946, the Navy activated the postwar Naval Reserve, and male reservists could be extended on active duty until June 30, 1947. . .then the Navy promptly asked women officers to volunteer to serve in their present ranks until July 1, 1947, expressing the hope that a determination of the placement of women in the peacetime Navy would be made prior to that date.⁷⁰

Post World War II and Beyond

Dennis Nelson, one of the first Africana Male Naval Officers, stated that during World War II a total of six Africana female officers served in the Navy.⁷¹ In addition to the three female officers previously mentioned, Pickens, Wills and Daley, Edith DeVoe, Maxine Magee and Eula Stimley served as nurses during this period.⁷² Nelson provided additional statistics which identified the Africana Naval Officers who served during World War II. He stated that during the war a total of 52 Africana officers were commissioned. The following is an occupational distribution of these officers:⁷³

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⁷⁰Ibid., 99-100.


⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Ibid., 206.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
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Nelson's data indicated that during the early part of the war an individual's age was the variable that determined commissioning rank. Generally, the rule allowed men ages 21 through 28 were commissioned as Ensigns, men ages 29 through 35 were commissioned as Lieutenant (junior grade) and men ages 36 through 42 were commissioned Lieutenants. Nelson further disclosed that the average age of the first twelve men commissioned was above 31 years. The Navy changed this practice in mid 1943. This age modification for commissioning rank reflected that men ages 19 through 30 were commissioned as Lieutenant (junior grade) and men 39 through 50 were commissioned as Lieutenants. Nelson stated that this practice was not implemented when the first Africana males were commissioned in 1944. If it had been applied then, 74

74 Ibid.
only a few of the first twelve would have been commissioned as Ensigns.\textsuperscript{75} Only one of the first Africana Male Officers commissioned reached the rank of Lieutenant.\textsuperscript{76} This promotion was a spot promotion. A spot promotion is given to an individual because the job she/he is performing requires an officer of a specific rank. Nelson's data showed that one staff corps officer reached the rank of Lieutenant Commander by the same process. The circumstances that led to his promotion was his agreement to remain overseas in an assignment rather than be demobilized. The Navy realized that demobilizing women had to be handled carefully. In 1945 the Navy established a demobilization team and tasked it with the responsibility to develop an effective demobilization plan. The team composition included three male officers and one female officer. The Navy purposely assigned a female commander to the team to ensure that the female perspective was included.\textsuperscript{77} Ebbert and Hall conveyed that "public opinion of the WAVES was highly favorable as was the WAVES own opinion of the Navy."\textsuperscript{78} It was perceived that a well organized and effective demobilization plan could preserve and protect these valuable assets. The Navy had learned to be more attuned to the status of the WAVES. It realized that unlike the Yeoman (F) of World War I, the WAVES were voters and veterans. This recognition demonstrated that the Navy fully understood the existing and future potential clout women had as voters and veterans. Dennis Nelson, one of the first

\textsuperscript{75}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{76}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{77}Ebbert and Hall, 90.

\textsuperscript{78}Ibid.
Africana officers commissioned, was retained on active duty during demobilization at the insistence of the Secretary of the Navy. Although Lieutenant Nelson was not a member of the demobilization team, his sheer presence gave high visibility to Africana Male Naval Officers during this transition period. As the Navy executed its demobilization plan, it consciously invested an obvious sensitivity to the issue of demobilizing women.

The country began to demobilize from its war posture during the mid 1940's and the first WAVES were being processed for discharge by October 1, 1945. By the end of the year approximately twenty-one thousand WAVES and nurses had been discharged. Available data did not indicate when Lieutenant (junior grade) Pickens was released from active duty. According to Frances Wills Thorpe, Lieutenant (junior grade) Pickens was released before she was. Wills was released in early 1946. The first two Africana Female Officers were released from active duty without replacement. During the period of 1945 through 1947 the Navy did not recruit any personnel.

The Navy miscalculated the length of time it would take to demobilize its personnel. Even though the process became a fairly protracted one because of a personnel shortage, there was some positive fallout. The shortage was significant enough that it impacted the Navy's ability to effect its demobilization plan. The Navy realized that the source of for from this problem lay with the same women that it had been hesitant to commission and enlist. This manpower shortage was so great that the Navy

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was forced to request that 1300 women officers remain on duty. In some instances the
women were involuntarily retained. According to Mrs. Frances Wills Thorpe, she was
not asked to remain on active duty during demobilization nor was she aware if
Lieutenant (junior grade) Pickens had been solicited to remain on active duty. The
Navy learned from this experience that women were an invaluable asset not only in war,
but also in peace.

Demobilization was a period when the country sought to recover economically,
and it was also a transitory period for the military. The U.S. Air Force became a
separate branch from the Army. The other military branches focused on enhancing their
resources so they could become more viable as permanent military entities. For the
Navy, demobilization was also a key period wherein European American females and
Africana males were able to capitalize on their physical presence in the organization and
became permanent sources of manpower within the Navy. This visibility of European
American Female Officers and Africana Male Officers proved to be a major asset for
them. They were able to actually participate in and contribute directly to the formulation
of policies and practices that ensured their permanency in the organization. Further, to
varying degrees, this visibility enabled these two groups to develop their own
professional agendas and develop advocacies that have ensured their professional
survival. It was perhaps this early lack of physical visibility of Africana Females
Officers in the Navy that significantly contributed to their current professional status in
the organization. During the period of 1946 to the mid 1960's the history, the
accomplishments, and contributions of Africana Female Officers were not very well
documented in the available resources. It appeared that, if Africana Female Officers were present, they embraced the networks of European American Female Officers and Africana Male Officers and assumed that their professional concerns and needs would be addressed via one or both of these avenues.

Approximately three hundred of the European American female officers who remained on active duty during demobilization were eventually selected to be commissioned in the regular Navy. The first eight were sworn in on October 1948. This selected group of officers provided a nucleus of women that could be quickly expanded in case of war. Further, this group of officers was tasked to keep abreast of the rapid developments in technological, scientific and medical fields. The Navy selected women from a variety of occupational specialties. To further enhance this nucleus of three hundred female officers, the Navy later decided to select two hundred more women as officers. The new officers were selected from the group of WAVES officers who had been demobilized and newly recruited women who had no previous Navy experience. The women who had been demobilized and selected for reactivation were given the opportunity to apply for acceptance in the regular Navy as opposed to remaining reserve officers. They were given this option because they had an asset the Navy needed, leadership experience. In May 1949, twenty-nine female Ensigns graduated from a five month training course. The available data did not indicate the race of these officers. This was the first group of female officers commissioned since 1944.

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80 Ibid., 117.
In 1949 Women Officer Candidate School was the only source of commissioning for women officers. On the other hand there were three commissioning sources for male officers: Officer Candidate School (OCS), Navy Reserves Officer Training Corps (NROTC) and the Naval Academy. For a twenty-five year period (1949 - 1974) civilian women could only become Naval officers after having successfully completed Officer Candidate School (OCS). Also, in 1949 Jesse Brown became the first Africana Male Officer to become a naval aviator, and Wesley Brown became the first Africana male to graduate from the Naval Academy.

As the Navy and Congress continued to work on a plan that defined women's roles in the Navy, European American Female Officers continued to purposefully etch out a place for themselves in the organization. They made themselves and their talents essential prerequisites to the Navy's operations. One way they ensured their survival was to develop an informal "good ole girl network". This network genesis was traced back to February, 1946.\(^{81}\) The first director of the WAVES, Captain Mildred McAfee, was relieved by Captain Jean Palmer. Captain Palmer had been a member of McAfee's staff in 1942. Later in June, 1946, Captain Joy Hancock relieved Jean Palmer as Director of the WAVES. Hancock was among the first group of women commissioned, and had previously served in the Navy during World War I. Immediately, upon assuming this duty, Hancock personally selected and surrounded herself with a strong team of women officers.\(^{82}\) Three of these officers were Commander Bess Dunn, Lieutenant Commander

\(^{81}\)Ibid., 98.

\(^{82}\)Ibid., 105.
Winifred Quick, and Commander Louise Wilde.\textsuperscript{83} Commander Dunn was made assistant Director of the WAVES. Lieutenant Commander Quick's expertise lay in her extensive background in personnel planning, both in civilian and military areas, and Commander Wilde's experience was public affairs, gained during the War.\textsuperscript{84}

Captain Hancock's primary project was to gain permanent status for women in the Navy. Commander Wilde and Lieutenant Commander Quick worked closely with her on the project, while Commander Dunn handled the day-to-day details of the Office of the Director.\textsuperscript{85} After a seven year tenure as Director of the WAVES, Captain Hancock retired in 1953. Louise Wilde, one of her assistants, was promoted to Captain and assumed the duties of Director of the WAVES.\textsuperscript{86} Captain Wilde had also served with Captain Jean Palmer, the second Director of the WAVES, as her assistant.\textsuperscript{87} Captain Hancock had been successful in her efforts to secure approval for both women officers and enlisted to acquire permanent status in the regular and reserve components of the armed services.\textsuperscript{88} By the time Captain Wilde was relieved in 1957, the Director of the WAVES billet had been renamed the Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel.(W)\textsuperscript{89} Captain

\textsuperscript{83}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{84}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{85}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{86}Ibid., 106.
\textsuperscript{87}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{88}Ibid., 112.
\textsuperscript{89}Ibid., 144.
Wilde was relieved in 1957 by Captain Winifred Quick.\textsuperscript{90} Captain Quick had previously served with Lieutenant Commanders Palmer and Hancock in Hawaii.

Both Palmer and Hancock served as Director of the WAVES. Furthermore, when Captain Hancock was promoted to the position of Director, she immediately transferred Lieutenant Commander Quick from her billet in Corpus Christi, Texas to serve on her staff.\textsuperscript{91} Captain Quick served in this billet until she retired in 1962. Ebert and Hall stated that "Quick's most highly symbolic victory was that of persuading the Navy to name a woman as a commanding officer."\textsuperscript{92} Upon Quick's retirement, she was relieved by Captain Viola Sanders. Sanders had been instrumental in planning and initiating peacetime training for enlisted women.\textsuperscript{93} Captain Sanders had at one time, in the late 1950's, served as Captain Quick's deputy.\textsuperscript{94} In 1966 Captain Rita Lenihan became the Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel (W), relieving Captain Sanders after she had completed a four year tour. Captain Lenihan came because she let it be known that she was not in favor of sending Navy women to Vietnam. She received a number of requests for women to be stationed in Vietnam. She denied each of them until April, 1967.\textsuperscript{95} At that time the Captain announced that the first non-nurse would be stationed in Vietnam. The officer was Lieutenant Elizabeth G. Wylie, the daughter of an

\textsuperscript{90}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{91}Ibid., 104.
\textsuperscript{92}Ibid., 145.
\textsuperscript{93}Ibid., 161.
\textsuperscript{94}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{95}Ibid., 156.
Admiral. As Captain Lenihan made announcement, she emphasized that Navy women were not to expect that any significant number of such assignments would be forthcoming. The Captain basically did not like the idea of sending women to a war zone. Another issue she did not support was the need, or appropriateness, of keeping pregnant women on active duty. Subsequently, the policy to discharge pregnant women remained in effect until Captain Lenihan retired.

Robin Quigley relieved Lenihan as Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel (W) in January, 1971. Little information was available which connected her to the previous WAVE Directors. Available data divulged that Quigley had completed two tours working for the Chief of Naval Operations, the most senior naval officer, a Four Star Admiral. Further, she had served as senior aid to a high-level Admiral in Paris.

Unlike her predecessors, Quigley did not serve in World War II. She was commissioned in 1954. It was superficial qualities, such as youthfulness, good looks, and forthright manner that influenced senior authorities to appoint Quigley to her new position. This cursory review of Captain Quigley’s attributes influenced the selecting

96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid., 179.
99 Ibid., 164.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid., 164.
103 Ibid.
authorities to assume that the persona she projected, conveyed that she was philosophically and intellectually aligned with Admiral Zumwalt. Ebbert and Hall best described this situation by exposing that "actually Robin Quigley's appearance and demeanor belied her conservative views."105

A year earlier the Navy had chosen an atypical candidate for Chief of Naval Operation. Admiral Elmo Zumwalt was not only younger than previous Admirals who had filled the billet, he was defined as being philosophical and an intellectual liberal. This label inferred that he was in accord with the changes that would improve navywide personnel morale and utilization, especially for women.107

One of Quigley's first actions was to publicly denounce the use of the term WAVES. On February 23, 1972, the Captain issued a jolting memorandum to all Navy women. . ."she reminded them that for a few years there was no such organization as the WAVES. . .they had not joined the WAVES, they had joined the Navy."108 The second major change the Director made was to disband the women's representative system. She directed women to use the same channels of communication and action already established for men.109 Prior to this action, commands had women representatives whose primary duty was to handle women's' issues in the command for the Commanding
Quigley's actions forced the matters to be handled via the regular chain of command, negating the double standard system of personnel problem solving.

Another significant decision made by Captain Quigley was to review the function of her office. This review lead her to conclude that most of the matters that were forwarded to her had been misdirected.\textsuperscript{110} She deduced that issues were directed to her only because they concerned women.\textsuperscript{111} Quigley "began to route all such matters to officer where, in her opinion, they more properly belonged, and thereby systematically dismantled her own office."\textsuperscript{112}

The actions taken by Captain Quigley were supported by Admiral Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations, because "they seemed consonant with the changes generated by Z-grams."\textsuperscript{113} However, the first sign of discord between the Captain and the Admiral surfaced when he established a WAVE retention study in March, 1971, and appointed Quigley as its sponsor.\textsuperscript{114} As the sponsor, the Captain was directed by the Chief of Naval Operations not to provide input, rather to facilitate only.\textsuperscript{115} In 1972 Admiral Zumwalt had created a committee to draft the contents for Z-116.\textsuperscript{116} Captain Quigley failed to

\textsuperscript{110}Ibid., 167.
\textsuperscript{111}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{112}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{113}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{114}Ibid., 168.
\textsuperscript{115}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{116}Ibid.
execute what, in essence, was a lawful order. The Captain basically told the Admiral, no, and sent her deputy, instead, to the meetings.\textsuperscript{117}

Ebbert and Hall stated that Quigley "declined the invitation to attend the meeting" because she believed that the intent was to get around her opposition to the Z-grams recommendations to send women to sea... admit women to the Naval Academy, and allow them into flight training.\textsuperscript{118} Instead of holding Captain Quigley accountable for her inappropriate behavior, she was instead rewarded. According to the same authors, the guise of her dismantling her billet "provided a plausible pretext for her departure from Washington."\textsuperscript{119} Quigley was rewarded with the honor of becoming the first woman to be given a major command... service schools command in San Diego, California.\textsuperscript{120}

When Robin Quigley eradicated her billet as Assistant Chief of personnel (W) in 1972, an informal but very institutionalized and very operational system was dissipated. This system no longer had a Washington, D.C. base. Nevertheless it was very resilient but assumed a more amorphous state at the grassroots level. This was the original good ole girl network.

\textsuperscript{117}ibid.
\textsuperscript{118}ibid.
\textsuperscript{119}ibid.
\textsuperscript{120}ibid.
In 1978 two officers stationed in Washington, D.C. spearheaded the drive to establish an informal organization called Women Officers Professional Network.\textsuperscript{121} With additional support, six years later the organization was incorporated as The Women Officers Professional Association (WOPA).\textsuperscript{122} The Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) sought support from service leaders to affirm their support for such organizations, so that the potential for backlash would be diminished.\textsuperscript{123} It was also revealed that Navy officials assured the committee that they supported WOPA formation.\textsuperscript{124} The stated purpose of this organization was to produce a monthly newsletter, to hold frequent workshops and symposia on career opportunities and on traditional, formal military dinners, such as dining ins.\textsuperscript{125}

WOPA has always touted that it had an open membership policy.\textsuperscript{126} Currently its membership is open to officers on active duty in all services, retired and former officers, midshipmen, and civilians.\textsuperscript{127} Despite the wide publication of WOPA's membership policy, over a period of time this organization has gained the reputation among Africana Female Officers as being one that really only embraced the interests and needs of European American Female Officers. They further, unequivocally, conveyed that

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{121}Ibid., 208
  \item \textsuperscript{122}Ibid, 209.
  \item \textsuperscript{123}Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{124}Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{125}Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{126}Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{127}Ibid., 154.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
WOPA was the updated code name for the good ole girl network, a system that has existed for a long time in the Navy. The interviewees for this research project reported that their many attempts to become active in WOPA at various commands had not been reenforced or encouraged, and certainly were not solicited. These officers were convinced that WOPA is an official source that gave voice to the concerns of European American Female Officers. These same interviewees stated that, similar to WOPA, the National Naval Officers Association, (NNOA), gave voice to the needs and issues of Africana Male Officers.

The National Naval Officers Association, (NNOA) was established in the early 1970's. NNOA is sanctioned by the Secretaries of the Navy and Transportation. The organization's membership is open to active duty, reserve, and retired officers of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. The stated objectives of this organization are to support the mission of the Navy Service by (1) promoting minority recruitment and retention, (2) encouraging maximum minority participation of the sea services, (3) identifying problem areas and forwarding them to cognizant authorities, and (4) establishing positive images of the sea service in the minority communities.

Ebbert and Hall did not deny the existence of a female officers' network. Instead, they clearly indicated that one of the chief reasons women officers survived in the Navy was because they "learned how to create a network of friends and contacts that

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128 The History of the NNOA Fact Sheet, 1.

129 Ibid.

130 Jean Ebbert and Marie Beth Hall, Crossed Currents, (Brassey, Washington, 1993), 154.
spanned continents and oceans." These scholars additionally articulated that the dominant reason women officers survived is because they "learned how to plan a career, how to transfer comfortably from one job to another, and from one duty station to another." These authors stated that still another principal reason women officers survived was because "in certain fields where they were clustered -- administration and communication, for example, they developed expertise well beyond that of many males in the same field." 

By the end of June 1950 America found itself caught in the midst of another international crisis, the Korean conflict. Even before the intensity of the conflict escalated, the Navy realized that it had a manpower shortage. There was a significant increase in the need for female officers. The number of requests had increased to such a level that the Navy female assignment officer experienced difficulty in filling the requests. To alleviate this problem, the assignment officer resorted to contacting a significant number of female reserve officers, and invited them to fill the void. The reserve officers responded to this request in such numbers that the Navy did not have to involuntarily recall any female officers. It was during this crisis that the training period for new officer candidates in Officer Candidate School was reduced from five months to sixteen weeks. These officers were commissioned into the active reserves rather than directly in the regular Navy, with the understanding that they could later apply for

131Ibid.
132Ibid.
133Ibid.
regular status. Reserve commissions required less time to process than regular commissions. A very old Congressional mandate directs that each regular commission be individually approved by Congress. During the Korean conflict, female officers were assigned to and performed essentially the same jobs and duties that they had done during World War II. However, during this period, some new strides were accomplished. In the early 1950's Katherine Keating became the first woman to be commissioned in the Medical Service Corps. She was commissioned as a pharmacist and later became the first female officer to relieve a male at sea.

After the Korean conflict cease-fire occurred in 1953, all of the branches of the armed forces experienced a tremendous reduction in the number of volunteers that they were attracting. This reduction impacted both the number of officer and enlisted volunteers. It is the contention of Ebbert and Hall that this apathetic attitude toward the military was the product of a very progressive national economy. At this juncture in history the national economy was not only vibrant but was also expanding. Young adults who entered the work force had a wide range of civilian options to choose from in terms of career choices. To put this situation in perspective from the Navy's position, these scholars further indicated that "for Navy women, the period from 1953 to 1963 was bleak in many ways. Promotions were slow, opportunities to enter technical fields were far fewer than in World War II, and discriminatory policies discouraged many women

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134 Ibid., 117.

135 Ibid., 135.
from continuing on active duty while all but prohibiting mothers from serving.”

Ebbert and Hall's data showed that during the period of June 1964 to June 1968 the number of female line officers declined from approximately 560 in 1964 to about 450 in 1966, and by 1968 the numbers began to move upward again to 530. Their data further indicated that in contrast, the number of male officers increased by more than 9,000 or approximately 12 percent. This situation remained static until the early 1970's when another international crisis galvanized the attention of the world and the United States military leaders and personnel.

As America sent its first groups of military personnel to southeast Asia, it realized that all of its military branches were confronted with an acute personnel shortage. The military draft was activated in an attempt to resolve this issue. Even so, the casualty to enlistee ratio did not fill the gap. Furthermore civilian jobs paid better than the military, and they were still very much available. The Navy received a sufficient number of enlistees who were avoiding the draft. However, once they completed their obligated service most chose not to reenlist.

