Peacekeeping in West Africa: an analysis of Nigeria's roles, 1990-2005

Anny Anthonia Ojekwe
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ABSTRACT

POLITICAL SCIENCE

OJEKWE, ANNY ANTHONIA B.S. EMBRY-RIDDLE AERONAUTICAL UNIVERSITY, 1992

M.S. CLARK ATLANTA UNIVERSITY, 1997

PEACEKEEPING IN WEST AFRICA: AN ANALYSIS OF NIGERIA’S ROLES.

1990–2005

Advisor: Dr. Robert DeJanes

Dissertation dated July 2010

This study investigated peacekeeping in West Africa, with particular focus on Nigeria’s roles (diplomatic, political, cultural, socioeconomic, peacekeeping and peace enforcement) in the West Africa region, from 1990 to 2005. This time frame is particularly important, because in the 1990s, the West African region experienced an outbreak of inter/intra state conflicts. These conflicts have been studied extensively by social scientists, political analysts and other scholars. In many of these studies, the analysts have focused mostly on the intervening roles of groups and organizations, such as the United Nations (UN), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). What this study found missing, however, is an in-depth analysis of the role/s of individual member states, such as Nigeria. The inter-agency framework for conflict analysis in transition and the contemporary history approaches were utilized to further understand the dynamics of peacekeeping in West Africa and the extent of
Nigeria's peacekeeping roles in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The conclusion drawn from the findings suggest that Nigeria plays pivotal peacekeeping roles in the West African region. These roles though necessitated by the limited role of the international community in Africa since the end of the Cold War, and by the need for regional political stability and security, have placed added burden on Nigeria as evidenced by the case studies of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean crises of the 1990s.
PEACEKEEPING IN WEST AFRICA: AN ANALYSIS OF NIGERIA'S ROLES, 1990–2005

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF CLARK ATLANTA UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY
ANNY ANTHONIA OJEKWE

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

ATLANTA GEORGIA

JULY 2010
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<tr>
<td>AFL</td>
<td>Armed Forces of Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNN</td>
<td>Cable Network News</td>
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<td>CFA</td>
<td>Communauté Financière Africaine</td>
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<td>CMPO</td>
<td>Conceptual Model of Peace Operation</td>
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<td>IAFCA</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Framework for Conflict Analysis</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>INPEL</td>
<td>Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>LPC</td>
<td>Liberia Peace Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDF</td>
<td>Lofa Defense Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>LURD</td>
<td>Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy</td>
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<td>NPEL</td>
<td>National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
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<td>NPFL-CRC</td>
<td>National Patriotic Front of Liberia-Central Revolutionary Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>None Government Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Union</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>PAC</td>
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<td>DEP</td>
<td>Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
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<td>SMC</td>
<td>Standing Mediation Committee</td>
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<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South African Peoples Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAC</td>
<td>Technical Aid Corps</td>
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<td>TCDC</td>
<td>Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries</td>
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<td>United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy-Johnson Faction</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNOMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The interest in peacekeeping has been the subject of several studies and continues to dominate the minds of many on the international scene. Fundamentally, peacekeeping relates to the preservation of peace, especially the supervision by international forces of a truce between hostile nations.\(^1\) It has been a subject of vast academic and professional inquiry, primarily because of its importance as a strategy for maintaining and preserving peace, stability, and order in conflict-ridden parts of the world. Worldwide, old and new conflicts, emanating largely from people's quest for political, economic, territorial, and even cultural independence and power, provide ample justification for peacekeeping initiatives and efforts at the international and regional levels.

Enormous resources and efforts are invested continuously in peacekeeping by international organizations, such as the United Nations (UN), by world powers, such as the United States, and by regional powers, such as Nigeria in the case of West Africa. As strategically important as peacekeeping is to peace and order worldwide, there is much to

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learn about the political, economic and tactical dimensions and dynamics of peacekeeping as an activity.

This study is an analysis of Nigeria’s peacekeeping policies, roles, and strategic actions in West Africa from 1990 to 2005. Nigeria acts in her capacity as an individual state and as a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Nigeria’s peacekeeping endeavors can be traced as far back as 1960 and even before then. The motivation for this inquiry stems from a need to understand the dynamics of regional peacekeeping particularly in relation to West African peacekeeping missions. Part of this study is also an attempt to further understand the reasons behind, and the extent of, Nigeria’s peacekeeping roles, because they differ from the traditional United Nations’ (UN) peacekeeping missions.

In this research, the interest in peacekeeping as a subject is from the point of view of political scholarship or analysis. Essentially, this interest is pursued by delving into the politics of peacekeeping in West Africa, zeroing in specifically on Nigeria’s roles. The motivation for Nigeria’s roles will be investigated, along with the various channels through which the roles are played. For the latter, an assessment of ECOWAS and its monitoring group, Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), will be made. To further enhance the depth of this analysis, an evaluation of Nigeria’s roles in ECOWAS/ECOMOG will also be carried out.

The scope of analysis of Nigeria’s peacekeeping roles in West Africa will cover diplomatic, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, political, socioeconomic and cultural

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dimensions. Outside the roles of the UN and world powers such as Britain, France, and the United States of America, little is known about the roles of individual member states in regional alliances in peacekeeping. This information gap is particularly serious in regions in the developing world, and especially in Africa. In West Africa, the geopolitical region of focus in this study, there is a significant body of literature on ECOMOG’s participation in different peacekeeping events in West Africa, but none shows, for example, an in-depth analysis of the peacekeeping roles played significantly by a country like Nigeria, a role that is unparalleled by any other country in the region.

Statement of the Problem

During the Cold War era, the West African region was relatively politically stable but in the 1990s, the region became home to some of the world’s deadliest conflicts. These conflicts have been studied extensively by social scientists, political analysts and other scholars. In many of these studies, the analyses have focused mostly on the intervening roles of groups and organizations, such as the UN, ECOMOG, and others. What this research finds missing, however, is an in-depth analysis of the role of individual member states, such as Nigeria, which plays pivotal peacekeeping roles in the West African region.

Peacekeeping is the action of a third party between warring forces, enforcing a cease fire or other truce, usually in support of political moves towards a lasting peace

settlement. The concept of peacekeeping is, however, extensive, encompassing several elements such as human behaviors and principles. According to Draman and Carment, the concept of peacekeeping is derived from certain principles: the consent of the parties to the conflict, the use of force only in self-defense and, more importantly, claims to impartiality.

The referenced principles are not always easy to maintain in times of conflict, and to prevent the collateral damages of conflict, such as destruction of lives and/or livelihoods, peacekeeping intervention finds it difficult to operate exclusively within the stated principles. As Draman and Carment further contend, “... it is well documented that these principles which constitute the basic elements of classical peacekeeping have become problematic in many intra-state conflict situations.” Furthermore:

A classical function of peacekeeping is the control of violent conflicts with the stabilization of armistice lines...the majority of peacekeeping during the Cold War period was limited to separating national armies in ending hostilities between belligerent states. Since then, the roles of peacekeepers have been diverse with rise of demand for new functions of international military forces in response to hostilities among ethnic groups.

It is not by accident that the West African region experienced an explosion of conflicts in the 1990s. Many of the states in the region became independent between


6. Ibid.

1957 and 1962; a period popularly referred to as “annus mirabilis”\(^8\) meaning years of wonder. Particularly, each one of these states was ill-equipped to function as a nation. The ill preparedness of these newly independent states (which have just emerged from colonial rule) is so because they were not groomed to self-govern, but rather were economically exploited by their various colonizers. As articulated by Rodney:

> The combination of being oppressed, being exploited, and being disregarded is best illustrated by the pattern of the economic infrastructure of African colonies: notably, their roads and railways. These had a clear geographical distribution according to the extent to which particular regions needed to be opened up to import/export activities. Where exports were not available, roads and railways had no place. The only slight exception is that certain roads and railways were built to move troops and make conquest and oppression easier.\(^9\)

What can be deduced from Rodney’s assertion is that exploitation of a people does not lead or translate to development. In essence, when many of these African states attained political independence from their European colonizers, they lacked the necessary infrastructure and structured institutions to facilitate adequate economic, political and social functions.

Like other regions in Africa, the end of the Cold War diminished competition for allies by both the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) and the West (Europe and United States of America). Writing in this vein, Gros states that, “... the demise of the East-West rivalry did not result in greater attention by the West to Africa’s

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Nor did the broader international community, such as the UN, care enough to play any active role in the reduction of many African intra-state or inter-state conflicts. This necessitated sub-regional organizations, such as Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) with Nigeria as its major participant, to respond and help resolve some of these conflicts.

Regulation of conflict in the West African region became imperative with the Liberian crisis, which corresponded to the end of the Cold War. Adhering to this urgency, and in accordance with the provisions contained in the ECOWAS mutual defense treaty of 1981 signed in Freetown, the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) stepped up to take charge of the situation.

ECOWAS was established in 1975, fifteen years before ECOMOG. The initiative for ECOWAS stemmed from a desire by some of the member states, particularly Nigeria, for an economically and/or politically stable and developing region. In addition to championing the ECOWAS initiative, Nigeria has continued to commit to its existence and operation and by extension, ECOMOG. Against this background of overt commitment by Nigeria, Aluko contends that:

The main ideas behind Nigeria’s initiative are political, security, and economic considerations. For political reasons Nigeria wants an arrangement that will put an end to colonial divisions in West Africa. Furthermore, she believes that such a step will put an end to border disputes and will be an important contribution to African unity.

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11. Olajide, Essays In Nigerian Foreign Policy, 17.
Aluko’s assertion implies that Nigeria believes, that through economic unity, the West African region will get closer to political unity, and that economic and political stability enhances greater regional security.

The successive inter-state and intra-state conflicts in the West African region since the end of the Cold War, have added extra burden to Nigeria’s roles in West Africa. From the time of her independence in 1960, Nigeria has participated in almost every peacekeeping effort in West Africa and beyond. Iweriebor and U homoibhi, in their work titled UN Security Council: A case for Nigeria’s Membership, wrote that “Nigeria has since independence made major political, economic, financial and diplomatic contributions to the development of African countries.”12 These authors further contend that Nigeria contributed to the resolution of inter-state and intra-state conflicts among and within African countries. Along the line of Nigeria’s peacekeeping efforts, Aluko also states that Nigeria’s peacekeeping endeavors can be traced as far back as 1960.13 Case studies of two West African countries, Liberia and Sierra Leone, will afford substantial insights into Nigeria’s roles in West Africa.

While there have been write-ups on Nigeria’s participation in the region, some of the discussions concentrate on whether Nigeria’s overall interest in West Africa has a bearing on her need to emerge as a regional hegemony. As Aluko contends, “... , Nigeria remains suspect in many west African capitals. With her vast economic resources and her enormous political and military strength, Nigeria is seen in many of


13. Aluko, Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy, 23.
these countries as working for the eventual domination of her smaller neighbors. . ."\textsuperscript{14}

This statement by Aluko is further echoed by Cleaver that — “. . . This problem reflects a wider one of the Francophone/Anglophone split within ECOWAS and also a fear of growing Nigerian hegemony in West Africa."\textsuperscript{15}

**Significance of the Study**

This study has both conceptual and empirical significance. Conceptually, the study will contribute to the existing literature on peacekeeping in West Africa, and help bring additional academic focus to the dynamics of peacekeeping in the region. The study is also significant from an empirical perspective, since the findings will be relevant to other future individual/sub-regional (African or global), peacekeeping framework analysis. More importantly, the study hopes that subsequent discussions on the subject of inquiry, will yield focused attention by scholars of African politics, and stimulate further debate among social science scholars and other political observers alike, about, not only Nigeria’s peacekeeping roles, but Nigeria’s commitments and contributions in the region and indeed, in the continent of Africa.

Though the West African sub-regional peacekeeping missions have generated incredible amounts of interest among scholars of African politics and other political observers, yet there is a void left on the need to understand the motivation, implication, and extent to which an individual member-state will go to achieve regional political

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 17.

stability. Thus far, many assessments and analyses of ECOMOG’s peacekeeping missions and of ECOMOG as an entity, in the academic literature, have been focused on whether ECOMOG had a clear mandate for peacekeeping, and whether it was prepared, and capable.

Commenting on ECOWAS/ECOMOG, Hutchful, noted that “the legal arguments around the issue of mandate and legitimacy masked deeper political and diplomatic rivalries and conflicts of interest within ECOWAS itself, mirroring, in particular, the linguistic divisions in the region…”16 In his assertion, Hutchful tries to point to the internal differences between ECOWAS member states. Other writers also contend that, “... ECOMOG lacked the experience, training and capability to carry out anything more than rudimentary peacekeeping.”17

As indicated earlier, first, this inquiry will contribute to the literature in the areas of West African politics as well as a framework for analyzing an individual member state’s role in regional peacekeeping. It will also bring more focus to Nigeria’s peacekeeping roles and peace endeavors in the West African region. Second, the expected research findings will further enhance an understanding of: (a) the reasons behind Nigeria’s peacekeeping roles and the extent of her foreign policy objectives for West Africa, (b) the type of dialogue Nigeria’s foreign policy makers and policy implementers should focus on and (c) potential areas for future research. Third, it is


possible that the findings of this study and the recommendations will serve as part of a reference point for Nigeria’s policymakers and policy implementers as well as ECOWAS/ECOMOG’s members and policymakers for a peacekeeping framework analysis.

**Research Questions**

With the above stated background, in analyzing Nigeria’s peacekeeping roles in West Africa, this study will address the following specific questions:

RQ1: What are the specific results and challenges of Nigeria’s peacekeeping roles in West Africa?

RQ2: What are the views and responses of Nigeria’s neighbors to her peacekeeping roles in the West African region?

**Methodology**

This study adopts a case study approach to analyze Nigeria’s peacekeeping roles in West Africa. "A case study is an investigation of a specific phenomenon or entity." Or as defined by Yin, a case study is a thorough evaluation of contemporary phenomenon in the context of the actual event/s; when limitations between phenomenon and context are not quite obvious; and in which several sources of evidences are applied.

This study evaluates data relating to Nigeria’s peacekeeping roles in both the Liberian and Sierra Leonean crises. Also, the study includes evaluation of historical

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analysis of Nigeria’s foreign policy implementation for West Africa. The study further examines the pattern of Nigeria’s peacekeeping endeavors, through the evaluation of relevant theoretical literature. The literature includes documented evidence of different peace Accords from the Nigerian government, and other such documents. Also in this study, effort was made to highlight the parts played by the international community, such as Britain, France, the UN and the United States of America. Because highlighting the parts played by the international community will further show the extent of Nigeria’s roles, especially in relation to the Liberian and Sierra Leonean crises.

A descriptive research design was used in this study because it assumes a prior knowledge of the research questions and problems before the research began. Also, descriptive research design allows for diverse method of data collection that ensures an adequate process and procedure in obtaining extensive information regarding the research questions. An advantage of case study method is that it enables the researcher gain a deeper understanding of peacekeeping efforts, particularly peacekeeping efforts in relation to Nigeria’s roles in West Africa. According to Grigsby, case studies do give interesting information. “For example, case studies of Spanish politics have provided data on the process of building a democratic society in the aftermath of authoritarianism.”

The review of published scholarly work, Nigerian government documents and other documents alike, will provide a reliable source for analysis. The focus of the analysis will be on Nigeria’s peacekeeping roles in West Africa. The study will examine

Nigeria’s/ ECOMOG peacekeeping efforts both in Liberia and Sierra Leone versus patterns of Nigeria’s peacekeeping endeavors in West Africa.

The research method is qualitative however, few tables of statistical data is included. The qualitative method is used because details from the data generated, for the purpose of analyzing peacekeeping in West Africa and analyzing Nigeria’s roles, cannot be quantified and also, because qualitative method tens to be more flexible (allows for broader range of utilization)—“range of techniques.” On like the quantitative method of analysis that is commonly used in the analysis of natural science. Besides, quantitative method tends to be more specific (concern for quantity). Furthermore, “flexible qualitative interpretation of data can lead to a holistic view of past, present and future issues.”

Data Source

In using the descriptive approach, the study makes use of primary and secondary data generated from diverse sources: (a) relevant empirical literature, consisting of published scholarly work, government documents and gazettes, and other documents alike, (b) a series of unstructured and informal interviews with few Nigerian diplomats who were present and/or participated in Nigeria/ECOWAS peacekeeping decision-making phases, (c) interviews with a few members of the Sierra Leonean community who were eye witnesses to the ECOMOG peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone, and interviews with some Liberian refugees, and (d) interviews with a few ECOMOG soldiers who participated in either the peacekeeping mission in Liberia and/or the

peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone. Peacekeeping is a critical subject of research and policy strategy for various political reasons. It is a subject that is widely documented in the conceptual and empirical literature in various disciplines and professions. Therefore, there is a rich and diverse, sometimes complex pool of information on the subject. From the standpoint of research methodology, the very sensitive and sometimes controversial nature of peacekeeping as a subject and as an activity implies that diverse methods should be employed in order to gather the quantity and quality of information that would enable a thorough analysis of the subject, especially as is pertinent for this study. To this end, the specific methods used to obtain data for this study were:

1. Face-to-face interviews with few Nigerian diplomats and some ex-ECOMOG officials who are very familiar with various Nigerian foreign policy issues and were/are affiliated or partial participants in much policy discussions. Some of these discussions resulted in the policy decisions for both the Liberian and Sierra Leonean peacekeeping missions.

Parts of the informal/unstructured interviews were conducted with few Liberian refugees and some Sierra Leoneans who were eyewitness to both ECOMOG missions. The input from these individuals interviewed, though informally documented, is very important and helped this study empirically, by offering their first-hand observation. For example, one of the diplomats interviewed, indicated that, in many of the decision-making phases, the general attitude in the meeting was that Nigeria has the resources to secure the West African region. Another stated that the main people in Abuja had indicated that West Africa was of utmost importance to Nigeria.

2. A comprehensive review of all unclassified government documents provided, upon request to the researcher, by the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos and Abuja; and Nigerian Consulate, Atlanta. Other data sources are: Nigerian government records from several different accord
proceedings e.g., from the *Abuja Accord communiqués*, also other documents such as *Nigerian Journal of International Affairs* (multiple volumes). Several newspaper clippings detailing Nigeria's participations in various peacekeeping missions as well as Nigeria's, participations in ECOWAS/ECOMOG peacekeeping missions as they evolve; there were many other non-governmental publications obtained from Nigerian Consulate, Atlanta, magazine articles, internet articles and reports as well as other relevant documents.

3. Extensive review of the empirical literature on peacekeeping around the world. The methods described above resulted in primary and secondary data that informed the analysis and conclusions in this study. All the primary data came from the interviews, and the data was valuable in detailing the sequence of events particularly in the decisions taken to embark on the Liberian peacekeeping and peace enforcement mission as well as the decision to continue with the Sierra Leonian peacekeeping mission despite Nigeria's heavy casualties.

Secondary data came from all the other sources except the interviews. Generally, the data was useful in addressing Nigeria's motivation and commitment to political stability and economic sustainability in West Africa. Many of these secondary data also helped tremendously in stating historical backgrounds of Nigeria's geopolitical structure, her relationship with her immediate neighbors and other such accounts.

In this study, most of the documents analyzed were magazine, internet articles, and scholarly literature. Information from published scholarly work centers on Nigeria's foreign policy as it relates to Africa but particularly to the West African region. In addition, documents dealing with ECOWAS affairs were evaluated as well, since the ECOWAS organization remains a large part of Nigeria's foreign policy preoccupation.

There are other documents such as the *Protocol Relating to the Mediation for Conflict Prevention Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping, and Security; ECOWAS Decisions of the Council Documents (1989 – 1992)* and *ECOWAS Resolutions,* as well as
other books that were quite useful. Including Ambassador Olu Adeniji’s *Mechanisms for Conflict Management in West Africa: Politics of Harmonization*; Muhammad Juma Kuna’s *The Role of Nigeria in Peace Building, Conflict Resolution, and Peacekeeping Since 1960*; Ayo Akinbobola’s *The Nature and Context of Nigeria’s Foreign Assistance: The Politics of Its Implementation* and many other such literature.

**Definition of Terms**

**Africa-Center-Piece:** Nigerian policy for African affairs, especially policy for the West African region. It simply means African affairs are the cornerstone of Nigeria’s foreign policy.

**Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL):** Liberia Armed Forces that supported the initially elected government of Charles Taylor.

**Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS):** Established in 1975, is an organization of fifteen West African nations that have agreed to share common market, technical ideas, cultural and social exchanges, with an eventual economic integration in the West African region. Since January 2007 ECOWAS has a commissioner format administration led by a president. Its secretariat is located in Abuja, Nigeria and has the following commissioners: agriculture, environment and water resources; human and gender development; Infrastructure and micro-economic policy; political affairs, peace and security and trade and customs for free movement of its citizens.
Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG): This body was formed in 1990 and is made up of military troops from some ECOWAS member-states, to help gain cease-fire and restore peace to the crisis in Liberia and has since remained as a security arm of ECOWAS. Since its creation, ECOMOG has been involved in several peacekeeping missions (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire and Sudan) in Africa.

Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA): This is a working group pm in transition issues, and social council assigned to address action point 14 of the Secretary General’s report on “strengthening of the United Nations Agenda for further changes.” The ECHA working group is partially responsible for the development of Inter-agency Framework for Conflict Analysis (IAFCA)—framework for the analysis of peacekeeping.

Extra-African-Countries: European countries, particularly Britain and France that colonized most of West Africa. These countries tend to have influence on their ex-colonies as well as extensive bilateral relationship.

Liberia National Transitional Government-I (LNTG-I)/LNTG-II: Due to a considerable political unrest and violence that precluded any stable leadership in power from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s. A power-sharing agreement in 2003 largely ended the fighting and created a National Transitional Government (NTG). The NTG, supported by United Nations peacekeeping troops, replaced the government under the 1986 constitution and ruled until a democratically elected administration was installed in 2006.
**National Interest:** As it relates to this study, is a term used by Nigeria, to articulate reasons or the need for her foreign policy objectives. It is based on the national interest policy that Nigeria formulates her foreign policy agendas, particularly as it relates to West African affairs.

**Organization of African Union (OAU), now African Union (AU):** Is an organization of all nations within the African continent, established to address African issues. The OAU also supported ECOWAS decision to send ECOMOG into Liberia. Nigeria has been a member of OAU since its inception in 1963.

**Ring-Countries:** The West African countries (Cameroon, Chad, Niger Republic and the Republic of Benin), that surround Nigeria at four coordinates. These countries are also considered Nigeria’s immediate neighbors and have on occasion, had border disputes with Nigeria, particularly Cameroon. Currently, based on mutual agreement by both Nigeria and Cameroon, they have worked out an amicable settlement as laid out by the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission.

**Standing Mediation Committee (SMC):** A committee set up by ECOWAS members to figure out how to initiate the peace process at the onset of the Liberian crisis in 1990, and is made of five ECOWAS members. Based on the recommendation of this committee, ECOWAS then created a peacekeeping/peace enforcement unit, ECOMOG, to help with the cease-fire initiative in the crisis in Liberia.

**Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs):** Economic programs that restructure an economy so that it allows proper pricing of goods and services while allowing private sector the latitude to operate within adequate market values and structure. In the 1980s
SAPs was one of the conditions imposed on many developing nations including Nigeria, by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

**Technical Aid Corps (TAC):** Nigeria’s initiative, which seeks to promote socio-economic development in friendly developing countries. This Nigerian initiative was established in 1987 and has since sent various professionals including nurses, doctors, engineers, and architects, as technical aid assistants to several countries in Africa and beyond.

**Transition:** Refers to the period of a crisis when external assistance is most crucial in supporting and underpinning still fragile cease fires, or peace processes, by helping to create the conditions for political stability, security, justice and social equity.

**Transnational Cooperation (TNC), sometimes called Multinational Enterprise (MNE):** A large corporation that manages products, productions and delivery of services to many countries. TNCs tend to be involved in several economic situations that are linked to unequal trade arrangements and other stringent financial programs that many West African countries, have been subjected to.

