Conflict resolution and nation-building in Somalia

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ABSTRACT

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CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND NATION-BUILDING IN SOMALIA

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Dissertation Dated July 2010

The research concentrated on the current as well as the past quagmire of the Somali conflict. Political, social and economic triggers have been identified to resolve or reduce violent conflict and disorder. The research used primary as well as secondary sources to study the issues and explore the problems inherent in an environment of scarce resources. Confrontations between the state and society were brought to a higher level of violence since the late 1970s following the Somali-Ethiopian war.

The author explored avenues for reconciliation and nation-building and introduced several models as possible strategies for nation-building. Conclusively, a home-grown, traditional mechanisms model was recommended which entails the following policy prescriptions to achieve long-lasting peace and security for Somalia: 1. Governance structures of law and order. 2. Resources: De-escalating conflicts by opening up negotiating opportunities of land and property. 3. Complete demilitarization of society. 4. International cooperation. A plan by the international community to reconstruct and rehabilitate Somalia is essential if we have to avoid a relapse into a chaotic, violent situation in Somalia.
CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND NATION BUILDING IN SOMALIA

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF CLARK ATLANTA UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

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ATLANTA, GEORGIA

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As I embark on the final phase of my dissertation, I express my utmost gratitude to my late father, Sheikh Ali Abdi Saleh. Without his interest and enthusiasm to provide me with the highest quality of learning and education at any cost, I would have never achieved the level of accomplishment that I enjoy today. It is indeed the nurturing and guidance that my father provided me at an early stage of my life that cemented my accomplishments and allowed me to become a successful man in later years of my life. I have to express my appreciation and gratitude to Dr. Abi Awomolo, Chair of the Political Science Department, for her occasional encouragement. Her colleagues, Dr. Hashim Gibrill and Dr. F.S.J. Ledgister, also deserve special mention here. I am also indebted to the library staff of Georgia Perimeter College, Clarkston campus, for a prolonged period of ongoing assistance. Special gratitude is due to Scott Smith, the computer lab supervisor, and Rita Clifton, Librarian, for their support and encouragement. I dedicate this dissertation to my late father, Sheikh Ali Abdi Saleh, who sacrificed a lot of resources to enable me to study both at home in Somalia and in overseas countries; such as, Egypt and the United States of America. I cannot repay that debt to him. May god offer him mercy.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Somalia

The research concentrated on the current quagmire of the Somali conflict which led to the destruction of the structures of government and its institutions and caused devastation of both human and material resources. We will examine a series of events that preceded the total collapse of the state resulting from the violent confrontations of State forces and various clan families. Also, we will be considering the gradual loss of sovereignty by the Siyad Government; and the call to arms by the Issaq and Hawiye clan families in the final years of the rule of Mohamed Siyad Barre. Further, the role of the international community in attempting to bring order and stability to the anarchic situation created by the ouster of long-term ruler, Mohamed Siyad Barre will be studied.

State collapse in Somalia was recognized by the international community when Siyad Barre was removed from power and forced to flee the capital, Mogadiscio, in the final days of January 1991. However, the process of state collapse in Somalia began earlier than that time, possibly in the mid-eighties. It is fair to say that the effectiveness and legitimacy of Siyad Barre’s rule was dealt a terrible blow by the continuous challenges of organized, armed clan militias in the latter part of the 1980s. In May of 1988, the violent battles that took place in and around the northwestern cities of Burao and Hargeisa had the impact of weakening the power base of the regime to a considerable degree and effectively challenging its legitimacy.
State collapse is not a short-term phenomenon; but a cumulative, incremental process similar to a degenerative disease. Governments lose their ability to exercise legitimate authority unevenly over territory. Certain regions fall away from central control, as happened in Northern Somalia in the late 1980s, while others remain within the government’s control. State collapse can also occur over time. Robert Kaplan quotes a resident of Freetown as saying that “the government in Sierra Leone has no writ after dark.”

Some states disintegrate as cohesive economic entities, while maintaining their political unity. The syndrome of state collapse often begins to take place when the regime in power fails to satisfy various demand-bearing groups in the community as resources dry up. The dissatisfaction and opposition on the part of these groups triggers the government’s use of security forces to maintain order. In certain cases, the existing government is overthrown and a successor government emerges to arrest the deterioration. In the case of state collapse, however, the degeneration is too widespread and society is not able to regain sufficient power to save the foundations of the state. The outcome of this is the total collapse of the state system. Political and economic space retracts, the center has no authority any longer, and power literally withers away.

This scenario of state collapse spells Somalia. What made state collapse unavoidable after the fall of Mohamed Siyad Barre's government was the absence of a viable civil society to establish authority in the anarchic situation that quickly developed in the country, especially, in the capital, Mogadiscio. What is the nature of the Somali conflict that led to State collapse in Somalia? Can we predict state collapse in modern times? Are there signs to predict the impending occurrence of a State collapse to forestall its eventual occurrence?

In a publication entitled, Missed Opportunities, Mohamed Sahnoun argues that the first envoy dispatched to Mogadiscio by the United Nations' Secretary General Boutros Ghali after the outbreak of hostilities in the country in 1992, the international community missed three opportunities to intervene in the Somali crisis prior to the collapse of the state in 1991. The first of these missed opportunities was the government's violent response to the uprising in the Northwest in May of 1988, wherein which the government used aircraft and heavy weapons in a bloody effort to repress the civilian population.  

Siyad Barre's forces destroyed the two largest cities in the region, Hargeisa and Burao, and thousands of the Issaq clans' men and women were killed. Africa Watch called for an "international outcry against the killing of thousands in the civil war in Somalia." Mr. Sahnoun claims that one "would expect that in the absence of a democratic mechanism allowing for corrective measures, the international community would come to the rescue

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of the victimized population. It did not and this represents the first of the missed opportunities.”7

The second missed opportunity by the international community according to Ambassador Sahnoun, occurred in May 1990, exactly two years after the beginning of the uprising in the North and as armed opposition spread to other areas of the country, a Manifesto calling for a national conference to reconcile the various movements and clans, was published in Mogadiscio, and signed by 144 well-known and moderate political leaders. The group blamed the government for the atrocities committed during the uprising, called for the abolition of repressive laws as a sign of the government’s sincerity, and called for a multiparty system, constitutional changes, and a national reconciliation conference that would form a caretaker government and prepare elections. The response of Siyad Barre’s government was to arrest many of the Manifesto’s signatories, including a former president of Somalia, Adam Abdullah Osman. According to Ambassador Sahnoun, this was a second missed opportunity for the international community to use its good offices for mediation.8

The last missed opportunity by the international community to intervene before the crisis reached a point that would lead to the collapse of the state and its institutions took place within days of the fall of Siyad Barre’s government. According to Ambassador Sahnoun, the Djibouti government made an effort at reconciliation from July 15 to 21, 1991, and requested the support of the UN, which refused with no explanation except that

7 Mohamed Sahnoun, Ibid. p. 6.
8 Mohamed Sahnoun, Ibid. p. 8.
the matter was too complicated. Ambassador Sahnoun states that “This conference was the third missed opportunity. Had the UN, together with the regional organizations, been involved in preparing this conference, the reconciliation process could have gotten off to a good start. Even though the negotiations might have been long and arduous, international pressure would have ensured that all parties were committed to the results.”

Events that took place after Ambassador Sahnoun’s writing in 1995, proved his assessment of the last missed opportunity unrealistic. It is not reasonable to expect a group of Somali leaders to agree on an agenda in a short time after the collapse of the State in January 1991. We now know that more than a dozen conferences and meetings have been held in Djibouti, Addis Ababa, and Nairobi. Such conferences take many months to produce a result. The two major national conferences, one held at Arta, Djibouti, for the better part of 2000, and the 2002/2004 one in Kenya, which lasted more than two years, point to the unrealistic assessment of the Ambassador regarding the third opportunity missed in his analysis of failure to intervene by the international community and to facilitate a national conference among Somali leaders. These leaders who have been participating in recent national conferences disagreed so strongly on the agenda for Somali reconciliation that a consensus on agreement on anything proved difficult despite

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9 Note Jonathan Stevenson’s comments in this regard in Foreign Policy “Hope Restored in Somalia?” 91:144.

10 Mohamed Sahnoun, Ibid. p. 10.
active mediation efforts by their neighboring countries. It has taken more than two years to conclude the conference with some agreement to establish a national government.

To understand and appreciate fully the dynamics of conflict that led to state collapse in Somalia, we have to first analyze the events that precipitated the ouster of Siyad Barre in the final days of January 1991. What muddied the political situation and made life untenable in Somalia was the authoritative, iron-fisted character of Siyad’s personal rule, its aloofness from the Somali social situation, abuse of human rights, and the destruction of livestock, water resources, villages, and towns. This coercive rule began in earnest after the conclusion of the Somali-Ethiopian war of 1977-1978 and the emergence of organized political opposition groups. First, it was by elements of the Majertene clan of Darod in the Northeast and Midwest, who formed the Somali Salvation Democratic Party (SSDP). This was soon followed by the Issaq clan of the Northwest regions of the country who formed their own political party, the Somali National Movement (SNM). The divide and rule policies of Siyad Barre’s regime in what was a difficult period for the Somali nation, created divisions and disunity that eventually lead to the eventual collapse of the Somali state and the emergence of secessionist movements in the Northwest that soon followed.

Political scientists have identified six crises or challenges that may place the functions of government and its state structures in jeopardy.\textsuperscript{11} The following are Leonard Pinder’s set of standards for the evaluation of political systems that help in understanding the mismanagement of the affairs of the state well before the actual collapse of the state in Somalia occurred: 1) Identify common purpose among culturally diffuse groups, 2)

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Legitimacy: Consensus or valid exercise of authority, 3) Participation and inclusion, 4) Penetration: effective control of a given territory, 5) Distribution, balancing the public demand for goods and services, primacy of economic growth, resource mobilization and national defense, 6) The creation of a coherent set of relationships among the many groups and interests competing for access and control within the state framework.

Statement of the Problem

The Somali state is the product of unifying and integrating the former British Somaliland which gained its independence from Britain on June 26, 1960, and the former United Nations Trusteeship of Somalia administered by Italy (1950-1960) and granted independence on July 1, 1960. The two entities formed the Republic of Somalia on July 1, and established as its seat of administration and capital the city of Mogadiscio. The flag of the new state consisted of five stars, referring to the division of the Somali people into five separate entities which included, besides the two that had united, French Somaliland (now the Republic of Djibouti), the Houd and the Reserved Areas (part of Zone 5 of Ethiopia), and the Northern Frontier Districts of Kenya, then ruled by Britain, and currently a Province of the Republic of Kenya. Upon unification, the two pre-independence legislatures were unified into a National Assembly consisting of a total of 123 members, 90 of whom represented the former United Nations Trusteeship of Somalia and 33 represented the former British Somaliland. The National Assembly elected Adan Abdulla Osman as the country’s first head of state, and he nominated Abdirrashid Ali Sharmarke as Somalia’s first Prime Minister.

Somali independence brought unity, but also brought democracy, something consistent with the pastoral ethos of the Somali people. The constitution of 1961 gave
political parties the freedom to organize and to compete for political office. Presidents and prime ministers were challenged and political parties proliferated to the point that Somalia had more parties per capita than any other democratic country except Israel. The constitution also guaranteed freedom of speech, of assembly, and habeas corpus. Somalia became a liberal democracy with all citizens having the right to vote. Citizens would vote for members of the National Assembly, which in turn would vote for a president who would become head of state. The president would serve for six years. He had enormous powers under the constitution, including the right to authorize government-sponsored legislation. He could dissolve the National Assembly if he thought it failed to discharge its duties and he could appoint and dismiss the prime minister.

The prime minister and his cabinet constituted the government, which had responsibility for implementing the acts of legislation passed by the National Assembly, and the day to day running of the executive branch of the government. The constitution provided for a judiciary that would be independent of the executive and legislative branches of government. The judicial system was a mixture of the British and Italian court systems and of the Sharia (Muslim legal system).

In its nine-year democratic experience, Somalia faced a number of problems. The first of these, the political integration of the two regions, was satisfactorily resolved. The civil service systems were integrated in 1964, and the administrative procedures were unified. It could not, however, resolve other national problems that had to be addressed. Somalia was unable to gain international support for its effort to unite all Somali-populated territories under one flag. Its economic program did not contribute significantly

to the well-being of the Somali people, and the parliamentary regime was unable to make any progress on the issue of Somalia's written language. The educational system was operating in three languages, as was the bureaucracy.

It was the opinion of many Somalis that democracy remained vibrant, but the country could not address its problems with any success. This has resulted in the proliferation of political parties with numerous agendas. In the national elections that were held in March of 1969, sixty-four parties contested for seats. The appearance of a large number of parties was facilitated by the kinship structure of Somali society and the proportional representation system of voting. The voting system specified forty-seven electoral districts which would send a total of 123 deputies to the National Assembly. Each party established a list of potential representatives, and the parties, not the individual candidates were recipients of votes. Candidates who secured victory in a minor party rejoined the Somali Youth League, the dominant political party, in order to serve their constituencies more effectively and to get a chance for a ministerial post.

This system promoted factions and exacerbated the anarchic tendencies present in a pastoral society. To win a seat in the National Assembly required the expenditure of vast amounts of money. This resulted in chaos that made a mockery of the democratic process. The losers of these elections were quick to point out numerous cases of rigged elections and misuse of public funds by the government to further the interests of particular candidates. In the months following the elections, there was so much public dissatisfaction about the way the elections were held and monitored, and the elected government reigned but could not rule. On October 16, 1969, President Abdirrashid Ali Sharmarke was assassinated by a police honor guard member in the town of Las Anode.
while touring the Northeast region of the country. Five days after this incident on October 21, 1969, a military coup lead by Major-General Mohamed Siyad Barre, the Commander of the Somali National Army took the reigns of power, arrested top officials of the civilian administration, suspended the constitution, and by decree abolished the National Assembly and all other constitutionally established bodies in the country. In their place, they announced the formation of a 25-member Supreme Revolutionary Council made up entirely of army and police officers. That ended the democratic experiment in Somalia which has lasted just nine years, and introduced a dictatorial period that lasted twice as long.

After the overthrow of Siyad’s regime in 1991, no alternative authority was available to replace it, and the country immediately plunged into a state of anarchy and devastation. Since the beginnings of the anarchic era, a new breed of power brokers has emerged to fill the vacuum left by the country’s power structure. These new forces include what are now referred to as “warlords”, armed organized criminal forces that prey on the unprotected civilian population of Somali cities in the South. Like all other groups in the country, they are clan-based and each one of them has a claim on a geographical area that they maintain as their center of operations. In addition to the warlords, there are religious leaders who are strongly involved in the politics of the capital, Mogadiscio. They are primarily engaged in the area of jurisprudence, and they run the court system in accordance with the Sharia. They have their own security forces financed by sympathetic businessmen in the capital. There are other criminal groups that are specialists in open ocean piracy of ships of all nations that happen to be present on their charted route. These forces have one goal in common. They all oppose the installation of legitimate civilian
rule in the capital. The reason is that they have a vested interest in the anarchic situation that allows them to make money illegally through the drug trade, control of the sea-ports, and airports, and the imposition of fees at arbitrarily set-up “check-points” throughout the city of Mogadiscio. It is a difficult task to remove these forces from the capital and permit the Transitional Somali Government to establish itself. There is a UN Security Council Resolution that forbids arms sales to all parties to the dispute in Somalia, including the Transitional National Government (TNG). That Security Council Resolution unfortunately favors the maintenance of the status-quo in Mogadiscio, and ironically favors the illegitimate forces in the capital who can only be removed by arming the Transitional National Government forces.

Over the past 18 years or so there have been numerous international and regional initiatives to resolve the Somali conflict in a manner which is fair and acceptable to all parties. None of these initiatives resulted in achieving a lasting peace and the establishment of an effective national administration in the country. Achieving the realization of a lasting agreement to end the current quagmire is a matter of great urgency.

It has been a frustrating experience to convince the Somali leadership in the current conflict to put their differences aside for the good of the country and concentrate on the noble task of rebuilding the institutions of a nation-state. At first glance, the quarrels and disputes among the Somalis appear easy to resolve in the light of the unifying factors present. The Somalis speak the same language (Somali), share the same faith (Sunni Islam), lead the same form of life and traditions (pastoralism, agro-pastoralism) share the same customs and traditions, and at one point in recent history
subscribed to the same national ambition, the reunification of the five Somalis under one flag. The Somali flag, which was designed and adopted upon the country’s independence in 1960, has five stars each representing one of the five entities the Somali people were divided into in the latter part of the 19th century.

As experience has taught us, resolving the Somali conflict is not that easy. There are deep-seated animosities and distrust among the leadership of Somali society. We believe it is the leadership of the Somali people who attend these mediating conferences and meetings that have to be blamed for the lack of success in reaching a successful conclusion to the dispute whatever that may be. The common man in Somalia has no vote in these affairs, and his position on the matters under discussion cannot be fairly determined. However, it is generally true to say that the Somali people to a man are fed up with their present condition of statelessness and are eager to welcome a fairly instituted national administration. There are a host of factors beyond the control of the Somali society that have immobilized the march to a state of stability and reconciliation. Ethnic, economic, regional, ideological, personal ambitions of individual leaders, superpower, and regional power rivalry, and colonial legacy, all have their own contributions to the Somali dilemma currently displayed before us.

These new factors of instability and chaos include the growing armies of warlords, centers of Islamic extremism that oppose the formation of a civilian administration, criminal enterprises that are bent on actions such as sea piracy, drug trafficking and the assassination of prominent Somali individuals, and other abhorrent activities such as digging up of graves for material gain. All these groups operate outside the Somali code of ethics and morality and would have faced tough justice if the Somali
people had been allowed to place their true representatives in power. That has not occurred, of course, for the actions of these destabilizing forces that have the upper hand at the moment.

These unfortunate developments since 1991, have contributed to a state of affairs that threaten the well-being of law-abiding communities, particularly in the South of the country where violence and disorder is rampant. We will review here the impact of these conflict-ridden developments on the Somali people and their fortunes. The impact of the current conflict will be analyzed under the following headings: The Political Dimension, the Economic Dimension, and the Social Dimension.

**The Political Dimension**

The long-standing Somali conflict has a political dimension that profoundly impacts the fortunes of the Somali people. The following are some of those negative consequences:

(1) Loss of governmental institutions, social and human service networks, security, freedom of travel and trade in a secure, peaceful environment.

(2) The emergence of warlords, pirates on the high seas, and ideologically-driven religious leaders with militias and power.

(3) Loss of national leadership in international and regional forums that would generate needed financial and political capital to the nation.

(4) Loss of official representation in foreign capitals to provide consular advice assistance to Somali nationals overseas.
(5) Loss of unity in achieving the national agenda, and the emergence of parochialism and divisive tendencies to fight for one's sub-clan and village in place of the commonwealth.

The Economic Dimension

There have been serious economic effects resulting directly from the current conflict. The following are some of those problems:

(1) The almost valuelessness of the Somali shilling due to an abundance of local currencies printed by regional authorities with no central banking supervision and control.

(2) As a consequence of the weak Somali currency, consumers have opted for foreign currencies to do their shopping. Households without overseas remittances are left destitute and unable to afford the price of basic necessities. International food aid has moderated the severity of this problem. However, aid is not always available and cannot be accessed in the pastoral areas where half of the population lives.

(3) Since the collapse of the Siyad regime in 1991, the health care system has been devastated due to structural damages of facilities, robbery of machinery and supplies, and the emigration of most of the workers in this field to safer quarters overseas.

(4) The decrease in wage earners, and the rise of the population of paupers due to the disappearance of the public sector altogether. International NGOs have valiantly picked up the slack in some areas and in some functions, but could not replace the national safety net lost.
(5) The banning of Somali livestock imports by Saudi Arabian authorities due to unsubstantiated claims that the Somali stock could pose health risks to consumers. This was the primary export market for this product and its loss caused serious economic harm to the pastoral community who are often dependent on this source of income for much of their household needs.

(6) The absence of essential services in banking and finance, communications, and postal services.

(7) Lack of universally recognized passport and travel documents for business, leisure, or education.

(8) The Somali conflict resulted in the disintegration of the country’s educational system at all levels. There are limited opportunities for schooling in some parts of the country and that is largely supported by the presence of International NGOs, such as UNESCO that assists in teacher compensation, provision of supplies and general support.

(9) Due to the absence of a national naval force to protect the frontiers, the Somali coastal areas have become targets of pirates, and illegal fishing vessels. European companies, particularly Italian, have signed contracts with some unscrupulous Somali politicians with some political clout to use the Indian Ocean along the coast of Somalia for solid waste disposal. This creates a hazardous environment that presents danger to humans and fishing resources throughout the East African coast. This problem has to be faced on top of what is often referred to as “the ecological inheritance”. The latter environmental crisis became much heavier during the 1970s with the arrival of the cyclical drought in the Horn. The effects of
drought and commercial devastation of hardwood for fuel has already brought
environmental nightmare to the region.

The Social Dimension

The current Somali conflict has created serious social problems for the Somalis.
The following are some of those problems:

(1) Due to the civil wars and military attacks against civilian targets in the northwest
during the waning years of Siyad’s rule, an estimated 10-20% of the civilian
population has lived overseas as refugees at one time or another over the past 18
years. Most of those refugees were in camps in Ethiopia and Kenya. Smaller
numbers were in camps in Djibouti and Yemen. Other have fled further into East
Africa, or gained political asylum in Canada, the United States, and Western
Europe.

(2) The influx of Somali refugees to neighboring East African states has created its
own set of social problems, including the dismemberment of families, with some
back home in Somalia, and others in refugee camps overseas. There have been
serious human rights abuses committed against the refugees in some of the host
countries. Of particular significance are the credible accounts of the kidnappings
and forced marriage of young girls against their will by bands of heavily armed
Yemeni tribesmen who often descended on refugee camps under the cover of
night.

The conflict over the last two decades or so has created civilian militias trained
in the art of violence and who possess no marketable skills or education to survive
outside their militia camps. They pose a real threat to the peace process, and a solution
to their reintegration into the society as responsible, law-abiding citizens has to be
found. In the case of Somaliland, where there is a regional Government complete with
legislative, executive and judicial branches, but without international recognition, a
temporary solution has been adopted. A militia force as large as 10,000, remnants of the
Issaq Somali National Movement troops, have been assigned to base camps where they
are provided with rations, and pocket money. That type of a solution is very costly, and
cannot be recommended across the board as an ideal solution to this problem.
Retraining these troops and gradually reintegrating them into the civilian population is a
better plan.

In the capital city of Mogadiscio and other areas of the South, the militia troops
have a field day. They are engaged in a highly profitable criminal enterprise of
manning traffic check-points they have created in various parts of the city. They
demand all passing traffic to stop and pay fees for being allowed to proceed on their
travel. They have no legal authority to enforce such rules. However, everybody had
to pay up or face the consequences of being shot at. The leadership of these street
gangs is in the hands of war lords of various sub-clans who organize them and
provide them with their daily assignments. These war lords refuse to recognize the
new Interim Federal Government that has settled in the town of Jowhar, 60 km south
of the capital. The Interim Government of Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed does not dare to
challenge these war lords and has so far avoided confronting them in their main areas
of operations, the Capital of Somalia.
The Reconstruction of the Somali Economy

The reconstruction of Somalia's economy is a daunting task. The civil wars, anarchy and chaos that prevailed in the country over the past 18 years, have destroyed what ever the country's development plans had accomplished since independence in 1960. The nation's factories, hospitals, banking and financial systems, schools, public buildings, and water systems have all been ruined, or taken over by squatters, and homeless people as shelters. All legal records, public documents, and official statutes are no longer available and the new administration has to build those resources anew. The professional and technical classes have left the country, and even in the unlikely event that development capital was available, technical manpower is not.

We have to realize that any serious effort at rebuilding the Somali economy would require an acceptable state of peace and tranquility, and an effective national government to plan, coordinate, and distribute available funds to the regions. There is no such government in Somalia today. The new Transitional Federal Government that was established several years ago in Nairobi, Kenya, has since resettled in the town of Jowhar, 90 KM south of the capital city of Mogadiscio. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has no budget, civil service, offices, or adequate security services to guarantee their own safety if they decide to move to the capital.

The foremost task facing the Somali people is to create a peaceful environment where the donor countries can be comfortable with. Economic development and reconstruction plans cannot be realized without massive infusion of funds from overseas. I do not foresee that happening any time in the near future. Reconstruction funding
similar to the US Marshall Plan for Western Europe after World War II is needed here after Somali reconciliation programs have succeeded.

There are no appropriate reconstruction models available for a failed state like Somalia. The path of development would be similar to those of Djibouti, Eritrea, and Ethiopia, neighboring states whose primary economic goals seem to be that of providing minimum services in education, health, security, and other essential services. There are no funds available or development from the national budget, and there are practically no resources to fight hunger in any of these countries. We do not expect Somalia to do any better than its sister neighboring states even when harmony prevails.

What we are recommending here is the adoption of nation-building programs which are not centered on capital-intensive projects, but on self-help, village level cooperatives in animal husbandry, fishing, and light industry. To realize that goal, it is essential to reinvigorate management systems, participatory democracy, democratization of processes, decentralization of operations, and the protection of the depleted natural environment. In their report entitled, “Somalia’s Economic Reconstruction, Institution-Building and Mobilization, (2003),”13 a panel of Somali experts reached the conclusion that “restoration of peace and stability should be the first order of the day for the new Somali government.”14 I strongly agree with the experts’ assessment. It will indeed take years before the new Somali government will be able to collect taxes, create a national bank, a civil service, a court system, and rebuild its tattered image, and gain the legitimacy that it badly needs throughout the country. Before that goal is realized, the


14 Ibid.
Somali government will be dependent on hand-outs from friendly nations in order to run their modest operations.

**Objectives of the Study**

The purpose of this research is to study the dynamics of the conflict in Somalia that eventually resulted in the destruction of the state and social institutions, and the disintegration of the political, economic, and social fabric of the country. The end-result was the collapse of the state on January 27, 1991, the date the vanquished dictator, Mohamed Siyad Barre and remnants of his forces were chased out of the capital city of Mogadiscio. What transpired in the final days of Siyad’s rule had its origins in earlier periods of his dictatorial rule. The divide and rule policies, the heavy-handedness, and the disregard of human rights caused such deep animosity among the populace impacted by such acts, that it was just a matter of time before a violent response takes place. The question was when this would occur, and in what form or manner the uprising would be expressed. We can indeed describe the evolving situation of state collapse in Somalia as a degenerative disease that gradually destroys the body politic it had infected.

Areas of interest include understanding ways we could predict the occurrence and likelihood of state collapse in a fragile, poor nation exposed to the temptations of armed merchants and superpower politics. Are there preventive measures that the international community could take to save a nation on the verge of collapse as Somalia was for much of the 1980s? As those who carefully observed the Somali political scene long enough understand very well, the actual date of State collapse in Somalia had been delayed long enough by the self-interest seeking national and international financial donors who kept the regime on life support through the infusion of large funds used for military ventures.
That was allowed to happen in the face of Siyad's blatant disregard of human rights. The Cold War politics kept that regime in power. The widespread documented abuse of human rights, public corruption, and abuse of power were not considered sufficient grounds for aid suspension on the part of the Reagan and Bush Republican Administrations. The United States, as well as certain European and Middle Eastern States cooperated fully in providing aid and comfort to the authoritarian regime. The opportunity of gaining ground in the strategic location of Somalia far outweighed the merits of moral considerations at the height of the Cold War.

A second objective of this study is to look for viable strategies for conflict resolution and reconstruction of the country. Are there mechanisms for durable peace in the Horn of Africa? We will explore options for nation-building and strategies for conflict resolution and rehabilitation.

A third dimension of this study is to analyze the nature, legitimacy, and effectiveness of international interventions in a collapsed African state such as Somalia. What should be the objectives of such an intervention when you lack legitimate national authority to represent the interests of the collapsed state? Should the international community opt for short-term, band-aid measures to resolve the issue of famine relief to the needy population or engage in a long-range goal of resolving the root causes of the conflict that lead to the conflict in the first place? These are some of the issues that this study will explore.

**Methodology**

This study will utilize sources of historical/comparative data, and analytical techniques. The historical approach will facilitate the study of the main trends of Somali
movements across the Horn of Africa to find a secure home to grow and expand. The Somali social life in pre-colonial and colonial periods will be carefully reviewed and analyzed in order to come to grips with social organization, type of government, relationships among clans, conflict resolution mechanisms, and relationship with outsiders as they continued to struggle and settle down in this harsh environment now known as the Horn of Africa in the tenth and eleventh centuries.

Secondly, all relevant data related to political developments will be examined to make sense of the varied, complex dynamics of a conflict-laden society. Special attention will be paid to the role of the military and civil-society relations. Issues to be analyzed include Somali-Ethiopian war of 1977-1978, civil wars of the 1980s and 1990s, famines of the early 1990s, dismemberment and destruction of the state, and the multi-national humanitarian interventions to save lives.

The study will utilize primary sources such as United Nations Resolutions, US Congressional hearings, and data from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. These primary sources will be supplemented by secondary sources, including books, periodical journals, newspapers, and relevant internet websites, such as www.Irinnews.org, www.Allpuntland.com, and www.Hiiraan.com, etc.

Significance of the Study

This study will analyze the historical development of the Somali society in an effort to unearth the root causes of the current conflict that engulfed the country since its independence in 1960. We will explore conflict resolution models, and the experience of certain African countries similarly situated. A review of conflict resolution models will be made in an effort to find the best strategy to resolve the Somali conflict. International
interventions to bring order into the chaotic system will be recommended. The study raises the question of whether the intervention's objectives as set out by the United Nations member nations with forces on the ground, might have missed an opportunity by not facing the local war lords head on, and disarming them completely. The international community decided to accomplish a short-goal of delivering humanitarian assistance in its mission of early 1990s. Alternative plans of a longer stay to accomplish a lasting peace and security have not been on the table. We consider this a shortcoming that should have been rectified by then in time.

