Sodade: diasporic cape verdeans and development in their homeland

Terza Alice Silva Lima-Neves
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ABSTRACT

POLITICAL SCIENCE

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SODADE: DIASPORIC CAPE VERDEANS AND DEVELOPMENT IN THEIR HOMELAND

Adviser: Professor F. S. J. Ledgister, Ph.D.

Dissertation date May 2009

This study addresses the questions of what factors impact diasporas’ involvement in the development of their homeland and how diasporas demonstrate their support for that development by analyzing the Cape Verdean diaspora in the United States and its relationship with the homeland, Cape Verde. I contend that diasporas maintain different levels of engagement with their homeland. This connection changes over time, based on conditions in the host country and the homeland, thus affecting the level of intensity of diasporas’ engagement with the homeland.

The research findings complicate how we conceptualize political mobilization and community organizing. They incorporate informal social and political networks as viable ways for diasporas’ involvement in homeland development, into the existing theories on diasporas, development, and the impact of remittances and brain drain. In the Cape Verdean case, informal transnational activities and networks are alternatives for this unskilled diaspora community that lacks the resources to flourish otherwise. This study also adds the Cape Verdean case to the broader scholarship on contemporary African diasporas.
The factors conducive to diaspora investment in homeland development include: stable homeland government, policies that are inclusive of diaspora political participation and business investments, and diaspora support through diplomatic relations with host country. Since its independence, Cape Verde has emerged as an example for other African nations, with a stable democracy and steady economic growth, while introducing policies inclusive of its diaspora. Most Cape Verdeans in the U.S. have not yet adapted to the Western system of group mobilization and political participation through formal networks. Through elite interviews and a survey of the masses, I found that most Cape Verdeans are not registered voters and do not vote in the U.S. or Cape Verde, and even those eligible for U.S. citizenship, often opt not to apply.

Although most Cape Verdeans in the U.S. do not participate in electoral politics and formal organizations, they demonstrate their connection with the homeland through social and cultural events, such as weddings, funerals, and sporting events. In these informal spaces, they engage in discussions and form opinions on issues related to socio-economic and political conditions in the homeland and host country. Within the few social and cultural organizations that support the homeland through fundraising and cultural events, the survey findings revealed there is an antagonistic relationship between the masses and leaders of these organizations. The masses demonstrated lack of trust in the leaders, while organizational leaders argued there is a great level of apathy among the masses. It might take one or more generations of academically trained Cape Verdeans to change this pattern, transforming the community from an unskilled to a skilled diaspora.
SODADE: DIASPORIC CAPE VERDEANS AND DEVELOPMENT IN THEIR HOMELAND

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF CLARK ATLANTA UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY
TERZA ALICE SILVA LIMA-NEVES

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

ATLANTA, GEORGIA
MAY 2009
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It is with great gratitude that I acknowledge the completion of this study. I want to thank my colleagues and friends for their encouragement. I would like to especially acknowledge the guidance of F. S. Ledgister, Abi Awomolo, Anthony Affigne, Richard Lobban, and Patricia Anderson. The Frank C. Munson Institute for American Maritime Studies, Rhode Island College Special Colleges on Cape Verde, The New Bedford Whaling Museum, Smith College, and Sewanee: the University of the South, supported my dissertation research. I want to thank my family for teaching me the value of education. I am especially indebted to my parents César and Ivone, and my grandmother, Mãe, for their continued support and sacrifices. I am thankful for the unconditional encouragement from my sisters, Frandine and Laurinha. To my family in Cape Verde, thank you for your undying support and encouragement. I thank my husband Luis for being my source of strength and motivation. Lastly, I want to express my gratitude to the Cape Verdean community in the United States, its people and organizations for sharing their stories. Through this research, I learned how proud I am to be a member of this community made up of hard working and supportive people. I wrote this dissertation because I believe all Cape Verdeans in the diaspora have a role in the development of our homeland. This dissertation is my contribution. Wherever there are Cape Verdeans, Cape Verde exists.
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<td>Association of Former Students of Cape Verde's Secondary Schools</td>
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<td>ACAPAC</td>
<td>Cape Verdean Association for the Self-Determination of Cape Verde</td>
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<td>AGOA</td>
<td>Africa Growth and Opportunity Act</td>
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<td>CABO</td>
<td>Cape Verdean American Business Organization</td>
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<td>CACD</td>
<td>Cape Verdean American Community Development</td>
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<td>CVUnited</td>
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<td>HTAs</td>
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<td>IADB</td>
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<td>MPD</td>
<td>Movimento Para a Democracia</td>
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<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>PAICV</td>
<td>Partido Africano para a Independência de Cabo Verde</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAIGC</td>
<td>Partido Africano para a Independência de Guiné e Cabo Verde</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
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<td>UPICV</td>
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

This study is an examination of the broader concept of diaspora politics by offering a case study of the Cape Verdean community in the United States. It focuses particularly, on Cape Verdean community organizations in New England and their impact on Cape Verde’s development before independence, during the independence struggle and since.

This dissertation’s title, Sodade, is a term used by Cape Verdeans to describe the feeling of yearning and longing for the homeland and loved ones they have left behind on the islands, in search of better living conditions. This sense of longing has permeated Cape Verdean cultural expression and has been immortalized in literature and song. The word sodade describes the sentiment of nostalgia and also a bittersweet feeling that has no direct English translation.

In the early 1900s, Cape Verdeans organized and mobilized on behalf of their communities in the United States as well as in Cape Verde. Mutual aid societies raised money to help Cape Verdeans in the U.S. as well as to send to the population in Cape Verde, stricken by long periods of drought and famine. During the struggle for independence, Cape Verdeans in the U.S. organized and demonstrated their support for and against the African Party for the Independence of Guiné-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC).

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1 For more on Cape Verdean cultural markers see Richard Lobban, Cape Verde: Crioulo Colony to Independent Nation (Boulder: West View Press, 1995), 75-80.
Although there is a strong history of activism, current Cape Verdean American organizations are not as active in the political, social, and economic development of their own communities in the U.S. and those in Cape Verde. There also seems to be a high level of apathy and a low level of activism and involvement of individuals in these organizations. Most organizations appear to suffer from financial woes, lack of support from the community and low membership. There is currently a low turn out rate of Cape Verdean Americans at the polls in the U.S. and in Cape Verde’s overseas elections. Moreover, the relationship between Cape Verdean American organizations and the government of Cape Verde seems to be strained. With a history of activism on behalf of their communities and many successful examples in other immigrant communities in the United States such as the relationship between Irish-Americans and Ireland, it is important to study the connection between Cape Verde’s development and its diaspora. This study also uncovers the political, economic, and social factors that affect Cape Verdean community organizations and their involvement in the development of their homeland.

In an era of globalization, the study of Cape Verde and its diaspora is crucial to understanding the changing ethnic mix in United States. Cape Verdean Americans have played a major role in the history and socio-economic development of the New England region. To acknowledge this community is to acknowledge not only its impact on New England but also the major contributions it has made to the socio-economic development of the United States. Given Cape Verdeans’ contributions to U.S. development over the
centuries, it is worthwhile to discuss the relationship between Cape Verdean Americans and Cape Verdeans in the homeland.

In his pioneering work on diaspora politics, Gabriel Sheffer defines modern diasporas as, "ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin — their homeland." Robin Cohen explains that, "a member's adherence to a diasporic community is demonstrated by an acceptance of an inescapable link with their past migration history and a sense of co-ethnicity with others of similar background."

With each wave of migration, new diasporas are constantly forming, growing, and creating networks in their host countries. Changing attitudes in pluralist societies such as the United States allows diasporas to do so. Due to more sophisticated forms of communication, the political, social, and economic activities of diasporas will only increase with time, and not necessarily disappear through acculturation and assimilation. Marxist and liberal theories propose that diasporas are a transitory stage of social and political development that will disappear with cultural, political and social tolerance or with the emergence of classless societies. However, diasporas have proven to continue to grow. Sheffer highlights, "Certain ethnic groups which were losing their ethnic identity and their inclination toward continuous and organized existence and action have

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4 Sheffer, 4.
revived their trans-state activities. This holds true of Jews and Irish, for example, who have revived their activities on behalf of their homelands. In addition to reviving the relationship and activities with the homeland, diasporas also affect the nature of United States foreign policy activity towards their homeland.

As a result of large-scale migrations across borders, diasporas maintain a permanent relationship with their homeland by visiting regularly, sending remittances, and political lobbying in the host countries, thus developing and maintaining trans-state relationships. In many cases, diaporas are also able to maintain a group identity. Diasporas are involved in national and trans-state politics, as well as cultural, educational and religious affairs, by forming organizations to promote these interests in the host country and their homeland. These organizations seek to preserve and promote their cultural, religious, and economic interests in both places. These activities are crucial to the survival of diasporas.

While diasporas maintain ties with their homelands, Sheffer argues that the attitude of their homeland may not always correspond with the attitude of the diaspora. Diasporas are not always supported by the homeland. Such is the case of the expulsion of Indians in Uganda during the dictatorship of Idi Amin in 1972, where the Indian government did nothing to mobilize in their support. Additionally, diasporas may not always support the homeland government, such as the case of Cubans in the United States and their opposition of Castro’s regime.

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5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., 11.
Research Questions and Hypotheses

The central question of this research is: What are the connections between the Cape Verdean diaspora in the United States and the process of development in Cape Verde? The following orienting questions have been developed as a guide for the study: How were Cape Verdean communities formed in the United States? What contributions did Cape Verdean organizations in the United States make towards Cape Verde’s development before, during and after the period of armed struggle? What current contributions do Cape Verdean organizations in the United States make to Cape Verde’s development? What have been the dynamics between the Cape Verdean community and its organizations? How has the Cape Verdean community perceived its relationship with the homeland? How have these perceptions changed over time?

The assumption is that there is and has always been a relationship between the Cape Verdean diaspora in the United States and the homeland. The form this relationship has taken varies based on the historical contexts of the United States and Cape Verde. The hypothesis is that diasporas demonstrate three levels of transnational engagement: 1. Cognitive (i.e. listening to the homeland’s traditional music, hanging pictures of leaders on wall, spiritual activities, observing homeland’s festivals and holidays); 2. Material (i.e. remittances); and 3. Political (i.e. supporting political campaigns, overseas elections, lobbying). Conditions in the United States and Cape Verde prompt or suppress the level of activities of the diaspora. There are political, economic, and social factors that impact the level of involvement Cape Verdeans in the United States maintain with their
homeland. These factors change over time, thus affecting the level of involvement towards the homeland.

Although past and current literature focus on formal networks to track diasporas’ involvement in homeland development in terms of remittances, my study focuses on the work of organizations as well as diasporas’ informal transnational activities. This study demonstrates that as a labor diaspora, Cape Verdeans find spaces to cooperate, even if it is at the lowest level of intensity to promote their cultural identity in support of their homeland.

Significance of This Study

This research is important not only for analyzing the trends of the Cape Verdean diaspora in the United States, but also to the broader theoretical questions surrounding diaspora, race and ethnic politics. Diasporas face diverse experiences and conditions in their host countries which affect the level of activism they maintain with their homeland. Additionally, socio-economic and political conditions in their homeland also affect the relationship. Given the growing population of African immigrant communities in the United States, it is important to study individual groups and the potential impact they will have on immigrant politics within the broader U.S. political system. There are more Cape Verdeans in the United States, including migrants and their descendants, than in any other country, including Cape Verde.⁷ This study on their relationship with the host

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⁷ It is estimated there are roughly 500,000 Cape Verdeans in the United States, an estimated 350,000 of which are in the New England area. The population of Cape Verde is estimated at 436,000.
country and their homeland greatly adds to the existing body of literature on diaspora politics and the black immigrant experience in the United States. It departs from the vast already existing literature on remittances and the effects of the brain drain and introduces the concept of informal networks and political mobilization as intricate components of diaspora involvement in homeland development. The study on Cape Verde also enhances the literature on Africans in the diaspora. As a stable democracy with a steady economic growth rate, Cape Verde serves an example of development. Given its positive socio-economic and political environment, Cape Verde is able to foster a good relationship with its diaspora. In this light, it opens the comparative discussion within modern African diasporas as well as other island nations and their diasporas in the United States. Similar cases can be made for the experiences of immigrant communities from the Dominican Republic and Haiti.

This study exposes the internal diversity and the increasing social-economic and political mobility of the Cape Veredian American community and identifies them as an ethnic interest group. Previous studies have placed all African immigrants in a homogenous category. This study adds the diverse experiences of the Cape Veredian diaspora as a case study to the existing body of literature on the African diaspora, and challenges the notion of homogeneity in the black immigrant experience.

Lastly, Cape Verdeans have challenged and reshaped racial and ethnic classifications in the American society. The fact that Cape Verdeans see themselves as Cape Veredian Americans, as well as black, demonstrates their resistance to the American
tradition of a one-fold racial classification. This also challenges the definition of race, ethnicity, and nationality within American and global contexts.

Definition of Major Concepts

Cape Verdean American

A person born in or whose parents/ancestors were born in Cape Verde, but who now lives in the United States. Cape Verdean Americans consider themselves, as such, if any of their ancestors were born in Cape Verde. From the legal standpoint, Cape Verde’s laws grant citizenship only to those born in Cape Verde and those whose parents were born in Cape Verde.

Cape Verdean Identity

They share with other people in the Portuguese-speaking world the commonality of language, religion, family structure and nationality. On the other hand, Cape Verdean identity and culture, which are expressed in food, music, dances, poetry, games, and local dialects, denote heavy West African influence as well as influences from European countries, in addition to Portugal. Understanding the background and cultural markers of the Cape Verdean society will give insight into the elements that bond the diasporic

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community together and create the identity which many have identified as *Cape Verdeanness* or *Cape Verdianity*.\(^9\)

Music is an important aspect of Cape Verdean cultural identity. Traditional musical and dance expressions include *funana*, *finaçon*, *batuko*, *coladeira*, *morna*, *mazurka*, and *contra-dança*.\(^{10}\) However, the music has transformed since independence. The younger generation of Cape Verdean Americans has demonstrated a keen interest in their African roots. They have resorted to the use of African drums in this transformation. More modern musical expressions such as *Cabo-love* or *Cabo-zouk* combine traditional elements and contemporary sounds with French Antilles influence of *Zouk*.*\(^{11}\)

Cape Verdean literature also symbolizes the uniqueness of *Crio\'ulo* culture. Cape Verdean writers laid the foundation for the independence movement. The need for a solely *Crio\'ulo* culture, not in relation to the colonial experience in addition to national liberation was expressed in poetry via metaphors. Founded in 1936 by distinguished Cape Verdean writers Baltasar Lopes da Silva, Jorge Barbosa, Manuel Lopes, and Eugénio Tavares, *Claridade* was a literary movement and publication which explored the sources of *Crio\'ulo* culture and developed original Cape Verdean literature and free cultural expression.*\(^{12}\) The subject matter included socio-economic analysis and commentary of the archipelago. Eugénio Tavares, for example, wrote almost exclusively

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\(^{10}\) For more on Cape Verdean music see for example http://www.umassd.edu/SpecialPrograms/Caboverde/cvmusic.html; accessed February 25, 2008.


\(^{12}\) Lobban, 78-9.
in *Crioulo*. This played a critical role in maintaining *Crioulo* as the language of the people. His morna, *Hora di Bai* (Hour of Departure) resonates the nostalgic and sad feelings of *sodade* among Cape Verdeans who are leaving the homeland in search of a better life. Since independence, Cape Verdean folklore and oral traditions such as *Nho Lobo* (Mr. Wolf), have regained notoriety.

Cape Verdean identity takes different shapes once it is transported abroad. Depending on the historical context as well as the socio-economic conditions experienced by the diaspora in the host country, cultural markers are altered to reflect the impact of the host country on the diasporic community. The defining feature of Cape Verdean cultural identity is the *Crioulo* language. In the U.S., it is a way of preserving one’s sense of being of mixed heritage and distinguishing oneself from American blacks and other immigrant blacks.\(^\text{13}\) *Crioulo* has also gone through transformations in its travels from Cape Verde to the U.S., and reflects certain nuances of the English language.

Most immigrants group together as a community for social reasons. The Cape Verdeans community resides in most eastern states from Boston to Philadelphia, Cape Verde, Europe, and Americas. Networks are formed based on friendships, kinship, and a shared identity. This network is maintained by various forms of communication and contacts such as emails, letters, goods, and mutual visits. Women are key actors in maintaining the networks’ activities. The role of women in maintaining informal social networks will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 4.

In the case of Cape Verdeans in the United States, the strict racial stratification of American society heightened the desire and need for Cape Verdeans to bond together and share experiences via a common cultural identity. Cape Verdeans were alienated from the Portuguese communities, by force, due to their darker skin. They were not welcomed in Portuguese churches and social clubs. Of course, those who were of lighter complexion, and could pass for white, did so. On arrival in the U.S., they distanced themselves from the African-American community to avoid the discrimination and racial oppression experienced by this group. In the end, they formed community organizations, churches, and social networks through which they could celebrate their culture, away from the European Portuguese and the African Americans. Congregating in the homes of members of the community, for example, afforded them a place where they did not have to explain or justify their racial background. It was understood they were “Cape Verdean,” not black or white, just “Cape Verdean.”

Cape Verdeans perceive their identity to be unique, a mixture of African and Portuguese cultures. This blend is the focal point of their identity and community formation.\(^{14}\) Although Cape Verdeans vary in skin tones (very light to very dark), the commonality of the Crioulo language (once perceived as a sign of low social status and/or illiteracy), creates in their mind a unique cultural identity. Embodied in this explication of Cape Verdean identity is the symbolic connection and responsibility to the homeland. This connection mobilizes the Cape Verdean community on behalf of their

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compatriots and homeland. Immigrants and American-born Cape Verdeans have revived the responsibility to help those who stayed behind on the islands by sending barrels filled with goods and foods, as well as attending fundraisers on behalf of their homeland and/or locality. Cape Verdean Americans feel grateful to be given the opportunity to have a better life in the U.S. Thus, they feel the responsibility to take care of their families and compatriots in the homeland who are less fortunate.

David Baxter argues, “the activities of daily face-to-face interaction provide an individual or a group of individuals with a setting in which to stage one or more characters or social identities.” The process which he calls staging comes to life based on the actor’s perception of his audience and how they view his performance. Baxter then defines social identity as, “the impression that an individual or group of individuals conveys to others in a particular social context” and the way this identity is conveyed as strategy of social identification.

Waltraud Coli takes Baxter’s social identity rationalization further in her pioneering study of Cape Verdean ethnicity. Coli makes the argument that ethnic identity is situational and it changes based on the conditions and realities of the diaspora, host country, and homeland. In addition, she concludes that there are several factors that impact ethnicity and the ways in which communities demonstrate their identity.

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15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

Coli’s observations add that ethnicity increases, decreases, and/or takes a new form in various contexts. Ethnicity increases as an instrument of cultural resistance to oppression, means of upward mobility, in-group formation as well as for members to receive recognition. On the other hand, it decreases when suppressed by a dominant group, restricts social mobility, lost via contact with majority culture, negative stereotypes, and with increased group marginality. Lastly, ethnicity assumes a new form over generational time, through dispersal as well as intermixing with other cultural sources. Thus, Cape Verdiene ethnicity and cultural identity is not stagnant. It changes and transforms itself with time, generations and as a result of contact with other cultures.

Cape Verdiene Identity will be observed through the extent that individuals attend social and cultural events (parties, weddings, funerals, dance performances, art exhibitions), attend festivals and observe holidays, religious saints, hold membership in social and political organizations, level of fluency in Crioulo, personal knowledge of traditional and modern music, connection with homeland via contact with relatives and sending remittances, familiarity with Cape Verdiene cuisine, attendance at kitchen parties (house parties), attendance in community’s church. A lengthier discussion of Cape Verdiene ethnicity and identity is discussed later in this chapter.

Diaspora

Although once defined as the forced dispersal of specific groups (i.e. Jews), the concept of diaspora is no longer applicable to only specific groups. Its definition has expanded to include a wider and more diverse group of people. Diasporas are conceived
as communities that are formed due to forced expulsions from a specific place of origin. Gabriel Sheffer explains diasporas as, “ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their homeland.” 18 This place or homeland gains significance in the memory of the dispersed community and creates the basis of groups consciousness within the diasporic community.

Past and current theoretical literature on diasporas focuses on the impact of the dispersal, relocation, and historical memory have on the development of the disporas’ new identity in the new country, its host country. 19 In her work, Gina Sanchez-Gibau explains that geographical dispersion as a defining feature of modern diasporas can be understood in terms of a historical moment that takes place which causes social change and alters the course of cultural history. 20 In the case of the African diaspora, for example, this historical moment is marked by the common experience of slavery. For the Cape Verdean diaspora the defining moments in its dispersal history were the initial immigrations with the whaling industry as well as the forced labor migrations to São Tomé and Príncipe. The larger part of this dispersal happened during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as Cape Verdeans migrated to Europe, and the Americas.

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18 Sheffer, 3.


The idea of diasporas also includes a desire of returning to the homeland. The return, most often than not, does not become a reality given that the same socio-economic conditions that drive the diaspora to migrate are those that prevent them from permanently returning to the homeland, as in the case of most groups from developing nations. A common feature of modern diasporas is the fact that they maintain strong and close links to the homeland based on this notion of a return. A more comprehensive discussion on diasporas is presented in the literature review.

Development

Development can be defined as progressive and qualitative changes that occur in society which improve the quality of people’s lives and conditions. Within this process the following components must be present: 1. raising people’s living standards, including their incomes and consumption levels of food, medical, services, and education; and 2. creating conditions conducive to the growth of people’s self-esteem through the establishment of social, economic, and political institutions, which promote and protect human rights, dignity, and respect. Because the process of development is progressive and qualitative, various stages of development are often hard to measure.  

21 Interview with Dr. Anthony Affigne at the office of the Program in Black Studies, Providence College, Providence, RI in October 2002.
Past literature has defined development in terms of economic growth. More recent literature has included a more comprehensive picture of development by incorporating the distinctions between economic growth and development and has also taken the socio-political realities of individual countries into account. Political rights, freedom of expression, life expectancy, access to clean water source, infant mortality, adult literacy, school enrollment at all levels, and gross domestic product per capita are some of the indicators used for measuring a countries’ development process. Increased focus on issues of concern to women, especially in the developing world, has led to the inclusion of gender indicators in the development process. Organizations such as the United Nations’ Development Program (UNDP), have created a Gender-related Development Index (GDI) to supplement its Human Development Index report (HDI).