**Literature Review**

For this study’s objective, quite relevant for review is a substantial amount of the theoretical and empirical literature on Nigeria’s national interests, foreign policy, contemporary conflicts in Africa, international politics/relations, international cooperation in economics and security, peacekeeping in Africa, ECOWAS and ECOMOG.
The evaluation of literature on the above listed areas and other such relevant literature was necessary because the literature facilitates a better understanding of Nigeria’s peacekeeping roles in the West African region. Equally, the literature reviewed pinpoints Nigeria’s participation and position in and within the UN general assembly. In their argument for Nigeria’s membership in the UN’s Security Council, Iweriebor and U homoibh i detailed the various attempts by Nigeria, to become a member of the UN’s Security Council. They took a look at the non-African permanent representation in the UN Security Council and contend that, given the present world condition, the UN is out-of-sync with the global political environment. Iweriebor and U homoibh i further argued that, at its inception, the UN included only three African countries - Ethiopia, Liberia and Egypt. Currently, however, the continent of Africa occupies 54 seats at the UN general assembly.

In Iweriebor and U homoibh i’s view, “the continent needs and deserves to be represented permanently in the UN Security Council, and that Nigeria should be Africa’s representative.”22 Furthermore, they contend, “the moral imperative and credibility of Nigeria’s candidacy for Africa’s permanent seat in the UN Security Council are predicated on the country’s ability and willingness to contribute significantly to the maintenance of international peace and security.”23

These authors further articulate that, “… Nigeria naturally sees its destiny intertwined with the dynamics of changes in the external environment; and a responsible


23. Ibid.
member of the international community . . . in relation to the concerts of nations at the sub-regional and international levels."

There is no consensus in the AU, based on the literature reviewed, that Nigeria should be one of Africa’s permanent representatives to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Nonetheless, Iweriebor and U homoibhi’s argument is relevant, because it shows Nigeria’s continuous and overt commitment both sub-regionally and to the broader international arena. In the same vein, Ate and Akinterinwa in their 1992 work, Nigeria and Its Immediate Neighbors, note that:

... it was demonstrated that Nigeria’s political stability could be undermined by foreign elements, using as staging point not only adjacent off-shore islands, such as Malabo, Sao Tome and Principe, but also Chad, Benin and Cameroun. It was for this reason that Nigerians raised with great alarm to the discovery of South African’s undercover attempts to establish in the Equatorial Guinea in 1987. Also for these reason Nigerians have to be wary about Americans, Israeli and French military and intelligence activities in Chad, Cameroun, Niger and Benin Republic.25

These incidents depicted by Ate and Akinterinwa indicate that “France is aiming towards a total consolidation of its hegemony in the contiguous area by calibrated penetration of the economy of Nigeria, the only Anglo-phone and also the largest population in the region, which is surrounded by four smaller Franco-phone counties.”


26. Ibid. 7.
The points made by Ate and Akinterinwa are quite important in the attempt to appraise Nigeria’s relationship with her immediate neighbors. Equally important are the view expressed by Offiong and Idise in their 1999 work, *The Determinant of African Foreign Relations, Continuities, Changes and Constraint: A Theoretical Overview*. They state that, “only a country in a secure environment can really be effective in her foreign pursuit. Since it is not possible for her to be an island unto herself, Nigeria must interact with other state actors. But she has to be discriminatory in her approach and prioritize the importance to its own existence.”27 Here Offiong and Idise by their statement, show why it is important for Nigeria to continue to participate in a bilateral or multilateral manner, because cooperation among other ECOWAS member states will lead to better economic integration in the West African region.

Alluding to Nigeria and the new century, Yomi Akinyeye in his work, *Nigeria’s Defense Policies: Perspectives for New Century*, contends that, “in projecting into the 21st century, the article advocates a people-centered defense policy that incorporates economic and defense ties with Nigeria’s immediate neighbors, and democracy, social justice and environmental protection.”28 In this, Akinyeye attempts to show a paradigm of defense incorporation. That is, a model where, in addition to her defense policies, Nigeria also tries to incorporate security, economic, politics and diplomacy. He states that, “although, scholars of international relations and strategic studies define defense in


different ways, there is a broad consensus that, it refers to the protection of a nation’s
goals and threats.”\(^{29}\) Or as Mountcastle writes and citing Roskin:

> Because the national interest is the foundation for both the National Security Strategy and its supporting National Military political context form which the details of the national interest emerge. The guiding concept of national interest is more often assumed than analyzed in the dynamic context of domestic and international politics.\(^{30}\)

In a different argument, Ogaba Oche in his work *Principles of International Relations*, concurs with Akinyeye’s assertions and states that, “it is important to look at foreign policy in a more depth because generally, they define the purposes and pursuits of states in the international system, and what principles those states tend to regard as being uppermost in their hierarchy of values…”\(^{31}\) Similarly, Ate continues within the context of Nigeria and its immediate neighbors and contends that, “the sub-region is vital to Nigeria’s survival, plainly because Nigeria’s vital assets are located within. . . Nigeria must treat this sub-region as a natural base from which to project its rational interest.”\(^{32}\)

Bukar Bukarambe, in *Nigeria’s Foreign Policy in Africa 1960-1999*, examines the period between the two landmark years (1960 – year of Nigeria’s political independence

\(^{29}\) Ibid., 7.


and 1999 – year that ended the Century), and discusses the various changes in world affairs and their impact on Nigeria’s international relations. In spite of profound world events such as the Cold War, end of colonialism, the new world order, and global economy, Bukarambe suggests that, “... the period spanning thirty-nine years affords enough time for Nigeria’s national institutions responsible for international relations to evolve and mature in their own right irrespective of the events within the country.”

In Aims and Objectives of Foreign Policy, Offiong and Idise contend that ultimately, the balance between external affairs and domestic matters is what should constitute the actual national interest(s). “A balance must be created between domestic and foreign policy in the sense that the pursuance of one policy does not lead to unnecessary utter neglect of the other.” This statement is quite important since very often, matters of external affairs are confused or stated as “national interest”, as Offiong and Idise articulated here:

National interest is a concept frequently used in understanding the foreign policy of a particular state. Often times, national interests are really the interests of a selected group of national leaders, or even the interest of the head of state, ...

During the overthrow of Milton Obote by Idi Amin of Uganda, Amin made an order for 50, 000 Asians to leave Uganda on the fact that their continued habitation of the country was not in Uganda’s national interest... Amin never cared about the consequences of his action on the economy...


35. Ibid., 92.
Similarly, Nwoke in his 2000 work, *An Overview of Nigeria’s International Economic Relations*, argues that Nigeria is a neocolonial and a dependent society; that this pattern of society, does not lead to economic liberation. He indicated that because of the dependent and neocolonial nature of Nigerian governments since independence, Nigeria’s external economic policies will always dictate the internal or domestic economic realities, which is, an underdeveloped economy. Nwoke’s argument points to the remarkable difference between Nigeria’s domestic and foreign policy, both in enactment and implementation.

Nwoke further argues that, “. . . throughout the history of the nation’s international economic relations, the attitude of Nigerian governments have been, that of less than nationalist and independent approach. In other words, since independence, in view of neocolonialism, no Nigerian governments’ economic diplomacy has been geared towards as it points to the extent Nigerian regimes have gone in their quests, to establish and maintain good international relations, especially regional relationships, and the dichotomy between Nigeria’s domestic (internal) and international policies, particularly at the regional level.

The deduction in this regard, is that, despite Nigeria’s economic problems such as underdeveloped economy, extensive national debt, and many such domestic problems caused by the lack of economic sustainability, Nigeria has managed to pursue peacekeeping campaigns; either unilaterally and/or in multilateral effort with other ECOWAS member states. In either case, this inquiry has found that Nigeria almost

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always absorbs eighty to ninety percent of the financial burden of these peacekeeping endeavors.

**Theoretical Framework**

For this study, the approaches employed and discussed are the Inter-Agency Framework for Conflict Analysis (IAFCA) or Framework for Conflict Analysis, and the Contemporary History also known as Descriptive-inductive. These perspectives serve as lenses for viewing and analyzing the concept of, and dynamics of peacekeeping. First is the inter-agency framework for conflict analysis, a framework which was developed by a UN working group – UNDG-ECHA, and focuses on three important elements of peacekeeping: conflict analysis, analysis of ongoing response, strategic and program planning. This framework is useful for this study since the investigative analysis of Nigeria’s peacekeeping roles in West Africa encompasses the above mentioned three elements as depicted in Table 1.

Conflict analysis is necessary because it facilitates understanding of the causes and consequences of violent conflict, as well as the dynamics supporting peace efforts made by Nigeria and ECOWAS diplomats, and the efforts by ECOMOG troops towards cease-fire. According to UNDG-ECHA, this framework also identifies all relevant conflict factors that have contributed and may further contribute to the resurgence of violent conflict.37 One of the important aspects of IAFCA, which helps to better analyze

Table 1: Overview of IAFCA

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<th>Element 3: Strategic &amp; Programmatic Conclusions for Transition Planning</th>
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Nigeria’s peacekeeping roles, is “transition programming.” As defined by the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) and Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA), the aim of transition programming is to “help to create the conditions for political stability, security, justice and social equity,” as sought by Nigeria and ECOWAS officials.

Conflict analysis include: identifying key conflict factors such as the origin of the conflict; identifying individuals or groups (Actor analysis) engaged in, and/or affected by the conflict; and analysis of capacities for peace—capacities for peace as defined by UNDG_ECHA, refers to structures, mechanisms, processes and institutions that exist in

38. Ibid.
society in order to peaceably and constructively manage conflict. In this instance, the assumption by IAFCA is that typically, capacities for peace involves informal approaches to conflict resolution, which may involve authorities, strong civil society, a cultural tolerance, community/inter-village meetings, courts and other such entities, as was applied initially to Liberia. When ECOWAS ambassadors tried to mediate between the four warring factions—the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) loyal to Samuel Doe, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor, and other divisions such as United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy-Johnson faction (ULIMO-J), and the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy-Kromah faction (ULIMO-K).

The second element of IAFCA is analysis of ongoing responses. This includes: mapping of ongoing responses—assessing how effective initiatives and programs put in place in a transition situation are aligned with the set of main concerns, such as the immediate and structural conflict factors, as well as factors considered to be key peace deterrents (“spoilers”), and assessment of impact of ongoing responses in relation to conflict.

The strategic and programmatic conclusions for transition planning, is a necessary tool for this study because it allows for testing and evaluating initiatives, programs and other such components, put in place as a means of transitioning from conflict to peace. These include: strategic recommendations for transition planning; and programmatic recommendations for transition programming. In this case, IAFCA presumes that the

objective of programmatic conclusions for transition planning is to contribute to the formulation of the overall strategy. In particular, while the conflict analysis helped identify priority proximate and structural conflict factors that should be considered priority areas and of particular concern for the development of transition planning, the assessment of ongoing responses contributed to highlight:

- Existing gaps and related possible new areas of engagement over the short and longer-term, in line with the conflict analysis;
- The need to strengthen ongoing interventions and programs (e.g. in relation to strengthening capacities for peace, etc);
- The need to refocus ongoing interventions, from a conflict sensitive perspective.  

According to UNDG-ECHA, IAFCA builds the following key assumptions. Each transition situation is unique, so that the analysis needs to be context-specific (as it applies to a particular conflict or country in crisis). Conflicts are not mono-causal phenomena and arise from a set of interconnected conflict factors and dynamics. As was seen in the Liberian crisis—there were several causes to the violent conflict in Liberia, Namely: disconnect with government institutions, lack of access to justice, lack of access to reliable appropriate mechanism for resolving disputes and other issues alike.

Transition programming of the UN system should aim at “doing no harm” and minimizing unintended negative impacts.

1. Transition programming of the UN system should aim at maximizing its peace building impact in the aftermath of the crisis, as well as over the longer-term.

40. Ibid.
2. Efforts should be made to ensure national ownership and seek the participation of all conflict parties in the process of the analysis. Furthermore, UNDG-ECHA explains that IAFCA has been developed, in order to contribute to the following objectives:

(a) To ensure a common analytical framework for understanding the underlying causes and consequences of violent conflict, as well as the dynamics supporting or undermining peace efforts in a transition situation, as was the situation with ECOMOG troops in Liberia.

(b) To support a conflict sensitive approach to programming within the UN system in a transition situation; particularly with the civilian population caught in a violent conflict, as was the case with the Liberian and Sierra Leonean crises; for example, "... As is all too common in African conflicts, civilians became the preferred targets of the armed fractions ...".

(c) To build a common approach to post-conflict needs assessment, or other inter-aplanning instruments, such as ECOWAS/ECOMOG, and the UN humanitarian unit, as well as facilitate the development of an overall targeted transition strategy.

The IAFCA equally builds on the various experiences of the UN system with conflict analysis, especially on the recent inter-state conflicts in West Africa.

Furthermore, and with respect to "capacity for peace", Cleaver writes in *Liberia: lessons for the future from the experience of ECOMOG* "the second fundamental problem that faced the ECOMOG forces arriving in August 1990 was that they had failed to

\[41\] This refers to "the period of a crisis when external assistance is most crucial in supporting and underpinning still fragile cease fires, or peace processes, by helping to create the conditions for political stability, security, justice and social equity," UNDG ECHA Working Group on Transition Issues.


obtain the consent of the belligerent parties to their mission.”44 IAFCA also contains other characteristics essential for this study, such as the ability to interpret the dynamics and logistics of peacekeeping (“broadly defined to include ethnographic, cultural, religious factors, etc.”).45 According to UNDG-ECHA, the relevance of utilizing these various characteristics contained in IAFCA is that each situation is unique and complex; dynamics do not reflect a steady, sequential or uninterrupted path of progress from conflict to peace; often a “no war, no peace” situation and humanitarian activities might increase initially.

**Critique of IAFCA View**

IAFCA view can be described as a set of policy analysis tools that is helpful in understanding the underlying causes and consequences of violent conflicts, as well as the issues supporting peace efforts in transition situation.46 A major criticism made against IAFCA approach is that part of its assumptions, such as its informal approach to conflict solution, which involves authorities, civil society and cultural tolerance, may not be attainable. IAFCA has considered the fact that each conflict situation is unique, but what it has not taken into account, is that perhaps, particularly in violent conflict situation, there may not be a civil society, a legitimate authority and/or any tangible cultural

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46. Ibid.
tolerance. IAFCA has ignored these possible limitations, by stipulating these limitations as standards for capacities for peace in a transition situation following violent conflict.

Furthermore, one of the above stated limitations such as cultural tolerance, might have been a, or part of the precipitant of the violent conflict in the first place. IAFCA’s stipulated formats for capacities for peace, seem straightforward, free of inherent conflict related issues such as social and cultural constraints. IAFCA is limited in its assumptions that understanding proximate or immediate conflict factors is the most crucial. This is not always so, as the crises in Liberia and Sierra Leone have proven; though the IAFCA model states, that it’s stipulated structure when followed, its inputs become assets for long-term peace building and development. So far, this claim has not been fully tested, as the IAFCA’s approach is a recent (2004) development.

As the U.S. Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations asserts, lack of reliable and appropriate mechanism for resolving dispute is through the state system. Rather, peace stability and humanitarian operations should involve the interaction of internal organizations and nongovernmental organizations. They indicated that the UN post-conflict responses are based on the standardized IAFCA structure for conflict to help overcome structures that lead to violent conflict. But the standardization of the IAFCA’s model is a problem—since all violent conflicts are not the same.47

The next analytical framework used for analysis in this study is the “contemporary history,” also known as “descriptive-inductive” or “reflective history” as

articulated by Hegel, and many others, contemporary history falls under the broad spectrum of “institutionalism.” Contemporary history is used in this study to properly understand and analyze Nigeria’s peacekeeping roles in West Africa from 1990–2005 and also to understand the motivation behind Nigeria’s policies for West Africa. Contemporary history allows for further modification (depending on the particular situation) of its application.

According to Rhodes, contemporary history is used to “describe and analyze phenomena that have occurred in the past which are used to explain contemporary political phenomena with reference to past events.”48 Rhodes further explains that, contemporary history employs the techniques of the historian and explores specific events, eras, people and institutions, generating studies which systematically describe and analyze phenomena that have occurred in the past.49

Furthermore, contemporary history allows for historical trace of events and issues relevant to this study. In this instance, emphasis will be placed on the countries and cases which relevant to the history of Nigeria’s peacekeeping roles in West Africa. This approach is found useful for the reasons cited above. The primary justification for the use of IAFCA and contemporary history approaches, hinges on the fact that, they both will enhance the study’s ability to adequately convey its findings. Contemporary history

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49. Ibid.
is also used because it bears close resemblance to policy analysis which is, according to Dye, "a gregarious search for the causes and consequences of public policy.\textsuperscript{50}

What this study finds further useful and appealing with the use of contemporary history is that it accommodates variation in time period - that is, both previous and current occurrences are adequately depicted, and will facilitate the verity of the times to which it refers (it is better suited in the sequential traces and analysis of the various peacekeeping events in the period 1990–2005 this study references). "\ldots, it is history whose mode of representation is not really confined by limits of the time to which it relates."\textsuperscript{51} In an attempt to describe in a historical context, what Nigeria's foreign policy objective and principles were, Sanda narrates in \textit{Past as Prelude: Continuity in Nigeria's Africa Policy}, that: In 1960 they were:

- The defense of Nigeria's sovereignty, territorial integrity and national independence;
- The creation of the necessary economic, political, social and cultural conditions to secure the independence of Nigeria and other African counties;
- Promotion of African unity;
- Non-partisanship in East-West ideological disputes and freedom of association in the international system.

In the 1999 Constitution [section 19 (a) – (e)], these are:

- promotion of the national interest;
- promotion of African integration and support for African unity;

\textsuperscript{50} Thomas R. Dye, \textit{Understanding Public Policy}, 10\textsuperscript{th} ed. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2002), 9.

• promotion of international cooperation for the consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect among all nations and elimination of discrimination in all its manifestations;

• respect for international law and treaty obligations, as well as settlement of international disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication; and

• Promotion of a just world economic order.52

Contemporary history also builds on the assumptions that occurrences are best understood via descriptive approaches. That rules detect behaviors, in other words, “behaviors occurs because of a particular rule.”53 That hyperfactualism provides an opportunity for reintegrating the empirical study of politics with the analysis of political values.

Further, analysis of Nigeria’s roles for instance, particularly her peacekeeping roles in West Africa is facilitated by looking back or reflecting on Nigeria’s foreign policy implementations since her attainment of political independence in 1960. According to Rhodes, “the hallmark of the descriptive-inductive (contemporary history) approach is ‘hyper-factualism’ In other words, ‘observation was to come first; the fact stood paramount’ . . . ”54 What Rhodes’ assertion tries to convey here is that, whenever contemporary history is used for a study of this nature, the outcome is almost always, a factual chronology of series of events. A particular observation by Hegel is that, “ . . .


54. Marsh and Stoker, Theory and Methods in Political Science, 44.
history investigates the particular,” which is an essential advantage for this study. Contemporary history also allows for in-depth analysis of socio-political conflicts.

**Critique of Contemporary History View**

The most valued aspect of contemporary history is its ability to trace past events as it relates to the present (factual detail of events as they occurred by date). Another of contemporary history's strength is that it brings attention to the relationship between apparently related events. Thirdly, inference is drawn from the observation of frequent occurrences. However, because of contemporary history’s use in the analysis political institutions, it is criticized in the context of political institutions. For example, Rhodes contends, “the study of political institutions has number of critics who may substitute vigor for accuracy. Contemporary history he further asserts, tends to be more descriptive rather than problem-solving or analytic in its application.” Another weakness of contemporary history is that it lacks the ability to “conceptualize a problem-oriented approach; formulate a hypothesis or set of hypothesis and test hypothesis by empirical data to eliminate untenable and formulate new ones.”

Other more contemporary theoretical and conceptual approaches were equally evaluated, to further determine the more suitable one/s for this study. These approaches include the “Magic Diamond” model, developed by Gordon McCormick of the RAND Corporation. The Magic Diamond model contains relevant elements such as the population (non-combatants in the disputed region), the international community, and

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56. Ibid., 49.
maintaining the perception of neutrality analysis tool. The Magic Diamond model, however, does not quite present a needed framework for the unique analysis of this research. It is neither suitable for analyzing the complex West African sub-regional peacekeeping missions and their associated conflicts, which this study investigates. The recent conflicts prevalent in the West African region are of a different nature and, as argued by Oche, "these conflicts tend to be intra-state rather than inter-state . . .

Unfortunately, the current conflicts also affect neighbouring states either by way of spreading instability or, by drawing these states into the conflict itself."57 There are also other conceptual theories that approach peacekeeping from a militaristic viewpoint, meaning, analysis based on military operation only or the recently evolving Conceptual Model of Peace Operation (CMPO), which is a theoretical "system's engineering information domain model" used by some scholars of peacekeeping.

**Limitations of the Study**

In any inquiry of this nature, certain issues will always present some level of difficulty and problems, this study is no exception. Through the course of this endeavor, difficulties encountered were: the non-exhaustible barrage of information, conflicting statements from various newspaper reports, and conflicting statements of the research area of concentration. Nigeria's peacekeeping roles in the West African region, is an ongoing affair, and participation in ECOWAS/ECOMOG continues to evolve. While the

scope of Nigeria’s peacekeeping roles continues to develop, to include: peacemaking, peace enforcement as well as economic assistance, and many other forms of aid.

While this study uses the case study approach which is suitable for learning more about little known and poorly understood phenomenon, it is by nature limited in that the findings cannot be generalized to include other situations. The interview procedure (informal and unstructured) provides an opportunity for some control over the conditions under which the interviewee responses are made. However, there seems to be limitations inherent in self-report. The persons interviewed may be limited by concern for socio-politically acceptable answers.

Furthermore, while the study focuses on the political, economic and technical dimensions of peacekeeping as an activity, there are numerous other factors related to peacekeeping processes that are not touched by this study. Given the above stated limitations, and some financial constraints with respect to accessibility of needed data, this study will limit its scope of inquiry to the stated time frame—1990 to 2005.

**Organization of the Study**

The layout of this inquiry will comprise of five chapters. Chapter I provides the general overview of Nigeria’s roles in West Africa including: statement of the problem, significance of the study, research questions, methodology, definition of term, literature review, theoretical framework, limitations of study, and organization of the study. Chapter II looks at Nigeria’s geopolitical structure and Nigeria’s roles in the West African region in its historical context. This chapter further looks at Nigeria as a major player in the region and beyond. As stated earlier, regional policy takes up a greater part
of Nigeria's foreign policy makeup. A more in-depth evaluation of Nigeria's foreign policy is therefore required. This necessarily includes Nigeria's economic assistance to various countries within the West African region and other African regions, peacemaking, regional political rivalry, and the Extra-African countries. Chapter III evaluates Nigeria's international relations, including her position in the broader African context, her contributions in the areas of diplomacy, economic, cultural, and socio-political. This chapter also investigates Nigeria's need for regional security, her military strength and her relationships with Britain, France the United Nations, and the United States of America. Chapter IV analyzes data in relation to peacekeeping in West Africa, and examines Nigeria's role in ECOMOG and ECOWAS, and the relationship between ECOWAS and ECOMOG from 1990 to 2005. It further analyzes ECOMOG's participation in the West African sub-region, with the aid of a case study of Liberia and Sierra Leone. The study also evaluates ECOMOG as a sub-regional peacekeeping unit within ECOWAS; analyzes its operational structure; its military strengths; its initial mandates; and its directives and limitations as a functioning unit of ECOWAS. Chapter V details the research findings through data analyses and a conclusion with suggested recommendations, issues needing reviews, issues corrected as a result of challenges and experiences faced in Liberia and Sierra Leone.
CHAPTER II
NIGERIA'S GEOPOLITICAL STRUCTURE

Background

Nigeria is extremely diverse, comprising of more than 200 ethnic groups with more than twice that size in sub-groups and about 300 dialects and languages. According to Cohen and Goldman: “... Estimates of the number of distinct ethnic groupings varied from 250 to as many as 400. The most widely used marker was that of language. In most cases, people who spoke a distinct language having a separate term for the language and/or its speakers saw themselves, or were viewed by others, as ethnically different.”¹ These groups were fabricated together, to function as a unit by the colonial British for their benefits. There can be several sub-groups within one ethnic group. For example, there are many groups within the ethnic Igbo people and these different sub-groups speak various Ibo dialects.

Historically, the purpose of the amalgamation of these very diverse groups of people was not to organize and establish a country, but to further assist the colonial British in achieving and maintaining relative decorum while they engaged in the

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extraction of resources from this region of Nigeria as well as that sub-region of Africa.