**The Research Question**

What factors have prevented the Somalis from reconciling their differences and forming a national government after 18 years of reconciliation efforts?

**Conceptual and Theoretical Framework**

In formulating appropriate mechanisms for the design of theoretical and conceptual approaches for the study of politics, political institutions, and frameworks, political science scholars have identified three main approaches. The three schools of thought are known as Modernization, Dependency/Underdevelopment, and state-centered or statist.

Modernization theory was envisioned and put to use in the early 1960s, coinciding with the first decade of independence of African states from British and French rule. It was based on lessons learned from the Western experience in development, and its adherents believed that the concepts and methods that worked fairly well in Western societies could be successfully transplanted to the African scene for development. What were not fully examined were the effects of cultural differences of
the two societies and levels of development in the transplanting process. Concepts and models of bureaucratization, objectivity, rationality, the rule of law, etc., were applied to the political and economic situation prevailing in African states without adequate modification or adjustment to fit these concepts and models into the burgeoning milieu of new states.

The second approach, Dependency/Underdevelopment was introduced as an analytical apparatus in the early 1970s. This framework was the product of scholars who questioned the utility of Modernization theory, and were very much in need of a replacement tool for their own scholarship. Dependency/Underdevelopment approach utilized different concepts and models to address the reality of post-colonial African State. Areas considered in this analytical framework include patterns of trade and exchange inequality that often resulted from international trade. This North-South trading system had inherent inequalities that clearly favored the industrialized North to the detriment of the commodity exporting countries in the Southern Hemisphere that included the whole of Africa. There was a predetermined inequality in the exchange relationship that the African countries could not intervene to change it in any meaningful way that could lessen the impact of the market on their economic fortunes.

The limitations inherent in Dependency theory led to the design of an alternative approach that addressed the needs of scholars interested in understanding and analyzing the situation on the ground in African societies. The role of the state was significant and had to be sufficiently accounted for. This approach is known as “statist” or “state-centered.” In this approach, the state is seen as the powerhouse that energizes the machine of government for good or bad. Since the private sector of these societies is
weak and cannot in anyway be relied upon to finance development projects, or impact on the economy in a big way, it was theorized that it was the role of the African state to undertake the functions of resource allocation, planning and development of the economically weak societies.

Another area relevant for the conceptual and theoretical framework of this study is state-society relations. Political scientists engaged in the task of analyzing politics and society in modern Africa have not been able to come to a consensus as to how to meaningfully analyze and comprehend the complex interconnections between politics and society. Largely abandoned by analysts are the relevance of legal, formal, institutional, psychological, and historical frameworks. These approaches to the study of politics in Africa were considered not entirely helpful in their insights into the impending hegemonic orders that came to prevail in much of Africa.

In place of old uncertainties, other approaches have come into prominence as frameworks of African political analysis. To name a few, these include the role of civil society, governance, and conflict resolution. State-in-society approach is useful in identifying and analyzing patterns of domination, a subject that has preoccupied social scientists in every period and in every culture. It has been of particular interest to students of African politics.

Civil society, a concept that has long interested political philosophers is now gaining ground as an analytical tool in African politics and society. Robert Fatton Jr. advances the theoretical proposition that the state and civil society in Africa form two

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ensembles of an organic totality.\textsuperscript{16} While their respective practices and institutions may clash, they are not distinct and opposite worlds, he states.\textsuperscript{17} The state is the higher circle’s structure of dominance and the principal instrument of their predatory role; civil society on the hand, is a contested sphere that often interacts with the three sites that he proposes in his analytical scheme, namely, the ruling class formation, class disarticulation, and subordinate class resistance which, in his view, is the last of these three entities that crisscrosses the two main ensembles, the state and civil society which are diametrically integrated.

Current understandings of African politics tend to posit a simple dichotomy between state and civil society. They portray a “soft” and decaying authoritarian state stuck in a deadly struggle against an emerging and democratic society.\textsuperscript{18} Others have expressed a more pessimistic viewpoint on the staying power of the state. Jean-Marie Guehenno has predicted the imminent demise of the states with such chilling phrases as “the Lebanization of the world.”\textsuperscript{19}

Joel S. Migdal, in his analysis of the relevance and necessity for the state offers a more positive note. He refers to certain elements that help fend off disintegration forces. He states that certain areas of state-society interaction can create special meaning for people in society, which has the effect of naturalizing the state. Naturalization means people cannot imagine living without the state present in one form or another. This


\textsuperscript{17} Robert Fatton Jr., Ibid.

\textsuperscript{18} Jean-Marie Guehenno, \textit{The end of the Nation-State} (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1995) p.21.

\textsuperscript{19} Jean-Marie Guehenno, Ibid., p.35.
provides a powerful antidote to the threat of disintegrative forces, even in the face of gross inefficiency, and poor management in delivering services. Therefore, the state-in-society centered approach for the study of politics in Africa is here to stay. However, due to the preponderance of conflict-laden situation, and their impact on the lives of African societies, we prefer the conflict resolution approach as the framework of analysis for this research. The framework has the capacity to embody the literature and analytical tools of other social sciences, such as psychology, sociology and anthropology. The approach is grounded in conflict theory which has proved to be of value in analyzing, understanding, and comprehending the complex issues of the post-colonial African state.

In order to minimize conflicts, and provide harmony among the various clans and sub-clans in Somalia, it is essential that we should design a machinery of government that would enhance the chance of all segments of society to participate in the affairs of the state. A federation is more appropriate than a unitary state in this arrangement. In a federal system of government, there is a compound sovereign state in which at least two governmental units, the federal and the regional, enjoy constitutionally separate competencies. They may have concurrent powers in certain jurisdictions, and both are empowered to deal with their citizens.

Fundamental changes affecting competencies require the consent of both levels of government. Federations imply a codified written constitution, and a supreme court is often appointed to interpret fundamental laws and umpire disputes in the functioning of government.20 To further strengthen the conflict resolution apparatus at the federal level, federations may have a bicameral legislature: a demos chamber that accounts for

population size, and the upper chamber that caters to special interests, such as equality of regions, clans, sub-clans, etc. The current organizational structure of the Somali Government lacks these two conflict mediating institutions, namely a federal constitutional court and a bicameral legislature.

In addition to the federal system of government stated above, other conflict mediating instruments that could be introduced into the governance of Somalia is the adoption of consociational theory of democracy. This theory was pioneered by Sir Arthur Lewis in his thought-provoking book, Politics in West Africa (1965). Lewis first recommended that Africans should drop the winner-take-all electoral principle and form grand coalitions, as a more realistic way to operate African governments: One can alter the constitutional rules for forming a government: for example, instead of the President sending for the leader of the largest party to form a Cabinet, the rule may tell him to send for the leader of every party which has received more than 20 percent of the votes, and divide the cabinet seats between them, or such of them who will cooperate---To write the coalition idea into the rules of forming a government in place of the present government versus opposition idea would itself be quite a step forward.\(^{21}\)

The breakaway region of Somaliland has adopted a consociational power sharing democracy with organizational safeguards for conflict resolution. This adoption of the new system has been aided by the following facilitating conditions in place:\(^ {22}\)

- the fact that no clan can unilaterally impose hegemony;

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• a principle of territorial and regional autonomy that is already formally endorsed;
• the fact that the Somali clans are territorially concentrated;
• recognized clan leaders have cooperated in the past;
• traditional Somali society endorses principles of proportionality; and
• Somalis are tolerant of the use of the mutual veto (one of the most controversial elements of a consociational system).

The consociational system of democracy and its accompanying organizational structure of government have in tandem ensured the timely and peaceful resolution of conflicts. We cite here two examples of the recent past where the system has worked admirably well in the face of impending political disasters. In the first occasion, there was a dispute on the validity of the electoral returns involving the presidential election of 2003. The dispute was settled by a Supreme Court decision. The second dispute grew out of the election of Speaker of the House. The president and his party disputed the validity of the election. The upper House, the House of Elders, intervened and sided with the opposition party. This shows without any doubt that the consociational system of democracy and separation of powers can work in the Somali environment.

Besides the establishment of a democratic system that caters for the cooption of more political parties into the decision making process as recommended by Lewis, political thinkers such as Arend Lijphart have formulated a set of criteria that are relevant to the successful working of a consociational system of democracy. The professor identified three characteristic in addition to grand coalitions that define consociational systems of democracy, namely, the mutual veto, or concurrent majority, proportionality, proportionality,

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and a high degree of autonomy for each segment to run its own internal affairs. These features are present in Somalia’s nascent federalism. The mutual veto has helped to prevent violent conflicts among the current parliament. There is a system of operation that relies more on consensus rather than majority rule. The parliamentary seats have been allocated on a system of proportionality of clan and sub-clan size of the population and autonomy of regions is ensured in the new constitution of the country.

**Organization of the Study**

The following is the organization of the study. Chapter I is an introduction. The following sections of the work are discussed here: a statement of the problem, study objectives, methodology, significance of the study, and scope and limitations. Also included in the introductory part of the dissertation is the research question, hypothesis, and the theoretical and conceptual framework.

Chapter II provides a review of models of post-war reconstruction, analytical overview of the dynamics of reconstruction, policy options, practices, and the role of the various players in the process.

Chapter III is devoted to literature review on conflict and conflict resolution; and the literature review of the Somali conflict. Literature review on humanitarian interventions is also provided here.

Chapter IV is devoted to the study and analysis of four African states that have recently emerged from violent conflict and reestablished an orderly system of governance. We addressed the relevance of their experiences to the Somali situation.

Chapter V addresses issues dealing with political strategies for nation-building and rehabilitation of the country. Various political models are reviewed with an eye to
their applicability to the Somali political environment. Six major policy parameters were identified from these models and discussed in detail, finally recommending the features of the models elucidated by David Held, and Alvin Toffler. This chapter also outlines five models of conflict resolution, and the relevance of each to the Somali situation. We selected the home-grown, indigenous conflict mechanisms model as the most worthy of implementation.

Chapter VI is devoted to economic reconstruction in post-conflict Somalia. We have outlined public policy strategies for nation-building and reconstruction, ranging from conflict resolution through democratization to the feasibility of achieving self-sufficiency in food, a monumental task. In this chapter, we discuss the United Nations-sponsored Somali Joint Needs Assessment, Reconstruction, and Development Program, known as JNA.

Chapter VII concludes the study with a review of current events, and the impact of the intervention of Ethiopian forces and United Nations-sanctioned African peacekeeping troops, still to be completely assembled on the Somali scene as an effective intervention force. The TFG, which has been irrelevant before this year, has established shop in the Capital and reclaimed its legitimacy.

We have concluded the study with recommendations for the establishment of the rule of law, sound governance structures, and respect for human rights. A cornerstone of resolving the Somali conflict is to settle disputes over land and property that has changed hands over the past decade and a half of violent conflicts in the South of the country. We have also emphasized the issue of de-militarization and disarmament throughout the country. It would be of utmost importance if the international community could get more
involved in the resolution of the Somali conflict. The provision of humanitarian and long-term economic aid is vital for the survival of any peaceful settlement reached in Somalia.

Scope and Limitation

This study will concentrate from the period of 1960, the birth of an independent Somali state, through 1995 the time the international intervention ceased. Since then, there has not been much of an activity befitting a nation-state. It is at the beginning of this period that the Somali people established an independent state, and achieved the unification of two of the five entities to which they had been divided during the colonial period. Also, it is this period that witnessed untold series of miserable state actions against various sectors of the population. These actions included denial of human rights, mass executions, air raids on civilian targets in the city of Hargeisa in May, 1988; poisoning of water wells, and the systematic expropriation of public funds. All of these actions and misdeeds helped plant the seeds of the conflict that later exploded in the face of the perpetrators, Siyad Barre and his hired henchmen.

Not much has been said in the dissertation about the period of 1995 onwards. During this period, there was no single power controlling the country, and the state collapse was complete. In the ruins of the Somali state, regional authorities sprang up. Somaliland is the most notable of these Administrations. Puntland is another regional Administration that has all the hallmarks of an autonomous state. Their administrative structures and experience in community-building will be useful in the proposed federal system of administration for Somalia.

There are discussions currently going on in the central regions of Beletwein and Galcayo, for the establishment of an autonomous administration yet to be named. It
seems as though that the creation of a system of statehood is gaining ground around the various parties of the country. The establishment of these regional administrations may form the basis of a national system of a federal administration acceptable to the people of Somalia. We hope that this will lead to a successful resolution of an acceptable Somali system of governance.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Somalia

The research concentrated on the current quagmire of the Somali conflict which led to the destruction of the structures of government and its institutions and caused devastation of both human and material resources. We will examine a series of events that preceded the total collapse of the state resulting from the violent confrontations of State forces and various clan families. Also, we will be considering the gradual loss of sovereignty by the Siyad Government; and the call to arms by the Issaq and Hawiye clan families in the final years of the rule of Mohamed Siyad Barre. Further, the role of the international community in attempting to bring order and stability to the anarchic situation created by the ouster of long-term ruler, Mohamed Siyad Barre will be studied.

State collapse in Somalia was recognized by the international community when Siyad Barre was removed from power and forced to flee the capital, Mogadiscio, in the final days of January 1991. However, the process of state collapse in Somalia began earlier than that time, possibly in the mid-eighties. It is fair to say that the effectiveness and legitimacy of Siyad Barre’s rule was dealt a terrible blow by the continuous challenges of organized, armed clan militias in the latter part of the 1980s. In May of 1988, the violent battles that took place in and around the northwestern cities of Burao and Hargeisa had the impact of weakening the power base of the regime to a considerable degree and effectively challenging its legitimacy.
State collapse is not a short-term phenomenon; but a cumulative, incremental process similar to a degenerative disease. Governments lose their ability to exercise legitimate authority unevenly over territory. Certain regions fall away from central control, as happened in Northern Somalia in the late 1980s, while others remain within the government’s control. State collapse can also occur over time. Robert Kaplan quotes a resident of Freetown as saying that “the government in Sierra Leone has no writ after dark.” Some states disintegrate as cohesive economic entities, while maintaining their political unity.

The syndrome of state collapse often begins to take place when the regime in power fails to satisfy various demand-bearing groups in the community as resources dry up. The dissatisfaction and opposition on the part of these groups triggers the government’s use of security forces to maintain order. In certain cases, the existing government is overthrown and a successor government emerges to arrest the deterioration. In the case of state collapse, however, the degeneration is too widespread and society is not able to regain sufficient power to save the foundations of the state. The outcome of this is the total collapse of the state system. Political and economic space retracts, the center has no authority any longer, and power literally withers away.

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This scenario of state collapse spells Somalia. What made state collapse unavoidable after the fall of Mohamed Siyad Barre’s government was the absence of a viable civil society to establish authority in the anarchic situation that quickly developed in the country, especially, in the capital, Mogadiscio. What is the nature of the Somali conflict that led to State collapse in Somalia? Can we predict state collapse in modern times? Are there signs to predict the impending occurrence of a State collapse to forestall its eventual occurrence?

In a publication entitled, Missed Opportunities, Mohamed Sahnoun argues that the first envoy dispatched to Mogadiscio by the United Nations’ Secretary General Boutros Ghali after the outbreak of hostilities in the country in 1992, the international community missed three opportunities to intervene in the Somali crisis prior to the collapse of the state in 1991. The first of these missed opportunities was the government’s violent response to the uprising in the Northwest in May of 1988, wherein which the government used aircraft and heavy weapons in a bloody effort to repress the civilian population. Siyad Barre’s forces destroyed the two largest cities in the region, Hargeisa and Burao, and thousands of the Issaq clans’ men and women were killed. Africa Watch called for an “international outcry against the killing of thousands in the civil war in Somalia.” Mr. Sahnoun claims that one “would expect that in the absence of a democratic mechanism allowing for corrective measures, the international community would come to the rescue


of the victimized population. It did not and this represents the first of the missed opportunities.”

The second missed opportunity by the international community according to Ambassador Sahnoun, occurred in May 1990, exactly two years after the beginning of the uprising in the North and as armed opposition spread to other areas of the country, a Manifesto calling for a national conference to reconcile the various movements and clans, was published in Mogadiscio, and signed by 144 well-known and moderate political leaders. The group blamed the government for the atrocities committed during the uprising, called for the abolition of repressive laws as a sign of the government’s sincerity, and called for a multiparty system, constitutional changes, and a national reconciliation conference that would form a caretaker government and prepare elections. The response of Siyad Barre’s government was to arrest many of the Manifesto’s signatories, including a former president of Somalia, Adam Abdullah Osman. According to Ambassador Sahnoun, this was a second missed opportunity for the international community to use its good offices for mediation.

The last missed opportunity by the international community to intervene before the crisis reached a point that would lead to the collapse of the state and its institutions took place within days of the fall of Siyad Barre’s government. According to Ambassador Sahnoun, the Djibouti government made an effort at reconciliation from July 15 to 21, 1991, and requested the support of the UN, which refused with no explanation except that

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7 Mohamed Sahnoun, Ibid. p. 6.
8 Mohamed Sahnoun, Ibid. p. 8.
the matter was too complicated. Ambassador Sahnoun states that “This conference was the third missed opportunity. Had the UN, together with the regional organizations, been involved in preparing this conference, the reconciliation process could have gotten off to a good start. Even though the negotiations might have been long and arduous, international pressure would have ensured that all parties were committed to the results.”

Events that took place after Ambassador Sahnoun’s writing in 1995, proved his assessment of the last missed opportunity unrealistic. It is not reasonable to expect a group of Somali leaders to agree on an agenda in a short time after the collapse of the State in January 1991. We now know that more than a dozen conferences and meetings have been held in Djibouti, Addis Ababa, and Nairobi. Such conferences take many months to produce a result. The two major national conferences, one held at Arta, Djibouti, for the better part of 2000, and the 2002/2004 one in Kenya, which lasted more than two years, point to the unrealistic assessment of the Ambassador regarding the third opportunity missed in his analysis of failure to intervene by the international community and to facilitate a national conference among Somali leaders. These leaders who have been participating in recent national conferences disagreed so strongly on the agenda for Somali reconciliation that a consensus on agreement on anything proved difficult despite

\[9\] Note Jonathan Stevenson’s comments in this regard in Foreign Policy “Hope Restored in Somalia?” 91:144.

\[10\] Mohamed Sahnoun, Ibid. p. 10.
active mediation efforts by their neighboring countries. It has taken more than two years to conclude the conference with some agreement to establish a national government.

To understand and appreciate fully the dynamics of conflict that led to state collapse in Somalia, we have to first analyze the events that precipitated the ouster of Siyad Barre in the final days of January 1991. What muddied the political situation and made life untenable in Somalia was the authoritative, iron-fisted character of Siyad’s personal rule, its aloofness from the Somali social situation, abuse of human rights, and the destruction of livestock, water resources, villages, and towns. This coercive rule began in earnest after the conclusion of the Somali-Ethiopian war of 1977-1978 and the emergence of organized political opposition groups. First, it was by elements of the Majerteen clan of Darod in the Northeast and Midwest, who formed the Somali Salvation Democratic Party (SSDP). This was soon followed by the Issaq clan of the Northwest regions of the country who formed their own political party, the Somali National Movement (SNM). The divide and rule policies of Siyad Barre’s regime in what was a difficult period for the Somali nation, created divisions and disunity that eventually lead to the eventual collapse of the Somali state and the emergence of secessionist movements in the Northwest that soon followed.

Political scientists have identified six crises or challenges that may place the functions of government and its state structures in jeopardy.⁹⁷ The following are Leonard Pinder’s set of standards for the evaluation of political systems that help in understanding the mismanagement of the affairs of the state well before the actual collapse of the state in Somalia occurred: 1) Identify common purpose among culturally diffuse groups, 2)
Legitimacy: Consensus or valid exercise of authority, 3) Participation and inclusion, 4) Penetration: effective control of a given territory, 5) Distribution, balancing the public demand for goods and services, primacy of economic growth, resource mobilization and national defense, 6) The creation of a coherent set of relationships among the many groups and interests competing for access and control within the state framework.

Statement of the Problem

The Somali state is the product of unifying and integrating the former British Somaliland which gained its independence from Britain on June 26, 1960, and the former United Nations Trusteeship of Somalia administered by Italy (1950-1960) and granted independence on July 1, 1960. The two entities formed the Republic of Somalia on July 1, and established as its seat of administration and capital the city of Mogadiscio. The flag of the new state consisted of five stars, referring to the division of the Somali people into five separate entities which included, besides the two that had united, French Somaliland (now the Republic of Djibouti), the Houd and the Reserved Areas (part of Zone 5 of Ethiopia), and the Northern Frontier Districts of Kenya, then ruled by Britain, and currently a Province of the Republic of Kenya. Upon unification, the two pre-independence legislatures were unified into a National Assembly consisting of a total of 123 members, 90 of whom represented the former United Nations Trusteeship of Somalia and 33 represented the former British Somaliland. The National Assembly elected Adan Abdulla Osman as the country’s first head of state, and he nominated Abdirrashid Ali Sharmarke as Somalia’s first Prime Minister.

Somali independence brought unity, but also brought democracy, something consistent with the pastoral ethos of the Somali people. The constitution of 1961 gave
political parties the freedom to organize and to compete for political office. Presidents and prime ministers were challenged and political parties proliferated to the point that Somalia had more parties per capita than any other democratic country except Israel.\textsuperscript{12} The constitution also guaranteed freedom of speech, of assembly, and habeas corpus. Somalia became a liberal democracy with all citizens having the right to vote. Citizens would vote for members of the National Assembly, which in turn would vote for a president who would become head of state. The president would serve for six years. He had enormous powers under the constitution, including the right to authorize government-sponsored legislation. He could dissolve the National Assembly if he thought it failed to discharge its duties and he could appoint and dismiss the prime minister.

The prime minister and his cabinet constituted the government, which had responsibility for implementing the acts of legislation passed by the National Assembly, and the day to day running of the executive branch of the government. The constitution provided for a judiciary that would be independent of the executive and legislative branches of government. The judicial system was a mixture of the British and Italian court systems and of the Sharia (Muslim legal system).

In its nine-year democratic experience, Somalia faced a number of problems. The first of these, the political integration of the two regions, was satisfactorily resolved. The civil service systems were integrated in 1964, and the administrative procedures were unified. It could not, however, resolve other national problems that had to be addressed. Somalia was unable to gain international support for its effort to unite all Somali-populated territories under one flag. Its economic program did not contribute significantly

to the well-being of the Somali people, and the parliamentary regime was unable to make any progress on the issue of Somalia's written language. The educational system was operating in three languages, as was the bureaucracy.

It was the opinion of many Somalis that democracy remained vibrant, but the country could not address its problems with any success. This has resulted in the proliferation of political parties with numerous agendas. In the national elections that were held in March of 1969, sixty-four parties contested for seats. The appearance of a large number of parties was facilitated by the kinship structure of Somali society and the proportional representation system of voting. The voting system specified forty-seven electoral districts which would send a total of 123 deputies to the National Assembly. Each party established a list of potential representatives, and the parties, not the individual candidates were recipients of votes. Candidates who secured victory in a minor party rejoined the Somali Youth League, the dominant political party, in order to serve their constituencies more effectively and to get a chance for a ministerial post.

This system promoted factions and exacerbated the anarchic tendencies present in a pastoral society. To win a seat in the National Assembly required the expenditure of vast amounts of money. This resulted in chaos that made a mockery of the democratic process. The losers of these elections were quick to point out numerous cases of rigged elections and misuse of public funds by the government to further the interests of particular candidates. In the months following the elections, there was so much public dissatisfaction about the way the elections were held and monitored, and the elected government reigned but could not rule. On October 16, 1969, President Abdirrashid Ali Sharmarke was assassinated by a police honor guard member in the town of Las Anode.
while touring the Northeast region of the country. Five days after this incident on October 21, 1969, a military coup lead by Major-General Mohamed Siyad Barre, the Commander of the Somali National Army took the reigns of power, arrested top officials of the civilian administration, suspended the constitution, and by decree abolished the National Assembly and all other constitutionally established bodies in the country. In their place, they announced the formation of a 25-member Supreme Revolutionary Council made up entirely of army and police officers. That ended the democratic experiment in Somalia which has lasted just nine years, and introduced a dictatorial period that lasted twice as long.

After the overthrow of Siyad’s regime in 1991, no alternative authority was available to replace it, and the country immediately plunged into a state of anarchy and devastation. Since the beginnings of the anarchic era, a new breed of power brokers has emerged to fill the vacuum left by the country’s power structure. These new forces include what are now referred to as “warlords”, armed organized criminal forces that prey on the unprotected civilian population of Somali cities in the South. Like all other groups in the country, they are clan-based and each one of them has a claim on a geographical area that they maintain as their center of operations. In addition to the warlords, there are religious leaders who are strongly involved in the politics of the capital, Mogadiscio. They are primarily engaged in the area of jurisprudence, and they run the court system in accordance with the Sharia. They have their own security forces financed by sympathetic businessmen in the capital. There are other criminal groups that are specialists in open ocean piracy of ships of all nations that happen to be present on their charted route. These forces have one goal in common. They all oppose the installation of legitimate civilian
rule in the capital. The reason is that they have a vested interest in the anarchic situation that allows them to make money illegally through the drug trade, control of the sea-ports, and airports, and the imposition of fees at arbitrarily set-up “check-points” throughout the city of Mogadiscio. It is a difficult task to remove these forces from the capital and permit the Transitional Somali Government to establish itself. There is a UN Security Council Resolution that forbids arms sales to all parties to the dispute in Somalia, including the Transitional National Government (TNG). That Security Council Resolution unfortunately favors the maintenance of the status-quo in Mogadiscio, and ironically favors the illegitimate forces in the capital who can only be removed by arming the Transitional National Government forces.

Over the past 18 years or so there have been numerous international and regional initiatives to resolve the Somali conflict in a manner which is fair and acceptable to all parties. None of these initiatives resulted in achieving a lasting peace and the establishment of an effective national administration in the country. Achieving the realization of a lasting agreement to end the current quagmire is a matter of great urgency.

It has been a frustrating experience to convince the Somali leadership in the current conflict to put their differences aside for the good of the country and concentrate on the noble task of rebuilding the institutions of a nation-state. At first glance, the quarrels and disputes among the Somalis appear easy to resolve in the light of the unifying factors present. The Somalis speak the same language (Somali), share the same faith (Sunni Islam), lead the same form of life and traditions (pastoralism, agro-pastoralism) share the same customs and traditions, and at one point in recent history
subscribed to the same national ambition, the reunification of the five Somalis under one flag. The Somali flag, which was designed and adopted upon the country's independence in 1960, has five stars each representing one of the five entities the Somali people were divided into in the latter part of the 19th century.

As experience has taught us, resolving the Somali conflict is not that easy. There are deep-seated animosities and distrust among the leadership of Somali society. We believe it is the leadership of the Somali people who attend these mediating conferences and meetings that have to be blamed for the lack of success in reaching a successful conclusion to the dispute whatever that may be. The common man in Somalia has no vote in these affairs, and his position on the matters under discussion cannot be fairly determined. However, it is generally true to say that the Somali people to a man are fed up with their present condition of statelessness and are eager to welcome a fairly instituted national administration. There are a host of factors beyond the control of the Somali society that have immobilized the march to a state of stability and reconciliation. Ethnic, economic, regional, ideological, personal ambitions of individual leaders, super-power, and regional power rivalry, and colonial legacy, all have their own contributions to the Somali dilemma currently displayed before us.

These new factors of instability and chaos include the growing armies of warlords, centers of Islamic extremism that oppose the formation of a civilian administration, criminal enterprises that are bent on actions such as sea piracy, drug trafficking and the assassination of prominent Somali individuals, and other abhorrent activities such as digging up of graves for material gain. All these groups operate outside the Somali code of ethics and morality and would have faced tough justice if the Somali
people had been allowed to place their true representatives in power. That has not occurred, of course, for the actions of these destabilizing forces that have the upper hand at the moment.

These unfortunate developments since 1991, have contributed to a state of affairs that threaten the well-being of law-abiding communities, particularly in the South of the country where violence and disorder is rampant. We will review here the impact of these conflict-ridden developments on the Somali people and their fortunes. The impact of the current conflict will be analyzed under the following headings: The Political Dimension, the Economic Dimension, and the Social Dimension.

**The Political Dimension**

The long-standing Somali conflict has a political dimension that profoundly impacts the fortunes of the Somali people. The following are some of those negative consequences:

1. Loss of governmental institutions, social and human service networks, security, freedom of travel and trade in a secure, peaceful environment.

2. The emergence of warlords, pirates on the high seas, and ideologically-driven religious leaders with militias and power.

3. Loss of national leadership in international and regional forums that would generate needed financial and political capital to the nation.

4. Loss of official representation in foreign capitals to provide consular advice assistance to Somali nationals overseas.
(5) Loss of unity in achieving the national agenda, and the emergence of parochialism and divisive tendencies to fight for one's sub-clan and village in place of the commonwealth.

The Economic Dimension

There have been serious economic effects resulting directly from the current conflict. The following are some of those problems:

(1) The almost valuelessness of the Somali shilling due to an abundance of local currencies printed by regional authorities with no central banking supervision and control.

(2) As a consequence of the weak Somali currency, consumers have opted for foreign currencies to do their shopping. Households without overseas remittances are left destitute and unable to afford the price of basic necessities. International food aid has moderated the severity of this problem. However, aid is not always available and cannot be accessed in the pastoral areas where half of the population lives.

(3) Since the collapse of the Siyad regime in 1991, the health care system has been devastated due to structural damages of facilities, robbery of machinery and supplies, and the emigration of most of the workers in this field to safer quarters overseas.