Globalization has forced a global application of neo-liberal development strategies by developing countries as a way for these countries to be incorporated in the global market. The structural adjustment programs (SAPs) promoted by lending institutions such as the World Bank, carry certain requirements such as opening markets to foreign trade, privatization of state enterprises, down-sizing of state supported social services

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programs, and liberalization of capital market.26 These strategies are not attentive to the historical contexts, cultural traditions, political and demographics factors, and ramifications on the people it affects.

Growth and socio-economic change also affects the physical environment. Competition among developing countries leads to exploitation of non-renewable resources under lenient environmental protection laws.27 Economic sustainability includes promoting an ecologically feasible standard of consumption. Human development without attention to sustainability would be costly to further generations or species. On the other hand, the world’s current population must be cared for as well.

Development is not just about human development or sustainable development. It is about sustainable human development where distribution of resources today and tomorrow is affected.28 It is about improving the income, and the health of all segments of population: women, ethnic and religious minorities as well as the poor. Development cannot be determined only in terms of economic indicators. It has to be socially and environmentally sustainable. However, inequality between and within countries proves the absence of redistribution of resources. A more detailed discussion of development and its processes will be laid out during the literature review chapter.

26 Ibid.


28 Ibid.
Development will be observed through political rights, civil liberties, freedom of expression and the press, life expectancy at birth, adult literacy rate, primary, secondary, and tertiary school enrollment, GDP per capita, access to clean water.

Diaspora and Development

Diasporas have existed for over twenty-five hundred years but the dynamics have dramatically changed in the face of a globalizing world. It has also grown as a major force for development.

Diasporas accumulate human, financial, and social capital that can be used in the development of their homeland. Homeland governments can provide resources and create an environment where diasporas can institutionalize and utilize their resources in their respective homelands. This, in turn creates a strong link between diasporas and their homelands. Transnational communities establish and reinforce multifaceted links between their homelands and host countries. The challenge is to create an environment where there are incentives in encouraging the diaspora to engage in and contribute towards homeland development.29

Diasporas can contribute by sending remittances, and supporting businesses in their home countries. Some work in skill sectors that are critical and in shortage in their home countries. Additionally, they have contacts with potential business partners in the host country, which can lead to the establishment of trade and production links that

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29 See the International Organization for Migration at http://www.iom.int/jahia/jsp/index.jsp.
promote the market access of export goods from developing countries. Lastly, diasporas can influence the host countries’ economic and political policies towards development in their homelands.

Financial capital accumulated by the diaspora is very often sent to the homeland to the benefit of its population and infrastructures. Human capital can result in higher education training and professional experience by diasporas that settle in developed countries. Additionally, human capital can also contribute to homeland development via the return of skills by return migration or through advanced technology in host countries. Diasporas create social networks and links between host countries and homelands, which gives the homeland access to more developed markets, thus encouraging foreign direct investments. Diasporas can play an important role in facilitating investment possibilities because they are familiar with the business processes in both the homeland and host country. Moreover, they can organize, promote, and encourage investments in the homeland. Lastly, the homeland’s government is an important actor in building and sustaining a relationship with the diaspora. They can facilitate the mobility of diasporas by offering dual citizenship, long term residence permits, and multiple entry visas. Governments can also strengthen relationships with diaspora organizations. A comprehensive theoretical review of the literature on diasporas and development is offered in chapter two.

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30 Ibid.

Diaspora and development is observed through, 1. Economic variables: monetary and in-kind remittances, businesses supported in Cape Verde, sending goods and money to community institutions (i.e. schools, and churches), investments in industries (resort hotels, manufacturing), vacation visits, attendance, donation to fundraising events on behalf of the homeland, and buying goods to resell in the United States; 2. Political variables: participation in electoral politics (overseas elections) and election campaigns, lobbying; and 3. Social variables: vacation visits, membership in Cape Verdean organizations in the United States, attendance in festivals and membership in social networks which support homeland.

Methodological Procedures

The central question of this research is: What is the connection between the Cape Verdean diaspora in the United States and the process of development in Cape Verde? The assumption is that there is and has always been a relationship between the Cape Verdean diaspora in the United States and the homeland. The form this relationship has taken varies based on the historical contexts of the United States and Cape Verde. Conditions in the United States and Cape Verde prompt or suppress the level of activities of the diaspora. There are political, economic, and social factors that impact the level of involvement Cape Verdeans in the United States maintain with their homeland. These factors change over time, thus affecting the level of involvement towards the homeland.

To answer this question and to test the hypotheses, the methodology for this study is derived from both qualitative and quantitative approaches to assessing the connection
between the Cape Verdean diaspora in the United States and the process of development in its homeland. This study focuses on the analysis of historical documents, personal interviews responses from Cape Verdean organizations as well as questionnaire responses from a subject population to determine the subjects’ attitudes towards their relationship with their homeland.

Subject Population

The subject population in this study consists of Cape Verdean residents in the states of Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. These states were chosen because they have the largest concentration of Cape Verdeans. Qualitative data was gathered from elites at the organizational level. These individuals are members and the organizational leadership of the Cape Verdean community. The ten organizations to be interviewed were chosen from a list provided to the researcher that reflect diversity in demographics, and the services they provide to the community. One representative from each organization is interviewed.

Quantitative data was gathered via a questionnaire, encompassing a sample of one hundred members of the Cape Verdean community, ranging from eighteen to eighty years of age, immigrant and American born, and from various generations. The sample population was created by “snowball” procedures from personal contacts within the Cape Verdean community and chosen to reflect diversity in gender, age, education and income levels.
Instruments

The study included both in-depth qualitative interviews and a quantitative survey questionnaire. Interview questions were open-ended and unstructured to allow interview subjects the freedom to provide additional information significant to the study. Personal interview questions with the organizations included size of membership, activities, types of services offered (whether they serve Cape Verdeans in the United States, at home, or both), nature of relationship with the Cape Verdean community, and Cape Verde and U.S. governments.

This information was supplemented by a survey questionnaire to be distributed to a broader cross section of the Cape Verdean community. It highlighted the attitudes of the subject population towards political, economic, and social conditions in the host country, their relationship to Cape Verde, and their involvement in the development of their homeland in terms of politics, remittances and investments. Questions explored whether subjects held memberships in Cape Verdean organizations, their attitudes and patterns towards voting in Cape Verde’s overseas elections and in U.S. elections (if subjects hold U.S. citizenship), sending remittances to family or government (local or national), and personal business investments. The question of citizenship is significant because it determines whether or not the diaspora has access to political participation in both homeland and host country, that allows it to have impact on policies and diplomatic relationship between the two countries.
Data Collection/Analysis

Rhode Island College Special Collections on Cape Verde contains historical documents (newspaper articles and editorials) as well as current and past academic literature (government reports, books, and theses). The New Bedford Whaling Museum in New Bedford, Massachusetts has a substantive record of ship manifests arriving from and departing to Cape Verde, as well as formal and informal communication between individuals, organizations, and government officials in the United States and Cape Verde. These records date back to the early 1800s.

A historical analysis of these materials provided the basis for explaining past trends in the attitudes and behaviors of Cape Verdean Americans, their organizations, and connection to the development of Cape Verde in the periods before, during, and after the independence struggle.

A quantitative analysis of survey findings provided the basis for explaining the current relationship between the Cape Verdean community in the United States and the homeland. Additionally, an analysis of the statistical data findings assisted in drawing generalizations about the dynamics between the Cape Verdean community and its organizations, the factors that impact the relationship between Cape Verdeans and their homeland, and the ways through which this relationship is maintained.
Cape Verde: Country Overview

The Cape Verde Islands are not well known to the rest of the world. The small archipelago of twenty-one islands and islets is located off the coast of the African continent, nearly 500 miles from Dakar, Senegal in West Africa. Santiago is the largest island with an area of 383 square miles. Santo Antão is the second largest island, followed by Boa Vista, Fogo, São Nicolau, Maio, São Vicente, Sal, Brava, and Santa Luzia. Its population is roughly 500,000, composed mainly of Crioulos, persons of mixed African and Portuguese descent. Although the official language of Cape Verde is Portuguese, the national language is Crioulo, an Africanized Creole of Portuguese.

Figure 1.1 Map of Cape Verde

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32 Lobban, 1.

Cape Verde’s society and development encompasses a vast and complex history spanning a period of five hundred years. It is important to study this history in order to understand Cape Verde’s current conditions. For the purposes of this study on diasporas and development, this history will not be discussed in details. However, one should not overlook the importance of the works by Carreira, Lobban, and others for an extensive and detailed description of this history.34

Portuguese explorers arrived on the islands during the late 1450s and 1460s, establishing plantation settlements based on the use of African slave labour. The slave trade expanded during the eighteenth century when the city of Mindelo, São Vicente Island became an important port for sailboats and schooners crossing the Atlantic Ocean.35

Portugal ruled Cape Verde and Guiné-Bissau as a single province from 1462 until 1879 when each became a separate Portuguese province and the provincial government obtained greater autonomy. A nationalist group named the African Party for the Independence of Guiné-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC), the forerunner of the African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV) was founded in 1956, under the


leadership of African revolutionary scholar-activist, Amilcar Cabral.\textsuperscript{36} It struggled to overthrow Portuguese colonialism until 1975, when Cape Verde became independent.\textsuperscript{37}

The Struggle for Independence

After World War II, cold war struggles were on the rise. Local levels of conflict also increased with the East-West tension. England and France recognized that the period of colonization was over and independence took place for their colonies. Portugal, however, had a different vision. It still opposed all anti-colonial movements. As Cape Verdeans witnessed the decolonization process in other parts of Africa, they too wanted the same for their country. At this time, African scholars and activists began to strategize for national liberation.

In the late 1940s and 1950s, the leadership in Portuguese-speaking Africa emerged with the appearance on the political scene of Eduardo Mondlane of Mozambique, Agostinho Neto of Angola, Amilcar Cabral of Cape Verde and many others.\textsuperscript{38} These scholar-activists began the much needed work on strategies for national liberation, to end Portuguese colonialism and fascism. Prior to World War II, Portugal


\textsuperscript{38} Lobban (1995), 87-8.
supported German fascism in its quest to end radical socialism, although economically aligned with western capitalism.\textsuperscript{39}

Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, created ideological divisions in the socialist movement, leading to the formation of independent Marxist and socialist parties in Western Europe. PAIGC supported Soviet Union because it supplied it with weaponry but remained nonaligned. Although they were mainly influenced by Marxist and socialist thoughts, PAIGC only applied what was relevant to the local conditions. Cabral accepted the basic principles of the Marxist-Leninist theory of economic development. Moreover, his analyses of history, development, and society were grounded on a Marxist framework. He viewed Marxism as a methodology rather than an ideology.\textsuperscript{40} If Marxism was useful in analyzing the plight of Guiné-Bissau and Cape Verde, then it was relied upon. If it was no longer relevant, it was either amended or abandoned. In one of the many responses to the contentious question, Cabral stated, "If you want to call it Marxism you may. Am I a Marxist? Judge from what I do in practice. Labels don’t concern us (the PAIGC). People are preoccupied with this question. The only issue is, are we doing well in the field?"\textsuperscript{41} Thus, Cabral was less concerned with doctrinaire Marxism, and more concerned with its relevance to colonized societies. As he explains:

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Ibid
\item Chilcote, 1-40
\item McCulloch, Jock. \textit{In the Twilight of Revolution: The Political Theory of Amilcar Cabral} (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul plc, 1983), 133.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
We cannot, from our experience, claim that Marxism-Leninism must be modified — that would be presumptuous. What we must do is to modify, to radically transform, the political, economic, social, and cultural conditions of our people. We have to create and develop in our particular situation the solution for our country.\footnote{Patrick Chabal, \textit{Amilcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leadership and People’s War}. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983, 169, quoted in Amilcar Cabral, \textit{Our People are Our Mountains} (London: Committee Doe Freedom in Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea, 1971), 21.}

On September 19, 1956, PAIGC was formed with the purpose of national liberation and improve the harsh conditions of their homeland and population. The founding members were Amilcar Cabral, Luis Cabral, Aristides Pereira, Fernando Fortes, Julio de Almeida, and Eliseu Turpin. The leadership of PAIGC agreed from the beginning to have common objective of liberating and integrating Guiné and Cape Verde as they shared a common colonial history. This would be the beginning of a long lasting conflict between the two countries. The PAIGC started with a very small membership of roughly thirty people in Bissau and a few more in other cities.\footnote{José Vicente Lopes, \textit{Cabo Verde: Os Bastidores da Independencia}, 2d ed. (Praia, Cabo Verde: Spleen Edições, 2002), 20-30.} A large part of this membership was Cape Verdean and the central part of the party came from what Cabral called the \textit{petite bourgeoisie}. These were civil servants, employees, and salaried workers.\footnote{Chabal, 175.} The work done by the Party during the initial phases was limited due to oppressive nature of Portuguese colonialism.

PAIGC was the successor of the Movement for the National Independence of Guiné (MING), founded in 1954 by Henry Labéry and Amilcar Cabral. The major difference between the two organizations was that Cape Verdean independence was a
goal for PAIGC and not MING. Labéry later on formed the PAIGC’s rival party, the Front for the National Independence of Guinea (FLING). By 1959, the PAIGC had gained major international notoriety with support from the British and Portuguese communist parties. During meetings in Tunis, the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, Popular Movement for the Liberation for Angola (MPLA), and PAIGC joined forces in a common African revolutionary front for national independence. During this period there was also the emergence of other parties such as the União das Populações das Ilhas de Cabo Verde, Union of the Population of the Cape Verde Islands (UPICV). This movement sought the independence of Cape Verde alone and was against the integration with Guinea-Bissau.

According to Chabal, the main aspect of the PAIGC’s work during the initial phase was trade union activity. Chabal states:

Luis Cabral, Abílio Duarte, Eliseu Turpin and others infiltrated the legal trade union, the Sindicato nacional de empregados do comércio e indústria. They succeeded in winning election to the leadership despite the attempt by the colonial authorities to impose official candidates.45

As a result of this small but significant victory, the Party began gaining notoriety among the workers of Bissau, especially dock workers. These workers organized and protested against poor working conditions and low wages. During a strike in 1956, they obtained higher wages. However, on August 3, 1959, during a strike in Pidjiguiti, Guinea, the Portuguese police and army opened fire, killing at least fifty workers and injuring many more. The Portuguese government viewed these workers’ protests as the result of

45 Chabal, 56.
possible political influence of the PAIGC. This event is known as the Pidjiguiti massacre.\textsuperscript{46}

The Pidjiguiti massacre alerted the PAIGC to restructure and rethink their approach to the national liberation movement. The members lacked the military power and knowledge to endure a lengthy struggle. By 1961, Portugal began a counterinsurgency with political arrests, extrajudicial executions, commando raids, and psychological warfare.\textsuperscript{47} Within his vision of a diplomatic transition to democracy, during 1960, Cabral called for a peaceful end to colonialism with open letters to the Portuguese people and appeals to the United Nations. The Party also asked for the support of the United States embassies and Congress. United States rejected any pleas because Portugal was its NATO ally. By July 1961, the Movement for Liberation of Guinea and Cape Verde, MLGCV, joined the PAIGC to become the United Front for the Liberation of Portuguese Guinea and Cape Verde Islands, FULGPICV. This union added much needed political experience to the PAIGC.\textsuperscript{48}

The armed struggle was initiated in 1963, with PAIGC’s attack on a small Portuguese fort in the town of Tite.\textsuperscript{49} Within the first year of combat a large part of Guinea-Bissau was liberated. In an attempt to conceal Guinea and Cape Verde’s colonial situation from the international community, in November of the same year, Portugal’s

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid, 70.

\textsuperscript{47} Lobban (1995), 90-1.

\textsuperscript{48} Chabal, 71-87.

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid, 92.
foreign minister, Alberto Nogueira, issued a decree, stating that the two countries were overseas province, as extensions of Portugal.50

In February, 1964, the first PAIGC congress took place in the liberated zones of Cassacá, Guinea. The objectives were to develop the Party’s organization and policies. Although the armed struggle was going well, there were internal military and political issues that threatened the survival of the Party and the success of the armed struggle. One of these issues was the abuse of power by local commanders. Chabal explains:

Some local guerrilla commanders, after securing the area against the Portuguese, were often tempted to install themselves as local chiefs. Others exercised absolute control over a whole region by force of arms. They had no intention of following PAIGC instructions and they were in fact, if not by design, working against the party by seeking to eliminate traditional village authorities whom they disliked but on whom the PAIGC relied for political mobilization.51

The commanders who violated party principles were removed and prosecuted by the Party, thus solidifying the trust between the Party and the people. The most important decisions made during the Cassacá Congress, however, dealt with the reconstruction and economic development of the liberated areas. The PAIGC had to strategize on issues pertaining to its administration as well. The Congress increased the central committee membership from thirty to sixty-five members. In addition, it established several departments: armed forces, foreign affairs, cadre control, training and information, security, economy and finance, and mass organization. It also officially recognized the People’s Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARP), created the People’s Stores and expanded

50 Ibid., 92-3.

51 Chabal, 78.
medical and educational services. Divisions within the Party were suppressed and eliminated in the hope of achieving its objectives of state building and power consolidation.\footnote{Ibid.}

The PAIGC celebrated major military victories from 1964 to 1967. It gained the military and political support of the newly formed Organization of African Unity (OAU). Although there were major military victories, Cabral reached out to the international community in hopes of creating new alliances and exposing Portugal's continued repression of its colonies. In 1962, Cabral was invited to address the United Nations and present PAIGC's position, with the support of the OAU. Cabral's objective was to establish the legitimacy of the PAIGC as the only official party in the national liberation of Guinea and Cape Verde.\footnote{Amilcar Cabral, \textit{Return to the Source: Selective Speeches of Amilcar Cabral} (New York: African Information System, 1973), 15.} Additionally, he sought to isolate Portugal within the international community in hopes of putting an end to the war and colonialism. As Chabal stated,

By 1964 a number of UN organizations had in fact taken action against Portugal. In July 1963, the Security Council had requested that member states refrain from supplying Portugal with military equipment which could be used in the colonial wars. Cabral's campaign, therefore, achieved notable legal success. But UN admonitions had no effect in practice. Portugal's NATO membership ensured that the major Western powers continued, until 1974, to supply Portugal with the weapons it required; this aid was significant since Portugal produced little military equipment beyond rifles and sub-machine guns.\footnote{Chabal, 88.}
In addition to the United Nations, Cabral and other African leaders met with the pope in 1964, to gather the support of the Catholic Church. PAIGC gained training and equipment support from Cuba, Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe. It also gained the support of the rural population in Guinea, who supplied them with shelter, food, and water.

In 1967, Cabral attended a conference in Cuba to rally further international political and military support. PAIGC gained support from the Cape Verdean diasporas in Dakar, Rotterdam, New England and other places. During the 1960s, PAIGC was able to secure much needed support from the growing anti-colonial activists in the United States. There was an attempt to incorporate the struggles of Portuguese and Southern Africa within the civil rights movement framework. However, civil rights leaders did not want to be viewed as communist supporters since the U.S. supported Portugal as an anti-communist NATO ally, not supporting liberation movements in Africa.\(^{55}\)

Successful attacks against Portuguese forces continued from 1968 to 1970. Portugal retaliated with the assassination of Eduardo Mondlane of the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) in 1969. In 1970, Cabral was invited to speak at Syracuse University during a tribute to Mondlane, who was a former professor at the same school. In his speech, Cabral spoke of the importance of national liberation for all African colonies. Cabral stressed:

A people who free themselves from foreign domination will be free culturally only if, without complexes and without underestimating the importance of positive accretions from the oppressor and other cultures, they return to the

\(^{55}\) Lobban, 95-6.
upward paths of their own culture, which is nourished by the living reality of its environment, and which negates both harmful influences and any kind of subjection to foreign culture. Thus, it may be seen that if imperialist domination has the vital need to practice cultural oppression, national liberation is necessarily an act of culture.56

The early 1970s marked a period of worldwide anti-war movements against U.S. intervention in Vietnam. This created an anti-imperialist movement in Europe and North America. Other events such as protests in the city of Praia, Cape Verde as well as Cabral’s visit to Lincoln University, in Pennsylvania, a predominantly African American university, helped to ensure the success of these efforts to gain international notoriety and end Portuguese oppression.

The first elections were planned for August 1972, but did not happen. Portugal felt the pressure to contain the political and military victories of the PAIGC in order to maintain its colonial possessions.57 As a result, on January 23, 1973, Amilcar Cabral was assassinated by Inocencio Kani, a PAIGC naval commander, in front of his house in Guiné-Conacry. Cabral’s assassination exposed a plot within the party to overthrow the party’s leadership and seize control of the party. The plan did not achieve its objectives but did not disrupt the movement as those who had taken part in it were arrested. The party members were released by the Guinéen police and re-established control of the PAIGC headquarters in Conakry. Chabal highlighted:

The coup had virtually no effect on the PAIGC outside Conakry and, had it not been for Cabral’s death, would have been of little significance. But because

56 Cabral, 43.
57 Lobban, 96.
Cabral had been killed it must be seen as the most serious challenge to the PAIGC since the Cassacá Congress in 1964.

The party responded to the loss of Cabral with attacks on Guiledge, an *aldeamento*, a Portuguese military camp and rural population concentration camp. It also destroyed Portuguese aircrafts and relief convoys. Even after Cabral’s death, the party remained committed to independence.

The second PAIGC Congress took place in July 1973, in Medina Boé. During this meeting, Aristides Pereira was elected the new secretary-general and Luis Cabral, the deputy secretary-general. At this time the constitution was being drafted. In September, 1973, the First People’s National Assembly proclaimed the declaration of state and was recognized by many nations in the international community.\(^{58}\) Portuguese General António Spinola was asked to leave his post as military commander in Bissau. In 1973, the United Nations ordered Portugal to cease military activity in Bissau. Guiné-Bissau was admitted as the forty-second member of the OAU. In other parts of the continent, liberation movements such as FRELIMO and MPLA had also made great gains. Additionally, in April 1974, Portuguese military officers, driven by their own frustrations with the Portuguese government, overthrew the Portuguese dictatorship of Marcelo Caetano, who had continued the tyrannical regime established in the 1920s by António de Oliveira Salazar, and began the process of ending Portugal’s colonial empire.\(^{59}\)

The union of Cape Verde and Guiné-Bissau did not take place as planned. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was strongly opposed to Cape Verde’s union with the

\(^{58}\) Ibid, 99-100.