Case in point:

Like so many other modern African states, Nigeria is the creation of European imperialism. Its very name—after the great Niger River, the country's dominating physical feature—was suggested in the 1890s by British journalist Flora Shaw, who later became the wife of colonial governor Frederick Lugard. The modern history of Nigeria—as a political state encompassing 250 to 400 ethnic groups of widely varied cultures and modes of political organization—dates from the completion of the British conquest in 1903 and the amalgamation of northern and southern Nigeria into the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria in 1914. The history of the Nigerian people extends backward in time for some three millennia.²

As Rodney observed in his renowned book, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*:

In addition to private companies, the colonial states also engaged directly in the economic exploitation and impoverishment of the Africa. The equivalent of the colonial office in each colonizing country worked hand in hand with their governors in Africa to carry out a number of functions, the principal ones being as follows: (1) To protect national interests against competition from other capitalists. (2) To arbitrate the conflicts between their own capitalists. (3) To guarantee optimum conditions under which private companies could exploit Africans. The last mentioned object was the most crucial.³

While Rodney's arguments here, is not limited to the Nigerian situation, however, it is more relevant to Nigeria because of her very diverse population. Pre-colonial era the different groups of people that make up Nigeria today, practiced group social structure that ranged from classical segmented system, to what Schrader called "Ritually Stratified Segmented System of self governance" (see Figure 1).

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Upon the arrival of the colonial British, and since the eventual distortion of these groups cohesive orderly system of life, Nigerians have been striving for a political structure that is both suitable and functional to their unique circumstance (the amalgamation of these very diverse groups of people).

From the onset of Nigeria as an independent state on October 1, 1960, Nigeria has had very dynamic/unstable governance—changing from one administration to another (thirteen different governments to be precise) and the majority of these times were under military governance. This lack of consistency in governance resulted in constantly changing public policy. In spite of this varying governance, Nigeria has remained quite consistent in her policy towards Africa, particularly her policy towards the West African region.
As indicated earlier, Nigeria is a large country, surrounded at its four coordinates by five smaller countries that can be susceptible to influence by the Extra-African countries. Besides this fact, Nigeria’s experience with colonialism and civil war, have continued to spur and compel her to seek regional stability. Writing in this vein, Iweriebor and Uhomoibhi stated that, “Nigeria has since independence made major political, economical, financial and diplomatic contributions to the development of African countries.”

On his part, Aluko contends that:

For analytical purposes Nigerian foreign policy could be said to operate within three concentric circles. The inner most circle consists of Nigerian policy towards her neighbors in the West Africa: the inner one is policy towards the rest of Africa: and the outer circle policy towards the larger international system.

Aluko’s above assertion is supported by several contributions made by Nigeria towards the attainment of peace in the West African region and beyond. As Iweriebor and Uhomoibhi further asserted, “... in the long drawn internal conflict in Chad, Nigeria from the late 1970s attempted to intervene to bring peace among the contending parties. She has convened peace conferences to resolve the Sudanese conflict. Nigeria also intervened multilaterally through the OAU in the attempts to resolve the Morocco-Saharan conflict.”

Apart from diplomatic endeavors and financial contributions, Nigeria has also contributed troops in several areas of the West African region, where there was a conflict and in the process, has lost many soldiers. According to Ibrahim Gambari, in January of


5. Aluko, Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy, 13.

1999, Nigeria lost 700 soldiers in Sierra Leone. It is quite obvious that regional policy issues, constitutes major aspect of Nigeria's Foreign policy objectives, despite her constantly changing government, her underdeveloped economy, and the fractures in her internal political structure, Nigeria strives to maintain her foreign policy objectives, particularly towards West Africa.

This study has found that Nigeria's geographical location as identified above, is one of the contributing factors to her regional participation/contributions, another being her enormous natural resources as well as the size of her population. Secondly, these findings show, that regardless of the reason(s), Nigeria is in a unique position (a large country with huge population, and located between smaller countries). In spite of her unique position, Nigeria is trying to navigate through the ever so complex, world politics that is further compounded with: the New World Order, The Global Market and more. From globalization, to technology innovations, and global communication advancements, to other more localized issues such as currency devaluation, national debt, and other domestic issues.

In addition to the above global issues, Nigeria is also trying to deal with more pressing domestic issues (high unemployment, underdeveloped economy, etc.), through a Federal system of governance, that, to a certain extent, represents democracy. In addition to her domestic issues and additional global issues—from politics of unequal development, the World Trade Organization (WTO), to UN's treaty of firearms, as well as regional and global peacekeeping mission, Nigeria tries to maintain a consistent

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foreign policy of Africa-center-piece policy, which several indications through the course of this inquiry has shown. Contrary to the revealed Africa-center-piece policy, some political observers and political scientists have continued to state Nigeria’s intent for regional hegemony.

Despite the assertions by these political observers of her hegemonic intent, perhaps more obvious to her claim, is Nigeria’s geopolitical location. Nigeria is located on the west coast of Africa, between latitude 4° and 14° N longitudes 3° and 15° E Meridian. She is bordered on the West by the Republic of Benin, on the North by Niger, on the East by Chad and Cameroon, and on the South by the Gulf of Guinea. In essence, Nigeria is surrounded by four to five Francophone countries—who can be susceptible to France influence (see Figure 2). It is in light of this potential external threat that Nigeria endeavors to ensure regional political stability and tranquility. Nigeria is in search of continental and/or sub-regional security. But to search for security implies that there is a need for security or a prior recognition of insecurity.8

As stated earlier, Nigeria endeavors to achieve regional political stability because she perceives external threat to her internal and regional security. As Aluko contends:

The experience of the last civil war when Dahomey Dahomey (now Republic of Benin) was used briefly in 1969 for airlifting arms and relief supplies to Biafra brought home this point to the Nigerian leaders more clearly than ever . . . one of the ideas behind Nigeria’s intense campaign for the formation of a West African economic community is to reduce dependence on extra-African countries.9


Also given that "French security arrangements with Francophone Africa have raised a number of problems..." Therefore, Nigeria sees France "as an obstacle to the achievement of Africa’s interests. In this context, French security links with Africa are generally seen to be detrimental to Africa’s resolve to see African problems solved by Africans themselves."¹⁰

The Country Brief of March 2008 puts Nigeria’s population at 140 million. This makes Nigeria the most populous country in Africa and the eighth most populous country

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in the world. These factors and the ones mentioned above, have made it all the more possible to continue with her commitment to peacekeeping roles in the region.

Nigeria is currently organized into thirty-six states. These states, plus the Federal Capital Territory—Abuja constitute the Federal Republic of Nigeria. As indicated earlier, Nigeria practice a federal system of governance, this is of a representative nature where, representatives from each of the states form the national assembly. In this centralized federal system of governance, none of the thirty-six states are economically independent and must, therefore, depend on the federal government for their annual operating budgets.

The above factors, coupled with other external forces such as the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), and currency devaluations, which in many cases, are influenced by the transnational corporations (TNCs). These TNCs are sometimes allies of some corrupt leaders who are used to excessive and extensive corruption practices, add to exacerbate the fracture in Nigeria’s internal political structure. As Sunday Dare’s article, *A Continent in Crisis Africa and Globalization*, reflects:

Because of the twin problems of rogue leadership and the exploitative tendencies of TNCs, Africa is caught between a rock and a hard place. As the history of conflicts in Africa shows, the extraction of mineral resources creates and reinforces government corruption, which easily begets repressive societies. As would be expected, poverty, unemployment, and insecurity spread, while social services decay. . .


There are other issues such as Nigeria's dependency on foreign goods and almost total dependent on crude oil revenues, these issues, add to Nigeria's internal political fractures.

**Nigeria's Roles in West Africa**

It is beyond the scope of this research to chronicle every aspect of Nigeria's foreign policy, especially in relation to Africa in general, and the West African sub-region in particular. It is appropriate however, to put into this study's frame of reference, the objectives and realities of Nigeria's policy for Africa.

For better understanding of the issues central to this study, it is necessary to review Nigeria's foreign policy towards the West African region. It is also important to show how the roles of foreign policy are intertwined or interrelated with the roles of public policy. In Dye's views, "policy analysis is finding out what governments do, why they do it, and what difference, if any, it makes."\(^\text{13}\) Some of the relevant documents reviewed revealed that part of Nigeria's national interests include: protection or defense of the country's sovereignty, as well as independence and territorial integrity from acts of aggression, serve as the raw material out of which the foreign policy of the nation is made.\(^\text{14}\) As Aluko aptly puts it:

Nigeria's foreign policy...is seen like this by the federal government. For security and political reasons the Lagos authorities consider their policy towards, and relations with, their neighbours as of the utmost priority and hence their efforts to establish the Chad Basin Commission and the Niger River Community

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in 1964, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975.15

Aluko’s view is similar to the views of some political scholars such as Yoroms, and Gambari, others contend that Nigeria’s foreign policy enactments and implementation particularly in West Africa, appears to operate in a backwards manner or order. In other words, Nigeria since independence tends to go to many lengths to achieve her foreign policy objectives. They further argue that Nigeria would be economically and politically, better positioned had she invested and/or committed to her domestic policies, similar to her foreign policy commitment. After all, should domestic affairs not supersede any other form of “national interest?” these scholars further indicate that Nigeria’s domestic policies have bearing on her external political image. In the past they contend, Nigeria paid great attention to domestic policy regardless of her Africa-center-peace policy.

This study also found that Nigeria or at least, some of her past regimes did not consider it a complete misnomer to be steadfast with what she considers her regional foreign policy. Though, she lacks similar consistency or continuity with her domestic policies, she does not think that it is a misguided priority to continue to champion regional peacemaking and peacekeeping missions.

Domestic policies aside, both domestic and foreign policy may operate on two different spheres—national and international but they are not isolated from each other; and either one can dictate the direction of internal or external political out. For example, Nigeria’s ability to carry out peacekeeping missions in West Africa and beyond

15. Aluko, Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy. 3.
(international affairs), depends mainly on her ability to generate the financial means as well as her ability to recruit the needed soldiers (internal affairs), and as such, there should be some level of, or need for consistence between international and domestic policy formulation.

The point here is that Nigeria’s foreign policy formulation since independence has remained consistent no matter how unstructured the implementations are. As Yoroms asserts, “blowing cold, hot or firm, depending on the circumstances in which she found herself.”

Yoroms further argues that:

Nigeria has engaged herself in tackling intractable conflicts and issues on the continent of Africa and the world at large. The foundation of this is rooted on the principle of ‘Africa as the Center-piece of Nigeria’s foreign policy, which has been in practice since independence and was only concretized during the Murtala-Obasanjor regime.

Ibrahim Gambari, commenting on his observation of Major-General Buhari’s administration noted, that the principle:

. . . was imprecise and weak in its implementation. Several questions were raised which were not adequately addressed, let alone resolved. Should we, for example, be a fire brigade, available at any time and place on the continent, to put conflagration? Alternatively, should we respond selectively to crisis areas on the continent that are closer to home or closer to our fundamental security and national interests objectives? . . .

From the first republic, Nigeria’s foreign policy formulation was the responsibility of the federal cabinet. The process was usually dominated by the Prime


17. Ibid., 301.

18. Ibid., 302.
Regardless of who (civilian or military) is in charge of government, the foreign policy implementation and possibly formulation have remained consistent particularly with regards to West Africa and the broader Africa. This is because Nigeria believes that an unstable region could and will impact her internal stability, and as such remains committed to her peacekeeping roles in West Africa. As a former Minister of Nigeria’s Foreign Affairs, detailed in a keynote address:

"... Although the cost in terms of human and material resources are considered quite high, they are regarded as necessary sacrifice for the attainment of peace and stability within the sub-region ..." In other words, Nigeria can afford to make sacrifices in terms of her national welfare in lieu of regional stability. After all, Nigeria argues, regional instability could devastate internal stability. Moreover, there are other more complex variables involved in the formulation of national policies including: the federal character principles, equal representation of all states within the federation, or “national interest must be conceived and in such a manner that it incorporates the particularistic interest of the component member-units of the Federation.”

**Economic Assistance**

It is against the foregoing background that Nigeria continues relentlessly to sponsor, assist and support many African states that have needed and/or requested her assistance, whether with economic, technical and/or human resources (Table 2).

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Table 2. Patterns of Nigeria’s Financial Assistance to Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial No</th>
<th>Recipient Country</th>
<th>Amount Received in Naira</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>4,325,239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>214,912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>200,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>407,875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>20,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>342,105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>333,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>320,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1,007,893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>60,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>675,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Sao Tomé and Principe</td>
<td>60,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>646,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Sao Tomé and Principe</td>
<td>124,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As Yomi Akinyeye contends, Nigeria after independence chose the doctrine of African-center-piece policy and has continued to put African interest in the forefront of her foreign pursuits. Additionally, there are several instances where Nigeria contributed, and continues to contribute to regional and continental economic development. A clear example of this was noted by Iweriebor and U homoibhi:

In the economic and financial spheres Nigeria has similarly contributed to economic projects and provided financial resources to promote the development of African countries and regional economic activities. In the area of industrial projects she has invested in sugar and cements plants in Benin Republic and Iron ore mining in Guinea. In terms of financial resources for development purposes, Nigeria established the Nigeria Trust Fund within the African Development Bank. This Trust Fund provides concessional loans to African countries to undertake

development projects with long and convenient payment terms. Aside from direct economic and financial aid, Nigeria has attempted to move African development to a stage and condition in which it would be based on extensive economic production and interaction and active economic and commercial exchange of goods and services within Africa which provides goods and services within and among African countries. This requires the creation of a vastly productive industrial and agricultural capacity within Africa which would provide the goods and services to be exchanged. But to facilitate this commercial exchange system requires the creation of regional economic arrangements or groups where this process will commence and the eventual attainment of this interaction at the continental level through an economic community and a common market. Thus, at the sub-regional level, Nigeria was at the forefront of the creation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), established in 1975, an organization which was to promote co-operation and development in all fields of economic activity, including industry, transportation, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions and to promote co-operation and development in social and cultural matters for the purpose of raising the standard of living of the African peoples. . . .

In spite of issues with border disputes, either with Chad, Niger, or the more trying Cameroon/Nigeria (Bakassi/Cross-River State) disputes, these issues have not dampened Nigeria’s willingness to continue to extend a hand in assistance, to various states within the West African region and beyond. Additionally, Nigeria, whether in staying true to the last instrument of statehood—her foreign policy stance or adhering to “Nigeria’s good neighbourliness policy,” remains adamant on all levels of international assistance, which as indicated by Saliu, “is a consistent theme in the country’s foreign policy.”

Nigeria’s assistance to her neighbors takes the form of loans, intellectual capital, and/or the provision and maintenance of institutions. For example, “To date, Nigeria


maintains a polytechnic in Equatorial Guinea and contributed to road construction and other infrastructural facilities." Even though Nigeria, in the international sphere, may not be accorded recognition for her numerous forms of assistance, her very overt efforts in these areas cannot be denied in Africa, as well as around the world. The above statement is further supported by Iweriebor and Uhomoibhi's assertion that:

All exposition of Nigeria's contributions to various African countries within and outside Africa will run into several volumes. But Nigeria's contributions can be briefly outlined in terms of bilateral aid to the African world and contributions to world peace and security through the United Nations system.

Furthermore, the inquiry reveals that, consistently, at all levels, whether regionally and/or worldwide, Nigeria continues to assist financially and otherwise, as the need demands. As evidenced by the UN report of, 17 September 2005, the Secretary General Kofi Annan, stated that, the Nigerian government, in addition to donating to the Tsunami relief fund, has also extended the sum of 1 million dollars towards relief for victims of hurricane Katrina in the United States. Additionally, and further giving credence to this study's fundamental inquiry, is the above stated UN report. Equally alluding to these facts, Ayo Akinbobola contends that, Nigeria provides aid and


assistance to diverse areas, which is not predicated on exploitation. The provision of aid is an important part of Nigeria’s foreign policy.\(^\text{28}\)

The general assumption of foreign aid to countries in Africa including Nigeria is that comes from the west—Britain, France, the United States, etc.: hardly are there any assumptions of aid from within the West African region. As noted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and cited by Akinbobola, foreign aid is “the flow of responses from the industrialized countries to the less developing countries.”\(^\text{29}\) Moreover, majority of these aid from industrialized countries is in form of loans and through either the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and almost always, with conditions such as devaluation of the receiving country’s currency, and/or the subjection of its citizens to some form of a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP).

In essence, there are several categories of foreign aid and is not always from the industrialized to the developing countries. Viewing foreign aid from a more divergent perspective, Akinbobola states that, in practice, foreign aid has been the subject of much international controversy. Part of the basis for this controversy is that the donors have mostly been countries of the Northern hemisphere. This has tended to generate immense geo-political concerns in aid relations and in international politics.\(^\text{30}\) He further observed


\(^{29}\) Ibid., 21.

\(^{30}\) Ibid., 23.
that the international controversy results from the categories, manners, and practices with which the aid is delivered. Akinbobola in his contention and citing Morgenthau, states that there are six types of aid, which include: humanitarian, subsistence, military, prestige, economic development and bribery.31

In further elaboration of these types of aid, Akinbobola, further alluding to Morgenthau’s suggestion, noted that almost all of the above mentioned aid have political implications—“all but humanitarian aid is used to pursue political objectives. Even humanitarian aid assumes political role where it operates within a political framework, in which case, it begins to perform political functions.”32 No wonder most types of foreign aid generate international controversy. On the other hand, Akinbobla asserts:

Nigeria’s assistance to other countries has involved all the major forms of aid. There has been no real emphasis on any particular category. However, there appears to have a greater emphasis on bilateral than multilateral assistance which only recently began to gain added impetus in the foreign economic policy in the Second Republic compared to the First which was largely dominated by the technical assistance.33

The UN Limited Role and Nigeria’s Commitment

The end of the Cold War diminished competition for allies in Africa by the “superpowers.” The United Nations as well has limited its role and the extent of its peacemaking, even though, as stipulated in the UN Charter, the main responsibility of the

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid., 24.

maintenance of international peace and security rests with the UN Security Council.³⁴

This scenario of limited role by the international body, created a subsequent void, particularly as the nature of conflicts has also changed. According to Furley and May’s explanation;

In years peacekeeping in Africa has been attempted, it has developed into extraordinary functionary. It is closely allied with peacemaking involving the political process of bringing the warring factions together securing cease-fire and establishing peace talks and helping to negotiating peace accords.³⁵

Nigeria’s audacity for commitment to regional peace and security comes from several stated factors, but her tenacity and capacity for peacemaking in the West African region and beyond, stems from immensely increased resources. According to Olajide Aluko in his work, Essays In Nigerian Foreign Policy, there can be no doubt that the most powerful factor in Nigeria’s more determined and positive line in the affairs of the African continent has been her own increased economic and military strength,³⁶ and according to the UN report of February 1, 2006, on troop contribution:

By 2005, Nigeria has been named among the largest contributors of troops to UN peacekeeping missions. A ranking completed by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations on a monthly basis showed that as at April this year,

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³⁶. Aluko, Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy, 32.
Nigeria is actually the fourth largest contributors to the UN peacekeeping missions coming after Pakistan, Bangladesh and India\(^{37}\) (see Table 3).

Table 3. Top Ten Contributors of Military Troops and Police Personnel to UN Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>264,236</td>
<td>7,340</td>
<td>114,235</td>
<td>94,344</td>
<td>55,657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>233,393</td>
<td>6,483</td>
<td>103,007</td>
<td>87,344</td>
<td>43,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>146,539</td>
<td>4,071</td>
<td>75,708</td>
<td>36,902</td>
<td>33,929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>111,886</td>
<td>3,108</td>
<td>36,068</td>
<td>41,485</td>
<td>34,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>98,577</td>
<td>2,738</td>
<td>36,799</td>
<td>36,350</td>
<td>25,428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>84,537</td>
<td>2,348</td>
<td>41,551</td>
<td>28,501</td>
<td>14,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>79,648</td>
<td>2,212</td>
<td>36,180</td>
<td>24,507</td>
<td>18,961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>76,476</td>
<td>2,124</td>
<td>29,644</td>
<td>25,743</td>
<td>21,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>72,439</td>
<td>2,012</td>
<td>41,041</td>
<td>30,315</td>
<td>1,083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>62,244</td>
<td>1,729</td>
<td>17,914</td>
<td>22,834</td>
<td>21,496</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3...PBC](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3...PBC).

Explanatory Note:

Resolution /60/180 requests the Secretary General to provide a list of the top ten providers of military personnel and civilian police to United Nations missions. Base on the average monthly contributions in the previous three calendar years.

Data for monthly contributions has been obtained from DPKO. Yearly averages have been complied on the basis of cumulative totals for each contributor, divided by 12 months. Peacemaking as articulated by Furley and May, is the process that may accompany either peacekeeping or peace enforcement—an ongoing process.\(^{38}\) There is however, an African tradition of peacemaking—meaning that historically, Africans have a traditional approach to peacemaking. This involves community leaders who in the past,


sometimes served as both traditional and spiritual leaders who had power over the ordinary citizens. With the arrival of the colonizers, and their subsequent control of all affairs, it became the duty of these individual new comers to administer solutions to issues, with the traditional leaders as intermediaries between families, groups, communities, as well as between clans and tribes. But with the advent of the new independent states (formally colonized states), the United Nations, Human Right Organizations, Global Village, the New World Order, peacemaking has taken on new forms of administration, particularly as disputes have taken on new forms of manifestation too, and with more deadly consequences.

**Regional Political Rivalry**

In addition to striving for regional political stability and economic sustainability, Nigeria has to also develop policies to encourage cooperation among member states to strive for a more tranquil territory. In the analysis of the West African region, the inquiry revealed that, there are issues that work against a more solid political and economic integration of the region. These key issues are border disputes, the difference between the Anglo-phone and Franco-phone states, and the vital interests of the ex-colonizers, particularly the French and the British.

There are other issues, but of those identified above, the most challenging is the border disputes—a consequence of colonial boundaries. To look more closely, since independence, Nigeria has had to deal with one area of border conflict or another. As depicted in Figure 3, Nigeria shares borders with five other countries at all four coordinates of the country. According to Akindele and Ate, "since independence,
Nigeria's relationship with its contiguous neighbours has been marked essentially by mutual suspicions, distrust and outright alienation. What these authors attempted to establish, is the impediment of the various artificial borders introduced by the colonizers and how incredibly daunting it has become for all concerned.

To better understand the implication(s) of border disputes, an understanding of the concept of "region," is quite pertinent in this research. Region, as well as the twin concept of regionalism, is a critical concept in the field of political science. According to Ferris, for example, "the study of regionalism is the study of the relations between people and the places in which they live." In line with Ferris' assertion, and, despite some security breaches and threats to her citizens, Nigeria, tries to devise ways to achieve amicable arrangement with the other governments of the disputed areas. For example,

In May 1981, some Camerounian troops ambushed and killed five Nigerian soldiers at Ikang, a border town adjoining Cross River State, raising a storm of protest by Nigerians for retaliation. Some years after this unprovoked aggression, Camerounian security personnel, again blatantly occupied Nigerian villages, hoisted their flag, collected taxes and generally terrorized the bewildered villagers. In 1983, there was an attempt by Chadian soldiers to similarly overrun and occupy Nigerian islands on the Lake Chad, a body of water which Nigeria shares with Chad, Niger and Cameroun. In early 1987 it was widely reported in the Nigerian Press (later confirmed by the authorities) that Equatorial Guinea—an Island territory formally ruled by Spain—just fifteen minutes by air from the Nigerian south-eastern coast, had permitted apartheid South Africa to establish a foothold in that territory. The real significance for Nigerians of this 'discovery' was that South Africa had a hidden design to use this contact for purposes of surprise military attack and/or electronic surveillance against Nigeria. And more recently in May 1991, some Cameroun security personnel abducted six Nigerians from Mbo Local Government Area in Akwa Ibom State, took them into

39. R. A. Akindele and Bassey E. Ate, Selected Reading on Nigeria's Foreign Policy and International Relations (Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Victoria Island, 2000), 172.