As they had done in previous national emergencies, during the Vietnam war the majority of Navy women served in the traditional fields women's fields. Available data indicated that the Navy was more resistive than the other branches of services to sending women other than nurses to the war zone. In spite of this hesitancy, nine female line officers served in Vietnam. Lieutenant Elizabeth Wylie was the first line officer

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136 Ibid.
137 Ibid., 156.
assigned to Southeast Asia. She was attached to the staff of the Commander of Naval Forces Vietnam in Saigon in 1967.\textsuperscript{138} Wylie's stellar professional performance apparently made a very positive impact on her seniors. Subsequent to her assignment to the area, the Navy established a policy that allowed a female officer to be assigned to the area "if a Navy commanding officer asked for her by name and stated that she was particularly qualified for a certain job."\textsuperscript{139} The enactment of this policy allowed eight additional female naval officers service in Vietnam. The authors of \textit{Crossed Currents} posited that "with this stringent policy in place, the wonder is that any Navy women officers served in the war zone at all.\textsuperscript{140}

In 1973 a second option for becoming a commissioned officer in the Navy was opened to women. After a year long trial program was successfully completed, Secretary of the Navy, John Warner approved plans to admit women in the Naval Reserves Officer Training Corps Program (NROTC), beginning in the fall of 1974. There are two tenets, past and present, to the NROTC program. They are the scholarship and contract tenets. Under the scholarship tenet, the Navy selects qualified high school seniors to attend a participating college at the expense of the government for a maximum of four years. The students receive tuition, textbooks, uniforms, and a small monthly allowance.\textsuperscript{141} During the academic school year, in addition to pursuing their major subjects,

\textsuperscript{138}Ibid., 157.
\textsuperscript{139}Ibid., 158.
\textsuperscript{140}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{141}Ebbert and Hall, 199.
midshipmen study designated naval courses taught by Navy personnel assigned to the institution's NROTC unit. During the summer the students are required to attend mandatory training activities. Midshipmen are commissioned into the regular Navy or Marine Corps and are obligated to serve on active duty for at least four years. Contract students are selected by the individual college's NROTC unit. They are allowed to take designated naval science courses along with their academic courses and are required to complete at least one summer training session. These students receive uniforms and naval science textbooks. Students who remain in the program until their Junior year become obligated to the Navy at that time. Once the students become officially obligated, they are given a small monthly allowance. These midshipmen are commissioned in either the Naval or Marine Corps Reserve and are obligated to serve on active duty for at least three years.

In 1975 women gained parity with men in terms of the number of options available for pursuing a commission in the U. S. Navy as an officer. Gerald Ford signed "Public Law 94-106 on October 7, 1975, and the following July the service academies accepted their first women."142 After much public and congressional debate, Congress agreed that women should be admitted to the previously all male service academies. Ebbert and Hall stated that the final supporting justification was that "the issue was equal access to career education, and the mission of the academies was to train officers for military careers rather than for combat."143 Subsequently, all of the academies

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142Ibid., 200.
143Ibid., 201.
omitted any reference to combat in their mission statements. The Naval Academy's mission statement was amended to read "to prepare midshipmen morally, mentally, and physically to be professional officers in the naval service." An individual may gain entrance to the Navy Academy by receiving a congressional appointment from one's U. S. Senator, U. S. Representative, or by receiving a Presidential appointment. This is an extremely competitive process and selected midshipmen are given, at the taxpayers expenses, four years of year round intensive academic, military, and physical training. Graduates of the Navy Academy receive bachelor's degrees and commissions in the regular Navy or Marine Corps. They are required to serve on active duty for at least six years.

Women, regardless of race, in all branches of the military displayed courageous acts and exemplary professional performance during the Gulf War of 1990 - 1991. These consistently highly visible accomplishments forced the Defense Department, military policy makers, and the general public to reexamine their perceptions and decisions regarding the participation and utilization of females in combat. The visibility and the magnitude of these accomplishments of military women in all the military services during this conflict were so pronounced that by mid 1991 both houses of Congress acknowledged the need to reexamine and potentially amend the portion of previous legislation that precluded women from combat. It was clear, that regardless of what the existing combat restriction stated, women in the Gulf War were directly 

144 Ibid.
affected daily. These restrictions did not guarantee safety for women. Ebbert and Hall argued that "they allowed women to be shot at but not to shoot."\textsuperscript{145}

By December 1991, Congress produced a compromise known as the Roth-Kennedy Amendment. The primary provision of this legislation gave women officers the opportunity to fly combat aircraft. However, it granted the President the option to appoint a commission to study combat restrictions before further action was taken. This Presidential commission recommended in late 1992 that Congress reverse its decision and prohibit the assignment of women to combat aircraft. It did vote to recommend that women be allowed to serve on all ships except submarines and amphibious ships.

As the politicians waged their political battle regarding women and combat, the Gulf War was the proving ground that was the turning point for women in the Navy. All available data indicated that this was the first time that Navy women were actually assigned to operational units in a combat environment, where many were exposed to hostile fire. A review of Ebert's and Hall's research revealed that approximately twenty-five hundred Navy women were involved in the Gulf War.\textsuperscript{146} According to this data the majority of this population served with medical units or on support ships. It also documented that a substantially smaller number of women officers served in aviation units, construction battalions, and cargo handling groups. Allegedly, two

\textsuperscript{145}Ibid., 127.

\textsuperscript{146}Ibid., 263.
women officers served with a construction battalion that built the fleet hospital at Al Jubayl, but overall a very small number of female officers participated in the Gulf.\textsuperscript{147}

During this time, Navy policy strictly prohibited women from being assigned to offshore aircraft carriers in any fashion. Yet women were assigned to air bases in Saudi Arabia. The missions of the bases and carriers were identical, however the carriers had the protection of the entire Navy Fleet. The bases, on the other hand, were subjected to constant fire from Iraqi Scud Missile attacks and took direct hits.\textsuperscript{148} Female officers who flew support aircraft that was ferrying in personnel and supplies, were not permitted to remain on board once they had made their deliveries.\textsuperscript{149} Even though women were precluded from being assigned to combatants, "they were assigned aboard ships that provided essential supplies, repair and ammunition to the American fleet during the Gulf combat operations."\textsuperscript{150} They were also aboard the hospital ships offshore. Blacksmith very logically and realistically reminded the researcher that "all of these support ships would have been as vulnerable to Exocet and Silkworm missiles and floating mines as the combat ship, and they generally sailed without the protection of the fleet."\textsuperscript{151} Furthermore, "in the Gulf War there were no fixed positions or clear lines in the sands -- in that the front changed hourly. Units in the rear areas, where the women were

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{147}Ibid., 264.
  \item \textsuperscript{148}E. A. Blacksmith \textit{Women in the Military} (New York: H.W. Wilson Company, 1992), 68.
  \item \textsuperscript{149}Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{150}Ibid., 69.
  \item \textsuperscript{151}Ibid.
\end{itemize}

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concentrated were often as exposed to attack as those at the front."\textsuperscript{152} Blacksmith also summarized the situation clearly by stating that "the men and women under Scud attacks knew they were in combat regardless of what the military called it."\textsuperscript{153} This officer was commissioned as a full Lieutenant and was the only Africana officer that fell within the proper age bracket.\textsuperscript{154}

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid., 65.
\textsuperscript{153} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{154} Ibid.
CHAPTER 5
GENDER AND RACE

Overview

Almost simultaneous with its establishment as a federal entity, the U. S. Navy has demonstrated a strong preference for having restrictive personnel policies that were either race or gender based. These policies, either written or unwritten, set the historical tone for the personnel hierarchy of this rather unique organization. According to E. A. Blacksmith, the Navy "evolved differently than that of the other military services."\(^1\) Blacksmith suggested this evolution occurred "perhaps because of its legacy from the British Navy and the demands of an infant nation."\(^2\) This unique heritage of the Navy might be one of the reasons for its prevailing elitist attitude. Furthermore, the constitutional provision that established the permanency of the Navy further enhanced the prevalence of this attitude. This scholar cited that "the constitution allowed for a permanent Navy but provided for the raising of armies only in times of emergency. Soldiers, not sailors, were expected to return to their farms after the threat of war had passed. The Navy, not the Army, kept an isolated and isolationist country safe by

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\(^2\)Ibid.
controlling its oceans." This significant national recognition coupled with the peculiar traditions of the sea gave the Navy the unstated permission to perceive itself and its personnel as being privileged and a breed apart from the other military services. This mentality of elitism provided the rationale for the infrastructure which led to personnel policies which have entrenched the homogenous founding group.

The first indication that the United States Navy engaged in race based personnel practices occurred during the late nineteenth century when the Navy integrated only out of necessity. Even then, race determined job and leadership assignments. It was the established practice to place Africana personnel in cook and servant type roles rather than in specialized or skilled positions. There were no Africana officers during this period.

The Navy's ensconced race based policy led to a conscious decision in the nineteenth century to change its recruiting practices. The Navy's first major technological advancement propelled it from an era of wooden ships to steel ships. This move significantly expanded the pool of available recruits. The Navy no longer had to rely solely on the limited number of personnel who had maritime experience, and lived in the coastal regions. The sudden demand for technical experience made more white men available for naval service. Thus the Navy was free to be even more restrictive in its use of Africana sailors.

Even in the face of a major international crisis (World War I), the Navy did not rescind this policy. While acknowledging the seriousness, as well as the potential impact of this problem, the Navy chose to look for alternative sources of relief. After much

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3Ibid.
research the Executive Branch posed a novel solution to the problem -- the recruitment of women. The Navy's need was so great and the idea was so new, yet very viable, that the Navy lost little time in adopting this policy. No written policy evolved. The utilization of this novel idea instantly provided the Navy with the solution it needed for its wartime personnel shortage. Women assumed responsibility for the administration and operation of the shore establishment, freeing the men for sea duty. Immediately following World War I the Navy stopped enlisting Africana sailors for a period of thirteen years, 1919-1932. Once the Navy reinstated its policy of recruiting and enlisting Africana sailors, the decision was predicated on a very operative race based policy. Africana males were sought out to serve only as stewards.

Blacksmith's interpretation of Naval history illustrated that after about two hundred years later the organization's response to change had been historically predictable. According to Blacksmith, "change has never come easily for the Navy."4 This scholar further stated, "the Navy is a culture that has been both intent on its privileges and intolerant of interference from outsiders, whether they be colleagues from other services, congressional oversight committees or contractors questioning bizarre procurement practices."5 Blacksmith concluded that the Navy's history clearly documented that "it is a service in which the privileged live comfortably in 'officer's

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4Ibid., 108.
5Ibid., 109.
country' sleeping in staterooms on clean sheets and waited on by Black and Filipino mess stewards."

After World War I, the needs of the Navy and an isolationist America changed. No emergency existed, thus the patriarchy had time to think. In the late 1930's the Navy passed The Naval Reserves Act of 1938. One of the major provisions if this Act excluded women from serving in the Naval Reserve. Thus at that point in history, the policies included social and gender implications. These race and gender based policies created a permanent milieu where the tone and practice for a privileged legacy would continuously evolve and be maintained. Several of Blacksmith's perceptions substantiate the survival of this legacy. Blacksmith stated "that the Navy today is an institution in profound crisis. It seems to see nothing amiss in its privileged ranks". Historically, the Navy as "the service of the Kennedys, the Roosevelts, and the Bushes, has long been a bastion of elitism."

During the late 1930's and early 1940's, the mood of world affairs shifted. A threat of another international crisis loomed on the horizon. The European war got closer to America, not so much geographically but ideologically. America moved from its isolationist posture and aligned itself with the philosophy of its allies. This philosophical alignment eventually was transformed into direct personnel support.

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6Ibid.

7Jean Ebbert and Marie-Ruth Hall, Crossed Currents (Washington: Brassey, 1993), 25.

8E. A. Blacksmith, 108.

9Ibid
The United States' involvement in early 1942 was apparent. As the U. S. Navy assessed its personnel inventory, it became immediately obvious that it was again faced with a major personnel shortage. Unlike World War I, the Navy could not just begin enlisting women to remedy this problem. One of the major provisions of the 1938 Naval Reserve Act precluded this option. As noted by Ebbert and Hall, historically, the Navy changed or changes only when there was or is an experienced need to do so or when it is solely in the best interest of the Navy's hierarchy.\(^{10}\) Conversely, Blacksmith stated that the Navy's hierarchy is too myopic or blind to change. She posited that "they are so wedded to old roles and missions to the Stovepipe culture and how to get their next star, that they are incapable of realizing what the country needs in its Navy."\(^{11}\) In 1942 because of the sheer magnitude of the personnel shortage, the Navy hesitantly agreed to make a change in its personnel recruitment practices. To do this, it decided that the 1938 Naval Reserve Act had to be amended. Women again were seen as the solution to an acute but severe personnel shortage.

**Review and Analysis of Gender-based Public Policy**

Public Law 689 amended the provision of the 1938 Naval Reserve Act which prohibited women from serving in the Naval Reserve. This new provision established the Women Reserve (WR) as an integral branch of the regular Naval Reserve.\(^{12}\) A fundamental proviso of this law directed that the Women Reserve be administered under

\(^{10}\)Ebbert and Hall, 88.

\(^{11}\)Blacksmith, 109.

\(^{12}\)Ebbert and Hall, 35.
the same provisions of the regular reserves in all respects.\textsuperscript{13} This stipulation specifically indicated that women were a part of the Reserve, not just serving as a separate entity.\textsuperscript{14} The passage of this law provided women an opportunity that was not afforded to them during World War I. It authorized the initial commissioning of women in the United States Navy. Women were authorized to be commissioned or enlisted in ranks or ratings that were parallel to those in the regular Navy with the permission of the Secretary of the Navy.\textsuperscript{15} This provision ensured that not only did Women Reservists have the same rank or rating as the regular Navy personnel, but most importantly, it assured that women would receive equal pay for equal rank.\textsuperscript{16}

Another important provision specifically declared that women reservists were not replacements for civilian personnel. Rather women were to be "trained and qualified to release male officers and enlisted men for sea duty."\textsuperscript{17} Parallel with this breakthrough opportunity, women officers were also confronted with a significant number of restrictions that instantly impeded their professional mobility. First, unlike men, Women Reservists had to be at least twenty years old. The breadth of female officers authority was also very restricted. I could only exercise authority over other women reservists and their sphere of operation was limited to administrative shore duty in the contiguous

\textsuperscript{13}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{14}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., 36.,
\textsuperscript{16}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{17}Ibid.
The specific reference to shore duty also served as the precedent for excluding women from assignments to navy ships and combat aircraft for a number of decades. Another restrictive provision limited the number of positions it made available to female officers. The most senior female officer could only be a Lieutenant Commander and there could only be one. Further, the number of Lieutenants was capped at thirty five, and "no more than 35 percent of the remaining female officers could be Lieutenant junior grade." 

Public Law 689 granted Women Reservists the same pay benefits as males, the benefits of the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act, and the National Service Life Insurance. Unlike male reservists injured or killed on active duty, women reservists did not receive the same benefits. Their benefits were commensurate to those prescribed by law for civilian employees. Additionally, this law did not grant a lump sum death gratuity to women beneficiaries, nor could they receive retirement pay or compensation of hospital care from the Veteran's Administration.

By mid 1943, the personnel needs of the Navy were so great that it took very little provocation for it to realize that the parameters of Public Law 689 were too confining, thus warranted change. In its hesitancy to commission women the Navy had

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18 Ibid., 37.
19 Ibid., 80.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., 37.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
miscalculated the number of women officers it actually needed. The large numbers of females commissioned in 1942 immediately filled the senior billets, billets that had been identified for females by Public Law 689. The fulfillment of public law 649 posed some very troubling effects for the Navy. Immediately its ability to ensure growth, both in terms of promotions and the continued recruitment of new officers, was seriously impaired. There was a cap on the number of senior female officers and the military pay was not competitive with civilian pay. Beside creating an internal morale problem, this situation diminished the incentive to join the Navy. To provide direct relief from this situation, Public Law 183 was enacted in November, 1943.\(^{24}\) As a result of this enactment, Mildred McAfee was immediately promoted from the rank of Lieutenant Commander to Captain by the Secretary of the Navy.\(^{25}\) She was not the only benefactor of this law. Her senior assistant was promoted from the rank of Lieutenant to Commander and thirty five female Lieutenants were promoted to Lieutenant Commander.\(^{26}\) Congress justified these numbers by stating that "more promotions to higher ranks for women would be unfair to men who had earned such ranks only after years of service."\(^{27}\) No such limitations were placed on male reservists who had parallel Navy experience. Public Law 183 also granted women reservists with dependents the option to request allowance for them. It was noted that Congress declared that "no

\(^{24}\text{Ibid., 80.}\)

\(^{25}\text{Ibid.}\)

\(^{26}\text{Ibid., 80-81.}\)

\(^{27}\text{Ibid., 81.}\)
allowances could be authorized for a woman's husband even if he did in fact depend on her for his support.  

As the activities of World War II escalated, it became inconspicuously obvious that the Navy could not execute its wartime mission without a secure source of personnel. Women proved to be that predictable and secure source. Attempts to just tap into this resource bank, readily displayed to the Navy the character of its gender based policies. The terms of the policies not only restricted the resource accessibility but also, how they were to be or not to be utilized. The Navy was unable to transfer qualified men to the combat area because assignment provisions in Public Law 689 precluded women from being stationed outside of the contiguous United States. Reacting to its self-imposed myopia, the Navy requested assistance from Congress with the matter. After denying the request twice, on the third request Congress responded positively. In September 1944 Public Law 441 was signed. It granted the Navy permission to assign women who volunteered to be stationed in Hawaii, Alaska, the Caribbean, and Panama.

This law, consistent with previous public laws, also embraced some exceptional conditions. Women who volunteered for overseas duty for a minimum of eighteen months had to have a commanding officer's endorsement. Specifically, this endorsement had to attest to the woman's maturity level, determine her ability to be responsive, and address her ability to adapt. Further, volunteers could not have dependents in the United States that needed them. Finally, the volunteers had to accept the fact that once assigned

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28 Ibid., 82.
29 Ibid., 86.
overseas they would not be granted leave in the United States during their entire assignment tour.\textsuperscript{30}

As the Navy addressed its gender issues, it was continuously being pressured to amend or discard its race based policies and practices. By September 1944 the Navy had acquiesced and perfunctorily incorporated Africana enlisted males into other occupational specialties aside from the strictly segregated ones. However, it had not experienced the need to change its policies and practices regarding the recruitment of Africana women. It displayed an attitude of disdain and noncompliance. Accordingly Blacksmith suggested that in the organization "there is an ultimate arrogance that its judgement is not to be questioned."\textsuperscript{31}

Unequivocally, women in the Navy during World War II proved that they were definitely essential to the effective and smooth operation of the organization. Similarly, women in the other armed services made the same impact on their respective services. Even though the invaluable contributions of these women could not be ignored, the Navy did not rush to embrace women within its ranks. The Navy, out of need, became more tolerant of women. The other services experiences were very similar, thus together they conspired to retain the resources which had enhanced their operational readiness. Public Law 625 was the product of this protracted and convoluted joint effort. This law became known as the Women Armed Services Act of 1948.\textsuperscript{32}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{30}Ibid., 88.
\item \textsuperscript{31}Blacksmith, 109.
\end{itemize}
During World War II, all of the military services learned an invaluable lesson regarding the necessity for having a well planned and executable personnel policy. The services also learned how invaluable this type of plan is by enhancing the organization's wartime effectiveness. Public Law 625 was enacted so that the services would have the necessary personnel policies and plans in place in the event of subsequent national emergencies. The prime provision of Public Law 625 gave the services the capability to call up large numbers of women in a national emergency. To accomplish this goal, it was necessary to make a concession that allowed women to be integrated into the regular forces of all branches of the military. With this option women gained the ability to pursue military careers, either on active duty or within the reserves, as a commissioned officer or enlisted women.