(4) The decrease in wage earners, and the rise of the population of paupers due to the disappearance of the public sector altogether. International NGOs have valiantly picked up the slack in some areas and in some functions, but could not replace the national safety net lost.
(5) The banning of Somali livestock imports by Saudi Arabian authorities due to unsubstantiated claims that the Somali stock could pose health risks to consumers. This was the primary export market for this product and its loss caused serious economic harm to the pastoral community who are often dependent on this source of income for much of their household needs.

(6) The absence of essential services in banking and finance, communications, and postal services.

(7) Lack of universally recognized passport and travel documents for business, leisure, or education.

(8) The Somali conflict resulted in the disintegration of the country's educational system at all levels. There are limited opportunities for schooling in some parts of the country and that is largely supported by the presence of International NGOs, such as UNESCO that assists in teacher compensation, provision of supplies and general support.

(9) Due to the absence of a national naval force to protect the frontiers, the Somali coastal areas have become targets of pirates, and illegal fishing vessels. European companies, particularly Italian, have signed contracts with some unscrupulous Somali politicians with some political clout to use the Indian Ocean along the coast of Somalia for solid waste disposal. This creates a hazardous environment that presents danger to humans and fishing resources throughout the East African coast. This problem has to be faced on top of what is often referred to as 'the ecological inheritance'. The latter environmental crisis became much heavier during the 1970s with the arrival of the cyclical drought in the Horn. The effects of
drought and commercial devastation of hardwood for fuel has already brought environmental nightmare to the region.

The Social Dimension

The current Somali conflict has created serious social problems for the Somalis. The following are some of those problems:

(1) Due to the civil wars and military attacks against civilian targets in the northwest during the waning years of Siyad’s rule, an estimated 10-20% of the civilian population has lived overseas as refugees at one time or another over the past 18 years. Most of those refugees were in camps in Ethiopia and Kenya. Smaller numbers were in camps in Djibouti and Yemen. Other have fled further into East Africa, or gained political asylum in Canada, the United States, and Western Europe.

(2) The influx of Somali refugees to neighboring East African states has created its own set of social problems, including the dismemberment of families, with some back home in Somalia, and others in refugee camps overseas. There have been serious human rights abuses committed against the refugees in some of the host countries. Of particular significance are the credible accounts of the kidnappings and forced marriage of young girls against their will by bands of heavily armed Yemeni tribesmen who often descended on refugee camps under the cover of night.

The conflict over the last two decades or so has created civilian militias trained in the art of violence and who possess no marketable skills or education to survive outside their militia camps. They pose a real threat to the peace process, and a solution
to their reintegration into the society as responsible, law-abiding citizens has to be found. In the case of Somaliland, where there is a regional Government complete with legislative, executive and judicial branches, but without international recognition, a temporary solution has been adopted. A militia force as large as 10,000, remnants of the Issaq Somali National Movement troops, have been assigned to base camps where they are provided with rations, and pocket money. That type of a solution is very costly, and cannot be recommended across the board as an ideal solution to this problem. Retraining these troops and gradually reintegrating them into the civilian population is a better plan.

In the capital city of Mogadiscio and other areas of the South, the militia troops have a field day. They are engaged in a highly profitable criminal enterprise of manning traffic check-points they have created in various parts of the city. They demand all passing traffic to stop and pay fees for being allowed to proceed on their travel. They have no legal authority to enforce such rules. However, everybody had to pay up or face the consequences of being shot at. The leadership of these street gangs is in the hands of war lords of various sub-clans who organize them and provide them with their daily assignments. These war lords refuse to recognize the new Interim Federal Government that has settled in the town of Jowhar, 60 km south of the capital. The Interim Government of Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed does not dare to challenge these warlords and has so far avoided confronting them in their main areas of operations, the Capital of Somalia.
The Reconstruction of the Somali Economy

The reconstruction of Somalia’s economy is a daunting task. The civil wars, anarchy and chaos that prevailed in the country over the past 18 years, have destroyed what ever the country’s development plans had accomplished since independence in 1960. The nation’s factories, hospitals, banking and financial systems, schools, public buildings, and water systems have all been ruined, or taken over by squatters, and homeless people as shelters. All legal records, public documents, and official statutes are no longer available and the new administration has to build those resources anew. The professional and technical classes have left the country, and even in the unlikely event that development capital was available, technical manpower is not.

We have to realize that any serious effort at rebuilding the Somali economy would require an acceptable state of peace and tranquility, and an effective national government to plan, coordinate, and distribute available funds to the regions. There is no such government in Somalia today. The new Transitional Federal Government that was established several years ago in Nairobi, Kenya, has since resettled in the town of Jowhar, 90 KM south of the capital city of Mogadiscio. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has no budget, civil service, offices, or adequate security services to guarantee their own safety if they decide to move to the capital.

The foremost task facing the Somali people is to create a peaceful environment where the donor countries can be comfortable with. Economic development and reconstruction plans cannot be realized without massive infusion of funds from overseas. I do not foresee that happening any time in the near future. Reconstruction funding
similar to the US Marshall Plan for Western Europe after World War II is needed here after Somali reconciliation programs have succeeded.

There are no appropriate reconstruction models available for a failed state like Somalia. The path of development would be similar to those of Djibouti, Eritrea, and Ethiopia, neighboring states whose primary economic goals seem to be that of providing minimum services in education, health, security, and other essential services. There are no funds available or development from the national budget, and there are practically no resources to fight hunger in any of these countries. We do not expect Somalia to do any better than its sister neighboring states even when harmony prevails.

What we are recommending here is the adoption of nation-building programs which are not centered on capital-intensive projects, but on self-help, village level cooperatives in animal husbandry, fishing, and light industry. To realize that goal, it is essential to reinvigorate management systems, participatory democracy, democratization of processes, decentralization of operations, and the protection of the depleted natural environment. In their report entitled, “Somalia’s Economic Reconstruction, Institution-Building and Mobilization, (2003),” a panel of Somali experts reached the conclusion that “restoration of peace and stability should be the first order of the day for the new Somali government.” I strongly agree with the experts’ assessment. It will indeed take years before the new Somali government will be able to collect taxes, create a national bank, a civil service, a court system, and rebuild its tattered image, and gain the legitimacy that it badly needs throughout the country. Before that goal is realized, the

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14 Ibid.
Somali government will be dependent on hand-outs from friendly nations in order to run their modest operations.

**Objectives of the Study**

The purpose of this research is to study the dynamics of the conflict in Somalia that eventually resulted in the destruction of the state and social institutions, and the disintegration of the political, economic, and social fabric of the country. The end-result was the collapse of the state on January 27, 1991, the date the vanquished dictator, Mohamed Siyad Barre and remnants of his forces were chased out of the capital city of Mogadiscio. What transpired in the final days of Siyad’s rule had its origins in earlier periods of his dictatorial rule. The divide and rule policies, the heavy-handedness, and the disregard of human rights caused such deep animosity among the populace impacted by such acts, that it was just a matter of time before a violent response takes place. The question was when this would occur, and in what form or manner the uprising would be expressed. We can indeed describe the evolving situation of state collapse in Somalia as a degenerative disease that gradually destroys the body politic it had infected.

Areas of interest include understanding ways we could predict the occurrence and likelihood of state collapse in a fragile, poor nation exposed to the temptations of armed merchants and superpower politics. Are there preventive measures that the international community could take to save a nation on the verge of collapse as Somalia was for much of the 1980s? As those who carefully observed the Somali political scene long enough understand very well, the actual date of State collapse in Somalia had been delayed long enough by the self-interest seeking national and international financial donors who kept the regime on life support through the infusion of large funds used for military ventures.
That was allowed to happen in the face of Siyad's blatant disregard of human rights. The Cold War politics kept that regime in power. The widespread documented abuse of human rights, public corruption, and abuse of power were not considered sufficient grounds for aid suspension on the part of the Reagan and Bush Republican Administrations. The United States, as well as certain European and Middle Eastern States cooperated fully in providing aid and comfort to the authoritarian regime. The opportunity of gaining ground in the strategic location of Somalia far outweighed the merits of moral considerations at the height of the Cold War.

A second objective of this study is to look for viable strategies for conflict resolution and reconstruction of the country. Are there mechanisms for durable peace in the Horn of Africa? We will explore options for nation-building and strategies for conflict resolution and rehabilitation.

A third dimension of this study is to analyze the nature, legitimacy, and effectiveness of international interventions in a collapsed African state such as Somalia. What should be the objectives of such an intervention when you lack legitimate national authority to represent the interests of the collapsed state? Should the international community opt for short-term, band-aid measures to resolve the issue of famine relief to the needy population or engage in a long-range goal of resolving the root causes of the conflict that lead to the conflict in the first place? These are some of the issues that this study will explore.

**Methodology**

This study will utilize sources of historical/comparative data, and analytical techniques. The historical approach will facilitate the study of the main trends of Somali
movements across the Horn of Africa to find a secure home to grow and expand. The Somali social life in pre-colonial and colonial periods will be carefully reviewed and analyzed in order to come to grips with social organization, type of government, relationships among clans conflict resolution mechanisms, and relationship with outsiders as they continued to struggle and settle down in this harsh environment now known as the Horn of Africa in the tenth and eleventh centuries.

Secondly, all relevant data related to political developments will be examined to make sense of the varied, complex dynamics of a conflict-laden society. Special attention will be paid to the role of the military and civil-society relations. Issues to be analyzed include Somali-Ethiopian war of 1977-1978, civil wars of the 1980s and 1990s, famines of the early 1990s, dismemberment and destruction of the state, and the multi-national humanitarian interventions to save lives.

The study will utilize primary sources such as United Nations Resolutions, US Congressional hearings, and data from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. These primary sources will be supplemented by secondary sources, including books, periodical journals, newspapers, and relevant internet websites, such as www.Irinnews.org, www.Allpuntland.com, and www.Hiiraan.com, etc.

Significance of the Study

This study will analyze the historical development of the Somali society in an effort to unearth the root causes of the current conflict that engulfed the country since its independence in 1960. We will explore conflict resolution models, and the experience of certain African countries similarly situated. A review of conflict resolution models will be made in an effort to find the best strategy to resolve the Somali conflict. International
interventions to bring order into the chaotic system will be recommended. The study raises the question of whether the intervention's objectives as set out by the United Nations member nations with forces on the ground, might have missed an opportunity by not facing the local war lords head on, and disarm ing them completely. The international community decided to accomplish a short-goal of delivering humanitarian assistance in its mission of early 1990s. Alternative plans of a longer stay to accomplish a lasting peace and security have not been on the table. We consider this a shortcoming that should have been rectified by then in time.

**The Research Question**

What factors have prevented the Somalis from reconciling their differences and forming a national government after 18 years of reconciliation efforts?

**Conceptual and Theoretical Framework**

In formulating appropriate mechanisms for the design of theoretical and conceptual approaches for the study of politics, political institutions, and frameworks, political science scholars have identified three main approaches. The three schools of thought are known as Modernization, Dependency/Underdevelopment, and state-centered or statist.

Modernization theory was envisioned and put to use in the early 1960s, coinciding with the first decade of independence of African states from British and French rule. It was based on lessons learned from the Western experience in development, and its adherents believed that the concepts and methods that worked fairly well in Western societies could be successfully transplanted to the African scene for development. What were not fully examined were the effects of cultural differences of
the two societies and levels of development in the transplanting process. Concepts and models of bureaucratization, objectivity, rationality, the rule of law, etc., were applied to the political and economic situation prevailing in African states without adequate modification or adjustment to fit these concepts and models into the burgeoning milieu of new states.

The second approach, Dependency/Underdevelopment was introduced as an analytical apparatus in the early 1970s. This framework was the product of scholars who questioned the utility of Modernization theory, and were very much in need of a replacement tool for their own scholarship. Dependency/Underdevelopment approach utilized different concepts and models to address the reality of post-colonial African State. Areas considered in this analytical framework include patterns of trade and exchange inequality that often resulted from international trade. This North-South trading system had inherent inequalities that clearly favored the industrialized North to the detriment of the commodity exporting countries in the Southern Hemisphere that included the whole of Africa. There was a predetermined inequality in the exchange relationship that the African countries could not intervene to change it in any meaningful way that could lessen the impact of the market on their economic fortunes.

The limitations inherent in Dependency theory led to the design of an alternative approach that addressed the needs of scholars interested in understanding and analyzing the situation on the ground in African societies. The role of the state was significant and had to be sufficiently accounted for. This approach is known as “statist” or “state-centered.” In this approach, the state is seen as the powerhouse that energizes the machine of government for good or bad. Since the private sector of these societies is
weak and cannot in anyway be relied upon to finance development projects, or impact on
the economy in a big way, it was theorized that it was the role of the African state to
undertake the functions of resource allocation, planning and development of the
economically weak societies.

Another area relevant for the conceptual and theoretical framework of this study
is state-society relations. Political scientists engaged in the task of analyzing politics and
society in modern Africa have not been able to come to a consensus as to how to
meaningfully analyze and comprehend the complex interconnections between politics
and society. Largely abandoned by analysts are the relevance of legal, formal,
institutional, psychological, and historical frameworks.¹⁵ These approaches to the study
of politics in Africa were considered not entirely helpful in their insights into the
impending hegemonic orders that came to prevail in much of Africa.

In place of old uncertainties, other approaches have come into prominence as
frameworks of African political analysis. To name a few, these include the role of civil
society, governance, and conflict resolution. State-in-society approach is useful in
identifying and analyzing patterns of domination, a subject that has preoccupied social
scientists in every period and in every culture. It has been of particular interest to students
of African politics.

Civil society, a concept that has long interested political philosophers is now
gaining ground as an analytical tool in African politics and society. Robert Fatton Jr.
advances the theoretical proposition that the state and civil society in Africa form two

ensembles of an organic totality.\textsuperscript{16} While their respective practices and institutions may clash, they are not distinct and opposite worlds, he states.\textsuperscript{17} The state is the higher circle’s structure of dominance and the principal instrument of their predatory role; civil society on the hand, is a contested sphere that often interacts with the three sites that he proposes in his analytical scheme, namely, the ruling class formation, class disarticulation, and subordinate class resistance which, in his view, is the last of these three entities that crisscrosses the two main ensembles, the state and civil society which are diametrically integrated.

Current understandings of African politics tend to posit a simple dichotomy between state and civil society. They portray a “soft” and decaying authoritarian state stuck in a deadly struggle against an emerging and democratic society.\textsuperscript{18} Others have expressed a more pessimistic viewpoint on the staying power of the state. Jean-Marie Guehenno has predicted the imminent demise of the states with such chilling phrases as “the Lebanization of the world.”\textsuperscript{19}

Joel S. Migdal, in his analysis of the relevance and necessity for the state offers a more positive note. He refers to certain elements that help fend off disintegration forces. He states that certain areas of state-society interaction can create special meaning for people in society, which has the effect of naturalizing the state. Naturalization means people cannot imagine living without the state present in one form or another. This

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\textsuperscript{17} Robert Fatton Jr., Ibid.

\textsuperscript{18} Jean-Marie Guehenno, \textit{The end of the Nation-State} (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1995) p.21.

\textsuperscript{19} Jean-Marie Guehenno, Ibid., p.35.
\end{flushright}
provides a powerful antidote to the threat of disintegrative forces, even in the face of
gross inefficiency, and poor management in delivering services. Therefore, the state-in-
society centered approach for the study of politics in Africa is here to stay. However, due
to the preponderance of conflict-laden situation, and their impact on the lives of African
societies, we prefer the conflict resolution approach as the framework of analysis for this
research. The framework has the capacity to embody the literature and analytical tools of
other social sciences, such as psychology, sociology and anthropology. The approach is
grounded in conflict theory which has proved to be of value in analyzing, understanding,
and comprehending the complex issues of the post-colonial African state.

In order to minimize conflicts, and provide harmony among the various clans and
sub-clans in Somalia, it is essential that we should design a machinery of government that
would enhance the chance of all segments of society to participate in the affairs of the
state. A federation is more appropriate than a unitary state in this arrangement. In a
federal system of government, there is a compound sovereign state in which at least two
governmental units, the federal and the regional, enjoy constitutionally separate
competencies. They may have concurrent powers in certain jurisdictions, and both are
empowered to deal with their citizens.

Fundamental changes affecting competencies require the consent of both levels of
government. Federations imply a codified written constitution, and a supreme court is
often appointed to interpret fundamental laws and umpire disputes in the functioning of
government. To further strengthen the conflict resolution apparatus at the federal level,
federations may have a bicameral legislature: a demos chamber that accounts for

20 Noel, S. J. R. (editor), From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in
population size, and the upper chamber that caters to special interests, such as equality of regions, clans, sub-clans, etc. The current organizational structure of the Somali Government lacks these two conflict mediating institutions, namely a federal constitutional court and a bicameral legislature.

In addition to the federal system of government stated above, other conflict mediating instruments that could be introduced into the governance of Somalia is the adoption of consociational theory of democracy. This theory was pioneered by Sir Arthur Lewis in his thought-provoking book, *Politics in West Africa* (1965). Lewis first recommended that Africans should drop the winner-take-all electoral principle and form grand coalitions, as a more realistic way to operate African governments: One can alter the constitutional rules for forming a government: for example, instead of the President sending for the leader of the largest party to form a Cabinet, the rule may tell him to send for the leader of every party which has received more than 20 percent of the votes, and divide the cabinet seats between them, or such of them who will cooperate—-To write the coalition idea into the rules of forming a government in place of the present government versus opposition idea would itself be quite a step forward. 21

The breakaway region of Somaliland has adopted a consociational power sharing democracy with organizational safeguards for conflict resolution. This adoption of the new system has been aided by the following facilitating conditions in place: 22

- the fact that no clan can unilaterally impose hegemony;

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• a principle of territorial and regional autonomy that is already formally endorsed;
• the fact that the Somali clans are territorially concentrated;
• recognized clan leaders have cooperated in the past;
• traditional Somali society endorses principles of proportionality; and
• Somalis are tolerant of the use of the mutual veto (one of the most controversial elements of a consociational system).

The consociational system of democracy and its accompanying organizational structure of government have in tandem ensured the timely and peaceful resolution of conflicts. We cite here two examples of the recent past where the system has worked admirably well in the face of impending political disasters. In the first occasion, there was a dispute on the validity of the electoral returns involving the presidential election of 2003. The dispute was settled by a Supreme Court decision. The second dispute grew out of the election of Speaker of the House. The president and his party disputed the validity of the election. The upper House, the House of Elders, intervened and sided with the opposition party. This shows without any doubt that the consociational system of democracy and separation of powers can work in the Somali environment.

Besides the establishment of a democratic system that caters for the cooption of more political parties into the decision making process as recommended by Lewis, political thinkers such as Arend Lijphart have formulated a set of criteria that are relevant to the successful working of a consociational system of democracy23. Professor Lijphart identified three characteristic in addition to grand coalitions that define consociational systems of democracy, namely, the mutual veto, or concurrent majority, proportionality,

and a high degree of autonomy for each segment to run its own internal affairs. These features are present in Somalia's nascent federalism. The mutual veto has helped to prevent violent conflicts among the current parliament. There is a system of operation that relies more on consensus rather than majority rule. The parliamentary seats have been allocated on a system of proportionality of clan and sub-clan size of the population and autonomy of regions is ensured in the new constitution of the country.

**Organization of the Study**

The following is the organization of the study. Chapter I is an introduction. The following sections of the work are discussed here: a statement of the problem, study objectives, methodology, significance of the study, and scope and limitations. Also included in the introductory part of the dissertation is the research question, hypothesis, and the theoretical and conceptual framework.

Chapter II provides a review of models of post-war reconstruction, analytical overview of the dynamics of reconstruction, policy options, practices, and the role of the various players in the process.

Chapter III is devoted to literature review on conflict and conflict resolution; and the literature review of the Somali conflict. Literature review on humanitarian interventions is also provided here.

Chapter IV is devoted to the study and analysis of four African states that have recently emerged from violent conflict and reestablished an orderly system of governance. We addressed the relevance of their experiences to the Somali situation.

Chapter V addresses issues dealing with political strategies for nation-building and rehabilitation of the country. Various political models are reviewed with an eye to
their applicability to the Somali political environment. Six major policy parameters were identified from these models and discussed in detail, finally recommending the features of the models elucidated by David Held, and Alvin Toffler. This chapter also outlines five models of conflict resolution, and the relevance of each to the Somali situation. We selected the home-grown, indigenous conflict mechanisms model as the most worthy of implementation.

Chapter VI is devoted to economic reconstruction in post-conflict Somalia. We have outlined public policy strategies for nation-building and reconstruction, ranging from conflict resolution through democratization to the feasibility of achieving self-sufficiency in food, a monumental task. In this chapter, we discuss the United Nations-sponsored Somali Joint Needs Assessment, Reconstruction, and Development Program, known as JNA.

Chapter VII concludes the study with a review of current events, and the impact of the intervention of Ethiopian forces and United Nations-sanctioned African peacekeeping troops, still to be completely assembled on the Somali scene as an effective intervention force. The TFG, which has been irrelevant before this year, has established shop in the Capital and reclaimed its legitimacy.

We have concluded the study with recommendations for the establishment of the rule of law, sound governance structures, and respect for human rights. A cornerstone of resolving the Somali conflict is to settle disputes over land and property that has changed hands over the past decade and a half of violent conflicts in the South of the country. We have also emphasized the issue of de-militarization and disarmament throughout the country. It would be of utmost importance if the international community could get more
involved in the resolution of the Somali conflict. The provision of humanitarian and long-term economic aid is vital for the survival of any peaceful settlement reached in Somalia.

Scope and Limitation

This study will concentrate from the period of 1960, the birth of an independent Somali state, through 1995 the time the international intervention ceased. Since then, there has not been much of an activity befitting a nation-state. It is at the beginning of this period that the Somali people established an independent state, and achieved the unification of two of the five entities to which they had been divided during the colonial period. Also, it is this period that witnessed untold series of miserable state actions against various sectors of the populations. These actions included denial of human rights, mass executions, air raids on civilian targets in the city of Hargeisa in May, 1988; poisoning of water wells, and the systematic expropriation of public funds. All of these actions and misdeeds helped plant the seeds of the conflict that later exploded in the face of the perpetrators, Siyad Barre and his hired henchmen.

Not much has been said in the dissertation about the period of 1995 onwards. During this period, there was no single power controlling the country, and the state collapse was complete. In the ruins of the Somali state, regional authorities sprang up. Somaliland is the most notable of these Administrations. Puntland is another regional Administration that has all the hallmarks of an autonomous state. Their administrative structures and experience in community-building will be useful in the proposed federal system of administration for Somalia.

There are discussions currently going on in the central regions of Beletwein and Galcayo, for the establishment of an autonomous administration yet to be named. It
seems as though that the creation of a system of statehood is gaining ground around the various parties of the country. The establishment of these regional administrations may form the basis of a national system of a federal administration acceptable to the people of Somalia. We hope that this will lead to a successful resolution of an acceptable Somali system of governance.
CHAPTER 2
MODELS OF POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION

Post-war or post-conflict reconstruction is gaining ground as an essential theoretical framework for establishing order and civility in counties emerging from protracted state of violent conflict such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola, Rwanda Mozambique, Somalia, and others. Since the end of the Cold War, almost half of the African countries have experienced some form of violent conflict or political disorder. Most of these states which experienced disorder were concentrated in the lower income countries. This fact establishes a clear, undisputed connection between poverty and political conflicts. Violent conflict can negatively impact on the lives of communities, businesses, and the capacity of governmental power and effectiveness in improving the lives of citizens and ensuring security, law and order and social welfare.

This chapter will provide an analytical overview of the dynamics of post-war reconstruction, policy options, practices and the role of the various players in the process and programming of reconstruction work in nations emerging from civil wars and violent conflicts. Reconstruction covers a wide-range of activities and interests. It involves activities that range from the demobilization of armed groups and peacekeeping to writing new constitutions, formulating new national laws, and establishing judicial systems and national legislatures where none existed before. An important aspect of this reconstruction agenda is the financing of the programs to be carried out in the reconstruction plan. As often is the case, the country to be assisted in reconstruction planning has no capital funds to be spent. The resources that would have been available for use have been wasted in arms purchases or squandered by corrupt politicians. The
only source of funding is international aid. The aid agencies and foreign governments that come to the rescue of this needy nation present a new problem, interference in the economic affairs of the country. The priorities of development are geared towards market-oriented, foreign investment-friendly policies that may not be in the best interests of the aid-recipient nation.

The following are some of the features of the reconstruction model outlined in a post-conflict reconstruction model: A United Nations-led mission for “transitional” administration, peace-keeping and donor coordination; plans for establishing electoral, Constitutional and governance programs, the deployment of fiscal and economic policies which are heavily market-oriented, democratization agendas of all sorts, etc. The fundamental tenets of post-conflict programs are based on neo-liberal ideology and emphasize rapid integration of domestic markets into the global marketplace, free flow of capital, privatization, deregulation, and profit-maximization for private sector firms outside these countries. The performance of reconstruction programs are often evaluated not on the basis of their impact on domestic populations, but on the basis of compliance with the financing requirements, and aid conditionalities of donor nations. The standards to be achieved include the establishment of a market economy, good governance, liberal democracy, and transparency in administration.

Countries that are targeted for reconstruction programs by the international community often include those with a long history of violent conflicts, including those that are characterized as “failed states.” A country is designated a failed state when its institutions are unable to exercise full control over its territory, is unable to fulfill its domestic and international legal obligations; and lacks an effective local and national
judicial systems to ensure the “rule of law.” Other features of a failed state include a lack of participatory democracy, transparency, and porous borders that invite the penetration of foreign nationals that commit economic and terrorist activities.¹

A clear drawback of reconstruction financing by outside agencies with their own political motivations is that nation-building is held hostage to the political and economic dictates of the financiers, especially with agencies with close ties to the United States, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. In this venue, Alejandro Bendana notes, “In this case as in others the world over, nation-building took the form of following an economic and political blueprint largely designed by the multilateral financial institutions in Washington. What we witness therefore is the transformation of nation-states and nation-building into the creation of neo-liberal national states.” A study on trends in bilateral and multilateral emergency and development assistance in Cambodia from 1992-1995 notes that, “Unfortunately, aid flows in crisis periods are not necessarily adjusted to the needs and absorptive capacity of the recipient country, but are more attuned to the political needs of donors seeking to manifest foreign policy.”²

Theories advanced by academics and “Think Tanks” are by no means flawless. These theories and propositions often fail to explain adequately the systemic causes of state failure and their associated problems of impoverishment and political
conflicts. Issues rarely raised in discussions of state failure are the obsolete colonial structures of production and marketing, debilitating debt repayment burdens and the problems created by the structural adjustment programs imposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These issues and similar ones are rarely if ever fully considered in the analysis of economic decline, deepening poverty and poor governance in the so-called failed states that are gripped in quagmire and political conflicts.

One notable area of consideration that gained ground in discussions of state failure is abuse of power by the ruling elites, their lack of concern for the “rule of law,” and the need for governance programs to ameliorate the situation. The utter lack of historical and international dimensions in the analysis of state failure in the third world renders them ideological and unrelated to the political economy of conflicts and their impact on emerging nations and their peoples. The prevailing theme in this analytical framework is that donors attribute violence and poverty in part to corruption by greedy national elites and the “absence of good governance,” as defined by the World Bank governance model. If that thesis is accepted, we will come to the conclusion that any solution to tackle these problems must lie in the adoption and careful adherence to the World Bank/IMF conditions of good governance. The Bank’s model of good governance requires that governments put in place legal and administrative systems that are private sector and market-friendly. It further requires the creation of an “enabling” environment for foreign investments. According to this model, there is no need on the part of the government that needs financial interventions to engage in a program of national development that prioritizes the development needs of the country. The provision of jobs,
food, and healthcare are not the priority concerns of the state under reconstruction plans. What is paramount is fiscal conservatism, low inflation, stable currency, and a balance of payments posture.

Post-conflict planning calls for the ‘normalization’ of the state of protracted instability in order to be able to manage development programs without the contribution of a “well-entrenched” or coherent state.\(^2\) Under this scenario, the World Bank, UN agencies and donor governments in the international system turn over development activities and programs to private actors on the ground, thus bypassing the often weak, dysfunctional, and authoritarian governments that are unable to meet their national development obligations. Humanitarian relief programs, and conflict management responsibilities are assigned to private corporations and international NGOs.

A glaring example of this state of affairs is provided by the experience of the Cambodian government from 1992-1995. According to a study on aid flows during the period, substantial amounts of this aid was not even spent inside Cambodia and the funds were managed largely by non-Cambodians. In a study on this subject, John P. McAndrew writes:\(^3\) “In the rush to repatriate people from the Thai-Cambodian border and to jump-start rehabilitation efforts, the participation of the government bureaucracy was largely ignored. In effect, a parallel structure was created with NGOs, multinational agencies, and private consultants performing many of the tasks normally assumed by government personnel. The urgency of donors to implement high cost emergency programs was, ironically, in conflict with the slow process of rebuilding social institutions to manage aid effectively.”

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The Roles of Stakeholders in Post-Conflict Reconstruction

The post-conflict period requires the cooperation of a number of partners to carry out the development and relief process. This is essential because of the enormity of challenges faced in achieving long-term peace in a country emerging from violent conflict and devastation. The challenges of establishing good governance and the rule of law, the lack of which is a causal factor to the conflict, are often beyond the capacity of a single entity, and certainly beyond that of a war-torn government, which is often a party to the conflict. Participation of the country’s citizens in the reconstruction process is a must, and to achieve this goal, all parties in the reconstruction effort should show a spirit of cooperation and compromise. The parties include the government, the private sector, the civil society, donor governments, international NGOs, multilateral financial institutions, among others. We will discuss here the roles of some of these partners in the post-conflict reconstruction process.