\(^{59}\) Ibid, 100-5.
Guiné-Bissau, out of concern about the Soviet Union’s relationship with the two countries.  

Because the armed struggle was largely fought in Guiné-Bissau, PAIGC had little military strength in Cape Verde. However, the Party was widely supported by the Cape Verdean population. Aguinaldo Veiga, a Cape Verdean lawyer, and his supporters expressed their opposition to the PAIGC and its supposed socialist agenda as well as Cape Verde’s unity with Guiné-Bissau. Veiga and others in New England, in particular, formed the Juridical Congress, and became opponents of PAIGC. This group would later become the União Caboverdeana para a Independência e Democracia, the Cape Verdean Union for Independence and Democracy (UCID). Another opponent was the anti-Soviet group, União das Populações das Ilhas de Cabo Verde, Union of the People of the Cape Verde Islands (UPICV). These groups were against decolonization and Cape Verde’s union with Guiné-Bissau. In February 1975, during a closed meeting in Boston, the Juridical Congress declared Cape Verde’s independence. Its purpose was to block PAIGC from assuming power in the Islands. PAIGC supporters were not allowed to take part. Lobban notes:

According to the U.S.-based PAIGC support group TCHUBA, this Boston declaration was a desperate fantasy. Inside the hotel where they met, the Cape Verdeans expressed a fear of losing their property to Africans and “Communist insurgents.” PAIGC supporters, gathered outside, were forcefully excluded from the meeting hall, which was accessible by invitation only. Once again, the deep

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60 Lobban, 91-101.

61 “Juridical Congress Meet in New Bedford” in The Cape Verdean, August 1975, 2, accessed via Rhode Island College, Cape Verde Special Collections.
connections between the islands and New England brought both regions into the struggle for independence.\textsuperscript{62}

There were groups who were opposed to PAIGC. However, their membership and political weight were trivial. The high level of support for PAIGC in Cape Verde was demonstrated through protests, strikes, and political support from other liberation movements.

Cape Verde’s independence was set for July 5, 1975 with a constitution to follow within ninety days. Aristides Pereira was named the first president of the Republic of Cape Verde. After Cabral’s assassination, Pereira was named PAIGC’s top officer. Pedro Pires was a primary negotiator for Cape Verde’s independence. He was able to gain some U.S. support by convincing the Congress that Cape Verde would not be used as a Soviet base. Additionally, he stressed Cape Verde’s policy of nonalignment to the international community. Cape Verde’s first Popular National Assembly elected Pires as the nation’s first Prime Minister.

The question of unity between the two countries was still inevitably present. Cabral believed the unification of the two states was historically and economically logical. He argued that the islands were largely populated by ethnic groups from the Guinean coast and had been under the same colonial government until 1789. Additionally, Cape Verde would benefit economically from Guinea’s potential agricultural production surplus. In turn, Guinea would profit from Cape Verde’s more educated and skilled people.

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid, 105.
Between 1973 and 1980, PAIGC was in power in both Cape Verde and Guinea. Its unification and integration was taking place at a very slow pace. In 1980, an attempt to draft a constitution that could benefit both countries resulted in a coup by PAIGC’s top military officer in Guinea, Nino Vieira. Guineans believed this constitution to be an attempt at consolidating Cape Verdean dominance in Guinea. Chabal emphasized:

The Constitution, which Vieira claims was forced on the Guinean PAIGC despite widespread opposition, was unacceptable to the Guineans because it differed in two crucial areas from the Cape Verdean version: in the first place the Guinean draft reduced the power of the prime minister in favour of the president and it maintained the death penalty while the Cape Verdean version did neither; and secondly the Cape Verdean Constitution specified that the country’s president must be Cape Verdean while its Guinean counterpart made no such reference to the nationality of the president.

Nino Vieira perceived the language of the constitution as an attempt to consolidate Luis Cabral’s (a Cape Verdean) dictatorship in Guinea supported by the death penalty for those who did not politically align themselves with his policies. As a result, the Cape Verdean government led by Pereira disassociated themselves from Vieira’s regime and severed political ties with Guinea’s PAIGC. Pereira gave up his rights as the leader of PAIGC and on January 18, 1981, created a separate party, Partido Africano para a Independência de Cabo Verde, African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde, (PAICV). Cape Verde’s PAIGC branch officially ceased to exist in February 1981.63

During the late 1970s, PAICV was viewed to some as a repressive government with arrests and execution of opposition party members and expulsion of opponents within the Party. Using illegal measures, it arrested members of UCID. UCID opposed

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63 Lobban, 112.
PAICV policies and deemed them to be anti-American and pro-Soviet. Articles written by John C. Wahnon of UCID:

They noted grievances concerning: political prisoners in Cape Verde, the PAICV’s association with international terrorism, the illegitimacy of the PAICV government, charges that the Cape Verde Islands were going to be transformed into a Soviet submarine base, cultural and political ties with Libya and Palestinians, and the expropriation of land.64

Indeed, major agrarian reforms became law in 1982, opposed by UCID members who apparently were landowners. With all the criticism, PAICV was still making progress in the development of Cape Verde. There were improvements in education and health services. In addition, the Transportes Aéros de Cabo Verde, Cape Verden Airlines (TACV) was established with direct flights to Boston.

Until 1990, the PAICV was the country’s only legal political party. In that year, the Constitution was amended to allow a multiparty system. After elections in 1991, the Movimento para a Democracia, Movement for Democracy (MpD) became the ruling party. It retained power after elections in 1995. Since then, PAICV has regained leadership of the government. Table 2 on page forty-three offers major indicators of Cape Verden development from colonialism through independence. The low population growth rate is attributed to increased Cape Verden migration.

Cape Verde lies in the same latitudes as the Sahara Desert and thus suffers from periodic droughts. In the two-hundred year period from 1748 to 1947, there were twenty-four years of famine. “In the drought of 1774-75, starvation claimed 22,000 lives; in

64 Ibid.
1831-33, 12,000 lives; in 1902-4, 15,000 lives; in 1920-22, 17,000 lives;"65 The hot and dry climate also makes agriculture very difficult. As a result, Cape Verde depends on assistance from Europe, Africa, and the Americas. Due to its limited natural resources and these extensive periods of drought and famine, Cape Verde's history is one of emigration. Table 2, depicts the economic make up of the country.

65 T. Bentley Duncan, *Atlantic Islands; Madeira, the Azores, and the Cape Verdes in Seventeenth-Century Commerce and Navigation* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1972), 197.
Table 1. Demographics of Cape Verde

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>426,998 (July 2008 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>Creole (mulatto) 71%, African 28%, European 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Roman Catholic 90%, Protestant (mostly Church of the Nazarene), and Muslim (2007 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Structure</td>
<td>0-14 years: 36.1% (male 77,533/female 76,489)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15-64 years: 57.4% (male 120,208/female 125,009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>65 Years and over: 6.7% (male 10,226/female 17,533) (2008 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Growth Rate</td>
<td>0.595% (2008 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy at Birth</td>
<td>Total Population: 71.33 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male: 67.99 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female: 74.76 years (2008 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy Rate</td>
<td>Definition: age 15 and over can read and write.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total population: 76.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>male: 85.8% female: 69.2% (2003 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration Rate</td>
<td>-11.74 migrants/1,000 population (2008 est.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Economic Characteristics of Cape Verde

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Characteristic</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP (Purchasing Power Parity)</td>
<td>$1.603 Billion (2007 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>$3,200 (2007 est.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| GDP Composition by Sector                     | Agriculture: 9.3%  
Industry: 16.7%  
Services: 74% (2007 est.) |
| Population below poverty line                 | 30% (2002 est.)                                 |
| Unemployment rate                             | 21% (2002 est.)                                 |
| Industries                                    | Food, beverages, fish processing, shoes and garments, salt, mining, ship repair |
| Imports                                       | $743.6 million (2007 est.)                      |
| Exports                                       | $76.5 million (2007 est.)                       |
| External Debt                                 | $325 million (2003 est.)                        |
| Economic Aid Recipient                        | $160.6 million (2005)                           |


There is an estimated one million Cape Verdeans in the diaspora in places such as the United States, Portugal, and Holland.

Cape Verde and the United States: The Historical Relationship

Cape Verdeans reached the United States in the early 1800s with the whaling industry and established communities in Providence, Rhode Island, and New Bedford, Massachusetts. These communities remained socially, economically, and politically linked to their homeland by sending remittances, for example, which currently account
for twenty percent of the country's national income. In addition, the communities in the United States send barrels of food stuff and clothing to relatives, churches, schools, as well as for business. Commerce, transport, and public services account for 70 percent of the gross national product. In addition, although most of the population lives in rural areas, fishing and agriculture only contribute 10 percent. Given the above statistics, Cape Verde depends heavily on foreign aid for its survival.

Cape Verdean Americans formed religious, social and political organizations that advanced issues pertaining to not only Cape Verdeans in America, but also those in Cape Verde. These social and political organizations were critical during the struggle for independence. This study analyzes the sources and types of organizations formed, their support or resistance towards the independence movement, the current trends like participation in electoral process at home through immigrant elections and remittances, and lastly, the paper analyzes the role of these organizations in influencing United States foreign policy towards Cape Verde.

The major era of migration of Cape Verdeans to the United States took place between the mid-19th century and World War II. In 1922, the change in United States' laws restricting immigration of people of color decreased the flow of Cape Verdeans.

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68 Halter, 22-45.

Due to this restriction, Cape Verdeans did not go back and forth to the islands as often as they had previously. Communication with their relatives in Cape Verde was limited. From 1922 to 1965, Cape Verdeans in the U.S. and Cape Verdeans in Cape Verde were estranged, with rare interaction, something foreign to Cape Verdean culture.\(^70\)

During the four decades following World War II, Portugal neglected Cape Verde and the islands were faced with severe drought, famine and poverty. With American immigration closed, Cape Verdean citizens began to emigrate to Europe, South America, and West Africa. Labor agreements in São Tomé and Principe allowed Cape Verdeans to work on those islands’ plantations.\(^71\) Meanwhile, Cape Verdean Americans continued to send remittances and pictures of well-dressed and well-fed families, portraying the positive images of a much desired American dream. Cape Verdeans in America never mentioned the hard work and conditions they experienced at sea, on the plantations and factories.\(^72\)

The Immigration Act of 1965 allowed for the reunification of Cape Verdean families.\(^73\) Thus, many Cape Verdean families arrived in Boston, Brockton, Scituate, and New Bedford, Massachusetts; Providence, and Pawtucket, Rhode Island; Waterbury, Connecticut; and Brooklyn, New York. As they arrived, the vision of the American

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\(^70\) Ibid.

\(^71\) Paul Wayne Barrows, *The Historical Roots of Cape Verdean Dependency, 1460-1990* (Dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1990), 123-8. In his discussion, Paul Barrows makes a strong case for the experiences of forced labor to São Tomé. Although there were contractual agreements, many times there were deceptive and the conditions under which Cape Verdeans worked were extremely harsh, resembling slavery.

\(^72\) Almeida, 53-60.

\(^73\) Almeida, 57.
dream was replaced by the harsh American realities of racism, discrimination, poor working and living conditions, and political powerlessness.\textsuperscript{74} Although they experienced racism in the islands prior to arriving on American soil, American racism and its rules differed from the racism in Cape Verde. These differences will be discussed at great length later in the chapter.

Cape Verdeans are the only group of African people who migrated voluntarily in large numbers to the United States before 1965.\textsuperscript{75} Deirdre Machado argues that the New England colonies made the initial contact with Cape Verde in 1643, during the triangular commerce of the seventeenth and early eighteen century. Cape Verde’s ideal location on the Atlantic Ocean made it convenient for slave traders, pirates, and sailors. It is reported that roughly twenty-eight thousand slaves departed from Cape Verde to the New World between 1601 and 1700.\textsuperscript{76} Slave traders would fly the American flag to engage in trade until 1808, when England and the United States abolished the slave trade. After this time, many American ships flew the Portuguese or Spanish flags, because these nations were less opposed to the slave trade. Other vessels would camouflage themselves as whaling ships as late as the 1860s.\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{76} Machado, 83.

Rhode Island and Massachusetts (New Bedford and Salem) merchants were very active in the slave trade. Between 1696 and 1708, there were 103 vessels built in Cape Verde which made slave voyages to various parts of the world. As late as the 1860s, ships were seized by the American African Squadron based in Cape Verde during the 1840s and 1860s, created to patrol the West African waters for vessels smuggling slaves to the New World. Many smugglers were American themselves.

In 1818, American merchant Samuel Hodges established a partnership with Cape Verdean, Manuel António Martins, where United States goods were smuggled to every part of the Atlantic coast of Africa. Hodges served as the first United States consul to Cape Verde from 1818 to 1827. He became a very well known commercial figure in the Islands. Due to significant U.S. presence in Cape Verde, American sea captains showed little respect for the Portuguese, often by not paying taxes. In 1842, eighty-seven American merchant ships traded in Cape Verde in comparison to Portugal’s sixty-one and Britain’s thirty-six ships. Additionally, three hundred and thirty-eight United States vessels stopped in Cape Verde between 1851 and 1879. They brought tobacco, flour, rice, cod, pork, buttermilk, soap, candles, cotton, paper, cloth, shoes, wood, dishes, and other goods from New England. Ships arrived from New York, Boston, Providence, Baltimore, Portland, New London, and New Bedford, on their way to West Africa, Madeira, Azores, Canary Islands, and Brazil to sell goods.

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78 Almeida, 11.


80 Almeida, 11.

81 Ibid.
By 1832, ships returning to the United States were reporting that large numbers of Cape Verde’s population were dying of starvation. Portugal did not come to Cape Verde’s immediate aid, thus Cape Verdeans made public pleas for U.S. support. Merchant ships from Boston offered to carry food and other necessary goods to Cape Verde. Donations poured in from Boston, Portland, Maine, Newburyport, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, the YMCA and the Catholic Church. Aid also arrived from Brazil, the African coast, and Canary Islands.  

Despite all types of support from many parts of the world, thirty thousand Cape Verdeans died, out of a population of three hundred thousand. The island of Santo Antão was affected the most, with the famine claiming eleven thousand of its twenty-six thousand inhabitants. Rain did come in 1856, however, by then one quarter of the population had already died of cholera, smallpox, and famine. Cape Verde’s economy suffered a major decline. It exhausted its finances on importing foods. Salt, its only export commodity was almost completely wiped out. The Portuguese Government placed heavy restrictions on import and export. Machado states:

The importation of many goods, including cloth and shoes was prohibited and exorbitantly high import duty was set for other goods. Moreover, foreign merchandise was to be brought to Cape Verde only in Portuguese vessels. To exacerbate the situation, higher taxes were placed on Cape Verdean exports to the metropole and preference given to Brazilian products over those of Cape Verdes, affecting the trade in coffee grown in Fogo, aguardente (sugar cane rum), and animal hides, leaving these last to lie rotting in the Islands.

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82 Ibid.

83 Ibid, 14.

84 Machado, 99.
It was then that Cape Verdeans began to leave Cape Verde in massive numbers, in search of a better life.

Cape Verdean Americans have played a significant role in the development of Cape Verde. Since the early 19th century Cape Verdeans have worked as whalemen, on the cranberry bogs, and as factory workers in the northeastern United States. They would, often send remittances (both of money and goods) back to their homeland. In 1941, the amount of remittances was delineated in an executive order by the Portuguese government in an agreement with the U.S. government. It stated that remittances were only to be sent to families. Cape Verdeans could only send one hundred dollars per month, additional twenty dollars per child, but not to exceed two hundred dollars monthly.85

Living conditions in the islands under Portuguese colonialism was very poor. Portugal did very little to support growth and, at times, prevented Cape Verdeans from taking control over their own economic destiny. During harsh periods of drought and famine from the nineteenth century through the mid-twentieth century, Cape Verdeans made desperate appeals of solidarity to their compatriots in the United States. One account from 1941 stated:

Sons of S. Nicolau in America! Listen to the painful plea of your hungry and impoverished brothers. Knock on each others' doors and unite your efforts, and contribute so that your brothers do not disappear in this famine. Help your

85 “Noticia Muito Importante: Remessas de Dinheiro Para Portugal, Madeira, Açores e Cabo Verde,” September 6, 1941 (New Bedford Whaling Museum MSS B92-1, Portuguese Immigration Records, Box 8).
brothers with money, foods, and clothing, because they need everything. And in the other islands, Fogo and Santo Antão, which also experience great misery. Open your giving and charitable hearts and your souls to these people, the voice of misery of those who suffer in the islands, principally the island of S. Nicolau. Each delayed month, represents hundreds of lives for the valley of death.86

Cape Verdean Americans joined forces and created several organizations, mutual aid societies, and committee and relief funds to help raise money and purchase goods to send to the islands. In addition to raising monetary support, Cape Verdean American organizations disseminated information to raise awareness on the severe conditions of Cape Verdeans in Cape Verde. The Cape Verdean Beneficent Association of New Bedford, founded in 1916, is the oldest Cape Verdean community organization. This organization was instrumental in bringing other Cape Verdean organizations together, to raise money and send aid to Cape Verde. Often, money was raised through socials, community picnics, and appeals for donations. Other Cape Verdean organizations of the early 1900s include the Cape Verdean Ultramarine Band Club, the Cape Verdean Woman’s Social Club, the Cape Verdean American Veterans Association, and the Comissão Pro-Necessitados de Cabo Verde (Commission to aid the Needy of Cape Verde).87 Some of these organizations remained active throughout the decades.

There was a significant level of political and social activism on the part of these organizations, which attracted individuals and institutions in the United States to join forces in support of this small archipelago plagued by drought, famine, and extreme


87 Please see www.umass.edu/cvsa, Cape Verdean Student Organization Website, CVSA, University of Massachusetts at Amherst; accessed March 12, 2008.
poverty. American organizations such as the Red Cross came to the aid of the Cape Verde Relief Fund after their efforts to bring ten thousand dollars worth of supplies they had collected to Cape Verde, were abandoned by the Portuguese colonial powers. The Red Cross spoke of their commitment to end the harsh conditions in Cape Verde:

Even though the wartime needs of the American Red Cross are the most vital factor in the picture, in the present campaign for funds, the Red Cross must also stand ready, war or no war, to meet the problems arising from peacetime disaster in this country. Its mission, year in and year out, always has been to help the victims of natural disaster in this country and elsewhere.  

The Red Cross secured a vessel, paid for shipping costs and licenses, and distributed all the supplies, island by island.

Between the 1950s and 1970s, Cape Verdean American organizations shifted their focus towards the education of Cape Verdean Americans on Cape Verde politics and culture. The end of World War II marked the beginning of the African decolonization period. Cape Verde had its own independence movement from Portuguese colonialism. Organizations such as the American Committee for Cape Verde, TCHUBA, were instrumental in educating Cape Verdeans-Americans about their history, Cape Verde’s socio-economic conditions and colonial situation. Other Cape Verdean organizations during this period included Cape Verde Islands Relief Association, the Cape Verdean American Federation, and the PAIGC National Support Committee U.S.A. TCHUBA, Cape Verdean newspapers and other social, religious, and political

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88 "Red Cross Aid to Cape Verde Relief Explained by Chairman," The Standard-Times, March 23, 1944, 16, (New Bedford Whaling Museum MSS B92-1, Portuguese Immigration Records, Box 8).
organizations, instrumental during the independence movement, will be discussed later on at greater length.

In the early 1800s Cape Verdean seamen settled in New Bedford, New England's main whaling city. The first Cape Verdeans to arrive in the United States were mainly from the island of Brava. Halter explains the connection of this phenomenon to the whaling industry:

It was the geographic features of the island that initially brought the whaling vessels to its ports. Once this link was solidified, the chain migration followed quite naturally and the Packet Trade boats continued to travel the same routes, docking at Brava.  

Table 3 demonstrates the number of Cape Verdean emigrants from Cape Verde and immigrants to New Bedford.

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89 Halter, 43.
Table 3. Emigration from the Cape Verde Islands/Immigration to New Bedford, Massachusetts, by Island, 1900-1920

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Island of Origin</th>
<th>Emigrating from the Islands (%)</th>
<th>Immigrating to New Bedford (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brava</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fogo</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Tiago</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Vicente</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Nicolau</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santo Antão</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Halter, 42.

In his discussion, Ivan T. Sanderson refers to the work ethic and skills of the Cape Verdean Whaler:

In almost all crews the Negro African figured very prominently, those from Portuguese West Africa proved particularly outstanding as whalemens. They usually far surpassed all others of whatever racial or national origin in this art, and many of them settled along the New England coast, where they became known, and still are known, as Bravas, which, for once, is more a term of endearment than of opprobrium.90

Feri Felix Weis contrasts this definition of the Bravas, by highlighting that:

A Brava is not, as you may think, a Venetian “bravo” who was hired by the Doge of Venice to dispatch a “friendly enemy” with the timely aid of a dagger. The name Brava describes a most peaceful individual, who comes here to work and to be content with almost nothing, because he is used to nothing at home.91


Cape Verdeans lived near the docks in flophouses and took on jobs associated with shipping and shipbuilding. They also bought schooners and brought other Cape Verdeans to the United States to work on the cranberry bogs of Cape Cod and mills of New Bedford. Ten or more ships made annual trips between Southeast New England and Cape Verde. The ships would arrive in the United States early summer before the cranberry season and returned after the harvest in the fall. They would return to Cape Verde with clothing, household goods, roof tiles, and other U.S. products. The trade was known as the Brava Packet Trade, since most of the ships during this period departed from the island of Brava. *Cape Verdeans in America: Our Story*, its significance is described:

The importance of the packets was far more than commercial. It was these fragile vessels, above all else, that nurtured a Cape Verdan American connection, making it possible for new immigrants to resolve a dilemma that deeply concerned many of them: how to make a new life for oneself in America without abandoning those left behind in the homeland. For one thing packets made visits home a possibility and this kept alive the dream many held dear of returning one day to live in the Islands as a prosperous mercano (American). For another, the packets, allowed immigrants to provide most of life’s necessities—and some luxuries—to relatives in their home island. These...were a lifeline between the immigrants and those who remained in Cape Verde. For the latter, they brought the material goods necessary for physical life, but just as importantly, for the lonely greenhorn, the packets enabled him to stay in contact with home and with the way of life that was part of his very identity.93

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93 Almeida, 30-1.
António Coelho was the first Cape Verdean American to purchase a vessel and make it possible for Cape Verdeans not only to travel but to send goods back to the Cape Verde Islands as well as pick up new immigrants.\(^94\) He purchased the Nelly May and sailed in 1892 from Providence to Brava. There were fifteen passengers on this vessel who paid fifteen dollars each for the trip.\(^95\) Due to rough conditions, it took the vessel roughly forty-five days to reach the islands. On its way back to the United States, the voyage lasted only twenty-eight days. It reached Providence with one hundred and seventeen passengers.