These achievements were significant accomplishments for women in the military. Indeed a major breakthrough had been achieved, but not without some circumscriptions. The very restrictive properties of this law provided the infrastructure and set the timbre for determining the kinds of professional opportunities that women in the military would have for years. First, Public Law 625 limited the number of women on active duty in each service to a maximum of two percent per service. Secondly, this law gave each service permission to temporarily promote one female to the rank of Captain or Colonel. In the Navy, this officer would serve as Assistant to Chief of Naval Personnel. Her singular responsibility was oversight of all plans and policies regarding women. Another restrictive feature, limited each service to having a maximum of ten percent female

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33 Ebbert and Hall, 111.
officers in the rank of Commander or Lieutenant Colonel, and a maximum of twenty percent in the rank of Lieutenant Commander or Major. The impact of these restrictions ensured that the highest permanent rank any female officer could achieve was Commander or Lieutenant Colonel. This created a definite morale problem because it limited women officers opportunity for promotion. These constraints further guaranteed that most senior female officers would not have access to their organization's senior policy makers, thus their ability to influence organizational policy was nonexistent. This directly and negatively affected the quality of all women's programs. In addition to these limitations, there was the requirement to maintain separate promotion lists of female officers. In essence, this meant that female officers competed for promotions only with women. The sole exception was in the Air Force where female officers competed for promotion with males, while the remaining services maintained separate female and male officer promotion lists.

Under the provision of Public Law 625, Congress granted the service secretaries the exclusive authority to determine the realm of authority that female officers could exert. It also allowed the service secretaries to prohibit women from duty in "aircraft when such aircraft are engaged in combat missions."

This limitation further excluded women from being assigned to any Navy vessel except hospital ships and naval transports. The intent for limiting their span of authority was to ensure that female officers did not exercise military authority over men or serve in combat. Congress further

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34Ibid., 112.
35Ibid.
granted service secretaries "blanket authority to terminate the regular commission or enlistment of any woman under circumstances and in accordance with regulations prescribed by the President." The authority to discharge pregnant officers or enlisted females or women who married men with dependent children was exclusively granted service secretaries. However, these same women could personally request a discharge. Finally, Public Law 625 permitted women to claim children or spouses as dependents. The stipulation was that it had to be proven that these family members were dependent on the service female member for chief support. This caveat reflected the societal attitude of the times. That is "unless proven otherwise, husbands rather than wives were breadwinners." 

These existing social or national conditions generating the catalyst for the drafting and execution of Executive Order 10240 are unclear. Signed April 1951 by President Truman, what was unmistakably clear is that this order was designed to further amplify the realms of authority granted to the service secretaries regarding female dependency issues addressed in the Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948. In this Executive Order the specific target was "certain women serving in the Regular Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force." As the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, the service secretaries were granted "blanket authority to terminate the regular commission or enlistment of any woman under circumstances and in accordance with regulations prescribed by the President." The authority to discharge pregnant officers or enlisted females or women who married men with dependent children was exclusively granted service secretaries. However, these same women could personally request a discharge. Finally, Public Law 625 permitted women to claim children or spouses as dependents. The stipulation was that it had to be proven that these family members were dependent on the service female member for chief support. This caveat reflected the societal attitude of the times. That is "unless proven otherwise, husbands rather than wives were breadwinners." 

36Ibid. 
37Ibid., 113. 
38Ibid., 112. 
39Ibid., 113. 
40Holm, 399.
Services, President Truman totally entrusted to the service secretaries the authority to
decide and execute, directly or by direction, the termination of the commission of a
female officer. This decision and action could occur without concern for the officer's
rank, grade or length of service.\textsuperscript{41} The termination process of a female officer's
appointment, commission, or revocation of her commission was an administrative action
that was processed in accordance with existing guidelines used for male members of the
same service, rank, grade, and length of service time a woman could be totally separated
from the service because "(a) she became a parent by birth or adoption of a child under
the minimum age stipulated by the service secretary, (b) she had personal custody of a
child under the stipulated age, (c) she became the step parent of a minor child and the
child was in the woman's home for more than thirty days during a year, (d) she became
pregnant, or (e) she, while on active duty, gave birth to a live child."\textsuperscript{42}

In response to one of the confining provisions of Public Law 625, in June 1956
President Eisenhower signed Public Law 585-84.\textsuperscript{43} The major purpose of the law was to
eliminate the twenty percent cap that was placed on the number of female Lieutenant
Commanders or Majors that each service could have. Basically, it allowed for the
promotion of more Lieutenants and Captains to Lieutenant Commander and Major,
increasing the number of Lieutenant Commanders and Majors that could be in each
service. This law did not improve the opportunity for promotion from the ranks of

\textsuperscript{41}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{42}\textit{Ibid., 400.}

\textsuperscript{43}\textit{Ebbert and Hall, 141.}
Lieutenant Commander and Major to Commander and Lieutenant Colonel by increasing the number of Captains or Colonels a service could have. Historians Ebbert and Hall stated that "throughout the 1950's and the 1960's promotion opportunities for female officers were far fewer than for males."\textsuperscript{44} They offered the following as supporting data, "from 1964 to 1968 eighty percent of male Lieutenants eligible for promotion to Lieutenant Commander were selected while only thirteen percent of the women were."\textsuperscript{45}

Ebbert and Hall found that the 1950's and 1960's were periods wherein female promotions in all services were at an all time low. This wane in professional advancement for female officers produced some very serious widespread military problems. The problems that evolved included promotion bottlenecks, especially at the Lieutenant or Captain level, career stagnation and early retirement for some officers who would have otherwise been at the pinnacle point in their careers.\textsuperscript{46} It is Jean Holm's perception that "these problems existed because of the arbitrary ceiling placed on upper grades and the percentages within certain middle grades."\textsuperscript{47} According to Holm this problem was greater for naval officers. Her data revealed that:

Navy women faced a crisis unique to the WAVES, because of the percentage limit placed on the number of women who could serve on active duty. Lieutenant promotion vacancies had been reduced to the point that forced the discharge of most female line officers as they reached their thirteenth year. Because they could not serve out twenty years, these officers had no retirement option. In 1966

\textsuperscript{44}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{45}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{46}Holm, 193.

\textsuperscript{47}\textit{Ibid.}
the Navy estimated that without legislative relief, forced attrition among WAVES would continue. Lieutenants would average fifty percent or more over the next five years, and the promotions to Commander for the next five years would be suspended, bottom line, women were not being promoted because of their gender.\footnote{Ibid., 194.}

To alleviate the previously mentioned problem, Public Law 90-130 was signed by President Lyndon Johnson in October 1967 to remove the percentage restrictions that were placed on female officers' numbers and ranks. This allowed for an improvement of military women's career opportunities. Holm stated that "The House Armed Services Committee report made it abundantly clear that it was not the intent of the Department of Defense, the services, or Congress to alter in any substantive way the unequal status or cumscribed roles in the military."\footnote{Ibid., 200.} Holm's assessment of the law's purpose, stated that "the purpose was purely and simply to provide a greater degree of career parity for women than was under old laws -- nothing more."\footnote{Ibid.}

Irrespective of its real purpose, Public Law 90-130 did add a number of positive benefits for the careers of military women. First, it immediately removed the two percent ceiling that had previously confined the end strengths of both regular line officers and enlisted women. Secondly, the thirty percent limit on Navy line officers in the grade above Lieutenant was terminated. Thirdly, the ten percent ceiling that restricted the number of regular female officers who could be promoted to permanent Commander or Lieutenant Colonel was removed. A major provision of the law allowed females to be
permanently promoted to the rank of Captain or Colonel. Another commensurate provision was the permission to promote women to the rank, or grade of Flag and general officers. This was the first time in military history that the avenue for promoting female officers to the rank of Admiral or General was available. Public Law 90-130 also equalized the retirement rules for females and males. In response to the enactment of Public Law 90-130 the Navy immediately promoted six Commanders to Captain and the ACNP (W) was promoted to permanent Captain.\(^{51}\) The following year, 1968, eight Commanders were promoted to Captain.\(^{52}\)

The 1970's were often viewed as the era of new thought for modern day changes, changes which reflected new social and political values, and attitudes. Some scholars argue that liberalism enjoyed its heyday during this period. In this environment the traditionally conservative military was not a vogue career choice. The military could not adequately compete with the civilian world for the much needed personnel, officer or enlisted. The reality of Vietnam during the early part of this period did not improve matters either. With the demise of the compulsory draft and the sole reliance on an all volunteer force the military services were forced to immediately identify qualified sources of manpower that would enable them to effectively execute their peacetime and wartime missions. In 1970 the Navy chose a very young, very mature, but junior Admiral to lead it through the tough times ahead. Elmo Zumwalt was the Admiral who was chosen to serve as the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). Zumwalt was perceived as being

\(^{51}\)Ebbert and Hall, 162.

\(^{52}\)Ibid.
ideologically and intellectually attuned to the times and able to orchestrate the Navy to bring about the needed changes. Ebbert and Hall described Zumwalt as having "bushy eyebrows and an aquiline nose which gave him a dashing appearance, which he often heightened during visits to the fleet by wearing a flight jacket emblazoned with a large Z across the back." These historians further documented that Admiral Zumwalt enjoyed the strong support of the Secretary of the Navy, John Chafee. Having been anointed with this very powerful level of support, the Admiral "set out to clear the decks."

Admiral Zumwalt became known quickly as a people person. He announced early during his tenure that one of his high priority issues was to produce and enact enlightened personnel policies and practices. To effect these changes the Admiral did not just seek input from senior personnel, he also sought and received input from junior personnel, fleet wide. Within two weeks of his assumption of duty as CNO, Zumwalt conducted a series of study groups to solicit input regarding his major issues of concern. These study groups convened in Washington, D. C. for several days at a time. The participants were junior personnel from various geographical locations, and represented numerous occupational communities. Each group was charged with providing the CNO with recommended solutions to problems that had negatively impacted recruitment and retention. The CNO was briefed in person on each group's recommendation. Results of

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53 Ibid., 163
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
these groups recommendations were announced navy wide via messages that became known as Zgrams.

In 1971 two study groups of women convened and reported to the CNO. Consistently, each group communicated to the CNO that the Navy had not effectively incorporated and used the many invaluable talents and skills that women had to offer. In response to this feedback the famous Navy Z-116 was publicized navy wide in August 1972. The quintessence of this communique was to promulgate immediate changes in policies that would significantly enhance the utilization of the talents and skills of all Navy women. These marked changes specified in the Zgram were directed toward improving the retention of women in the Navy, both at the officer and enlisted levels. These resources were definitely needed so that the all volunteer force could be realized. Z-116 stated that measures would be taken to eliminate any legal or attitudinal restrictions that posed a disadvantage to women.57

The terms of Z-116 that were applicable to female Naval officers were (1) a pilot program was established that assigned a limited number of officers to the USS Sanctuary, a non combatant (2) the NROTC program was open to females, effective fall, 1974. This provided another source for commissioning female officers aside from officer candidate school (3) female officers now could assume command of shore activities (4) in support of Public Law 90-130, qualified female officers would be considered or allowed to become Flag officers, Admirals, and (5) female officers now could be selected to attend all joint service colleges.58

56Ibid.

57Ibid.

58Ibid., 164.
Three years after the Navy was struck with the provisions of Z-116, it and the other armed services, based on their reactions, were dealt another blow: the viability of their sacred all male bastions, the service academies, were at risk. All last minute attempts to administer the last rites failed. In October 1975 President Gerald Ford signed Public Law 94-106 "settling one of the most controversial issues surrounding women in the military in the 1970's." 59 The enactment of this law directed Service Academies to admit females in the fall of 1976. Holm perceived that "the greatest obstacle the academies encountered in integrating women was, and continues to be, the attitude of men -- faculty members and students." 60 Initially, the Navy, in response to the statutory restrictions regarding women aboard ships, adopted a "two track system." This two track system excluded female midshipmen from taking the required summer courses aboard ship. Later, this system was terminated when the law affecting females at sea was changed.

In 1980, thirty-two years after the Women's Armed Services Integration Act (Public Law 625) was signed, one of its major provisions and barriers to women was eradicated. The abolishment of separate female and male promotion lists in the Army, Navy and Marine Corps, and the consolidation of the male and female promotion lists into one list was effected by PL94-106. 61

59 Holm, 305.
60 Ibid., 311.
61 Holm, 2.
Some naval personnel, active and retired, stated that the coup de grace was accorded to the "Old Navy" on April 28, 1993. On this date the Secretary of Defense issued a military wide memorandum regarding the assignment of women. This memorandum directed all services to open up more occupational specialties and assignments to women. It further allowed women to compete for duty in aircraft, including aircraft engaged in combat missions. Specifically, the Navy was directed to open "as many additional ships to women as is practical within current law."

In summary gender based laws and policies were identified: eight public laws, one executive order, one intraservice and one interservice. These communiqués evolved over a fifty-five year period. The general purpose of each of these communiqués was to acknowledge the current status of women of the time in the military branches. They announced new changes that impacted the status of women, and identified related restrictions that accompanied the new changes.

During the period that these gender based policies evolved, current research did not reveal any public laws that were enacted which specifically addressed the issue of race in the Armed Services. It appeared that the Navy's method of addressing this issue has primarily been fostered by traditionally unwritten policies and practices or making policy decisions because of existing pressures. These decisions appeared to be the


\[63\] Ibid.
products of arbitrary or impulsive intra service actions that were based on posing political pressure.

**Review and Analysis of Race Based Executive Orders**

Two key Executive Orders that focused on race were issued during the 1940s. The first Executive Order (8802) was issued and signed by Franklin Roosevelt, June 25, 1941. President Roosevelt articulated in this executive communication why he felt that there was a need for all citizens to participate in the Defense Program. It was his position that an effective and successful national defense program depended on all citizens having an equal chance to participate and contribute to the overall effort. This goal could only be achieved if discrimination based on race, creed, color or national origin was curtailed in the employment of workers in the defense industry and government. To ensure this the Executive Order authorized employers and labor organizations to make sure that discrimination was not a factor that impacted the work environment. This also extended to the governmental agencies and departments that were responsible for conducting vocational and training programs. A Fair Employment Practice Committee was also established by this order to provide guidance for its enforcement. Further, the Committee was tasked to receive and investigate complaints of discrimination that violated the terms of the Order and to provide redress options when the grievances had merit.

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64 Statutes-At-Large, Executive Order 8802, (77th Congress - 1st Session, 1941) Page 860.

65 Ibid.
The second Executive Order (9981) was signed by Harry Truman on July 26, 1948 and focused on equality within the Armed Services. President Truman charged the armed services of the United States with the responsibility of displaying and maintaining the highest standards of democracy as reflected by availing equal treatment and opportunity to all members of the armed services. President Truman stated that it was his policy "that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin." As in Executive Order 8802, the President specifically stated that the enforcement of the policy should be accomplished as quickly as possible, however it was to be done in a fashion so that the affected organizational efficiency or morale would not be disrupted. The status quo basically was to be maintained at the same time a new and emotional task was to be implemented -- a very difficult charge for any individual or organization. The President established the Committee on Equity of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Service to accomplish this mission. The commission was to exist until it was terminated by Executive Order. In order to accomplish this charge the President empowered the committee with investigative authority which allowed it to review rules, procedures, and practices that required amending so that the desired goal could be achieved. The committee had investigative authority, but it lacked the ability to

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66Ibid.
67Ibid.
68Ibid.
69Ibid.
enforce identified changes or correct wrongs when merited. Both Executive Orders reflected each President's political position and support for the prevailing racial issue of the time.

One of the major deficits of Executive Orders is their lack of judicial enforceability. Executive Orders are articulated principles that are designed to influence or govern behavior on a particular matter. The level of commitment and support they commanded are commensurate with the level displayed by the originating president. Also, the president could change his/her position and support level for an Executive Order, given the political climate. Seldom are presidents challenged and monitored for not following through with the provisions of an Executive Order. Finally, the commitment and support for an Executive Order is not transferrable to succeeding presidents. Public Laws, on the other hand, are judicially enforceable. They do not exist at the pleasure of the Chief Executive, rather they are legislative products. Once passed by the Congress, they became public property and their effectiveness and compliance can be monitored and measured by the public.

This analysis of Public Laws and Executive Orders strongly suggests that the former had more clout than the latter. It appeared that, historically, the gender focused Public Laws produced more positive results and benefits for females in the military than the two Executive Orders that were race focused.

Instituting change in any bureaucratic organization is difficult at best. It was Blacksmith's contention that "when change in policy affects the fundamental values of an organization, resistance to change is likely to be very intense and require constant
monitoring over long periods of time in order to ensure implementation."\textsuperscript{70} Despite this tendency to resist change, the changes in laws and policies have been credited with the increased number of women who served and will serve in the military. Maisels and Gormly argued that the increased numbers of women in the military are parallel to the civilian labor market.\textsuperscript{71} They further contended that women will compose 47.4\% of the civilian force in 2005, up from 45.4\% in 1991.\textsuperscript{72} Along with this trend, these scholars purport that the military will likely show a similar growth pattern over the next ten years.\textsuperscript{73} Blacksmith strongly argued that the rise in the percentage of women choosing the military as a career option and the increased number of occupational fields that have been opened to them were the direct result of political and legal decisions that have occurred over the past twenty years.\textsuperscript{74} She stated that there have been three specific and crucial decisions and three major court decisions that have created permanent positive change for military women.

The three major political decisions according to Blacksmith were (1) the passage of Public Law 90-130, which eliminated the ceiling on grades and numbers of military women, (2) the termination of the all male draft in 1973 and the resulting all volunteer

\textsuperscript{70}Blacksmith, 8.
\textsuperscript{71}Amanda Maisels and Patricia Gormly, "Women In the Military Where They Stand (Washington: Women's Research and Education Institute, 1994), 1.
\textsuperscript{72}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{73}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{74}Blacksmith, 9.
force, and (3) the opening of the Service Academies to women in 1976. Blacksmith suggested that the three court decisions significantly enhanced women's professional opportunities and retention levels in the military. They were (1) *Frontiero v. Richardson* (1973) in which the Supreme Court ruled that dependents of military women, including husbands, could receive the same entitlements as those offered for the dependents of military men, (2) *Crawford v Cushman* (1976) in which the court ruled that a woman could not be discharged if she became pregnant or if she had dependents less than eighteen years old, and (3) *Owens v Brown* (1978) in which the court ruled that the Navy had to open certain categories of assignments to women.

**Summary**

The previous chronology which addressed the evolution of gender and race based policies unveiled a dramatic picture of significant benefits that military women have garnered from the passage of numerous Public Laws, judicial decisions and other policy. The data did not uncover a similar portrait for the race focused policy, which primarily has been effected through Executive Orders.

The incorporation of organizational policies and the passage of enforceable public laws clearly created a professional environment wherein women's status in the military services had to move, ever so slowly, in a positive direction. It must be noted that each policy and public law came with accompanying restrictions. These restrictions built and maintained glass ceilings and glass walls for women in the military. On the other hand, it

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75Ibid.

76Ibid.
was the lack of similar thorough going policies and statutes that created problems for Africana and other non European American personnel. For Africana Female Naval officers the glass ceilings and glass walls were, and are, even more onerous because they are composed of variables that do not affect European American female officers and Africana male officers in the same fashion.
CHAPTER 6

AUDIBLE VOICES FROM THE NAUTICAL SHORELINE: AFRICANA
WOMEN OFFICERS SPEAK

Subjects' Profile

The population sample for the oral interviews included fifteen Africana Female Officers. These individuals were, or are currently, active duty naval officers. Respondents were selected by using the snowball sampling method as described in chapter one.

Eight (53 percent) of the respondents were active duty while five (33 percent) were retired, and two (14 percent) had prior active duty experience. The average age for the 15 respondents upon entering the Navy was 25.7 years. The youngest (two) were 21 years old when they were commissioned, and the oldest (one) was thirty-three years old when she was commissioned. At the time of the interviews, the ages of the subjects ranged from 30 years to 80 years.

Consistent with the basic officer selection criteria, all of the respondents had earned academic degrees. Twelve (80 percent) of the respondents had advanced or professional degrees, i.e. Doctor of Philosophy, Juris Doctor, Doctor of Dental Science, Masters, etc.. Eight (53 percent) entered the navy with advanced or professional degrees. Four (27 percent) of the respondents obtained advanced degrees while on active duty.
Only three (20 percent) of the respondents entered the navy with a bachelor degree and
did not pursue an advanced degree during their tenure in the Navy.

The most senior officers in this investigation were two (13 percent) retired
Captains. There were also two (13 percent) Commanders who participated. The largest
group of participants was composed of six (40 percent) Lieutenant Commanders. Four of
the Lieutenant Commanders were active duty and two were retired. The largest group of
junior officers to participate in the interviews were four (27 percent) Lieutenants. Three
of these individuals were on active duty, and one had previously served on active duty.
The most junior participant was one (7 percent) Lieutenant Junior Grade who had
previously served on active duty.