The Role of Government

The government in place in the emerging nation under reconstruction must rise to the occasion and take the lead in good governance. It should provide as much as possible the broad framework within which all partners must operate and which will define the general developmental goals of the country. That should be done despite the conditionalities that may be imposed by the World Bank and IMF. Among the top concerns of the government are issues that relate to the initiation of recovery, reconstruction of the economy and the rehabilitation of society. In this respect, the critical

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4 Mark Duffield, Ibid.
elements required for post-conflict reconstruction, as identified by the World Bank are:
a) well-planned economic reforms, mainly organized and secured through good
governance; and b) a thriving civil society buttressed by a solid social capital base
and augmented through decentralized government.\footnote{Mark Duffield, Ibid.}

The problems that foment intra-state conflict are best left to the national
government to resolve. In that capacity, the government plays an important role in post-
conflict reconstruction. The government has the authority to channel resources to local
and provincial bodies that would manage projects. If the state is incapable of managing
disputes and grievances emanating from the reconstruction agenda, conflict will occur
and violence may soon follow. If the state is too weak to maintain and enforce conflict
management systems and if it also lacks popular legitimacy, violence may erupt. The
national government in place to oversee the development process has a stake to
proactively build peace by establishing a political structure that is transparent,
representational, and interactive.

\textbf{The Role of Civil Society Organizations}

The role of the civil society organizations is crucial in the rebuilding process of
states shattered by violent conflicts. What is essential is to delineate the specific needs for
coordination and partnership between the CSOs and other stakeholders in the
reconstruction process. The function of government is to be a facilitator that establishes
a conducive environment for effective interaction among groups and businesses in the
country.\footnote{Mark Duffield, Ibid} It is the government’s responsibility to mend fences with former parties to the
conflict and encourage all facets of conflict management. To achieve this mandate, the
government needs some help from the international community in the provision of resources, capacity-building measures of weakened public institutions, and governance structures and processes. The CSOs if unhampered by bureaucratic red-tape, and unnecessary interventions can indeed be able to fill the vacuum where government institutions are particularly weak or non-existent.\(^7\)

In the case of African states undergoing periods of post-conflict reconstruction, CSOs can and do develop creative options for promoting effective, sustainable programs that assist in the management of the conflict. Areas in which African CSOs are useful include the creation of small business enterprises, encouraging the spirit of cooperative ventures, and recycling profits into the communities that provide resources and labor, etc. Success stories of government-CSO collaboration have been documented in Latin America. These include the fight against HIV/AIDS in Brazil, and in judicial reform in Ecuador. Such success could be replicated in post-conflict situations in Africa.\(^8\)

**The Role of the Private Sector**

In order to rebuild post conflict economies and institutions, it is essential to explore the role that the private sector can play. It has been the policy of African governments to tap resources from foreign donors, including governments, multilateral corporations, international NGOs and UN agencies, neglecting in the process to assess the capacity of the domestic private sector to contribute to the development objectives. The private sector can be called upon to contribute to the task of economic development through the provision of investment capital to revitalize an ailing economy, to create

\(^7\) UNECA, Studies in Participatory Development: A Case Study of Uganda, No.2.

\(^8\) UNECA, Ibid.
distribution networks, financing mechanisms, marketing of agricultural products, training and human resources development, among other projects.

The private sector, if assisted with coordination and incentives, can be the engine of growth in Africa. A strong private sector economy can be developed through liberalization policies and proper regulatory mechanisms. We have to understand that the private sector in Africa has an important role to play in the reconstruction process. This role can complement the contributions of the government and civil society organizations. In the case of post conflict rebuilding, the private sector may be able to provide funds for rebuilding infrastructure, and investing in identified productive sectors of the economy. The sector can also contribute to the social and humanitarian needs of the country. In an environment of depleted resources, weak institutions, and inertia stemming from long term conflicts, the private sector with its entrepreneurial capacity and profit motive, can play a significant role in achieving sustainable development. Government’s role in this collaborative effort with the private sector is to embark on economic reform that provides the right combination of incentives for private sector development. The partnership of government and private sector in rebuilding economies under stress due to post-conflict problems can be rewarding and can lead to local economic development. The scenario of collaboration between government, CSOs, and the private sector can ensure a successful transition for a post-conflict society mired with problems of poverty, and poor governance.

The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

The NGOs from wealthy countries play a pivotal role in the post-conflict development process. The functions of these NGOs have changed over the years, and as
of late there has been an emphasis on achieving the political objectives of the donor countries. Some are now involved heavily on projects emphasizing democracy promotion in place of humanitarian and developmental activities. This leaves them open to the charges of interference in the politics of the post-conflict state. Conor Foley studied this issue, and argues that it is becoming difficult for NGOs to maintain that their work portfolio is not heavily weighted in politics. This is his assessment of the foreign aid situation:

Since the advent of the Bush Administration and September 11, "the humanitarian Space" in which aid workers can operate has been steadily shrinking. During the 1990s, some aid NGOs moved away from their traditional position of neutrality by calling for Western military intervention, for humanitarian purposes, in certain circumstances. Aid workers now cooperate with the military in conflict and post-conflict zones through practical necessity. Britain’s Department for International Development links the provision of humanitarian assistance to objectives such as restoring peace and human rights. The US government has, even more overtly, called on NGOs to help US foreign policy goals; in Iraq, humanitarian aid has been politicized on an unprecedented scale and its impartiality undermined.⁹

Since the 1990s, international NGOs from Western nations have increasingly assumed the role of official representatives of their governments in the distribution of relief and development aid. They have assumed responsibility for state-type functions such as the provision of public services, health and education. This state of affairs permits relief supplies to be used for the purpose of political meddling and manipulation. In Iraq,

Afghanistan, and other conflict states, the local people cannot differentiate the official and non-official representatives of the US government. They are all viewed as Washington bureaucrats with political agenda of their own.

**The Role of Bretton Woods Institutions: The IMF and the World Bank in Post-Conflict Reconstruction**

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have a large stake in the development effort of nations in distress, and in the throes of political and social conflicts. By its own admission, “mitigating the effects of war” accounts for about 16 percent of the Bank’s total lending. In order to expend its construction work, the bank has developed ‘new products” for situations where normal lending instruments cannot apply. These allow the Bank to “position itself” early on in shaping the affected country’s development path. In a host of countries emerging from conflict, the World Bank prepares a Transitional Support Strategy TSS). The TSS is a short to medium range economic plan for comprehensive reconstruction through which the Bank can provide emergency recovery grants and loans. Countries that have current World Bank TSS plans include Angola, Macedonia, Kosovo, Timor Leste and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Bank has less comprehensive programs for Afghanistan, and countries in the Great Lakes region in Africa.10

An important area of World Bank-IMF operations is overseeing debt repayments and scheduling. In Afghanistan, donors prepared a plan to mitigate the effects of debt by first clearing arrears. In this way, new loans administered by the World Bank could be approved. Bilateral donations are skimmed off the top before the remaining funds were

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10 UNECA, Profiles of African NGOs.
made available to the Afghan government.

A constant feature of all World Bank reconstruction programs is the policy of immediate application of free market reforms, including legal provisions for foreign investment, full repatriation of profits to foreign investors, private property rights, zero subsidies for food and essential services, and establishment of "good governance". In a study on IFI involvement in Afghanistan, Anne Carlin noted that IFIs are seeking "new lines of business" at a time when large borrowers such as India and China turn to other sources for major projects.\footnote{Anne Carlin, Rush to Reengagement in Afghanistan: The IFI's Post Conflict Agenda, Bank Information Centre, December 2003.}

"Language in some World Bank documents—'new products for a new era'—is more evocative a commercial strategy than of development assistance. Reforms underway in Afghanistan include a law on private and foreign investment that 'expedite the investment process, grant tax waivers based on terms of investment, exempt some exports from taxes, and allow for tax-free repatriation of funds.'\footnote{Bretton Woods Project.}

The free market oriented policies demanded by the World Bank, IMF, ADB, and other donors as a condition for reconstruction financing have made reconstruction an extremely lucrative business for the IFIs themselves, bilateral and international technical support agencies, development experts, international consulting and contracting agencies, multilateral corporations, NGOs and national elites. All these parties to the development business reap large profits in the guise of rebuilding economies and societies. One outcome of this fantasy is the creation of inequality, and social polarization..."
among the local population who lack the skills and political clout to gain access to the new market opportunities that reconstruction brought about. There was often a wide gap between the salaries offered in the local market and those offered by the reconstruction-related economy.

Countries undergoing post-conflict reconstruction display characteristics of what has been described as the "reconstruction economy," where essential commodities such as food, housing, and services are easily available for international peace-keepers, administrators, NGO and contractors' personnel, while the rest of the society are left with sub-standard and poor services, dead-end jobs, and unemployment. The resultant disparity in living standards contributes to rising crime rates, social unrest, and communal tensions that threaten the safety and security of the society.

Post-Conflict Partnership Practices in African states

In order to understand the importance of partnerships in post-conflict situations, we will review here the partnership experiences of three African states. The countries reviewed here are: Mali, Liberia, and Mozambique.

Liberia

It was back in 1989 that Liberia had its first confrontation with a violent conflict situation involving armed insurrection by rebel groups. That precipitated a period of seven years of factional fighting, which turned into a state of dormancy in 1996. Permanent peace has not been assured, however. During the period of violent conflict, efforts were made to restore peace and tranquility at the local, sub regional and international level. At the local level, civil society groups played an important role in administering relief and engaging in conflict resolution responsibilities.\textsuperscript{13} Civil society

\textsuperscript{13} UNECA, Profiles of African NGOs.
organizations at the local and sub regional level as well as their international partners waged a campaign to bring durable peace to Liberia. In fact, it was these citizens’ groups that eventually succeeded in ending the war and installing an elected government.

During the long, bitter conflict, Liberia was devastated and its economy shattered. Agricultural and industrial productivity was significantly reduced, and this had a negative effect on the country’s balance of payment with the rest of the world. The infrastructure was destroyed and the task of rebuilding the country grew beyond the capacity of the government. It was now time for other bodies to intervene and fill the void. The civil society groups went into action on all fronts. The CSO redirected their energies from peace brokering to post-conflict activities, namely, conflict management, peace-building through community development programs, activities in rehabilitation and over all reconstruction of the state where ever that assistance was needed. The CSO activities also covered activities to organizing micro-economic projects, and programs to promote democracy, and social justice.

In the Liberian situation, partnerships with the government was so essential because the government’s credibility was undermined. The participation of the CSOs helped overcome some of these deficiencies, and helped build trust and morale among the populace. Various CSOs had specialized functions and contributed enormously in their area of specialization. One notable organization that has had a significant impact in post-conflict reconciliation is the Monrovia-based Center for Democratic Empowerment (CDE). This organization took the lead in the campaign for disarmament and demobilization of former fighters. It also organized, in partnership with government, a series of meetings, workshops and conferences on post-conflict reconciliation that
targeted women, children, traditional leaders, and government leaders and civil society groups.

**Mali**

Mali has successfully established a partnership program between the government and civil society in the reconstruction process. The Malian conflict involved two major armed conflicts between the government and the Tuaregs in the North between 1962 and 1964 and from 1990 to 1995. In both periods of conflict, governments tried to resolve the issues with military might. This consistently failed to bring about a peaceful reconciliation to the conflict. The business community and civil society were never consulted about a solution to the crisis. A number of factors collaborated to undermine the success of several peace accords that were signed before 1996. The success of these accords were never realized and the conflict continued to escalate into violent armed confrontation.

Finally, civil society was brought in to assist in the peace process, and as a consequence of such a move, a successful resolution to the Malian conflict was finally realized. This achievement did not occur overnight. It was the culmination of several years of extensive consultations with civil society groups across the country starting in 1991. The success of this method of reconciliation showed that civil society can be meaningfully engaged in the resolution of major national problems. The involvement of civil society has resulted in a lasting resolution of the Malian conflict. The outcome was the consolidation of governmental power and the reconstruction of a peaceful nation.

A key component of the Malian reconstruction process has been the pursuit of

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good governance and the mobilization for sustainable development. The Northern regions of the country have attracted the attention of the authorities not only in the framework of good governance but also in the area of sustainable human development. This provided the context for a decentralized administration that fostered the spirit of popular participation in development planning at the regional and local level. An opportunity for civil society involvement was at the heart of this post-conflict reconstruction.

**Mozambique**

Mozambique was engulfed in full-scale civil war throughout the 1980s. This protracted war resulted in economic devastation. The introduction of multiparty democracy helped create conditions necessary for resolving the long-term conflict and revitalizing the shattered economy. It has taken just a decade to transform Mozambique from a state of conflict and violence to a state of peace, harmony, and economic revitalization. Since the signing of the peace agreement between FRELIMO and RENAMO, the country enjoyed sustained peace, economic stability and strong investor confidence. The Mozambique peace process is one of the few successful examples that resulted in durable, lasting peace. The role of civil society and the private sector played a pivotal role in the reconciliation process.

The Non-Governmental Organizations have taken a leading role in rural development. These organizations which include peasant associations, and community-based groups continue to play a significant role in the post-conflict process. A notable example in the contribution of the CSOs is the work of Mozambican Association for Rural Development (AMODER). Founded in 1993, AMODER was involved in the improvement of living conditions for rural communities and to augment their level of
food security. This organization has undertaken programs and activities in reconstruction and rehabilitation of the country’s infrastructure. Areas emphasized in their program include credit support services and institutional capacity building to enhance a government-led process of decentralization. The following are examples of AMODER’s activities:

- Credit concessions to small rural traders and enterprises for purchase of agricultural products produced by peasants and for engagement in commercial and production activities.

- Reconstruction and rehabilitation of commercial and productive infrastructures and to a lesser extent social infrastructures such as schools, health facilities, and communications.

To engage in viable partnership with government agencies was a cornerstone of civil society mandate in Mozambique. In turn, the government responded with open armies to acknowledge the aid of these organizations, and facilitated the establishment and work of the CSOs in a number of ways, including the organization of the CSOs and their distribution in the country. Today, there are about 600 NGOs with an average membership of 40-50 being situated in each of the 10 provinces, and 200 in the capital.\textsuperscript{15} Civil society has tremendously supported the private sector, in particular traders in rural areas in community development. Micro industry was supported as well. This support of the micro-financing industry, and targeting it to war-affected populations was in effect an

\textsuperscript{15} UNECA, Profiles of African NGOs
aid to the rural domestic sector of the economy.\textsuperscript{16}

The Post-Conflict Period: Challenges and Opportunities

In the business of post-conflict reconstruction, a variety of actors and interests claim differing stakes and roles in the development program underway. There are the national elites who espouse the goal of reconstructing the country on an egalitarian basis that lays heavy emphasis on policies that cater to the improvement of the peoples' living conditions, and ensures equitable distribution of reconstruction resources, increases in school enrollment, availability of health care, affordable food, and job creation. Proponents of this policy viewpoint come into conflict with those who engender policies and programs that are market-oriented, and push for neo-liberal model of economic programming.

Post-conflict reconstruction is indeed a politically-charged project that raises questions about state sovereignty, legitimacy, democratic governance and political independence. There are also questions raised concerning social and political justice, as well as self-determination in the midst of a chaotic situation with many outside players that eclipse the activities and actions of the local population. There is concern about issues regarding the type and mode of reconstruction often imposed by others on the nation under reconstruction. We are in agreement with the premise that attention should be directed towards prioritizing the rebuilding of the nation's physical infrastructure, all essential social and economic services, national institutions, and administrative capacity. Equally important is the revitalization of the domestic economy, political institutions in order to achieve the fundamental

\textsuperscript{16} Evolution of Microfinance in a Successful Post-Conflict Transition: the Case of Mozambique, a document prepared for the Joint ILO/UNHCR Workshop, Geneva, September 1999.
tenets of effective, good governance, the enactment of rules and regulations of accountability and their application to both the government, the private sector, and civil society. These governance parameters should be supported by a well-defined, legal system that is independent, fair, and impartial in its adjudications.

In post-conflict reconstruction, the transition process from violence and war to peace and reconciliation entails not only the task of overcoming the structural causes that sparked the conflict in the first place, but also mitigating the on-going conflict, and dealing with its legacies that often define the real challenges of post-war situation. The challenges are there, and are complex and often numerous, and widespread in their scope and effect. In a situation where civil authority has broken down, for example, the first rule of thumb in dealing with the affairs of state is finding a course of action that would lead to the restoration of sense of security. The mere absence of law and order mechanisms creates a feeling of fear and a sense of insecurity among the populace at large. The remnants of the previous administration or the civil society that may inherit the power vacuum should pay enormous attention and concern to the amelioration of civil authority breakdown. The restoration of legitimate authority to run the affairs of the state following the breakdown of authority cannot wait long and must be attended to as the first priority. The newly established authority has to gain popular legitimacy in order to rule the country with authority. The legitimacy thus gained should pertain to all groups of society, and not be limited to previous opposition groups or remnants of former administrations. The security of the individual and respect for human rights are standards and values that should form the cornerstone of political and economic rejuvenation. To achieve that
objective necessitates the rebuilding of credible institutions at the center, and local levels of administration. These institutions can serve as the guiding force for the successful reconstruction efforts, including disarmament of combatants and their employment in the civilian sector of the economy, self-help projects for the employment of the young and restless, and creating mechanisms of continuing conflict management venues for the society.

One way of establishing legitimate and effective state institutions is through democratic governance and participation of all sectors of society in decision making and policy advocacy. “Democratization” should be viewed as a means of bringing positive changes in relations both within government circles, the private sector and civil society. Democratization should lead to the creation of an open society that permits dialogue between all stakeholders in the reconstruction of the country. To strengthen the system of government, it is essential to create governance structures, rules and regulations. These innovative measures should include law and order institutions and recognition of the role civil society can play in a democratic society.

In order to build a harmonious, cordial environment in a post-conflict era, it is necessary to put in place sustainable peace and economic development. The following are essential features of such a program of action:

- infrastructure recovery, including water, sanitation, shelter and transportation;
- food security and agricultural rehabilitation, including land tenure designation and registration;
- urgent health, education, and basic social welfare requirements, including employment and income generation; and
- more importantly, demobilization, which takes priority in the peace process because security must be enhanced; the rule of law promoted; development stimulated; refugees repatriated.

Conflicts had their negative economic impact in other parts of the world
particularly in South Eastern Europe. The East West institute and a number of NGOS conducted a study on the subject and recommended the need for an absolute priority for government and private sectors to contribute to the stabilization and economic revitalization of South Eastern Europe. Through its Action Network for the region, EWI launched a Task Force to stimulate domestic and foreign private investments in the countries in the region. Private sector development was particularly targeted in this endeavor.

Lessons Learned from Partnership Practices

1. Post-conflict reconstruction needs strategic partnerships between government, private sector and civil society to make the task of development and conflict management feasible.

2. In the partnership arrangement, it is the government that has to take the lead role in harmonizing functions and streamlining operations.

3. As the government’s role in the partnership arrangement is paramount, the private sector has an important supporting role to play in the area of economic growth and development reconstructing.

4. Civil society organizations should show a strong collaborative effort in the overall restructuring of administration and people’s participation in the affairs of the state.

Post-war reconstruction in African states has proven difficult to manage for a variety of reasons. Firstly, there is the shortage of financing the projects. The local societies that are engaged in development lack the resources to run and manage capital projects of any size, and the international community represented by donor
nations in Europe and North America suffer from what I would describe here as "aid fatigue." These governments are called upon for humanitarian assistance in ever-increasing scale, and are becoming increasingly reluctant to embark upon massive projects in areas that are characterized by instability, corruption, and insecurity. Consequently, development planning and programming in post-conflict States are issues that are not prioritized by the international community, and recipients of aid in low income, stressed nations. Development programming in all its pros and cons is, therefore, often placed in the back burner to await an unpredictable future for its implementation.
CHAPTER 3

LITERATURE REVIEW ON CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Conflict and conflict resolution are terms that are widely utilized in politics, sociology, law and other areas of study. The occurrence of a conflict is inevitable in relationships between individuals, groups, nations, and human interactions. Whenever human beings interact with each other long enough some sort of conflict occurs. Conflict is said to have both positive and negative consequences. The issue we have to deal with is not the elimination of conflict in human relationships, but rather to comprehend the nature of the conflict we face, and the capacity of human beings to manage and conquer them to avoid the violence that may occur. The term conflict is used interchangeably with that of disputes. The distinction is that disputes involve negotiable interests, while conflicts are related to issues that are often not negotiable. Settlements and resolutions are also concepts that serve similar functions. Disputes can be settled, and conflicts resolved.

Claude Levi-Straus, 1956, defines conflicts as “struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power, and resources, a struggle in which the aims of opponents are to neutralize, injure, or eliminate their rivals.” He also maintains the view that conflict, although inevitable, is not inherently pathological or always necessarily dysfunctional. Another student of “conflict” D. M. Lyons, further suggests that conflict can often be a constructive force in social life. Levi Strauss (1958) suggests that conflicts of different kinds are latent in every culture, and the reason why norms are formed is to counter the effects of latent and potential conflicts. Rubin, Bruitt, and Kim. (1994) provided a clear

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1 Claude Levi-Straus, Anthropologie Structurale (Structural Anthropology), Paris, Plon, 1958
definition of conflict that can be applied widely across cultural settings: "Conflict means perceived divergence of interest, or a belief that parties’ current aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously." They suggest that some conflicts can be resolved when the parties realize, perhaps with the help of a third party, that their perceptions of divergent interests are erroneous. An example presented to support this argument is President Jimmy Carter’s mediation effort leading to the Camp David accords of 1978 between Egypt and Israel that dispelled erroneous assumptions of the parties.

Several lessons were learned from this experience. First, Carter recounted how progress was made after Begin and Sadat were given the opportunity to interact informally. Second, it illustrates the utility of having a neutral location, Camp David in Maryland, instead of one of the negotiators’ home state. Third, the closeness and isolation of the site and the absence of press and constituency pressures contributed to the success of the negotiating enterprise. Rubin, et al, noted: “Carter’s initial efforts to mediate a settlement, proposing a compromise in which each nation retains half of the Sinai, proved completely unacceptable to both sides. President Carter and his aides persisted nonetheless, to eventually discover that the seemingly irreconcilable positions of Egypt and Israel reflected underlying interests that were not incompatible at all. Israel’s underlying interest was security; Israel wanted to be certain that its borders would be safe against land or air attack from Egypt. Egypt, in turn, was primarily interested in

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2 Claude Levi-Straus, Ibid.


5 Rubin, et al, Ibid.
sovereignty, regaining rule over a piece of land that had been part of Egypt as far back as biblical times.6

Divergent interests among individuals, groups, or nations, can be seen as the natural consequences of independence, and as an inevitable feature of social life. Conflicts that caused by divergence of interests can be resolved in one of several ways, including that of denial, negotiating a mutually acceptable settlements and compromises, or resort to a course of violence and aggression, and the mediation of third parties.

Violence is a byproduct of unresolved conflicts, however it is often avoidable. Douglas P. Fry and Kaj Bjorqvist propose three themes for the analysis of violence.7 The first theme states that there are alternatives to violence. Contrary to the prevalence of beliefs in Western culture that human nature is violent and warfare is inevitable, alternatives to violence are widely available among human populations. If such beliefs were true, we would find warfare in all cultures. Cross cultural comparisons do not support that. In fact, people in some societies live their lives non-violently (C.T. Denton, 968;8 Fabbro, D. 1978,9 Howell & Ellis, 1989,10 Sponsel & Gregor, 1994.11) Humans do not always and everywhere engage in warfare. They point out the availability of a variety

6 Rubin, et al, Ibid.
of ways to handle conflict, such as non-violent protests, democratic elections, symbolic strikes, boycotts, appeals to courts or arbitration boards, grievance hearings, direct bipartisan negotiation, mediator-assisted negotiation, discussion and problem-solving with or without the assistance of a counselor or mediator, family and marriage counseling, psychotherapy, and so on.

The second theme proposed in this literature is that conflict resolution is a cultural phenomena. It was M.H. Ross, 1994, who coined the term "culture of conflict," which reflects a society’s relevant norms, practices, and institutions, which constitute the basis of people’s perception of conflict framework.\textsuperscript{12}

The third theme presented by these scholars makes use of the study of comparative cultural settings. This was done to enhance the repertoire of alternatives to violence and to discard general conflict resolution principles. This approach is to expand the number of options to consider in understanding conflict, and general principles are sought to help develop conflict resolution models and theories.

Kenneth Waltz, 1959, attempted to unravel the complexities of analyzing conflict by developing a framework analysis that has the following dimensions:\textsuperscript{13} (1) The Individual Level (image 1), (2) The Societal, National Level (image II); and (3) the Trans-Societal Level (image III). The Global Level (image IV) has been added by Robert North, 1990, and Nazli Choucri (Choucri and North, 1990). The following is a summary of this system of analysis: The Individual Level. Many theorists worked at this level and

\textsuperscript{12}M.H. Ross (1993). The management of conflict, New Haven, Yale University Press.

their work can be categorized as (1) biological, (2) physical, (3) learning, and (4) dissonance. Among the biological theorists is the classic realist Hans Morgenthau, 1973. According to this researcher, interest is defined as power (survival). Reinhold Niebuhr, 1940, conceived of humans as corrupt by original sin, and capable of evil behavior, especially given their will to power which encourages them to seek security by enhancing their power at the expense of others. This line of thinking is similar to the earlier writings of St. Augustine, 1948, which also advanced the idea that human behavior was a function of original sin.

The physiological sub-category of researchers are those who observe and examine “symptoms” of human nature. The researchers intervene into parts of the organism to explore certain interventions. Paul Scott, 1958, for example, has argued that humans have an internal psychological mechanism which has only to be stimulated to produce fighting.

The sub-category of scholars who espouse the role of learning in understanding conflict include Albert Bandura, 1973, who sees aggression as a function of the intervention between a psychological mechanism, stimulation of that mechanism and learning. He bases his theory on social learning, social contexts, and role, response,

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16 St. Augustine (1948), the City of God, translated by Marcus Dods, Hafner, New York.

feedback influences, modeling and reinforcement, and the learning ability to assess the rewarding and punishing consequences of any given function.\textsuperscript{18}

There is also the category of thinkers whose studies can be put in the area of dissonance. They base their views on violence as a reaction to felt discrepancies between preferred and actual states of affairs. These scholars include Johan Galtung whose structural violence, 1969, still ranks as one of the most provocative contributions to conflict and people studies (CAPS). Structural violence is what exists in situations of institutionalized racism within, and imperialism across societies: "above all, the power to decide over the distribution of resources is unevenly distributed."\textsuperscript{19} Robert Gurr, 1970, is another scholar who contributed to study of dissonance.\textsuperscript{20} He coined the useful term "relative deprivation," RD, which he explained as the perceived discrepancy between "value expectation," VE (resources to which one feels entitled) and "value capabilities," VC (resources to which one feels capable of acquiring and keeping). The greater is the average degree of perceived discrepancy between VE and VC, the greater the RD, the greater the intensity and scope of the RD among some members of collectivity, the greater the potential for collective violence, including political violence (Gurr, 1970).

It was Galtung, 1964, who coined the term "rank disequilibrium," which refers to discordant locations of actors along various indicators of socio-economic and other measurements.\textsuperscript{21} One may score high on some indicators such as education, but low on

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{18} A. Bandura (1973): \textit{A Social Learning Analysis}, Prentice Hall, Englewood, Cliffs, NJ.
  \item \textsuperscript{21}Galtung, Ibid.
\end{itemize}
others such as employment, housing, and income. In Galtung’s scheme of analysis, it is not the actor who is low across all indicators, but the one who is mixed between top dog and underdog statuses, who is most likely to respond violently to the perceived source of imbalances (Galtung, 1964, in Smith, 1975). In situations of rank disequilibrium, aggression should be expected to occur. In the case of individuals, it may take the form of crime, in a system of groups, it may take the form of revolutions or rebellions, and in the case of nations in the international system, it may take the form of war.

Whether we conceptualize it as Gurr’s “relative deprivation” or Galtung’s “rank disequilibrium,” perceived structural violence leads to the realization of violence as a result of the underdog’s determination to change the status quo through manifest violence. This is true of the individual as well as the group or nations.

Much of what has been said of the individual can also be related to the societal level or Waltz’s second image. A glaring example of this hypothesis is a study conducted by Robert North and his colleagues of the crisis that led to World War I. The researchers explored relationships between perceptions and actions, and found evidence to support the following hypothesis: If perceptions of anxiety, fear, threat, or injury are great enough, even the perception of one’s inferior capability will fail to deter the nation from going to war (Zinners, North, and Koch, 1968), and in situations of high involvement, actors will tend to over perceive the level of violence in the nations of their adversary.

The findings of over perception and over reaction to threatened or actual attacks are

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22Galtung, Ibid.


compatible with Espinoza’s thesis that violence is the result of passions overwhelming reason, with McLean’s schizophysiology that under the stress of threatened or actual attacks, the limbic will dominate the neocortical brain so that it will result in increasing the probability of an emotional, violent response to the threatened or actual frustration of basic needs, such as security. Georg Simmel (1955) theorized that elites in “certain groups see to it that that there be some enemies in order for the unity of all members to be effective and for the group to remain conscious of this unity as its vital interest.”25 This line of reasoning is consistent with Vanic Voltan’s, 1985, thesis that there is a need for enemies as well as allies, the fulfillment of which is essential to the development of one’s identity.26

This also gets support from Burton’s thesis that “the major sources of potential conflict between capitalism and socialism are the shortcomings within each system that render each insecure, even without any external threat. Such shortcomings referred to here include ethnic conflict, race riots, high levels of street violence high levels of unemployment, and growing inequalities of income and opportunity. The State collapse in Somalia, and internal conflicts within the clan groupings are examples of system failure.

Conflict can occur at the international level, the third image of Walt’s analytical framework. In fact, the international environment is but a reflection of the “Hobbesian black hole of international anarchy.” This is what Rappaport (1974) refers to as an


exogenous conflict environment. Endogenous conflicts, as opposed to exogenous conflicts, are displayed where the conflicting systems form parts of a larger system that has its own mechanisms for controlling or resolving conflicts. Exogenous systems lack the self-correcting feedback mechanism.