The most noted of these ships in the Cape Verdean packet trade was the schooner *Ernestina*, which sailed as late as the 1960s, carrying Cape Verdeans as well as goods between the Islands and the United States.\(^96\) Built in 1894, the *Ernestina* is more than one century old and is listed in the National Register of Historic Places.

By the end of the nineteenth century, more and more factories were built in New Bedford. Business was booming and factories required more workers. Due to this demand for factory workers Cape Verdeans were encouraged to come to the United States to work. This marked a period of increased migration of Cape Verdeans to the U.S. Due to the high costs of the voyage, poor peasant families would combine their financial resources and send one family member, frequently a young male, to America. These young men would leave Cape Verde in their teens and return decades later, as


\(^{95}\) Ibid.

adults, to establish households after having saved money in America. Those who were already married would come to see their wives and children every few years. In many cases, men would spend decades abroad, only returning in old age.\textsuperscript{97} For many Cape Verdeans, the dream was to work in America, save money, and set up a house in Cape Verde with American goods.

By 1911, an estimated five hundred Cape Verdeans would go to Cape Verde each year and return to the United States. This period of cyclical migration was problematic for record keeping and accurate information on the actual numbers of Cape Verdeans who migrated to the United States for the first time. Table 4 on page fifty-six demonstrates this.

\textsuperscript{97} Almeida, 49.
Table 4. Departures from the Cape Verde Islands and Arrivals to New Bedford, Massachusetts, 1900-1920

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Departures from the Cape Verde Islands</th>
<th>Arrivals to New Bedford</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>1,311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>1,296</td>
<td>1,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>1,054</td>
<td>1,049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>1,474</td>
<td>1,555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>1,128</td>
<td>960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>1,691</td>
<td>1,307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>1,610</td>
<td>2,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>1,829</td>
<td>1,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>1,508</td>
<td>1,209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>1,506</td>
<td>1,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18,629</td>
<td>18,122</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Because it was an overseas province, records show Portugal listed as the country of origin for all Cape Verdeans. There were also many clandestine departures by Cape Verdeans who could not afford the trip cost or who were attempting to avoid conscription into the Portuguese military. Still, many entries in the United States were unrecorded.
The inconsistencies are also demonstrated on the table below with conflicting figures from the United States Immigration Service and migration records in Cape Verde.

Table 5. Cape Verdean Immigration to the United States, 1912-1920

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exit from Cape Verde to U.S.</th>
<th>10,870</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Entries of Black Portuguese Aliens to U.S.</td>
<td>7,798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>3082</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Often U.S. officials would use typical American categories of black and white to classify newcomers. This was problematic because Cape Verdeans held Portuguese passports until 1975, the year of Cape Verde’s independence from Portugal. Those who seemed white were labeled as European Portuguese by U.S. officials. Those who looked black were known as the Bravas or black Portuguese as most Cape Verdeans were called at this time. By the 1920s, African-born blacks in New Bedford formed more than two-fifths of the population classed as Negro by the Federal Census.98 Reid discusses the antagonistic relationship between the Azoreans and Cape Verdeans:

The Portuguese from the Azores consider themselves far superior to those from Cape Verde, who they look upon as Portuguese Negroes, though neither group considers itself negro. Azoreans are fair of complexion, largely olive-skinned with straight black or brown hair. The Cape Verdeans range from brown to black, with hair varying from the long straight black to the short and different variety.99


99 Ibid.
The racial stratification issues in the United States would become the basis of Cape Verdean identity struggle in the United States. This phenomenon will be discussed in depth, in a separate section. As Almeida asserts:

This early failure of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service to institute procedures which would identify Cape Verdeans as a distinct ethnic cultural group and as a multi-racial people with a geographic land of origin would form the basis for many problems they would have as a people in their new homeland.\(^{100}\)

Migration increased between the U.S. and Cape Verde. In contrast to the above mentioned figures, a 1911 report calculated as many as fifteen hundred Cape Verdeans arriving in the New England area on an annual basis as well as an estimated population of ten to fifteen thousand Cape Verdeans in the Southeastern Massachusetts in 1912.\(^{101}\) During this period, many Cape Verdeans arrived in the United States under contract as laborers in the cranberry bogs and the cotton mills in towns such as New Bedford.\(^{102}\) Cape Verdeans were considered hardworking, obedient, and docile as well as a source of cheap labor. They replaced the Americans, Italians, Polish, and Finns. The average pay for a seven hour working day during harvest was between $1.40 and $1.75 for a hand picker and from $3.00 to $5.25 for a scoop picker.\(^{103}\) In addition to the bogs, their

\(^{100}\) Almeida, 51.

\(^{101}\) Dillingham, 539-54.

\(^{102}\) Ibid and “We Salute the Cranberry Industry: A Cape Verdean Creation,” The Cape Verdean, March 1975, 7. Cape Verdean Special Collections, Rhode Island College.

\(^{103}\) Ibid, 546.
working conditions in the factories were far from optimal. Many died of diseases such as pneumonia and tuberculosis caused by these living conditions. As highlighted in this account:

The conditions in the dingy barracks set up to receive these workers were scarcely better. Unmarried were forced to live in bare barracks rooms, sleeping in shifts. Large families would share houses where only one family previously lived. Most of the houses where Cape Verdeans lived in the South End of New Bedford were without toilets and the city made no provision for disposing of garbage and waste. The infant mortality rate was very high and schooling was not encouraged for the Cape Verdeans. It is scarcely surprising that these immigrants were more discouraged and less ambitious than their predecessors, as Black-Americans particularly were experiencing the full brunt of the economic depression. Conditions were similar for the Cape Verdeans who came to work in the cranberry fields. Housing was often rude company owned shacks build to give a minimum of shelter and a maximum of profit for the bog owners. Many pickers, unused to American food and climate, died at the bogs of diseases caused partly by these poor living conditions.104

The strict immigration laws of the 1920s closed U.S. borders to immigrants of color and thus substantially curtailed new Cape Verdean migration to the United States. Few Cape Verdeans entered the United States and those who were already here were afraid to visit the islands unless their immigration papers were legal. Cape Verdeans began moving to other areas and establishing communities in industrial cities such as New Haven, New York City, New Jersey textile cities, Pennsylvania steel towns, and Ohio rubber manufacturing centers. Cape Verdeans also settled in Providence and worked at paper and clothing factories as well as on the docks. By the 1920s, whaling was not as significant to the world economy as in previous times. Modern shipping emerged as a new form of business. Cape Verdeans became a central source of labor in

104 Almeida, 55.
this industry. Manuel Q. Ledo, who was Australian and Cape Verdean arrived in Providence from New Bedford, and worked as a business agent for the international Laborer’s union.\textsuperscript{105} In his account of the history of the Longshoremen’s Union, Sam Beck explains Ledo’s significance in organizing and creating the Union:

He allegedly pulled a strike when the Industrial National Bank was being built in downtown Providence in 1929. His involvement in waterfront work inspired him to organize his fellow workers into a united body, which on November 13, 1933 formally became the International Longshoremen’s Association Local 1329. While Ledo could not control the unpredictability of ship arrivals, he was able to secure greater safety and support for those injured and a pay scale that provide people with a more equitable standard of life.\textsuperscript{106}

While Manuel Q. Ledo and many other Cape Verdean Americans settled in Providence, others joined friends and families in California. The abolition of the discriminatory laws of the 1920s and the enactment of the new immigration laws of 1965 stimulated renewed Cape Verdean migration to the U.S.

\textbf{Cape Verdeans and the Identity Question}

In his study of Cape Verdean identity in New Bedford, David Baxter explains that Cape Verdeans viewed themselves in terms of their unique cultural and phenotypical diversity.


\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., 77.
Cape Verdeans see themselves as a unique blend of European and African elements. On the other hand, they share with other peoples of the Portuguese world a common national language, state religion, family structure and nationality. On the other hand, Cape Verdean foods, music, dances, poetry, games, and localized dialects reflect many West African influences, as well as few influences from European countries other than Portugal. Cape Verdeans explain this unique cultural blend with reference to several factors. 1) the location of the Cape Verde Islands as a supply stop for international shipping; 2) the longstanding tradition of seafaring among Cape Verdeans, a tradition that has resulted in Cape Verdeans acquiring cultural elements from many parts of the world; and 3) the dual role that Cape Verdeans have played in African slavery, both as slaves themselves and as masters of slaves.\footnote{David Baxter, “Approaches to Studying Ethnicity Among Cape Verdeans in New Bedford,” Preliminary Report of Field Work in Progress; Massachusetts Second Colloquium on Peoples of Portuguese Origins in North America, (Held as part of the Northeastern Anthropological Association Annual Meetings, Clark University, Worcester, MA, April 26-28, 1974), 1. Accessed at the Special Collections on Cape Verde, John P. Adams Library, Rhode Island College.}

Identity and ethnicity are the most widely studied areas of the Cape Verdean community in the United States. Cape Verde’s racial make up attracts the attention of many in academia, because it defies America’s strictly defined racial stratum. In order to understand these dynamics we must first understand the historical and ethnic make up of Cape Verde’s population.

Until independence in 1975, Cape Verde’s power was placed in the hands of the Portuguese and other European residents in the islands. Because they were light in complexion, rulers were called brancos (whites in Portuguese). Lobban reveals:

In the fifteenth century, when the initial settlement of the islands was taking place, there were simply two large groups: (1) the brancos, the rulers, capitãos, administrators, noblemen, and top officers, settlers, and their wives and children, in addition to some exiled Portuguese criminals, and (2) the pretos (“blacks”), who initially were almost all slaves, with some exceptions for those who played special roles in slave raids and trade, in translating, in enforcement of the slave system, and in the military service.\footnote{Lobban, 54.}
This system immediately changed after slave masters commenced sexual relations with their slaves, thus blurring this well defined racial divide. This would also cause the formation of the mainly *crioulo* or *mestiço* population in Cape Verde. The following table displays the composition of Cape Verdean society between 1550 and 1950. After independence, the “race” category was dropped from Cape Verde’s National Institute of Statistics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Mestiço</th>
<th>Black</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1550</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>69.61</td>
<td>28.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>62.47</td>
<td>34.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>3.98</td>
<td>59.80</td>
<td>36.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>75.23</td>
<td>20.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>62.47</td>
<td>34.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>69.09</td>
<td>28.84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lobban (1992), 55.

The Portuguese did very little to preserve African culture in Cape Verde. They banned African cultural practices, religions, languages, and music. Slaves were often baptized with European names and converted to Catholicism.

Slave records demonstrated that African ethnic features were just as important as physical features. Color was reported as preto (black) but as Lobban mentioned, “…there were many who are recognized as *preto fula* or simply *fula* colored, with a suggestion
that an individual had a somewhat lighter complexion typical of the interior Fula people." Additionally, in the Portuguese language color references were brown, light tan, and dark tan. With the emergence of the mestiço population, this same system used physical attributes such as nose type (flat or very flat), hair textures, and body build to describe slaves. This was very different from the United States where race classifications were sharply divided and identifiable hint of African blood would be enough for one to be discriminated against. In Cape Verde as well as in Brazil, for example, racism existed but there were no institutionalized structures.

Cape Verdeans served as middle men during the colonial period. They were local administrators in various parts of the Portuguese-speaking Africa. On the one hand, Cape Verdeans were exploited by Portugal but on the other, Cape Verde was better off than other African colonies in terms of economic development, health conditions, and education because they were considered an overseas province hence received limited privileges. However, the system of divide and conquer had lasting effects in its society. There were those who accepted the colonial system and did not think there was an alternative. Thus, Cape Verdeans were both oppressed and oppressors.

From the initial period of their arrival in the United States, during the nineteenth century, Cape Verdeans were faced with the harsh realities of racism in the American society. In the rural areas of Cape Verde where most Cape Verdeans in America came from, race and identity was not a concern for everyday life. In the United States,

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109 Ibid., 55-6.

110 Lobban, 55-60.
however, the color of a person’s skin was politically and socially important. Because Cape Verde was part of Portugal’s colonial empire, Cape Verdeans called themselves Portuguese. In the United States, being Portuguese meant being white. Darker skinned Cape Verdeans identified themselves as white Portuguese. In Cape Verde, being white was a social as well as a racial label. A person of color could be called white, if they demonstrated superior social and education skills and possessed wealth.111

The white Portuguese from Azores and Madeira did not associate with Cape Verdeans. They considered Cape Verdeans to be Africans due to skin color as well as cultural differences such as language. Cape Verdeans were almost fully excluded from Portuguese churches, social clubs, and communities. They were not attracted to predominantly Protestant African American communities in New Bedford, although some Cape Verdeans converted to Protestantism or formed new Catholic churches.112 Cape Verdeans quickly noticed that, in America, there was racism against anyone who was not white.

Cape Verdeans were considered black not only because of the rigid racial structure existent in American society but also because of conventional American social classification.113 The jobs they were able to obtain were similar to those of African Americans. However, as Machado pointed out, “By their own reckoning, Cape Verdeans

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112 Ibid., 237.

113 Halter, 8-15.
were “Portuguese,” culturally superior to Africans and to American blacks as well.”\footnote{Machado (1981), 235.} They did not want to be seen as “negro.” Most Cape Verdeans sought to gain recognition as a separate social group than African Americans “by preference” and segregated from the white Portuguese by “necessity.”\footnote{Ibid., 236.} Similar to the Cape Verdean community, this phenomenon was also true of the Irish community once its members saw value in being considered “white” and not a “minority.” Some Cape Verdeans “passed” for Latin Americans (Puerto Rican or Cuban) and others, who were darker, were lumped with the larger Black American population.\footnote{Ibid.} This was true of Cape Verdeans from Fogo and Santiago islands, where the population was typically darker. These immigrants suffered discrimination from the American society as well as their fellow Cape Verdeans.

After independence there was an increased interest in Cape Verdean culture, music and language, especially by younger Cape Verdean Americans.\footnote{Ibid.} Once these cultural expressions were brought to the United States, certain versions slightly transformed from its original form in Cape Verde.\footnote{Richard Lobban, “A Synthesis of Cape Verdean Culture and History,” Cimboa, 5-9.} Crioulo also gained social significance. Once considered embarrassing and a sign of illiteracy and African roots, Crioulo became a way for Cape Verdeans to identify themselves, create a cultural commonality, and distinguish themselves from African Americans. It also afforded them a sense of higher social status. “There was certainly some practical utility in maintaining
the mother tongue, since American whites often regard foreigners of color as "not the same as" or "better than" American Blacks and accord them more benign treatment."119

As the civil rights movements gained momentum in the 1960s with the black pride and black power movements, many young Cape Verdeans joined forces and identified themselves as African Americans and not as white Portuguese.120 They were often rejected by African Americans who did not accept them as black. In addition, there was conflict between the younger and older Cape Verdeans over racial identity, which continues today.

Cape Verdeans face many questions relating to racial identity. For a people who, historically, were never required to place a racial label on themselves, they were faced with this phenomenon once they arrived in the ports of New Bedford. Cape Verdeans endure what Halter called the "double invisibility" of being black and foreign.121 Different labels emerged as Americans did no know what to call Cape Verdeans, "the green people," black Portuguese, and Bravas. Sometimes they were black, at other times they were white, but most of the time, Cape Verdeans were neither. American culture forces people to choose between the categories of "black" or "white." The identity question persists. The wide variety of recent ethnic studies on the Cape Verdean community and the question of its identity, demonstrate academia's interest in dealing with this question within the strict racial spheres of American scholarship. However, the


121 Halter, 14.
racial system in the United States, especially within scholarly work, needs reconsideration in terms of the approach to studying black immigrant politics. It is not so much of a problem of Cape Verdean ethnicity but of the existing racial construct in the United States. As Halter pointed out:

Perhaps because the United States has had a history of institutionalizing racism within such fixed genetic categories as compared to other societies, even those with a history of slavery such as Brazil or even the Cape Verde islands themselves, it has been more difficult for American historians to view race as anything but a physical feature.

The discourse on race relations and immigration, for blacks in particular, has been narrowed to the African American experience. A recent article in USA Today speaks to the growing nature of the black immigrant population in the United States and diversity within the black community. It stated that, “The diversity is not in skin color but in culture, language and national origin.”

Twenty-five percent of the growth of the black population between 1990 and 2000 was due to African and Caribbean immigrants. The black immigrant population has increased at a faster rate than the population of traditional African Americans. The number of African Americans increased ten percent to thirty-one million in the 1990s. However, the number of blacks from Africa

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123 Ibid.

124 Ibid.
doubled to five hundred thirty-seven thousand during the same period. The Caribbean population also increased sixty-three percent to more than one and a half million.\textsuperscript{125}

The shift in the black population in the United States changes the nature of black politics and forces the black community to restructure social and political institutions, to include immigrant groups. Black immigrant groups are in their largest numbers in major U.S. cities such as Boston, Washington, DC, New York, and Atlanta. In some regions, black immigrant groups make up twenty percent of the population.\textsuperscript{126} Members of such groups are being elected to office and representing their communities in the political sphere.

Another component affecting population growth in the black community is conceptualizing the term, \textit{African-American}. There are many people in the black community who consider themselves black but do not see themselves as African American. "Blacks from Africa and the Caribbean tend to be better educated, have higher income and live in more prosperous neighborhoods than African-Americans."\textsuperscript{127} Black immigrants see the United States as a land of opportunities. African Americans are still linked to the legacy of slavery, which marked their history for centuries. However, the demographic changes in the black community will force changes in the black political agenda.

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{126} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.
Cape Verdianity: Diaspora and Homeland Development

What is the basis for the connection between Cape Verdeans and their homeland? Promoting Cape Verderan ethnic identity and culture also promotes development at home. That is to say, promoting Cape Verderan culture and ensuring its predominance among Cape Verdeans in diasporic communities will result in a stronger connection and relationship between Cape Verdeans abroad and their homeland. The process is mutually reinforced by the continued financial and political support from diasporic communities as well as the political and social support the diaspora receives from Cape Verde’s government. Promoting the culture abroad also creates a distinction between the Cape Verderan community and other ethnic groups living within the same geographic space. The Cape Verderan community can then identify itself as a separate ethnic interest group. The unique essence of being from Cape Verde, a descendant of Cape Verderan immigrants, and the continued display of the cultural markers previously discussed constitute Cape Verdianity, Cape Verderanness, or Creoleness and creates a need for a connection to the homeland; it fosters the desire to maintain a connection to what is familiar and what is known to be one’s true cultural and ethnic identity: not quite European yet not quite African, but a mixture of the two.

Laguerre explained that, “Nineteenth Century America provides us with a good laboratory for the observation of the diverse forms of integrating immigrants in urban America.”128 He questioned the assimilationist ideology which failed because America is

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inherently a transnational state filled with diverse cultures. The assimilationist ideology predicted that all newcomers to the American society would absorb themselves into the American cultural and social norms thus producing a homogenous nation. However, as in the case of Cape Verdeans, most immigrants continued to maintain strong links to their countries of origin by corresponding with relatives and friends as well as by sending monetary and in-kind remittances and sometimes, returning to their homeland. Full assimilation to the American culture did not happen because of "their attachment to their countries of origin, their unwillingness to become completely AngloSaxonized, and their desire to speak their native language and establish schools, churches, and newspapers that maintain their cultural identities and traditions."\(^{129}\)

*Cape Verdianness, Cape Verdeanness, or Creoleness* creates a safe social space for Cape Verdeans in the United States to be who they believe themselves to be and not what has been assigned to them by the American racial system. The notion of cultural and ethnic commonalities, as described by Gillis, "indicates the promotion of or adherence to a communal identity that is characterized by a sense of sameness over time and space."\(^{130}\) This also pertains to Cape Verdeans who were born in the United States who maintain a symbolic relationship with their homeland. Even if they have never visited Cape Verde they still refer to it as their homeland. More recent Cape Verдеan immigrants maintain more active ties with Cape Verde with frequent phone calls to relatives, and sending monetary remittances home. As asserted by Sanchez, "whether maintaining an active or

\(^{129}\) Ibid.

passive connection, Cape Verdeans still conceptualize the Cape Verde Islands as a defining cultural symbol in their identity construction.”

In his work on the Haitian diaspora in New York, Laguerre uses the concept “dispersed nation” to define a diaspora as “individual immigrants or communities who live outside the legal or recognized boundaries of the state or the homeland, but inside the reterritorialized space of the dispersed nation.” Thus diasporic communities can be considered populations belonging to two different spaces, the homeland and host country. Sanchez identifies the “Cape Verdean diaspora as one of the many populations who acquire this type of nationalist double consciousness.” She further states that, “Cape Verdeans are at once attached to two societies. They are living and participating members of the U.S....yet, they still reference Cape Verde as their home. The U.S., then, is understood as a home-away-from-home in the minds of Cape Verdean-born members of the diaspora.”

Laguerre also defines “diasporic nationalism” as “the public or domestic patriotic expression of attachment that immigrants exhibit for the homeland,” in reference to immigrant activities in the host countries and the transnationalist relationships they maintain with the homeland. Cape Verdeans in southern New England display their diasporic nationalism or patriotism in various ways. They demonstrate their allegiance to Cape Verde by wearing shirts bearing the Cape Verdean flag and images of national

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131 Sanchez, 95.