Of the 15 respondents, 11 (74 percent) indicated that they were, or had been,
career designated. Four (26 percent) indicated they had decided against being career
designated. Two (13 percent) of the four entered the Navy with the intent of not making
the navy a career. The remaining two (13 percent) entered the Navy with the intent of
making it a career. However, because of their personal experiences they felt that they had
outgrown the Navy, and a Navy career was not appropriate for them.

This investigation reviewed twenty-two different occupational specialties. The
fifteen participants represented six (27 percent) different career fields or designators. The
largest designator group represented was the General Unrestricted Line. Six (41 percent)
of the respondents were included in this group. Designators with two (13 percent)
representatives were: Dental Corps, Nurse Corps, Medical Service Corps, and Judge
Advocate General's Corps. One (7 percent) respondent was a member of the Chaplain Corps.

Two (13 percent) of the interviewees had held the position of Commanding Officer during their navy careers. Each had held this most senior command billet as Captain late in their navy tenure. The two (13 percent) Commanders reported having held the position of Executive Officer during their navy career. The Executive officer is the second most senior billet in a Navy command. If the Commanding Officer is unable to perform the duties of the billet the Executive Officer assumes command. One of the Commanders served back-to-back tours as Executive Officer for two large Navy commands. This same officer served as Executive Officer as a Lieutenant Commander at a large Navy command. One of the Lieutenant Commanders had served as Executive Officer at a previous duty station. The remaining 10 (67 percent) officers had served in mid-grade leadership positions, i.e. department heads for small departments, division officers, and program directors.

In terms of professional mentoring, 11 (73 percent) reported that they had never had a mentor during their Navy careers. Four (26 percent) of the participants reported that they had, or currently have, a mentor.

The total aggregate number of years served in the Navy by the 15 interviewees was 210.4 years. The average number of years served by the 15 interviewees was 14.03 years. One interviewee served 31.9 years. The least number of years served by one interviewee was only 1.5 years.
Among the 15 interviewees there had been only a total of 31 personal merit awards received. Personal awards may be awarded to individuals by various navy and Department of Defense echelons when the individual's command deems that their professional performance merits special recognition. Eleven (73 percent) of the interviews reported having received some personal awards. However, four (27 percent) reported that they had not received any personal awards. Three (75 percent) of this four who had not received any awards had over nine years of naval service and were career designated. The average number of personal awards for each interviewee was 2.1. One Commander reported having five personal awards. The most senior award held by an interviewee was the Legion of Merit. This individual received this award upon retirement. In order of precedence for the U.S. Navy the Legion of Merit Medal is the seventh most senior award out of a total of forty-two awards. The second most senior award held by an interviewee was the Defense Meritorious Service Medal. There were two (13 percent) interviewees who were authorized to wear this award, one Captain and one Commander. In order of precedence, this medal is the twelfth most senior award out a total of forty-two awards.

These women were geographically located in numerous states throughout the United States. At the time of their interviews, the 15 respondents were located in the District of Columbia, New York, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Florida, California, Illinois, Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina. Similarly, their native home states varied. Eleven (73 percent) reported having been born and reared in a number of southern states. Three (20 percent) indicated that they were products of northern states. Only one had
been born, reared, and educated in the western part of the United States. The subjects were representative of very well educated and upper middle class Africana women. An added richness of the input of the interviews was the input provided by one of the first two Africana Women Officers commissioned in 1944.

Prior to coming into the Navy, 11 (73 percent) reported not having held a professional job. This group indicated that they had decided to join the Navy during their last year of college, or immediately afterwards. Two (13 percent) interviewees indicated that they had held professional occupations prior to coming in the Navy. One interviewee reported having served as an enlisted personnel in another branch of the military. She subsequently finished college and became a commissioned naval officer.

Five (33 percent) of the interviewees reported being married. Ten (67 percent) of the interviewees reported that they were not married. Since the interviews, one of the married interviewees status has changed to not being married. Four (26 percent) of the respondents had children, while 11 (73 percent) of the respondents had no children. Two of the four interviewees who reported having children stated that they had worked the same day, approximately three hours prior to delivery of their babies.

**Instrument**

Each interviewee was asked to respond to 31 open-ended questions that assessed their beliefs, attitudes, perceptions, experiences, and behaviors regarding their individual, as well as the collective professional attainments as Africana Female Officers. The questions were designed to provide feedback from the interviewees regarding their
personal perceptions of the Navy and their perceptions of the project's two comparison groups.

Each of the 31 questions were structured so that responses could be coded for the 13 major themes that captured the essence of this research project. These 13 themes were:

1) **History**: Responses that reflected the interviewees' depth of knowledge of general Naval history, Africana personnel Naval history, and Africana Female Officer Naval history.

2) **Motivation**: Responses which detailed the interviewees' initial motivating factors for entering the Navy, and explained why they chose the career or non-career track.

3) **Billet Assignments**: Responses which disclosed the types of billets an individual had been assigned to during her Navy tenure, and whether the assigned billets provided them with the essential leadership, management and lateral opportunities and experiences that groomed them to assume greater levels of leadership, responsibility, and accountability. The jobs that provided these professional enhancing variables were defined as career enhancing, and those that did not were deemed non-career enhancing.

4) **Command Support and Mentoring**: Responses which disclosed the level of organizational and senior officer support and sponsorship the interviewees garnered.

5) **Fitness Reports**: Responses indicative of whether the respondents perceived their professional performance assessments fair and objective; whether they were
reflective of their true level of performance, and whether the fitness reports made them competitive with their peers and likely candidates for promotion.

6) Promotions: Responses which indicated whether the interviewees perceived that they were professionally competitive with their peers based on their billet assignments and the caliber of their Fitness Reports. They also indicated whether the interviewees had been promoted with their peers, on time, earlier than expected, or after their peers.

7) Training: Responses indicative of the initial level of specialized training the interviewees had upon accession into the Navy, the amount of on-the-job-training, special training, and advanced training provided by the Navy.

8) Education: Responses which revealed the level of education that each interviewee had when she entered the Navy, and graduate and/or professional levels of education obtained while on active duty.

9) Trust: Responses reflective of the level of confidence in the integrity and professional ability an interviewee perceived that she was shown by her seniors, peers, and juniors.

10) Respect: Responses conveyed whether the interviewees perceived that they received appropriate deferential regard and esteem from their seniors, peers, and juniors commensurate with their rank and position as Naval officers.

11) Appreciation: Responses that indicated the receipt of personal awards and personal statements from the Navy's hierarchy.
12) **Overall Progress:** Responses which summarized the interviewees evaluations and perceptions of the overall historical professional progress attained by each of the research populations. These also revealed the interviewees assessment of how and why the level of achievement was ascertained by each group. These questions were designed to highlight significant differences between the groups.

13) **Perceptions:** Responses disclosed how the interviewees interpreted and evaluated the Navy's assessment of their abilities, other Africana Female Officer's abilities, Africana Male Officer's abilities, and European American Female Officer's abilities.

**Data Analysis**

Oral interview responses are products of communications research. The appropriate method of data analysis for this project's 15 interviews was content analysis. According to Earl Babbie, "Content analysis . . . is particularly well suited to the study of communication and to answering the classic question of communications research: Who says what to whom, why, how, and with what effect?" The researcher isolated the major issues of concerns that were revealed in the interviews. In-depth analysis on both the manifest contents and latent contents of each response was coded thus allowed the researcher to determine if, and to what degree, the variables race, gender, class, color, and race and gender were individually and/or collectively oppressive forces in the lives of Africana Female Officers.

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Each response was assigned one of the following numeric codes:

1 - race
2 - gender
3 - social class
4 - color
5 - race and gender.

When the major theme did not reflect any of the above major concerns, a (6) was assigned.

After the coding of all of the 13 general theme categories for each interview, the researcher calculated the number one major concern for each interview. This calculation was determined by tallying the frequency of the appearance of a specific code, i.e., if of the 13 categories for one interview, 7 categories were coded 1, race was determined to be the interviewee's major concern. This same process was used to determine the interviewee's second and third major concerns. To develop a group profile, the coded data for each interviewee was compiled into a unified list. The frequency of the appearance of each code identified the first, second and third major concerns for the entire group.

**What They Said About Naval History**

It was not their wealth of knowledge of Naval history that acted as a magnet to draw the interviewees to the Navy. All of them admitted having very little working knowledge of Naval history in general. Three (20 percent) of the women disclosed that they had family members who had served in the Navy, two of them were fathers. One of
the fathers was a messman during World War II. The second father served later and became a Chief Petty Officer during a time when that was very atypical for Africana personnel. The third officer had an uncle who served during the late 1950's as a Hospital Corpsman.

Most knew almost nothing about Africana personnel history, officer or enlisted. All of the subjects had heard of the "Golden Thirteen," the first group of Africana Male Officers. On the other hand only one (7 percent) was familiar with the history of Africana females. Three (20 percent) knew the names of the first Africana female officers. Two of these women stated that they had heard "something" about the first Africana female officers, whom they thought were nurses. The information they had came from presentations that had been given at various Black History Month celebrations or at various National Naval Officers Association Conventions. Fourteen (93 percent) admitted that they never had entertained the idea of researching the history of Africana personnel in the Navy, specifically Africana Female Officers.

In response to the question "What did you know about the history of Africana people when you entered they Navy?", one interviewee responded with: "I didn't know anything and I didn't ask." She further stated "I didn't know if there were other Africana women in my designator-group, and I didn't ask." This interviewee stated that she didn't come into the Navy thinking of herself as a Black woman. She came in as a member of her respective designator group with an interest in a military career.
Why They Came, Why They Stayed, and Why They Left

This section specifically addresses the circumstances which influenced Africana Women to become Naval officers, as well as the circumstances which influenced their decision to be career officers or to leave the Navy.

The Africana Female Officers's interviewed reasons for joining the Navy varied, yet these reasons were very similar. Only one interviewee indicated that she had nurtured a childhood dream and fulfilled it when she became a commissioned naval officer. The remaining 14 (93 percent) disclosed that their inspiration was more acute. Seven (47 percent) disclosed that they had been pursued by various Navy recruiters while they were still in school. One of the officers said that the Navy did such a wonderful job of winning, dining, and courting her that she didn't give a second thought to do anything but to join the Navy. Three (26 percent) of the subjects chose the Navy themselves as part of a job search. Another two (13 percent) subjects revealed that friends had been a prime motivator for them. Finally, one interviewee indicated that she was influenced by an older next door neighbor, who had become a naval officer. One of the officers served in the Navy during World War II. The remaining officers served in the Navy from the late 1950's to the present.

All the women stated that their primary reason for choosing the Navy was because of their beliefs about the organization. One belief shared by the women was the idea that real opportunities for them existed in the Navy, opportunities that were better than those in the civilian labor market. These officers shared a belief that the Navy was free of any type of discrimination, and that individuals were objectively evaluated or judged by the
quality of their work. Finally, this group stated that they entered the Navy believing that it functioned as one big team where people were treated fairly and as equal members of the team all working toward a common goal. One of the interviewees said that she came in the Navy to do good from a universal perspective. She entered at the end of the Kennedy and King Civil Rights era. This interviewee went on to say that she came in with a hero mentality because she had accomplished something that no one else had done. Because of her achievement, she came expecting "to sit on the front porch." This same officer disclosed that she did not know that she would be injected into an organization where the people were so un-alike, shared nothing in common, nor would have spoken to each other the previous day. This interviewee further disclosed that on the first day she reported to her officer indoctrination course she was greeted by her classmates who were openly hostile, and who openly directed threats at her. She was the only woman and only Africana person in her class. Her classmates were all white male officers. The interviewee reported that all of these officers threatened to resign if she was not removed from the class. The threats of bodily harm escalated to the point that the school's director feared that she would be injured. The tension was so great she was moved out of the Bachelor Officers Quarters overnight to the Marine Gunnery Sergeant house so she would have a guard. "The following day", according to the interviewee, "the situation had been controlled." She was able to return to class and the Officers Quarters to live. To her knowledge, none of the classmates were held accountable for their involvement in the previous day's disturbance. This officer was assigned to one of the staff corps designators
where its members are charged with helping personnel with maintaining their wholistic selves and preserving their spirituality.

Aside from the philosophical reasons, all of the interviewees stated some very specific and very similar reasons for joining. Some claimed they joined because they were looking for a job that ensured upward mobility and financial security. Other reasons given for joining the navy were: (1) the desire to gain professional leadership and managerial experience in a disciplined environment, (2) the desire to acquire advanced professional training and advanced educational opportunities, (3) the desire to travel, seek adventure, and the desire to live in exciting places, unlike the places other services offered. The latter set of reasons given by the interviewees are parallel to the ones given by women who were commissioned in the early 1950's. Ebbert and Hall stated "their reasons had more to do with travel and adventure, than with patriotism."2

Eleven (73 percent) of the officers indicated that they were, or had been, career designated. The reasons stated for choosing this option were reflective of some of the same reasons that motivated them to enter the Navy. Added to those reasons were guaranteed job security, active duty and retirement benefits as well as the enjoyment of their jobs. These officers also mentioned that once in the Navy they saw the reality that things were not any better than on the outside. The major advantage the military service offered was that until very recently once one had become career designated, she was guaranteed a job for twenty years regardless of her failure to promote. Two (13 percent) interviewees entered the Navy with the desire and plan to only serve a designated number

of years. Two (13 percent) interviewees came in the Navy with the intent to make it a career. They changed their plans because of their negative experiences on active duty. One of these officers stated, "I have become streetwise about the Navy." What she meant by this statement was that she had become keenly aware of the political maneuvering that occurs in the navy. She indicated that merit was not the only variable used to determine one's success. Thus, she felt that she had outgrown the Navy. The second interviewee who changed her mind about a Navy career simply stated that if her subsequent tours had been like her first tour, she would have certainly stayed for at least twenty years. Furthermore she said that the subsequent tours were so horrendous that they had taken a toll on her mental and physical well being. Seven (46 percent) of the remaining interviewees disclosed that they, too, experienced serious physical and/or mental distress. It was their contention that these conditions evolved from their method of handling or coping with professional problems. Strategically these women learned to keep their problems to themselves and to internalize them. They perceived this strategy protected from professional liability.

Billet Assignments

Nine (60 percent) of the officers interviewed indicated that the billets that they had served in or were currently serving, were not career enhancing. Four (33 percent) of the interviewees felt that they had served, or were serving, in career enhancing billets. One interviewee served during the time when billets were not characterized as career or non-career enhancing. All of the interviewees had served, or are serving in service or support type billets. All of the five officers who had the General Unrestricted Line
designator had at some point in their careers served in a Human Resources Management billet. It is common knowledge throughout the Navy that Human Resource billets are billets where mostly Africana officers serve. This is especially common for Africana Female Officers, or Africana Male Officers who have been marked as being non-competitive. One interviewee indicated that as a senior officer, her detailer, the officer responsible for making billet assignments, attempted to assign her to a second Human Resources Management billet at a major Navy activity's headquarters. The interviewee stated that she asked the senior white female officer if she would assign a senior white female officer they both knew to that same billet. The detailer answered "no," so the interviewee indicated that she did not want the billet either. All of the interviewees who had served or are serving in non-career enhancing billets were told by their various detailers that the needs of the Navy took precedence over personal desires of one's career needs. These officers disclosed that they were all told by the detailers that the most important variable in a billet assignment was superior performance, not the actual billet assignment.

As indicated by these interviews, the previous statement has become known as a popular euphemism used by detailers to justify assigning an officer to a stereotypical female or Africana female billet. Additionally, it was the women officers' experiences that most often Africana Female Officers were assigned to less visible billets. One interviewee stated that her experience had taught her that European American personnel, officer and enlisted, as well as Africana personnel, officer and enlisted, often indicated in various ways that they had difficulty being able to effectively interact with Africana
Female Officers in positions of authority. The same groups tend to respond more positively to the Africana Female Officer in a service or supportive position. The difficulty and problems arose when the Africana Female Officer was in a leadership or policy making position.

Another interviewee, a senior officer, disclosed that over the years she had become keenly aware that the Navy has billets which are reserved for "golden girls and golden boys." These individuals were European American Officers who were premier network players. This officer contended that in this scenario superior performance, or even outstanding performance, was not the criteria, rather it was a reflection of, or an indication of how well an individual was connected and who were their sponsor(s). These benefits were products of the historical formal and informal networks European American Naval Officers have established and maintained.

Eight (53 percent) of the interviewees revealed that they had never received any meaningful career counseling or professional guidance at any point during their careers. They further said that their attempts to solicit assistance in these areas were not responded to in a sincere manner by their seniors. Some of the group members were told not to worry and just continue to work hard. One interviewee confided that this kind of treatment made her feel out of place in the Navy. She also stated that the only person who would talk to her about career issues was an officer who had less time and less experience in the Navy. Another interviewee responded "nobody. I had to rely on my peers and learn from them."
Quite often the majority of the interviewees based their self worth on the billet they served in. Assignments to Human Resource Management, Family Service Center, and Administrative Officer billets were viewed as having very little professional prestige. Because of these assignments, these women tended to perceive themselves and abilities in a negative fashion. Also they viewed themselves as being professionally non-competitive with their peers.

Two (13 percent) interviewees had leadership experience and responsibility as Commanding Officers of various activities. Three (20 percent) had leadership experience and responsibility as Executive Officers, who are second in command and would become Commanding Officer if the Commanding Officer became unable to perform. One of these three officers had served as Executive Officer at three major commands, yet was not selected to serve as Commanding Officer. This officer presented this problem to the Chief of Naval Operations. During the presentation, the officer provided official documentation which indicated that she had completed all of her career path criteria and had never failed to be promoted to the next rank on time. Further she presented him with official documentation that a European American Female Officer who was in her same promotion group had failed to be promoted with the group. The European American Female Officer had failed to be promoted until her second promotion opportunity, which placed her in a promotion group behind her original one. This same European American Female Officer who had failed to be promoted on time, was subsequently selected to become a Commanding Officer and was promoted to Captain. The Chief of Naval Operations told the interviewee who presented the issue, that the European American
Female Officer "had an overall better record." The interviewee stated that she has yet to comprehend the Chief of Naval Operations response. Her question was how could an officer who had failed promotion have a better record than one who had never failed to be promoted? The interviewee concluded that not only was there a racial difference, but she realized that she did not have a father who was a retired Captain.

Three (20 percent) of the interviewees had held a department head position. One interviewee had served as an assistant department head. Two (13 percent) of the officers had served as Division Officers. Four (27 percent) of the interviewees reported not having had any leadership experience at all.

The majority of the interviewees had served, or were serving, in stereotypical female billets, or billets that were even sometimes stereotypical Black billets, and were not typical career enhancing. Despite these negatives, all of the interviewees reported they were committed to their assignments, worked very hard, and had learned to enjoy and take new knowledge away from the situation. They said they had learned to make the best of a bad situation.

**Mentoring and Networking . . . What are Those?**

Fourteen (93 percent) of the interviewees conveyed their personal idea and formula for success. The remaining one did not focus on the issue of success. Paraphrasing the Horatio Alger philosophy of success provided insight into these interviewee's ideology of success. Alger's philosophy postulated that one will be successful if she is honest, perseveres, and works hard. When these feats alone were
accomplished, the individual would receive her just rewards. This is the same success philosophy 93 percent of the interviewees espoused.

One interviewee felt that one's leadership skills and abilities should be the primary determining factors of who is or is not successful. Five of the interviewees credited solely their own individual efforts as the reasons for their professional success. Each of them clearly conveyed that their success was the fruit of their own efforts. No assistance was provided by others. These individuals did not interpret or acknowledge that their successes were the product of good networking or mentoring. Further, they did not acknowledge that the foundation for their successes had been laid by other Africana women who had preceded them.

One officer argued that when Africana Female Officers experience professional difficulties it is because they have a chip on their shoulder, or they see racism in everything. This officer also verbalized that she felt that a lot of Africana Female Officers have not learned how to speak up for themselves. It was her idea that one's coping skills, abilities, and personalities came with them from high school and college. Thus, what they brought with them to the Navy guided them forever. Another interviewee stated that she exceeded most of her peers because of her high level of motivation and her high level of interest in her work. One interviewee indicated that it was her belief that those Africana Female Officers who did not get their just rewards were either too lazy, or "too something".

All of the interviewees displayed an academic understanding of the concept, practice, and value of networking. They knew that European American Female Officers
had a historically strong and operative networking system in place. These officers knew that Africana Male Officers had an effective networking practice in place. Yet, when they talked about networking and Africana Female Officers, it was discussed in a rather abstract fashion, rather than from a more tangible basis.