Cameroun territory where they were detained and tortured for about two weeks before being released, after diplomatic intervention by the Nigerian government.41

Part of Nigeria’s decision to treat the border disputes with caution and moral consideration stems from the fact that, peoples from these disputed areas are ethno-culturally linked to similar populations in Nigeria. Equally, many Nigerian citizens share history, geography, kith, and kin with other groups of people from these areas of dispute. These interrelationships make the installation of physical demarcation a difficult proposition for the governments concerned. Ate and Akinterinwa argue, “features that bind and also strain—meaning that the fact of history generally should be regarded as a binding factor which, if constructively harnessed, ought to promote a harmonious relationship rather than conflict.”42

Secondly, the other key issue which exacerbates regional political rivalry among the various states in the West African region is the Anglo-phone/Franco-phone dichotomy. This problem was precipitated by France, who had and still has major influence on several states in the region, and whose influence continues to hinder complete political integration of the region. On this point, Aluko’s contention is enlightening.

It is no secret that it has been the cardinal policy of the French to encourage close co-operation among its former West African colonies in order to counterbalance the weight of Nigeria. In pursuit of this policy the French inspired the establishment of an exclusively francophone West African economic community


42. Bassey E. Ate, Nigeria’s Relations with its Immediate Neighbours: A Security-Political Analysis in Selected Reading on Nigeria’s Foreign Policy and International Relations (Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Victoria Island, 2000), 176.
between 1971 and 1972, the Communaute Economique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEAO) whose final agreement was signed in Abidjan in April 1973. . . .

The establishment of this exclusively Franco-phone economic organization was to deter or forestall the formation of ECOWAS.

Another key issue and a major obstacle to regional political integration, is the vital interests of the ex-colonizers, particularly the French. The very overt presence of the French and their military in the West Africa region, poses a security threat, and also has negative influences on regional political integration. Moreover, the French presence influences regional political rivalry among some smaller Franco-phone countries that depend on France for their security. Consequently, Nigeria, in order not to undermine its quest for regional security and political stability, is taking steps towards a new policy agenda for the contiguous sub-region; it is in this regard that Ate advised that Nigeria, “must take a serious account of the French position as a ‘regional’ actor. This does not mean that we should regard the presence of France as an inhibitive factor on Nigeria’s Policy.”

Additionally, Nigeria has to be conscious of the strategic significance of regional political unity for West Africa, such as the North-East corridor and the maritime states of Cross River and Akwa Ibom. In the same view Ate points out that, “Hence there is a substantial truth in saying that Nigeria’s national security interests are intertwined with


44. Bassey E. Ate, Nigeria’s Relations with its Immediate Neighbours: A Security-Political Analysis in Selected Reading on Nigeria’s Foreign Policy and International Relations (Lagos: Victoria Island, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs 2000), 176.
the systemic security of the sub-region."45 Nigeria notwithstanding, any state with complete sovereignty will want and needs security for its citizens.

As found by this inquiry, there is a huge policy difference between Nigeria’s domestic and foreign policy. While externally, Nigeria has maintained a consistent—"Africa-center-piece policy;" internally, it lacks similar consistency.

The lack of consistency for example, in internal (domestic) economic policies, which itself, is as a result of none existence of well established and/or poorly established and operated government institutions, e.g., in December 1983, Shagari’s administration (civil) was displaced by the Buhari’s administration (military) and twenty months later (August) 1985, the Babangida’s military administration took over power from the Buhari’s regime. With the constantly changing government, there was no time for policy implementation or time to ascertain the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of any implemented policy. According to Abubakar Momoh, in the Political Economy of Transition to Civil Rule:

Following his ascendance to power; IBB set in place the Political Transition Program (PTP) and the Economic Transition Program (ETP). It was in this context that the transition to civil rule and the SAP were conceived . . . The result of this being the sensitisation of Nigerians into accepting the nebulous, Maradona syndrome—a culture characterized by roguery and swindling. The combination interplay of PTP and ETP created an emergency (new) SAP class, which further improvised the workers, peasants and middle class. . .46

45. Ibid., 175.

The point here is that, granted, external political environment is different from domestic environment, every Nigerian government (civilian or military), managed to maintain the Africa center piece policy—showing level of consistency. In contrast and as indicated above, since national and international affairs both can dictate the direction of one or the other, their relative economic/political issues should impact on another.

**Extra-African Countries**

Due to the dependent nature of virtually all the states in the West African sub-region, Nigeria included, on the extra-African countries, for intricate network of economic, military and some levels of cultural ties, a complete independence of these states may be unattainable. For example, About ten Franco-phone countries affiliated their currencies to the Communaute Financiere Africaine (CFA) franc, to the French franc. Issues such as that of the currency affiliation could result in an indirect control of these countries’ foreign reserves by France. It is matters such as the currency affiliation, that add to further motivate Nigeria’s need for regional economic sustainability hence, her relentless efforts for the creation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975 and other similar economic integration endeavors.

Virtually all countries in the West African region were colonized by some European countries, particularly Britain and France, for more than half a century. Over this period of colonization, none of these countries were able to develop adequate

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economic institutions, infrastructure as well as political structures. Consequently, these counties have built a relationship of ‘intricate network of economic, political and some cultural ties,’ with their ex-colonizers. This type of relationship is that of dependency — meaning that though, these African countries are now “politically independent,” they are still very dependent on their ex-colonizers (the Extra-African countries) for many of their economic, financial, military, and other such technical needs.

The relationship as stated above is seen as these: the African countries are dependent on the Extra-African countries, but in reality, the relationship is more complex, because even though the Extra-African-countries are economically developed and politically more established, they look to their ex-colonies for some of their raw materials such as rubber, coco, crude oil, to name but a few. Thus each side finds de-linking from one another, a difficult proposition. Despite these scenarios however, terms of trade or terms of exchange of one good with another, are unequal and as Kunirum Osia alluded to, developing countries, particularly African counties, are still at an unequal level of economic development vis-a-vis the industrialized counties which seem to be the purveyors of globalization.

The final analysis of this chapter is that Nigeria since her independence in 1960 and before, has sought ways to help eliminate and/or prevent any and all African nations from colonial rule and the negative impacts of colonization, by championing various

48. Ibid.

causes that promotes economic sustainability, political stability as well as regional security in West Africa and beyond.

Sometimes these causes have generated controversial questions from political observers, as to Nigeria’s motivation for championing regional peacekeeping efforts or her intent for extending economic assistance in the region. So far, the findings in this study have not indicated that Nigeria’s motivation for her peacekeeping roles in West Africa is for reasons other than regional political stability and security. As observed by Yoroms;

... the fundamental objectives of Nigeria’s foreign policy clearly delineated her concerns for African regional security and development. These, among others include: The creation of relevant political conditions in Africa and the rest of the world to facilitate the preservation of the territorial integrity and security of all African countries, while at the same time fostering national self-reliance and rapid economic development in Africa; ...\(^{50}\)

Finally, the analysis of Nigeria’s peacekeeping role in West African from the point of view of the Inter-Agency Framework for conflict Analysis in Transition (IAFCA), introduces a new dimension of analyzing a regional peacekeeping missions particularly as it relates to roles played by individual countries.

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CHAPTER III

NIGERIA IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA

Historical Background

From 1958 to the time of her political independence in 1960 and from the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 and beyond, Nigeria has been at the helm of all affairs of African unity. This applied particularly, in relation to the de-colonization process of many African nations and the eventual dismantling of apartheid in Southern Africa. Thus, Akinterinwa observed that, “... Nigeria has, until now, been very instrumental to the maintenance of peace and security in Africa.”

(Equally, either unilaterally or) Nigeria has been involved in many roles in Africa: as a member of one of the international organizations, including the AOU, now African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), or the Commonwealth of Nations. As a member of the United Nations Organization (UNO) Nigeria has participated in many of its programs, such as the United Nations Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (TCDC) created in 1970. On several occasions Nigeria embarked on ways and means of advancing positive African issues and causes, especially issues affecting her immediate neighbours, from the Gulf of Guinea, to Benin Republic, the Cameroons, to Chad and Niger Republic as well as causes of Africans in the Diaspora. Sule Lamido has pointed one such instance when he stated that:

To further consolidate relations with our neighbours and to provide alternate mechanism for constructive engagement with our neighbours on economic, political, maritime and boundary issues, we have reactivated the Gulf of Guinea Commission and expanded the membership to include all countries sharing common maritime borders within the Gulf of Guinea Basin. These include Nigeria, Cameroun, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Gabon, Angola, Congo Brazzaville and Congo Kinshasha.\(^2\)

In addition to the TCDC, Nigeria in 1987, established the Technical Aid Corp (TAC). According to Mamman Daura, “TAC Scheme is a whole-owned (fully funded) Nigeria initiative, which seeks to promote socio-economic development in friendly developing countries of the South.”\(^3\) Table 4 depicts the various countries that have benefited from TAC since its inception. Though TAC was established in 1987, Nigeria, long before then and as evidenced in the earlier chapter, has since her political independence, given various forms of assistance to many countries. Case in point, “Nigerian Technical Aid Corp was formally established in 1987 out of a desire by the Nigerian government to streamline the hitherto uncoordinated foreign aid and technical assistance programme.”\(^4\)


\(^4\) Ibid., 373.
Table 4. Deployment of Technical Aid Corps Volunteers Since Inception from 1987-2004

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<td>12</td>
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<td>25. Seychelles</td>
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<tr>
<td>26. Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>29. St. Kitts &amp; Nevis</td>
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<td>30. Kenya</td>
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<td>31. Tanzania</td>
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<td>32. Shelter Afrique</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>33. Uganda</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,677</strong></td>
<td><strong>21</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
<td><strong>58</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>122</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Whether the issue is with the United Nations, the Economic Community of West African States, or the African Union, Nigeria has never hesitated to participate at significant levels. Echoing similar sentiments, Iweriebor and Uhomoibhi contend that, in
addition to contributing tremendously to the development of African countries, Nigeria has provided free untied aid in the areas of technical assistance (various specialties), financial assistance and economic investments, and conflict resolution among several African countries unilaterally, bilaterally, and multilaterally through the OAU and other regional arrangements. For example, Nigeria, as far back as 1962, sent troops to help quell the mutiny against Tanganyika; also in 1981, Nigeria spear-headed the first ever OAU peace-keeping operations to resolve the conflict in Chad.

In the course of this study, the literature reviewed showed that Nigeria’s willingness to participate in any international matters necessitating assistance (in both financial and human resources), be it on the continental level, global level, or both, is a policy based principally on the will to limit and if possible, eradicate general human suffering. It is also quite ironic that Nigeria strives very hard at the international level to prevent human suffering, but lacks the same zeal internally. Or as “Larry King of the Cable Network News (CNN) organization once stated, Nigeria exports what she does not have while importing what she has in abundance.” What Mr. King saw as ironic and was alluding to, is Nigeria’s ability to assist in bringing peace to Liberia and Sierra Leone, by enhancing the installation of the then, democratically elected presidents of both counties, whereas, her own head of state (General - Sani Abacha) at that time, was


considered a dictator. Secondly, with the abundance of crude oil—a base for petroleum, Nigeria as at then, was importing all her petroleum products; quite ironic indeed.

Nigeria’s foreign policy has remained relatively consistent especially towards Africa. This was the same point implied by Obiozor, who stated that, "... historically, Nigeria’s foreign policy has been influenced and guided by a commitment to five broadly defined principles: Respect for the sovereignty and independence of nations, Non-Alignment, Non-Interference in the internal affairs of other nations, Multilateral diplomacy, and Decolonization". Through this inquiry, Nigeria’s regional multilateral roles can be better understood against the background of her past and current international roles, and policy agendas set forward for future policy implementations.

Here Ate’s suggested new policy framework and indicated that, Nigeria should institute diplomatic dialogue with governments of her immediate neighbours—to solicit their opinions or “sound them out” as it were, which is a way of building consensus on the general proposed development and integration agenda for the region, and to establish a common market located strategically in the trans-border areas. He further stated that, the common market, apart from serving as a center of commercial interaction on a larger scale which the people require, such markets in the African tradition is a unifying force that strengthens existing socio-ethno-cultural and personal ties.


The above agendas, Ate argues, must include the introduction of free movement of people and goods to facilitate participation in the larger economy of these countries. Additionally, the creation of embracive trans-boarder local government areas, to co-ordinate activities with the commercial zones and to provide service for trans-border communities; the author further states that, the above suggested framework should also include broadening of areas of coordination and unified operations of the following tangible matters: defense and intelligence, fisheries and mineral explorations, custom and immigration, language and cultural developments, etc.9

As stated earlier, it is necessary to evaluate the vast literature on Nigeria’s foreign policy and international politics because their details enhance the analysis of Nigeria’s international peacekeeping roles and help direct focus on the different intricate issues associated with peacekeeping, such as multilateral collaboration, financial obligation and other such issues. As Magbadelo asserts:

Aside from her multilateral relations through the regional integration strategy, Nigeria has been deeply involved in fostering bilateral relations with several African countries, relations bordering on the economic, cultural political and diplomatic concerns, aimed at further entrenching the bonds of friendly and cordial relations across the African region. Nigeria believes that peaceful coexistence among countries of Africa is a prerequisite for the creation of a formidable regional integration institution to which all member-States would show allegiance. This explains why the country has continued to expend huge sums of money on peace-keeping operations in the continent.10

9. Ibid.

Magbadelo assertions further indicates to some extent, the length and breadth Nigeria has gone to encourage economic development though economic integration and bring peace to African countries; or as noted by Akinterinwa, “… Nigeria is unreservedly committed to the development of Africa.”\textsuperscript{11}

In all the different literature reviewed above so far, none has confirmed any other motive or intent by Nigeria for the multilateral roles in the West African region, other than regional political stability/regional economic integration. It is important to note, however, that some scholars have suggested the need for Nigeria to focus on her internal affairs, so as to be better positioned as an eventual regional power.

**Nigeria’s Position in the Broader African Context**

Nigeria, for many years has played important roles in many African issues—from the eradication of colonialism/apartheid, to peace promotion - peace enforcement, and/or peacekeeping. One of Nigeria’s “foreign policy cardinal objectives is the promotion and sustainment of peace in Africa.”\textsuperscript{12} Akinterinwa, writing on Nigeria’s foreign policy, contends that, “since the attainment of political independence, Nigeria has been virtually committed to the promotion of peace in Africa. The zeal with which the country pursues the agenda of peace and security regime in Africa became more pronounced, particularly after the conclusion of her 30–month civil war…”\textsuperscript{13}


\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 49.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
This statement by Akinterinwa continues to substantiate many earlier similar statements by various authors on Nigeria’s multilateral roles in Africa. Similarly, Iweriebor and Uhomoibhi observed that, “A full exposition on Nigeria’s contributions to various African countries within and outside Africa, will run into several volumes. But Nigeria’s contributions can be firefly outlined in terms of bilateral aid to the African world and contributions to world peace and security through the United Nations system.”

To further reconcile Iweriebor and Uhomoibhi’s statement on Nigeria’s roles in Africa and African affairs, other similar indications in political literature, also showed that, the reason for Nigeria’s multilateral roles in West Africa, is as a result of her geographical location, and her experience with civil war and colonialism, is why Nigeria endeavours to ensure regional stability and tranquility. Magbadelo on his part asserts that, “Nigeria has continued to show immense concern for issues bordering on the development of Africa since periods before her attainment of sovereign statehood. The country’s focus on Africa could be explained in part as a conscious resolve by both the nationalist and post-independence leadership to shoulder the burden of the black man.”

Regardless of the fact that Nigeria herself is still struggling with economic development—lacking the necessary economic structures and infrastructure to continuously champion African affairs, she forges ahead anyway. Echoing the same sentiment, Gambari states that, “the effort to re-define foreign spheres where we are in a


position to exert any real influence; where we stand best to realize our national interest; a policy which Nigeria would play the role of a sub-continental power and where our immediate neighbours would rightly be our priority.”16 Gambari’s assertion corresponds to an article “The New Realism in Foreign Policy,” by National Concord.

The article by National Concord was at the time, echoing the general opinion of the Nigerian public and other political observers, which was and is still that, Nigeria should concentrate most of the effort put into assisting many states within the African continent, into the structuring and restructuring of Nigeria’s socioeconomic and sociopolitical affairs and/or on the West African region alone. Gambari concurring with the above statement, elaborated, “There is little point in deceiving ourselves that we can play the policeman in Africa. We cannot. And it would be ridiculous to believe otherwise, because while ours may in fact be the most populous state on the continent, we seem to lack the economic status necessary for effective diplomacy on a continental basis.”17 Despite all the cautions from many streams of the public opinion, Nigeria has continued to pursue what Aluko called “promotion of African unity and solidarity,”18 either through the AU, ECOWAS/ECOMOG, or unilaterally.

In 1976 for example, Nigeria allowed the South African Peoples Organization (SWAPO), to open offices in different cities in Nigeria and extended the same gesture to the African National Congress (ANC) and the South African branch of Pan-African


17. Ibid.

18. Aluko, Essays In Nigerian Foreign Policy, 24.
Congress (PAC) as well. The operation of these offices, facilitated coordination of various refugee relief activities by these groups' representatives. Even though Nigeria's actions were necessary at the time, particularly for the care of the refugees but according to Bukar Bukarambe, "...successive Nigerian governments habitually employed rhetoric's that cut a chord with the general public. Such strategies of rousing public sentiments also served the additional purpose of popularizing the government of the day."\(^1\)

Within West Africa and in the broader African continent, Nigeria has played major roles—politically, economically, and culturally and from all indications, will continue to play major roles in these matters. Apart from the stated motivation for these roles, Nigeria also believes, that her internal political stability indirectly depends on the stability of the West African region. Evidence of this has been indicated in previous chapters of this study. Furthermore, Nigeria was negotiating loans with the International Monetary fund (IMF), to cover importation of goods and services while at the same time, providing financial assistance and grants to some African governments—hardly the time for any government to continue to be generous (financially or otherwise).

According Yaqub, during the civilian administration and President “Shehu Shagari a pacifist,” and wanting to maintain Nigeria's “Africa-center-piece policy,” not only hosted the first OAU summit in Lagos, in April of 1980, but also provided the Zimbabwean newly elected president (Robert Mugabe), a grant of $5 million at the

Zimbabwe’s independent election, that gave him power as the first post Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) era in Zimbabwe.\textsuperscript{20}

It is obvious from different statements by various authors referenced above, that Nigeria’s roles in the continent of Africa has been extensive; these roles include economic assistance, technical aid, diplomatic relations, regional political security (peacekeeping/peace enforcement) and social cultural endeavors, to name but a few. It is also evident, from some African political observers that Nigeria intends to continue playing these roles in Africa. According to Kuna, “Nigeria is the only country in the world with the largest concentration of black people. And the most populous country in Africa, it is perceived and perceives itself as responsible for Africa and its problems.”\textsuperscript{21}

**Nigeria at the Multilateral Level**

In spite of Nigeria’s undeveloped economy, various Nigerian governments have perpetually indicated that championing African affairs and building partnership with other nations and organizations (both regionally and globally), is the only way Nigeria can grow economically as well as politically. According to Magbadelo, “it is note worthy that, although these objectives of Nigeria’s foreign policy have been criticized variously

\begin{footnotesize}

\end{footnotesize}
as overly ambitious, un-representative of the country’s core-national interests, and limited in focus, they have continued to influence successive Nigerian governments. . . 22

There is really no evidential indication found by this inquiry, to support any other reason(s) for Nigeria’s multilateral roles in Africa, than the ones state earlier, which are that Nigeria seeks economic development though economic integration in and within the West African region and beyond. Nigeria also believes that unstable region will affect her domestic stability and as such endeavors through diplomatic relationships, economic assistance, peacekeeping and peace enforcement mission, and several bilateral collaborations in conflict resolutions around the African continent.

In Aluko’s view, “another aspect of Nigeria’s attitude to intra-African economic co-operation is her growing anxiety over any association or regional grouping whose activities are regarded in Lagos as being incompatible with the OAU Charter. She has not hesitated to make other African countries aware of her concerns.”23 While Aluko is diplomatic in his contentions of the possible precipitants of Nigeria’s multilateral involvement in most African courses, some Nigerian political scholars such as Chuibuzo N. Nwoke, Bassey E. Ate, and Bola A. Akinterinwa, to name a few, are not.

Nwoke on his part, pinpoints what he considers a ‘new order’ – “that will be even more inequitable and inimical to the development aspirations and needs of the poor developing countries than the ‘old’ order against which they have been protesting for


23. Aluko, Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy, 29.
years." This study’s deduction from Nwoke’s assertions is that perhaps Nigeria’s multilateral endeavours in Africa and particularly in the West African region, is a way to reduce the extensive encroachment by the industrialized nations, an encroachment that Nwoke further termed, Economic Diplomacy in a Neo-Colonial Society.

By this term (Economic Diplomacy in a Neo-Colonial Society), Nwoke infers that, African economy is hijacked by largely European and American domination—a practice that prevents many peasant and cottage-industry driven economies from economic advancement, economic sustainability, and perpetual inequitable competition in the global market. This concept is further reinforced by Kunirum Osia who notes, “those that protest against ‘globalization’, feel that, in large measure, the continuing deprivations, inequality and rising disparities in the level of living that they see in current period, are distrustful not only of the agents of globalization but insist that the concept itself does not have universal applicability.”

The implication of Osia’s assertion is that globalization and/or neo-colonial economic practices are one and the same, and that at best these terms are ambiguous—designed for continuous marginalization of non-industrialized nations (almost all African nations), by the industrialized world (mostly of Europe and North America).

Regardless of the term or terms used—“new order,” “new world order,” “old order,” globalization, etc., what can be said about Nigeria’s international affairs, is that she has maintained a high degree of diplomacy around the world. Despite her


undeveloped economy and constantly changing government (mostly of military regimes); Nigeria’s diplomatic/foreign affairs policies including foreign policy implementations have been quite consistent, especially when compared with other more established governments.

Some authors like Yoroms, hold a different view regarding Nigeria’s foreign policy. As he contends, “It is believed Nigerian foreign policy had no focus, but was only pursued on the maniac quest for liberating Africa from colonial rule in a poorly articulated manner. . .” 26 However, other authors such as Oluyemi-Kusa, hold a different view on Nigeria’s foreign policy. She intimates that, “Any discourse on the new foreign policy thrust for Nigeria without adequate consideration for Nigeria’s policy on Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, IDPs, is incomplete . . .” 27 Similarly, Magbadelo, contend that:

Nigeria has continued to show immense concern for issues bordering on the development of Africa since periods preceding her attainment of sovereign statehood. The country’s focus on Africa could be explained in part as a conscious resolve by both the nationalists and post-independent leadership to shoulder the burden of the black man based on awareness that Nigeria is the abode of the black race... Indeed, Nigeria’s consistency in her concern for Africa is evident in the adoption of Africa as the cornerstone of the country’s foreign policy. 28

Finally, Nigeria’s multilateral endeavors in Africa - regionally and in the broader African continent, have gained little international attention. Though such attention and/or


recognition would important but so far, what the inquiry in study revealed, is that Nigeria is propelled by the need for national/regional security coupled with her experience with external encroachment during her 30-month civil war and as such, continues to push adamantly, towards an eventual complete African peoples’ peaceful coexistence with each other.

**Nigeria’s Military Strength**

It is essential to understand that power is an important component of a viable legitimate state or sovereignty. Power is a composite of human resources, natural resources, economic development, socioeconomic sustainability, political stability and other such related structures such as, financial/political institutions and the related infrastructure. Before further analysis of Nigeria’s peacekeeping roles, this study will try to define/explain power- both regional and global. Power in the context of world politics, is understood to encompass wealth—money, land, and other such properties that constitute assets. However: there must be balance of power. According to Claude Jr., “The Balance of Power is a system of political dynamics that comes into play whenever a society articulates itself into a number of mutually independent local states. . . In such a world the Balance of Power operates in a general way to keep the average caliber of states low in terms of every criterion for the measurement of political power. . .”

Another aspect of power is human resource, yet it alone is not enough to sustain power or substitute for other necessary components of power. Large human resources however, can give access to large armed forces and can add to enhance and/or facilitate

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political power within the context of world politics. As echoed by Oche, a country’s military power can be measured essentially by the size of its armed forces and the number and diversity of the weapons it possesses.\(^{30}\)

Nigeria, in spite of her enormous human resources (about 140,000,000 people), her equally impressive natural resources, such as crude oil and other minerals, lacks an equally impressive global political strength. One of the main reasons for this deficiency stems from Nigeria’s lack of adequate socioeconomic structure, sustainable economic structure and other such power—enhancing/facilitating elements as indicated above.