Since the end of the cold war, there has been a resurrection of ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet Union Republics, and inter and intra-state conflicts. Similar conflicts have developed in the States of Sub-Saharan Africa who lost economic and social supports of their socialist allies. Those states include the Horn African nations, including Somalia.

The fourth level image was added to the Waltz’s framework of analysis by Robert North and Choucri, 1975. These two researchers were concerned about the outcome of the first three images on the global level: the planet and the delicate balance of its natural features. Even relatively minor alterations in natural environment could make human survival difficult, if not impossible. Meanwhile, our expanding activities and interests exert increasingly threatening pressures on both social and natural environments.

The growth of human populations and their developed technologies in search of resources are menacing the planet. All this could result in violent conflicts over the ever-shrinking resources available. The carrying capacity of some territories have already been put to the limit leading to ever-widening struggle over the resources of the land that has led to the collapse of some states.

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Literature Review on Conflict & Conflict resolution in Africa

Having reviewed the literature of western, primarily American, scholarship on conflict and conflict resolution theories and paradigms, we can now turn our focus first to the comparative African scholarship, and later on move to review the literature on the Somali conflict by Somali scholars. Adedeji Adebayo (1999), in his effort to comprehend African conflicts asks the following questions: why has there been so much conflict in changing governments in Africa? Why are conflicts so perennial as to have become structural in some countries? Why are they spreading like wildfire across the continent? He notes that Western scholarship on African conflicts often put forward ethnicism and tribalism as the main factors responsible for intra-state conflicts.29 He disputes the efficacy of such analysis and argues that “this type of approach or analysis lacks clarity and consensus as to the exact make-up of the ethnic or tribal phenomena.30 He explains that ethnicism or tribalism is not simply a question of objective data such as language, culture and religion, but rather ethnic identity is more of a question of perception than an absolute phenomena and can be perceived by the group family themselves or can be attributed by outsiders.31 In the Horn of Africa, Adebayo notes, “the ethnic factor cannot be ignored entirely. It is more often than not exploited and manipulated by those who are bent on promoting conflicts.32 In Somalia, the population of 10 million is made up of six


30 Adedeji Adebayo, ibid, p. 8.

31 Adedeji Adebayo, p.9.

32 Adedeji Adebayo, p. 9
major clan families: The Darod, the Isaaq, the Dir and the Hawiye, the Rahanwein, and the Digil. In these regard, the Somali society is distinct from other multi-ethnic sub-Saharan African societies that are divided by religious, linguistic and ethnic differences. Although, the Somali society is blessed with homogeneity of religious, linguistic, ethnic and cultural identities, they are embroiled in long-standing conflicts, and civil wars.

Amadou T. Toure (1999), in analyzing the mastering of African conflicts, states that “conflicts arise from human relations in two ways: first, individuals or groups of individuals have different values, needs, and interests; and second, most resources are not available in unlimited quantities and so access to them must be controlled and fought for. These two factors intrinsically cause conflicts. For the task of controlling conflicts, Professor Toure proposes the following program.

1. Although third parties can play a big role in conflict resolution, the burden of preventing a conflict lies primarily with the opposing adversaries.
2. Finding a way which is global, integrated and geared towards resolving issues is most essential in conflict management, for even if urgent interventions sometimes produce settlements or a transient peaceful resolution to a crisis, it is unlikely that they could lead to permanent resolution of conflicts.
3. The fundamental causes of conflicts must be tackled in order to master them and

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33 According to population estimates of 1994. For more explanation see Torrenzano 1995:9).

34 Somali society is ethnically homogeneous, but it is divided into clan families.


36 A.T. Toure, Ibid., p. 23.
prevent or resolve antagonistic situation.

African conflicts can be traced to the colonial area. Through arbitrary boundaries, divided communities, and an increase in heterogeneity of state populations, the colonial powers left a legacy prone to lead to conflicts. Segun Odunoga (1999) in his analysis of the "Dialectic between Conflict and Good Governance," notes that, "the political framework inherited by these countries has been known to have helped to widen the local divisions, especially in those countries where the colonial powers identified particular groups as partners to assist them in the administration, some of which employ strong-arm tactics to keep the restive ethnic group in check." Professor Odunoga further notes that the African political institutions could not meet the challenge of nation building leading to cultural incongruence between the unit of the state and the national unit. There were often challenges to legitimacy resulting in ethnic and clan conflicts, and eventually to violent confrontations. Another variable that contributes to African conflicts is the application of socialist ideology to supplant traditional beliefs and practices. The authoritative tendencies of the practitioners of a one-party or none-party systems was also a source of conflict in African political life. As Odunoga thoughtfully noted "a major source of conflict in many African countries is the often brutal determination of leaders to stall democracy."38

Conflicts of all sorts are responsible for the tragic state of affairs in a large number of African states. Wars and other large violent outbreaks reflect ethnic cleavage, or other social divisions in one form or another. In Somalia, the rift is between clans


38Odunoga, Ibid, p.44.
within a common ethnic group, whereas, in Ethiopia the cleavage is often between
different nationalities within dissimilar cultures and agendas. A common factor in
African conflicts is poverty. The conflict in the Sudan provides a clear example of the
conflict over resource allocation. The Southerners have always felt neglected by the
Northern Government which is based in Khartoum, and they have resorted to taking arms
to remedy the situation. The participants of many other African violent demonstrations
have been primarily motivated by their deteriorating economic circumstances. Some see
an economic incentive in joining a resistance army. Food and shelter are provided, and
can be an escape from hunger and boredom in a tough environment.

Inter and intra-African conflicts are often fueled by the readiness of neighboring
African states to take sides. This is facilitated by the kinship across boundaries. The
Colonial legacy of arbitrarily drawing boundaries created this sort of problem. The
Somalis, for example, were divided by arbitrary boundaries to the South in Kenya, to the
West in Ethiopia, and to the North in Djibouti. When a problem occur involving one area
inhabited by Somali nationals, other Somalis felt obliged to come to the aid of their
brethren across the dividing line. This situation is far from unique. It is replicated
elsewhere in the Continent. Examples are the Tutsis and the Hutus in Rwanda, Burundi,
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

**Literature Review on Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Somalia**

Some scholars note that the Somali society is fortunate to share a common
language (Somali), a religion (Sunni Islam), physical characteristics and pastoral
agricultural way of life. That is not entirely true of today’s Somali society. Although a
majority of the Somalis lead a pastoral and agro-pastoral way of life, a significant
minority, close to a half of the total population now live in urban areas, and therefore, are likely to engage in conflicts over governance issues, class struggle, and over imported ideologies concerned with social change. This can create all the urban problems of modern societies that are conflict-ridden in one way or another. There is another factor often missed by analysts of Somali social structure. It is the fact that there are minorities in the Southern part of the country that do not share the same physical characteristics with the rest of the Somalis. These include the Bantu farmers who have Negroid features and the light-skinned inhabitants of the Bravo region who are thought to be remnants of the Portuguese residents of the area in the sixteenth century. These demographics also include the long-time residents of central Mogadiscio, the “Xamaries,” believed to be Arab immigrants from Zanzibar, part of Tanzania now. Other minority populations in Somalia include Indians, Pakistanis, and Yemenis who are in the retail business.

In spite of the unifying traits noted earlier, the Somali nation continues to be plagued by continuous conflicts. In some African countries the root causes of conflict include ethnicism, In Somalia however, clanism is the major source of strife, disunity, wars, and an ever-continuing struggle over scarce resources of grazing land, water, and space. The Somalis are divided into clan families, clans, and sub-clans, all the way to lineages. Six unranked clan families are at the top of the organizational chart, all presumably equal in status. There has never been a single clan hegemon with power to dictate his wishes to the other clans. It was Siyad Barre, the dictator who ruled the country over most of its period independence from colonial rule, who attempted to undertake such a fiat by promoting his sub-clan, the Marehan as the hegemon. This was short-lived, and no replacement of power to claim hegemony has been established. The
six clan families have historically lived side by side in relative harmony. This was enhanced by two factors. The first is the “xeer,” a system of covenants and treaties among the various clans that served the purpose of dispute settlements. The second factor is the application of Sharia, an Islamic law and jurisprudence that adjudicates both civil and criminal cases. The main Somali clan families are: Hawiye, Darode, Issaq, Dir, and Digil/Mirifle. History shows no evidence of warfare at the level of clan families.

Clan conflict, like ethnic conflict elsewhere, has an ‘instrumentalist” orientation. It is spurred by struggles for survival on such basic needs as water sources, grazing lands, and distribution of resources at both the national and local level. A conflict over these scarce resources can quickly exacerbate into armed warfare. Besides these concrete interests, there are psychic interests that have to be defended and have a role to play. These factors include pride for self, and family, and clan consciousness for respect and fairness in the normal inter-clan business and political transactions. What Fanon, 1967, termed the “savage struggle” for recognition, continues in its original form because no group has been able or willing to conquer the other in the Hegelian sense. The struggle for recognition involves not only intangibles such as ‘prestige,’ which constitutes a significant value, but also includes recognition of social, cultural, political, and economic rights.

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Several sources of clan conflict can be identified today. The foremost of these is what is termed by Professor Hussein M. Adam as “elite manipulation.” It is the result of the elites in positions of clan power and influence when they foment hatred towards other clans and mobilize their followers to take arms in order to defend the clan frontier. Clan consciousness is endowed with both positive and negative attributes. In periods of clan formation, it manifests a trade union aspect in order to mitigate the consequences of uneven development. What constitutes a positive and lasting force in dispute resolution is the time honored Xeer. While the inherited colonial legal systems in operation in Somalia have fallen on the wayside along with the collapse of the state, Xeer remains in force and applicable to dispute settlements.

In addition to elite manipulation, the following are sources of conflict in Somalia as identified by Professor Adam:

1. Struggle for social justice and equality. 2. Historical memories. 3. Environmental pressures. 4. Foreign intervention such as super-power rivalry during the cold war that flooded the country with deadly weapons. During the Cold war era, the significance of this factor was quite obvious as evidenced by the rivalry of the superpowers to gain a foothold in the strategically-located piece of real estate. Both the United States and the Soviet Union poured tons of military hardware into the country. The legacy of such irresponsible policies on the part of these superpowers is continuing to cause problems until today. The country is awash with weapons that are causing death and destruction. Disarmament is not a possibility at this time or any time in the near future as all groups to the current


42 Hussein M. Adam, Ibid.

43 Hussein M. Adam, Ibid.
conflict continue to arm themselves. The super-power rivalry of the cold war era have been replaced by other less powerful but nevertheless harmful to the cause of unity among the Somalis. These new forces include Ethiopia, the traditional enemy of Somali unity and independence that has now taken sides in the Somali conflict to the detriment of all Somalis interested in unity and peaceful resolution of the conflict.

As we have noted earlier, the Somali social and political structure consists of clan families and clans which sub-divide into sub-clans, primary lineages, and dia (blood) paying groups. An informal contractual obligation binds these groups into self-help systems of mutual aid in time of need and acts as a mutual insurance plan to bury members, and pay their obligations to victims of crime committed by their members.

Some Somali scholars express concern that the emphasis on the Somali crisis may fall into a reductionist trap, ignoring the intricacies of Somali political economy while engaging in a one-dimensional explanation of ‘conflict based on kinship.’

The Somali society consists of pastoralists in the North and agro-pastoralists in much of the South. These societies have different cultural, linguistic, and social structures. The people who live in the inter-riverine regions speak a different language called Mai Mai, a mixture of local Somali and Swahili dialects. Waldron and Hasci (1994) argue that it is simplistic to reduce the complex dynamic of the Somali society to a system of clans and clan structures which is not sufficient to unlock the social and political organization. Abdi Samatar (1992) notes that “citing lineage structure and its contemporary form, clanism, as

\[44\text{Waldron & N. Hasci.} \text{ State of the art literature review on Somali refugees in the Horn of Africa}, \text{Refugees Studies Programme Authority, Oxford University and the Swedish International Development Authority, 1994.}\]

\[45\text{Abdi Samatar (1992).} \text{“Destruction of State and Society in Somalia: Beyond the Tribal Convention”}, \text{Journal of Modern African Studies, 30, 624-641.}\]
the cause of the prevailing havoc, and then repeating these claims many times does not provide an adequate explanation of the Somali catastrophe.\textsuperscript{46}

The Somali conflict that led to the state collapse in early 1991 has a variety of causes and sources. I will touch on several of these here. The first cause of the conflict, and the mother of all causes is the authoritarian rule of Siyad Barre, whose destructive policies and actions caused irreparable damage to inter-clan relations. The policy of divide and rule resulted in the destruction all governmental institutions and structures, and a solution to undo the damage proved mind boggling to this day.

The second source of the conflict is the devastating effects of the Ogaden war of 1977-1978. The defeat of the Somali army at the hands of the Ethiopians, Cubans, and the Soviets demoralized the Somali society and created divisions and disharmony to an extent that Siad’s extensive intelligence apparatus could not control. One of the problems created by this war was the flood of refugees from Ogadenia, estimated at 1.3 million in 1979.\textsuperscript{47}

The third source of the Somali conflict is the failing economic system, a major instrumental cause of state collapse (Mubarak 1977,\textsuperscript{48} World Bank 1997). The Government in power lacked a coherent economic strategy and its macro-economic policy was erratic, inconsistent, and often moved from one set of objectives to another, thereby confusing the domestic market.\textsuperscript{49} In 1990, the external debt was $1.9 billion, the equivalent of 360 percent of GDP (World Bank 1990,\textsuperscript{50} IMF 1993\textsuperscript{51}). According to the

\textsuperscript{46}Abdi Samatar, Ibid.

\textsuperscript{47}K. Kahill (1986). \textit{The Clinical Forces of Famine in Somalia}.


\textsuperscript{49}Mubarak, 1997.
World Bank, 1997,\textsuperscript{52} clan fighting “played no part in the collapse---rather, the dynamic of Somalia’s collapse was set in motion during a long period (1969-1991) of dictatorial rule, and an egregious economic mismanagement of Siyad’s government.”\textsuperscript{53}

**Humanitarian Interventions**

In the aftermath of the cold war, struggles for national identity and self determination have gradually disintegrated into ethnic, religious and political fragmentation. Humanitarian intervention became the international community’s response to these disorders, and precedents overriding national sovereignty were established in troubled countries such as Iraq, Somalia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Interventions take a variety of forms, including actions taken by governments to influence the behavior of others, actions by international organizations, such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), commonly known as the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) imposing conditions that limit policy options by governments borrowing resources for structural adjustment programs mandated by these same organizations. There is the humanitarian intervention that serves cover for the international community to violate national sovereignty of weak nations undergoing fundamental political and social stress.

Japan’s 1931 invasion of Manchuria and Germany’s invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1938 were undertaken in the name of humanitarian intervention. Arm-twisting is used by states to compel others to adhere to certain types of behavior. A good example of arm-


\textsuperscript{53}World Bank 1997, Ibid.
twisting occurred in Operation Lifeline in the Sudan in 1989, where both the government and rebel forces in the South agreed to respect “borders of tranquility”. In such a situation, the deployment of foreign armies is avoided. This step is used as a last resort.

When arm-twisting fails, the international community opts for arms breaking employing dramatic forms of enforcement. These measures are approved by the United Nations Security Council pursuant to the authority of Chapter VII of its Charter. Traditional peace-keeping relied on the approval of warring nations, and consisted of the stationing of neutral, lightly-armed force, as an imposition following a cease-fire. Examples of these actions are the peacekeeping troops stationed in Cyprus since 1964, and in Southern Lebanon since 1986. The problem with this type of approach is that it is ineffective in the long-term since it does not address the root causes of the conflict. The term peacekeeping has been used to designate wide-ranging activities carried out by the international community to advance the cause of peace. Druckman, Diehl, and Wall, 1998, distinguished among twelve different characteristics as follows:

(1) Traditional peacekeeping: Stationing troops in an area after the cease-fire so as to keep combatants separate

(2) Observation: Collection information and monitoring activities

(3) Collective enforcement (e.g. Kuwait: A large scale operation to defeat an aggressor

(4) Election supervision: monitoring an election after a peace agreement


55Diehl, et al, Ibid.
(5) Humanitarian assistance during conflict: Transportation and distribution of life-sustaining food and medical supplies

(6) State/nation-building: Restoration of law and order in the absence of government authority (i.e. failed states)

(7) Pacification: Quelling civil disturbances and defeating local armed groups

(8) Preventive deployment: Stationing trip-wire troops between two combatants to deter the on-set or prevent the spread of war

(9) Arms control verification: Inspection of military facilities, supervision of troop withdrawals, etc., as part of an arms control agreement

(10) Protective services: Establishment of safe havens, ‘no fly zones,’ etc.

(11) Intervention in support of democracy: Overthrowing existing leaders and supporting freely elected government officials. Supporting democratic norms can also be considered as collective security

(12) Sanctions enforcement: Use of military troops to enforce sanctions (e.g. banned arms trading) defined by the international community.

Many countries in the third world are opposed in a variety of degrees to military intervention and believe that military intervention without the permission and authorization of the host country involved violates sovereignty. Some note that aggression across borders and violence against United Nations member nations do not generate military response from the powerful states or the United Nations security Council. The gruesome situation in Somalia merited international response while the longer-running conflict in the Sudan did not attract military intervention. The U.N. Security Council’s imprimatur determines what
is justifiable versus unjustifiable intervention. Threats to international peace and security constitute an all-purpose parachute.\textsuperscript{56}

United Nations intervention is prohibited except for instances where the Security Council determines that there is a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression triggering enforcement actions under Chapter VII of the Charter. New triggers for intervention include intervention to facilitate the restoration of a democratic government in a state where the form previously had been guaranteed by the U.N. or a regional organization, to enforce the "right to democracy and to good governance."\textsuperscript{57}

One thing that the developing countries avoid publicizing to the rest of the world is Thucydides Melian Dialogue---the stronger do what they can and the week do what they must. The United Nations Security Council makes decisions to intervene not according to objective criteria acceptable, and fair to all, but rather on the basis of what the traffic can bear.\textsuperscript{58} The selection of humanitarian causes as basis for intervention is a sound extension of that practice. Despite the fact that humanitarian intervention raises the level of violence in the short term, it may make longer term reconciliation that much more difficult. It is essential to halt genocide, abuses of human rights, and starvation.

Another problem related to intervention, is that great powers often opt to this track when their own perceived national interests are at stake, and they resent international oversight and accountability for their actions. These accountability


\textsuperscript{58} Thomas Weis, Ibid.
standards are especially desirable for intervention based upon a human rights or a humanitarian rationale. Rationalization and hidden agendas have historically characterized such interventions epitomized by Japan’s 1931 invasion of Manchuria and Germany’s invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1938, both undertaken in the name of humanitarianism.\textsuperscript{59} Non-intervention is the logical corollary of territorial integrity, which has traditionally underpinned inter-state relations and the United Nations charter. It was supported by as a means for protecting weaker nation-states from the powerful and serves frequently as the last line of defense for autocratic governments to fend off outside criticism and intrusion in their domestic repression, and human rights violations. There is a growing number of individuals and institutional members of the international community who see that there is a right for international interventions for humanitarian purposes. In their claim that ‘sovereignty is no longer sacrosanct,’ Jane Chopra, and Thomas Weis, 1992, present their tenets which sharply contrast with the conventional wisdom of the past, which held that sovereignty dominates all other principles of international intervention.\textsuperscript{60} It was Alan Roberts who once stated that, “humanitarian war is an oxymoron which may yet become a reality.”\textsuperscript{61}

In late 1992, the United Nations approved intervention in Somalia to ensure humanitarian access by military forces led by the United States. This step allowed for the first Chapter VII military operation to be carried out under the direct command and

\textsuperscript{59} Thomas Weis, Ibid.

\textsuperscript{60} Jane Chopra and Thomas Weis, “Sovereignty is no Longer Sacrosanct: Codifying Humanitarian Intervention”, \textit{Ethics and International Affairs}, Vol. 6, pp. 95-118.

control of the United Nations Secretary-General to ensure humanitarian access and disarm warlords.

Jane M. Lyons and Michael Mastanudo made a study of the justifiability of international interventions in today’s world. To determine the legitimacy and effectiveness of intervention, they provided the following criteria as a guide:

1. The sovereignty of the rights violation. In order to consider this standard an exception to the principle of non-intervention, the violation should reach the level of genocide, the growth and systematic betrayal of basic human rights, or present an imminent threat of the highest order.

2. To satisfy the proportionality criterion. Evaluation turns on factors such as the duration of intervention as well as whether excessive force was used.

3. Humanitarian concern. It is important that there be no hidden agenda or mixed motive. Many unilateral interventions are not conducted in good faith and are labeled as ‘humanitarian” in order to obscure the intervener’s agenda, which may be purely based on national interest.

4. Consent of target state. They see the inability or unwillingness of a target state to cope with the situation may violate the need for consent. This situation often occurs in Francophone African states where the French are called in to stabilize the situation.

The criteria outlined here do not include the international community’s necessity to intervene in collapsed or failed states such as Somalia where consent cannot be given by state organs. In the absence of the consent of the target state, the type of reception

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received by the interveners from the victims of abuse can act as a substitute. This is referred to as the “Liberation of Paris Principle.”

We have also to be aware about the problem of double standard in applying the intervention measures. Reed and Keysen noted that by the end of the nineteenth century, the double standard was developed fully with the “civilized” nations holding the right to control their destinies free of intrusion, while those in Egypt, Turkey, Persia, China, and other backward and less civilized nations in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Central Asia were targets of intervention.  

The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 seems to echo the voice of those who warn of double standards. North Korea, a state whose behavior towards the United States is far more war-like than that of Hussein’s Iraq, avoided the wrath of the United States due to its military might. Respect for sovereignty not only prevented humanitarian intervention but entailed respect for the territorial integrity of existing states. Claims for self-determination were cast aside. The self-determination clause in the U.N. Charter was seen only in the context European decolonization. That means that criteria for state creation and recognition outside the context of decolonization were never seriously examined.

When democratically instituted governments were overthrown by authoritarian regimes, legitimacy and recognition were transferred, and therefore, these authoritarian, illegally instituted regimes enjoyed the benefits of Article 2 (7) which offered protection to these regimes from interference in their domestic disputes.

The cold war has left two special legacies that hinder reconstruction of the international community. The first is the distinction between the humanitarian on the one hand and, on the other, the political and security dimensions. This dichotomy allowed U.N. agencies and NGOs (Nongovernmental Organizations) to disperse relief from suffering with the tacit consent of authorities, and these organizations could not oppose the behavior of brutal regimes. The collapse of the states of Somalia and Yugoslavia made it abundantly clear that there can be no humanitarian order divorced from strategic considerations.

The second legacy of the cold war is the theory and practice of peace-keeping. Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter had envisioned international action to repel or deter aggression, and Chapter VI to facilitate the pacific settlement of disputes. Since the end of the cold war, situations that fell halfway between Chapter VI and Chapter VII developed. This is often referred to as six and a half solution.

In the case of Somalia, both the American-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) Which landed in Mogadiscio, the Capital in 1992 and the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), which took over in May 1993, operated from the start with a peace enforcement mandate drawn up under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Since the purpose of U.N. intervention was strictly humanitarian, sovereignty was not considered an obstacle to action. What was at issue was the collapse of all authority.

The political orientation and framework for the transformation of conflict and promotion of the development between 1970 and 1989 was scientific socialism, defined as the 'redistribution of Somali resources in the light of scientific wisdom' based on the principles of communism and comradeship, cooperation and the equal status of all
Somalis, self-sufficiency and sovereignty of Somalia. Somali social titles acquired a new term, "comrade." The traditional title of council of elders, whose task was to resolve social conflicts at community level, was replaced by 'a peace council.' The traditional practice of imposing a compensatory payment in cases of murder was abolished and a death penalty was introduced to punish crimes of homicide. A number of these time-honored conflict resolution practices were abolished by the Socialist regime of Mohamed Siyad Barre.

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65 Comradeship was the new name used instead of citizenship.

66 The practice of compensatory payment: for homicide among Somali age groups was a reconciliatory measure meant to sustain clan and tribal allegiance. Its application had social and political significance (Lewis 1980:217).
CHAPTER 4

CONFLICT RESOLUTION STRATEGIES IN SELECTED AFRICAN STATES

In this chapter, we will review and analyze the reconciliation process between and among parties following the ebb and flow of political conflicts that are often associated partially or in whole with bad governance, and the collapse and dissolution of African states. We are interested in understanding the conflict situation in states like Somalia ruled by war lords and assorted armed groups. There have been recent cases in Africa, such as Sierra Leone, which has been racked by small scale conflicts throughout the 1990s decade and beyond; and the case of Rwanda, at the time of massacres and genocide of 1994 and its immediate aftermath; and the various phases in the development of the Congo, a country that has remained virtually ungovernable since its independence in 1960.

These developments are strikingly reminiscent of the historic challenges faced by other nations at the dawn of their formative years. These developments also bring to mind the chaotic power struggles in China in the 1930s, and the Thirty Years’ War of Seventeenth Century Europe that eventually paved the way for the peace signed at Westphalia. The collapse of states caused by power struggles for control invariably results in failed states that cannot survive absent the political support of law and order, and the emergence of anarchic forms of internal violence. This type of situation has been aptly described by the former Secretary-general of the United Nations, Boutros Ghali:

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A feature of such conflicts in the collapse of state institutions, especially the police and judiciary, with resulting paralysis of governance, a breakdown of law and order, and general banditry and chaos. Not only are the functions of government suspended, but its assets are destroyed and looted and experienced officials are killed or flee the country. This is rarely the case in inter-state wars. It means that international intervention must extend beyond the military and humanitarian tasks must include the promotion of international reconciliation and the reestablishment of effective government.

States in which law and order has partially or totally disintegrated in broad daylight under the tremendous pressure of internal violence and still have their presence on the world map are generally referred to as “failed states.” There is no precise definition of the term “failed state.” However, “failed states” represent a new phenomenon that can be described in legal, developmental, and sociological perspectives. From the standpoint of politics and law, the following are elements identified as characteristic of a “failed state:"

1. Failed states are associated with internal and endogenous problems. Their problems are therefore displayed as an implosion rather than an explosion of the structures of power and authority.

2. There is the political aspect represented by internal collapse of law and order. This is unlike the case displayed by the fragmentation of State authority seen in civil wars, where identifiable military or para-military rebels engage in fighting in order to consolidate their own position within the State or break away from it.

3. There is the noticeable absence of bodies, structures, or institutions that can claim to represent the State at the international level, and in turn are the subject of influence by the outside world. There is lack of representative bodies for the country in general.

From the legal point of view, it is a fair statement to note that the “failed
state” is one which, though retaining legal capacity, has for all practical purposes lost the capacity to exercise it. The key element here is the absence or lack of a body that can commit the State in an effective and legally binding way, such as the power to enter into contracts, and conclude agreements. From the perspectives of historical analysis and development of current “failed and failing states,” we come to realize that these are essentially Third World states that have been impacted by the following geo-political factors:

1. The cold war era that permitted shallow-rooted regimes to remain artificially in power by the competing two super-powers who often provided a dose of moral and material support to keep their respective client states in tact, even by the use of force, if necessary.

2. The heritage of colonial regimes that destroyed traditional social structures, but failed to replace them with sound Western constitutional structures and methods that ensure the birth of new states that stand on their feet without the support of superpowers and their ideologies.

3. General processes of modernization that enhanced social and geographical mobility, but lacked nation-building processes that would provide firm foundations, and anchor development.

The Failed States Index

In a report compiled by the US Foreign Policy magazine and the US-based fund for Peace think-tank ranked nations according to their viability. Judged in accordance with 12 criteria, including human flight, and economic decline, states ranged from the
“the most failed,” Sudan, to the “least failed,” Norway. A total of 146 nations were examined in the study. Each nation was given an overall score based on the following 12 criteria:¹

* mounting demographic pressures
* massive movement of refugees and internally displaced persons
* legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance
* chronic and sustained human flight
* uneven economic development along group lines
* sharp and/or severe economic decline
* criminalization and de-legitimatization of the state
* progressive deterioration of public services
* wide-spread violation of human rights
* security apparatus as ‘state within a state’
* rise of factionalized elites
* intervention of other states and external actors

The study concluded that Sudan was the country under the most stress due to the violent internal conflicts in Western Darfur region. The Democratic Republic of the Congo and ivory Coast ranked second and third respectively. Chad and Somalia tied in sixth place, and Nigeria was 22nd. The review above was provided so that we could appreciate the dynamics of the conflict situation in African states. Furthermore, a comparison of four African states is being presented here to gain further insights into the reconciliation agenda and their possible relevance to the Somali situation. We will

analyze the historical record and current issues that construct and structure the present realities of these four African states. To highlight some common problems shared by most, if not all of these conflict-ridden African states, we enhanced ourselves to a survey of Somali nationals who reside in the greater Atlanta Metropolitan area. The survey should help us understand what a representative sample of Somalis believe are needed for a successful reconciliation program for their country. We hasten to add here that the countries reviewed do not even come anywhere close to meeting the standard of stable, prosperous and democratic societies. They are generally in a state of transition from violent conflicts to a state of relative peace and tranquility. What they seem to have attained so far is a structure of central government with a national capital, a flag, and a minimum claim to national sovereignty, and that is what the Somalis are lacking right now. The four countries surveyed here are: Mozambique, Rwanda, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.

The social sectors and political administration machinery of these four African states have changed extensively during the past two decades. The root causes of the conflicts that devastated these states and their societies are both internal and external, and these have to be addressed in a meaningful way to achieve peace and security after a long period of violent conflicts and civil wars. To address the task at hand at the time of reconciliation, it became essential to adopt new attitudes towards legal, political, administrative, and economic domains. Even culture with its perceptions and values had to be addressed in the light of rapidly changing social milieu. In our review of these states, we will consider two areas of relevance to our research: background to the conflict and reconciliation agenda.
Mozambique

An Overview of Conflict and Reconciliation Strategies

Mozambique has experienced a long history of turmoil and violence in its short history. International and domestic factors contributed to this quagmire that lasted over a period of over 30 years. From 1964 to 1975 it waged the war of liberation, and from 1976 to 1992 it was embroiled in an armed conflict initiated from the outside, but eventually deteriorated into civil war.