These officers clearly indicated that they placed distance between themselves and others, including Africana Female Officers. They gave a strong message of being suspicious of other Africana Female Officers and chose not to build a network system with them. These officers viewed other Africana Female Officers in their respective designator groups as their only real competitors, and thus sought to be better than those persons.

In terms of the concept, value, and practice of mentoring, the interviewees portrayed a hazy picture. Again, in abstraction, these officers comprehended the concept, the value and the purpose of mentoring. In reality they provided a picture that was incongruent with their understanding. Some of the officers implied that no senior officer had selected them as a mentees. Still others strongly indicated that they did not necessarily need a mentor because they could do it on their own. Finally, a very small number of this group had personally identified a senior officer who served as their mentor.

Ten (66 percent) of the group of interviewees stated that they had no mentor and/or never had a mentor. Four (26 percent) interviewees had mentors, and one did not respond to the question. Of the four officers who stated that they had mentors, two of
them specifically stated that their mentors were male officers. The remaining two did not disclose the sex of their mentor.

Eight (53 percent) members of this group felt that there was no one in their chain of command on whom they could rely for professional support and encouragement. They contended that they had to go outside of their chain of command for this kind of support. Six (40 percent) of the officers acknowledged having had supportive chain of commands. These officers indicated that they were cognizant of the fact that European American Officers, male and female, were mentored early in their careers. Often times the senior officers sought them out and declared themselves these junior officers mentors. This proved to be a major professional asset to the junior officers. Additionally, these interviewees disclosed that they often saw Africana Male Officers being mentored by senior Africana Male Officers and senior European American Male Officers. It was their observation that European American Male officers had little or no problem mentoring Africana Male Officers or European American Female Officers. It was their position that European American Male Officers experienced great difficulty identifying with Africana Female officers because they had nothing in common, i.e. race or gender, and did not extend them support, whereas with European American Female Officers race was similar, and gender was similar with Africana Male Officers. Another interviewee shared that she felt that European American Female Officers do not know what is going on professionally with Africana Female Officers. They do not know how to get close and interact with them as peers, juniors, or seniors.
Another interviewee, an Executive Officer, was told by her Commanding Officer, that initially he was unsure and uncomfortable around her. He revealed that he had never been around a Black woman of her professional status and with her intellectual and leadership abilities. He indicated that the only Black women he had ever been around had been maids. He specifically stated that he knew how to handle that kind of situation.

This same officer was told by another Commanding Officer that she was too educated to be in the Navy. He told her also, that because of this there were not any billets in the entire navy she would fit in, thus she should leave the Navy.

Finally, it was almost an unanimous perception among the interviewees that a historical and current schism existed and exists between Africana Female Officers and European American Female Officers. It was their opinion that this issue is made up of a number of complex reasons. Their perceptions further suggested that this issue will never be resolved because no one is willing to acknowledge it, thus it will remain repressed.

Fitness Reports

A Navy military personnel command instruction dated May 12, 1981, defined Fitness Reports as "the principal document in an officer's record and are the primary basis of comparing and selecting officers for promotion, assignment, selection for command, and professional training." Similarly, in a report prepared by the General Unrestricted Officer Community Manager for the Chief of Naval Personnel in 1990, it was further corroborated that General Unrestricted Line Officers' fitness reports were also used to

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determine who would be "selected for advanced training, leadership jobs, postgraduate school, and proven subspecialty codes."\textsuperscript{4} Fitness reports are maintained for each officer from the day they are commissioned until the day they are separated from the Navy.

Instructions of the May 12, 1981 Fitness Report required that officers be evaluated on traits that included goal setting and achievement, subordinate management and development, working relationships, equipment and material management, Navy organization support, response in stressful situations, equal opportunity and personal traits which include judgement, personal behavior, forcefulness, and military bearing, writing ability, and speaking ability.\textsuperscript{5} Each of these traits was assigned an alpha character of A through I. A was the highest grade that could be assigned and as the grades progressed downward the less positive they were. Each officer was also compared and ranked against the other officers in command who were the same rank, and had the same occupational designator. For example, if a command had ten Doctors who were Lieutenant Commands, they would be ranked in order of 1 of 10, 2 of 10, down to 10 of 10. All of these individuals could have all A's on their fitness report, but the one ranked 10 of 10 would be the least competitive. The one ranked 1 of 10 would be perceived as being the most competitive. The same instruction stated that "reporting seniors are encouraged to show support and provide counselling to all officers, but are required to do

\textsuperscript{4}General Unrestricted Line Officer Career Path Guidance Report Briefing for the Chief of Naval Personnel, January 1992, Pages not numbered.

so for officers in the grades of Chief Warrant Officer ... and Ensign through Lieutenant. Further, it stated that "officers in the grades of Chief Warrant Officer and Ensign through Lieutenant must sign the record copy regardless of the report content." Officers in the grades of Lieutenant Commander and above did not have the protection of this institutional right to see and sign fitness reports before they are forwarded to the Personnel Command for inclusion in their professional records. This placed them in a very disadvantaged position because reports could be included in their records for any reason and without their knowledge. Nine (60 percent) of the interviewees were in the designated rank categories wherein they may have possibly been impacted by the previous fitness report provisions.

In August, 1995 the Chief of Naval Personnel released a new instruction that governed the preparation and submission of Navy performance evaluation. This new instruction focused on the evaluation of officer's professional traits, which include professional expertise, teamwork, equal opportunity, military bearing/character, mission accomplishment, and initiative and leadership. Unlike the previous fitness report system, the updated reports evaluated officers' professional performance using a numeric system. Officers could receive grades of 5.0 to 1.0. The highest grade one can achieve is 5.0 while 1.0 is the lowest grade. Any grades of 5.0 or 1.0 are required to be justified in writing in the comments section of the report by the reporting senior officer.

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6Ibid. Enclosure 1, Page 22.
7Ibid.
Additionally, the reporting senior can make other comments about the officer's performance, however these comments are required to be verifiable.

According to the most current fitness report instruction, "members will be counselled at the mid-term point of the evaluation period and at the time of receiving the fitness report, or evaluation report." A mid-term counseling schedule for officers for the ranks of Ensign through Captain was provided as part of the fitness report instruction. While the fitness report instruction does not specifically state that officers in ranks of Ensign to Lieutenant were required to be shown their fitness reports, it does provide an established mid-term counseling schedule for those officers. This instruction requires that counseling be given at the time the officer receives her fitness report. This statement strongly indicated that, unlike the 1981 instruction which required officers in the ranks of Ensign to Lieutenant be shown their fitness reports, it requires that all officers in the ranks of Ensign to Captain should engage in two counselling experiences. One of the required times was the time they received their fitness report. Other requirements of this new fitness report instruction directed the reporting senior not to rank the officers assigned to the command, and conveyed that all officers signatures are required on most regular reports.

If an officer contends that her/his fitness report is unfair, there are three options one can pursue to seek redress. The first step in the redress process is to discuss the problem with the reporting senior officer. If this step does not ameliorate the issue, the

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9 Ibid. Enclosure 2, Page C-2.

10 Ibid.
subject officer has the option to request that a fitness report be investigated, modified, removed, or replaced. There are two procedures one may use to achieve the desired result. The member may pursue relief by employing the provisions listed in "Article 1126. U. S. Navy Regulations. 1990 - correction of naval records." Provisions of this Article empowers the member to petition the Board of Correction of Naval Records for correction of error or removal of injustice in a fitness report. Once the report has been forwarded to the Board of Correction, the Board determines whether appropriate and substantial evidence has been provided by the officer. If the board determines that the required documentation has been provided and support the complaint, it can recommend to the Secretary of the Navy that the record be changed. A final option an officer has available in order to seek redress for a perceived wrong, is listed in the provisions of "Article 1150. U. S. Navy Regulations 1990-Redress of Wrong Committed by a Senior, and Article 138. Uniform Code of Military Justice - Complaints of Wrongs." These Articles empower officers with the right to submit a complaint against a senior officer. As in the request to the Board of Correction, the complaint can make a request to have a fitness report revised, removed, or replaced. The reporting senior officer of the complainant has the responsibility to investigate the complaint and determine the disposition of the request. If the request is approved, the senior officer who investigated

11Ibid. S-4.
12Ibid.
13Ibid.
14Ibid.
the complaint may submit supplemental material or direct the officer's reporting senior to do so, and may direct the removal of all or part of the original report.\textsuperscript{15}

Historically, the General Unrestricted Line Officer community has been composed predominately of females. General Unrestricted Line officers do not have warfare qualifications. In March 1990, the Chief of Naval Personnel approved a detailed General Unrestricted Line Officer Professional Development Plan. This plan provided precise information to officers regarding the criteria that they need to meet in order to be and remain competitive with their peers.\textsuperscript{16} The researcher was not able to ascertain whether such a plan existed for other designators.

In the 1992 General Unrestricted Line Officer briefing, prepared for the Chief of Naval Personnel, disclosed that there were some anomalies which are exposed in minority fitness reports.\textsuperscript{17} According to this report, the anomalies found in minority fitness reports indicated that "most minority officers are rated lower than their majority counterparts.\textsuperscript{18} This phenomenon impacted Lieutenants particularly, and those officers marks became competitive only at senior lieutenant Commander and Commander levels.\textsuperscript{19} Another anomaly revealed that minority officers had a lower percentage of recommendations for early promotion, and they received loser grades in goal setting, response to stress,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{15}Ibid.
\item\textsuperscript{16}General Unrestricted Line Officer Career Path Guidance Report Briefing for the Chief of Naval Personnel, January 1992, Pages not numbered.
\item\textsuperscript{17}Ibid.
\item\textsuperscript{18}Ibid.
\item\textsuperscript{19}Ibid.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
forcefulness and judgement.\textsuperscript{20} This report also disclosed that the narrative or comment section of the fitness report focused more on the officers "potential".\textsuperscript{21} The final anomaly acknowledged that minority officers were assigned to minority billets (recruiting, Navy ROTC, and Equal Opportunity), and these billets were outside of the career pattern, thus they detracted from the officer's competitiveness.\textsuperscript{22}

Sometime in 1995 or 1996 General Unrestricted Line became known as the Fleet Support community. In 1996 the demographics of this community reflected that 98 percent of the officers assigned were female (85 percent European American Female Officers and 13 percent Africana Female Officers).

The interviewees had a lot to say about fitness reports. Ten (67 percent) of these officers said that they perceived that the fitness reports they had received throughout their career had not objectively reflected the true level of their professional performance. Only one interviewed disclosed that she had taken action to have a fitness report removed from her official record. The officer petitioned the Board of Correction of Naval Records for assistance with the problem. A year later, the Board of Corrections notified this officer in writing that not one, but all of the fitness reports she had received from one commanding officer had been extricated from her official record. Further, the Secretary of the Navy had enclosed a memorandum in the officer's record communicating to any subsequent selection boards that they were not to make any inferences because the reports had been

\textsuperscript{20}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{21}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{22}Ibid.
removed. The Board of Correction recommended, and the Secretary of the Navy concurred with the Board, that all of her fitness reports should be removed because they indicated that the officer had been subjected to both racial and gender discrimination by the commanding officer. In her petition to the Board of Correction, this officer had sought relief because it was her assessment that the report did not reflect her true level of performance. With this request she had submitted a wealth of detailed documentation. This was the same officer who had been told by her commanding officer that she was too educated to be in the Navy. It was the fitness report that he had written on the aforementioned officer that the Board of Corrections had removed. Four (26 percent) of the interviewees conveyed that from their perspectives all of their fitness reports had been fair, objective, and reflected their true performance levels. Yet two of these four officers had failed to be promoted at some point in their career. One individual did not answer the question relative to the fairness of fitness reports.

It was the general perception among the interviewees that characteristically Africana Officers received some "B's" on their fitness reports, while European American Officers characteristically got all "A's" on their reports. Their reporting seniors cited that there was nothing wrong with these reports, they too had gotten B's when they had been junior officers. One officer stated that she had received a B in Equipment Management. However, she found that her counterparts (she defined counterparts as "white folks") had received A's in this area. The interviewee had inquired of her counterparts what the area of Equipment Management evaluated. She stated that neither her counterparts, nor could her reporting senior explain it. They just said that this was no big thing and not to worry
about it. In essence, she felt that Navywide there were two sets of fitness reports, "a Black officer model" and "a White officer model." This same officer indicated that she felt that her fitness report had been fair and objective. She had failed to be promoted once during her career.

It was a common observation among 12 (80 percent) of the interviewees that characteristically Africana Officers were not recommended or promoted early. A number of the interviewees conveyed that on more than one occasion, and at more than one command, their reporting seniors told them that it was not their policy to recommend junior officers for early promotion. These officers indicated that in each instance, they learned by talking to and seeing some of their white peers' fitness reports that most white officers were recommended early in their careers for early promotion.

It was the perception of one of the interviewees that while her fitness reports were fair in terms of grades assigned, she did not think they were objective and fair in terms of rankings. This officer felt that the number one ranked officer always went to the favorite son or the golden girl, because they fitted in more than she did. It was her feeling that Africana Female Officers, no matter how hard they worked, would never be ranked number one. She contended that the Navy did not view Africana females positive enough to warrant that position.

One experienced officer stated that the writing of her fitness reports improved as she became more senior and her seniors became accustomed to writing fitness reports for minorities. Two interviewees stated that they had received fitness reports that specifically stated that they were a credit to their race. Another officer shared that she received a
fitness report that stated that her performance was outstanding in spite of the obstacles she was confronted with, namely her race, her sex, and her lack of experience as a naval officer.

**Promotions**

Fourteen (93 percent) of the interview participants clearly articulated their understanding of the degree to which the right billets and the quality of one's fitness reports impact one's competitive level and potential for career progress and future promotions.

None of the officers interviewed acknowledged having ever been promoted early. Ten (67 percent) of the officers had, at some point in their careers, failed to be selected for promotion to the next rank. The officers who had been passed over for promotion indicated that they were not really aware of the reasons they had failed to be selected for promotion. Attempts to find the real reasons were blocked. Some were told that they were competitive, but not competitive enough. Some were told that they were late bloomers and did not possess sufficient experience. Other reasons given were that they had not had the right job assignments and their fitness reports were not strong enough.

Seven (47 percent) interviewees disclosed that at various points in their careers they had been recommended for early promotion. The remaining eight (53 percent) had never been recommended for early promotion. A number of the interviewees said that they knew several European American Female Officers who held the same billets that they had yet were promoted early. It was their perception that Africana Male Officers and European American Female Officers were promoted more often than Africana Female
Officers.

All of the interviewees enunciated that they comprehended the role and the value advanced training played and contributed to their professional growth and development. Some of the perceptions of the interviewees indicated that they felt, based on their observations, that the decision of who received advanced training was largely influenced by the officer's race. Concurrent with this perception, favoritism was the ultimate determining factor. This meant that basically European American Officers were selected for training and the final selection is made using the favorite son or golden girl formula. It was stated that Joint Service training and attendance at the Navy War College and various armed service schools were saved for the golden girl or favorite son.

Other interviewees stated that they believed that gender determined who would be selected for advanced training. It was their belief that the good ole boy network determined who would be trained. The Navy leaders had long decided that advanced training was only essential to those designators that were primarily male and were operational. It was the impression of these officers that female officers as a whole, especially those who were General Unrestricted Line Officers, were expected to learn and train themselves on the job, often without assistance from within the command.

Ten (67 percent) of the interviewees claimed that they had never received any job related training. Three (20 percent) of the officers indicated that they had received some type of training that was job related. Finally, two (13 percent) of the interviewees with professional degrees had received formal advanced training that provided them with a specialty concentration in their specific professional field.
Education

Nearly all of the interviewees expressed an ardent interest and desire to enhance their educational achievements, both for personal and professional gains. There were three officers who had not attained advanced degrees. Two of these officers reported that they believed that their Navy careers had been negatively impacted because of this factor. One officer with a professional degree indicated that she did not believe that a postgraduate degree would add to her competitiveness.

None of the interviewees had been selected for Navy sponsored postgraduate education, neither at a civilian institute or at the Navy's Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The nine officers who reported that they had postgraduate degrees stated that they had paid for this education and had accomplished this attainment on their private time. Five (33 percent) of these nine officers had attained this accomplishment while on active duty. Four (27 percent) of these nine interviewees each conveyed that they had two Masters degrees. Four (27 percent) stated that they each had a Masters degree. Three (20 percent) of the interviewees each held a professional degree in areas such as law and dentistry. One interviewee held a Doctor of Philosophy degree. As noted earlier, three (20 percent) of the interviewees stated they had not pursued a degree beyond the required bachelor degree.

As a whole, the more senior officers disclosed that for a long time it was their experience and perception that the Navy conveyed the idea that graduate school was not essential to female officer's career and professional development. A more current belief consistently articulated that selection for Navy sponsored education was largely based on
race while gender was not a factor. As a group, these officers stated that they felt that postgraduate school student and staff billets were reserved for "golden girls and golden boys".

The twelve officers with postgraduate and professional degrees all expressed a real appreciation for this type of education. They also conveyed a spontaneous enthusiasm that stated their achievements were not only a professional accomplishments, but also a personal and sometimes very private ones.

Trust

A fundamental need expressed by all of the interviews was the need to know that their seniors and peers trusted them professionally. Eight (53 percent) of the interviewees disclosed that they had never felt that they were trusted. One officer divulged that during her entire naval career she never felt trusted by her seniors until the end of her tour. It was her observation that trust was automatically extended to European American officers. This officer also remarked that this was not the custom for Africana officers. The officer contended that the practice of extending trust to European American Officers existed because of race, and race only. This interviewee stated that it was just assumed the European American Officers were a part of the team, unless they demonstrated a reason why they should not be. This officer re-emphasized her belief that in the Navy race prevails over everything, including gender. She perceived that she was viewed as being alien-like until proven otherwise.

Another interviewee stated that at first she felt threatened. Africana officers at her command were under attack and European American Officers were criticized. Her
explanation of the differences were that criticism allowed one to be corrected, "as a child would be when she made a mistake. After the child had been corrected, she would be patted on the head and told everything was okay. Conversely, when one is under attack, she or he is a "scumbag," the enemy, never to earn the good graces of the parents again. Another officer revealed that she felt that she was not trusted by her seniors, not only because of race, but also because she was not a "brown noser." She was an honest person who did not sugarcoat things. One interviewee said that she never had felt trusted by her seniors. She maintained that they over-supervised her. She stated that her seniors had always been males, so she did not know whether they mistrusted her because of her race, her gender, or both. One Commanding Officer reportedly demonstrated his mistrust of one interviewee when he told her that he had never had to rely so directly on a woman for so much, for so long. An interviewee disclosed that she felt mistrusted by her seniors because they always tended to respond to any question she asked as if she was incompetent and stupid. She also reported that several of her seniors had told her that they would not hire her if she were a civilian in a civilian job. However, they did not give their reasons.

Finally, an interviewee shared a two-fold perception regarding the issue of trust and seniors. She stated that she felt trusted when she was performing, specifically in her specialty area. However, she felt that she was not trusted to manage junior personnel or to be involved at any level of policy making.
Respect

Eleven (73 percent) of this project's target population indicated that they were respected by their peers and juniors, but it did not come automatically. They indicated that in most instances, they had set a precedence and demanded the respect that is customarily accorded automatically to commissioned officers. One interviewee indicated that European American enlistees and officers did not automatically extend respect to Africana Female Officers. She further stated that some junior Africana personnel, officers and enlisted, demonstrated the same level of hesitancy recognizing their positions as officers. Another interviewee disclosed that enlisted personnel in her command tended to disregard orders issued by her. She often found herself in a position where she had to call these individuals on the carpet to rectify their behavior. This same officer noted that she noticed that her white counterparts, male and female, did not have to employ the same leadership tactics that she was forced to. She was forced to demand professional respect. Similarly, this officer stated that she also noticed that Africana Male Officers did not have to employ the tactics that she was forced to use.

An acute issue relative to respect was shared by an officer who angrily disclosed that overtly, junior enlisted personnel were taught to and supported, when they undermined her authority, by her department head.

A relatively senior interviewee conveyed that she was never allowed to exercise any authority as a naval officer. She indicated that junior enlisted personnel in the command were taught and allowed to disregard any authority she sought to exert.

Further, the enlisted personnel were actually allowed, with the support of the command's
senior officers, to disrespect her. She was chastised for holding enlisted personnel accountable for their professional duties and responsibilities.