The main reason for Nigeria’s the lack of adequate economic development, can be attributed to Nigeria’s undisciplined past and present leaderships (both military and civilian). Other reasons are also due to the unequal terms of trade between the developed world (mostly Europe and North America), and the developing world (all of Africa and other regions of the world). Echoing the same sentiments on the unequal terms of trade; Sunday Dare points to the insatiable appetite of the Western countries for Africa’s diverse natural resources, as the main precipitant to perpetuate the urge for the exploitation of the African people; initially in form of colonization and more recently, globalization.\(^{31}\)

Within the continent and context of Africa and within the African, particularly in the West African region, Nigeria’s population and her military strength (the size and

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\(^{31}\) Sunday Dare, *A Continent In Crisis: Africa and Globalization*, “Dollars & Sense” (July/August, 2001): 30-32
military equipments), and as stated by Ogaba Oche, “the size of Nigeria’s armed forces, which is 76,000 strong, makes it the 46th largest in the world and one of the largest in Africa,”\(^{32}\) affords her the ability as a regional power. Her military strength as the fourth largest United Nation (UN) troop contributor also makes her a potential global political power.

In the evaluation of almost all political crises that have occurred in several different African countries since Nigeria’s political independence, there is hardly any such incidence that did not involve Nigeria’s military assistance, in one form or the other—either military equipment and/or troops. These findings are not in line with the common assertion by some political scholars that, Nigeria seeks regional hegemony.

Thus far, what the inquiry in this chapter and the previous one shows, is that Nigeria, from the time of her political independence to the present, has remained committed to all causes that aim to liberate Africa and Africans from economic and/or political hardship and despite some assertions of her hegemonic intent, Nigeria has remained steadfast in her quest for a peaceful Africa. For Nigeria to move forward towards a better economic development and economic sustaining state, she has to be recognized beyond her current commonly inferred status of an aspiring regional hegemon.

**Nigeria and the United Nations Security Council**

Proponents of Nigeria’s viability and need for a seat in the UNs Security Council, point to her peacekeeping endeavors as part of Nigeria’s attribute as a viable political

entity within the global political environment. Case in point, "Nigeria’s record in peace-keeping operations worldwide, and particularly in Africa, is impressive and second to none in Africa. The record is a reflection of unwavering commitment to peace as instrument of national and African development. This commitment is explained not just by funding but also by troops’ contribution." What is being expressed here by Akinterinwa is that not only does Nigeria have the capacity (resource wise) but she has also met the requirements in terms of her versatile contributions and commitment to peace around the Africa and the world alike.

The expansion of the United Nations Security Council to include major countries from the developing world, particularly from the continent of Africa, is a fundamental necessity. Advocates for the expansion, indicate that the primary reason for the enlargement of the UN’s Security Council, is for a more global representation. In addition to becoming more globally representative, Iweriobor and Uhomoibhi further contend that, the UNSC should be enlarged, to represent a more democratic, transparent, effective and accountable agency, geared for the improvement of human welfare and the resolution of conflict word-wide.

On the other hand, there are those who argue differently, particularly those permanent members in United Nations Security Council, who represent continents with fewer nations than Africa. For example, the continent of Europe with 46 countries


compare to the continent of Africa with 53 countries (see Table 5), believes that Africa should be equally represented.

Table 5. Structure of an Enlarged UNSC as Recommended by the High-Level Panel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Areas</th>
<th>Number of Seats</th>
<th>Number of P/Seats Now</th>
<th>Rec. New P/Seats Renewable</th>
<th>Rec. 2-Yr. Seats Renewable</th>
<th>Total Seats</th>
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</thead>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>Asia and Pacific</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is important to note that, those with permanent memberships in the UNSC also represent continents with the most industrialized countries. Despite these countries' military powers, economic might as well as being committed to world peace, Akenterinwa questions how many of their citizens were engaged to the maintenance of peace in Africa. In as much as they may be contributing funds, funding alone does not maintain peace nor resolve crises.35 Those who argue for African permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council claim that it is only Africans who can better represent Africa.

On the issue of African representation in the United Nations Security Council on a permanent basis, some proponents for Nigeria’s membership argue that Nigeria should at least occupy one of the seats supposedly reserved for Africa. In their argument, they point to the criteria set forth by the high-level panel on the review of the UN Charter, which includes that the eligible country must contribute most to UN financially, militarily and diplomatically should have their involvement in decision-making increased. . .

It is important to note here that, the United Nations former Secretary General, Kofi Annan, established a high-level Panel to look into the possibility of the enlargement of the United Nations Security Council. The UNSC is charged with maintaining peace and security around the world. For the past decade and half, the numbers of crises around the world have increased, thereby increasing activities of the UNSC. This issue has necessitated many UN member-states to advocate for more representation at the UNSC on permanent basis. Currently there are “only five powerful countries sit as “permanent members” along with ten other member states, elected every two years, for a two-year terms.”

Since the debate has been for ways to enlarge the United Nations Security Council, the High-level Panel has a mandate to come up with ways to improve the UN Charter, bearing in mind “the adoption of the United Nations Millennium Declaration on 8 September 2000 by which member states resolved to intensify efforts ‘to achieve a comprehensive reform of the Security Council in all aspects’ renewed and even increased


the scope of work of the working group . . .”. One of the recommendations of the High-
level Panel was that the United Nations Security Council should be expanded or enlarged
to accommodate the countries with significant number of input to the UN in terms of
financial, military and diplomatic sphere, to be part of the decision-making body.

Secondly, countries that are more representative of the broader membership of the UN should be brought into the decision-making process; the effectiveness of the United Nations Security Council must not be allowed to be impaired; and the United Nations Security Council should be made more democratic and accountable. They concluded their recommendation with a suggested format of expanding the United Nations Security Council with option A and B, (see Table 5).

Based on the recommended set criteria as listed above, proponents for Nigeria’s permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council contend that, as a result of her peacekeeping and peace enforcement in Africa and around the world, Nigeria is the most eligible Black African state to represent the black people of the world. Furthermore, Akinterinwa contends that, “as at today, it is the British people that are represented with Britain’s permanent membership of the UNSC. In the same vein, it is the Americans, the Chinese, the French, etc. that are represented with the US, China’s and France’s membership of the UNSC. So there is the need to have the Black people of the world also represented.”


39. Ibid.
It was essential to evaluate literatures dealing with Nigeria and the United Nations, because within the UN organization, Nigeria plays an important security role (in terms of troop contribution, peacekeeping/peace enforcement). The need to discuss Nigeria's qualification as Africa's permanent representative in the United Nations Security Council is therefore, relevant to the analysis of Nigeria's peacekeeping roles both regionally and globally.
CHAPTER IV
DATA ANALYSIS

This study analyzes the literature reviewed in Chapter I, via the inter-agency framework for conflict analysis in transition (IAFCA) approach and the contemporary history approach. These approaches are different and as such, will be treated separately. The choice of IAFCA is primarily because it addresses peacekeeping dynamics (violent conflicts, ongoing responses, strategic and transition planning), and focuses on the characteristics—key conflict factors, capacities for peace and mapping of ongoing responses, involved with peacekeeping. The contemporary history approach is also used because it analyzes peacekeeping from past and present perspective. These two viewpoints are analyzed in respect of peacekeeping in West Africa.

The contemporary history viewpoint on Nigeria’s roles in West Africa—it is important to note that historically, Nigeria, from time of independence has sort ways to help rid Africa of colonial rule. Equally, Nigeria has continued to extensively contributed resources to course relating to Africa’s freedom from colonization. Nigeria has extended her roles in Africa and West Africa in particular, to include: diplomatic, economic assistance, cultural exchange, social and economic integration, peace enforcement and peacekeeping. These stated roles are better presented from the viewpoint of contemporary history, because the contemporary history utilizes descriptive characteristics to analyze events. By so doing, details of Nigeria’s commitment to
ECOWAS/ECOMOG, as well as the case studies of Liberia and Sierra Leone, are presented sequentially.

**Nigeria’s Commitment to ECOWAS and ECOMOG**

Since its inception, Nigeria has remained committed to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and by extension, its monitoring group (ECOMOG). Nigeria’s commitment to these organizations is examined in relationship to her peacekeeping efforts in the West African region.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established in 1975, and is made up fifteen countries (see Figure 3), essentially to facilitate economic integration among the West African States, to raise the standard of living of its citizens, as well as to foster socioeconomic and sociopolitical relationship between its member-states. The initiative for ECOWAS stemmed from a desire by some of the member states, particularly Nigeria, for an economically and/or politically stable and developing region. In addition to championing the initiative, Nigeria has continued to commit to its existence, operation and by extension, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).

Along the line of Nigeria’s commitment to ECOWAS, Iweriebor and Uhomoibhi assert that, Nigeria contributes thirty-one percent of ECOWAS total annual budget and on occasions supplied other resources such as petroleum products and Nigeria has helped to construct new roads to link up member states.1 As stated earlier, after the years of wonder, 1957-1962, many of these newly independent African states, particularly the

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West African states, were glad to attain independence but looked forward to complete independence for all African states.

Nigeria had always campaigned and aspired for total African independence from their European colonizers. But after the experience of her 30-month long civil war (Nigeria/Biafra, 1967-1970), and the experience of colonization, the need for total African freedom from colonization, became more urgent. Therefore, Nigeria stepped up her efforts towards the attainment of this goal.

Apart from augmenting the goal of total political independence for Africa with both financial and human resource assistance, Nigeria also sought ways to enhance an eventual economic integration in the West African region in the interim, and later to include OAU/AU member-states. As stated earlier, in many of the colonized states including Nigeria, the colonizers had not instituted adequate economic, political or any
form of educational structure/infrastructures, nor had they endeavored to educate many of the colonized Africans; this scenario created room for crises, including anarchy.

Incidentally, this same period (between 1960 and 1988), happened to be a period when there was a power-stalemate in world politics, between the so called “super powers”—the former USSR and the United States of America. This impasse necessitated pacifying some of the newly independent African nations with the supply of arms and/or financial assistance, so that there were less inter-state or intr-state conflicts in around Africa. Also because the Western “super powers” encouraged peace maintenance in most regions in Africa, they compelled the UN which by the way, is charged by its Charter with peacekeeping and/or peace maintenance around the world, to deploy security personnel to maintain peace in some of these African nations under the United Nations Security Council.

Given the fairly calm political climate in many regions in Africa, especially in the West African region, Nigeria, though still bent on complete political independence for the whole of Africa, began to escalate her strategies for regional economic integration. This economic integration, if legalized, Nigeria hopes it will raise the standard of living of many Africans regionally and on the continent level as well.²

With the establishment of ECOWAS in 1975 (made up of 16 West African states initially and currently 15), and the subsequent victory in Zimbabwe by Mr. Robert Mugabe—Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), Nigeria was beginning to attain

its goals. As with any establishment ECOWAS had its challenges especially in the areas of funds needed to sustain the basic day-to-day/ECOMOG’s operations. As noted by a former Nigerian president Babangida, “while appreciating the serious balance of payment problems facing Member States I implore members who are not up-to-date in their contributions to intensify effort to liquidate them . . .”

Adding to the lack of funds, which is a drawback, ECOWAS suffers from the perceived Anglo-phone/Franco-phone dichotomy—a situation which infers that, there was some level of mistrust between the English speaking states and the French speaking ones. Another reason though, more speculative, than factual, was the language barrier between the English speaking group and the French speaking ones.

There were other issues too, such as the often commonly asserted notion by some political propagandists that, Nigeria’s intent for and effort in the formation of ECOWAS, stems from an ulterior desire for regional hegemony. The issues discussed above further retard the achievement of the main idea for the establishment of ECOWAS—which was an economic integration, socio-economic and socio-political relationship among its member-states.

Some progress though has been made, such as the construction of the coastal Trans-West African Highway, the execution of INTERCOM, the operation of the Brown Card Scheme and the implementation of protocols on free movement of persons, right of residence and establishment. As stated in Nigeria and the ECOWAS since 1985, “The

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first major area of activity of the ECOWAS was the dismantling of barriers to trade in the sub-region as the initial steps towards trade expansion. Agreement on these schemes, however, was not reached until May 1980 at the Third Summit of the Authority of Heads of States and government.  

Subsequent to the summit, there were so many interesting initiatives taken and planned by ECOWAS community. These initiatives were in the areas of —trade liberation; transport and communication, free movement of persons, defense co-operation, the fund for co-operation, compensation and development (Fund), and executive secretariat. But implementation of these initiatives had many problems and as it was stated in *Nigeria and the ECOWAS since 1985*:

Quotas on industrial products were to be lifted between May 28, 1981 and May 28, 1989. For the More Developed Countries (MDCs), this took effect from May 28, 1979 with regards to Community priority goods. Non-tariff barriers were scheduled to be lifted between May 28, 11981 and May 28, 1985. Rules of origin were to be applied gradually: industrial enterprises producing goods in the Community would have 20 per cent of their equity in the hands of nationals of the Member States by May 28, 1981, 35 per cent by May 1983 and 57 per cent by May 28, 1989... The delay in the adoption of the first phase was partly due to the failure to employ the requisite personnel at the secretariat from the onset... Another aspect of the problem was from the perceptions of the West African Economic Community (CEAO) and the Mano River Union (MRU) with regards to the first phase. Both believe that Article 20 of the Treaty of Lagos is inimical to their interest...


5. Ibid.
Despite different problems affecting the ECOWAS community initiatives, including funding, the organization was able to achieve some success with some of the initiatives. For example, “by 1985, the telecommunication network in the sub-region had received a face-lift. INTELCOM I, the infrastructural development aspect had proceeded satisfactorily with active participation of the ECOWAS Fund.” ECOWAS also succeeded in erecting the ECOWAS secretariat in Abuja, Nigeria.

Other problems however, surfaced to set the community’s progress back especially with the implementation of the free movement of persons. From the onset, the protocol was not quite clear—the ratification was hastily done and equally misinterpreted, which resulted in massive immigration particularly from the less developed states to the more developed ones; so that, “by 1982, illegal immigration in Nigeria from Benin, Ghana, Niger and Togo numbered about 2 million. Many of these immigrants were employed at wages below the statutory national minimum, thus exacerbating the unemployment problem which was then at about 15 percent. Their presence created the need for more social overhead cost in terms of more schools, hospitals, etc.” There were other immigration related problems, apart from social-economic issues; there were religious issues that somewhat spilled over into socio-political issues. As indicated in Nigeria and the ECOWAS Since 1985: Towards a dynamic regional integration.

6. Ibid., 19.
7. Ibid., 20.
The more significant part of the immigration problem was that large segment of these immigrants, were of diverse religious persuasions and political beliefs, susceptible to local political manipulations by devious political leaders in Nigeria. These, in fact, became inevitable in the political and socio-economic crisis that ensued in Nigeria as from the early 1980s—about mid 1988s. In the report of the Aniagolu’s Commission on the Maitasine (Islamic extremist movement that resulted in the killing of many Muslims in Northern Nigeria) uprising in 1980, ECOWAS illegal emigrants were said to be effectively involved. As a result of this pressure and the calculation that the emigrants could be mobilized into an army of thugs at the October 1983 general elections, the government in January of that year expelled the illegal emigrants.8 In spite of the above socioeconomic problems, the ECOWAS community did overcome these setbacks and obstacles and forged ahead with the integration and arrangements, for further implementation of various projects. At each summit, treaties were signed and protocols set for new agendas.

Subsequently, as the conflict in Liberia continued to escalate and in accordance with the provisions contained in the ECOWAS mutual defense treaty of 1981, signed in Freetown—which authorizes ECOWAS member-states to intervene with force when the security of a member-state is threatened, ECOWAS members therefore, could not stand by while the peace and tranquility they so desperately wished and needed for the realization of regional economic integration evaporate. After all, economic stability/sustainability and peaceful/tranquil environment are not mutually exclusive; one enhances and reinforces the other.

8. Ibid., 20-21.
Given the noncommittal attitude of the world community, ECOWAS members therefore, had to devise a means to attend to the rather pressing Liberian crisis. It is important to note that before 1990, ECOWAS had no unit within it, nor did it commit or set aside resources to deal with security issues. However, in the wake of the Liberian crisis, ECOWAS in desperate need for a necessary cease-fire, moved to set up the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC), during its 13th summit of May 28-30 1990 held in Banjul, Gambia. SMC a committee made up of five ECOWAS members-states—Gambia, Ghana, Mali Nigeria and Togo. SMC hence formed, was designated the task of finding a possible solution to the deplorable attacks on civilian lives in Liberia and the rising security concern to other neighboring states.

SMC subsequently recommended the creation of a cease-fire group, which will then cater to regional security. The result of this recommendation was the creation of the ECOMOG as of August 7th 1990. In support of ECOWAS action, Salim Ahmed Salim, the Secretary-General of the OAU at the time, stated that, “…Africans are one people. It is hence unacceptable that a part of that people should stand in silence and in seeming helplessness when another part is suffering.”

A Case Study of Liberia

Background

Liberia was a created by the United States of America in 1847, by taking those ex-slaves who had expressed the desire to return to Africa and settling them among three

other ethnic groups—the Sapo, Krahn, and Fante (coastal people) who coexisted for centuries in the today’s Liberia (see Figure 4).

![Map of Liberia](http://media.maps.com/magellan/Images/LIBERI-W1.gif)

Figure 4. Map of Liberia:

Source: http://media.maps.com/magellan/Images/LIBERI-W1.gif

According to Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia:

American Colonization Society, organized Dec., 1816-Jan., 1817, at Washington, DC, to transport free blacks from the United States and settled them in Africa. The freeing of many slaves, principally by idealists, created a serious problem in that no sound provisions were made for establishing them in society on an equal basis with white Americans anywhere in the United States. Robert Finley, principal founder of the colonization society, found much support among prominent men, notably Henry Clay. Money was raised—with some indirect help from the federal government when (1819) Congress appropriated $100,000 for returning to Africa blacks illegally brought to the United States. In 1821 an agent, Eli Ayres, and Lt. R. F. Stockton of the U.S. Navy purchased land in Africa, where subsequently Jehudi Ashmun and Ralph R. Gurley laid the foundations of Liberia.  

Like all Western intrusions in Africa, the infusion of the newcomers into the preexisting groups (the natives) was not without its disruption of the stable native groups. But unlike the usual European colonizers (who were of a different race), these Americo-Liberians were mostly of the African race or mixture of the white and black race, who upon arrival began to impose their superiority complex on the natives. Over time, they began to dominate and marginalize the natives economically and politically. Further in the same line, Adekeye Adebayo indicated that, the 133-year rule of the Liberian oligarchy created deep seated resentment and divisions within Liberian society and left historical scars on the oppressed indigenous population; the reforms enacted by presidents William Tubman and William Tolbert (1944-1971; 1971-1980) failed to heal these.11

As with everything that has a beginning, by the 1970s, the inequality had reached its saturation level and the natives escalated their agitation. On April 12, 1980, the Americo-Liberian monopolized government was overthrown by Samuel Quiwonkpa Doe. As stated by Britannica:

After the coup Doe assumed the rank of general and established a People’s Redemption Council (PRC) composed of himself and 14 other low-ranking officers to rule the country. Doe suspended the nation’s constitution until 1984, when a new constitution was approved by referendum. In 1985 he won a presidential election that was denounced as fraudulent by some observers. Doe faced opposition both at home and abroad, where his regime was often described as corrupt and brutal. His term of office was burdened by deteriorating economic conditions. . .12


Subsequently, Doe, a soldier and a member of the Krahn ethnic group, created ethnic division within his administration and ultimately, the ethnic division led to mistrust. As things began to deteriorate, the economy began to crumble, and on December 24th 1989, Charles Taylor, a rebel leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, invaded the country through neighboring Côte d’Ivoire, thereby, officially starting the Liberian crisis. As observed by Time Week in Review, “On Christmas Eve, 1989, a small force of about 100 men led by an obscure former Liberian government official crossed the border from Ivory Coast into Nimba County in northern Liberia.”

Charles Taylor, graduate of Bentley College, Massachusetts, was a member of Doe’s government but unlike Doe, had no military background. After falling out with Samuel Doe’s regime and “allegedly embezzling the sum of $1 million from the government,” fled back to Massachusetts, where according to Time Week in Review,

He was jailed in Massachusetts, but escaped in 1985 by sawing through the bars of his jail cell. Once back in Africa, he met with Liberian dissidents in Ghana and then made common cause with revolutionaries in Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast and, most critically, Libya, where Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi was plotting and supporting a continent-wide revolution. In Libya, he trained in camps that also trained men who would later play starring roles in the great African tragedies of the 1990s; they included Sierra Leone’s Foday Sankoh, whose rebel movement would become best known for hacking off the arms and legs of civilians, ...
In an attempt to quell the situation and to initiate an immediate cease-fire in Liberia, the newly formed security group (ECOMOG)—made up of military contingents from the five SMC members, plus Guinea and Sierra Leone, left for Liberia on August 29, 1990. Support for the mandate though, was not unanimous within the ECOWAS organization—Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire were not in agreement, but it had the approval of both the OAU and the UN. Also because of fear of wide spread regional instability, the ECOWAS member-states had to act to contain the crisis and/or end it. In the same view, Draman and Carment, assert that:

... ECOWAS’ decision to intervene transcended primordial and humanitarian concerns. First, citizens from several member-states were in Liberia at the outbreak of the conflict. Some were killed while others were taken hostage (mainly by Taylor’s [NPFL]). Second, Member states were concerned that the Liberian civil war would have a domino effect in the region. The movement of peoples fleeing the conflict across borders combined with the constantly shifting military alliances could prove too much for these unstable and largely authoritarian regimes.16

The ECOMOG intervention was a heavy under-taking for an economic organization such as ECOWAS which as at five months into the Liberian crises, had no security division and was pleading with its members to liquidate their respective outstanding contributions to the organization. Nonetheless, ECOMOG deployed to Liberia with a diverse contingent of 2,700 troops led by a Ghanaian force commander.

ECOMOG was mandated to monitor ceasefire between the rebel group National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) lead by Charles Taylor, and the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) in support of Samuel Doe, until the environment was conducive for an

eventual general election. But what ECOMOG met upon arrival at the Liberian capital of Monrovia, was beyond ceasefire operation “... as ECOMOG forces landed in Monrovia, they were attacked by the NPFL, which then controlled almost all of the country outside capital city...” the situation warranted a reinforcement of intense military operation.

According to an eyewitness account, the condition in Liberia was too violent among the different groups ECOMOG had to deal with and the civilian population was caught in the crossfire. This situation was much more than ECOWAS/ ECOMOG had anticipated. It should be understood that ECOMOG is a group pulled together in an instance of emergency, to further compound this position, the group was made of different military contingents.

Secondly, the force commander did not have complete autonomy in issuing directives, even though, “SMC stipulated that ‘the commander was to have full command authority over ECOMOG, which he will derive from the chairman of the ECOWAS Authority through the Executive Secretary,’” each contingent however, obtained directives from its military leader from their home base. Daily operational movements of the troops however, were enforced by the force commander. The above scenario invariably could lead to a safety issue for the troops.