The international order characterized by the cold war was a significant contributing factor. Mozambique happened to have had territorial borders with two racist regimes in Southern Africa: South Africa and Rhodesia. Their constant interference and harassment made matters almost unbearable. A domestic base for destabilization was caused not by the foreign interventions as generally anticipated and presumed, but surprisingly, by decisions taken by the national government of Mozambique. These policies were related to unpopular models of development, economic policies that clearly tended to exclude social groups from the process of governance due to ideology.

Individuals and social groups were further alienated from the process of nation-building by denying African culture in the name of modernization. The forces of destabilization were given an unexpected support by the traditional elites who were unhappy about the obvious marginalization and replacement by the forces of modernization.

We have to realize that the road to peace starts with an appreciation and faith in the process of reconciliation. The first order of business in Mozambiquean reconciliation strategy was the firm recognition of past mistakes, and a determination to forge new policies, and corrective action plans to ameliorate the situation. The following are
features of a peace plan adopted by Mozambiquean leaders in their reconciliation strategy:

1. Peace without exclusion and free of prejudices.

2. A targeted development strategy was seen as constituting a principle of reconciliation.

3. The principle of participation in the political and social process was understood to be a clear basis for inclusion, as well as a foundation for ownership and sustainability in guaranteeing peace and reconstructing development.

4. It was recognized that there was a need for continuous and sustained dialogue between all parties in the process of transition in order to achieve a lasting, durable peace.

5. A need to resolve regional imbalances in terms of development and citizens’ participation in all aspects of governance.

Maintaining peace and sustaining the reconciliation of Mozambiquean development provide the basis and cornerstone of this country’s success story in reconciliation and durable peace.

Rwanda

In order to understand the root causes of the Rwandan conflict, we have to focus our attention to the events that occurred in recent history, and the role of conflict resolution and the colonial policy of “divide and rule,” We have to pay special attention to the colonial policies, including the deliberate polarization of ethnic group differences. The Belgians after World War II, continued to follow their German predecessors’ policy
of indirect rule of the Africans both for ease and convenience in the tasks of management.

This policy has resulted in the destruction of traditional authorities among the population, and the "restratification" of Rwandan society. This "restratification" system of society was rationalized by the logic of imaginary distinction of a superior race, the Tutsi, and the so-called primitive indigenous Negroes, the Hutu. The colonial regime bestowed power and prestige on the Tutsis. The 'Hametic hypothesis,' although long since discarded, held the Tutsi to be more civilized, physically closer in resemblance to the European and therefore, "deserving of greater power, privilege, and social status than the Hutu, the pseudo-racial hierarchy created by colonial policy."²

The Tutsi minority was thus preserved and strengthened under colonial rule. This was achieved by offering better educational opportunities and higher posts in the civil service, the police and the military.³ The result of all this was the monopolization of power by the Tutsis, a crucial element in the accentuation of class consciousness and the 'structuration' of ethnic cleavage.

These were warning signs of an impending disaster as early as 1959, a Hutu uprising was directed against the Tutsis.⁴ The period between 1959 and the genocide of 1994, was characterized by the escalation of tension and mistrust between the Hutu and the Tutsi. Ethnic skirmishes became endemic, and it is estimated that between 250,000-

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²Bayo Adekanye, "Rwanda/Burundi: 'uni-ethnic' Dominance and the Cycle of Armed Ethnic Formations", p.4.


⁴Kamakama, Ibid. 28.
600,000 people died of ethnic clashes.\(^5\) The worst disaster occurred in 1994 when an estimated 800,000 lives were destroyed by ethnic cleansing. The Tutsis fought back and took control of the reigns of power. They are still in charge.

After the take-over of power, Tutsi troops sought reconciliation with the Hutu moderates who were not deeply involved in the genocide. After a series of negotiations, the two sides agreed to adopt two forms of reconciliation mechanisms: power-sharing, and Victor’s justice in post-genocide era. Power-sharing is a concept easy to comprehend and needs no further explanation here. It simply means that both Tutsis and Hutus will participate in the governance of the country. In the case of victor’s justice, we have to explain it in the context of post conflict resolution strategies. Two types of justices have been implemented concurrently, Retributive justice and restorative justice. To carry out these activities, the international community had to be co-opted to provide input and direction to the Rwandan personnel committed to this task. After long consultations among the international and national leadership, a consensus has been reached that retributive justice is the alternative to restorative justice. The goal of retributive justice is to repair the harm and heal the victims and community, and restore offenders to a healthy relationship with the community. Success in this undertaking is measured by the value of the offender to his/her community after reintegration. The level of emotional and financial restitution for the victims of the crime has to be carefully considered and evaluated. Restorative justice can be differentiated from retributive justice with its focus on re-integrative shaming over guilt and its impact on reconciliation. "Re-integrative shaming means that expressions of community disapproval, which may range from mild

\(^5\) Kamakama, Ibid, p. 32.
rebuke to degradation ceremonies are followed by gestures of reacceptance into the
community of law-abiding citizens.\textsuperscript{6}

\textbf{Liberia}

Under William Tubman's leadership during the 1970s, Liberia loosened its close
ties to the United States. In 1974, it accepted economic aid from the Soviet Union for the
first time. Domestically, emphasis was placed in bringing the isolated interior into the
center of national political life and on improving the economic conditions of the
indigenous population. Things got worse, however, and riots erupted in 1979. This was
triggered by an increase in the price of rice.

The situation was further inflamed by the increase of human deaths attributed to
the practice of juju, which is based on ritual human sacrifice and cannibalism of body
parts. President Taylor was accused of trading weapons for diamonds from brutal Sierra
Leone conflict. Taylor was indicted for war crimes at the United Nations Tribunal in
Sierra Leone on June 4, 2003. The civil war in Liberia continued to go on unabated.

In August of 2003, a comprehensive peace agreement ended 14 years of civil war
and prompted the resignation of former President Charles Taylor, who was exiled to
Nigeria. The National Transitional Government of Liberia composed of rebel,
government, and civil society groups assumed control in October 2003. The United
Nations mission in Liberia continued to play a pivotal role in the security of the country.
Notwithstanding the UNMIL's deployment of 15,000 peacekeepers and 1,100 police
advisers nationwide, the security situation remains tenuous, at best. The milestone in the

reconciliation agenda here is the election of the first civilian leader for a long time in Liberia. That by itself is a sign of good things to come and a cause for optimism.

**Sierra Leone**

Between 1991 and 1992, Sierra Leone was engaged in brutal civil war and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) committed horrendous atrocities, and gained the country's main resources, the diamond mines. This protracted war left hundreds of thousands of civilians displaced and a large number of Sierra Leoneans were killed, an estimated half a million of them were forced into exile in neighboring countries. The diamond trade proved a tragic minefield for the population of Sierra Leone. The war was so bitter that thousands of children lost their limbs, attacked by marauding troops in their villages; others were forced to take arms and engage in undesired sexual activity at an early stage of their lives. There were no human rights advocates or guardians of peace to protect these vulnerable, defenseless populations.

The United Nations Security Council determined that an intervention from the international community was essential. To that end, a mission for Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was established in October 1999. At its height, UNAMSIL had a force of 17,000 men making it the largest UN peace contingent in the world. A reconciliation agenda was pushed forward in Abuja, Nigeria in 2002. The peace conference was successful and an agreement was reached among the parties. This agreement leads to a reduction of hostilities under which tens of thousands of combatants were disarmed and demobilized. At the end of that process, a democratic, workable system of administration was established.

A random sample of 15 individuals representing the Somali community of Greater Atlanta Metropolitan Area was interviewed over a period of six weeks in the Summer of 2006. The purpose of the research was to identify which country’s conflict reconciliation model among the four countries surveyed in this study could offer the best chance of success for Somalia’s reconciliation efforts. The following is the outcome of the survey:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of country</th>
<th># of responses in favor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on the above survey, Mozambique and Liberia are the two countries whose models of conflict resolution can be considered in the search for a resolution to the Somali conflict: The former, for its success in regaining a long lasting period of peace and stability, and for the latter for its successful democratic elections following a protracted of civil strife.
CHAPTER 5
DATA ANALYSIS

Political Strategies for Nation-building and Reconciliation in Somalia

In this chapter, we intend to address the strategies for reconciliation and nation-building in Somalia in the context of available reconciliation strategy models and in conformity with the understandings enunciated in the Somali leaders’ Agreement reached at Eldoret, Kenya, in October 2002. We strongly believe that at the early stages of recovery from a state of violence and anarchy to a state of peaceful reconstruction and rehabilitation, governance programs and models must be central to the process of political reconciliation as governance is, by its very nature, a determinant of political and economic power. Another important function of governance programs is establishing legitimacy in the institutions of the nation-state and the institution of government itself.

Any program designed to alleviate the conditions of instability should address the need for the effective and equitable management of the affairs of the state. To ensure the achievement of an effective reconciliation process and the re-establishment of the legitimacy of the state, the following functional areas have to be successfully addressed as a matter of priority:

1. re-establishing or recreating agencies and institutions of government that are essential for ensuring political, economic and social stability.
2. re-establishing confidence in the institutions of government.
3. re-creating an environment conducive to stable economic activity.
4. fostering democratic institutions of government and establishing capacity to manage elections.
5. strengthening capacity to ensure the adherence to international human rights, norms and standards.

6. re-establishing effectively and efficiently functioning institutions of government through public administration and civil service reform.

The implementation of the program outlined above will need to be closely integrated with the broader political reconciliation activities executed in the on-going conflict and its aftermath.

The term “conflict” is often used to describe the state of inter-action between parties that involves the use of violence. Conflict may also be viewed, in a broader sense, as a concept that describes and refers to differences in positions between actors that are of lower degrees of intensity. Such form of conflict is considered positive and a prerequisite for the health of an emerging democratic system with sufficient controls and accountability.

In Somalia, violent conflict has a variety of sources. It may be triggered as a result of a dispute over territory, over the control of land and water sources, or over the exercise of power over a specific territorial entity. In recent times, violence was also due to matters political in nature, such as the concentration of power at the hands of certain clans to the exclusion of others. Violent conflict may also arise out of economic gain and competition for resources. The cause of a conflict may also be social, triggered by the unequal distribution of government positions among clans, which impacts the upward mobility and prestige of certain clans.

All those issues are to be addressed in a systematic way in order to lessen the chances of violent and widespread disorder in the society. Developing sound alternative
solutions for the management of governmental institutions is of utmost urgency in an environment where there has been no internally recognized authority over a period of 15 years. In Somalia, the public institutions have long disintegrated resulting in a power vacuum, and in the eyes of the general public, loss of legitimacy for the government at all levels. This situation poses a serious challenge for the long-term rehabilitation of the system of government and the future viability of a nation-state. Ever since the collapse of the Siyad Barre government in 1991, a political vacuum existed in the country. The disintegration of government institutions was further impacted by widespread migration of white collar and skilled labor to Europe, the Middle East and North America causing a serious brain drain. This was quickly accompanied by anarchy and civil war, and even the secession of the North, the former British Somaliland, and its claim to independence from the rest of the country.

Since the collapse of the state in Somalia in early 1991, there have been some notable successes in community self-government programs. Local and regional administrations were organized in various parts of the country. Some of these entities were founded on solid administrative and management structures, and performed admirably well in the all important area of maintaining law and order and in addition to that managed to offer a minimum degree of social and community service work. Other governance structures, particularly those in the south of the country lacked the capacity to offer security or social service supports to their communities. The following is a fair description of the breakdown of communities in terms of governance structures and capabilities:
1. Zones of recovery: These are primarily in the Northwest or Somaliland, and in the
Northeastern, central region of Puntland. These areas have demonstrated an acceptable
level of governance and administration despite all the odds against them in terms of lack
of international support, and inadequate resources. They have managed to establish some
social services programs, law and order services, and provided assistance in the
rejuvenation of society, and economic recovery. Somaliland is an entity that does not
plan to be part of Somalia even after a central government is finally established there. On
the other hand, Puntland remains committed to being part of Somalia in a federated state.
They prefer to remain an autonomous region of united Somalia.

2. Zones of instability: This description characterizes the rest of the country in the South
where violence reigns and the future of recovery is bleak as of this time. It is this area
that needs intervention and a lot of help from the rest of the international community.
Outside intervention in the form of financial and management assistance is greatly
needed. The instability and general malaise have further been aggravated by the presence
of Ethiopian forces with their own agenda of harassment and abuse of the civilian
population.

Generous and consistent international assistance in rebuilding this nation has not
been forthcoming. Aid is often limited to humanitarian disaster relief, refugee aid and
inconsistent supplies of food aid provisions. Capital expenditures and development aid to
rebuild the country ended with the Siyad Barre era. The East African States neighboring
Somalia undertook Herculean efforts to resolve the Somali conflict over the past 15
years. However, they are small states struggling under similar conditions of nation-
building and political conflicts. Sudan is mired in crisis situations in the Darfur region in
the West, and in the long-running, decade’s long-battle in the South. Uganda is engaged in a fight against the Lord’s Resistance Army in the North, and Ethiopia is faced with a multitude of problems, including nationalist ethnic insurgencies in the South and in the East, Region 5, the Somali Region. They lack the resources and international standing to forcefully broker a deal that stands the test of time.

**Conflict Resolution & Nation-building Models**

A number of models have been developed to conceptualize the dynamics of conflict resolution at the level of societies and nations. In my research on the Somali conflict, I have identified several of these models that appear promising to assist us in resolving the long-term conflict situation in that country. I will be reviewing in the next few pages the relative utility, effectiveness and shortcomings of these models to the Somali situation. The following are the models surveyed here:

1. Accommodate Existing Forces.
2. Encourage New Institutions.
5. Track Two Approaches to Conflict Resolution Model.
6. Accommodate Existing Forces Model

**An Overview of Model**

This model was proposed for the reconstruction of Somalia by political scientists, Terrence Lyons, and Ahmed Samatar.\(^\text{12}\) It is based on a premise that the forces that survived or developed in the aftermath of state collapse represent the primary source

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legitimate authority, and therefore should be granted recognition and allowed to be the new functioning order replacing the old one. The role of the international community is to organize a peaceful coexistence and power-sharing arrangements among these entities. According to this line of thinking, there is even a chance that a single force or alliance of forces may be capable of acting as the core of a new order, thus enabling the international actors to play the role of facilitator in the consolidation of power. Multi-national forces, will, if needed, maintain neutrality and be subject to the consent of local authorities before actual deployment.

Utility of Model to the Somali Situation

When the model’s main outlines were conceived, a multi-national force led by the United States Rapid Deployment Force was in operation in the country. That force has long left the country and they cannot be considered part of any power play in Somalia, nor can they be utilized as a controlling mechanism to mediate the transformation of power structures. While the model was of some utility back in 1994, it cannot be of any help at this stage of political development where a new government has been formed to establish order and organization in the country.

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The Model’s Effectiveness in the Somali Situation

In two geographic regions of Somalia, i.e., Puntland and Somaliland, there has emerged new forces, and political frameworks that replaced the old, and they are capable of serving as new building blocks for the reconstruction of a federal system of government for the country. In the rest of the country, power-seeking militias control the reign of power, and pose a threat to any effort at reconstruction and rehabilitation. The new Somali government’s role should be that of offering a carrot to the administrations of Somaliland and Puntland, and a big stick to the anarchic forces that reign in the rest of the country.

The model ignores the adoption of constitutional and legal structures for the forces that may have survived the collapse. It says nothing about public participation and democratization. There is no mention of the form of government (federal or unitary); nor elections of new leaders and their tenure and powers.

2. Encourage New Institutions Model

An Overview of Model

According to this political strategy model, every effort should be made to ensure the creation of a sustainable new order based on locally legitimate forms of political authority. New alternative structures need to be encouraged when the old structures and centers of power are not capable of performing properly in the interest of society.
Utility of Model to the Somali Situation

The model's premises are applicable to the situation in the southern parts of the country, including the capital, Mogadiscio. In these areas, there is anarchy and the presence of private militias that are bent on maintaining the system of instability that serves their purpose well. New institutions of government and centers of power are called for. An international intervention force to assist the new Somali government to break the backbone of these forces is of great need.

Effectiveness of the Model in the Somali Situation

No credible force has so far been applied to force the militias in the south of the country to disband and allow the creation of new institutions to govern Somalia. The model has therefore been utterly ineffective for lack of financial and political support for the development of new institutions.

The Model’s Deficiencies

The following are the model’s deficiencies:

(1) Lack of a scenario for building new institutions in the south of the country.

(2) There is no provision in the model for replacing the militias that control the cities and towns in the south.

(3) A plan for the integration of all the regions of the country has not been worked out in the model.

Table 1: Shows the Two models of political Strategies Discussed Above

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models of Political Strategies</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underlying</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conditions</td>
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<tr>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>State collapse and anarchy capable of serving as basis for new enduring order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of forming new order need to encourage alternative structures</td>
</tr>
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</table>


3. Cybernetics Model of National-Society Systems

An Overview of Model

Let us briefly discuss pertinent arguments of a couple of the main proponents of the cybernetic view to solidify its validity in designing and implementing socio-economic programs in more systematic oriented approaches. According to Espinoza and Jackson a more holistic approach to educational development programs would seek to address attitudes, values and the context of interaction at the level of local educational systems as well as linking these to other societal and institutional systems.4

A critical issue for system sustainability is the ability to recognize and to monitor main issues concerning its own viability. For any such system to work in the long term it needs to:5

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4Terrence L. Lyons, Ibid.

• Discover and experiment with new methods of self-governance,
• Develop proper networking collaborators and supporters,
• Continuously improve or keep its steering skills and communicative means,
• Learn to make and sustain good allies and collaborators,
• Develop understanding and criteria for local development decisions, concerning the meta-level long-term objectives.

Another contributor to the literature on cybernetics and social systems development is Stafford Beer, whose Viable System Model offers a theoretical framework for understanding organizational viability and adaptation that is a clear alternative to traditional hierarchical approaches that offers criteria to design effective organizations through encouraging participation and democratic work practices. For a clearer understanding of the cybernetics model, we have to briefly elucidate one of its components, the dynamics of the societal system as follows. Government as the control subsystem is confronted with politico-military pressure (pmp). These pressures may emanate from both endogenous and exogenous sources. Neighboring states may pose the danger of military threats due to border conflicts. Economic blockade or full-scale war may result from such encounters. The higher the politico-military pressure (pmp), the lower the input volume of investment resources (ir) of a national economy.

The volume of available resources for investment in the economy permits a potential rate of economic growth, subject to society’s relative capability for the utilization of its resources. The capability factor is termed administrative effectiveness (ae). Two major system elements determine administrative effectiveness: education (ed)

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and government stability (gs). The higher the educational level and knowledge base of a society, the more efficient would be its economic and public administration. In the same vein, governmental stability is vital for the administrative processes to be carried out in an effective manner. Administrative effectiveness serves the role of a filter for instable resources (ir) and helps determine the actual rate of growth (rg). Economic growth may be impacted by such factors as the weather, trade relations with other nations, and inflows of economic resources in the form of foreign aid, remittances, etc. Economic growth affects unemployment (ue) and price rise (pr), and is affected by contingent factors like imported inflation (higher prices paid for essential imports, such as oil). The higher the level of economic growth in real terms, the lower the levels of unemployment and inflation. All the functional relationships of the cybernetics model are known to be common and invariant for all national society systems considered as a class of societal systems.

**Crisis in Nations**

When all the system cycles are positive, there is an indication of an inherent growth orientation of the normal societal processes. It demonstrates a continual development and stability of societal systems. It is when we find evidence that societal systems failed to function in their natural growth mode that a concern is raised of a nation on the verge of a crisis, and the likelihood of its eventual demise and collapse (i.e., higher pr, ue, pu, and et; and low gs, ae, rg, and despair (low es)). According to the cybernetics model the following factors are responsible for disrupting societies’ growth processes:

1. Severe external pressures from hostile nations and/or serious internal stresses that may lead to diversion of resources toward socially non-productive purposes, such
as an increase in armed forces, including the military and politically-geared intelligence. In the case of Somalia, conflict with Ethiopia over territorial boundaries dating back to the 19th century forced the Siyad Barre government to build up a large army that consumed more than a third of the national budget. Such resources could have been put to good use in resolving some of the many economic and social problems of the nation.

Adverse weather conditions leading to serious losses in agricultural production and/or adverse trade conditions leading to a lowering of economic growth, food insecurity and increased poverty among the populace. Somalia experienced drought in 1974-1975, most of the 1980s, and early 1990s that resulted in significant loss of livestock in the pastoral areas, and failure of farm harvest in the agro-pastoral regions. Shortage of water sources and fresh pastureland devastated the nomadic population. The resulting catastrophe of hunger and famine led to widespread criticism of the government’s effectiveness in time of hardship. This was a major contributing factor to the collapse of the Somali state. The economic situation was further aggravated by adverse trade conditions due to the Saudi Arabian authority’s embargo of Somali livestock exports due to unsubstantiated claims the livestock was infected with viruses that could be transmitted to humans.

1. High population growth rate increased demand for scarce consumer products leading to inflation.

2. Low level of administrative effectiveness adversely affected the achievable level of economic growth.
The above-stated problems had the effect of depressing the operation of growth processes individually or collectively. They created a growing malaise for a society afflicted with social and economic problems ranging from acute poverty and unemployment to debilitating civil unrest and violent chaos. The increased strain on the government’s regulatory capacity to confront these challenges rendered the social system rather unstable and fragile.

Weak societal systems also suffer from the effects of externally induced subversion and internal stresses. Pathology of political instability is at times hindered by the power of a charismatic leader in the case of some developing nations. Unfortunately, Somalia doesn’t fall in that category of nations, as Siyad Barre cannot be described as a charismatic leader with the power to pull his people together in crises situations and be able to accomplish miracle of some sorts. According to the cybernetics model of national society systems, total pressure on government is determined by politico-military pressure, public unrest, and ethnic tension. These factors determine the extent of a government’s stability or viability during any given period. Government stability expresses the relative capability of a societal system to withstand the stresses and strains confronting it, i.e., its strength and viability.

**Utility of the Model to the Somali Situation**

The utility of the cybernetics model of national society systems to the Somali situation is the model’s provision of clear policy requirements for maximizing the viability of the country as a social system. These can be summarized as follows: (1) The first policy imperative in this context is the need to reduce the politico-military pressure on the social system. There are two tracks to accomplish this fiat, one external and one
domestic. The external route will call for the adoption of good neighborly relations with Ethiopia and Kenya, two former antagonistic states. The second track involves the tailoring of imaginative national reconciliation programs among and between all the clans, factions, and parties in the country. (2) A second policy objective identifiable from the model is the significance of improving administrative effectiveness. This entails an overall improvement in the efficiency and effectiveness of administrative work, executing of development programs, and competent implementation of national policies in all sectors. Such an effort can be facilitated most effectively by a nation-wide program of moral rejuvenation of society. (3) A third policy objective is the development of education. This signifies the development of the nation’s human resources in terms of creating a resource base of knowledge, skills, and all sorts of expertise in nation-building and rehabilitation. (4) The fourth policy objective is economic growth. This can be accomplished by adopting a strategy of self-sufficiency, utilizing the nation’s natural resources, available stock of domestic capabilities and skills, and executing the essentials of a self-sustained, and sustainable process of growth and development.

The model is capable of yielding verifiable, predictive and reproductively confirmable inferences. Once the model is implemented, we can conduct an evaluation program to ascertain the effectiveness of the program elements outlined above. At present, we can be satisfied that the projected plan of action has the hallmark of specificity, and coherence, prerequisites for an effective, goal-oriented national plan. However, there are certain flaws in the application of the model to the Somali situation as follows:

* High cost of implementing the cybernetics plan
* The model assumes the existence of a viable government, and does not address the problems of a “failed” state.


An Overview of Model

The Somali traditional conflict mechanisms model utilizes the resources of local actors and traditional community-based quasi-judicial and Somali common law decision-making practices to manage and resolve conflicts within and between communities. Negotiations at the local level can lead to ad hoc, workable, practical agreements that can facilitate a peaceful political environment that fosters cooperation between different nomadic clans in their sharing of grazing lands, and water wells. These agreements can also open up trading routes, and enable villagers and town’s people of different clans to transact business deals in an amicable, non-threatening environment.

In conflict resolution conferences, where issues of contention are hammered out between representatives of feuding parties, it is essential to have present mediators of reputable standing to manage the conference, and issue judgments on the disputes before the conference. Parties to the conflict are often predisposed to accepting guidance from these mediators. One advantage of this mechanism is that decisions of the mediators do not involve loss of face to the parties, and are backed by social pressure.

How are the mediators chosen? Before a conflict management conference is commenced, the parties in dispute request an intervention by elders from a neutral clan who will preside over the conference proceedings. The selected, agreed upon mediating elders function as a tribunal with broad and flexible powers to interpret evidence, impose judgments, and manage the process of reconciliation and dispute settlement. The
mediators lead and channel the discussions, and parties address their case to the mediators, minimizing direct confrontation with each other as much as possible. Statements are followed by open, frank deliberations, and free expression of grievances by the parties. The elders' role includes consulting with representatives of both parties to the conflict, reliance on circumstantial evidence, fact-finding on the ground, reviewing past settlements, and considering fair and equitable settlement to the dispute. Credible local people must be willing to assume the role of traditional mediators. For the mediation role to be effective, there has to be a pause in the on-going violence. Traditional methods proved ineffective when the conflict is in an acute stage, and war is raging between the parties to the conflict.

**The Model’s Utility to the Somali Situation**

With the collapse of the state in Somalia, and the emergence of warlordism, traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution were revived and adapted to resolve inter-clan killings and conflicts over resources. Lineage elders, who headed smaller units within the clan system, were elevated to a state of prominence, and the mediating role of "Akils," heads of lineage groups was once again re-established. Their functions and powers filled the vacuum left by the collapse of the national government, and all its functionaries. These re-created local structures have been instrumental in breaking the cycle of war in certain areas of the country, in particular the autonomous Region of Puntland in the northeast of the country, and in the secessionist "Republic of Somaliland." in the northwest.

**Effectiveness of the Model in the Somali Situation**
This model has proven effective in the resolution of long-standing disputes in Somali communities across the Horn of Africa where it was applied. Not only did it prove an effective mechanism in the context of parts of the failed state of Somalia, but it has been used to resolve community conflicts in the Somali region 5 of Ethiopia, and the breakaway region of Somaliland. The Qabri Dahar Conference in the Ethiopian Somali Region of Ogaden, which brought together a significant percentage of the Ogaden’s political and traditional leadership, helped stop the planting of land mines, reduced tensions between the army and local population, increased commerce, and temporarily reduced the overall tension and conflict. In Somaliland, by solving the conflict at the level of traditional social organization, elders were able to deprive the politicians of any possibility of waging war, and managed to create a peaceful environment where harmonious relationships between communities prevailed.

One clear advantage of the indigenous conflict mitigation mechanisms over other forms of models is its capacity to address some of the proximate factors that help fuel conflict at the local level. These factors include access to land and water, competition over foreign assistance and other available contested resources. It can also provide appropriate, sustainable and long-term solutions. It can prevent small scale conflicts from escalating into major conflicts that are difficult to control.

Many communities in Somalia perceive conflict resolution activities directed by outsiders as intrusive and unresponsive to indigenous concepts of justice, and prefer to resolve conflicts within the community. Conflict management mediators from the local community are often more responsive to local needs than outsiders, and are knowledgeable about the culture of the violence-prone community. Their tactics and
plans of conflict mediation are always rooted in the specific conflict’s context, and are bent on resolving the immediate causes in order to forestall long-term problems.

Indigenous conflict management and resolution mechanisms aim to resolve conflicts at the local level, thus rendering external dispute resolution unnecessary. This approach provides a low-cost, empowering means of resolving conflicts within a reasonable time-frame. In Somalia, mediating elders have traditional jurisdiction in facilitation, arbitration, and monitoring of outcomes.

In many parts of Somalia, residents have achieved agreements to end fighting through local peace conferences. These conferences were guided by the elders of neutral sub-clans. The conferences addressed immediate concerns, declared local leaders responsible for inter-clan fighting, and helped identify appropriate areas of concern that need mediation. Once such local agreements are executed, the process can be further expanded, and elevated to a higher level with a wider participation of clans. These processes are reliant on the good offices of credible, impartial group of elders who have the time and commitment to undertake the mediating role. These mediating counsel of elders engage in lengthy oral deliberations, creation of a forum or assembly of elders, and negotiations over access to resources and payments for deaths and injuries among clans.

Clan elders authorized peace conference agreements, but other traditional leaders, such as politicians, military officers, religious figures, and poets have played crucial roles in the peace process. In the Somali context, religious figures such sheikhs and wadaads (Islamic scholars) have peacekeeping responsibilities. As spiritual leaders, they command authority based on their knowledge of Islam and the Sharia. They are considered neutral arbiters who have allegiance to universal Islamic values that transcend clan loyalties.
Delegations of renowned holy men participated in all major peace initiatives between clans in Somaliland.

In May 1993, elders from numerous sub-clans in the economically and strategically critical, Central Region of Mudug, initiated a peace initiative. UNOSOM (United Nations Operations for Somalia) was not involved and chose not to recognize or support the conference; for fear that General Aideed had hijacked the process. The conference participants included community and religious leaders, businessmen, students, and factional representatives. Surprisingly, they managed to produce a successful settlement of the issue at hand and a ceasefire was achieved. The Agreement involved the return of property, the withdrawal of militias, and the opening of roads.