132 Laguerre, 8.

133 Sanchez, 97.

134 Ibid.
leaders as well as by playing Cape Verdean music in their cars loud enough for others to hear.

Similar to the *claridade* literary movement of the 1920s in Cape Verde, the Créolité movement in the French Antilles in the early 1990s, proclaimed they were “neither Europeans, nor Africans...[but] Creoles.” Creolité appeared as a literary movement in 1989 with *Elogé de la Créolité (In Praise of Creoleness)* by Martinican scholars, Patrick Chamoiseau, Raphael Confiant, and Jean Bernabé. Noted Martinican writer and thinker Édouard Glissant pioneered this movement with his descriptive novels on the realities of creole culture in Martinique.

Creoliste novels dealt with Martinican society in the post-war period before the 1970s. From these scholars’ perspective, creoleness is defined as an “interactional or transactional aggregate of Caribbean, European, African, Asian and Levantine cultural elements, united on the same soil by the yoke of history.” Their history is a braid of histories affected by several different kinds of languages, idioms, religions, which ended up on the islands. According to Jean Bernabe et. al., “Creoleness is the world diffracted but recomposed.” Creoleness implies the recognition and acceptance of multiracialism and the commonalities of Creole peoples in the new worlds and Indian oceans and Oceania.

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137 Bernabe et. al., 891.
According to Bernabe et. al. creole culture was created in the plantation system with the creole language at its core. Thus orality, for the Martinicans and Cape Verdeans alike was and continues to be a central point of their creoleness. It has produced songs, tales, proverbs, nursery rhymes which has created the people’s knowledge base.

Another distinctive point that defines creole people or any colonized peoples is the legacy of colonialism and its impact on defining and creating the people’s history. In most instances, the history of the colonization process is perceived as the history of the people. Historians only offer accounts or responses to colonialism and omit the stories of resistance and spirit of local people, non-relational to the colonial experience. Thus, the history of colonization is wrongly recognized as the history of the people. Similar to the Creolité movement in Martinique, the scholars of the Claridade movement in Cape Verde, used literature to convey the realities of the common people and resist the vanishing of Cape Verdean Creole culture.

The Creolité movement came about as a critical response to Negritude, a movement popularized by notable Martinican writer Aimé Cesaire, encouraging blacks in the diaspora to rediscover and proudly accept their African roots. Negritude as an ideology was designed to revolutionize black literature, cure black alienation, and bring about political, economic, and social reform. However, Negritude was not as popular in the 1970s, since most African nations had already gained independence and major changes were already taking place on the continent. The Caribbean, however, remained a French colonial subject. Thus, as a movement, Negritude was not as popular in the Caribbean, whose people felt indifferent towards their African roots. They were
disenchanted with their colonial situation but did not believe Negritude was the answer that would bring change. These answers were oriented towards Africa and did not present the French Caribbean with any answers to their socio-economic and political realities.

Martinican writer, Edouard Glissant recognized Negritude as a necessary movement for its time period given that most African nations were not independent. However, in the post-independence period, Glissant argued that while African writers should move towards discussions to reflect contemporary realities in redefining the African personality in the context of contemporary life, Caribbean writers should do the same for their own realities, but that the Caribbean constituted a different cultural zone, races, customs, and ways of thought which also implicated different cultures over centuries while celebrating this métissage (race mixing). Glissant suggested a move beyond Negritude to a more realistic goal: "One cannot take root in poetic desires, even desires which proclaim one's roots, nor in a distant country, even if it is the mother-country, Africa... We must move from desire to reality."138 In his work, instead of Negritude, Glissant suggested a different perspective where the Caribbean was the center and Africa was present as an "instructive actuality, a paradigm of social cooperation," and not as a metaphor for black beauty or vanished dignity.

In their critique, Bernabé et. al., argue that Negritude replaces one construction of the self, the notion that Antillean identity is essentially European with the notion that Antillean identity is fundamentally African. Both Eurocentric and Afrocentric images

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repress the mixture of creole culture, and its multiple identity. Raphael Confiant highlights, “our mosaic identity has nothing to do with the phantasms of purity or harmony entertained by the zealots of total assimilation into France, or contrarily, by the tenants of Negro identity, of Afrocentric Negritude.”

In critiquing Creolité, scholars have identified it as a movement to cater to the foreign ideals of exoticism and stereotypical notions of island culture. Proponents of negritude and Cesairian thinking have also depicted it as an attack on Négritude and a desire to separate the Antilles from Africa and the black race. This critique is also true for those who disagree with Cape Verdeans who choose to call themselves simply Cape Verdean and not African nor European.

However, Creolistes argue for the positive aspects of globalization and how it allows Creolité to flourish as a movement. Global migration has afforded people to move about with more fluidity and define themselves in diverse ethnic lights based on the geographical space they find themselves. It gives people more individual and cultural freedom.

In her discussion of Creolité, Francoise Lionnet provides the example of two sister islands in the Indian Ocean, Mauritius and Reunion, and how they have developed very different models of multicultural societies. While Mauritius exemplifies a great example of a “creole state,” Reunion, on the other hand finds itself in chaos with heavy

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influence from its metropole, France. Mauritius has allowed minorities the rights to their own language, religion, and cultural practices. Tensions between the Hindus, Muslims, and black Creoles plagued the country following independence in 1968. Since then, compromise between the ethnic groups was reached and Mauritius emerged as a nation where cultural differences are celebrated and solidarity among these groups is desired for the sake of the nation’s development and peaceful existence. Similar to Creolité, “Mauritians do not believe there is only one true and objective answer to the question of identity, but rather that identity is a complex process of negotiation, something that all postcolonial and minority cultures are acutely aware of today.”

Mauritius’ framework on nationalism and identity is similar to Cape Verde’s and quite different from Europe and the United States. Although Cape Verde’s society is not comprised of different ethnic groups, it is still similar to Mauritius because of its crioulo heritage which has resulted in a society of diverse people, all of whom consider themselves Cape Verdean first, despite the vast difference in background and physical appearance. In the cases of Europe and the U.S., both states identify with one particular ethnic group. For example, second generation North African immigrants in France or Muslim immigrants in Britain are not seen as real French or British citizens. In the U.S., Asian Americans and African Americans are viewed as Asian and African first because they can be visibly identified as such and are different from the norm as defined by the

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141 Ibid, 105.
majority. In Mauritius, cultural diversity is celebrated and reflected in socio-economic and political affairs. However, the ethnic groups are considered Mauritian first.

This introductory chapter has described the premise of the research study by providing an account of Cape Verde’s development from Portugal’s colonial subject to independent nation, the Cape Verdean diaspora in the United States, and its arrival to the U.S. as well as the challenges of community and ethnic identity formation in Southern New England. It has identified the preservation of Cape Verdaen crioulo cultural identity as the basis for the diaspora’s commitment to homeland development is. Pires-Hester’s work on the Cape Verdean diaspora discusses the prevalent notion among Cape Verdeans regarding the unique essence of their culture and the promotion of such in the host country. They deem their mixed identity as a social value and as key to the emergence of the Cape Verdean diaspora as a significant ethnic interest group who has the potential to be a principal actor in the development of the homeland and improve its diplomatic relationship with the United States. The belief that Cape Verde is still considered home, and that the U.S. is the home-away-from-home, remains persistent in the minds of many Cape Verdeans. However, as highlighted in Sanchez’ study, the Cape Verdean diaspora remains plagued by fragmentation over identity and nationality issues. There is a division between Cape Verdeans born in America (Cape Verdean Americans) and Cape Verdeans born in Cape Verde (Cape Verdean immigrants). The


143 Ibid.

144 Sanchez, 114-125.
ways in which they identify themselves is contingent upon their notions of nationality. While Cape Verdean Americans might see themselves as being Americanized, Cape Verdeans immigrants might define themselves based on their islands of origin. This dichotomous notion of identity has created a fragmented diasporic community. This research analysis offers further insight into the trends and attitudes of these two fragments of the Cape Verdean community and whether this dichotomy affects the way they relate to each other and their homeland.

Limitations of the Study

The analysis covers the period from 1945 to 2008. The timeframe was chosen to cover the end of World War II, a period when many African nations were seeking or had already achieved independence. Cape Verde was no stranger to this movement, having also sought independence from Portugal. In the 1950s and 1960s, many of its citizens living abroad either supported or protested this struggle for independence. An analysis of primary and secondary sources (newspaper articles, books, and interviews with Cape Verdean organizations) will highlight the dynamics between those who supported the independence movement or supported continued colonial rule.145

This case study focuses on the Cape Verdean diaspora in the United States but does not attempt to give a detailed account of Cape Verde’s history and current conditions. It focuses primarily on Cape Verde’s diaspora resident in the United States.

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145 Secondary sources such as newspaper articles from the Standard times and the Cape Verdean (CVN) were collected from the New Bedford Whaling Museum in New Bedford, Mass and the Rhode Island College Special Collections on Cape Verde in Providence, RI.
and their perceptions, attitudes, and trends towards their community organizations and homeland. Lastly, given that a portion of the literature is in Portuguese, certain translations are subject to the author’s interpretation.

Organization of Study

This study is organized in five chapters. Chapter one consists of the introduction and statement of the problem, research questions, hypotheses and assumptions, significance of the study, definition of concepts, methodological procedures limitations and organization of the study. Chapter two reviews the existing literature within the scope of the study and chapter three contains the theoretical framework.

Chapter four highlights Cape Verde and its diasporic communities. It offers a general discussion on Cape Verdean communities and their organizations in Portugal, Holland and Argentina, and a brief overview of the largely female community in Italy. Chapter five will provide an analysis of the data findings on Cape Verdean communities in the United States. In addition to the analysis of the data collected, chapter five will also focus on data and survey findings which are used to generate observations, conclusions, and recommendations.
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

This review analyzes scholarly work on diaspora politics defined as the political behavior of diaspora groups. The discussion considers modern diasporas in the twentieth century. Brief attention is given to historical roots of diasporas for contextual purposes, and diasporas within the global perspective. This review is an assessment of how diaspora groups emerge and organize to protect, promote, and advance their political, economic, social, and cultural interests in their host countries, homelands, and in the international arena.

United States as a Melting Pot

Immigrants and their children make up one in every four Americans. There are more than thirty-four million foreign-born persons in the United States, both documented and undocumented.\(^1\) Almost eight million of these immigrants are permanent residents, eighteen years of age or older, with sufficient residence time (five years) to be eligible for

American citizenship. During the 1970s, roughly nine million were foreign-born residents.

Most contemporary immigrants to the U.S. come from Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America. Until the first decade of the twentieth century, ninety percent of new immigrants came from Europe. Currently, Latinos make up eighty-five percent of new immigrants to the U.S. As a consequence, non-Hispanic white Americans are projected to fall below fifty percent of the U.S. adult population by 2050. The new era of immigrants has produced a significant change in the American racial and ethnic composition. Figure 2.1 illustrates the foreign born population in the United States by state of residence.

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2 Ibid.


4 Ibid.

Figure 2.1. Foreign-Born Population by State of Residence

Diaspora Defined: From Ancient Greece to Modern Times

The word diaspora comes from the Greek verb *speiro* (to sow) and the preposition *dia* (over). The term *diaspora* was not used until the 1960s in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* and it was primarily applied to the *Jewish exile*, that is to say, to the Jewish communities who dispersion around the world had begun with the Babylonian captivity. Until 1993, Webster’s dictionary defined diaspora as “the settling of scattered colonies of Jews outside Palestine after the Babylonian exile.” After this period, the definition became more inclusive of other groups and changed to “the situation of people living outside their traditional homeland.” The Jewish and Greek communities are two of the world’s oldest diaporas. For ancients Greeks, diaspora meant migration and

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*Gabriel Sheffer, Diaspora Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 8-10.

colonization. For Africans, Irish, Palestinians, and Armenians, however, its meaning is rather traumatic due to the harsh experiences faced by each group. In contrast, most modern diasporas, were not agents of colonization or victims of persecution.

Modern diasporas are defined as, “ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin — their homeland.” An ethnic community, as explained by Milton J. Esman, is a group of people united by inherited culture, racial features, belief systems (religion) or national sentiments. Membership in an ethnic community is a relationship that an individual is born into. Ethnic identity is a set of meanings that individuals ascribe to their membership in an ethnic community, including attributes that bind them together as a collective and distinguish it from others in their respective environments. Once an individual accepts this membership he has certain obligations and responsibilities to the community that Esman refers to as ethnic solidarity. Solidarity is established and maintained by socialization reinforced by social controls, economic incentives, and external pressures. The population bases for the solidarity that is necessary for ethnic political organization are “ethnic communities whose cohesion and sense of continuity reflect perceptions of common peoplehood,


11 Esman, 26-27.
collective interests and destiny."12 Solidarity means commitment to defending these interests and maintaining boundaries. These may change overtime. The greater the solidarity, the more likely the emergence of ethnic political movements.

Ethnic political movements convert an ethnic community into a political competitor to combat ethnic antagonists or promote interests on the agenda of the host country. It seeks to reflect the needs of the collective consciousness or aspirations of the entire ethnic community. These may be split into several different organizations. Once the ethnic community becomes politicized it mobilizes on behalf of its collective interests and aspirations. This requires political action, recruitment of individuals into organizations, and financial and material resources. Additionally, incentives must be provided for individuals to remain committed to and provide financial support to such organizations. Although Esman (ethnic communities), and Sheffer and Cohen (diasporas) define these communities with different terms similar features can be found among their discussion. These differences are highlighted in a later section.

Robin Cohen draws attention to the common features of a diaspora on table 7.

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12 Ibid, 27.
Table 7. Common Features of a Diaspora

1. Dispersal from an original homeland, often traumatic, to two or more foreign regions;

2. alternatively, the expansion from homeland in search of work, in pursuit of trade or to further colonial ambitions;

3. a collective memory and myth about the homeland, including its location, history, and achievements;

4. an idealization of the putative ancestral home and a collective commitment to its maintenance, restoration, safety, and prosperity, even its creation;

5. the development of return movement that gains collective approbation;

6. a strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long time and based on a sense of distinctiveness, a common history, and the belief in a common fate;

7. a troubled relationship with host societies, suggesting a lack of acceptance at the least or the possibility that another calamity might befall the group;

8. a sense of empathy and solidarity with co-ethnic members in other countries of settlement; and

9. the possibility of a distinctive creative, enriching life in host countries with a tolerance for pluralism.


There are differences in factors which cause diasporas to emerge as well as the degree of trauma suffered which include expulsion, coercion as well as pressures of overpopulation, famine, hunger, poverty, and repressive government. In addition to the Jewish community, the African, Armenian, and Irish communities experienced such circumstances. Nearly ten million Africans were brought to the Americas to work on
plantations, through the slave trade. During 1915-16, Armenians faced forced displacement from much of their homeland. The Turks deported almost two million Armenians who ended up in Syria and Palestine (and later to the U.S. and France). In addition to those deported, there was a reported one million Armenians who were killed or died of starvation during this ethnic cleansing. The massive Irish migration between 1845 and 1852, following the great famine was a direct result of laissez-faire attitude from the British government who were looking to push for population control, modernization of agricultural production, and land reform agendas. Other indentured laborers abroad include Indians, Japanese, and Chinese. Table 9 and 10 demonstrate the main historical and modern diasporas.

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14 Sheffer, 31-54.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diaspora</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Main Host Countries and Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>5,500,000</td>
<td>Iran, Turkey, Lebanon, Syria, Germany, France, U.S., Canada, Australia, Georgia, Russia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Central Asian States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>35,000,000</td>
<td>Burma, Vietnam, Kampuchea, Malaysia, Korea, Singapore, Philippines, Indonesia, Taiwan, Japan, Thailand, U.S., Canada, Australia, Peru, South America, Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>Syria, Lebanon, Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td>U.S., Australia, Latin America, central and eastern Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
<td>Albania, Cyprus, Turkey, U.S., Australia, Canada, South Africa, Ethiopia, Germany, Western Europe, Middle East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gypsy</td>
<td>8,000,000</td>
<td>U.S., Canada, former Soviet Union republics, the Balkans, eastern, central, and western Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>9,000,000</td>
<td>Fiji, Guyana, Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mauritius, Nepal, Burma, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, South Africa, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Trinidad, Tobago, United Arab Emirates, UK, U.S., Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>8,000,000</td>
<td>U.S., Canada, South African, UK, France, Australia, former Soviet republics, Latin America, eastern Europe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sheffer (2003), 104.
Table 9. Modern Diasporas (Estimated Numbers in Main Host Countries)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diaspora</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Main Host Countries and Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African-American</td>
<td>25,000,000</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Atlantic</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>U.S., Canada, UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>4,500,000</td>
<td>Czechoslovakia, Romania, U.S., Canada, former Yugoslavia, former Soviet republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iranian</td>
<td>3,500,000</td>
<td>Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, UK, Germany, U.S., Canada, Australia, Central America, South America, western Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>U.S., UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>8,000,000</td>
<td>Britain, Argentina, Brazil, Germany, U.S., France, Australia, western Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>U.S., Hawaii, Brazil, Peru, Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdish</td>
<td>14,000,000</td>
<td>Iraq, Iran, Syria, Turkey, Germany, France, other western European countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanese (Christian)</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td>Egypt, Syria, Persian Gulf states, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, U.S., Australia, Canada, France, western Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>4,500,000</td>
<td>U.S., Canada, western Europe, former Soviet republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>3,500,000</td>
<td>Germany, Bulgaria, Holland, Cyprus, Greece, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, U.S., Austria</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sheffer (2003), 105.
Classifying Diasporas

In his discussion on diasporas in international relations, Milton J. Esman draws from John Armstrong distinguishing between proletariat and mobilized diasporas. He argues that proletarian diasporas have no economic resources, few communication skills and limited organizational experiences. They are incapable of articulating their group’s interests and have little to no access to power decision making circles. They are normally at the bottom of the income, occupational, and status ladders. Gradually they become proficient in local languages and obtain better jobs, more education, and advance their agenda within the public sphere. Esman makes the argument that diasporas take time to create in that, “The majority of migrant communities begin as proletarian diasporas. Before they develop the skills, capabilities and access needed to promote their domestic or international group interests, at least one or perhaps generations may be required.”

Mobilized diasporas however, bring occupational or communications skills that are in short supply in the host country. These skills are valuable to the local elite. The mobilized diaspora also gains access to public spheres and is able to push for the interests of its community by gaining the protection and trust of the “native elite.” As explained by Esman, eventually the native elite loses trust on the foreigner, and as the indigenous population gain the same skills and knowledge, the foreigner is no longer needed as an intricate part of this elite sphere.


18 Ibid.

In a later discussion on ethnic politics, Esman refines his classification of diasporas into three categories 1. settlers; 2. bourgeois; and 3. labor.\textsuperscript{20} He defines settlers such as the Norman invaders of Britain who arrived in large numbers and with superior military and technological strength, expelled or exterminated the inhabitants, and took possession of the territory. Bourgeois diaspora are immigrant communities that move to host country with education and economic skills, equal to or the same as the indigenous population. Lastly, the most common type of all is the labor diaspora, arriving as a result of large-scale migration from poor and overpopulated labor-surplus countries.

Labor diasporas as political actors are driven by two complimentary forces: 1. compelling need for unskilled labor to first world industrial and post-industrial economies and 2. desperate search for livelihoods in labor surplus third world countries.\textsuperscript{21} Esman highlights:

These simultaneous push and push forces have been strengthened by low fertility rates in the industrialized countries and the unprecedentedly high rates of population growth in the third world. So imperative are these demand and supply relationships and so persistent and resourceful the migrants that the resultant labor flows, legal where possible, illegal where necessary, thwart the enforcement of immigration controls.\textsuperscript{22}

Labor migrations are not random. They are patterned by familiar channels traceable to earlier links, established networks, and geographical convenience. Prospective migrants are attracted to locations where they can expect social support from earlier arrivals and

\textsuperscript{20} Esman (1994), 8.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid, 178.

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
job opportunities. These arrangements are facilitated by factors such as services to send remittance of funds to families in the homeland, two-way shipping of goods, arrangements of travel back and forth, and importation of foodstuffs. This can be said of such groups as the Mexicans in the United States, and North Africans in France.23

In contrast to Armstrong and Esman, Gabriel Sheffer offers a different classification of diasporas. The distinction, he argues, is between stateless diasporas and state-linked diasporas. A stateless diaspora is dispersed segments of nations that have been unable to establish any independent state. State-linked diasporas are in host countries and are connected to societies of their own ethnic origin that constitute a majority in established states such as the case of the black diaspora in Europe and the United States. They cannot define where home is and do not have the wish or access to resources to establish a state. Sheffer argues that there is no direct correlation between a diaspora’s link to an established national state (nor a diaspora’s statelessness) and the social and economic status and organization of most members of that diaspora.

Members of both stateless diasporas and state-linked diasporas can be “proletarian” (i.e., from poorer segments of their homeland societies, such as the Pakistanis, Indians, and Moroccans, in the United Kingdom, most Palestinians in the United States and Kuwait, both Christian and Muslim Lebanese who have recently migrated to the United States, and the Latin Americans in the United States) or “capitalists” (middle-class migrants and richer migrants, such as the recent emigrants from Hong Kong to Canada and the United States, white South Africans who have migrated primarily to Anglo-Saxon countries such as Australia, and Israeli Jews who permanently reside in various host countries. In the same vein, some of those groups are unorganized (as is the case of the white South Africans), some are loosely organized (such as the Palestinians in the United States and Canada), and some are well organized (such as the Colombians in the United States and Israel).24

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23 Ibid.
Modern diasporas are organized and develop multilateral connections with various political and social groups in the host countries, homelands, and third countries. They exchange information and resources with international organizations, government, and other relevant groups within the state which serve their base and homeland. Modern diasporas are showing great deal of interests in organizing for the survival of their culture. Their activities tend to influence politics at a trans-state level, in their host country, homeland and third countries. By creating trans-state networks, diasporas are protecting, promoting, and maintaining their interests. Gabriel Sheffer sums up diasporas:

In their host countries diasporas preserve their ethnic, or ethnic-religious identity and communal solidarity. This solidarity serves as the basis for maintaining and promoting constant contacts among the diasporas' activist elements. These contacts have political, economic, social and cultural significance for the diasporas, their host countries, and homelands. One of the purposes of these actions is to create and increase the readiness and ability of the diasporas to preserve a continuous interest in, and cultural, economic and political exchanges with their homelands...and most importantly, the capability of diaporas to mobilize in order to promote or defend their interests or the interests of their homelands within their host countries will result in the formation of either conflictual or cooperative triadic networks involving homeland, diaspora and host country.25

One of the fundamental concerns with this operational definition is its application to certain cases. In some cases, the homeland and the diaspora are not clearly defined. Sheffer provides the example of the Jewish and the African diasporas. In the case of the Jewish diaspora there is no consensus within the community as to whether Israel is

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24 Sheffer, 148.

indeed the center of the community. Another example is the African-American community in the United States and its relationship with the African continent. It is not clear whether the whole continent is considered the homeland or if only certain countries are considered as such. In addition, Sheffer points out the complex nature of this relationship and adds, "whether Blacks in the U.S. can be regarded as a diaspora since their ties with the "homeland" are only a vague concept among certain limited segments of the Black elite in the U.S. The majority feel that they are not of a diaspora and that their homeland is definitely the U.S."^28

Locksley Edmonson, himself part of the Jamaican diaspora, offers a comprehensive discussion on African Americans and the emergence of coalition building and support for the African continent. He highlights, "the extent to which Black Americans historically "rejected" identification with Africa has long been subject to debate, with profound variations on the acceptance/rejection theme influenced by time, place and circumstances."^29

Another aspect of the above mentioned definition is the relationship between the homeland and its diaspora. It assumes that the homeland is supportive of its diaspora and there is a level of reciprocity between the two entities. The diaspora may maintain ties

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27 Skinner, 21.