In some other interstate conflicts and wars, usually the situation was somewhat straight forward, in that, there is a rebel group opposing the main government or just two


18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.
opposing groups fighting for the right to govern. The case of Liberia had more than three warring factions—the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) loyal to Samuel Doe, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor, and other divisions such as the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy-Johnson faction (ULIMO-J), and the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy-Kromah faction (ULIMO-K). According to SMCs report, the situation on the ground in Liberia had deteriorated from violent to extreme violent. As noted by Gerry Cleaver:

The second fundamental problem that faced ECOMOG forces arriving in August of 1990 was that they failed to obtain the consent of the belligerent parties to the mission. Taylor regarded ECOMOG as a Nigerian force sent to deny him his ‘deserved’ triumph over Doe. The later must have mixed feeling about ECOMOG. Its arrival undoubtedly relieved the pressure on his forces, if only because the NPFL had another target to aim at . . . The only group to welcome openly ECOMOG was the newly formed splinter group of the NPFL, led by Prince Johnson, which was contesting control of Monrovia with Taylor.20

Given the above scenario, ECOMOG’s initial mission of ceasefire/peacekeeping changed to peace enforcement. Since the group had not trained together as a peacekeeping unit, the troops lacked cohesion and they were very few troops (2,700), compared with the enormity of the task of enforcing peace in such a hostile environment as Liberia was then. Additionally, the two-tier chain of command (the different contingents, sought directives from their home base) within the ECOMOG contingents, as well as the lack of funds to sustain the mission, and reported skepticism of some ECOWAS members. All these stated challenges mentioned above, combined to turn a difficult case into an almost impossible mission. According to Cleaver, “on

the question of the size of ECOMOG the initial deployment of 3,000 troops was inadequate to the tasks allotted to them."²¹

Part of the problems found in the Liberian crisis included different acts of violence, from rapes to torture, and killings committed on the civilians (mostly women and children), as well as the reported different attacks on the nongovernmental organization (NGO) aid workers. As these violent attacks continued, ECOMOG’s initially mandated mission of peacekeeping for the sake of cease-fire, transformed to peace enforcement. According to the Human Rights Report entitled, Liberia Human Rights Practices, “Although the Constitution prohibits torture and other degrading treatment, the factions perpetrated massive abuses. But there were no reports of torture by the AFL, LNTG-I or LNTG-II police or security forces, nor by ECOMOG.”²²

It is also important to point out that SMC’s initial mandate for ECOMOG was for ECOMOG to keep the two groups (Doe’s and Taylor’s) from fighting, while ECOWAS members through diplomacy negotiate proper conditions for a cease-fire. But given the violent treatment of the civilian population, particularly by the NPFL rebels, there was the urgent need for peace enforcement.

As the conflict continued and not much physical military assistance from the international community anticipated by ECOWAS, ECOMOG troops strived to maintain some level of security. There were those within the international community who criticized ECOMOG’s use of force. For example, “One of the persistent problems that

²¹ Ibid., 227.

have bedeviled ECOMOG is the legitimacy of the force itself and of its mandate for action.” But peace enforcement under the Liberia’s violent and volatile conditions required some level of force. According to Draman and Carment: It is obvious that the use of force in efforts to reduce violent interstate conflict constitutes a basic violation of impartiality...by contrast, Betts argues that intervention cannot hope to maintain impartiality if the form of forceful intervention is limited in scope. He maintains that only in instances where the outside power takes complete command of the situation and imposes a peace settlement, will the intervention result in stability.

Perhaps ECOWAS moved too fast in the bid to attain a ceasefire at the very initial stage of the Liberian crisis. But given the non-urgency of the crisis to the international community and the precarious position of the organization—the fact that members were concerned that the civil war would have a domino effect in the region, the desire for regional stability, led ECOWAS to respond in the manner they did. At the end of the crisis, and in spite of the difficult scenarios, many including the critics of ECOMOG’s intervention all agreed that the Liberian crisis was an incredible challenge and ECOMOG did relatively well given what it had to work with.

Furthermore, ECOMOG may not have been able to carry out any peacekeeping mission, had Nigeria not contributed the majority of the troops as well as the funding and other military equipments. As Hutchful indicated, “...without Nigeria’s massive


contribution in funding and manpower, the ECOMOG operation could not have been sustained..."\(^25\) Though there are some scholars who asks what Nigeria’s motive for such massive contributions are and other scholars such as Cleaver, who indicated that, “... the Francophone states believed that Nigeria was using ECOMOG as a vehicle for its own regional hegemonic ambitions..."\(^26\) Scholars such as Adebayo, on the other hand, suggested that perhaps, “It will be important to find ways in future of harnessing the important military and financial capacity of local hegemons like Nigeria."\(^27\) Or it could just be as Kuna stated, “Nigeria’s effort at peace building has been predicated principally on the pursuit of domestic security through the promotion of peaceful relations between herself and neighbours, and between neighbours themselves."\(^28\)

It could just also be that Africans are beginning to take care of Africa. As Adebayo stated in *Regional Security in Post-Cold War Africa*, “There is a new urgency among African policy-makers and scholars in the search for effective mechanisms for resolving African conflicts.”\(^29\) No matter what reasons are attributed to the motivation

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behind Nigeria’s role/s in the ECOMOG’s peacekeeping mission to Liberia, one thing is certain, Nigeria played an unparalleled role in putting an end to the crisis in Liberia; crisis that had the potential to spill over in the neighboring countries. Also as observed by some members of the Liberian community that were interviewed, “if Nigeria did not come to the aid of the Liberian, when they did, there may not be more than few of us Liberians left. At time it looked like every member of the ECOMCG army was a Nigerian because they all spoke pidgin English.”

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A Case Study of Sierra Leone

Background

Sierra Leone, a former British colony of about 6,440,053 people (2009 est., CIA World Factbook), is located in West Africa and occupies a geographical area of about 71,740 Sq. kilometers (29,925 Sq. Miles-see Figure 5). Sierra Leone’s initial contact with Europeans was through economic sphere with the Portuguese who in 1495 according to Bureau of African Affairs (BAF), “built a fort in Freetown, the country’s capital city, for trade in gold, spices, ivory and slaves.”

31 Sierra Leone from the time of her independence in 1961 had a relatively stable civilian government until the military coup in April 29 1992.

30. “Comments from the members of the Liberian community” who were eye witness to the Liberian crisis and the arrival of the ECOMOG troops as of September 1990.

After Siaka P. Steven’s 18 year regime, ended in 1985, and Major General Joseph Saidu Momoh, was elected president in a one-party referendum in October that same year. The Sierra Leone’s relatively stable government began to experience some agitation and lack of confidence in Major General Momoh’s government. Across Sierra Leone, public revolt continued fueled by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) led by Foday Sankoh, and the economy of the country further deteriorated, as a result of mismanaged of natural resources.

Part of the root cause of the Sierra Leone crisis is poor administration of the country’s economy which according to BAF, included natural resources such as
diamonds, bauxite, gold, iron ore and many more as well as forests, abundant fresh water, and rich offshore fishing grounds. Another part of the Sierra Leone crisis was precipitated by the prevalent unequal distribution of goods and services like many states in the developing world but especially in West Africa.  

By March 1991, a full-blown revolution ensued against Momoh’s government, incited by the RUF movement, which was reported to have an established relationship between its leader Foday Sankoh, and the leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), Charles Taylor. With no credible group in charge of the central government, things got out of hand and subsequently, Momoh’s government was over thrown by a military coup. But by 1996, in a general election, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was elected Sierra Leone’s President.

On May 25, 1997, after the elected government of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was over thrown in a coup d’ etat, led by Major Koroma. The crisis in Sierra Leone worsened. Incidentally, Major Johnny Paul Koroma, had aligned himself with the RUF movement, but his administration could not maintain security in the country.

It is also possible that, given the proximity of Liberia to Sierra Leone, some of the crisis in Liberia, particularly violence against civilians and smuggling of arms/ammunitions as well as some diamonds, had earlier spilled over into Sierra Leone. Further complicating the crisis there was also the fact that, some of the RUF’s movement


had reportedly been trained by the NPFL group, especially as there were reported
evidences of strengthening of the relationship between Taylor and Sankoh. For example,
"Knowledge of President Charles Taylor's NPFL led government's support of rebels in
Sierra Leone is an open secret in Liberia."  

Additionally, Foday Sankoh was himself very visible in what was known as
Greater Liberia, especially between the periods 1991 to 1994. There were several other
eyewitness accounts narrating what Charles Taylor's men did as stated by Masa
Washington:

A Liberian mother of two, who sought refuge in Sierra Leone at the start of the
Liberian war in 1990, returning home in 1997, narrated her ordeal. The outskirts
of Freetown in which I lived along with other Liberian refugees was captured by
'our boys' (meaning Liberians). After they captured the area, they hoisted the
Liberian flag and began singing songs in praises of Charles Taylor. When we saw
this, we became very terrified' she said.

Furthermore, Adekya stated:

... ECOMOG's involvement in Sierra Leone's civil war was inextricably linked
to its peacekeeping efforts in its neighbouring Liberian's civil war. The
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) had invaded Sierra Leon from Liberia in
March 1991 with the assistance of Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of
Liberia (NPFL), resulting in several hundred Nigerian and Ghanaian troops being
deployed to assist Sierra Leon a fellow ECOMOG member, to defend it capital,
Freetown.

34. Masa Washington, "The Crisis in Sierra Leone: The Heart of the Matter"

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Adekeye Adebayo, "Regional Security in Post-Cold War Africa," in ECOMOG:
By 1998, Sierra Leone’s crisis had reached the level where ECOWAS had to once again, elect for ECOMOG to intervene in the country. This intervention was in spite of ECOMOG’s challenges in Liberia, which were the non-cohesiveness of the contingents (having not before the Liberian conflicts, trained or worked together, etc.), and the fact that, financial and logistical aspects of the group’s mission were seriously lacking. Given these challenges, coupled with the internal political struggles within the ECOWAS organization, the Sierra Leonean case was beginning to resemble the ECOMOG’s experience in Liberia. As Mohamed Belmakki indicted, “The diversity of languages, equipment, and doctrine denied the ECOMOG force the synchronicity and homogeneity that a military operation requires to be successful on the ground. There were communication difficulties between Francophone and Anglophone forces and lack of overall training in counterinsurgency.”

Since many ECOWAS members lagged behind in their required financial obligations (annual dues and other required fees), Nigeria had to bear the burden of financially sustaining ECOMOG’s operations. In addition Nigeria also contributed about eighty percent of the troops. According to Belmakki, during the 6 January 1999 rebel invasion of Freetown, Nigerian jets bombed rebel’s positions in the capital and its soldiers shelled the outskirts of eastern Freetown. ECOMOG eventually forced the rebels to withdraw from Freetown after more than six weeks with the loss of 3,000 civilian lives

and massive destruction of the city by arsonist rebels. About 100 Nigerian soldiers died in this attack and 100 were missing in action.  

Some observers indicated that, Nigeria, because of her regional hegemonic intent, has elected to shoulder most of the burden. As Hutchful asserted, “On the Nigerian side, several personal as well as economic motives, have been cited as principal reasons for the intervention.” There were others who saw Nigeria’s level of participation within the ECOWAS organization, as activities indicative of a member state, wanting to and doing everything in its power to prevent political and security destabilization to its region. Yet, others contend that, since the aid pledged by the UN and the international community was insufficient (below that which the situation demanded), Nigeria, often criticized for its hegemonic aspirations, continued to regularly bear the burden of the missions to prevent what she saw as embarrassment to West Africa. As President Ibrahim Babangida stated at the 10th session of the Authority held at Abuja, “Nigeria’s interest in establishing effective and integrated security in the subregion is shared by other states and is designed to promote the general wellbeing of the region.”

In various accounts of ECOMOG’s peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone, several different reports indicated that Nigerian soldiers dominate the mission. What this study

39. Ibid.


found however, is that ECOMOG troops were made up of soldiers from several different military contingents' from different ECOWAS member-states but the Nigerian contingent made up eighty percent of the force. To this end, perhaps the “dominant force” often attached to Nigeria, fits, but Nigeria equally suffered huge casualties as evidenced by Omoigui’s account:

For Nigerian troops, the casualty rate was horrific. Although the government has kept mum about figures, foreign news agencies and some Nigerian newspapers reported an average figure of 30 deaths on a daily basis for all of January and early February, 1999... But perhaps most provocatively, a Sierra Leonean Minister announced that the conflict was costing Nigeria 1 million US dollars daily! This has not been denied by any knowledgeable Nigerian official. ... 42

Though Nigerian force constituted the largest contingent of ECOMOG troops, the troops still had major problems for example, many of these soldiers spoke different languages thereby, making communication among them difficult. Also the troops had issues that should have ordinarily, deterred any group from functioning as a unit but the ECOMOG troops, reinforced by large military supply by Nigeria, including military planes, and other military ammunitions, carried on in spite of the difficult working conditions and challenges. Along the same line, Mohamed Belmakki asserted that: ... Nigeria again provided the bulk of the forces, the Force Commander, and the majority of financial and logistical support, and this lack of balance within ECOMOG led to

unilateral manipulation of forces by Nigeria . . . But ECOMOG national contingents did work together at operational levels . . . \(^\text{43}\)

As noted earlier, Nigeria, spurred by her experience with colonization and the urgent need for regional security, pursues regional peace through several peacekeeping roles. To Nigeria, regional security/stability became even more necessary, particularly as the attention to African issues by the international community diminished after the Cold War. As reported by different political observers; for example, "The UN and the international community played only a passive role in stopping the recurrence of internal conflict in Africa, and helping to reduce the violence prevalent in many West African countries. The perceived inadequacy of their combined response, prompted sub-regional organizations . . ."\(^\text{44}\)

Equally, Britain, like the US, lent mostly diplomatic and humanitarian assistance to ECOMOG’s peacekeeping efforts, and until a brief military intervention in 2000 which helped to stabilize a collapsing UN mission, desisted from playing a direct military role in Sierra Leone. Both interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leon illustrated the growing

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indifference of external actors to African conflicts in the post Cold War era, the rising influence of regional actors like Nigeria.\textsuperscript{45}

Further noting the passive role played by the international community, especially at the initial stages of the crisis, the Center for Democracy and Development and IRIN-West Africa Update reported that, Britain’s Royal Air force evacuated about 80 European citizens from Sierra Leone on Friday following fighting near Freetown. Tow C-130 Hercules transport planes flew the evacuees to the Senegalese capital, Dakar, for an onward flight to London. They included nationals of Ireland, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Poland, Italy and Spain. There were also one Canadian and one Mexican, Reuters reported on Saturday, quoting a British Foreign Ministry official. The US closed operations at its embassy and ordered all US government personnel to leave. The airlifts follow hit and run attacks by rebels near Freetown. “... Nigeria’s claims to regional hegemony can be made or unmade by the outcome of the war.”\textsuperscript{46}

In spite of all the difficulties it faced, such as logistical issues, ECOMOG achieved a respectful success in Sierra Leone, by reinstating Ahmed Tejan Kabbah as the rightfully elected president. Brief as it may be, and regardless of the UN peacekeeping mission (UNAMSIL), it was ECOMOG, after the killing and hostage taking of the UN peacekeepers in May of 2000, that finally supervised the eventual Sierra Leonean


transition to peaceful election in 2003, with Nigeria substantially absorbing greater part
of the cost.

As was reported by the Center for Democracy and Development “in the aftermath
of the AFRC-RUF coup of May 1997, diplomatic efforts were made by ECOWAS, OAU
and UN to return the country to the elected government of Tejan Kabbah. However,
faced with the insurgents’ prevarication and the project of long drawn negotiations,
President Kabbah solicited the help of mercenaries to mount a counter-coup that was
largely supported by the international community. 47 Nigeria, not about to allow matters
to deteriorate further, reconvened ECOWAS member-states for another ECOMOG
operation.

Subsequently, and regardless of the reported recruitment of the private military
company (Sandline International), Nigeria/ECOMOG forces embarked on the Sierra
Leone peacekeeping mission and together with the Kamajors (a Sierra Leonean based
civil defense force) fought against the RUF rebels to reinstate Kabbah’s government.

Reporting on the same event, Ero contends:

From December of 1998 until the signing of the Lomé peace agreement of 7 July
1999 in Togo, the RUF and the AFRC launched a devastating attack throughout
Sierra Leone. Kabbah and ECOMOG were not alone in relying on mercenaries.
Taylor’s network of mercenaries, mainly from the Ukraine, was effective in
supporting the RUF/ACRF military campaign. The ECOMOG contingent of 15,
000 was unable to respond to the jungle warfare tactics of the RUF and the
AFRC. Instead the Kamajors and other civil defense forces orchestrated much of
the fighting that took place between January and June of 1999. 48

47. Ibid.

(London: King’s College, (Monograph No 46: February, 2000), 8, http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/
Even though there was the controversy in March of 1998 of President Kabbah, the British official (Ambassador Penfold), and Nigeria's involvement in the acquisition of private company to maintain peace and order in Sierra Leone, what is important here, is the effort by Nigeria/ECOMOG troops to restore peace to the region and bring order to an ECOWAS member-state.

Nigeria also advanced the initiative to continue peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone particularly after the "RUF rebels attack on UN peacekeepers in May 2000. This led to the arrest of Foday Sankoh who had been appointed Vice-President in the transitional government at a peace conference in Lomé in July 1999."^{49}

There were similarities between the Liberian and the Sierra Leonean crises. In both cases, the ECOMOG troops were dealing with multiple factions—in Liberia, they had to contend with the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy-Johnson faction (ULIMO-J), and the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy-Kromah faction (ULIMO-K). It is along this line that Cleaver argues that, "ECOMOG’s claim to be an effective intervention force has been undermined by numerous failures to enforce agreements and disarm the factions. . . . Generally speaking the only constant in what was otherwise a fluid environment of shifting alliances had been the antipathy between ECOMOG and the NPFL. This has at times led to open warfare with ECOMOG

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fighting alongside other factions, such as ULIMO and AFL, against the NPFL."  

While in Sierra Leone, apart from coping with the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) led by Lieutenant Colonel Johnson Koroma, ECOMOG had to deal with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) led by Sankoh and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) led by Sam Bockarie. With the above challenges as the (UNAMSIL) later found out, ECOMOG’s troops had to additionally cope with outdated equipments, nonfunctioning communication system and many other logistical problems already mentioned above.

Adebayo further stated, UNAMSIL eventually recovered its balance, disarming Sierra Leone’s factions and overseeing the successful election Kabbah in May 2002. While Taylor and Sankoh along with Johnny Paul Koromah, and the head of the Kamajor (Hinga Norman), were indicted for war crimes by an international Special Court for Sierra Leone in 2003.  

It is relevant to point out that the conducive environment for the UNAMSIL to eventually return to Sierra Leone, particularly after the UN peacekeepers’ killing and hostage taking by the RUF rebels, was by the efforts of the Nigeria/ECOMOG troops, which sustained heavy casualties. Finally, there is no knowing for sure what the outcome in both the Liberian and the Sierra Leonean cases would have been, had ECOMOG not intervened and had Nigeria not played the roles—both diplomatically with the OAU/AU, and at various UN general assemblies; and resource wise (financial and human), as it did (as narrated by several eye witness counts). But one thing is certain; ECOMOG’s


intervention in both of these crises did minimize violence against the civilian populations of both countries and provided relative security for the West African region. As noted by Draman and Carment,

...This fear was based on the fact that the preponderant majority of ECOWAS member-states were governed by weak regimes. The movement of peoples fleeing the conflict across borders combined with the constantly shifting military alliances could prove too much for these unstable and largely authoritarian regimes.\(^{52}\)

Secondly, the various diplomatic endeavor by different organizations such as the OAU now AU, the UN, and other ECCOWAS member-states such as Ghana, Gambia, Mali, Nigeria and Togo, has added to bring an end to the crises in both Liberia and Sierra Leone. In almost all of these diplomatic efforts, Nigeria has participated in one form or the other. According to Akinterinwa,

As part of Nigeria's effort to strengthen and sustain sub-regional and regional cooperation, Nigeria established the Technical Aid Corps (TAC) scheme to assist needy countries, especially in Africa... Nigeria again brokered peace in the Mono River Union, comprising Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone Nigeria and Sierra Leone have a bilateral agreement on security protection for the government of President Tejan Kabbah. It was the basis of the bilateral accord that Nigerians were in to contain the violent activities of the RUF before the arrival of ECOMOG II in Sierra Leone.\(^{53}\)

The OAU on the other hand has equally been instrumental in seeing that peace was restored to both Liberia and Sierra Leone. This point has been reiterated by Akinterinwa who stated that:

In Liberia, the role of the OAU was critical in the mobilisation of international political, financial and material support for the initiative of the Economic

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Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The OAU promoted the evolution of a regional consensus behind the ECOWAS Military Observer Group (ECOMOG), and contributed to the Abuja Peace Accord and the process that culminated in the successful elections held in that country during mid-1997. In Sierra Leone, the OAU worked closely with the UN, and the regional actors in the negotiations that brought the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) to the conference table, and is still engaged in the search for a political and security solution to the stalemate brought about by the coup d'état in the country in June 1997. It is also important to note that the roles played by these five SMC members especially in the creation of ECOMOG was very instrumental in the minimization of violence as well as peace enforcement/peacekeeping successes achieved in Sierra Leone.

Data analysis in this study was conducted utilizing the IAFCA and the contemporary history approach. The primary data detailed descriptively, the responses from the different informal interviews. A great amount of the theoretical aspect of the data was also detailed from the viewpoint of contemporary history. Since contemporary history investigates past and present and future occurrences, it became quite relevant for the data analysis of the study. The analysis was used to answer the research questions and the case study method was used to adequately trace the cause and consequences as well as the implications of peacekeeping in West Africa.

CHAPTER V

RESEARCH FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

Summary

The preceding chapters evaluated data collected for the analysis of Nigeria’s peacekeeping roles in West Africa. This chapter starts with brief summary of Nigeria’s roles in West Africa, what the response of her neighbours have been and for better insight into the extent and motivation to Nigeria’s commitment to the roles as well as ECOMOG’s efforts. Then, concludes by summarizing the findings throughout the course of this study and making necessary recommendations, issues needing reviews, as well as providing future perspectives.

During the Cold War the East-West rivalry necessitated vying for political allies by the “Super powers” (mainly the USSR and USA), during this time, many newly independent nations (mostly African nations), benefited with attention from the more powerful countries—Russia, the USA, Britain, France and others. By the end of the Cold War (1989), there was less need for allies from the developing countries and especially from the West African newly independent nations. For example, before the end of Cold War in the 1980s, before then, the UN had enjoyed strong support by the big powers to intervene in Africa. When it was thought necessary, and where it coincided with their strategic interests. Afterwards, strategic interest faded, and Africa ceased to be stage
where the East and West could play out their rivalries using surrogate African states in bids for dominance or influence.¹

The findings in this is this study, also showed that the stated policy at the ministry of external affairs, Nigerian foreign policy has been characterized by a focus on African and by attachment to several fundamental principles: African Unity and independence; peaceful settlements of disputes; nonalignment and noninternational interference in the internal affairs of other nations; and regional economic cooperation and development. In carrying out these principles, Nigeria participates in the Organization of African Unity (OAU) now known as the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Non-Aligned Movement, the Commonwealth, and the United Nations.²

The above stated policy is in line with several similar statements found in different literature reviewed, this study also was able to deduce that Nigeria has attempted to stay true to her independence stance proclamations, “...Nigeria would subscribe to the principles...of multilateralism, peaceful resolution of conflicts, and equality of states...”³ Nigeria could have and can still achieve continuity in her foreign policy, with cautious contribution of funds.

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Many analysts point to Nigeria’s quest for regional hegemony. But many also point to the enormous cost (in human and other resources) she has had to bear for the sake of regional hegemony. Similarly, the deductions of this study are that there are many evidences to support Nigeria’s professed motivation and intent for her peacekeeping roles in West Africa, which is as a result of her geographical location, and her experience with colonialism.

The study further revealed that some of Nigeria’s neighbors, particularly her immediate neighbours, do not think that Nigeria intends to dominate her small neighbors but rather, they think that Nigeria seeks security coexistence with other countries in the region both far and immediate neighbours. As Metz states, “Nigeria had cordial relations with all its neighbors—Benin, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Equatorial Guinea—as well as with other countries in the West African sub-region, with most of which it had bilateral agreements.”