Appreciation

The interviewees revealed that when one is recognized and given accolades for sustained superior performance, it expresses a degree of trust, respect, and appreciation. Further, it served as a motivator to one so that she might continue to aspire and achieve as a worthy team member.

Ten (67 percent) of the fifteen interviewees expressed that they had not felt appreciated by their respective commands. These officers indicated that they had to work twice as hard as their peers, and then were labeled as being average and late bloomers. Two of these ten revealed that they had been sent to Navy billets and told to clean up a major problem caused by the incumbent. One of the incumbents had been relieved for cause during a surprise Navy Inspector General's investigation. A number of violations were uncovered and the officer in charge was relieved on the spot. The Africana Female Officer who relieved her was given six weeks to re-establish the organization from a physical, administrative, and personnel perspective. The officer accomplished this task in one month. The commanding officer never acknowledged or thanked her, nor did he give her an end of tour personal award. Instead, he told her that she was too educated for the Navy, and there was nowhere in the Navy for her to fit in. This was one of the officers, a Lieutenant Commander, with two Master degrees. The commanding officer was a Captain who did not hold a graduate degree. She, as well as the second officer,
mentioned that European American Officers were given the credit for the success of the organization.

One interviewee with over ten years of service stated she had no personal awards, letters of recognition, or appreciation. She had nothing. No trust, no respect, or appreciation. Yet, she expressed a deep commitment and a great professional love for the Navy and her occupational designator group.

**Major Concerns**

After sharing comments, beliefs, and perceptions on numerous issues, the interviewees articulated a list of major concerns that they felt warranted immediate and serious review and action.

The officers identified three specific areas that posed the most serious obstacles to their on-going professional development. The area of the billet assignments, fitness reports, and promotions were equally determined to be the number one concern for 14 (93 percent) of the interviewees. It was their united position that these areas were the fundamental building blocks one needed in order to have a long and successful career. These individuals declared that each of the mentioned areas were separate but simultaneously and directly affected each other. Eleven (73 percent) of the interviewees unequivocally declared that race and gender collectively predominantly determined the quality and frequency of their billet assignments, fitness reports, and promotions.

The second group of major concerns for the interviewees was composed of accessibility to professional training and depravation of acknowledged appreciation or recognition. Thirteen (87 percent) of the interviewees presented these areas as their
second concern. Eleven (73 percent) of the officers agreed that access to Navy sponsored advanced education constituted their major problem area.

These officers stated with intensity that race and gender, collectively, gave preeminent substance to their second and third group of issues.

Two (13 percent) interviewees stated that the lack of progress by Africana Female Officers was linked to such reasons as the lack of personal motivation, or the fact Africana Female Officers constituted a very small population in the Navy. One interviewee felt that Africana Female Officers professional trials were grounded in racism and one interviewee stated that she did not know the source of the problem.

**Africana Female Officer Articulated Perceptions**

In this section, the researcher used the interviewees' experiences and perceptions to summarize and recapitulate their totality.

The majority of Africana Female Officers interviewed described having a controlled love-rage syndrome with the Navy. For the participants, the love-rage syndrome represented a deeply rooted dislike for the Navy solely because of the treatment they received while on military duty. Concurrently, the Africana Female Officers expressed an undaunted sense of loyalty to and pride in the organization for the few accomplishments they had obtained. Specifically, 8 (53 percent) of them expressed experiencing this phenomenon, while 4 (27 percent) did not experience this syndrome, and 3 (20 percent) admitted that perhaps they did at various times experience this syndrome.
One constant perception that was revealed among the interviewees was that they, unlike Africana Male Officers and European Female Officers, did not have an established legacy in the Navy. Only three participants had family ties to the institution, thus they did not feel a deeply rooted allegiance to a legacy. This lack of grounding resulted in their feeling a sense of non-essentiality to the Navy's mission or manpower resource bank. These Africana Female Officers not only stated that they felt as non-essentials, but also felt that this treatment created a sense of invisibility — a sense of what bell hooks referred to as marginalization. According to hooks "to be in the margin is to be part of the whole, but outside the main body."\textsuperscript{23}

The preponderance of the interview participants declared unquestionably that their marginalized status in the Navy was an unmistakably by-product of the Navy's chronic practice of overt and covert racism. They further suggested that the magnitude of the multiple sources of discrimination was so great that it categorized them as a secondary class of naval officers. They did not garner the same levels of visibility, recognition, respect, and trust and professional successes as the two other research populations.

The interviewees firmly argued that the exclusive litmus test used by the Navy to determine who succeeds is race, and race alone. One interviewee strongly ascribed to the belief that race prevails over everything, including gender. She further enhanced her argument by sharing her belief that, historically, the Navy has demonstrated that it is a white male-focused organization that is determined to replenish itself with duplicate images, images that are most like them, with race being the deciding factor. Another

\textsuperscript{23}bell hooks, \textit{Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center}, (South End Press, Boston, 1984), preface.
officer confided that she believed that the Navy is most comfortable with women who are most like them. A very experienced officer stated that she thought that the Navy knew that Africana Women Officers were present, but would not, or could not, recognize any contributions they have made. Another very experienced officer conveyed that she felt that the Navy placed Africana Female Officers in two groups: (1) the extremely competent, and (2) the extremely incompetent. There is no gray area. She expanded her explanation by revealing her perception that white officers used very descriptive terms when they speak to an Africana Officer about another Africana Officer. This system is allegedly used to inform the officer what is thought of the officer who is being talked about. To this she added that she was not sure that the Navy realized that Black women had ever made significant contributions to the Navy. Based on her wealth of knowledge and experience in the Navy, Black Female Officers have not even been showcased as other officers. An interviewee who chose not to make the Navy a career, indicated that she believed that the only reason the Navy had Africana people, especially Africana Officers, was because it needed to satisfy some statistics. A junior officer readily conveyed that, based on her experiences, she had developed the belief that if the Navy thought that it could get away with it, it would make the statement that it could immediately do without Africana Female Officers.

Overall, the majority of the interviewees strongly stated that they perceived that the Navy was not educated on the contributions Africana Female Officers had made to the Navy, that it was not concerned about the contributions this group has made, and was making no real efforts to learn.
This group of officers expressed, without any hesitation, that the Navy defined Africana Female Officers as non-threatening and ancillary resources that it did not need, did not want, but was stuck with. The officers shared a common observation that the Navy has always maintained an institutional mindset about Africana women, the mindset introduced by Frank Knox. One interviewee stated that during her naval experience, of over ten years, she had come to realize that the Navy values stereotypical behavior from females, and white women filled this expectation. She stated that she had simply realized that the Navy had never been comfortable with the culture of Africana women. It just does not like Africana Female Officers who do not conform to institutionalized controlling images, such as "Sapphire", "bitch", or "Superwoman".

Another officer posited that it had been her experience that a lot of Africana Female Officers assumed the stereotypical male persona in their work spaces. A persona that conveyed strength and assertiveness. This officer stated that if you did not assume this posture early, people would take advantage of you. She defined this action as a survival mechanism: the Navy viewed it as being very negative, and the Africana officers were labelled and viewed, not just as bitches, but a super bitches. A senior officer participant relayed that at one of her farewell parties, the commanding officer presented her with a glass that was completely covered with the word bitch. She was horrified, angry, and hurt. Everyone else thought it was appropriate and funny.

A very astute and mature junior officer gave the issue considerable thought, and then solemnly stated that it was her staunch conviction that the Navy had carefully formed, and maintained, a historical image of what an Africana women should do and
should not do, or be. This Navy image of Africana women had never having changed through the passage of time. She was convinced that the Navy never envisioned Africana women as Naval Officers. Junior and Senior officers stated that even now, when they are in public gatherings in uniform, walk into a command's wardroom, are at the Exchange and Commissary, or go into an Officers' Club, the common response is for the patrons to stop what they are doing and stare, and stare again.

In a confidential 1993 memorandum, an interviewed midshipman forwarded to her commanding officer a final report of her required summer cruise. In the memorandum she acknowledged that she had learned a great deal of essential information and skills. Despite this, she conveyed that she had experienced some forms of racial prejudice and sexual harassment. This student believed that these problems could have been avoided if another female officer had been present on the ship. It appeared to her that everything she did on the ship was closely scrutinized. The midshipman conveyed that she was being watched at all times, not because she was a midshipman, but because she was a female. She stated that she should have expected that kind of behavior would occur in the Navy. The midshipman deduced that since she should have expected that kind of behavior to be displayed in the Navy that she had no redress or options. Another problem she encountered was a disagreement about the evaluation she received from the cruise. The midshipman felt that it was unfair. She contended that she had exhibited more leadership ability and more motivation than the male midshipman on board. However, it appeared to her that he was given the higher evaluation. This midshipman viewed this action as being unfair, and showing favoritism. The midshipman's
commanding officer never did talk to her or respond to her in writing about the memorandum.

It appeared that the feelings of being helpless, of being invisible, and of being devalued occurred very early in the lives of Africana Female Officers. This researcher contends that institutional coping mechanisms of Africana Female Officers are developed during their officer training programs. These officers take their selected mode of coping with them from their training environment to their commissioned officer's environment.

The Africana Female Officers interviewed exhibited a relatively high level of difficulty, and frustration, in attempting to convey their conceptualized picture of Africana Female Officers as a collective as well as themselves individually. The majority of these women admitted that whenever they heard the term "women officers," automatically a mental picture of European American Female Officers came to mind. This term women officers is synonymous with Women Officers Professional Association (WOPA). These officers each displayed an audible, or visible, degree of shame when they made this disclosure. One officer said that she knew that she was in there somewhere, but honestly, a picture of a white female officer came to mind. Another officer explained that because of the paucity of Africana Female Officers, and all she ever saw were white female officers, they shaped her perception. Still another interviewee disclosed that she did not perceive herself as an Africana Female Officer, but an officer with a desire to make the Navy a career. One officer specifically conveyed that she had not initially perceived herself as an Africana Female Officer, rather she came in with a hero mentality because she had done something no one else had done. Finally, an
experienced officer stated that she had never envisioned herself as a representative of a Naval officer. She did not view herself as representative of a typical Black person, or a typical person in the world scheme of things. This officer stated that she tended to shy away from people, and had a negative self-image.

A large number of the interviewees confided that for them the term "minority officers" primarily embraced Africana Male Officers, and sometimes Hispanic Male Officers. For them, this meant that they and other Africana Female Officers were out there somewhere. One officer stated, Africana Females Officers are invisible in the Navy.

It took a tremendous amount of directing to get them to conceptualize and envision themselves as part of the whole, the whole Navy. This proved to be difficult because this process evoked a considerable amount of pain and anger.

Others expressed that it was totally unnecessary for Africana Female Offices to see themselves as a separate group. These individuals felt that Africana Female Officers had the double advantage of being counted twice, as a female officer, and as a minority officer.

A segment of the interview population took sole credit for their progress and success. They were self-made naval officers. This segment emphatically proclaimed that it was their hard work, their sacrifice, their dedication, their giving 200 percent to the cause, and their being a trusted team player that were the sources of their success. It was their opinion that those who failed to apply the Horatio Alger philosophy to their careers had no one to blame but themselves. It was most likely, they opined, that those who were
not successful, either had been too lazy, too timid to speak up for themselves, did not
know how to do the job, or had a chip on their shoulders. These officers did not realize
that they were using the same subjective institutional language and criteria to describe or
judge other Africana Female Officers that they abstractly accused the institution of doing
to them.

Having articulated their perceptions, their beliefs, their feelings, their
observations, and their experiences, with few exceptions, a significant number of the
interviewees stated the following information summarized their conceptions of the
historical professional attainments of the three research populations. The groups are
listed in order of the group with the most professional progress achieved to the group that
has achieved the least. European American Female Officers were perceived to have made
the greatest professional attainments since their entrance in the organization. This growth
is manifested in terms of increased population, expanded opportunities, and increased
promotion numbers. The rationale used to justify this choice was race. The interviewees
conveyed that race is the Navy's litmus test that determines who succeeds and the rate at
which this success is obtained. Africana Male Officers were viewed as the second group
which had made significant professional progress. The variable that fostered the level
and rate of their success was gender. The interviewees contented that when a group
shares some commonalities with Navy patriarchs, the more likely this shared
commonality will enhance their chances of achieving tangible levels of growth. Africana
Male Officers and white male officers share gender commonalities. Africana Female
Officers were identified as the group that had made the least amount of professional
progress. This resulted from the institutional and systemic barriers that have impeded
their grow potentials and options. These barriers have been both race and gender roots. 
The symbiotic nature of these two conditions created a situation wherein a serendipitous
third obstacle evolved, secondary social class. This population of officers shared no
common physical qualities with the power brokers, primarily senior white male officers,
thus to the power brokers they have nothing to offer. Hence, Africana Female Officers
have been deemed to be non-essential resources to the Navy's overall mission.
CHAPTER 7
FINDINGS, DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION:
IS THERE A SHARED PERCEPTION BETWEEN AFRICANA FEMALE OFFICERS
AND THE NAVY

There were two overriding questions that guided regarding this research. The questions were: (1) What systemic obstacles have historically affected the professional attainments of Africana Female Officers, and (2) How have Africana Female Officers contended with the systemic obstacles?

Historically, Africana women have experienced discrimination because of their race and their gender. As Americans they shared all of the injustices inflicted on and suffered by their race. They too, like their fathers, husbands, sons, and brothers inherited the legacy of slavery, and were denied equal access to education, jobs, and public places.¹ For them, because of their gender, opportunities were even more restricted, their occupational options were significantly limited, and their economic gains were even lower than those of their male relatives.²

²Ibid.
The researcher discovered that systemic barriers were indeed part of the historical experiences of Africana Female Naval Officers. These barriers were specifically identified as the issues of race and gender. Together they created a third obstacle, a secondary social class of naval officers. Systemic barriers included the historical controlling images which have maligned Africana women and impacted their perceptions of themselves as individuals, as Africana and military officers.

**Historical Findings**

In 1972 the Navy experienced numerous incidents of racial unrest. Two of the most publicized riots occurred aboard the USS Kitty Hawk and the USS Constellation, both aircraft carriers with populations of about five thousand men each. Women, regardless of race, had not been authorized to serve on board ships. All naval operations aboard these man-of-war vessels were brought to a screeching halt, their operational priorities very immediately changed. At the helm of this massive request for change were Africana men. For this population, the Navy's traditional grievance procedure process, the chain of command, had systematically failed to hear, acknowledge or response to their complaints. It was their collective perceptions that overt civil disobedience was the only alternative left. As a result of these crises, the Navy became engaged in numerous short term and long term interventions that were designed to prohibit future disturbances.

One of the long term interventions the Navy decided to employ was to administer a biennial Navy wide Equal Opportunity Survey. This instrument was designed to surface potential equal opportunity problems, and to provide an assessment of the prevailing status of the Navy's Equal Opportunity climate.

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In the Executive Summary of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), 1988 Study Group's report on the status of Navy Equal Opportunity, the CNO acknowledged that some progress in this area had been made. The CNO stated that since the inception of the Equal Opportunity program in 1970, the Navy "has made important gains and steady progress." As he acknowledged the positive changes, he also disclosed that "in spite of this progress and the realization of significant growth in career opportunities, shortfalls continued for minorities in accessions, promotions, advancements, and distribution." The deficits had prevailed in spite of "extensive recruiting, education, and affirmative action effort."

The first Navy wide Equal Opportunity Survey was conducted in 1989. Aside from the general background information, the survey focused on the proceeding categories: (1) assignment and job duties, (2) training, (3) leadership, (4) communication, (5) interpersonal relationships, (6) grievances, (7) discipline, (8) performance evaluations, (9) promotions and advancements, (10) social support, (11) general Navy policy, and (12) sexual harassment. The survey had approximately 120 questions that addressed the previously mentioned categories.

The Navy was not prepared for Africana women's collective response to the 1989 Equal Opportunity Survey. The Navy did not provide a statistical analysis regarding the specific issues that were surfaced. Instead, it provided this summary statement, "that of

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4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.
any representative group, Black women had the least positive perceptions of the Navy’s Equal Opportunity climate."⁶ In response to that finding, the Navy convened a Black Women in the Navy Study Group, October 1990.⁷ The group's charge was to "identify areas of concern, and propose potential solutions."⁸ The original concerns that lead to the creation of this group fell into seven major categories which included Equal Opportunity programs, training, assignments, recognition, evaluations (fitness reports), promotions, and advancements.⁹

This group's composition included twenty Africana Female Officers, enlisted, and civilian personnel. Their aggregate Naval service represented a total of 247 years in a number of diverse career fields. This Study Group was under the leadership of Roberta Hazard, a European American Female Admiral. The Admiral's coordinators were an Africana Male Captain, a European American Female Commander, and a European American Male Lieutenant Commander. The coordinators were responsible for the overall administrative, logistic and facilitation of the Study Group. No Africana Female Officer was included in this group of coordinators.

This action demonstrated that Africana Female personnel were not allowed to identify their own problems and issues. The Navy's utilization of Africana Male Officers as well as European American Female Officers, is interpreted as another means of


⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid., B-9, B-10.

⁹Ibid., B-10).
oppression of Africana Female personnel. Africana Male Officers and European American Female Officers were further used to articulate and interpret Africana Female personnel problems and concerns for them. Moreover, the Africana Female is perceived and treated as victim; she is furthermore marginalized and made invisible. This action implied that progress was dependent upon Africana Female personnel's ability to accept unquestionably the guidance and leadership of Africana Male Officers and European American Female Officers.

The rank composition for the Study Group ranged from a Captain, five Commanders, two Lieutenant Commanders, three Lieutenants, three senior enlisted females, five junior enlisted females, and two civilian personnel. This group worked together for a five day period. The group identified eight prominent issues that warranted immediate attention. The areas included Equal Opportunity Programs, training, assignments, recognition, evaluations (fitness reports), and promotions and advancements.10

These concerns were brought to the Chief of Navy Personnel by the Admiral in the presence of the Study Group's participants. In contrast to the 1989 survey findings, the Study Group found that "sexual harassment of Black women is much more pervasive than indicated in the survey."11 The 1990 Black Women in the Navy study concluded that the Navy's Equal Opportunity program must reflect a


11Ibid., 18.
similar zero tolerance emphasis as the Navy Alcohol and Drug Prevention Program's non-negotiable commitment to zero tolerance. It must reflect total chain of command support, and enforcement of the letter and spirit of zero tolerance. . . the message must be clear around issues of discrimination and of sexual harassment -- Not In My Navy! This will perhaps be one of the greatest challenges to commands -- to actively counter what has been a view of EO as an area unworthy of priority consideration and relevance.  

Thus the group presented the following summary and conclusions:

A positive EO climate can only be achieved where leadership and the chain of command emphasis and enforcement are strong, effective, and supportive.

Although Navy policies relative to EO are explicit, a recent Navy wide survey of the Navy's EO climate indicated that Black women have perceptions of serious problems in this area. The Black Women in the Navy Study Group confirmed these findings. Bases on this group's experiences, it is clear that being Black, and being a woman, constitutes a unique challenge for these Navy service members.

On 1 April 1991, the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) released a Navy wide message that focused on the progress of women in the Navy. In the opening remarks of

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12Ibid., 19-20.

13Ibid., 18.