28 Sheffer, 11.

with the homeland but the homeland’s attitude toward the diaspora may not be clear. In addition, the diaspora may be actively opposed to the homeland’s government, such as the case of Cuba and its diaspora in the United States.

Profile of Modern Diasporas: Reasons for Solidarity and Organization

Current notions of the historical roots of ethnic diasporas tend to link them to expulsion or exile. Often migration happens voluntarily, caused by a group’s desire to find better conditions elsewhere. There are push and pull factors for voluntary migrations. At times political and economic conditions are appealing and pull diaspora groups towards particular host countries (pull factors). On the other hand, diasporas can also be driven out of their homeland by harsh social, economic, and political conditions. Economic situations caused by drought and famine can push diasporas towards migration.

Once in a host country, diasporas feel a need to organize and protect themselves from hostility by maintaining their unique cultural identity, ensure continuity, and constant contact with their homeland. Patterns of organization and political behavior only occur after migrants have permanently settled in a host country. However, the fate of migrants after arriving in a host country depends on their choices to acculturate, assimilate or resist assimilation.

Both earlier and modern diasporas have demonstrated similar features: frequent contact (i.e. communication, visits, permanent return) and virtual links (i.e. sentiment, emotional attachment) to ancestral homelands (Esman, 1994), (Sheffer, 2003), (Cohen, 1997). Symbols, legends and myths, oral narratives, remain vivid for centuries and are
significant features in maintaining a solid and long lasting diaspora. For some, the homeland is a cherished and imagined place. Dreams of a permanent returning most often, never happen. However, for some, these memories are enough motivation to actively organize on behalf of the diaspora and the homeland.

Eisman argues that ethnicity cannot be politicized unless a core of memories, experiences, or meanings move people to collective actions. For example, struggles against outsiders for possession of homeland, and cultural markers (language, religion, and legal institutions) that set the community apart from others all help to mobilize and politicize ethnic communities. Eisman opines,

Ethnicity is thus shaped by environment, by the threats and the opportunities it affords. Seldom is ethnicity invented or constructed from whole cloth: a cultural and experiential core must validate identity and make solidarity credible to potential constituents. Yet problems posed by the external environment are as likely as the historical experiences and collective aspirations of the group to determine its dynamics.30

Historical myths can be shaped from imagined pasts to legitimate current goals. Ethnic collectivity and solidarity can be located on a spectrum between historical continuities and opportunistic adaptations.31

Diasporas' behavior is not contingent upon their economic status (rich or poor) when they arrive in the host country. Gabriel Sheffer argues that rich and poor migrants deal with similar issues.32 Migrants only make decisions once they arrive and assess the

31 Ibid.
32 Sheffer (2003), 76.
politic and economic conditions of the host country. Sometimes migrants will move from their homeland to a host country and then on to a second or third host country due to economic, political, and social difficulties in the first host country. Only when they reach a host country with appealing conditions will they consider assimilation, acculturation, and diasporic organizations. Two important features of modern diasporas are the ability of migrants to maintain identity in a host country and openly nurture its community as well as support the homeland. Only when they are settled will they seriously consider decisions such as assimilation, acculturation, and resistance to assimilation. Once this initial phase of development is reached, then they begin to deal with issues related to interaction with the prevalent culture, find jobs, rent or buy homes, establish relationships and create support systems. The individual and collective decisions to maintain an ethnic identity is not enough to develop, revive, or maintain diasporas. They must be supplemented by action to join organizations or establish them when they do not exist.

Memories of leaving the homeland, initial hardship in the host country, making the decisions to settle there and efforts to establish communal organizations, all promote solidarity among members of ethnic groups. Solidarity is not only based on ties to the homeland but to the conditions of the diaspora in host country. Solidarity and sense of identity provide motivations to promote and maintain contacts among diaspora activists. These relationships are important for the diaspora, host country, homeland and other actors. This is the foundation on which diasporas organize and implement strategies to promote collective interests.
Diaspora organizations function at different levels: local diaspora communities, host country’s societies and governments and trans-state activities. They also exist to sustain the diaspora communities themselves as well as to offer essential support to the homeland. The exchange between diaspora and homeland is done by trans-state networks. Some serve peaceful and legal functions but others utilize these networks as a resource to promote illegal activities such as international terrorism, by supplying weapons and financial resources.

Technological advances make these activities so much easier with facilitating direct personal communication, and money transfers. Diasporas become predisposed to conflict and tension with host country, homeland, and international actors.

Irish communities, in America have supported the Irish Republican Army (IRA) for many years, and Jewish organizations were reported to have transferred over four hundred million dollars to Israel during the 1980s. The Lebanese diaspora which includes a population of four million, have played a role in the homeland’s civil war and sent remittances of two hundred and fifty billion dollars in 1980. Hamas has been identified as a terrorist organization by the U.S. since 1995 government, and has received continued financial support from the international community in excess of one hundred million dollars per year flowing via the Arab states, the British Muslims, and the United States. The African diaspora is no stranger to involvement in these networks and armed

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33 Sheffer (2003), 173.

34 Ibid.

struggles. The Eritrean embassies in the West summoned the support of its diaspora in the armed struggle against Ethiopia. In addition, the African continent has been consistently used as route for the transfer of money by many guerrilla movements.

Diasporas and their organizations are beneficial because they contribute to the culture and economy of host country. They create positive bridges between segments of host country and at the international level. Exchange between networks can bring economic, political, and cultural benefits to all involved.

Functions of Diaspora Organizations

Diasporas function at five levels of politics: 1. domestic level in host countries; 2. regional level; 3. Trans-state level; 4. level of entire diaspora; and 5. homeland politics. On each level, the functions fall into three broad categories: 1. maintenance; 3. Defense; and 2. promotion of its communities' multifaceted interests.\footnote{Sheffer, 173-175}

At the host country level, communal organizations deal with issues pertaining to internal affairs and relations with host countries' political and social institutions. At the regional level, organizations are involved in economic matters and broader political arena. Lastly, at the global level, diaspora organizations interact with global organizations such as the United Nations. Maintenance functions include fundraising, routine administration of cultural, economic and social functions, which may include schools and community centers, and oversee religious institutions (i.e. mosques, churches, and theological schools). Other functions may include supervision of universities and research
institutions. Long standing and well established diasporas such as the Greek and Jewish communities in the United States, may support health and welfare services in their communities (i.e. hospitals, clinics, senior citizen’s home). Defense is offered through organizations that provide physical protection for diaspora members when necessary. South Korean, Chinese, and Jewish communities in the United States have established self-defense organizations.\(^{37}\)

Promotional and advocacy functions are extremely significant to the emergence and survival of the diaspora organization. They fall into three categories: cultural, political, and economic. These include recruiting new members, persuading them to become new and active members, activities that are intended to increase ethnic awareness and sense of identity among diasporans (i.e. coordinate ethnic festivals, exhibitions, lectures, and operate via media outlets).

Advocacy work is also very important to the continued success of diaspora organizations. Providing generous economic aid and investments to their homeland, promoting cooperation between host country and homeland are key activities. The United States is arguably the last remaining super power in the world and it is considered one of the main financiers of states in need.\(^{38}\) Intensive lobbying and persuasion in the United States Congress and White House in regards to economic issues that affect homelands is profitable activity for diasporas. Not only can organizations gain U.S. support but that of the G8, World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), due to U.S. influence in world politics and in these spheres. In post World War II periods, the Greek,

\(^{37}\) Ibid.

\(^{38}\) Ibid., 175.
Polish, and Irish diasporas in the United States succeeded in obtaining economic aid for their homelands.\textsuperscript{39} Diasporas can also influence host countries and their policy makers to agree on moratoriums on loans for homelands (such as the case of Mexicans in the United States). Lastly, diasporas can lobby to end economic boycotts as the case of the Jewish community’s pressure on the U.S. to end economic boycott on apartheid South Africa. This resulted in tensions between the Jewish and African American communities. The objective is to increase diaspora membership, advance diaspora communities’ visibility and stature in host country, and consolidate contacts with homeland.

Extra communal levels maintenance activities include remittances, personal and collective donations, and other kinds of economic and financial resources as well as supply of other political and social services to homelands. Additionally, diasporas organize campaigns to engender favorable attitudes towards homeland and other parts of their diasporas. Diaspora leaders tend to cooperate with leaders from other diaspora communities in organizing demonstrations for attainment of individual and collective political rights.

The richer the community the more comprehensive its organizations become. Being well established does not only mean availability of resources. It gains access to power spheres in host countries. However, affluence is not an absolute requirement for successful organizations. Determination, experience, enthusiasm, and hard work on the part of the leaders and members of the diaspora are also key components. Lastly, new

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.
ethnic groups do not need to reinvent ways of entering mainstream politics. Less visible minorities should learn from more visible minorities.\textsuperscript{40}

Diasporas and Political Transnationalism

In the last two decades the world has witnessed new forms of immigrants’ involvement with politics in the homeland. There new and extending notions of citizenship while the homeland asks for the support of the diaspora. Consulates have become important intermediaries between the homeland and communities abroad. There are increased activities of homeland political parties in the diaspora’s host country. On the other hand, diaspora organizations; are making demands of political participation and rights (i.e. voting, political representation, dual citizenship) in homeland’s affairs.

The rise in diaspora social networks and organizations has changed the nature of politics both at home and abroad. In his comprehensive work on U.S. immigrants from El Salvador, Haiti, and Dominican Republic, Jose Itzigsohn defines the immigrant’s political transnational field as, “a realm of recurrent and institutionalized interactions and exchanges between, on the one hand, immigrants and their social and political organizations and, on the other hand, the political institutions and the state apparatus of the country of origin.”\textsuperscript{41} Itzigsohn highlights these three small nations and the impact their immigrant population has had on politics of their receiving and sending countries.


Itzigsohn's case studies on these three developing states shed significant light on those in the periphery of the world market economy and the broader discussion of diaspora politics and transnational practices. He argues that diasporas from these countries have changed the nature of immigrant participation in homeland politics, democratization processes, and diplomatic relationships with the United States. Itzigsohn also concludes that the unstable economic and political conditions in which Latin America and the Caribbean find themselves, allow for the continued pattern of transnational politics. Additionally, this pattern of transnationalism allows these countries to be incorporated into the world economy, to the development of competitive party politics, and to the persistence of immigrant organizations in the host countries.

In the case of Haiti, for example, the government has implemented an overseas department which includes the immigrant population. The Dominican Republic has created legislation where political rights will be extended to the migrants abroad. However, these rights have not yet been implemented. For El Salvador, migrants' political rights are still a futuristic vision. Nevertheless, organizations have supported the democratization and development processes. For all three countries, the process of transnationalization of immigrants' political rights and citizenship is still in its beginning stages.

42 Ibid, 1147.
44 Itzigsohn, 1150.
Similar to Haiti, Dominican Republic, and El Salvador, Cape Verde depends on remittances from its diaspora. Cape Verde’s democratization process during the 1990s encouraged the inclusion of its diaspora in homeland politics and development by opening up seats in the parliament for diaspora representation from communities in Europe, United States, and Africa.

In his work on the political value of remittances Montclos argues that the political impact of remittances is dependent on homeland state structure as well as the domestic economy. He adds that the size of the migrant community is not enough to guarantee their political weight. Montclos uses the case of Nigeria, who has the biggest African diaspora but yet do not have much influence on local or national politics. In addition to undemocratic state structures, Montclos offers Comores, Lesotho, and Cape Verde as comparative case studies. He points to fragmentation in diasporic organizations within the Comores and Lesotho migrant communities as the additional leading cause of their diasporas’ low political influence on homeland politics.

The Modern African Diaspora in the United States

The growth of the African population in the Americas decreased with the abolition of slavery and was legally restricted to only European countries for most of the nineteenth century. Records show between 1820 and 1841, there were seventy-one immigrants from Africa to the United States. Between 1841 and 1960, forty-seven

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thousand Africans immigrated to the United States.\textsuperscript{46} Due to strict immigration laws, it was difficult to obtain immigrant visas. From 1982 to 1992, the number of African immigrants escalated to roughly two hundred thousand. Additionally, one hundred eighty-five thousand were admitted as legal immigrants. Since the 1970s, however, the United States and Canada has become major destinations for African immigrants. Currently, the African immigrant population represents two to three percent, about five hundred thousand in the United States.\textsuperscript{47} Considering the U.S. population is over three hundred million, this figure might not be accurate because it might not include the undocumented African population in the U.S.

Africans did not begin migrating in huge numbers until the 1970s when persistent economic problems exploded in the African continent. Declining food availability, negative growth of national income, rising unemployment, increased debt, high rates of inflation, among other issues, all accounted for factors pushing Africans to migrate.\textsuperscript{48} There were increases in prices of manufactured goods that Africa did not produce but consumed. Inversely, prices of goods produced but not consumed by the continent were on the rise. The price of cocoa, coffee, and mineral resources, representing the core of Africa’s export, drastically dropped.\textsuperscript{49}


\footnotesize\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.

During the 1980s Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), intended to improve the economy of its implementing countries by devaluing the currency, cutting back on government spending on social services such as healthcare and education, resulted in impoverishing more people whose living conditions worsened. In addition, drought and famine also plagued many African nations as they sought to move forward in post independent times.

Europe has been the primary destination for Africans. Africans began traveling voluntarily to the metropoles towards the end of World War II. However, Europe and its changing immigration policies are closing its doors to Africans. Tighter laws of citizenship discourage immigration. The United Kingdom is the host country of many a large numbers of Zimbabweans, Kenyans, Nigerians. France hosts immigrants from Senegal, Cote D'Ivoire, Algeria, Morocco, and other Francophone countries. In contrast, African immigration to the United States has increased due to the diversity visa program.

The notion of a “return” to the homeland is a focal issue within the diaspora framework. In their discussion, Mohan and Zack-Williams highlight the complex implications of the diaspora and a return to the African continent. The establishment of

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the settlements of Sierra Leone and Liberia had the primary objective of creating a “home” where Africans could return. In addition, other return movements included efforts by Marcus Garvey and Pan-Africanist W.E.B. DuBois are also highlighted. However, Mohan et. al. point out the multifaceted notion of a return and what it means to different people. “Different individuals and groups have different relations to “home” and return. Again, some see Africa in idealistic terms as a pristine haven or, according to the Afrocentrists, it was until white people came and despoiled it.”52 Others see the continent as a historical place that continues to change with time. There are cultural, religious, and physical differences that debunk the homogenous notion of a unified “Africa” as a place where all Africans in the diaspora can call home.53 For some, to have a long lasting and stagnant vision of a place to return is not only naïve but also unrealistic.

Although the idea of returning to the homeland on a permanent basis is far fetched for some, those who do return bring financial, human and social capital, which can contribute to the development of the national or local economies. However, those who do return are part of the exception and not necessarily the rule. Attention to diasporas and returnees scholarship has focused on the notion of a return and its positive aspects.54 However, there is limited analysis on returnees who do so as a result of deportation. Deportation often occurs as a result of the returnees’ illegal status in the host country, and/or criminal activities. While the host country is rid of a criminal, this creates a


54 Mohan and Zack-Williams.
problem for the homeland in terms of repatriation and rehabilitating the returnees as productive members of society.

Most members of the African diaspora have the capacity of becoming central players in the political processes of their homeland. Some engage in organizational networking or specific political activities related to the homeland. Mohan et. al. highlight the efforts of Ghanaian and Nigerian diaspora organizations in Atlanta, political campaigns against the rule of Jerry Rawlings and Mugabe, and the setting up of the University of Hargeisa in Somaliland as a result of diaspora support, as key examples of how African diasporas can work from abroad to create political and social change at home. However, as mentioned in the earlier discussion of diasporas, the extent to which they organize is determined by the degree to which they are integrated in the host country. Lacking the right to work due to illegal status means that an individual is less likely to support the homeland in financial terms. Others might feel afraid to be involved in nationalist discourses due to their illegal status in the host country.

Diasporas’ financial support of their relatives at home and homeland in general, is of major significance to the scholarship on this topic. Although the vast scholarship on migration and development has focused on the impact of remittances on the homeland, the exact numbers are difficult to calculate. Remittances most often, go through informal channels, while only fifty percent are formally recorded. In the United States for example, Ghanaians remitted approximately between two hundred and three hundred and

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fifty million dollars per year during the 1990s. The sending and receiving of moneys between Africa and the United States has been facilitated by sophisticated technology. Money transfer companies (i.e. Western Union and Money Gram) have increased their marketability and services to appeal to African communities.

Scholarship on the role of the African diaspora in the continent’s development has been limited. Research has focused on the cultural and social aspects of the diaspora and its impact on the host country, without any comprehensive analysis on how the diaspora can contribute to their homeland’s development. Scholarship must begin to look at the African diaspora not as a cultural phenomenon but as a crucial component to African development. African intellectuals and academics have been intimidated and victimized by governments who will not allow them to offer honest academic critique on the state of Africa’s development. Thus, many choose to accept jobs outside of their homeland.

The African Brain Drain Dilemma

Conditions in Africa force its nationals abroad in search of better living conditions. Citizens from Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Nigeria, Senegal, Cameroon, Ghana among other African countries can be found all over the world. Those who are not well-educated get educated and acquire the necessary skills to contribute to the societies where they live. Africa spends four billion dollars annually in training one hundred thousand skilled expatriates while her own professionals are abroad contributing to the

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development of other societies, not Africa. Between 1960 and 1975, twenty-seven thousand highly qualified Africans left the continent for Western societies. Africa lost six hundred thousand professionals between 1985 and 1990, and has been losing about twenty thousand annually since then.\textsuperscript{58} This flight of human capital from the African continent is known as brain drain. This is defined as:

\begin{quote}
The loss, indeed an exodus of highly trained and often experienced individuals from their country to other nations in pursuit of higher paying jobs, as well as, more conducive working environments within which to express and utilize their hard-learned specialized talents and skills.\textsuperscript{59}
\end{quote}

The brain drain conditions are then created in the country the individuals leave. Migration is detrimental to the country of origin because the labor force is reduced by the departure of its most qualified manpower. There is however, brain gain for the country that receives them.

The effects of the brain drain on the African continent are tremendous. Twenty thousand doctors, university professors, engineers, and other professionals have left the continent on an annual basis since 1990.\textsuperscript{60} There are three hundred thousand qualified Africans in the diaspora. Thirty thousand are reported to have Ph.D. degrees. Africa spends four billion dollars (thirty-five percent of its official development aid to the


\textsuperscript{59} Ibid, 121.

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid, 129.
continent) for one hundred thousand western experts in technical assistance jobs. The human capital loss is most felt in Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Ghana.\textsuperscript{61}

There are one hundred Ethiopian economists in the United States, in contrast to one in Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{62} Between 1986 and 1990, Nigeria lost ten thousand academics for tertiary education. Sixty-four percent of Nigerians in the United States over twenty-five years old hold a bachelor’s degree.

The health care sector is one of the areas mostly affected by the African brain drain. Kenya, for example, loses twenty doctors per month.\textsuperscript{63} Ghana lost sixty percent of its doctors in the 1980s. There are reportedly six to seven hundred practicing Ghanaian physicians in the United States. In 1993, there were twenty-one Nigerian doctors in the U.S., while Nigeria experienced shortages. The diasporic figure has been estimated at thirty thousand African doctors in Saudi Arabia, Australia, Europe, and Canada. Although the effects of the brain drain are negative on the homeland, there are scholars who claim to the positive impact of remittances made by African professionals in the diaspora. Africans in the diaspora reportedly send home forty-five billion dollars per year.\textsuperscript{64}

These however, do not make up for the social costs on developing economies. It encourages further reduction of already low quality of skilled manpower available in the African countries needed for development. Additionally, it increases the dependency on

\textsuperscript{61} Apraku, 50.
\textsuperscript{62} Okeke, 130.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{64} Apraku, 50.
foreign technical assistance. It also encourages the steady slow down of transfer of technology widening the gap between Africa and the industrialized countries. Lastly, there is a loss of money in income tax revenues as a result of brain drain which could count towards and contribute to the gross domestic product (GDP) of many African countries. Ultimately, remittances produce rich families and poor government institutions. The loss of human capital also known as brain drain worsens the continent’s chances for development.

African governments are creating programs to incorporate diaspora communities in nation building in their countries of origin. Some offer programs for diasporas to virtually participate, without having to be physically present. The African Union (AU), has recognized the importance of diaspora communities in the development agenda of the continent. It has updated in charter to, “encourage the full participation of the African diaspora as an important part of the continent.”65 Okeke concludes there is correlation between development and migration. He opines that the relationship between African governments and its diaspora must change. Diasporas will not show interest in returning or remain active contributors to development at home if socio-economic and political conditions do not improve. Among other issues, good governance, greater transparency, effective public sector management, increased government response to the poor and other citizens’ concerns, human rights violation, gender and social representation, and no tolerance for corruption must all happen for this relationship to progress.

65 Okeke, 131-32.
Africans and African Americans: Politics of Cooperation or Conflict?

The migration of Africans to America has facilitated conflict between Africans and African Americans. Current literature on the African diaspora in the United States assumes a homogenous culture with no major ideological differences.