The Republic of Niger (Nigeria’s neighbor to the North), shears a 1500km (450 mile) long border with Northern Nigeria. The people of this area shear common culture, language, kith and kin as well as other social activities. Nigeria has a cordial relationship with the republic of Niger, for example, “Each nation plays active roles in continental multilateral organizations . . . , the two nations formed the Nigeria-Niger Joint

Commission for Cooperation (NNJC), established in March 1971, with its permanent Secretariat in Niamey, Niger. 5

Chad’s view of Nigeria: “the two countries have had some differences but we live as brothers.” 6 Furthermore:

The two nations forged stronger ties during the 1980s. Hoping to benefit commercially and diplomatically by expanding regional trade relations, Nigeria replaced France as Chad’s major source of export revenues. Bilateral trade agreements involved Chadian exports of livestock, dried fish, and chemicals and imports of Nigerian foodstuffs and manufactured goods. Both governments also recognized the potential value of the large informal trade sector across their borders, which neither country regulated. In addition, Nigerian industry and commerce employed several thousand Chadian workers. 7

In the past, the relationship between Nigeria and Cameroon had been strained because of territorial/land (Bakassi peninsula) dispute, but things have settled and many Cameroonians state that they do not have any ill opinion of Nigeria. Equally, as indicated by The Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission Intentions (see Figure 6), for a few years, relations between Cameroon and Nigeria have intensified over issues relating to their 1,600-kilometer land boundary. . . The issues that are involved are rights over the oil-rich land and the fate of local populations.” 8

6. Ibid.
The disputed Peninsula of Bakassi (green) is mostly a mangrove swamp

Figure 6. Area Showing Nigeria/Cameroon Border Dispute

Sources: Based on UN sources and afrol archives, http://www.afrol.com/News2002/cam012_nig_bakassi.htm

The Republic of Benin’s relations and view of Nigeria - many Beninese see themselves as partially Nigerians. “Many Centuries ago some of our people migrated from Western Nigeria, and today many of our citizens speak the Yoruba language and hear the Yoruba culture.”\(^9\) Furthermore, “the Republic of Benin enjoys stable relations with Nigeria, the main regional power.”\(^10\)

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Equally, on Ghana’s view of Nigeria, “Ghana has a close relationship with Nigeria and they collaborate on different issues.” 11 Ghana does not share border with Nigeria, but shares several bilateral/multilateral partnership with Nigeria. Ghana also sees Nigeria as a brother country and also as a “great strength in Africa and African Affairs.” 12 In West Africa and around the world, Ghana and Nigeria are seen as “two of the most important members of ECOWAS and the Commonwealth of Nations.” 13 “Nigeria and Ghana have a close relationship, and they collaborate on various issues.” 14

It is important to note here that ECOMOG is not a governing body, nor is it an established administrative organization; or even an established security entity for that matter. In 1990 by the end of the Cold War, and at the height of many interstate conflicts, as the West African region became home to some of the world’s deadliest conflicts, ECOWAS urgently assembled ECOMOG as a necessary possible means to help solve these problems and provide the region with relative security. As Mitikishe indicated:

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) is a non-standing military force consisting of land, sea and air components that, was set up by member states of the ECOWAS to deal with the security problem that followed the collapse of the formal state structure in the


12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

Republic of Liberia in 1990. The force successfully restored an atmosphere that permitted the reinstatement of a functional state structure in Liberia...\textsuperscript{15}

When ECOMOG's was created, ECOWAS had no security unit within it, nor did it commit or set aside resources to deal with security issues. The violent and lawless situations in Liberia and the subsequent repeat of same issues in Sierra Leone and few other states, presented enormous security implications for the West African region.

According to Coetzee:

The apparent aversion of Western nations, especially the United States of America (USA), to peacekeeping in Africa after the Mogadishu experience of 1993 has placed a big responsibility on the shoulders of African leaders to get their peacekeeping house in order. In fact, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UN Secretary-General had already made a call for regional security arrangements to lighten the peacekeeping load of the UN in 1992. African heads of state looked for mechanisms to manage the conflicts of the continent and found what looked like a suitable vehicle in the existing regional economic cooperation arrangements.\textsuperscript{16}

As a group that was hurriedly gathered together, ECOMOG had several challenges, many of which were as a result of preexisting problems within ECOWAS. These challenges included: the lack of funds to sustain the organization's operations, the perceived Anglophone/Francophone dichotomy, which sometimes created political struggle/rivalry among members. Of the many challenges ECOWAS faced, was the lack of funds, particularly, because many if not all the member-states, with the exception of Nigeria,


genuinely lack the financial means to adequately meet their individual domestic obligations.

Equally, along the line of challenges encountered by ECOMOG, Hutchful stated that, “The ECOMOG operation occurred at a difficult time for the states in the region, when they themselves were involved in painful economic reforms and their own legitimacy, in most cases, was subject to internal criticism and pressures. The ECOMOG intervention in Liberia was also complicated by linguistic and geopolitical rivalries and by cleavages within ECOWAS itself, and undermined by debilitating arguments about its legitimacy and organization.17

Until ECOMOG’s intervention in Liberia, there had never been a sub-regional organization anywhere in Africa that took on a peacekeeping mission at the level the ECOWAS organization did. As Draman and Carment pointed out, “The ECOMOG initiative, the first of its kind in Africa, was a significant milestone in African politics. It signified a bold attempt in designing African solution to African problems within the current environment of international neglect and state failure.”18

ECOMOG, as mentioned earlier, had several challenges including: lacking up-to-date equipments, lack of cohesiveness among the contingents exacerbated by language barrier, poor living conditions, and inexperience with peacekeeping/peace enforcement. The inability to agree on some of the issues among ECOWAS members, the indiscipline

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behaviors of some of the soldiers (in terms of the reported involvement with illegal acceptance of diamond/money), and other similar matters, further compounded the challenges faced by ECOMOG troops in the peacekeeping missions. But despite all the enumerated challenges, ECOWAS members, through tenacity and Nigeria’s immense financial contribution, some of the challenges were much contained.

Given the nature of the recent West African inter-state and intra-state conflicts (often unexpected and many a time, vicious and volatile) as stated earlier, some of ECOMOG’s problems such as insufficient fund and lack of consensus by the member-states, were unavoidable. As Draman and Carment pointed out, “It is an accepted fact that in international relations, particularly in military interventions, there is the need for a lead player around which intervention efforts can mobilize. As ECOMOG’s architect, Nigeria’s leaders chose to put the force together amidst opposition from Francophone states.”

ECOWAS, through subsequent summits and accords during and since the initial peacekeeping mission of 1990, has continued to improve/correct some of ECOWAS/ECOMOG shortcomings. As Coetzee asserted, “ECOMOG forces, mainly led and financed by Nigeria, have undertaken three interventions of note since its inception. These interventions were criticized widely at the time and in subsequent studies. Yet,

19. Ibid.
some academics have pointed out the positive achievements of these interventions and
have postulated the value of these experiences for all concerned. . .”

The problems encountered by ECOWAS/ECOMOG in the course of attending to
the Liberian and the Sierra Leonean crises, especially with the Liberian crisis,
necessitated immediate attention. ECOWAS took the necessary steps with the various
subsequent accords, for example, The Abuja Accord of August 1995. This accord, made
allowance to bring all warring factions into the transitional government; enlarging the
Council of States to six members and appointed a third civilian, Mr. Wilton Sankawulo,
as the chairman; naming LPC’s George Boley as “coalition” representative on the
council; reasserting the allocation of ministries. The Abuja accord did serve to
temporarily resolve some of the problems, particularly in relation to the Liberian warring
factions.

There were other matters that could not be given immediate attention such as the
difficulty of establishing sustaining funding within the ECOWAS organization. There
was the inability of the body to reach a consensus on some of the issues, either as a result
of political struggles, the perceived Anglo-phone/Franco-phone dichotomy, and the issue
of troops training, or combination of all of the above. But there have also been
subsequent Summits that have and addressed and continue to address these matters. For

Military Interventions in West Africa: Success or Failure? http://www oppapers.com/essays/

21. Mohamed Belmakki, African Sub-regional Organizations in Peacekeeping and
Peace making: The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), (California:
April 4, 2007).
example, "Assessing the Liberia and Sierra Leone operations in 1998, ECOWAS ministers decided that ECOMOG should form the basis of a regional peacekeeping mechanism."²²

Furthermore, the underdeveloped economy of all ECOWAS member-states, plus extensive economic hardships, brought on by the various (hardship exacerbating programs) such as Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP), and the devaluation of these states’ currencies, have all combined to escalate various economic/political instability and/or crises.

In the analysis of Nigeria’s peacekeeping roles in the West African region, the study revealed that, Nigeria has attempted to stay true to her proclamations at independence, “...Nigeria would subscribe to the principles...of multilateralism, peaceful resolution of conflicts, and equality of states...”²³ Nigeria could have achieved and can still achieve continuity in her foreign policy, with cautious contribution of funds.

Many analysts point to Nigeria’s quest for regional hegemony. But many also point to the enormous cost (in human and other resources) she has had to bear for the sake of regional hegemony. Similarly, the findings of this study are that there is much evidence to support Nigeria’s professed motivation and intent for her peacekeeping roles in West Africa, which is as a result of her geographical location, and her experience with colonialism. According to Magbadelo,

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The zeal, with which Nigerian nationalists prosecuted the struggle for political autonomy of the countries of Africa from colonial bondage, has continued to reproduce itself in the policies and programmes of the successive post-colonial Governments of Nigeria. Indeed, Nigeria’s consistency in her concern for Africa is evident in the adoption of Africa as the cornerstone of the country’s foreign policy. The country’s African diplomacy centers around five broad strands. . .

Whether the ECOWAS decision to intervene in the Liberian crisis and subsequently, in Sierra Leone, was championed by Nigeria as it has often been said, or not, one thing many observers seem to agree on is that, ECOWAS, given what it had to work with (all the enumerated challenges) succeeded, beyond any observer’s expectation. As Draman and Carment indicated:

ECOMOG initiative, the first of its kind in Africa, was a significant milestone in African politics. It signified a bold attempt in designing African solution to African problems within the current environment of international neglect and state failure. Given the novelty of the initiative for Africa, the complexity of the Liberian conflict, the intra-regional rivalries, the lack of experience in multilateral diplomacy on the part of the sub-regional leaders and the difficult financial and political circumstances within which ECOMOG had to operate Overall, the ECOMOG initiative is indicative of a number of lessons both for policy and theory on peacekeeping in Africa.25

It must also be remembered that as at the time ECOWAS was involved with the crises in Liberia and Sierra Leone, there were many different political crises taking place in different regions in Africa. Some of these unrests and their seriousness perhaps induced ECOWAS members to make the decision to intervene in Liberia and Sierra Leone. For example, in the early to mid 1990s, there were serious political crisis in Angola, Burundi, the ethnic conflict in Rwanda that resulted in where at least eight-hundred thousand people lost their lives as well as the tribal/racial problems in the Sudan.


All the terrible incidences listed above took place between 1990 and 1994, dwarfing one of the biggest celebrations all Africa should have had as a result of the disintegration of the apartheid system in South Africa. These incidences also disrupted the development process in Africa, as these types of crises take up essential funds. Often time, it is only the conspicuous participation of peacekeepers and other peacekeeping attendees that are noticed but the financial implications are often unnoticed. Case in point, “ECOMOG’s offense in Liberia succeeded in containing the conflict, at least for a short period, preventing the situation from degenerating into genocidal proportions . . .”

Given all the different political cries listed above (from the political crisis in Angola, Burundi, to the ethnic conflict in Rwanda) in different regions in Africa, no wonder the ECOWAS organization felt the need for their peacekeeping initiative in Liberia/Sierra Leone. Equally, since “her own security is inextricably tied to the security of West Africa . . .” Hence Nigeria felt compelled to pursue the peacekeeping initiative.

In spite of the obvious need for security in the region, some political observers such as Hutchful, Draman, and Carment, Adebayo, Cleaver to name but a few, argue that Nigeria’s principle motive for championing ECOMOG initial peacekeeping initiatives is for regional domination. Equally, Cleaver stated that, “. . . The Francophone states

26. Ibid.

believed that Nigeria was using ECOMOG as a vehicle for its own regional hegemonic ambitions . . .”

Nigeria on the other hand, and cognizant of the fact that political observers, especially western political observers, perpetually insinuate that her main objective for leading the way in both the Liberian/Sierra Leonean crises or for dominating the peacekeeping missions as it was often portrayed, was for her eventual regional hegemony. She nonetheless stepped up to help prevent what could have turned out perhaps many times worst than they did in both cases.

Through the course of this study, several research outcomes showed that Nigeria played a significant role as an ECOWAS member-state but more importantly, it showed that there was a need for a leader. As Draman and Carment point out, “it is an accepted fact that in international relations, particularly in military interventions, there is the need for a lead player around which intervention efforts can mobilize…” In all, this study was able to deduce that Nigeria and ECOMOG, both played their parts in the best way they could, especially with their first peacekeeping mission in Liberia. Against the same background, Chikwem asserts that, “. . . there is no best approach to peacekeeping missions because no approach to peace is ideally suited to every situation.”


Findings

In the course of this study, information gathered from various sources was analyzed in an effort to establish the scope and extent of Nigeria’s roles in peacekeeping in West Africa. The study also looked at the relationship between Nigeria and her neighbors as well as the perception of Nigeria by her neighbors in West Africa; then, through different theoretical and conceptual approaches, the study delved into scholarly and empirical analyses of the international/domestic implications of Nigeria’s extensive involvement in international peace-keeping operations.

A lot of interesting and insightful findings emerged from the vast body of literature reviewed and the interviews conducted for this study and the findings are summarized as follows.

Nigeria has been at the forefront of peacekeeping in West Africa, through enormous contributions of financial assistance, economic aid, diplomatic relations and partnerships and extensive contribution of other resources, including human resources. The findings in this study revealed that Nigeria since her independence and even before then has remained committed to achieving economic and political stability for Africa, especially for the West African region. The findings also showed that, Nigeria remains adamant and committed to these causes, because they are necessary for economic development, political stability, socioeconomic sustainability and regional security.

Nigeria’s intent or rationale for taking the lead role in peacekeeping in West Africa has been commended by some, but it has also been misconstrued by others as an attempt to establish political hegemony. What the findings further indicate, is that the
perceived regional political rivalry, particularly between the Anglophone/Francophone ECOWAS members, is more speculation than factual and often exacerbated by the Extra-African countries, for their own ulterior benefits. It was also found that part of the political rivalry among some of the ECOWAS members, is as a result of the constant insinuations by some western political observers, of Nigeria’s intent for regional hegemony. The findings showed that many of these observers were quite critical of ECOWAS initiative, and even called it Nigeria’s decision, indicating that because of Nigeria’s need for regional hegemony, she dominated the forces and created problems for ECOMOG in Liberia as well as in Sierra Leone. Some political observers equally contend that some of ECOMOG’s decisions were made unilaterally by Nigerian forces.

The perception of Nigeria’s neighbors of her peacekeeping roles in the West African region as the finding revealed, is that some of her neighbors see Nigeria as a powerful good neighbor and some see her as rich in resources, helpful but arrogant; while others view Nigeria as a leader in West Africa. For example, “Today, each of Africa’s sub regional entities has a natural lead country. South Africa plays that role in the Southern Africa sub region just as Nigeria plays it in West Africa, and Kenya does same in East Africa.”31 As summed up by one of the Liberian refugees interviewed, “many of us in Liberia and West Africa appreciate what Nigeria does to help in times of crisis. We are lucky Nigeria is in West Africa.”32

The findings also revealed that the ECOMOG troops (trained for conventional army), were not used to the tactic (guerilla war) used by the warring factions in both the Liberia and Sierra Leone crises. There were many such challenges, as stated by Adebayo, "Military maps were not available except the tourist maps of Monrovia which was what the initial planning was based on." Furthermore, the lack of consensus among ECOWAS members in addition to the challenges enumerated above resulted in ECOMOG’s inadequate strategies throughout their peacekeeping missions. It is clear from the findings, that the recent (1990 to 2005) waves of inter state conflicts prevalent in various parts of West Africa and indeed, Africa, are more vicious, volatile, and sophisticated (in terms of the arms and ammunitions) used by the perpetrators.

ECOWAS had many questions regarding its legitimacy in creating ECOMOG, particularly with reference to its Treaty of non-aggression, signed in 1981, in Freetown, Sierra Leone. This issue of legitimacy was further addressed by the then President of Nigeria, Ibrahim Babangida, who during an impromptu briefing stated that:

We have heard of the illegality of the ECOMOG. But those who raise this preposterous question are equally but indirectly questioning the legality of the ECOWAS. The answer therefore to this rather ambiguous question lies in asking the fundamental question, is the ECOWAS legal? Furthermore, people who raise the issue of legality should promptly look at Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations for the appropriate and expected role of the ECOMOG and other sub-regional organizations world-wide. However, for the benefit of the general public let me cite this very relevant Chapter of the United Nations Charter: a Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided

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that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purpose and Principles of the United Nations. . . .

The findings also showed that ECOWAS members have been financially handicapped and Nigeria has had to bear the financial burden of maintaining both ECOWAS and ECOMOG.

The findings summarized above are useful for, or contribute to, scholarly and policy discourses of peacekeeping in Africa. They also serve a pragmatic purpose as the basis for the recommendations of this study, which are presented below.

**Conclusion**

This study concludes from the findings, that Nigeria/ECOMOG encountered many obstacles and challenges in these two peacekeeping missions (Liberia and Sierra Leone) but in the end, what mattered was that ECOWAS members were able to find an African solution to an African problem—ECOWAS members were able to organize troops from the organization’s member-states, to prevent the Liberian/Sierra Leonean crises from becoming a regional anarchy. Regardless of the criticisms of Nigeria’s actions/strategies, she was determined to end both crises. It is, however, important to note, that the effort of the ECOWAS organization and Nigeria’s determination to bring about peace to Liberia and Sierra Leone, are what ultimately brought relative peace to these two countries.

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Furthermore, Nigeria’s insistence on a stable region stems, from her belief that economic/political stability leads to secure environment, especially in relation to her contiguous neighbours. Nigeria further believes that Africa can take care of Africa’s problems, hence her adamant commitment to several peacekeeping roles in the region and beyond. To further substantiate the above statements, former Nigerian President Ibrahim Babangida, speaking on the Liberian crisis, stated that:

Our attitude over the years with all these countries (Ring Countries) has developed a consistent pattern and relentless effort to ensure and encourage peaceful co-existence. Nigeria may as well be one of the countries in Africa with less number of border clashes with our immediate neighbours. We believe that policies that emphasize stability, and above all, we believe that crisis or conflicts in our region will inevitably have adverse spill-over effects on the peace and stability of our own country.35

This study set out to analyze Nigeria’s peacekeeping roles in West Africa. It is obvious that Nigeria/ECOMOG will continue to participate in peacekeeping endeavors in the West African region and other regions in Africa. This form of regional peacekeeping arrangement is new and unique. According to the inter-agency framework for conflict analysis in transition (IAFCA), there are three important elements of peacekeeping: conflict analysis, analysis of ongoing response, strategic and program planning. When followed, these elements not only guide peacekeeping principles and process, but also give structure to an otherwise chaotic situation.

As supported strongly by the reflective history theory and the concept of national interest, this continuous involvement in international peacekeeping is extensive. The implication of this extensive peacekeeping role is its cost on the domestic economy. But Nigeria, given her geographical location in the West African region, has to continue to

35. Ibid., 103-104.
play the part of a coordinator, by constantly finding ways to maintain political stability in
the region.

Some scholars in Nigeria for example, have also stated that “Nigeria cannot but
thread the path of multilateralism (the coordination of relations among two or more states
based on specific norms and principles.)” They however, insist that while Nigeria
continues to cooperate and collaborate with other nations in West Africa, for ways to
maintain peace and political stability, she must also pay attention to principles and
standards guiding the collaboration. A good example of collaborative work is the
establishment of ECOMOG by ECOWAS member-states. Another effective means of
collaborative work is the setting up of treaties (some articles of these are contained in the
appendix) and accords, and the diligent implementation of the agendas set forth in that
treaty and/or accord.

The Abuja accord signed in August of 1995 in Abuja, Nigeria, is an example of
how to set standards or principles of a collaborative endeavor. The Abuja accord had
sixteen articles to it, some of this are the enlarging of the council of states to six members
and appointing Mr. Wilton Sankawulo (a civilian), as chairman; imposing a cease-fire
from August 26, followed by the installation of the council of states immediately after.
The OAU/AU was equally in support of Nigeria’s peacekeeping roles and the
collaborative efforts of ECOWAS member-states, to send ECOMOG in to Liberia in
1990. In spite of criticisms from many international political observers, some political
observers as well as the UN were in support of Nigeria/ECOMOG peacekeeping roles.

Foreign Policy Thrust: Essays in Honour of Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji, CON. Ed. Bola A.
Akinteriwa (Ibadan: Vintage Publishers LTD.), 347.
This new bold move by a regional group showed the world what Africans are capable of achieving when they decide to work together.

Since the Liberia and Sierra Leone crises, Nigeria has adjusted her peacekeeping policy, though still "Africa-center-piece," the format of its implementation has some element of change. With the election of a democratic government in 1999, "the current thrust of Nigeria’s foreign policy is to regain respectability and relevance in the international community... The grand strategy seeks to the conversion of foreign policy activities into concrete achievements which are of direct benefit to Nigeria."37 From many indications, it is obvious that democracy has a direct bearing on the way Nigeria’s foreign policy is implemented. Another way of looking at it is that over time, Nigeria’s foreign policy implementation which by extension, her peacekeeping roles, will adjust to reflect its format of governance, especially in a democratic environment.

Finally, in this study of an analysis of Nigeria’s roles in the West African region, it was revealed that Nigeria has taken a leading role in providing funding and military personnel for conflict resolution in the West African region, in forming organizations and assembling groups to protect the region’s economic and political stability, and in encouraging a collaborative partnership among the member states of the region. All these responsibilities have placed a burden on Nigeria’s ability to take adequate care of her own domestic (internal) affairs, mainly economic and security. On this issue, the following recommendations become very relevant.

37. Ibid., 348.
Recommendations

The recommendations made in this study are by no means exhaustive or even comprehensive. This is partly because conflict, by nature, takes on new and different dimensions with time and context. This would mean and require response strategies that are appropriate and feasible at the time of a conflict and for the parties in the conflict. It is in this regard that the recommendations made in this study are relevant and appropriate. They point to specific and useful lessons that ECOWAS member-states particularly Nigeria, can and should learn from their experiences in peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace-making in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

It is recommended therefore that:

1. Nigeria continues to work with ECOWAS members as well as the “Ring Countries” (countries that surround Nigeria in all her four coordinated (see Figure 7), through diplomatic and cultural endeavours to minimize and/or eliminate the perceived Anglo-phone/Franco-phone differences. These differences are seen as distracting and limiting on the effectiveness of the organization.

2. Nigeria should streamline her regional multilateral roles and devote more of the resources going towards regional peacekeeping, to strengthening her domestic economy.

3. This study, highly recommends that the ECOWAS organization, in the case of future peacekeeping missions, try to solicit extensive international help (more than they sought during the Liberian/Sierra Leonean crises). Especially from the more established organizations such as the United Nations—with extensive peacekeeping experience and financial backings. The solicitation should not however, be limited to the UN, the United States of America, Britain and France, but should be expanded to nations like Japan, China and any such nations with the capacity and ability to assist in times of extreme crises. As Adebayo suggested, “It would be important to find a way in the future of harnessing the important military and financial capacity of local
power like Nigeria into more multilateral efforts, preferably, under a UN umbrella.”

Along the same line, Draman and Carment also suggested that, “UN support will not only have the effect of neutralizing the perception that regional powers are at the forefront of local initiatives, but it could also do much to enhance organization’s peacekeeping influence, reputation and capabilities.”


4. Finally, this study further recommends that it would be logical and/or necessary for Nigeria to reduce the dichotomy or balance the difference in policy implementation between her domestic policy and her foreign policy, while paying attention to the environmental variables, such as regional intra-state and inter-state crises. Attention to these environmental variables is necessary, given the reduction in the level of peacekeeping involvement by the international community such as the United Nations.
APPENDIX

Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (COWAS)

Text Of The
Treaty Of The Economic Community Of
West African States (ECOWAS)

Preamble

The President of the Republic, Head of State, Head of the Revolutionary
Military Government, and President of the National Council of the
Revolution of Dahomey

The President of the Republic of The Gambia

The Head of State and Chairman of the National Redemption Council of the
Republic of Ghana

The Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the People's Revolutionary
Armed Forces, President of the Republic of Guinea

The President of the Republic of Guinea Bissau

The President of the Republic of Ivory Coast

The President of the Republic of Liberia

The Chairman of the Military Committee of National Liberation, President
of the Republic of Mali

The President of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania

The Head of the Federal Military Government, Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria

The President of the Republic of Senegal

The President of the Republic of Sierra Leone

The President of the Republic of Togo

The President of the Republic of Upper Volta

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Conscious of the overriding need to accelerate, foster and encourage the economic and social development of their States in order to improve the living standards of their peoples;

Convinced that the promotion of harmonious economic development of their States calls for effective economic co-operation largely through a determined and concerted policy of self-reliance;

Recognising that progress towards sub-regional economic integration requires an assessment of the economic potential and interests of each State;

Accepting the need for a fair and equitable distribution of the benefits of co-operation among Member States;

Noting that forms of bilateral and multilateral economic co-operation existing in the sub-region give hope for wider co-operation;

Recalling the Declaration of African Co-operation, Development and Economic Independence adopted by the Tenth Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity;

Bearing in mind that efforts at sub-regional co-operation should not conflict with or hamper similar efforts being made to foster wider co-operation in Africa;

Affirming as the ultimate objective of their efforts accelerated and sustained economic development of their States and the creation of a homogeneous society, leading to the unity of the countries of West Africa, by the elimination of all types of obstacles to the free movement of goods, capital and persons;

Decide for the purpose of the foregoing to create an Economic Community of West African States, and AGREE AS FOLLOWS:

NOTE
1. The Republic of Cape Verde has adhered to the Treaty of the Community in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 Article 6 of the Treaty
2. The Treaty of the Community shall be binding on the Republic of Cape Verde as from 1977 (date of submission of its membership document to the Federal Military Government of Nigeria)

CHAPTER 1

Principles

ARTICLE 1

Establishment and Membership of the Community

1. By this Treaty the HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES establish among themselves an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), hereinafter referred to as 'the Community'.