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the message, SECNAV indicated that he had directed an update of the 1987 study on women in the Navy because "Admiral Kelso and I decided it was time to take stock and determine what more needed to be done to ensure full and equal opportunity for all Navy women and men."\textsuperscript{15}

A study group was appointed and tasked to determine what was further needed to ensure that full equal opportunity was accorded to all Navy women and men. During the research phase, the group used numerous sources of data to gather the essential information. One source was "the findings and recommendations of the 1990 Black Women in the Navy Study Group."\textsuperscript{16} The 1991 Study Group found that women had increasingly become more visible throughout enlisted ratings and officers communities, successfully taking on non-traditional roles alongside their male shipments. Major accomplishments include "assignment of women to combat Logistic Force ships and to reconnaissance air crews."\textsuperscript{17}

The SECNAV was pleased with this positive report. He disclosed that the group had "made a wide variety of recommendations to improve the opportunity, acceptance, equal opportunity, and utilization of Navy women."\textsuperscript{18} Among the key recommendations that focused on female officers were" (1) re-examine policies regarding permanent assignment of women at sea and ashore, (2) review and revise policies regarding

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., 2.
\textsuperscript{17}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{18}Ibid.
accession of women officers in unrestricted line, restricted line, and staff corps to ensure
artificial limits are not in place."\textsuperscript{19}

On 29 August 1989, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) released an
unclassified, but personal, message to unit commanders, commanding officers, and
officers in charge, entitled "Building Trust in Our System.\textsuperscript{20} In the message, the CNO
commented that he had just spoken at the National Naval Officers' Association Annual
Convention. During this convention "NAACP top leadership was very complementary of
the Navy's progress in Equal Opportunity, and of the military's position as a leader in
society in that regard."\textsuperscript{21} The CNO reiterated that "it is clear that we are making very real
and measurable progress and that we in the Navy can be proud of our efforts and our
accomplishments. Even so, we cannot afford to become complacent."\textsuperscript{22} The CNO also
stated that "Navy policy with regard to equal opportunity is clear. We will accept nothing
less than true equal opportunity for all naval personnel, majority and minority: men and
women. We stand together as a service dedicated to the principle. We abhor
discrimination in any form, and take swift and appropriate action when it is discovered."\textsuperscript{23}

The CNO released the "Results of 1991 Navy EO/SH Survey" on 27 August 1992
in an unclassified, but "Personal For" message addressed to all Navy admirals, unit

\textsuperscript{19}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{20}Chief of Naval Operations Personal Message for Building Trust in our System, (Washington,

\textsuperscript{21}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{22}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., 2.
commanders, commanding officers, and officers-in-charge. The CNO revealed that "while comparison of these findings and those of the 1989 NEOSH survey disclosed some positive and encouraging trends, results, overall, are mixed." He further indicated that "the findings that follow are worth your time, concern, and future effort. We need to pay attention to what our people have told us. Their perceptions, good and bad, affect their morale and productivity." The findings that were labelled as good news included only one of this project's research populations, Africana Male Officers. According to these findings, "over 70 percent of our Black male officers are satisfied with the Navy, and 80 percent would recommend the Navy to others." However, the two remaining research populations, Africana Female Officers and European American Female Officers, conveyed different perceptions. The results indicated that "in general, women responded less positively than men on EO climate questions, and women officers were least positive."

The 1991 survey results stated that "as in 1989, Black women had the lowest positive perceptions than any group. Only 37 percent of our Black women officers (vs 55 percent of our Black males, and 53 percent of our white women) believed that the chain

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25Ibid.

26Ibid.

27Ibid.

28Ibid.

29Ibid., 2.
of command discourages favoritism, and only 44 percent of our Black women (vs 57 percent of our white women) felt free to report unfair treatment without reprisal . . . similarly, 49 percent of the Black women (vs 64 percent of the Black males) felt they got the recognition they deserved.30

The results of the 1993 Navy Equal Opportunity Sexual Harassment (NEOSH) Survey were released by the CNO on 9 January 1995. In the opening remarks of the message, the CNO disclosed that the survey had been "mailed in October 1993 to 9,537 naval personnel."31 Analysis of the survey responses were "conducted to assess the current perceptions of equal opportunity within the Navy, and to identify trends with respect to the previous surveys conducted in 1989 and 1991."32

The 1993 survey results disclosed that discrimination and harassment had decreased overall.33 Specifically for female officers, that figure dropped 40 percent.34 Another disclosure indicated "the gap between white and Black male officers perceptions of discrimination occurring at their command, narrowed from the 1991 survey."35 This CNO's message stated that "beside telling you the signs are pointing in the right direction.

30Ibid.
32Ibid.
33Ibid.
34Ibid.
35Ibid., 2.
.. there are a few areas where we need to place additional emphasis." The number one area of equal opportunity we need to improve is "the perception of equal opportunity in the Navy held by Black women. We need to learn more about our lack of progress in the area." The CNO ended this message with this statement:

Now, just like we have done in operational and material matters for over two hundred years, we must hold ourselves accountable in the "people" part of the Navy, as well. It's not enough to take action only when someone complains. The standard must be to take action when the trends show that trouble is brewing. We have Command Managed Equal Opportunity (CMEO) tools in place today to let us know what those trends are in each command. We must use these tools -- and use them routinely, to make even greater progress toward our goal of "zero tolerance."  

Between the period of 23 May 1995 through 19 December 1995, the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center (NPRDC) conducted five Black Women Focus Groups. The facilitators for these groups were a European American civilian female, a European American civilian male, and two Africana Lieutenant Commander Male Officers. The Africana Female Officer participants consisted of 54 women whose

36Ibid.  
37Ibid.  
38Ibid.  
ranks ranged from Ensign to Captain. These officers represented a number of
occupational fields. The focus groups were held on site and in places where there were
high concentrations of women, including Washington, D.C., Norfolk, Virginia, San
Diego, California, and on board the United States Ship McKee.40

The impetus for the establishment of these focus groups was "the 1989, '91, '93,
and NEOSH surveys, each which produced results that indicated Black women were the
least satisfied with the equal opportunity climate."41 These results had been "consistent
for the past six years, there was a need to determine the basis for the findings."42
Additionally, "Black women did not receive feedback from the 1990 Black Women in the
Navy Study Group. the findings and recommendations were never published . . . and
action items were never established."43

Each of these focus groups were presented a list of discussion topics. These
topical areas were the same scales that appeared in the NEOSH surveys. They included
discrimination, leadership, billet assignments, communication, fitness reports,
promotions, sexual harassment, and Navy satisfaction. Once operational, each focus
group was subsequently sub-divided into four small groups, based on the ranks of the
participants. Each small group was added for reasons that would possibly explain why

40Ibid., unpaginated.
41Ibid.
42Ibid.
43Ibid.

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Africana women felt that they were treated different from other demographic groups in the Navy.\textsuperscript{44}

The major findings of all of the 1995 Study Groups conveyed "that the same perceptions identified in the 1990 Black Women in the Navy Study Group exists today."\textsuperscript{45} These Focus Groups stated that, essentially, they believed that both top leadership and local commands only pay lip service to the tenets of equality.\textsuperscript{46}

Other key perceptions these groups disclosed were that Africana women were not treated fairly with regard to awards, fitness reports, and joint education for officers.\textsuperscript{47} It was expressed that few Black women rose to senior officer positions. This reality existed because of inequities that are inherent to the awards, fitness reports, and training systems.\textsuperscript{48} These group participants stated that the absence of networking organizations, and personal mentors, were also seen as impediments to their progress.\textsuperscript{49}

The National Naval Officers Association (NNOA) has been perceived by the Navy as the organized network for "minority officers." Its charter stated the organization would address generic minority issues.\textsuperscript{50} Some of the officers in the focus groups said that the Women Officers Professional Association (WOPA) had the potential to provide

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{44}Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{45}Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{46}Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{47}Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{48}Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{49}Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{50}Ibid.
\end{itemize}
this service for all Female Naval Officers. A number of Africana officers disclosed that
they attempted to become affiliated with this group, but had not "felt welcome at WOPA
meetings." They stated that they had not been acknowledge by any WOPA members.
Most of the officers in the focus groups told stories of being ignored, or passed over for a
specific billet or for promotion in favor of a white woman or man. The participants
repeatedly told the facilitators "that it is a white man's Navy." According to the project's
facilitators, "Black women noted that their primary incentives for staying in the Navy
were job security, the challenge, and the many benefits."

One of the major conclusions drawn from the focus groups data was that Africana
women believe they are doubly disadvantaged in their Navy careers, by being both
members of a racial minority and by being women. This perception was corroborated by
the majority of the fifteen participants who took part in this project's oral interviews.

The sponsor of the focus groups, the Navy Personnel Research and Development
Center, stated that it proposed to senior Navy leadership that "a zero tolerance policy be
adopted for racial discrimination, just as had been promulgated for sexual harassment,
and abuse of drugs and alcohol."

The compiled summary of these 1995 focus groups stated that:

51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.

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Black women feel disadvantaged because of their race and gender. Black women are dissatisfied with the way the Equal Opportunity Program in the Navy is applied. They perceive their treatment is less favorable than any other group, minority or majority, in the Navy. Their opportunity to advance to high ranking positions is hindered by the inequalities in recognition for superior performance, through awards and performance evaluations, training, and educational opportunities. They believe the Equal Opportunity policies are not upheld in their favor, and that Black women are alone in their concern about this situation. Studies have been conducted since 1990, but nothing has ever been published acknowledging that they have concerns about their career opportunities. There has been no action items assigned to anyone to address the issues that concern Black women. The contributions of Black women to the Navy are many, but Black women don't feel anyone knows, or cares.56

Findings and Discussion

This researcher agreed with Mary Washington's argument that the most damaging impact of the application of controlling images is that people other than Africana women attempt to define who she is, her physical characteristics, her behavior, as well as what she even sounds like. These illusions of the Africana woman bear very little resemblance

56Ibid.
to the real persons. In spite of this fact, controlling images have survived as real environmental and cultural constructs, and have been employed in the Navy, when needed, by the reigning power brokers. These power brokers do not know, nor care, about the subjects of their negative manipulation. bell hooks argued that "the dearth of affirming images of Black femaleness in art, magazines, movies, and television reflects not only the racist white world's way of seeing us, but the way we see ourselves." Patricia Hill Collins historical interpretation of controlling images, especially Sapphire, appears to have been historically used to describe Africana Female Officers. Collins contended that "the stereotypical portrayal of Africana American woman as various caricatures has been historically essential to the political economy of domination, which fosters African American oppression." However, Collins suggested that white America's primary purpose for initially creating stereotypes of the Africana woman was to justify its inherent racist and sexist nature, thus providing an illusion that verified the superficial naturalness of every poverty experienced by Africana women. Further, Collins posited that the Eurocentric practice of denigrating Africana women was spawned as a strategic mechanism designed to keep the target group disarmed and oppressed. Disarmed and oppressed people, such as Africana Female Officers, are not empowered

58bell hooks. Sisters of the Yam (Boston, South End Pass, 1993), 84.
60Ibid., 67.
61Ibid.
and do not make claim to their legitimate political, social, economic, and historical legacy. Without this legacy, their ability to define themselves does not exist.

Disarming and oppressing the Africana Female Officer provided the Navy with the opportunity to remain unchallenged. To gain the position of dominator, one must have direct access to power. In the United States, the political and economic positions of the empowered Eurocentric culture has enabled it to unabashedly create and manipulate symbols that fostered Africana women's oppression.62

Continuation of the general society's socio-economic-political practices of Eurocentric domination necessitated a spokesperson and a leader. Knox emerged as the power broker for the Navy, who set, until his death, policy related to Africana men and women Naval Officers. He set a precedent, while not as overt as in the past, which still undergirds Navy racial and gender policies as they relate to Africana Female Officers and Africana Male Officers. This research data, both historical and narrative, demonstrated that the "Knox Stance"63 currently impacts Naval equal opportunity policies.

Naval personnel, like society at large, objectifies the oppressed. Objectification is a de-humanizing process that fabricates objects, not subjects, for the purpose of gaining manipulation and controlling rights. In essence, this is a depersonalizing process, wherein people become things. Things are oblique, distant, and powerless. Navy personnel who would dominate use controlling images to disempower objects (Africana

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62 Ibid.

63 This term was a creation of the researcher of the project and is based on data surfaced regarding her interpretation of Frank Knox's attitude on the integration of Africana personnel in the U. S. Navy.
Female Officers), superficially, negating the need to understand, appreciate, and respect them as complex and unique individuals. The objectified individual's or group's only option is to respond to the dominator in a prescribed and predictable fashion. This objectification process was clearly demonstrated in the interview question responses in the themes of perception and respect. The manner in which the Africana Female Officers responded to these two themes clearly indicated their difficulty in identifying themselves as individuals, and as Female Naval Officers.

In a work environment, for example in the Navy, Africana Female Officer interviewees felt that they were not evaluated on their actual job performance, but rather on their personalities. They are evaluated on how well they ascribe to the power base's preconceived conception of them. With prompting, Africana Female Officers are expected to know when to become invisible. Objects who do not conform to stereotypical expectations are not rewarded or valued. They are often labelled as being late bloomers," trouble makers,""non team-players," super bitches having potential, and sometimes militants.

By the end of October, 1944, Africana males and females, as well as European American Females had representatives in the Navy's Officer Corps. The common denominator that the three groups shared is that they were not included in the Navy out of a sense of heightened moral and social enlightenment. Rather, Africana female personnel have been objectified by the Navy to varying degrees, based on its perception of the individuals who constituted the group. European American Female Officers were brought into this previously all-male institution because the men on shore duty were
needed at sea. These women were perceived by the Navy as the most viable and obvious answer to the existing problem. Africana Male officers were subsequently included because the Navy needed to pacify some unrelenting internal and external power sources who would not accept the Navy's justification for not commissioning officers from this population. Africana Female Officers were incorporated because the incumbent President "needed" to overcome a serious campaign challenge.

It was "need" that drove the Navy to solicit help from the three groups, Africana Female Officers, Africana Male Officers, and European American Female Officers, however, the Navy distinctively reacted to their presence differently. Once the decision had been made to accept European American women, the entire Navy became involved in the planning of this phenomenon. Similarly, the civilian communities and educational institutions across the nation became involved and assisted in making this momentous change a smooth and dignified one. The Navy displayed an immense amount of confidence in these women's abilities and their value to the organization. One way this was demonstrated was through the large numbers of women who were initially commissioned, as well as the total number of 8,400 commissioned between 1942 to 1945. Africana Male Officers certainly did not get the same kind of reception and sponsorship provided to European American Female Officers. In contrast, their training and commissioning were handled like a highly secret operation. This was an example of the Navy being very dishonest with the general public, the Black and white tax payers of America. This purposeful and deceitful act allowed the Navy to arm itself against further public criticism. It also provided the Navy with leverage to discredit anyone who
continued to pursue the matter. Essentially, commissioning some Africana Male Officers acted as a "pressure reliever" for the Navy. As a "pressure reliever" the commissioning of Africana males proved the same kind of fast relief that Alka-Seltzer claims that it provides for heart burn, acid indigestion, sour stomach, headache, and body aches and pain.⁶⁴

Africana Male Officers did not gain as much access to the center of the Navy as did European American Female Officers. This is reflected in the initial numbers commissioned, and the total numbers that served during World War I. Race emerged as the negative variable that determined where Africana Male Officers were positioned in the organization. On the other hand, gender proved to be a valuable asset for Africana Male Officers, and race for European American Female Officers. Both of these groups had variables that the white male patriarchy could relate to, Africana Male Officers and European American Female Officers retained varying degrees of visibility in the organization. This visibility gave the two groups the opportunity to develop and maintain a long term legacy in the institution. From their initial entry to 1996, in terms of numbers, or size of personnel population, Africana Male Officers have never been close to the numbers of European American Female Officers. (See Chart 1). Africana Female Officers have not reached parity with either group, and thus have remained invisible and marginalized. (See Table 22).

⁶⁴Bayer Corporation. Alka-Seltzer, Consumer Care Division, Eikhart, Indiana.

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Table 22 details the ratios found between the groups for the periods 1973-1996. As indicated, Africana Female Officers have not been proportionally represented in the Navy careers for the periods under investigation.
Table 22. - Summary of Ratios between Research Populations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ratio</th>
<th></th>
<th>Ratio</th>
<th></th>
<th>Ratio</th>
<th></th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EAFO/AO</td>
<td>EAFO/AFO</td>
<td>AMO/AFO</td>
<td>EAFO/AMO</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-1976</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-1979</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1981</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-1984</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-1987</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-1990</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-1993</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-1995</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: The above ratios indicate the rate of change that occurred between research populations over a twenty-three year period.
From all indications, racial and gender discrimination prevented Africana Female Officers from acquiring its proportional share of Naval officers. According to Cochran, Mayer, Carr & Cayer, Africana Female Officers do not reach a state of proportional equality.

Proportional equality refers to the idea that a social group's percentage in the overall population should be equaled by its share of certain benefits, such as income and wealth, or the holding of desired social roles, such as membership in the professions, high socioeconomic status, and admission to professional schools.⁶⁵

Based on this concept, the number of Africana Female Officers during the research period 1973-1996 should have reached a total of 10,649. Instead there have been only 4,208 Africana Female Officers for this period. If African Americans constitute 12 percent of the general population, it is assumed that Africana women constitute 6 percent of the African American population. It is further assumed that the European American population is 80 percent of the general population. Of that group European American women comprise 40 percent of that specific population.

The Africana Female Officers interviewed reinforced this perception of invisibility and marginalization. To comply with President Roosevelt's directions, the Navy simply brought Africana Female Officers onto the margin of the organization, and left them there. This group of officers had no visible and powerful sponsors or advocates, either in the Navy or in the civilian arena. They were left to fend for themselves in an

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unknown world that had not invited them in. Their minuscule numbers did not make them very visible, nor empower them as a force that commanded recognition.

Unlike the Africana Male Officers and the European American Female Officers, Africana Female Officers shared no commonalities with the Navy's patriarchs. They are just too different, thus they are kept on the margin of the organization so that they will be invisible and not taint the esteemed image of the United States Navy.

Collectively, all of the military branches have been held up to the general public as the archetype of racial equality and true equal opportunity in the United States. Official data found during this research project documented grievous incongruencies between the historical, statistical, and oral history data and the official Navy Department's generalized propaganda. The Navy certainly did not fabricate the phenomenon of glass ceilings and glass walls. These structures existed in the United States long before the Navy existed. The Navy, as a microcosm of the general society, shares similar attitudes, values, and biases with regards to parity and equal opportunities for people who are different.

Historically, European American Female Officers, as well as Africana Female Officers, have been, and remain, concentrated in stereotypical female billets that provided support to, and service for, the at sea Navy. Even so, their numbers and percentages increased noticeably in these designators. European American Female Officers also rapidly expanded their presence in the non-traditional designators, including sea duty and aviation. Often when European American Female Officers were assigned to non-traditional and operational designators, their numbers and percentages gradually exceeded
those of Africana Male Officers, who had previously been assigned in the designator
group. The exception to this was in the Chaplain Corps, where there were more Africana
Male Officers than either European American Female officers or Africana Female
Officers.

The data presented in this project indicated that Africana Male Officers, too, have
made measurable professional progress. Similar to European American Female Officers,
Africana Male Officers experienced a significant increase in their aggregate population.
The numbers of commissioned Africana males have increased as well as the numbers that
have been promoted and became career designated. Moreover, their presence in all of the
designator groups has become more readily apparent. This tangible growth, both in the
rank structure and designator groups, has made Africana Male Officers more visible in
the organization. This visibility has amassed for these officers, a staunch group of
supporters in the Navy, the Defense Department, and in the civilian sector. This level of
support has certainly furthered Africana Male Officer's professional opportunities.

However, the growth and the high powered sponsorship have not enabled them to achieve
the level of success that European American Female Officers have realized.

For a period of 24 years, the available data disclosed that Africana Female
Officers progress has consistently lagged behind Africana Male Officers and European
American Female Officers. (See Table 23).
Table 23. - - Summary of Research Populations 1973-1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>AFO</th>
<th>AMO</th>
<th>EAFO</th>
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<td>76</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974-1976</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>798</td>
<td>3305</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977-1979</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>1148</td>
<td>3960</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980-1981</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>1387</td>
<td>4798</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982-1984</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>1600</td>
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<td>1985-1987</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991-1993</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>2245</td>
<td>7004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-1995</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>2332</td>
<td>6499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>719</td>
<td>2396</td>
<td>6405</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LEGEND
AFO = Africana Female Officers
AMO = Africana Male Officers
EAFO = European American Female Officers

Note: Information in the above table summarizes the end strength numbers of each research population.
Of these groups, Africana Female Officers have always had the smallest aggregate population, the smallest numbers and percentages of officers in each rank, the smallest numbers of officers to be commissioned, promoted, and designated as career officers. Africana Female Officers was the last group of officers to have an officer promoted to the rank of Captain. To date, no Africana Female Officer has ever been promoted to the rank of Admiral.

It would be incorrect to imply that Africana Female Naval Officers have not made any progress during their fifty-three year history. Their growth from a total of two officers in 1944 to a total of 719 in 1996 warrants recognition. However, in comparison to the initial 151 European American Female Officers in 1942 to the current 6,405 in 1996, and the 12 Africana Male Officers in 1944 to the current 2,396 in 1996, Africana Female Officer's progress can best be described as anemic.