Recent immigrants from African and the Caribbean are more likely to support liberal immigration policies and to disapprove of anti-immigration legislation like Preposition 187 (anti-immigration law in California, denying welfare and other rights to both legal and illegal immigrants). Akwasi Assensoh argues that “lower income, native Blacks often perceive immigrants as fierce competitors for low-skilled jobs and adequate housing.” In inner city communities there is a preference for Mexican, Asian, and African labor rather than African-American labor.

Another issue is the level of political competition between naturalized Caribbean and African immigrants with indigenous African Americans for electoral positions. For example, in 1995, Ghanaian-born Loyola student and naturalized resident of New Orleans, Joe Aidoo, campaigned and almost won against a long-term African American state legislator in Louisiana. In New York, there have also been local elections where African and Caribbean-born blacks have competed against African Americans. Competition within the black political elite is not a new or strange phenomenon.

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67 Ibid, 125.

68 Ibid.
However, it does make matters more complex. It creates a divide in policy issues within the black agenda.

Lastly, there is a new wave of African Americans interested in business ventures in the African continent. Hundreds and maybe thousands of African Americans travel to countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, and South Africa with hopes of making millions with innovative entrepreneurial ideas. For some there is a sense of Black solidarity, that African Americans have an interest in the African continent and its development. For others in South Africa, for example, “they fear the African Americans are coming to take jobs from local professionals. That is a widespread view.” The question remains if African Americans have a sincere motive to support African development or if the sentiments are strictly for money-making and business purposes.

Diasporas and Globalization

Elements of globalization facilitate the flow of international migration. Inexpensive means of transportation, technological advances that facilitate communication and disparity in global wealth are all incentives for international migration and global movement. According to Chris Rudolph, international migration in number is increasing rapidly in contrast to the eighteenth and nineteenth century waves of migration. At the turn of the century, 175 million people live outside of their country of

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birth or nationality. As a percentage of the world population, the number of foreign born has increased fifty percent during the last century, from two to three percent. The international migration flow has departed from the traditional notions associated with European colonization and slave trade. It now includes several sending and receiving countries, ethnicities and identities.

Globalization enhances the practical economic and effective roles of diasporas. As they become more integrated into their host societies, diasporas gain power and importance. In the age of globalization, diasporas are predominant in what Cohen refers to as the "global cities." Global cities are key centers of global economy, transport and communications. They become headquarters of transnational corporations and serve as hosts to several ethnic groups who are attracted to the global cities in seeking better economic conditions.

Once established, diasporas build relationships and solidarity with the local populations. However, a diaspora’s relationship with the local population may also be antagonistic. Predominance of unemployment and temporary jobs may decrease solidarity between groups, which may lead to isolation and group individualism. In contrast some diasporas live in global cities, obtain good jobs, thus reinforcing globalization.

Our world is emerging as a global society. Certain elements allow for these assertions: 1. individuals have similar needs and that most democratic societies and its leaders have embraced this concept; 2. the world is interdependent at technological,
political, economic, and cultural levels; 3. the planet is now one space, without borders; 4. the collapse of the Soviet Union marked an important junction in world politics, whereas divisions do not exist anymore, there is no third world; 5. goods, capital, cultural practices and beliefs, and communication can now flow across national boundaries with ease; and 6. we are on our way to a global civilization where we share values and institutional structures. In addition, Kate Gillespie et al. point out that as international migration and market liberalization expand in the global context, homeland investments by diaspora businesses and entrepreneurs will become a significant part of the foreign investment.

What do these assertions mean, if anything, to migration and diasporas? The belief that nation-states and borders are disappearing and the world is becoming a global society must be considered. Nation-states can be simply adapting to the demands of a new global system. Cohen further explains, “For example, it can be argued that the nation-state no longer crystallizes and organizes domestic capital, but that it continues to police inward labour flows and seeks to galvanize, although with diminishing capacity, a single identity around a national leadership, common citizenship and social exclusion of outsiders.”

Globalization disregards the nature of the capitalist market and its supposed “invisible hand.” The exchange between states is by far a fair one. As Waters points out,

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71 Cohen, 50-57.

72 Kate Gillespie, Liesl Riddle, Edward Sayre, and David Sturges, “Diaspora Interest in Homeland Investment,” *Journal of International Business Studies* 30, no. 3 (3rd Quarter, 1999), 623-634.

73 Cohen, 156.
“globalization is a consequence of the expansion of European culture across the planet via settlement, colonization, and cultural mimesis.”\textsuperscript{74} In addition, nationalism as an ideology is on the rise. As ethnic movements and diasporas become more organized, some will seek exclusive territorial boundaries, which can create some level of conflict. What allows diasporas to emerge?

Robin Cohen has highlighted world economy, international migration, the development of global cities, creation of cosmopolitan and local cultures, and deterritorialization of social identity, as phenomenon that open up and allow the opportunity for diasporas to emerge.\textsuperscript{75}

Globalization, Migration and its Effects

The processes of globalization, (trade, production, exchange, labor movement, economics, social and political integration) produces winners and losers.\textsuperscript{76} Some countries gain population, others lose. Some population movement is welcomed and desired and others are resented and criminalized.

Globalization produces low returns for some countries and gains for others. The losers labor under massive debt burdens while the gainers’ economy prosper. Those individuals who are able to move from the struggling economies do so to the economic powerhouses like the United States. Industrial jobs move to the less developed world


\textsuperscript{75} Cohen, 157.

\textsuperscript{76} Stiglitz, 23-52.
while technical jobs go to developed countries. To maintain the labor power for these jobs and necessary social services such as healthcare, developed countries pull the most skilled from the developing countries, including African immigrants. The consequences of this population movement are tremendous.

Theoretical Concerns and Limitations of Current Literature

This review of scholarly work on diapora politics has examined the factors that allow or force individuals to migrate, create new communities in host countries, and maintain or sever socio-economic and political relationships with their homeland. The extensive literature suggests there is an increase in scholarly work that analyzes theoretical notions on diapora groups and their trans-state activities. However, the review has uncovered a lack of consensus in defining the politicized nature of diasporas. Ethnic politics, diapora politics, and transnationalism have all been used to define the political nature under which diaporic communities organize and mobilize in support of their community interests as well as the interests of their homeland. For the purposes of this literature review, Gabriel Sheffer’s *Diaspora Politics* was used as a theoretical point of reference due to its comprehensive nature.

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Although there is an increase in scholarly materials on diaspora groups, the discussion is still limited within the scope of political science. Analyses on the relationship between diasporas, and their access to political power in both their host country and homeland as well as factors that impact their transnational activities is still narrow. In addition, there is limited information on specific diasporas, their organizations, and activism.

One example of this limitation is the research on contemporary African and African-derived diaspora communities. Most scholars in North America tend to lump native, Caribbean and African born blacks under the same umbrella. We must recognize the cultural, social and political differences among these immigrants by offering case studies on the specific groups. In his discussion of modern African diasporas, Colin A. Palmer argues for a more in-depth understanding and explanation of the fundamental differences in African cultures that affect the ways in which the diasporas manifest themselves. He alerts scholars not to, “homogenize the experience of the diverse peoples of the modern diaspora.” He goes on to explain that, “There are obviously certain commonalities, but there are fundamental differences born of the societal context, the times, the political, economic, and “racial” circumstances, and so on.”\(^{79}\) There is a grave assumption that blackness is a characteristic that nullifies all the historical and cultural differences.

Another shortcoming is the lumping of all African immigrants in one category. The African continent contains fifty-three nations and many hundreds of different

ethnicities. Although there are similarities among ethnicities, the differences must also be recognized because they also dictate the nature of activism among the African diaspora. Additionally, studies tend to focus on trends within the Ghanaian, Nigerian, and South African diaspora communities. Further research should focus on additional case studies for comparative purposes in order to illustrate the differences between the African diaspora. Lastly, a more comprehensive intellectual discussion on the intersections of gender, class and diaspora politics must begin to take place. The discussion on the Cape Verdean diaspora at the global level, in Chapter four as well as the new trends of its diaspora in the United States in Chapter five, will enhance the body of literature on the African diaspora in general, and its mobilization on behalf of its communities abroad and at home.

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CHAPTER III
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter serves as the theoretical foundation for this study of the Cape Verdean diaspora and of development in their homeland. The core argument is that diasporas demonstrate three levels of transnational engagement: 1. Cognitive (i.e. listening to the homeland’s traditional music, hanging pictures of leaders on wall, spiritual activities, observing homeland’s festivals and holidays); 2. Material (i.e. remittances and goods); and 3. Political (i.e. supporting political campaigns, overseas elections, and lobbying).

The relationship they maintain with their homeland fluctuates over time. Conditions in their host country as well as their homeland can prompt or suppress the level of activities of the diaspora. The hypothesis is that there are political, economic, and social factors which affect diasporas and their levels of involvement. These factors change over time, thus affecting the level of involvement towards the homeland. However, moments of crisis in the homeland can trigger activities at all levels of engagement. Identifying these factors that affect diasporas’ involvement and improving the structures of institutions can lead to better relationships between the diaspora and the homeland.

Although past and current literature focus on formal networks to track diaspora’s involvement in homeland development, my study focuses on the work of organizations as well as diasporas’ informal transnational activities. This study demonstrates that as a
labor diaspora, Cape Verdeans always find spaces to cooperate, even if it is at the lowest level of intensity to promote their cultural identity in support of their homeland.

Scholarship on diaspora and development is beginning to gain much needed attention among scholars, governments, and the diverse group of actors within international communities. These groups recognize the importance of diasporas as actors in peace, conflict and development. However, policy makers do not know how to best incorporate, mobilize and utilize them in formal policies in peace and development strategies so as to maximize them as resources. Most data and scholarly research has focused on economic remittances and the consequences of brain drain.¹ The World Bank estimated that remittances reached seventy billion dollars in 2004, one hundred twenty-five billion in 2005, and one hundred sixty-seven in 2006.² Remittances can reduce recipient household poverty with spillover to other households, increase investments in health and education as well as productive activities, reduce child labor, and increase entrepreneurship. Remittances by hometown associations (HTAs) in particular, are used to channel resources for development projects in education, health, and infrastructure. Diasporas are growing and gaining more notoriety beyond issues related to tourism, security concerns, and civil unrest in the international arena, not to say that these issues are not a matter of concern.

Brain drain results in losses to the sending countries as a result of skilled migrations. Among others, the most crucial are spill over productivity of other workers,


public service provisions (education and health), tax revenues, and public debate and policy and institution influence. As mentioned previously, public health systems in Africa are most affected as a result of the brain drain.

The significance of diasporas also goes beyond remittances as they can be mobilized to provide social remittances such as skills transfer, cultural and civic awareness and experience. According to the International Organization on Migration (IOM), diasporas can also offer development potential for the homeland via social and professional networks they have become integrated into their host countries resulting in homeland investments in advanced technologies, market intelligence, and business contacts. At a national level, migration can decrease unemployment rates as well as provide access to foreign exchange.

Reasons for Diaspora Participation in Development in the Homeland

Diasporas mobilize partly to express their cultural identities and to maintain activities which can benefit its native country. Some groups are driven by a sense of obligation towards homeland development while others mobilize due to pride in their cultural identity. In the United States for example, the pluralistic nature of its society allows diasporas some fluidity to express and mobilize on behalf of their homeland. They can also influence U.S. foreign policy decisions, resulting in improved development

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4 Ibid.
strategies and investments in the homeland. However, "the higher the cost to status and
security in their adopted country, the greater the likelihood that the diaspora community
will split and/or fail to support the homeland." Five

There are three factors that influence diaspora participation in homeland
development: material, cultural, and organizational resources available. Opportunity
structures in host countries affect their inclination or motivation to maintain their
solidarity and exert group influence. Most importantly, the level of economic resources
in their host country is crucial to remittances and repatriation aspirations. At the
community level, organizational resources also affect the diasporas' ability to mobilize
for political change and independent development activities such as hometown
associations as well as access to political decision-making spheres in host countries.
While resources and access to political spheres in host countries are important,
organizational resources also depend on the size and diversity of the diasporic
community. Creating a sense of solidarity and community identity is a necessary factor
for effective mobilization. In essence, diasporas must ask themselves for what purposes
are they mobilizing.

In his pioneering work on diasporas, Milton J. Esman explains that individuals
belong to a diaspora as long as they identify with that ethnic community. They may hold
multiple identities that reflect occupational, political, ideological, and cultural

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5 Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff, ed., Diasporas and Development (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
While they identify with their ethnic origin for a long time, conditions in their host country may alter their ethnic solidarity in terms of time and attention they devote to their homeland. France, for example, encourages their immigrant population to assimilate and it also offers incentives for them to integrate into the French way of life. As people choose to follow this route the interaction they maintain with their homeland decreases or ceases to exist. In contrast, some do embrace mainstream culture while they still maintain attachments with the homeland due to pride in ethnic identity, sense of obligation, and nostalgia for their roots and ancestor’s culture.

In some countries, assimilation is not encouraged by the host country or the diaspora group. In Malaysia for example, the Chinese and Indian minority population are denied full citizenship status by the Malay Muslim majority. They maintain separate identities although they live in the same geographic space. Diasporas may also choose to maintain an attachment with the homeland, as small as it may be, whether sentimental or actual. In few cases, the homeland is not geographically connected to the diaspora’s origin such as the case of the Jewish diaspora in the United States and its relationship with Israel or the Armenians and the Caucasian country of Armenia, since many ethnic Armenians do not originate in that country. “Their loyalties are to the land that the current generation of fellow ethnics, owing to historical circumstances, now regard as their legitimate homeland.”

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7 Ibid.

Skilled and Unskilled Diasporas

Esman divides diasporas into two separate classes, labor and entrepreneurial diasporas. He defines labor diasporas as unskilled individuals with little formal or no formal education, or no business experience such as North Africans in France and Mexicans in the United States who work in low paying jobs. On the other hand, entrepreneurial diasporas are people with business experience and skills who desire to start businesses in their countries and seek the right opportunity to do so, such as the case of the Jews in the United States and the Chinese in Indonesia. Most entrepreneurial diasporas start at the bottom and work their way up the socio-economic ladder. Through education and experience second generation diasporas might emerge as professionals and increase their income status in comparison to the first generation.

The diasporas' capabilities in the host country and the policies in their homeland fosters an environment for them to contribute to the economic development of their homeland. The purpose of transnational migrations that create diasporic communities is to create better economic opportunities. Their earned income is sent back home to their families. While the amount of some of these remittances may be small they add up and contribute to development, although little is devoted to economic development of the country as a whole. While remittances make up for a large amount of money flows at a global level, diasporas' remittances are not large enough to make substantial change. Once generations of diasporas are integrated into their host country the need to send
money back home is not as pressing. Those that maintain a connection with the homeland do so via charitable donations.

Diasporas and Economic Development in Their Homeland

Three factors affect a diaspora’s ability to contribute to the economic development of their ancestral homeland: investment climate in the country of origin, resources available to the members of the diaspora, and the inclinations of the members of the diaspora. The climate in the homeland is favorable if the government welcomes foreign direct investment, protects private property, enforces contracts, permits the remittances of profits, and provides large internal market or opportunity for exporting. Secondly, most members of labor diasporas such as the case of Cape Verdeans in the United States, lack sufficient capital resources for investment in homeland for several generations. They might not have enough surplus to remit to both families and social and political institutions. Entrepreneurial diasporas, however, can accomplish this once they become successful. Thirdly, diasporas might not want to support homeland development if they have negative memories of being oppressed in that homeland. Additionally, others might be fully integrated or assimilated into the host country and have no desire to be involved with the homeland as they do not identify with it or its cultural identity because of active rejection of that identity or assimilation into a new identity in the land of immigration. Other individuals who are culturally and socially integrated in their host country might feel a sense of obligation to their homeland and choose to provide assistance in homeland development.
In order for any society to experience true development the following must occur: access to education, health services, and material asset accumulation. As previously discussed, development is a condition that creates an enabling environment for people to enjoy long, healthy, and creative lives. Individuals in a developed society enjoy a good quality of life, freedoms, and have the opportunity for upward mobility and are able to improve their material condition.

Immigrants’ economic link to their homeland include at least four practices involving spending or investing capital: family remittances; demand of services such as telecommunications and consumer goods; charitable donations to hometown organizations to raise funds for the community; and lastly, capital investment. According to a study on immigrant practices, Latinos and Filipinos in the U.S. remit three hundred dollars on a monthly basis to their homeland while Southeast Asians in Japan send roughly six hundred seventy-one. Ghanaians in Europe remit at a rate of four hundred dollars bi-monthly. In terms of consumer goods eighty percent of Latinos in the U.S. purchase phone cards to call their relatives for two hours each month. Lastly, donations to hometown organizations account for one to two hundred dollars spent annually per person. In the case of Mexico these donations account for fifty million

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dollars of the donations. Table 10 offers an overview of the figures for all migrants in the U.S.:

Table 10. Immigrant Economic Practices (annual expenses in U.S. Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Remittances</th>
<th>Donations</th>
<th>Consumption</th>
<th>Capital Investment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Household Economy</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Trade and Services,</td>
<td>Property and Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>($2,700)</td>
<td>($10,000)</td>
<td>Retail ($3,000)</td>
<td>($5,000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 10 shows that the impact immigrant communities have on the economy of both their host countries and homeland cannot be ignored. In the case of large diaspora groups it is imperative to create development strategies and policies. Current scholarship has offered limited theoretical perspectives on how to link diasporas to the development of their homeland. The figures on the table 11 from the Ghanaian diaspora in the United States further demonstrate this point:
Table 11. Ghanaians Expenditures in the U.S.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Annual Cost/Expense per person (U.S. Dollar)</th>
<th>Total Expenditures (U.S. Dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Call on Average 80 minutes 50</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>43,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Send over $300 60</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td>576,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buy home country goods 80</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>32,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel once a year and spend over $1,000 50</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>120,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>160,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have a mortgage loan 80</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>300,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belong to a HTA 20</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>8,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Manuel Orozco’s analysis offers five recommendations for linking diasporas to development: 1. distinguish three dimensions of diasporas’ links to development: development in the diaspora, development through the diaspora, and development by the diaspora; 2. Understand and target the corresponding economic activities for each dimension; 3. Recognize the limits to diasporas’ economic contributions to development and support necessary enabling environments; 4. Acknowledge the varied levels of participation within diasporas and not expect all migrants to participate in development activities; and lastly 5. Develop institutionalized communication mechanism with diasporas.

The three dimensions of diasporas’ links to development framework defines development in the diaspora as the diasporas’ use of networks in the host country which
include the formation of ethnic businesses and cultural ties as well as social mobilization. *Development through the diaspora* is defined as how diasporic communities utilize their diverse global connections beyond the locality to facilitate economic and social well-being. Lastly, *development by the diaspora* is the result of the diasporas’ flows of ideas, capital, and political support to benefit the migrant’s home country. Table 12 offers a detailed description of these dimensions:

Table 12. Three Dimensions of Diasporas’ Links to Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development Activities</th>
<th>In the Diaspora</th>
<th>Through the Diaspora</th>
<th>By the Diaspora</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family Remittances</td>
<td>Banking the unbanked</td>
<td>Financial intermediation; microfinance institutions</td>
<td>Money Transfer Operations (MTOs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption of goods and Services</td>
<td>Supporting demand for products</td>
<td>Supply of home-country commodities</td>
<td>Small-business development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment of Capital</td>
<td>Setting up minority-owned businesses</td>
<td>Technical training in remittance-receiving areas</td>
<td>Manufactured goods; nostalgic trade; tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash and in-Kind donations</td>
<td>Capacity building</td>
<td>Project identification; networking</td>
<td>Social philanthropy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In addition to identifying the different areas of diasporas’ link to development, a link must also be created between development and migrant economic practices such as remittances and investments. Nevertheless, once these links are identified their limitation in promoting development must also be recognized. For example, remittances only
provide short-term relief to the migrants’ families and function best when the local economy works effectively.\textsuperscript{10} Orozco points out that sustainable development through the diaspora depends on reinforcing policies which deal with inequality in the homeland since remittances reduce poverty only to a certain extent. Additionally, investments only work when there is a fostering political and economic environment for them to do so. When local governments and economy function effectively it encourages trade and investment not only for diaspora groups but also other foreign investors.

In linking diasporas to development one must also consider the diverse levels of participation exercised by the diaspora. Only one fourth of the individuals who remit to their homeland belong to formal diaspora organizations. Individuals tend to be more active within family spheres or through personal investments. Thus, it is not realistic to assume that all members of the diaspora group will be involved and with the same level of intensity.

Lastly, institutionalized forms of communication are important in creating development partnerships. Governments should do more to engage diaspora groups and their organizations in development strategies. They must also demonstrate a high level of commitment towards these initiatives as well. Government institutions can create dialogue with diaspora organization leadership, ensure there are institutional resources available for policy outreach, create formal communication avenues thus legitimizing contact with diaspora groups and lastly, create policy agenda that is mutually beneficial and meets the needs of both the government and the diaspora.

\textsuperscript{10}Orozco, 207.
Obstacles in Linking Diaspora to Development

Development experts do not think migrants can effectively participate in development initiatives. Due to the lack of information on specific diaspora organizations and their practices, there are uninformed expectations about the results that these groups can achieve. In addition, diasporas are limited in terms of knowledge and expertise in how to become part of the development process. Those in the academic field have not developed an approach to directly link diaspora and development. Thus, there is limited knowledge, theory, and method on how to best create this link. Lastly, lack of communication between all the donors (governments and organizations) also adds to the mystery surrounding diasporas and their direct role in the development of their homeland.

Conditions in the homeland may prevent diasporas from fully participating in the development of its homeland. In the case of the Cape Verdean community and its arrival in the United States in the 1800s, Cape Verde was still under Portuguese rule. Cape Verdeans were fleeing an oppressive colonial regime as well as famine and poverty, results of long periods of drought. It would be difficult for Cape Verdeans in the United States to support the development of their homeland due to Cape Verde’s political situation as a Portuguese colony and as newly arrived immigrants at the initial phase of integration into American society.