Other examples of this type of peace process were implemented in the Northwestern Region, known as Somaliland, which seceded from the rest of Somalia in May 1991. All clans in Somaliland and some of the larger sub-clans, as of late 1993, had their own Supreme Council of Elders, known as guurti. The Council acts as both a legislative and executive body and is responsible for responding to questions within the clan and for arbitrating with other clans. Peacemaking initiatives in this region and in the autonomous Region of Puntland have been relatively successful compared with other parts of the country. In the Region of Somaliland, a series of inter-clan reconciliation conferences began in 1991 and gradually advanced to district and provincial levels. Two elders' conferences in Borama and Sanaag brought together communities and their leaders from Northern Somalia in early 1993 to address conflicts in these areas. Both efforts led to significant reduction of tensions. The Borama conference created a national security framework for Somaliland, developed an interim constitutional structure, and
facilitated a peaceful change in government. The Agreement was honored until October 1994, when fighting erupted between the government army and an opposition militia. The Sanaag conference managed to keep the peace in Erigavo indefinitely.

John Paul Lederach identifies ingredients that were critical to the success of the Borama meetings: A series of local clan meetings preceded the conference. The meetings were initiated and conducted by clan elders, and the process was rooted in the base of the conflict. The Borama conference cost roughly $100,000 for five month, a minute fraction of the weekly cost of Somali conferences held outside the country. This model, is therefore, cost-effective, to say the least.

The Model’s Shortcomings

The indigenous, traditional Somali mechanisms of conflict management and resolution are not flawless. They cannot handle root causes of certain conflicts, including those that are centrally instigated, predatory behavior linked to exploitation of economic resources and external meddling, such as the provision of military support by Ethiopian authorities to some of its ever-shifting allies. Indigenous mediators can bring important social influence but may lack the means to enforce the resolutions adopted.

Indigenous traditional authorities are not progressive elements of social change. In this system of governance, bias on the basis of age and sex are tolerated. The system is maintained on the basis of male elders. Their decisions may well be biased against women. Local conflict management’s potential effectiveness is considerably weakened where traditional authority has eroded and armed authority, such as warlordism, has increased.

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5. Track Two Approaches to Conflict Resolution Model

An Overview of Model

“Track-Two” diplomacy has been described as “unofficial, informal interaction among members of adversarial groups or nations, with the goals of developing strategies, influencing public opinion, and organizing human and material resources in ways that might help resolve conflict.” Former US Department of State official, Joseph Montville, who first coined the term, further explains: “Track-Two activity is designed to assist official leaders by compensating for the constraints imposed on them by the psychologically understandable need for leaders to be or at least seen to be strong, wary, and indomitable in the face of the enemy.”

Track Two diplomacy is not a novel course of action in The Greater Horn of Africa. It has been used once before with mixed results. The following is a narrative of that exercise. In the mid-1960s when violent conflict, including troop skirmishes between Somalia on the one hand, and Ethiopia and Kenya, on the other, were rampant, international concern about the unfolding drama of a wider war were raised. To get a grip on the situation, international actors with a stake in the conflict organized conflict resolution workshops attended by representatives from each of the three countries: Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya. The delegates were asked to discuss possible resolutions of the two border disputes: one between Ethiopia and Somalia, and the other between Kenya and Somalia. The objectives of this project were threefold:

* To ascertain whether in the detached and permissive atmosphere of a workshop the participants might express and then modify some of their attitudes and

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values, improve their communication skills, reveal the deeper psychological or emotional issues in the disputes, and thereby move closer to an innovative resolution.

* Give participants new insights into the attitudes and values behind the disputes.

To see whether the influential elites participating in the workshop would or could transmit their new knowledge and insight to the leaders in authority. Numerous administrative, financial, and other difficulties were encountered during the three-year planning process. After taking care of the logistics, and financial imperatives to execute the project, the workshop was finally ready to start. Participants were mostly from academia without official political or diplomatic portfolios in their society. Activities in the workshop included poetry-reading, role-playing exercises; lectures, audio-visual aids and various other training techniques were employed to assist in achieving the program objectives. The participants gained insights into the difficulties of their neighbors and frankness in the exchange of views were clearly demonstrated throughout the workshop. The outcome of the exercise in terms of goal achievement was mixed. Successes and failures were documented as is the case in any such endeavors. Some of the participants admitted that their common professional backgrounds would have led to similar outcomes without the encounter employed.

As the participants neared completion of the workshop, it became obvious to all that the positions of the representatives began to harden and became closer if not identical to the positions of their respective governments. Issues of identity took monumental importance. It was later learned that at least two of the participants from each country
were debriefed by their foreign offices and other government agencies. This impacted on the quality of their overall participation.

The Model’s Utility to the Somali Situation

Track-Two approaches to conflict resolution can be utilized in the Somali front at several levels. Since this approach has a face-saving mechanism for those who do not like to be seen as negotiating with the other party, it can be effectively used to resolve issues of concern between the Southerners of former Somalia who are deeply embroiled in clannish, sectarian, and communal problems and some of the Northerners of former British Somaliland who have declared their own independence from the rest of the country and who no longer welcome open negotiations about their declared sovereignty. Outside mediations would be needed to accomplish this feat. We have to note here that we are dealing with elements of a potentially divided state, where sovereignty issues are crucial. Great care has to be taken to separate issues from emotions, which are often interlocked. Issue identification and clarification of parties’ positions are crucial in the initial stages of the workshops. The goal that is to be achieved is the creation and development of a sense of trust that could facilitate understanding between communities. Through careful analysis of various perspectives, delegates of communities to the conference arrive at new realizations about the source of the conflict in a secure, non-threatening physical environment.

The Somali conference lasted close to two years of deliberations in Kenya, and concluded in November 2004. The proceedings were more in line with Track-Two approaches to conflict resolution. Conference participants who at times acted as though they were representing different nations were engaged in brainstorming and making lists
of ideas that needed to be discussed. The first phase of the conference was devoted to the
discussion of areas of concern to be decided on. This was followed by consideration of
pertinent, specific categories of issues, and finally, making a decision on a constitution,
and the structure of a government to run Somalia. It was a long, drawn out process that
was totally dependent on outside mediations and financial support.

Effectiveness of Model in the Somali Situation

Somali conferences on conflict resolution issues of national significance that may
have a wide scope of functions, often require more time than normal. The delegates’
squabbling, and horse-trading take an enormous amount of time. The validity of that
statement was proven in the last conference in Kenya, 2003-2004. Track-Two approaches
of conflict resolution accommodate such activities. The model has been effective in the
Somali situation and accomplished the following:

(1) Provision of relaxed, safe environment that permitted participants to speak
freely.

(2) Allowed for a wide-range of issues to be taken up by conference participants.
Permitted the consideration of alternative consideration to decisions made.

(3) Provided a democratic environment in which leadership selection was
enhanced.

Track-Two Shortcomings

1. Grassroots-level groups have minimal influence in the deliberations and outcomes.

2. The length of time required for Track-two processes result in large financial costs that
are difficult to meet by a Somali society that is not that well-off. Track-two meetings,
unlike the indigenous traditional model, are typically held in closed settings to ensure the
physical safety of the participants and to encourage candid discussion. Minimal public exposure, when combined with the lack of political access, reduces the level and intensity of democratic supports.

The Reconstruction of Somalia and Models of Political Strategies

Having reviewed, somewhat in detail, the utility and effectiveness of several political strategy model, let us now pause for a second and determine which of those models holds out hope for the long-awaited tasks of reconstruction and nation-building in Somalia. Cursory glance at the models reviewed we discern a certain level of utility in each of them. However, if we have to make a decision among these models, a preference is in place for two of them: The Cybernetics of National Society Systems Model and the Indigenous Traditional Management Mechanisms Model. The two are by no means mutually exclusive, and we can therefore usefully adopt the best of each to design a model for the reconstruction of Somalia. In this serious endeavor, discussing the features of that model in isolation from the reality of the situation on the ground will be avoided. Rather, the features of the models in conformity with the most recent Agreements reached by Somali leaders in their conference at Eldoret, Kenya, and executed there on October 27, 2002 will be applied. Please refer to appendix on page 166 for details on the agreed upon Declaration on Cessation of Hostilities, Structures and Principles of the Somali National Reconciliation Process:

Article 1 of the leaders' Declaration on Structures and Principles calls for the establishment of a federal system of government. This form of governance ensures the sharing of powers between the provinces, which are founded on the basis of clan autonomy and local sovereignty, and the central government that ensures the unity of the
parts of the nation, and coordination of common policy matters in the areas of foreign affairs, defense, foreign aid, and inter-governmental relations, among others. Power-sharing will be a matter for discussion and debate among the members of the new Transitional National Government who are charged with the task of designing the nature and operational features of the new Somalia. The distribution of powers between the federal government and the yet to be organized provinces, regions or states, may well be modeled after federal systems already in place the world over, including the United States, Nigeria, India, Canada, etc.

One of the primary functions of the new administration is to negotiate boundary lines among provinces and determine the number of states to be established. I would recommend the establishment of just six provinces, two of those are already in place but need minor adjustments in border lines. These two potential federal Somali provinces are the Puntland in the Northeast and the so-called Republic of Somaliland in the Northwest. Four other provinces could be created out of the rest of the South. One should be anchored at Belet Wein in the Central region and its northern borders to be the Province of Puntland. The name of this Province would be Hiiraan, the name designated for the area under both the Italian Administration and Siyaad Barre Government. Another province would be Banadir, headquarted in Mogadiscio, the capital. The remaining two provinces will be the Upper Jubba, capital and lower Jubba (Kismayo would be its capital). There is nothing new about these provincial names and boundaries. They were inherited from the Italian system of government, and remained viable entities for autonomous provinces until in the mid-1970s when Siyaad Barre made boundary changes to increase the number of regions from eight (8) to eighteen (18).
To bolster federalism’s power in the country, item 2 of Article 1 endorses the principle of decentralization as an integral part of Somalia’s governance structures. Decentralization and devolution of powers to the regions and local authorities has a number of advantages. One of these is the minimization and reduction of the incidence of conflicts between clans and sub-clans and regions as each clan or a combination of neighboring two or three sub-clans share a province of their own with the freedom and power to negotiate power-sharing and resource allocation. Decentralization brings the government closer to home and reduces the distance traveled by those who seek government services. The following are some of the needed decentralization tools:

* empowering local groups in decision-making, planning and implementation of projects at the local level;
* motivating and organizing local groups in activities of community development, self-help programs, and campaigns to rebuild the country at the local level;
* offering training in leadership roles to aspiring politicians;
* encouraging local alliances that cut across clan, gender, age, and political ideologies;
* providing training in local-level conflict resolution;
* encouraging cooperation between neighboring provinces and enhancing their cooperation in joint projects that would benefit all.
* helping to market local products across boundaries, and creating secure environment in all areas under their provincial control.
Article 4 of the Declaration of Principles advises that political negotiations and technical discussions should be held in good faith and in a spirit of negotiation during each phase of the Somalia National Reconciliation Process. The conference leaders were correct in recognizing the need for a continuous adherence to the principles and warning against the dangers to deviate from the course of action taken by the conference. The Somali reconciliation process needs a continuous agenda that should be allowed to run its course unimpeded until the goal of permanent peace and conflict resolution is achieved. This is a patient, long-term process that should continue unimpeded until all the wounds of the past decades of misfortune and travesty of justice are healed.

There are certain enabling tools that are considered significant in upholding the principles of reconciliation and peaceful coexistence and I would like to briefly discuss a couple of them here. These two potentially enabling tools can be put to good use for the political health and social welfare of Somalia. The two are: the role of Islam and the role of women.
CHAPTER 6

FASHIONING A RECONSTRUCTION MODEL FOR SOMALIA

In this chapter, we intend to explain the layout of a national reconstruction plan to be adopted in the aftermath of forming a government, and creating a suitable organization structure for public administration. At that time, it would be necessary to identify functional program areas to prioritize in the nation-building process. While proposing the public policy strategies for program operations and planning for the emerging state of Somalia, it is imperative to bear in mind that any plan of action for a failed state should start with the establishment of governance strategy that emphasizes the significance of national security and the rule of law. Without guaranteeing safety and security for the citizens and their communities, any plan formulated to materialize is likely to meet failure. That is why the task of consolidating and maintaining peace tranquility should be the top priority. It is also essential that any post-conflict reconstruction strategy must bear in mind the lessons learned from previous actions and avoid repetition of any and all structural failures encountered in past policies and plans. The following strategic plans are some of the areas that need to be addressed in a professional way and with a measure of professionalism and accountability. Participation of the people in the decision-making process should be assured in all phases of planning and execution if feasible.
Public Policy Strategies for Nation Building & Reconstruction

We are borrowing from the Cybernetics of National Society Systems discussed earlier a number of analytical concepts and strategies that are required for maximizing the viability of Somalia as a societal system. The following are seven of the strategies identified from the model and the implication of their implementation in the Somali situation:

The First Public Policy Strategy: Conflict Resolution Through Democratization

The most significant policy imperative in the context of a collapsed state, and conflict-ridden society is to dramatically reduce the level of politico-military pressure (pmp) on the system. This calls for peaceful and harmonious relations with neighbors, and the resolution of the domestic armed militias and their warlords. This could be accomplished by a program of national reconciliation that has its foundations at the grassroots and village level.

A factor that has caused the Somali conflict to escalate to unprecedented levels in the past three decades is the denial of freedom and democracy to the population by, first, the military dictatorship, and second, by warlords. The vital issue of a return to democracy, should be immediately confirmed. The sturdy, hardworking, energetic Somali people have been basically democratic people. For centuries, the pastoral nomads of Somalia have been discussing and deciding their own personal and clan disputes in the most democratic manner under a “big tree” in the open. They have been described by British explorer Richard Francis Burton as “a fierce race of Republicans.” Another traveler, Gordon Waterfield described them saying that “Somalis have intelligence, charm, and considerable ability in arguing a case which concerns their interests.”
Social anthropologist, professor I.M. Lewis, in his research study, "A Pastoral Democracy," vividly describes the democratic process of decision-making adopted by the Somali pastoral bands in their shirs. He testifies in the following manner:

The informal Council (shir) summoned as need arises, at every order of segmentation, and attended by all the adult men, or their representatives chosen at smaller lineage group shirs, is the fundamental institution of government. It has no formal constitution except that of membership of the lineage concerned, no regular place or time of meeting and there are no official position on them. All men are councilors and all men politicians. Arguments are reached by majority decisions following the direction taken by the consensus of feeling at a meeting. Usually the participants sit in a rough circle in the "coffee shop" in a village or town. Where a large lineage with a male strength of several thousand is concerned, delegates may be chosen to represent each of the component lineages and sent to a central meeting place. Sometimes, however, all those concerned, even if they number several thousand, attend the council and form a large loose ring. Representatives may then be appointed for the smaller units and sent into the middle of the circle to thrash the matter out while their kinsmen sit listening in the outer ring. Men sit or squat on the ground at a shir and when they wish to speak often rise to their feet. Although there may be a great deal of argument and wrangling, all those present are expected to behave courteously and breaches of good manners may be punished.

The ad hoc council disposes of the collective business of a group. Here contracts are promulgated within dia-paying groups and between them, or they are rescinded; peace treaties are made, the decision to unite against another group is taken and an attack planned with the appointment of a battle leader; all these and other matters are dealt with by the shir.

In 1960, when Somalia gained independence from The United Kingdom and Italy, and achieved unity for its two parts, the North and South, a form of Western liberal democracy was introduced into the country’s political system. It proved to be a well-

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suited system for Somali culture and way of life. At that same time, western scholars showed a keen interest in the study of Somali affairs. Among these scholars were Saadia Touval who wrote on *Somali Nationalism*, 1963, and I.M. Lewis, the *Modern History of Somaliland*, 1961. Democratic practice did not last that long in Somalia, however. A military coup led by Major General Mohamed Siyad Barre, ended the democratic experience in Somalia on October 21, 1969. Since that time, the country did not regain the momentum to install a system of democratic practice.

Let us now ask the following relevant question, “what model of democracy Somalia should adopt?” There are a variety of democracy models that political scientists like David Held threw light on.¹ For Somalia, the most suitable model of future democracy may consist of a blend of the salient features of “Democratic Autonomy,” identified by David Held and the idea of “semi-direct democracy “highlighted by Alvin Toffler in his “Democratic Autonomy Model of Democracy.”² The following are the essential features of the model of democracy presented by David Held:

1. The rationale of this model is that individuals should be free and equal in the determination of the conditions of their own lives. They should enjoy equal rights and equal obligations to the extent that they should not transgress or violate the rights of others.

2. The principle of autonomy preserves ‘the ideal of active citizen’ which requires that people be reorganized as having the right and opportunity to act in public life. Citizens should be obliged to accept democratic principles in a variety of


circumstances unless it could be proved that their rights were violated by such decisions. But the obligations to be involved in all aspects of public life would not be a legal obligation. The right to a life of one’s own, within a framework of democratic autonomy, is indisputably important.

3. The principle of autonomy requires the rigorous pursuit of equality of conditions with respect to productive property; it certainly does not presuppose the rigorous pursuit of an ‘equal condition’ with respect to items we choose to consume in daily life.

4. People would come to have far greater opportunities to control the organization and institutions that directly affect their lives, and they would enjoy far more information and access to key regional or national power centers, than they do at present.

5. The enactment of the principle of autonomy would be based upon a process of “Double Democratization”- democracy at the level of the state as well as at the level of civic society.

The Second Public Policy Strategy: The Establishment of Administrative Effectiveness

A second significant policy strategy is the establishment of administrative effectiveness (ae). This entails an all around improvement in the efficiency and effectiveness of administrative work, execution of development projects and competent implementation of national policies in all sectors. To accomplish this fiat, all administrative functionaries and their support staff should be imbued with the
productivity norms of work ethics, duty, and cooperation in a the context of national culture of productivity.⁴

The Third Public Policy Strategy: The Development of a Sound System of Education

A third significant public policy strategy is the development of a sound system of education appropriate to the goals of national reconciliation. The term education does not stand merely for literacy and formal education. It encompasses a lot more than that. It strongly signifies the development of the nation’s human resources, and calls for the creation of a national resource base for knowledge, skills, productivity techniques, and all other areas essential for national reconstruction. The requirements for meeting this standard include the establishment of a long-term educational planning ranging from primary and secondary education to vocational training, research and development and higher education in all areas deemed essential for Somalia’s rehabilitation needs.

The collapse of Somalia’s educational system constitutes a societal emergency, which will constrain economic development for decades. The country now faces the prospect of three “lost generations” with little education or training to shoulder productive roles and leadership responsibilities in the future. Somalia’s public education system had already virtually seized functioning in the mid-1980s. A second-plus generation of young people has lost access to education over a decade-plus period of statelessness from the 1990s. The loss of this “human capital” has enormous costs both to individual households and to a society geared to rebuilding a shattered economy and governmental institutions to manage it.

Traditionally, oral education has been important for Somali education for centuries and this education is consistent with the values, norms and interests of the traditional pastoralists. This included domestic skills, livestock management, trading, as well as the skills required or survival on the land and for protection against warring parties. Formal school systems in the style and language of colonial were established reluctantly and in piecemeal in both the British and Italian colonial Administrations only in the second half of the twentieth century. However, Islamic schools that taught the Quran and the Arabic language were in existence as far back as the 19th century before the arrival of colonialism in the area. The colonial administrations expedited school construction and enrollment of elementary and primary education as the independence movement accelerated at a rapid pace. The purpose of this fact-paced educational program was to ensure that an educated cadre of Somali nationals was available to administer the country at independence. In 1960, the Republic of Somalia inherited 233 primary and 12 secondary schools of varying origins and in different languages. The perception of value of formal education suffered under the Siyad Barre regime. In the past, formal education was seen as the key prerequisite for civil service employment. By the 1980s, however, well educated Somalis working in the civil service or at the university were paid so little that they were hard pressed to sustain their nuclear families financial needs. At the same time, many less educated individuals were appointed to higher positions and became prosperous due to close clan connections in high places.

Revival of educational facilities commenced in early 1993 when communities and teachers began reopening schools primarily in urban areas. UN agencies such as UNESCO, UNHCR, UNOPS, and UNICEF, and international NGOs all took some sort
of initiatives to assist these local efforts. The initiatives included reprinting basic primary school textbooks, teacher training, and providing basic school supplies through much of the country. These organizations were able to rehabilitate some buildings and provided supervision and support to the educational programs. The World Food Program provided food incentives for teachers of registered primary schools in some areas. At the peak of these initiatives and programs, it was reported that a total of 165,000 children enrolled in 465 schools.5

Just a year later in 1995, the situation was dramatically reversed, and enrollment declined as the level of external donor assistance began to diminish and food incentives terminated. By 1997, there were a very small number of children attending school in Somalia at a level above grade 8, an estimated total of fewer than 2,000 children.

The Fourth Public Policy Strategy: The Creation of Community-Oriented Health-care

The fourth most significant public policy strategy is the creation of a community-oriented health care system. Health is defined as a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity. Health care is a fundamental human right and the attainment of the highest level of health is the most important social goal. To achieve this state of health, it is essential to develop a system of primary health care based on practical, scientifically sound and easily accessible to individuals and families in the community.

Before 1990, Somalia committed itself to improving its health services under the auspices of the World Health Organization’s “Health for all by the year 2000” program of

primary health care. Development plans were drawn up for basic health services that were to focus on rural and nomadic populations. The health care delivery system then consisted of 411 health posts, 94 maternal and child health centers, 50 primary health care units, 52 district ambulatory care centers, 19 regional hospitals, 4 general hospitals, and 17 generalized hospitals. Almost all health care provided in pre-war Somalia were either heavily or completely subsidized by external sources thus raising concern of its long-term sustainability.

A large percentage of these facilities were, however, neither functional nor operated at reasonable levels due the government’s poor economic management and emerging security problems. The distribution and mix of the health care facilities and programs that existed did not follow population distribution patterns. Most health care facilities concentrated in Mogadiscio. These shortcomings manifested themselves in very poor health care indicators in the country. Even in the pre-war era, Somalia ranked near the bottom of the world in many basic health indicators, such as infant mortality rates and life expectancy.

**Health Indicators in Somalia**

Evidence of Somalia’s enduring health care crisis is borne out by incomplete but still revealing statistics tracking basic health indicators. The Somali status of health care presented here is based on pre-war and more recent data. The pre-war data has been augmented by World Health Organization Study completed in 1994.

Life expectancy at birth is estimated at 43-46 years for the period 1995-1997. Even in 1990, Somali’s life expectancy of 48 years was nearly three years lower than the average

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7 Somalis 1999 Human Development Report, Ibid.
of 50.9 for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) as a whole in 1993 (1996 UNDP HDR). Infant mortality was around 129 per 1000 life births in 1990. This was much greater than the average for SSA in 1993 (97 per 1000 life births). Maternal Mortality rate was 1,600 per 100,000. The comparative figures for Kenya were almost a third of that: 600. Please see Table 2 below.

**TABLE 2. Infant under 5 and Maternal Mortality Rates for Somalia and other countries in the region**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>IMR  (rate per 1,000)</th>
<th>U5MR (rate per 1,000)</th>
<th>MMR  (rate per 100,000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>196/160</td>
<td>770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Somalia-UNICEF/WHO estimates; other countries-State of the World’s Children, 1997*

Estimates indicate that only 10% of infants are immunized and about less than 10% are attended to by trained personnel either during pregnancy or child birth according to UNICEF estimates in 1997/98. The main causes of maternal death are bleeding after child birth, prolonged and obstructed labor, infections and enclampsia. Poor antenatal delivery and postnatal care, and the extremely limited availability of emergency obstetric referral care for birth complications, result in high rates of mortality and disability.

The main causes of death, illness, and chronic disability among infants and children, according to UNICEF, are diarrheal diseases, respiratory infections and malaria. Malaria is seasonal in the northern regions, but hyper-endemic, year-round problem in the Southern riverine areas.
What is needed in Somalia is the introduction of Community Oriented Primary Care (COPC). This is a system of health care approach that that uses epidemiological and clinical skills in a complimentary fashion to tailor programs to meet the particular health needs of a defined population. This approach applies the methods of clinical medicine, epidemiology, social sciences, health services research and evaluation to the following tasks:

* Defining and characterizing the community
* Identifying community health problems
* Modifying programs to address these problems
* Monitoring the effectiveness of the program modification.

In approaches to measuring the attainment of primary care, community orientation is considered a "derivative" feature, in the sense that it would derive from a high level of attainment of the unique features of primary care.

In the process of achieving a high degree of longitudinality of care, a sound program should be able to define the Somali individuals and communities that are eligible for care, and the type of care needed, costs, and accessibility. The population would be mad aware that the program assumed responsibility for its health services.

The second step in achieving community oriented primary care is achieved when the program itself in its quest for ultimate comprehensiveness, identifies community problems and recognizes the health needs of its clientele, including those who rarely appear for care. Documentation and registration responsibilities should assist in this endeavor. The third and fourth steps-modifying the health care program to fit the needs of an emerging society and developing a monitoring instruments for its effectiveness in such
an environment, is closely in line with the requirements of longitudinality and comprehensiveness variables.

**Utilizing Traditional Practices in Primary Health Care**

The lack of adequate financial resources to purchase drugs from overseas and the scarcity of professional personnel to administer them makes it almost essential for the Somali people revert to the old ancient and culture-bound health care practices that existed before the application of modern science to health affairs. The traditional medical systems and folklore practices have been utilized an alternative to modern medicine. The pastoral, nomadic nature of the majority of the Somalis makes it appropriate for the application of traditional health care practices. The practice of traditional medicine, which has been out of favor since the introduction of modern medicine into the country, is now gaining ground in popularity not only in Somalia but in other parts of the world, including the West. The traditional medicines practiced in Somalia, the Sudan and Egypt are known to have curative effects that have yet to be analyzed and marketed properly. We need to provide the necessary monitoring and evaluation for the use of these drugs and their effectiveness to heal the sick.

Finally, we have to urge the government ministry of health to undertake the following program guidelines:

* Reinforce collaboration with other ministries and agencies to reinforce the concept that health determinants include social, economic, environmental, and other factors that may be the concern of those agencies.
* Decentralize the operations of the ministry and ensure local participation and control of services, and involve communities in the planning and implementation process of health plans targeted in their communities.

* Increase resource mobilization efforts.

* Emphasize health education and communication at all levels of services.

**The Fifth Public Policy Strategy: Organizing a Growth-oriented Economy**

A fifth public policy strategy is economic growth (eg). Economic growth is enhanced in part by reduced politico-military expenditures. These funds can be freed for investment purposes. In the past, a significant portion of the Somali budget was earmarked for military expenditures, and no funds were made available for investment in the country’s agriculture, industry, transportation, and communications. That policy should never be allowed to take root in the country again. What is needed is to design an economic plan that encourages higher inflow of external resources, improved administrative efficiency and development of human resources. This implies a strategy of development based on the nation’s natural resources, available stock of domestic capabilities and skills. A self-sustained process of growth should be the ultimate goal. This economic growth will be led by the primary sector (agriculture, livestock, fisheries, etc). This sector of the economy and the infrastructure represented by power, transport, ports, communications, etc., should receive a priority attention in investments and rehabilitation.

There are certain problems in dealing with the country’s natural environment that should be taken care of early in any reconstruction plans. Somalia’s main productive activity, livestock herding, is sharply limited by the semi-arid environment and cannot be
easily expanded without the risk of environmental degradation. The main environmental problems of the country today are in the areas of rangeland degradation, deforestation, the depletion of wildlife resources, desertification, marine pollution and the damage to marine life through illegal fishing and over fishing by foreign vessels.

The main immediate environmental issue in Somalia today is the availability of water resources. In most parts of the country, water has always been a scarce commodity, but the problem has been aggravated of late by the destruction and looting of water supply installations for major cities, and the general lack of proper maintenance. These problems have been further compounded by erratic rainfall patterns that cause both draught and floods. Accurate data on overall access to water resources is not available at present for much of the country. It is estimated that less than 5% of the population can readily access to safe drinking water throughout the year.

Water availability has always been a major issue in Somalia. Competition for water and the livelihood options that derive from the control of water are deeply ingrained in Somali life and culture. Water is a precious resource to be owned and jealously defended by families, lineages and clans. Every developed water source is owned by some one or a group of people. Historically, there has been chronic shortage of water in Somalia and this has been exacerbated by the continuing conflict. The following activities and programs could foster economic growth and development in post-conflict Somali state:

* The introduction of viable financial instruments, such as credit schemes, insurance plans, savings and loan centers. These instruments, which are now
lacking in Somalia could spur the pace of economic development, and bring about stability and legitimacy to the financial system as a whole.

* Creation of a national banking system anchored by a National Central Bank and other financial intermediaries that could facilitate money exchanges, transfer of funds, as well as serving as a reservoir of investment funds, and saving of assets, both public and private.

* Establishment of regulatory bodies, advisory councils, and "Think Tanks" to Regulate and monitor both public and private entities and to ensure compliance with rules and regulations in place.

* The creation of a task force to find ways and means of raising funds for the nation's development plans. Sources of such funding may include the Somali Diaspora in the Middle East, Western Europe and North America.

* Conducting plans to redirect foreign aid received by government agencies to investment projects in the agro-pastoral sector of the economy, and de-emphasizing investments in manufacturing which has had an unsatisfactory rate of return in past plans.

**The Sixth Public Policy Strategy: Achieving Self-Sufficiency in Food**

The sixth most significant public policy strategy is to attain a satisfactory level of self-sufficiency in food. The country has been traditionally well-supplied in meat and milk, but the local production of other needed staples such a rice, tea, and sugar had to be imported from overseas in ever increasing amounts. The new agricultural policy of the country should lay added emphasis in the production of these commodities.
In order to maintain a healthy environment for livestock breeding, the following measures should be implemented as a policy imperative:

* Updating laws and regulations pertaining to the health of livestock, and provision of government inspection services to detect the incidence of disease before an outbreak occurs.
* Training and licensing of veterinary workers through government funds.
* Establishment of an epidemiological services unit for data collection, monitoring and evaluation of livestock health.