Historically Africana Male Officers have been concentrated in stereotypical operational designators, such as Surface Warfare and Aviation. The data disclosed that a new trend is evolving. As the number of European American Female Officers increased in the non-traditional designators, the number of Africana Male Officers began to decrease. The Surface Warfare designator remains the primary occupational field for Africana Male Officers. However, in the early 1990's these officers began to be less visible in some of the other primary operational designators and becoming more visible in support and service designators, such as Supply Corps and Medical Service Corps.
Africana Female Officers had been, and continue to be, primarily assigned to service and support designators such as Nurse Corps and Fleet Support Officer. This group of officers was the last of the three research population groups to be incorporated into the non-traditional designators. This expansion occurred at very negligible rates, and included very small numbers. Currently the Navy has not yet placed an Africana Female Officer in several of the non-traditional operational billets.

One of the purposes of this research was to determine the degree of disparity that existed, and exists, between Africana Male Officers, European American Female Officers, and Africana Female Officers. Whatever the Navy has forgotten, denied, or hidden about its relationship with Africana Female Officers, Navy sponsored research conducted over the past seven years has again brought it to the forefront.

Since 1989, a number of Navy sponsored Equal Opportunity surveys and Personnel Research projects have been conducted. In each instance they produced results that were the same, or very similar, to those of the first Equal Opportunity survey. Each time the Navy has responded in its customary fashion. It acquired the facade that said act like you are concerned, act like your care, and act like you are currently doing something about it. To date the Navy has never taken any official action on any of these findings. The message that the Navy sends is that if it addresses the issues of women and the issues of minorities, then the issues of Africana women have been addressed. Africana Female Officers professional concerns have been continuously wrapped in multiple layers of benign neglect.
The Africana Female Officers who participated in this research project did not have a firm grasp on the details of Africana Female Officer history, but they demonstrated keen awareness of their professional surroundings and of their organizational ranking in relationship to Africana Male Officers and European American Female Officers. They articulated with resounding clarity that Africana Female Officers have, and are still, making the least amount of professional advancements. Without hesitation, these officers identified the systemic obstacles -- such as controlling images of Sapphire and superwoman, that have historically prohibited their professional advancements.

One of the primary controlling images associated with Africana women that have survived through the centuries is the Sapphire or Super Woman image. This is the woman who can do everything for anybody at any time, without any reactions, concerns, or regard for her individual conditions and feelings. It is the Superwoman/Sapphire mission in life to be the mules of the world. Many of the Africana Female Officers interviewed consciously, as well as unconsciously, ascribed to the script and acquired the associated behaviors.

The interviewees disclosed a number of behaviors they employed in order to cope and survive with the realities of their Navy experiences. These behaviors represented a gamut of options. A fundamental coping mechanism was unconditional acceptance. These officers stated that they painfully and angrily accepted the reality that because of the interlocking nature of their innate qualities of race and gender, they would always be on the bottom of the Navy's success ladder. This acceptance triggered tremendous pain and anger that they could not express. Rather, it was turned inward and left to fester.
In an effort to terminate this malignant pain and anger, the interviewees also used the mechanism of "over compensation" -- giving 200 percent instead of the expected 100 percent -- as a coping device. As that option proved to be ineffective, they replaced it with the mechanism "I am to blame" mode. Essentially, they blame themselves for their lack of growth. To further cope, some accepted the label of "late bloomers." Assuming this label explained that the individuals had so many deficiencies that their careers were beyond salvaging. This protracted victim status forced the officers into a world of isolation. In that space they felt safe. This attitude prevailed to the degree that in order to further cope, they became estranged from other Africana Female Officers. In fact, they disclosed that they became suspicious, distrustful, and afraid of other Africana Female Officers. Because of these feeling, the interviewees did not even think to seek out another Africana Female Officer as a safe haven. Each of these coping mechanism used, failed to produce the desired changes. As the consistency of failures increased, the Africana Female Officers unconsciously opted to internalize all of the oppressive experiences.

The researcher made several secondary findings which are related to the internalization of race compounded by gender, and Naval social class oppression experienced by Africana Female Officers. These secondary findings are the Concept of Difference, and the Military Service Stress Syndrome.

These findings will be the focus of future research that will address the internalization of race plus gender, and class oppression experienced by Africana Female Officers.
During the entire course of this research project as all data were analyzed, a particular trend surfaced and prevailed. This distinctive trend portrayed that each of the research population groups experienced some obstacles to obtaining professional growth. However, it is the unique fusion of race and gender which have made Africana Female Officers problematic for the Navy. The presence of this unique fusion of race and gender differences intensified the professional liability which confronted Africana Female Officers.

The commonality of the themes indicated that differences in individuals or groups directly determined their degree of acceptance or oppression incurred from the group in power. The more visible the differences, the more likely the targeted individuals or groups will be subjected to a varying range of oppression and acceptance. Navy history has consistently shown that differing from the group in power is a costly liability. The power brokers have deemed themselves as the ideal model of success and acceptance. It is the responsibility of the affected groups to meet the standards of the power broker, and ascend to their level. If this is impossible, then for each difference that exists, a penalty is attached.

The significant differences that separate European American Male Officers and Africana Female Officers have permanently positioned Africana Female Officers on the nautical margin of the Navy, creating for them the historical glass ceilings and glass walls that have continuously stunted their level of professional attainments.

The Concept of Difference also serves as the primary tool or gauge used by the power brokers to determine the degree of difference they will tolerate in the organization.
Simultaneously, The Concept of Difference assisted the power source with establishing a hierarchy of acceptance and success. The senior white male Naval officer is the exclusive source of power in the Navy. The potential victims of oppression, as indicated by the Concept of Difference, are the individuals or groups who are the most unlike the model's physical attributes.

**Military Service Stress Syndrome**

This researcher also found that the presence of Differences created by the unique fusion of race and gender in the lives of Africana Female Officers, has produced another phenomenon -- one that very strongly affects the quality of life that these officers experience. The researcher identified this second phenomenon as the Military Service Stress Syndrome. It is characterized as a cumulative and protracted condition that primarily affects Africana Female Officers who have completed, usually five years or more of military (naval) service.

This group is the primary victim because of the onerous impact the Paradigm of Difference has on their professional lives. The condition is the product of systemic and protracted benign neglect. It evolves and thrives because of massive exposure to, and endurance of, numerous negative variables. The negative variables include sustained experiences of marginalization, massive amounts of internalized oppression, multiple forces of oppression, historical levels of diminished professional attainment, negative professional and personal self images, and subjugation which evolves from the constant

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66 Theresa Ware-Asbury, The researcher, proposes the Concept of Differences as the main construct of the Military Service Stress Syndrome.
application of controlling images. One of the interviewees of this study demonstrated the impact of the Military Service Stress Syndrome. This officer clearly commented that she did not see herself as an Africana Female Officer, a Black person, or an individual in the scheme of people in the world. She said that she was shy, and tended to isolate herself from people.

From all indications, Africana Female Officers in other branches of the military may be affected by this condition. In a 1995 newspaper article, entitled "Women at Military Schools", an Africana Female Army Officer described her experiences. This retired Army major stated that in reference to her four years at West Point, "I will never talk about what I went through... I have never told anyone -- not even my husband. I don't want to relive that. But I was willing to endure anything, much more than almost everyone else, because this was going to be my one chance in life."67 One of the European American Female Officers who served with this officer stated that "the harassment she experienced far exceeded their own."68


68Ibid.
CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSIONS

From its inception, the Navy's personnel policies and practices have been grounded in racist and sexist ideology contributed by the founding patriarchs. During the wooden ship period of the U. S. Navy, Africana males served in multiple fields of billets. This option existed because the Navy's access to essential personnel was very restricted. However, at the turn of the century the Navy improved its technology and moved from a wooden ship fleet to a steel Navy. Further, it expanded the parameters for selecting personnel resources. This expansion enabled the organization to recruit more European American males, thus it decreased its need to include Africana males. The few Africana males who were recruited were restricted in the billets to which they would be assigned. The Navy had determined that Africana males, were more suited to serve only as cooks and stewards.

There were four purposes that inspired this study: (1) produce a descriptive history documenting and describing the professional experiences, contributions and accomplishments of Africana Female Officers from 1944 to 1996; (2) determine the degree of disparity in professional attainments that historically existed and currently exists between Africana Female Officers and those of Africana Male and European American Female Officers; (3) identify the major factors that constitute the glass ceiling
and glass wall phenomena experienced by Africana Female Naval Officers, and (4) determine how the glass ceiling and glass wall phenomena have affected Africana Female Officers' perceptions of themselves as an aggregate group and the perceptions of the Navy. The quantity and quality of the discovered data lead to the achievement of all four purposes. The data allowed the researcher to develop an in-depth descriptive, as well as numeric, history of Africana Female Officers, covering the period of 1944 to 1996. The profundity of the information displayed in the project's Tables, Chart, and text corroborated that Africana Female Officers have always lagged behind the comparison groups in every category in which they were compared. This degree of disparity was very visible and significant.

Analysis of historical textual data, Navy research project results, and oral interviews data exposed that the major ingredients that constituted the systemic barriers were race plus gender. However, the interlocking forces of these traits produced another obstacle, secondary social class. The force of this barrier proved to be as powerful as the others.

Historical and personal narratives were research methodology strategies which enabled the researcher to find answers to the research questions. In response to the first question, the data identified the combination of race plus gender, and social class as the historical systemic obstacles that have chronically affected the professional attainments of Africana Female Officers. The qualities and the controlling images of super woman and Sapphire are the primary ingredients that composed the glass ceilings and glass walls, the oppression, voiced by the African Female Officer. Secondly, in response to the final
question, the data disclosed that Africana Female Officers employed multiple coping mechanisms, such as over compensation to contend with the oppression. However, they primarily used the mechanism of internalizing the oppressive experiences in order to cope. Color was not identified as a barrier, neither in the descriptive data or the interview data.

The oral interviews were the major sources that provided insight as to how Africana Female Officers viewed themselves and the Navy. The historical presence of systemic barriers in the lives of Africana Female Officers have created within them a perception of themselves individually, and collectively, as well as perceptions of the Navy. These officers described themselves as being well educated and dedicated professionals, whose vast talents and abilities had never been acknowledged or valued by the Navy. As they articulated this perception, they conveyed another. This perception described them as aloof and powerless victims who were invisible and had been permanently placed on the Navy's margin.

The Navy steadfastly maintained its ideological doctrine regarding its personnel composition, and did not consider a need for change until it was forced to. The evolution of a number of very serious and very obvious national security, political, and social conditions challenged their respective personnel practices and policies. Primarily, it was the presence of a very threatening and major international crisis that galvanized the Navy's attention and forced it to realize that its desires were incongruent with its pressing needs. As the likelihood of America becoming directly involved in World War II significantly increased, the Navy slowly accepted the reality of its acute and critical
personnel shortage. The shortage was so severe that it posed serious implications on the Navy's ability to execute its wartime mission.

To alleviate this personnel problem, the Navy sought help from white America . . . European American Females. To preserve the basic underpinning of this organization's personnel philosophy, the white male patriarchs chose to select individuals to work with who looked most like them racially. Conceptually, this decision ignited the perception that race has been, and remains, the most important and determining variable when Naval personnel decisions are made. This perception is further strengthened by the historical fact that the Navy has always presented that it was, and is, a very male environment.

Once the Navy accepted the reality of its personnel shortage and decided to select white women to fill the billets so men could go to sea, the Navy conveyed an attitude that it had sufficiently prepared itself to execute its wartime mission. The decision to accept white women in the Navy was a rather generous one. This decision not only allowed for the enlistment of women in the Navy, it also allowed them to be commissioned as officers. Furthermore, they served in the Navy equally with their male counterparts, not in an auxiliary as Army women did. These women were brought into the Navy, because they were needed. In spite of this, they were generally very positively received. One of their principal vocal and powerful proponents was the Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox. His level of support allowed them to be recruited as officers and enlisted personnel in large numbers with little established selection criteria in place. Even so, these women were not free from gender discrimination. They all served in stereotypical female billets.
Africana personnel did not garner a noticeable level of recognition or support from within the Navy. In fact, the quality of support they received was diametrically opposed to the quality of support European American females received. Frank Knox, the Secretary of the Navy, did not disguise his vehement opposition to having Africana personnel in the Navy. Without reservations, Knox indicated that Africana personnel would best serve the Nation in the Army's all Black units. He continued by stating that it would be inappropriate, as well as cruel, to have Africana personnel serve in the Navy anywhere except as mess cooks and stewards. According to Knox's logic, the cruelty lay with placing Blacks in professional fields wherein it was a foregone conclusion that they would fail. In essence, Knox did not have any confidence in the intellectual abilities of Africana people. Essentially, he conveyed the belief that all Africana people were mentally challenged. Knox's pernicious and stalwart mindset regarding racial integration did not curtail the continuous and immense social pressure he was subjected to from both inside and outside the Navy. These sources continued to challenge the soundness of the Navy policy that constricted the population as well as the utilization of Africana male enlisted personnel. These forces additionally questioned the justifications used to prevent the commissioning of Africana officers. The degree of pressure placed on the Secretary of the Navy increased to such a magnitude that he eventually ran out of excuses. His skewed and subjective logic became so obvious that he was unable to provide plausible retorts to the unrelenting questioning.

The three research groups entered the Navy during the same time period, the 1940s, when the nation was deeply involved in a major international war. However,
contrary to the researcher's initial assumption, the circumstances which brought them into the Navy differed. European American Female Officers were brought in the Navy in 1942 in order to alleviate a serious manpower shortage at sea. It was the Navy's position that if women -- European American women -- were commissioned and enlisted, they could relieve the men ashore, thus allowing these men to go to sea and fill the critical vacant billets there. Even though the first 151 European American Female Officers did not come into the Navy because they were wanted, just needed, this did not interfere with the Navy's recognition of their presence with fanfare and publicity. Parallel, they came in with an in-house and staunch supporter, the Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox.

For some reason, Africana personnel were not viewed by the Navy as being a viable resource, especially as officers that could effectively contribute and lessen the widespread manpower shortage. Frank Knox unrelentingly resisted the notion of commissioning Africana officers until the logic he used, relative to Africana Male Officers, was significantly defaced. Because of the mounting social pressure place on the Navy from civilian and military sources, it reluctantly acquiesced and commission twelve Africana Male Officers in 1944. These officers were not met with any fanfare or publicity.

This action did not amend the Secretary of the Navy's position regarding Africana women and the Navy. Frank Knox continued to vehemently resist and oppose the commissioning and enlistment of Africana females. He did very little to conceal or camouflage his strong feelings. One senior European American Female Officer who had served in World War II, admitted in a 1970 interview, that the Secretary of the Navy
indeed had a strong opposition to having Africana females in the Navy. This opposition was translated to an unwritten policy practice. She confided that the policy and practice existed because Knox had subjective standards for the WAVES. Namely, they had to look good in uniform, be beautiful, and had to have high moral standards.

Mildred McAfee, the first Director of the WAVES, corroborated that the Navy indeed had an unwritten policy and practice not to recruit Africana females. This information from two very creditable and highly respected senior officers, was used to strongly reinforce the interviewees perceptions that Knox steadfastly believed that no Africana woman in America could meet the aforementioned standards or criteria. It is also alleged that Frank Knox had stated on more than one occasion, that it would be over his dead body before Africana females would be allowed in the Navy. It was, in fact, over his dead body that the issue of Africana females in the Navy was resurfaced.

Approximately ninety days after his death, Knox's successor, James V. Forrestal, superficially brought the issue to the attention of the President in a confidential memorandum. The language used in the memorandum stated "...if and when we do this. ...and I suggest that we do it before we are forced to..." did not portray a picture of an individual who was morally convinced of, or committed to, the cause.

Perhaps because Secretary Forrestal did not take the lead on this matter, and continued to discuss it with the President, about ninety days later the President had not even addressed the matter. What forced the matter to the oval office, and got action, was the utilization of election year political tactics. In 1944, President Roosevelt, the incumbent, was accused directly by the challenger, Thomas Dewey, Governor of New
York, of having a racist administration because of its position of not admitting Africana females into the WAVES. The incumbent responded hastily, and announced, in less than a week, that the Navy would begin accepting Africana females both as officers and enlisted personnel. This was done in order to counter any potential political damage.

In late October, 1944, the only two Africana Female officer candidates who applied were sent of Officer Candidate School. Even though they were about a month late, they graduated with their class on time. One of the officers was ranked third in her class of over three hundred women. These first two Africana Female Officers did have a formal, traditional commissioning ceremony, but did not garner much media publicity.

Currently laws do not prohibit the permanent assignment of Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force women to ships and aircraft engaged in a combat mission, and where there is no comparable statutory prohibition for Army women, policies adopted by the Army and the other services further restrict women's roles. Whether a matter of service policy, the prohibitions bar women in many career fields from being assigned to positions necessary, or advantageous to advancement and promotion. In the U.S. armed services overall, 50 percent of military jobs are open to women, but the percentages vary greatly by service. Women in the Coast Guard, a part of the Department of Transportation, are not subject to combat exclusion laws or policies. Consequently, all Coast Guard jobs are open to women.¹

Jobs currently open to women are about 59 percent of all jobs. Job assignments for all Navy women are restricted by statute and Navy policy: women cannot serve on

¹Ibid., 15.
ships or fly aircraft that are designated as "combat" by the Navy, although women are allowed to serve temporary duty on combat ships, as well as to train men to fly combat planes. Women can be assigned to Navy auxiliary ships, such as repair, research, and training ships, and civilian contract ships. Some 7,700 Navy women currently serve on over 100 Navy and civilian ships.²

The most recent extensive nationwide survey on attitudes concerning women in the military was conducted in 1982 by the National Opinion Research Center. The results indicated that the public showed strong support or approval of women in the military. According to the survey results, "...eighty-four percent of the respondents conveyed that they wanted to maintain, or increase, the proportion of women in the military. Eighty-one percent thought the increased presence of women had not reduced military effectiveness."³

The United States Navy, has known for a long time that it treats Africana Female Officers differently than they treat the other two groups of officers in this research population. These differences have historically impacted, and continue to impact, the professional attainments of Africana Female Officers.

Bernard Nalty's summary of the military's historical response to race relations very appropriately explained how the Navy handled race relation issues. According to Nalty,

Unfortunately, the history of race relations in the military, since President Truman's integration order of 1948 teaches one inescapable lesson: progress requires pressure, whether from elected officials from demands of war, or

²Ibid., 6.
³Ibid., 4.
from Black Americans themselves. Left to its own devices, the bureaucracy charged with ensuring equal treatment and opportunity in the armed forces will avoid innovation, generating paperwork instead of taking decisive action. Evidence of this tendency is the lack of response to the report of Secretary Laird's Task Force on the Administration of Justice in the Armed Forces. Except for the tacit admission that systemic discrimination does exist, the majority report could have gone unwritten for all it accomplished.⁴

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APPENDIX

QUESTIONS FOR INTERVIEWEES

1. What motivated you to come in?

2. What did you know about the Navy prior to coming in?

3. Why did you choose the Navy over the other branches?

4. What do you know about the history of Africana personnel in the Navy?

5. What do you know about the history of Africana women officers in the Navy?

6. Who was the first Africana woman officer and what year was she commissioned?

7. How did you find your information?

8. How long have you been/were you in the Navy?

9. Do you have/have you ever had a mentor?

10. Tell me the types of billets you served in.

11. Do/did you perceive them to be career-enhancing?

12. In each billet did you have access to on the job training, professional training, graduate school?

13. Did other officers have access to these items?

14. In each of your billets do you feel that you were trusted and appreciated by your seniors?

15. In each of your billets do you feel that you were respected by your peers and juniors?
16. How were your fitness reports, and how were/are you ranked in comparison with other officers?

17. How many personal awards have you received?

18. Who is your chain of command? Can/could you rely on them for professional support and encouragement?

19. What can you do/did you do to improve your competency as an officer?

20. What is your highest degree obtained?

21. What were your perceptions of Naval officers prior to becoming one, especially Africana women officers?

22. If prior enlisted, what were your perceptions of women officers, Africana male officers, and specifically Africana women officers? Why did you desire to become one?

23. How would you describe your personal professional progress as an officer?

24. What are your perceptions regarding the progress of Africana women officers in the Navy?

25. What are your perceptions regarding European American women officers progress?

26. What are your perceptions regarding Africana male progress in the Navy, and how does it compare or contrast with Africana women officers and European American women officers?

27. What do you think causes the similarities and differences?

28. From your experience, what group does the term "women officers" embrace, and what does the term "minority officers" embrace?

29. How do you think the Navy views Africana women officers and their contributions?

30. Why did you/have you chosen the Navy as a career?

31. If you could do it over again, would you joint the Navy?
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