2. The members of the Community, hereinafter referred to as 'the Member States', shall be the States that ratify this Treaty and such other West African States as may accede to it.

ARTICLE 2

Aims of the Community

1. It shall be the aim of the Community to promote co-operation and development in all fields of economic activity particularly in the fields of industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions and in social and cultural matters for the purpose of raising the standard of living of its peoples, of increasing and maintaining economic stability, of fostering close relations among its members and of contributing to the progress and development of the African continent.

2. For the purposes set out in the preceding paragraph and as herein after provided for in this Treaty, the Community shall by stages ensure:
   (a) the elimination as between the Member States of customs duties and other charges of equivalent effect in respect of the importation and exportation of goods;
   (b) the abolition of quantitative and administrative restrictions on trade among the Member States.
Appendix (continued)

(Article 3)

General Underwriting

The Member States shall make every effort to plan and direct their policies with a view to creating favourable conditions for the achievement of the aims of the Community; in particular, each Member State shall take all steps to secure the enactment of such legislation as is necessary to give effect to this Treaty.

(Article 4)

Institutions

1. The institutions of the Community shall be:

(a) the Authority of Heads of State and Government;
(b) the Council of Ministers;
(c) the Executive Secretariat;
(d) the Tribunal of the Community; and
(e) the following Technical and Specialised Commissions:
   — the Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and Payments Commission;
   — the Industry, Agriculture and Natural Resources Commission;
   — the Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Commission;
   — the Social and Cultural Affairs Commission;

and such other Commissions or bodies as may be established by the Authority of Heads of State and Government or are established or provided for by this Treaty.

2. The institutions of the Community shall perform the functions and act within the limits of the powers conferred upon them by or under this Treaty and by protocols thereto.
Article 5
Authority of Heads of State and Government
Establishment, Composition and Functions
1. There is hereby established the Authority of Heads of State and Government of the Member States referred to in this Treaty as 'the Authority' which shall be the principal governing institution of the Community.
2. The Authority shall be responsible for, and have the general direction and control of the performance of the executive functions of the Community for the progressive development of the Community and the achievement of its aims.
3. The decisions and directions of the Authority shall be binding on all institutions of the Community.
4. The Authority shall meet at least once a year. It shall determine its own procedure for convening its meetings, for the conduct of its business thereat and at other times, and for the annual rotation of the office of Chairman among the members of the Authority.

Article 6
Council of Ministers
Establishment, Composition and Functions
1. There is hereby established a Council of Ministers which shall consist of two representatives of each Member State.
2. It shall be the responsibility of the Council of Ministers:
   (a) to keep under review the functioning and development of the Community in accordance with this Treaty;
   (b) to make recommendations to the Authority on matters of policy aimed at the efficient and harmonious functioning and development of the Community;
   (c) to give directions to all subordinate institutions of the Community; and
   (d) to exercise such other powers conferred on it and perform such other duties assigned to it by this Treaty.

3. The decisions and directions of the Council of Ministers shall be binding on all subordinate institutions of the Community unless otherwise determined by the Authority.
4. The Council of Ministers shall meet twice a year and one of such meetings shall be held immediately preceding the annual meeting of the Authority. Extraordinary meetings of the Council of Ministers may be convened as and when necessary.
5. Subject to any directions that the Authority may give, the Council of Ministers shall determine its own procedure including that for convening its meetings, for the conduct of business thereat and at other times, and for the annual rotation of the office of Chairman among the members of the Council of Ministers.
6. Where an objection is recorded on behalf of a Member State to a proposal submitted for the decision of the Council of Ministers, the proposal shall, unless such objection is withdrawn, be referred to the Authority for its decision.

Article 7
Decisions of the Authority and the Council of Ministers
The Authority shall determine the procedure for the dissemination of its decisions and directions and those of the Council of Ministers and for matters relating to their coming into effect.

Article 8
The Executive Secretariat
1. There shall be established an Executive Secretariat of the Community.
2. The Executive Secretariat shall be headed by an Executive Secretary, who shall be appointed by the Authority to serve in such office for a term of four (4) years and be eligible for reappointment for another term of four (4) years only.
3. The Executive Secretary shall only be removed from office by the Authority upon the recommendation of the Council of Ministers.
4. The Executive Secretary shall be the principal executive officer of the Community. He shall be assisted by two Deputy Executive Secretaries, who shall be appointed by the Council of Ministers.
5. In addition to the Executive Secretary and the Deputy Executive Secretaries, there shall be a Financial Controller and such other officers in the Executive Secretariat as the Council of Ministers may determine.

6. The terms and conditions of service of the Executive Secretary and other officers of the Executive Secretariat shall be governed by regulations that may be made by the Council of Ministers.

7. In appointing officers to offices in the Executive Secretariat due regard shall be had, subject to the paramount importance of securing the highest standards of efficiency and technical competence, to the desirability of maintaining an equitable distribution of appointments to such posts among citizens of the Member States.

8. The Executive Secretary and officer of the Executive Secretariat, in the discharge of their duties, owe their loyalty entirely to the Community.

9. The Executive Secretary shall be responsible for the day-to-day administration of the Community and all its institutions.

10. The Executive Secretaries shall:
(a) submit from time to time reports and recommendations through the Executive Secretary to the Council of Ministers either on its own initiative or upon the request of the Council of Ministers or the Executive Secretary; and
(b) have such other functions as are imposed on it under this Treaty.

ARTICLE 9
Technical and Specialised Commissions
Establishment, Composition and Functions

1. There shall be established the following Commissions:
(a) the Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and Payments Commission;
(b) the Industry, Agriculture and Natural Resources Commission;
(c) the Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Commission; and
(d) the Social and Cultural Affairs Commission.

2. The Authority may from time to time establish other Commissions as it deems necessary.

3. Each Commission shall consist of representatives designated one each by the Member States. Such representatives may be assisted by advisers.

4. Each Commission shall:
(a) submit from time to time reports and recommendations through the Executive Secretary to the Council of Ministers upon its own initiative or upon the request of the Council of Ministers or the Executive Secretary; and
(b) have such other functions as are imposed on it under this Treaty.

5. Subject to any directions which may be given by the Council of Ministers, each Commission shall meet as frequently as necessary for the proper discharge of its functions and shall determine its own procedure, including that for convening its meetings and the conduct of business thereat and at other times.

ARTICLE 10
External Auditor

1. There shall be an External Auditor of the Community who shall be appointed and removed by the Authority on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers.

2. Subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the Council of Ministers shall make regulations governing the terms and conditions of service and powers of the External Auditor.
Appendix (continued)

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Conscious of the overriding need to accelerate, foster and encourage the economic and social development of their States in order to improve the living standards of their people;

Convinced that the promotion of harmonious economic development of their States calls for effective economic co-operation largely through a determined and concerted policy of self-reliance;

Recognising that progress towards sub-regional economic integration requires an assessment of the economic potential and interests of each State;

Accepting the need for a fair and equitable distribution of the benefits of co-operation among Member States;

Noting that forms of bilateral and multilateral economic co-operation existing in the sub-region give hope for wider co-operation;

Recalling the Declaration of African Co-operation, Development and Economic Independence adopted by the Tenth Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity;

Bearing in mind that efforts at sub-regional cooperation should not conflict with or hamper similar efforts being made to foster wider co-operation in Africa;

Affirming as the ultimate objective of their efforts accelerated and sustained economic development of their States and the creation of a homogeneous society, leading to the unity of the countries of West Africa, by the elimination of all type of obstacles to the free movement of goods, capital and persons;

Decide for the purpose of the foregoing to create an Economic Community of West African States, and AGREE AS FOLLOWS:

NOTE

1. The Republic of CAPE VERDE has adhered to the Treaty of the Community in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 Article 6 of the Treaty

2. The Treaty of the Community shall be binding on the Republic of CAPE VERDE as from 1977 (date of submission of its membership document to the Federal Military Government of Nigeria)

Appendix (continued)

ARTICLE 11

Tribunal of the Community

1. There shall be established a Tribunal of the Community which shall ensure the observance of law and justice in the interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty. Furthermore, it shall be charged with the responsibility of settling such disputes as may be referred to it in accordance with Article 56 of this Treaty.

2. The composition, statutes and other matters relating to the Tribunal shall be prescribed by the Authority.

Chapter III

Customs And Trade Matters

ARTICLE 12

Liberalization of Trade

There shall be progressively established in the course of a transitional period of fifteen (15) years from the definitive entry into force of this Treaty, and as prescribed in this chapter, a Customs Union among the Member States. Within this Union, customs duties or other charges with equivalent effect on imports shall be eliminated. Quotas, quantitative or like restrictions or prohibitions and administrative obstacles to trade among the Member States shall also be removed. Furthermore, a common customs tariff in respect of all goods imported into the Member States from third countries shall be established and maintained.

ARTICLE 13

Customs Duties

1. Member States shall reduce and ultimately eliminate customs duties and any other charges with equivalent effect except duties notified in accordance with Article 17 and other charges which fall within that Article, imposed or in connection with the importation of goods which are eligible for Community tariff treatment in accordance with Article 15 of this Treaty. Any such duties or other charges are hereinafter referred to as 'import duties'.

2. Within a period of two (2) years from the definitive entry into force of this Treaty, a Member State may not be required to reduce or eliminate import duties. During this two-year period, Member States shall not impose any new duties and taxes or increase existing ones and shall transmit to the Executive Secretariat all information on import duties for study by the relevant institutions of the Community.
APPENDIX (continued)

3. Upon the expiry of the period of two (2) years referred to in paragraph 2 of the Article and during the next succeeding eight (8) years, Member States shall progressively reduce and ultimately eliminate import duties in accordance with a schedule to be recommended to the Council of Ministers by the Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and Payments Commission. Such a schedule shall take into account, inter alia, the effects of the reduction and elimination of import duties on the revenue of Member States and the need to avoid the disruption of the income they derive from import duties.

4. The Authority may at any time, on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers, decide that any import duties shall be reduced more rapidly or eliminated earlier than is recommended by the Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and Payments Commission. However, the Council of Ministers shall, not later than one calendar year preceding the date in which such reductions or eliminations come into effect, examine whether such reductions or eliminations shall apply to some or all goods and in respect of some or all the Member States and shall report the result of such examination for the decision of the Authority.

ARTICLE 14
Common Customs Tariff

1. The Member States agree to the gradual establishment of a common customs tariff in respect of all goods imported into the Member States from third countries.

2. At the end of the period of eight (8) years referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 13 of this Treaty and during the next succeeding five (5) years, Member States shall gradually, in accordance with a schedule to be recommended by the Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and Payments Commission, abolish existing differences in their external customs tariffs.

3. In the course of the same period, the above-mentioned Commission shall ensure the establishment of a common customs nomenclature and customs statistical nomenclature for all the Member States.

ARTICLE 15
Community Tariff Treatment

1. For the purposes of this Treaty, goods shall be accepted as eligible for Community tariff treatment if they have been consigned to the territory of the importing Member State from the territory of another Member State and originate in the Member State.

2. The definition of products originating from Member States shall be the subject of a protocol to be annexed to this Treaty.

3. The Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and Payments Commission shall from time to time examine whether the rules referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article can be amended to make them simpler and more liberal. In order to ensure their smooth and equitable operation, the Council of Ministers may from time to time amend them.

ARTICLE 16
Defection of Trade

1. For the purposes of this Article, trade is said to be deflected if,

(a) imports of any particular product by a Member State from another Member State increase,

(b) as a result of the reduction or elimination of duties and charges on that product and,

(ii) because duties and charges levied by the exporting Member State on imports of raw materials used for manufacture of the product in question are lower than the corresponding duties and charges levied by the importing Member State and

(b) this increase in imports causes or would cause serious injury to production which is carried on in the territory of the importing Member State.

2. The Council of Ministers shall keep under review the question of deflection of trade and its causes. It shall take such decisions, as are necessary, in order to deal with the causes of this deflection.

3. In case of deflection of trade to the detriment of a Member State resulting from the abusive reduction or elimination of duties and charges levied by another Member State, the Council of Ministers shall study the question in order to arrive at a just solution.
ARTICLE 17
Revenue Duties and Internal Taxation

1. Member States shall not apply directly or indirectly to imported goods from any Member State fiscal charges in excess of those applied to like domestic goods or otherwise impose such charges for the effective protection of domestic goods.

2. Member States shall eliminate all effective internal taxes or other internal charges that are made for the protection of domestic goods not later than one (1) year after the period of two (2) years referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 13 of this Treaty. Where by virtue of obligations under an existing contract entered into by a Member State and such a Member State is unable to comply with the provisions of this Article, the Member State shall duly notify the Council of Ministers of this fact and shall not extend or renew such contract at its expiry.

3. Member States shall eliminate progressively all revenue duties designed to protect domestic goods not later than the end of the period of eight (8) years referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 13 of this Treaty.

4. Each Member State shall, not later than the end of the period of two (2) years referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 13 of this Treaty, notify the Council of Ministers of any duty it wishes to apply under the provisions of paragraph 3 of the aforementioned Article.

ARTICLE 18
Quantitative Restrictions and Community Goods

1. Except as may be provided for or permitted by this Treaty, each of the Member States undertakes to relax gradually and to remove ultimately in accordance with a schedule to be recommended by the Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and Payments Commission and not later than ten (10) years from the definitive entry into force of this Treaty, all the then existing quota, quantitative or like restrictions or prohibitions which apply to the import into that State of goods originating in the other Member States and therefor refrain from imposing any further restrictions or prohibitions.

2. The Authority may at any time, on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers, decide that any quota, quantitative or like restrictions or prohibition shall be relaxed more rapidly or removed earlier than is recommended by the Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and Payments Commission.

3. A Member State may, after having given notice to the other member States of its intention to do so, introduce or continue or execute restrictions or prohibitions affecting:
   (a) the application of security laws and regulation;
   (b) the control of arms, ammunition and other war equipment and military items;
   (c) the protection of human, animal or plant health or life, or the protection of public morality;
   (d) the transfer of gold, silver and precious and semi-precious stones; or
   (e) the protection of national treasures, provided that a Member State shall not so exercise the right to introduce or continue to execute the restrictions or prohibitions conferred by this paragraph as to stabilize the free movement of goods envisaged in this Article.

ARTICLE 19
Dumping

1. Member States undertake to prohibit the practice of dumping goods within the Community.

2. For the purposes of this Article, 'dumping' means the transfer of goods originating in a Member State to another Member State for sale:
   (a) at a price lower than the comparable price charged for similar goods in the Member States where such goods originate (due allowance being made for the differences in the conditions of sale or in taxation or for any other factors affecting the comparability of prices); and
   (b) under circumstances likely to prejudice the production of similar goods in that Member State.

ARTICLE 20
Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment

1. Member States shall accord to one another in relation to trade between them the 'most-favoured-nation' treatment and in no case shall tariff concessions granted to a third country under an agreement with a
Member States shall be more favourable than those applicable under this Treaty.

2. Copies of such agreements referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be transmitted by the Member States which are parties to them to the Executive Secretariat of the Community.

3. Any agreement between a Member State and a third country under which tariff concessions are granted, shall not derogate from the obligations of that Member State under this Treaty.

**ARTICLE 21**

**Internal Legislation**

Member States shall refrain from enacting legislation which directly or indirectly discriminates against the same or like products of another Member State.

**ARTICLES 22**

**Re-exportation of Goods and Transit Facilities**

1. Where customs duty has been charged and collected on any goods imported from a third country into a Member State such goods shall not be re-exported into another Member State except as may be permitted under a protocol to this treaty entered into by the Member States.

2. Where goods are re-exported under such a protocol, the Member States from whose territory such goods are re-exported shall refund to the Member State into whose territory such goods are imported the customs duties charged and collected on such goods. The duties so refunded shall not exceed those applicable on such goods in the territory of the Member State into which such goods are imported.

3. Each Member State, in accordance with international regulations, shall grant full and unrestricted freedom of transit through its territory of goods proceeding to or from a third country indirectly through that territory to or from Member States, and such transit shall not be subject to any discrimination, quantitative restrictions, duties or other charges levied on transit.

4. Notwithstanding paragraph 3 of this Article,
   (a) goods in transit shall be subject to the customs law; and
   (b) goods in transit shall be liable to the charges usually made for carriage and for any services which may be rendered, provided such charges are not discriminatory.

5. Where goods are imported from a third country into one Member State, each of the other Member States shall be free to restrict the transfer to it of such goods whether by a system of licensing and controlling importers or by other means.

6. The provisions of paragraph 5 of this Article shall apply to goods which, under the provisions of Article 15 of this Treaty, fail to be accepted as originating in a Member State.

**ARTICLE 23**

**Customs Administration**

Member States shall, upon the advice of the Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and Payments Commission, take appropriate measures to harmonize and standardize their customs regulations and procedures, to ensure the effective application of the provisions of this chapter and to facilitate the movement of goods and services across their frontiers.

**ARTICLE 24**

**Drawback**

1. Member States may, at or before the end of the period of eight (8) years referenced in paragraph 3 of Article 13 of this Treaty, refuse to accept as eligible for Community tariff treatment, goods in relation to which drawback is claimed or made use of in connection with their expatriations from the Member States in the territory of which the goods have undergone the last process of production.

2. For the purposes of this Article:
   (a) 'drawback' means any arrangement, including temporary duty-free admission for the refund of all or part of the duties applicable to imported raw materials, provided that the arrangement, expressly or in effect, such refund or remission if goods are exported but not if they are retained for home use;
   (b) 'remissions' includes exemption from duties for goods imported into free zones or other places which have similar customs privileges ports, and;
Appendix (continued)

(c) Duties means customs duties and any other charges with equivalence imposed on imported goods, except the non-protective element in such duties or charges.

ARTICLES 25
Compensation for Loss of Revenue

1. The Council of Ministers shall, on the report of the Executive Secretary and recommendation by the appropriate Commission or Commissions, determine the compensation to be paid to a Member State which has suffered loss of import duties as a result of the application of this chapter.

2. A protocol to be annexed to this Treaty shall state precisely the methods of assessment of the loss of revenue suffered by Member States as a result of the application of this chapter.

ARTICLE 26
Safeguard Clause

1. In the event of serious disturbances occurring in the economy of a Member State following the application of the provisions of this chapter, the Member state concerned shall after informing the Executive Secretary and the other Member States take the necessary safeguard measures pending the approval of the Council of Ministers.

2. These measures shall remain in force for a maximum period of one year. They may not be extended beyond that period except with the approval of the Council of Ministers.

3. The Council of Ministers shall examine the method of application of these measures while they remain in force.

Chapter IV
Freedom Of Movement And Residence

ARTICLE 27
Visa and Residence

1. Citizens of Member States shall be regarded as Community citizens and accordingly Member States undertake to abolish all obstacles to their freedom of movement and residence within the Community.

2. Member States shall by agreements with each other exempt Community citizens from holding visitors’ visas and residence permits and allow them to work and undertake commercial and industrial activities within their territories.
Appendix (continued)

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(6) ‘duty’ means customs duties and any other charges with equivalence imposed on imported goods, except the non-protective element in such duties or charges.

ARTICLES 25
Compensation for Loss of Revenue

1. The Council of Ministers shall, on the report of the Executive Secretary and recommendation by the appropriate Commission or Commissions, determine the compensation to be paid to a Member State which has suffered loss of import duties as a result of the application of this chapter.

2. A protocol to be annexed to this Treaty shall state precisely the methods of assessment of the loss of revenue suffered by Member States as a result of the application of this chapter.

ARTICLE 26
Safeguard Clauses

1. In the event of serious disturbances occurring in the economy of a Member State following the application of the provisions of this chapter, the Member State concerned shall inform the Executive Secretary and the other Member States take the necessary safeguard measure pending the approval of the Council of Ministers.

2. These measures shall remain in force for a maximum period of one year. They may not be extended beyond that period except with the approval of the Council of Ministers.

3. The Council of Ministers shall examine the method of application of these measures while they remain in force.

Chapter IV

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Chapter V

Industrial Development and Harmonization

ARTICLE 28

General Principles

For the purposes of this chapter, Member States shall achieve their industrial development and harmonization in the three stages as set out in Articles 29, 30 and 31.

ARTICLE 29

Stage I: Exchange of Information on Major Industrial Projects

Member States undertake to:

(a) furnish one another with major feasibility studies and reports on projects within their territories;

(b) furnish one another, on request, reports on the performance of prospective technical partners who have developed similar projects in their territories;

(c) furnish one another, on request, reports on foreign business group operations in their territories;

(d) furnish one another, on request, with reports on their experiences on industrial projects and to exchange industrial research information and expertise;

(e) commission, where appropriate, joint studies for the identification of viable industrial projects for development within the Community; and

(f) finance, where appropriate, joint research on the transfer of technology and the development of new products through the use of raw materials common in some or all of the Member States and on specific industrial problems.

ARTICLE 30

Stage II: Harmonization of Industrial Incentives and Industrial Development Plans

Member States undertake to:

(a) harmonize their industrial policies so as to ensure a similarity of industrial climate and to avoid disruption of their industrial activities resulting from dissimilar policies in the fields of industrial incentives, company taxation and Africanization; and

(b) co-operation with one another by exchanging their industrial plans so as to avoid unhealthy rivalry and waste of resources.

ARTICLE 31

Stage III: Personnel Exchange, Training and Joint Ventures

Member States shall:

(a) exchange, as may be necessary, skilled, professional and managerial personnel in the operation of projects within the Community;

(b) provide places for training in their educational technical institutions for Community citizens; and

(c) engage, where appropriate, in joint development of projects including those which entail the execution of complementary parts of such projects in different Member States.

ARTICLE 32

Remedial Measures

1. The Council of Ministers shall keep under constant review the implementation of the provisions of this chapter, the disparity in the levels of industrial development of the Member States and may direct the appropriate Commission of the Community to recommend measures to remedy such disparity.

2. In the implementation of the aims of the Community, the Council of Ministers shall recommend measures designed to promote the industrial development of Member States and shall take steps to reduce gradually the Community's economic dependence on the outside world and strengthen economic relations among themselves.
Appendix (continued)

3. The Council of Ministers shall further recommend measures designed to accelerate the industrial integration of the economies of the Member States.

Chapter VI

Co-operation in Agriculture and Natural Resources

ARTICLE 33
Co-operation among Member States

Member States shall co-operate as set out in this chapter in the development of their natural resources particularly agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fisheries.

ARTICLE 34
Stage I: Harmonisation of Agricultural Policies

1. Member States undertake to work towards the harmonisation of their internal and external agricultural policies in their relations with one another;

2. Member States shall exchange regularly information on experiments and results of research being carried out in their respective territories and on existing rural development programmes and

3. Member States shall formulate, as appropriate, joint programmes for both basic and in-service training in existing institutions.

ARTICLE 35
Stage II: Evolution of a Common Agricultural Policy

Member States undertake to take all measures necessary for the creation of a common policy especially in the fields of research, training, production, processing and marketing of the products of agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fisheries. For this purpose, the Industry, Agriculture and Natural Resources Commission shall, as soon as possible, after its establishment, make recommendations to the Council of Ministers for the harmonisation and exploitation of natural resources of the Member States.
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