Conditions in the host country may also create obstacles for the establishment of the diaspora. As Cape Verdeans arrived in the United States, they faced the same harsh realities of American racism as African Americans. Cape Verdeans encountered a system that discriminated against people solely on the basis of the color of the arbitrary
categories of race. The strict racial stratification in the United States created a major divide within the Cape Verdean society because they saw themselves as Portuguese citizens, which for Americans meant being white Europeans. Cape Verdeans were placed in the same racial and social categories as African-Americans. Some Cape Verdeans, if they could, based on their light skin tone "passed" for whites. Most, however, could not escape this reality. This meant they had limited access to education, employment opportunities and place of residence. The discriminatory nature of the U.S. society created major obstacles for the foundational establishment of the Cape Verdean community and its long term connection to the homeland. While other historical diasporas such as the Jews arrived and created well-established and long lasting communities, Cape Verdeans and other immigrant communities (mostly of color) were discriminated against thus retarding their level of political and economic growth within the American system.

During the early 1900s, while Cape Verdeans were at the genesis of their activism towards their homeland, the Irish communities had already taken control of the political machines in major U.S. cities like Boston, Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia. They had access to secondary and higher education and thus, able to find jobs as fire fighters, police officers, and teachers, a sphere that African-Americans were generally not allowed to enter. At this time, the Cape Verdean community came together on behalf of their homeland and raised money to buy foods and goods in an effort to relieve the country of famine, which was wiping out much of the islands population. Although the community
raised money, due to their economic and social conditions in the United States, the support they were able to give to Cape Verde was limited.

The Irish diaspora has been used as a classical example of an ethnic community of migrants in the United States who faced discrimination before becoming a successful and well-established community. In his discussion of the Irish diaspora, Noel Ignatiev demonstrates how the Irish were assimilated as whites into the American society and links the embracing of white supremacy and Irish success in nineteenth century America.\textsuperscript{11} His discussion helps us conclude that given the opportunity, all those who faced ruthless racial discrimination within American society, would jump at the chance of becoming a part of the main stream white society in the way the Irish eventually accomplished.

What’s Next? The Future of Diasporas’ Role in Development

Homeland governments can legitimize diaspora groups by creating policies and developing necessary conditions in both the home and host countries. This fosters an environment conducive to engaging the diaspora in development processes in the homeland. For example, the Dominican and Cape Verdean diaspora communities in the U.S. enjoy dual citizenship rights thus are able to impact policies in both the host and home countries. In addition to political rights, diasporas can also benefit from the creation of financial institutions where remittance recipients can save or invest money. The objective is to be able to track the amount of money flow coming into the homeland

\textsuperscript{11} Noel Ignatiev, \textit{How The Irish Became White} (New York: Routledge, 1995), 1-20.
through formal channels. Additionally, homeland governments can also build business relationships with money transfer companies as well as banks in order to create easy access and improve costs of sending money back home.

Hometown organizations should be viewed as agents of development if diasporas are to be successfully linked to development. Government institutions as well as non-governmental organizations should work with hometown organizations and support their initiatives. Other policy areas that should be engaged are tourism and trade of cultural consumer goods. Institutional policy can support local artisan businesses and enhance their productivity and marketing skills in local markets or wherever they exist. However, for all these recommendations to take place, the key actors (governments, private sectors, NGOs, international donor agencies, and HTAs) in linking diasporas to development must work together and support each other’s efforts. Current efforts in linking diaspora to development have been launched by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Ford Foundation. One of the initiatives by the Ford Foundation includes research on Mexican women’s use of remittances. The World Bank is also working with African nations and their diaporic communities towards finding new ways to finance development in Sub-Saharan Africa.¹²

This chapter has laid out the theoretical foundations for this study on diasporas and development, particularly the Cape Verdean diaspora and its role on development at home. It makes the argument that while certain diasporas maintain a connection to their

homeland, the intensity of this connection varies with time and according to the conditions existent in the homeland and the host country. For example, in a time of crisis such as war, famine or drought, diasporas might activate their involvement with their home, such as in the case of Afghans in the United States. The research also states that the desire to support homeland development is determined by whether a diaspora is considered a labor or a skilled diaspora, thus affecting the level of human, social, and capital resources available to them. However, we must not assume that all diasporas are willing to be involved in the development discourse. One major conclusion is that the size of the diaspora might not always matter. For example, Mexico has a large diaspora but they are not as active in the political process of their homeland.13

The existing theory linking diasporas to homeland development remains limited to discussions on the impact of remittances and the brain drain on sending countries.14 The pioneering work of Jennifer Brinkerhoff et. al. sheds some light on the issue and how to best approach it. It highlights diasporas as essential actors in the development process of their homeland. It also calls for the collaboration between diasporas, non-governmental organizations, and state institutions if true progress is to be made. State institutions should forge partnerships with money transfer companies and other agencies in order to facilitate the avenues used by diasporas in maintaining connections with their homeland. In this regard, state institutions should engage diasporas and their organizations in creating projects that best meet each other’s needs. Lastly, research on


diasporas and their political mobilization via informal networks remains understudied. This is an important aspect of transnational political and economic activities. My research on the Cape Verdean diaspora uncovers some of these informal transnational practices which can greatly contribute to the literature on diasporas and development.
CHAPTER IV
CAPE VERDE'S DIASPORIC COMMUNITIES

This chapter explores the patterns of migration among Cape Verdeans and the communities they have formed in different host countries. It focuses on specific diaspora communities: in Portugal, Holland, and Argentina. In addition to the United States, Portugal and Holland have been major destinations of choice for Cape Verdelan migrants. Argentina is also noted as an understudied area of the Cape Verdelan diaspora. Although records show Cape Verdeans have migrated to Argentina since the 1920s, little is known about the dynamics of this diasporic community. The objective here is to offer a broad overview of the transnational political practices among Cape Verdeans in Europe and Latin America.

While research on the Cape Verdelan diaspora remains limited, scholars have focused mainly on the sociological aspects of its transnationalist practices. In addition to the works of Richard Lobban, Marilyn Halter, Deirdre Meintel Machado, the work of Luis Batallha and Jorgen Carling have added considerably to the scholarship on Cape Verdelan emigration, particularly to Portugal and Holland. Other scholars who have written on the Cape Verdelan diaspora include Augusto Nascimento (São Tomé and Principe), Marta Maffia (Argentina), Jacqueline Andall (Italy), Lisa Akesson (Sweden), and Rocio Moldes Farelo and Luzia Oca González, (Spain). Still, little is known

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2 Luis Batalha and Jorgen Carling, eds, Transnational Archipelago: Perspectives on Cape Verdelan Migration and Diaspora (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008).
regarding the degree of engagement by émigré Cape Verdeans in their host countries as well as the factors that suppress or motivate their desire to be involved in the development of their homeland.

The Historical Relationship: Cape Verde and Migration

Migration is an important part of the formation of Cape Verdean society and it continues to shape the islands' development in modern times. Opportunities and desire for migration arose from Cape Verde's strategic location in the geography of trade and empire building as well as the lack of natural resources and agricultural base. It is estimated that between 1774 and 1975, one hundred twenty thousand Cape Verdeans perished as a result of drought and famine. Today there are over five hundred thousand Cape Verdeans living throughout the world, exceeding the domestic population (434,263 in the 2000 Census). Pedro Góis argues that the Cape Verdean diaspora has forged a relationship of co-dependency, often times based on an illusion. He makes reference to Anderson's concept of imagined community, as he sees Cape Verde "not only as an

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3 These scholars' analyses of the Cape Verdean diaspora are part of the edited book by Batalha and Carling (2008). Research on Cape Verdean communities in these particular countries is very limited and focuses on specific sociological topics such as language and music.

4 Jorgen Carling, "Aspiration and Ability in International Migration: Cape Verdean Experiences of Mobility and Immobility," (Dissertation and Theses, 2001/5, Center for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo.)


imagined community, but also as a truly imagined nation, or even an imaginary nation that flows within a particular and imagined world: the Cape Verdean World.\textsuperscript{7}

The dispersion of native Cape Verdeans began in the fifteenth century, through forced migration of the slave trade which was replaced by spontaneous forms of migration in the eighteen and nineteenth centuries, when slavery was abolished. Cape Verdean migration throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries assumed different routes, as Cape Verdeans searched for new destinations. Because of its archipelago-form, Cape Verde’s migratory process had specific features with different migration flows and destinations by islands of origin (i.e. Santiago Island to Lisbon and São Vicente Island to Rotterdam). Table 13, on the next page, illustrates Cape Verde’s migration flows between 1920 and 1959:

\textsuperscript{7} Pedro Góis, “Low Intensity Transnationalism: the Cape Verdian Case,” Stichproben (Wiener Zeitschrift für Kritische Afrikastudien Nr. 8, 5), 2005.
Table 13. Cape Verdean Migration (unforced) by Destination and Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>1920-1945</th>
<th></th>
<th>1927-1945</th>
<th></th>
<th>1946-1959</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>18,629</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>1,408</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile</td>
<td>1,968</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>1,203</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guiné-Bissau</td>
<td>2,247</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>1,197</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola and Mozambique</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Tomé and Principe</td>
<td>1,532</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal and Gambia</td>
<td>1,428</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>1,772</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisbon, Azores, and Madeira</td>
<td>1,232</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3,336</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>3,933</td>
<td>57.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>719</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>1,087</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27,765</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10,120</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>6,804</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Emigration has created Cape Verdean communities in countries such as the United States, Holland, Portugal, Italy, Argentina, and France. There are over half a million Cape Verdeans living in other countries, with two hundred fifty thousand in the United States, one hundred and six thousand in Portugal, thirty-seven thousand five hundred in the Netherlands, thirty-five thousand in Angola, twenty-two thousand five hundred in Senegal, and fifty thousand distributed throughout Spain, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Italy, Luxembourg, Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium, and Germany. However, 

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the population could indeed be much larger given that these figures do not reflect undocumented migrants.

These groups have been important in financing Cape Verde’s economy. The country relies on remittances from its diaspora for survival. In 1980, remittances accounted for eighty-six percent of the country’s gross national income.\(^9\) Cash remittances fluctuate with economic conditions in both the homeland and host country, but on average currently constitute twenty-five to thirty percent of the annual gross national product.

Diaspora Inclusion: Cape Verde’s Government Efforts

The Cape Verdean government has also recognized the importance of the Cape Verdean diaspora as an “international community of Cape Verdeans.” The government includes a secretary of state for immigration affairs as well as ministries of culture and education that specifically deal with issues pertaining to the immigrant population. Founded in 1986, the Instituto de Apoio e Protecção ao Emigrante, Institute of Emigrant Support and Protection, renamed the Instituto das Comunidades, Institute of the Communities in 2001.\(^10\) It promotes the crioulo culture and also assists the organization of migrant communities. The new constitution allows Cape Verdean citizens dual nationality and permits emigrants to vote in Cape Verde’s presidential elections. The diasporas were allotted three seats in parliament in 1991 with an increase to six seats in

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\(^9\) Almeida.

\(^10\) Instituto das Comunidades at http://www.ic.cv.
1995: two for the Americas, two for Europe, and two for Africa.\textsuperscript{11} Table 15 shows the results of the 2006 presidential elections:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Continent</th>
<th>Registered</th>
<th>Abstentions</th>
<th>Voters</th>
<th>Blank</th>
<th>Null</th>
<th>Pedro Pires</th>
<th>Carlos Veiga</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>8,429</td>
<td>4,810</td>
<td>3,619</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>2,608</td>
<td>932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.61%</td>
<td>57.06%</td>
<td>42.94%</td>
<td>0.09%</td>
<td>0.84%</td>
<td>73.67%</td>
<td>26.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>11,419</td>
<td>8,622</td>
<td>2,797</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>2,035</td>
<td>691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.53%</td>
<td>75.51%</td>
<td>24.49%</td>
<td>0.04%</td>
<td>0.59%</td>
<td>74.65%</td>
<td>25.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe &amp; Others</td>
<td>31,686</td>
<td>26,758</td>
<td>4,928</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>2,599</td>
<td>2,253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.79%</td>
<td>84.45%</td>
<td>15.55%</td>
<td>0.08%</td>
<td>0.16%</td>
<td>53.57%</td>
<td>46.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>51,534</td>
<td>40,190</td>
<td>11,344</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>7,242</td>
<td>3,876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15.93%</td>
<td>77.99%</td>
<td>22.01%</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
<td>0.37%</td>
<td>65.14%</td>
<td>34.86%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As observed in the above table, the African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV), presidential candidate Pedro Pires won a majority of the votes over the Movement for Democracy (MPD), candidate Carlos Veiga. The results conclude that PAICV continues to receive the support of the diaspora community.

\textsuperscript{11} de Montclos.
In comparison to other African countries, Cape Verde’s diaspora is relatively well organized. The emigrant population played a significant role in ending the one-party system in 1991 as well as supporting the struggle against Portuguese colonial regime. While MPD won the democratic elections in 1991, it lost the diaspora’s confidence with allegations of mismanagement and corruption, leading to the reinstatement of the PAICV in 2001.12

MPD was also less able to mobilize the diaspora and gain its support. Cape Verdeans in the United States supported the PAICV. During the independence struggle Cape Verdean Americans were more educated and financially well-off than other communities in the diaspora. Unlike Cape Verdeans in France or Portugal they were also more organized in the struggle against colonialism. The newer members of the diaspora in Europe, disillusioned by the one-party system were more apt to support PAICV’s opposition while the older diaspora generation in the U.S. for example, continued their support for the PAICV.

Marc-Antoine Perouse deMontclos argues that shared commonality based on ethnic identity, dispersion of its immigrants, and the creation of organizations is not enough to create a unified political lobby. He adds that while the concentration of Cape Verdeans is a strong point, dispersion is an obstacle to a serious Cape Verdean political diaspora constituency on behalf of the homeland. He argues,

Some districts like New Bedford, Boston, or Delfshaven, which accommodates almost half of the Cape Verdeans in Rotterdam, are strongholds where proximity helps to foster a sense of communal identity. Yet in France, the 21,000 Cape Verdeans who were counted in the 1999 census are more widely scattered,

12 Ibid
especially in the suburbs around Paris like Clamart, Sarcelles, Clichy, and Malakoff. Another factor is that the diaspora in Europe did not always settle in the country of arrival, and therefore became more dispersed.\textsuperscript{13}

According to deMontclos, the number of Cape Verdeans in these cities does not mean they have a strong link to the homeland. Fewer than half of all Cape Verdeans in the United States speak \textit{Crioulo}. Less than nineteen percent of Cape Verdeans in Portugal belong to Cape Verdean organizations (most of which focus on cultural activities and not politics).\textsuperscript{14} In addition, only forty percent of the Cape Verdean population in Portugal exercises their right to vote in the host country, while the number who cast absentee votes in elections in the homeland is much lower (eighteen percent). In France, seventy percent of the population was eligible to vote in Cape Verde’s 2001 elections. However, few actually registered. The Cape Verdean diaspora seems to be politically apathetic given these statistics on voting history and other forms of political participation.

\textbf{Migration Cycles}

Cape Verdean emigration is divided into three migratory cycles:\textsuperscript{15} From the end of the nineteenth century to the first decade of the twentieth century, Cape Verdeans migrated to the Americas, mainly to the United States. During this time, there was also substantial migration to São Tomé and Príncipe and other parts of the Portuguese colonial

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} Góis, 257.
empire such as Angola and Guiné-Bissau. This cycle was thus divided into two migratory flows: North to the United States and South to São Tomé and Principe and Angola. The second cycle took place from the 1920s until the end of World War II. Two major trends occurred: a reduction in the number of exits and shift in migratory destination to Brazil, Argentina, Senegal and Gambia. Migration within the Portuguese colonial empire continued to be significant for Cape Verdeans. The period following the end of World War II to present time marks the last of the migration cycles. In this cycle, the main destinations were the Netherlands, Portugal, France, Luxembourg, Italy, Switzerland, Spain, and Germany. During this period, migration to the United States was also reactivated. This migration cycle has different features: A first flow towards the Netherlands; a second flow towards Portugal; a third flow towards Italy; and a fourth flow towards other European countries. The fifth flow follows other previous migratory destinations.

Europe has been the main destination for Cape Verdeans since 1960. The 2000 census highlighted between the periods between 1995 and 2000, fifty percent of emigrants were destined mainly to Portugal. The United States was the second major destination of choice, followed by France, and Holland. There were also significant flows to Italy, Spain, and Luxembourg. Economic growth in post-war Europe as well as the need for labor attracted Cape Verdeans to the continent. In Portugal, for example, there was a flow of Portuguese workers to more industrialized parts of Europe (Germany, France, Switzerland, and Belgium), thus prompting the demand for unskilled labor in

\[\text{Ibid, 258.}\]
The port city of Rotterdam in Holland was an attractive destination for workers. Towards the end of the 1960s, nine thousand documented Cape Verdeans lived in Rotterdam, a few thousands in Lisbon and Paris, a few hundreds in Italy (mostly women living in Rome, Naples, and Milan). Rotterdam and Lisbon were the main destination cities for Cape Verdean emigration to Europe.

The Desire to Migrate

More than fifty percent of all Cape Verdeans wish to go abroad. These Cape Verdeans cite unemployment, having relatives abroad and recurring remittances as factors in their desire to emigrate. Some desire to go abroad, work hard, and come back to their homeland. The examples of many Cape Verdeans who have returned, built big homes, and drive fancy cars, motivate those on the islands, specifically the youth, to seek the same dreams.

Since independence, strict immigration policies in potential destination countries have challenged the Cape Verdean dream of emigration. Emigration declined from two percent in 1970 to 0.5 percent in the 1990s. Cape Verde’s population has tripled from the 1970s to the 1990s, with a growth rate of twenty-five percent per year. Cape Verdean

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20 Ibid.
authorities expect emigration flows to decline in years to come as a result of strict immigration laws in the countries of destination.

In terms of gender, there has been a balance in emigration flows. The shift changed from individual labor to family-related migration. Cape Verdean men settled in northwestern Europe during the 1960s and 1970s and brought their wives and children in the 1980s.21 During this period, single women also migrated. While men migrated to the Netherlands and Portugal, women tended to choose Italy, although not exclusively (others still migrated to Portugal). These places were major destinations for Cape Verdean domestic workers, both documented and undocumented. Table 15 illustrates the gender imbalance within migration flows to Italy:

Table 15. Cape Verdean Residents in Italy by Sex, 1994-1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>3,214</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>2,391</td>
<td>74.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>3,386</td>
<td>912</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>2,474</td>
<td>73.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>3,658</td>
<td>1050</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>2,608</td>
<td>71.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>4,222</td>
<td>1274</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>2,948</td>
<td>69.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>3,974</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>3,140</td>
<td>79.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


21 Ibid.
The table highlights a steady four-year increase in Cape Verdean female immigrant population in Italy, almost triple of the male population.

In more current times, women in Italy are now employed as hourly domestic workers instead of live-in domestic workers. In her research, Jacqueline Andall points out that although the domestic sector wages are higher in northern Italy, this has not led to Cape Verdean women’s increased internal mobility due to strong family ties in the cities they predominantly reside.22

Wendy Pojmann’s research on women migrants in Italy offers great insight on Cape Verdean women as domestic workers and their formal networks in Rome. What was once a male-dominated phenomenon, migration in Italy became female oriented. Large numbers of women, including Cape Verdeans, Filipinas, and Moroccans began arriving in Italy in the 1960s and 1970s.23 According to Pojmann, the formation of women’s associations in Rome was largely due to the lack of assistance these women received from the Italian government, unprepared to handle the massive migration of female domestic workers. The Cape Verdean Women’s Association in Italy was founded in 1988. The women wanted to self-organize and create awareness on being part of a predominantly female migrant group. While a Cape Verdean community organization existed, Pojmann emphasizes three factors which motivated the women to launch the women’s association: 1. the women developed a consciousness of their gender-based

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22 Jacqueline Andall, “Cape Verdeans in Italy,” in Transnational Archipelago: Perspectives on Cape Verdean Migration and Diaspora ed. Luis Batalha and Jorgen Carling (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008), 81-90.

needs. They wanted more detailed and practical solutions to their problems; 2. in 1986, Law 943 was passed in Italy, recognizing the rights of immigrant communities to organize. This law opened the doors to immigrant groups’ full participation in the political process; and lastly, 3. an Italian women’s trade union supported the Cape Verdean Women’s Association with, “office space as well as with a model for organizing on behalf of women’s interests.”24 The case of Cape Verdean women and their formal networks demonstrates a grassroots level of political and social consciousness. They demanded their rights not only as members of the immigrant community but also as members of the larger Italian community.

The migration of women to Italy also forged a new level of transnationalist networking. Cape Verdean males in the Holland often vacationed and visited the women in Italy. This relationship between Cape Verdeans in Holland, Portugal, and Italy formed the Cape Verdean European community. Cape Verdeans came together during social events and exchanged economic and cultural goods. The regional integration of the European community, the European Union (EU), has made it much easier for the formation of a stronger community of Cape Verdeans in Europe. It has facilitated migratory circulation in Europe.

There are several actors responsible for building the transnational nature of this relationship. Women are important actors in this process. They bring the different diaspora communities together and also connect them with the homeland.25 Female

24 Ibid., 34.
25 Góis, 260.
entrepreneurs in the informal market carry traditional Cape Verdean products to be sold to the diaspora and in turn, bring back to the islands consumer goods such as clothes, shoes, domestic appliances, foods as well as other products otherwise inaccessible to the poor. Góis also identifies musicians, students, and families as important actors in maintaining linkages between the diaspora communities.

In his analysis, Pedro Góis highlights the distinctions between immigrants in Europe or Senegal, the Kriolu or newly arrived emigrant in the U.S., on the one hand, and the first wave of emigrants in the U.S., referred to as the Merkanu (the American) as well as the Cape Verdeans living in countries such as São Tomé and Principe or Brazil. Góis argues that the Kriolu has remained in constant connection with his homeland and other communities in the diaspora through what he calls transnational practices. The Merkanu however, has maintained a lower level of transnational practices. Transnational practices refer to the social, cultural, and economic exchanges between the communities in the diaspora. He also calls attention to the Cape Verdean community in São Tomé and Principe whose lack of economic capital accounts for its low level of transnational practices. Góis, however, does not explain what accounts for the shift in transnational practices. He also fails to clearly identify the nature of the economic and political transnational practices which may indeed impact diaspora political visibility in the host country as well as contributions to the homeland. He focuses on the social practices, which account for contact with the homeland and other diaspora communities via vacation visits, exchange of goods, telephone calls, emails, and letters.