**The Seventh Public Policy Strategy: Identifying Charismatic Leadership**

The seventh most significant public policy strategy is the leadership factor (ldf) of the government. Leadership depends on the attributes of charisma and empathy. It should have the capacity to imbue the people with a sense of vision and foresight. In order to accomplish the difficult task of nation-building ahead, the leadership itself requires the inner resources of strength of character, deep commitment to Somali values and ideals, and a highly empathic understanding of the needs and aspirations of the people. Since every clan represents groups of people related to each other through lineages and extended families, they organize themselves and call for a ‘shir’ when they have to confirm their new leader who may be variously called Chief, Sultan, Aqil, Ugas, Seel Daje Wabar, Islan or Lalaq, etc. Before being selected, the candidate for leadership has to prove his qualifications for the position in terms of having the qualities of respect, honesty, truthfulness, justice, love for his people, and be already known for his capacity

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for leadership and good conduct. The leaders are also expected to demonstrate their mastery of “xeer.”

Dedicated and visionary national leaders serve as examples and teachers of their people. Strong public leadership cannot be exercised in an environment fraught with corruption and administrative malfeasance. Somali leadership should operate in a manner beyond to accomplish the task of creating a harmonious, civil, transparent political environment. The state should safeguard the rights and liberties of citizens who are ultimately the best judge of their own interests. The state has to be accountable for all its actions and activities in order to win the trust and support of a population in a post-conflict recovery and under an enormous political and social stress. Some signs of internal strains in the form of parochial loyalties and interests, regional and clan animosities are very much in evidence in the current Somali situation. They are aggravated by the nation’s economic difficulties. The new leadership should embark on a wide-spread program of civic education and moral regeneration of the citizens of Somalia. The emerging leadership should instill in the young the virtues of patriotism, devotion to high ideals of public service, and in doing so set themselves as an example of non-clan-based, cooperative, fair dealers for all the communities in the country.

The Somali Joint Needs Assessment, Reconstruction and Development Program Formation of the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI) in 2004, together with the drive and resourcefulness of the Somali people, began opportunities for recovery, reconstruction, and development goals. In response to this opportunity, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the International Community requested the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) and the World Bank (WB) to co-lead and prepare
for a Somali Joint Needs Assessment (JNA). In the last couple of years, a series of consultations were held Somali authorities, Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), research groups and the private sector. These consultation conferences were conducted in Nairobi, Hargeysa, Garowe, and Jowhar.\(^9\) To ensure ownership and participation of Somali stakeholders, workshops were organized in Hargeysa and Nairobi to identify and discuss priority needs and areas of intervention, as well as the JNA methodology to be adopted.\(^10\)

The objective of this Joint Assessment was to help Somalia begin to achieve sustained reconstruction and development and cement the peace process on a firmer ground. This fiat is accomplished by a process of enhancing cooperation between Somali and international experts in an effort to assess needs and develop priority strategies to achieve reconstruction and development and reinforce peace building. This plan also serves as an instrument for mobilizing, distributing and coordinating international recovery assistance.

The JNA was carried out in parallel with Somali efforts to establish the TFG, the work of regional organizations, in particular the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the African Union (AU), the European Community (EC), as well as the wider international community that has become more proactively engaged on the Somali issue. This collaborative endeavor resulted in the October 2004 donor meeting hosted by Sweden. At this conference, a Draft Declaration of Principles was agreed upon

\(^9\) Two joint UNDP-WB missions took place from 19 March to 2 April and from 2 till 19 May 2005.

to guide assistance from the donor community.\textsuperscript{11} The following is the proposal agreed upon:

- implement a Rapid Assistance Program (RAP);
- launch preparations for a longer term Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP),\textsuperscript{12}
- Collaborate to prepare and convene an international donor conference; and
- Jointly address humanitarian crisis situations, in coordination with the programming for the RAP and the RDP.

The Declaration of Principles was subsequently signed between TFG and the UN in early 2005, and the Coordination and Monitoring Committee was established consisting of key national, regional, and international stakeholders.

Somalia has also been identified as a Low Income Country Under Stress (LICUS) by the World Bank and receives limited funding through the Post-Conflict and LICUS trust funds.\textsuperscript{13} In this context, the World Bank has assumed a leadership role in conducting a conflict analysis of the country for the sake of comprehending the sources and dynamics of conflict in Somalia and to bring conflict sensitivity in program delivery.\textsuperscript{14} Regional organizations play a considerable role in the on-going Somali peace and reconstruction processes. The AU Peace and Security Council authorized on 12 May

\textsuperscript{11}Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 22 October 2004.

\textsuperscript{12}The agreement to launch preparations for the RDP provides the background to the subsequent request from the IC and the TFG to the UN and WB to co-lead the Somali Joint Needs Assessment.

\textsuperscript{13}A joint World Bank-UNDP re-engagement strategy is focusing on: (1) macro-economic data analysis and dialogue; (2) the livestock and meat (productive) sectors; (3) a strategic HIV/AIDS action plan; and (4) capacity building through skills development and training centers.

2005 the deployment of an IGAD Peace support Mission (IGASOM) to Somalia, and the Council of Ministers of the Arab League has offered financial support to the yet formed transitional federal Institutions (TFI). International NGOs also play a significant role in the provision of humanitarian relief and other essential social services.

**Opportunities**

In these difficult times, the Somali people have shown commitment to rebuilding their lives, and are posed to overcoming the odds that hindered their progress over the past two decades. In many areas of the country, an active civil society and community-based organizations are delivering basic social services. Womens' organizations have emerged in many towns and villages for the support of the peace process. Traditional conflict resolution mechanisms are being increasingly utilized to maintain order and stability in the absence of governmental organizations. In both Somaliland and Puntland, NGOs and the local governments are providing schools, social and health services often with the support and collaboration of donor and international organizations, such as UNESCO and UNICEF.

There are considerable untapped economic resources in Somalia today. These resources are in fisheries, livestock and agriculture. The country has one of the best fish resources in the world but limited experience and infrastructure hamper exploitation at commercial level. This could be remedied with outside help and together with sound and sustainable rangeland management, Somalia's livestock and fish industries can be a major source of foreign exchange needed for economic expansion.

At present, there continues to be a strong, genuine support among the international community that is engaged in Somalia, regional organizations and the
Somali stakeholders for collaboration within the technical framework of the Joint Needs Assessment (JNA). The JNA provides a unique opportunity for the reconstruction of Somalia. The following is a vision statement provided in Joint Needs Assessment framework. Consultations with Somali stakeholders and other interested parties, the United Nations-World Bank team focused on the following key vision statements for the 2006-2010 period:

- To regain Somalia’s full membership in the international community;
- To establish peace and security;
- To foster reconciliation and unity at all levels of Somali community;
- To promote democracy, good governance, the rule of law, and human rights for all Somalis;
- To develop effective, transparent and accountable institutions at all levels;
- To establish a rapidly growing free market economy by strengthening the productive sectors, improving infrastructure and developing a macro-economic framework;
- To provide essential basic services and social protection, and create livelihoods through community-driven development programs; and
- To reverse the regression in attaining the Millennium Development goals.

Priority Clusters and Cross-Cutting Issues

As a result of the vision statement outlined above and the outcome of extensive consultations among national and international experts, as well as drawing on the

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15 JNA-Somali Reconstruction and Development Framework, United Nations & World Bank Coordination Secretariat, P.O. Box 28832, Nairobi, Kenya.
experience from other needs assessment programs, the priority needs are grouped into six proposed clusters and three cross-cutting themes. The following are the six proposed clusters:

1. Governance, safety and the rule of law
2. Macro-economic policy framework and data development
3. Infrastructure
4. Social services and protection of vulnerable groups
5. Productive sectors and the environment

The experts who designed the needs assessment framework also identified the following three cross-cutting issues:

* Peace-building, reconciliation, and conflict prevention;

* Capacity building and institutional development (public and private) plus anti-corruption initiatives; and

* Gender parity and human rights.

Other issues decided in the plan include issues that address in a detailed fashion the implementation of the Joint Needs Assessment (JNA).

The economic program reviewed here will, if implemented in a timely fashion, go a long way towards the rehabilitation of Somalia. The plan is currently in its initial phase, and we have to wait patiently for a while before we render judgment on its feasibility and intended impact.
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

The focus of this study was an analysis of the Somali conflict that has, over the past decade and a half, perplexed the imagination of all those "good intentioned people" the world over who have tried to bring sanity to the chaotic situation. The Somali conflict is indeed a complex one that has its roots in long-standing disputes over grazing land and water resources. These are vital to the survival of all the nomadic communities in this country. In prior periods, these conflicting interests were often resolved peacefully through the good offices of clan leaders who marshaled powers of persuasion and compromise using the Xeer as a mechanism for dispute resolution, and resorted to the rule of Sharia where applicable. Those good old days of peace and tranquility are past and replaced by the rule of militiamen and their warlords who are not bound by any rules or regulations in an anarchic environment. The warlords are not the only actors in this complex web of conflict dynamics in this Horn of Africa nation. There are other interested parties in the conflict, and we discuss their relative roles and interests here.

The first actors in the conflict are the warlords mentioned above. These leaders of lawless gangs who victimize the defenseless populations in the Somali cities and towns proved to be a new breed of power brokers who have in certain respects practically replaced the institutions of the collapsed state, and established their own centers of power and influence, and they are answerable to no one outside their own
organization. These forces became a serious challenge to all efforts aimed at rebuilding the state and its institutions. This state of affairs continued unabated for most part of the decade and a half following the ouster of Siyad Barre’s regime in early 1991. It became impossible for the law-abiding citizens of the country to counteract these negative forces and rebuild the country.

The second group of actors is comprised of religious coalitions of fighters who are determined to rule the country by the Sharia law. The military wing of this group is the powerful al-Sabab who are about to take over the Capital of Somalia any day now following the retreat of Ethiopian forces from the country in the beginning of 2009.

A third actor in the Somali conflict dynamics is the United States. After 9/11, the U.S. State Department added Somalia to the list of states sponsoring terrorism. They reasoned that al-Qaeda would find a sympathetic ear in a lawless, anarchic environment like the one prevailing in Mogadiscio, the capital of Somalia. In the midst of Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia in December of 2006, the U.S. used its airpower to bomb the retreating ICU forces, thereby causing heavy collateral damage to civilian populations in the target area. One of the casualties of this aerial bombardment was ICU military leader Adan Hashi, nicknamed “Irro.”

A fourth factor in the Somali conflict is the State of Eritrea which sided with the Somali religious movement, and provided them a base of operations. The Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict is interlinked with the U.S. Concerns on terrorism. The U.S. Central Command has a base in neighboring Djibouti, who has a growing border dispute with Eritrea, as Ethiopia also does. It is not difficult to understand the concern of Eritrea, which has been left in the cold by the U.S. policy in the Horn. To make them noticed,
Eritrea decided to play the role of a spoiler in the Somali dispute by hosting the most extreme wing of the ICU group headed by Sheikh Aweyes. To update our understanding of the dynamics of the Horn of Africa conflict, we have to note that Ethiopia and Eritrea fought a brutal border war from 1998 to 2000, and that there has been an unfinished business of implementing the agreements leading to the cease-fire. The frustration felt by the Eritreans lead them to support dissident movements both in Somalia and Ethiopia. The political and military support Eritrea is now providing al-Shabab militia is enormous. This has enabled this movement to weather the storm in tough times, and keep on fighting a guerrilla-style war in various parts of Somalia. At present they control most parts of the South, including Baidoa, the seat of the TFG.

Somalia’s neighbors, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti were uncomfortable about the lawlessness, refugee inflow into their territories, and the constant banditry and illegal operations along their borders with Somalia. They felt they could not remain unconcerned about these developments, and had to act in unison to resolve the issue and bring about a functioning administration. There have been a total of 14 attempts at reconciliation. The conferences were variously held in the three neighboring countries, and Egypt. The last two of these efforts resulted in the formation of Transitional Somali Governments. The first conference was held at Arta, Djibouti, from March until August, 2000, and the second one was held in Mbagathi first, and then moved to the sister city of Nairobi, Kenya, for over a period of two years (October 2002-October 2004). Both of these conferences were attended by hundreds of Somalis of various clans, organizations, and interests. The first of the two conferences produced a Transitional National Government with an executive and legislative branch of government. This
TNG was installed in Mogadiscio, Somalia in October, 2000. However, due to fierce opposition of warlords and lack of support from the public and international community, this TNG could not function as had been anticipated, and eventually became powerless and redundant. This paved the way for the second all-Somali conference in Kenya. It took over a two-year period of negotiations to reach an agreement over a National Constitution, a unicameral legislature, and executive branch headed by a president, and a prime minister.

It took more than six months for the TFG to relocate from Kenya where it has been established to a temporary seat in Somalia. The reason for the delay was concern for the safety and security of the new government members, who had no police or military forces to guarantee their safety in a land governed by war lords and clan chiefs who have not fully supported the new TFG. Mogadiscio was considered unsafe. It was under the control of various private militias, with their own fiefdoms and power centers. After a long wait in Kenya, the TFG reached a decision to move to the town of Jowhar, 60 miles west of the capital, and under the protection of Mohamed Dhere, the Governor of the town. The TFG remained in that town for a considerable period of time, but had no power to govern or legislate. Finally, there was another move to a different city, Baydoa, where members of government felt relative safety. A protection force was organized, including a significant armed force from Puntland, the president’s home province.

In the city of Mogadiscio, matters got worse. Violence continued to escalate as there was more deaths of innocent civilians and destruction of property. This led to a power struggle between the forces of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and a coalition of
forces of a number of warlords. The latter had the support of the United States. The clash resulted in heavy casualties and both sides suffered tremendously, but the undisputed winner of this contest were the ICU forces. They soon claimed the right to rule the city of Mogadiscio and a large part of Southern and central Somalia, the most populous areas of the country.

In their six months of glory, the ICU managed to restore a sense of peace and tranquility. They installed a firm, law and order system which was ostensibly based on the teachings of the Sharia. They banned the consumption of Quat, a mildly narcotic substance chewed by Somalis during their socializing hours. They closed down movie theatres, and internet coffee houses. The death sentence was imposed on the crimes murder, and public lashing of adulterers was decreed. The reaction to the ICU rule was mixed. There were those who commended the new rulers for their tough stand against warlords, and cleansing the capital city of thugs and criminals. There were also those who did not appreciate the tough stand taken by the new force that disrupted their normal, every day routine of chewing quat and watching movies.

Soon after their ascendancy to power, the Islamists developed a dislike for the presence of the TFG and their close association with Ethiopia, an arch enemy of Somalia. The ICU wanted to be the uncontested center of power and did not welcome the idea of power sharing with any, particularly with the TFG. The presence of the TFG in the town of Baidoa and their close relations with Ethiopian authorities became a matter of great concern with the ICU leadership. Contacts between the two sides were minimal. That is despite the fact that the Arab Union made two efforts to mediate the two sides in the Sudanese capital. My understanding is that neither side really sought to
enter into a dialogue with the other. The delegations that reached Khartoum, the Sudanese capital did not meet face to face on either of the two occasions that they happened to be in the same city. There was a deadlock. Both the TFG and ICU claimed to be in charge of the affairs of the state. While the ICU presence was felt in most of the Southern regions of Somalia, the TFG center of power and presence was limited to the town of Baidoa and its immediate environs where their forces could patrol from time to time.

In order to overcome the dominance of ICU and to expand the territory under their control, the TFG contacted the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) of which it is a member and requested the deployment of the African peacekeeping force that had been promised to them two years earlier to pacify the country and provided added muscle to their relatively young and inexperienced militia. The ICU leadership got a wind of that TFG move and they were not pleased. As a countermeasure, The ICU planned a series of subversive activities against the TFG in Baidoa. On one occasion, an attempt was made while President Abdillahi Yusuf Ahmed was leaving the parliamentary building. His entourage was attacked just as he sat in his car. The bomb that was meant for him exploded, but he was unharmed. However, a number of his security detail, including his brother, lost their lives in the ambush.

From there on, matters got worse between the two sides and they started preparations for an armed conflict. The ICU continued harassing the TFG and preparing their supporters for an anticipated violent conflict. The TFG mended fences with the Ethiopian government and obtained assurances from prime minister, Meles Senawi for a guaranteed military support, if war breaks out between them and the ICU. The situation
rapidly deteriorated as the ICU threatened to take action against the Ethiopian and support them that was training the TFG militia. The day of reckoning finally arrived, and the military skirmishes started around the middle of October. The Ethiopian Government committed a sizable military force complete with tanks and air support to this engagement. After about a week, the battle was over. The Islamist forces were routed by the combined task force of the Somali TFG and the Ethiopian army. This new force replaced the ICU as the authority in the capital of Mogadiscio. The ICU forces fled south towards the Kenyan border with the Ethiopian army in hot pursuit. Some of the fleeing forces were killed or captured, and others made to the Kenyan border where they were apprehended by Kenyan authorities.

The historical backdrop to the animosities prevalent in the situation has been highlighted. These include political as well as social factors, namely, issues of unresolved power-sharing in previous governments following the country’s independence, regional and clan equality in representation, conflicts emanating from different colonial legacies, varying dynamics of state modernization, cold war superpower competition for client states, and government’s repressive dictatorial policies and practices. The long-standing conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia over the Haud province in current Ethiopia that led to border wars in 1964 and 1977/78, and the strained relations between Kenya and Somalia over the issue of the Northern Frontier Districts of Kenya (NFD) in 1964-1967, further placed undue stress on the young, fragile state of Somalia. The most devastating stressors that eventually fragmented the country and resulted in large scale clan warfare, refugee problems,
population displacement and famines is the prolonged rule of Mohamed Siyad Barre (1969-1991).

While the eventual ouster of this octogenarian despot was a welcome development and a great achievement of the militias that fought him, it did not put to an end to his legacy of “divide and rule.” Soon after his departure from Mogadishu, the victorious militias that had overthrown Siyad Barre, began their own pitched battles for control of power. The power struggle concerned two Hawiye family clan strongmen, General Mohamed Farah Aideed of the Haber Gidir sub-clan and businessman Ali Mahdi of the Abgal sub-clan.

Matters were made worse by the atrocities committed by the retreating Siyad Barre forces that resorted to “scorched earth” practices on their route to southwest Somalia, a Marehan territory. They devastated the agricultural communities in the inter-riverine region, taking property by force, killing innocent farmers, and intimidating the entire population forcing many of the best farmers in the country to flee the country and cross the border into Kenya. This area has long been known as the bread basket of the country producing sizable amounts of food for the domestic market, and excess produce for overseas market. Soon after the farming community was displaced, food shortages were reported through much of the south of the country. It did not take long before the region was gripped by a devastating famine that eventually resulted in over 300,000 people dead.

In the last months of 1991, the situation became so bad that the Western press published of starving women and children. CNN was particularly effective in raising viewer’s sympathy and concerns about horrifying pictures of human misery. This had
an impact on American public opinion who called their representatives demanding an immediate intervention. Congress began to hold hearings on the matter, and called for an airlift of food supplies. As this was undertaken as an emergency matter, a problem of security for the delivery of supplies was encountered. Militiamen who had no feelings of humanitarian concerns hijacked much of the supplies and diverted them to the open market for profiteering.

The Western, particularly American, Non-governmental agencies in the field in Somalia pressured the Bush Administration for protection, and the deployment of US troops to guard the humanitarian supplies as they are transported across the country to the needy, hungry Somalis. After a long process of evaluation and debate within the Administration and in Congress, President Bush finally embarked on the task of deploying up to 28,000 US men and women to undertake Operation Restore Hope. Operation Restore Hope was a new direction in international engagement for the United States. Neither a traditional peacekeeping mission nor a textbook military undertaking, it sought to combine elements of each for a rapid and productive venture. Operation Restore Hope had to coordinate their operations with a United Nations force of 10,500-strong consisting of elements from 21 nations.

The multi-national intervention mentioned above faced some problems on the ground. The greatest loss of human life involved the battleground casualties of 18 men from a special elite Delta force. As soon as this news hit home, President Clinton decided to call the US forces home. Contingents from other nations followed suit, and the international intervention was declared closed. Somalis were left to themselves and soon fighting started to resume in the capital and other areas. The warring factions are
still in continual battle, and no international interventions have been resumed since 1995 when Operation Restore Hope was abandoned by the Americans.

On the political front, the international community remained active on the Somali scene. From 1991, a series of mediations forums have been hosted by Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Egypt. Two of these conferences were large enough to accommodate hundreds of Somali politicians, warlords, intellectuals, civic society activists, etc. The first of these was held in Arta, Djibouti from March to October 2000. A Transitional National Government was inaugurated at the end of the conference, and members of that group relocated to Mogadishu soon after. However, due to strong, armed opposition from the city’s warlords, the TNG has failed to gain legitimacy from the Somali public and the international community which withheld recognition.

The second national conference was hosted by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), where Somalia is a member. The conference was started in October 2002 and continued in session negotiating day in and day out until a parliament and president were elected for Somalia in October, 2004. The president Abdillahi Yusuf Ahmed nominated Ali Mohamed Ghedi as prime minister to form a cabinet. That cabinet was approved by parliament in November of that same year. The TFG has remained powerless inside Somalia until today. The days ahead may offer them a chance to prove their muscle with the help of the Ethiopian army, and other African peacekeeping forces soon to be deployed. It is my opinion that no permanent solution to the Somali conflict will result from the use of force. The conflict can be handled by political means through dialogue and negotiation among all Somalia’s disparate communities and regions. In this study, I have outlined five conflict resolution models
to be utilized in finding a durable solution to the Somali conflict. The following are those five models:

1. Accommodate Existing Forces
2. Encourage New Institutions
3. Cybernetic Model of National Society systems
5. Track-Two Approaches To Conflict Resolution

Of the five models outlined above, the Home-Grown, Traditional Conflict Mechanisms Model appears the most promising. This is a brand of conflict management that has been utilized by the Somali people for generations. It is tied in with the “Xeer,” a customary law founded on prior clan treaties and precedents that govern disputes among feuding clans and sub-clans. This model has been utilized in the negotiations process for the creation of Somaliland as an independent entity in May of 1991. The clans that are bound by the agreement are those that reside in Somaliland proper, namely, the Isaacs, and the Dir sub-clans of Gada Bursi, and Easa. The Darode sub-clans of Warsangelli, and Dulbahante, are not part of this arrangement. They opted to unite with their Darode cousins in Puntland. The agreement to establish Somaliland was implemented successfully. There are executive and legislative branches of government, and all disputes among the constituent parties of the coalition are resolved through negotiations. In case there is a dispute over the allocation of resources among the “districts” in the entity, I would recommend that model #3, the cybernetic model of the National society systems with its sound analytical and economics approach be utilized.
This approach has the capability to provide unique professional guidelines to resolve discrepancies in resource allocation, a potential trigger for conflict.

I have also outlined six major policy parameters to be prioritized by a new Somali administration, including peacemaking and conflict resolution, economic growth, a new agenda for educational development, etc. I would also suggest that the federal system of government agreed upon by the delegates to the conference in Nairobi in 2004 should be reorganized on the basis of federalism. That means creating more “Puntlands” or sovereign entities within a system of federalism. The current state of Puntland in northeast Somalia could be considered a model for the establishment of any number of states decided upon by the new Transitional National government, currently based in Magadiscio. The international community is needed to provide financial and technical assistance to the country for the next five years at least.

The issue of the break-away region of Somaliland should be tackled later rather than sooner to minimize the outbreak of a new civil war. The Somaliland leadership should be approached firmly but fairly and assured that human rights abuses will not be tolerated in the new Somalia, and that all efforts will be made to guarantee social justice for all Somalis. The task of rebuilding and rehabilitating Somalia is a difficult one that needs leadership with foresight, diligence and charisma. We hope such leadership will be realized soon in the future. It was only a week ago that a conference attended by members of all Somali clans and sub-clans was satisfactorily concluded in the capital. It was agreed in that conference that national elections for president, and parliament would be held in two years, and the power transferred to that democratically-elected national government, hopefully in the fall of 2009, if all goes well. The international
community is urged to offer its financial and moral support to that effort. Research has yielded the following recommendations to achieve long lasting peace and security in Somalia:

1. Governance. The Somali people have been subjected to heavy handed abuses of power for too long a period that they cannot take any more injustices from their rulers. It is therefore essential to establish rule of law that punishes the guilty and rewards those who decide to earn an honest living in a free society. There has to be equality of opportunity, and respect for human rights.

2. Resources. Competition among clan and sub-clan groups over access and control of water and grazing lands has been a trigger of violent conflict in many parts of the country in recent decades. To bring order and stability to these areas, reconciliation mechanisms should be developed with the help of traditional Authorities. Clashes over crop production, grazing lands, and use of water-points, have been the common sources of conflict. De-escalating conflicts may include such measures as opening up negotiating opportunities to settle disputes of land and property that has changed hands in a violent, unjust manner. The rewards for all parties should be the creation of a peaceful environment and long-lasting tranquility for their respective communities and families.

3. De-militarization. The proliferation of all sorts of armaments had the effect of encouraging warfare among clans and sub-clans. Small-scale conflicts were turned into more lethal warfare. This further enhanced the
militarization of society where violence became an accepted norm and guns became the means of dispute resolution. We should therefore try our best to ensure complete demilitarization of society. This task should be considered a top priority.

4. International cooperation. A positive contribution from the international Community is called for. The country needs financial resources and technical assistance to survive in the face daunting difficulties ahead. The European Union and the oil-rich Gulf States should take the lead in this task.
APPENDIX A

A Map of Somalia
APPENDIX B

SOMALI LEADERS’ RECONCILIATION AGREEMENT IN NAIROBI, KENYA IN 2004

The following are the agreed upon Declaration of Hostilities, Structures and principles of the Somali National Reconciliation Process:

WE, the undersigned,

GUIDED by the common desire of the people of Somalia for peace;

AWARE of the prevailing poverty of the Somali people and their humanitarian needs;

DESIRING to bring an end to the continuing conflict in Somalia;

COMMITTED to the improvement of regional security for all Somalis and the regional states;

WELCOMING the commitment of the international community to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia;

APPRECIATING the leading role of IGAD Frontline States (Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya) in this process;

APPRECIATING further the efforts of the international community in promoting national reconciliation in Somalia;

ACKNOWLEDGING that the Somali Authorities have the primary responsibility for ensuring the well-being of civilians in Somalia;

HEREBY SOLEMONLY UNDERTAKE, the FOLLOWING COMMITMENTS:

Article 1: Federalism

1) To create federal governance structures for Somalia, embodied in a Charter or Constitution which are inclusive, representative and acceptable to all the parties
2) To endorse the principle of decentralization as an integral part of Somalia’s governance structures

3) To ensure the rights, representation and protection of all Somali individuals and groups

Article 2: Cessation of Hostilities

1) To abstain from the conduct of hostilities in Somalia from 27 October 2002 and to maintain this state of affairs during the peace process, its implementation and subsequently

2) To use only peaceful means in the resolution of all disputes between political, military and other groups and the community they represent

3) To ensure that all political, military and other groups maintain only defensive military positions and capabilities, and refrain from any military provocations


5) To invite the international community to undertake field-based and remote monitoring of the arms embargo, and to guarantee their representatives unimpeded and safe access.

Article 3: Enhanced Safe Access for Aid

1) To represent the rights of the people of Somalia to receive humanitarian assistance

2) To guarantee the security of all humanitarian and development personnel and installations, including those of the United Nations Agencies, non-governmental organizations, ICRC and donor governments and organizations

3) To ensure that the safe access to aid for all the people of Somalia is enhanced

Article 4: Enhancement of Outcomes of the Peace Process

1) To undertake political negotiations and technical discussions in good faith and in a spirit of cooperation during each face of the Somalia National Reconciliation Process

2) To abide by the conclusions resulting from the Somalia National reconciliation Process
3) To implement all the resolutions of the process in good faith and in a timely way

Article 5: Combating Terrorism

1) To combat all forms of terrorism, and to cooperate with the international community in the fight against terrorism pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1373 of 2002
2) To prevent the use of Somali territory as a base for any terrorist activities

Article 6: Monitoring of the Declaration

1) To invite IGAD, the African Union and the international community to support and monitor the implementation of this Declaration and all other further agreements reached
2) To support the establishment of enforcement mechanisms for the safe delivery of humanitarian aid and implementation of this Declaration and all further agreements reached in the interest of the people of Somalia.

DONE at ELDORET, KENYA, 27 OCTOBER 2002

SIGNED:

Hassan Abshir, Prime Minister of Transitional National Government

Abdullahi Derow Isaak, Speaker of the Transitional National Assembly

Col. Hassan Mohamed Nur

Col. Hassan Abdulla Qalad, Chairman of HPA

Musa Sudi Yalahow, Chairman of USC/SSA/SRRC

Osman Hassan Ali ‘Ato’, Chairman of USC/SNA/SRRC

Col. Abdirizak Isak Bihi, Chairman of SNF

Bare Adan Shire, Chairman of JVA

Abdillahi Sheikh Ismail, Chairman of SSNM/SNA

Mohamed Adan Wayel, Chairman, SPM/Nakuru

Abdullahi Yusuf, President of Puntland State of Somalia
Hussein Farah Aideed, Co-Chairman of SRRC  
Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, Chairman of USC  
Mowlid Ma’ane Mohamoud, Chairman, SAMO/SRRC Nakuru  
Omar Mohamoud Mohamed, ‘Finish’, Chairman of USG/SSA  
Mohamed Sayyid Aden, Chairman of SNF/SRRC  
Gen. Mohamed Said Hersi ‘Morgan’, Deputy SPM Chairman  
Mohamed Omar Habeeb ‘Dhere’, Chairman of Jowhar Administration  
Hilowle Imam Omar, Co-Chairman of SRRC  
Gen. Aden Abdullahi Nur Gabiyow, Chairman of SPM  
Dr. Sharif Salah Mohamed Ali, Civil Society Representative
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