African international relations: A metafunctional approach

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This study examines the descriptive utility of a meta-theoretical approach over the traditionally applied general theory approach to African International Relations. It argues in favor of the meta-theoretical approach commonly employed in US foreign policy studies as yielding greater explanatory capacity to describing the behavior and relations of the African state than traditional approaches based on a single primary determinant. It suggests that a multiple primary determinant approach to assessing African state behavior and relations grants greater theoretical and empirical parallels to state and system structure and behavior than analysis based on a single determinant.

This study builds a meta-theory of International Relations (metafunctionalism) by which to assess African state behavior and relations utilizing the most commonly applied and descriptive conventional and non-conventional theories within the discipline. Metafunctionalism combines multiple theoretical approaches while negating the contradictions between them that would limit their relative explanatory capacity. It employs the theories of functionalism, evolution, realism, liberalism, neomarxism
(international class theory). The presentation of a metafunctional model of African
International Relations will provide an alternative lens by which to view African state
behavior and relations and address the fundamental problems of “description” and
“consensus” within African political discourse.
AFRICAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A METAFUNCTIONAL APPROACH

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF CLARK ATLANTA UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First, I want to thank my twin brother Benito Wheatley, without whom the completion of this document and my graduate education would not have been possible. Second, I want to thank my mother Medita Wheatley for all the support you have granted me in pursuing my graduate education. Next, I want to grant very special thanks to professors Dr. Abi Awomolo, Dr. Benneson Dejanes, Dr. Fragano Ledgister, and Dr. Hashim Gibrill for entertaining my curiosity and granting me the opportunity to grow both in and outside the classroom. I want to recognize my colleagues Ayanna Armstrong, Joseph Jones, Tonya Williams, and Terza Lima who embraced me and made my learning experience competitive and fun. Last, I want to thank my closest friends, Oren Hodge, Shamika Fulston, and Elizabeth Armstrong, who have supported me unconditionally in completing my dissertation.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Introduction

The objective of this study is to categorize the African state based on the dominant behavioral, relational, and structural characteristics that define its behavior and relations in the first decade of the 21st century. Twenty-first century analysis of the African state warrants recognition of the complex balance that has evolved between the structure of the international system and the degree of agency exercised by the African state over the past fifty years. Previous approaches rooted in realist, liberal, and international class schools of thought have traditionally attributed African state behavior and relations primarily to structural forces emerging out of the international system.¹ Statist approaches based on sociocultural, psychoanalytic, and structural and functional frameworks have largely attributed African state behavior and relations mainly to the degree of internal agency exercised by the state in the decision-making process. Neither approach by itself is sufficient to describe the evolution of the African state and its relations into the 21st century.

In the unipolar and now the emerging post-unipolar world of the post-Cold War

¹Feminism is not included here, as the feminist approach does not constitute one of the major theoretical frameworks used to assess IR, IR theory, or African politics within the most significant literature within those fields. Feminism does not provide a mechanism for structuring the international environment and describing the characteristics and behavior of its units.
period, neither the security concerns of the Cold War nor the postcolonial ambitions of Western Europe are the primary drivers of African state behavior and relations. In the fifty years following African independence, the state in Africa state has evolved a unique pattern of relations between itself and other actors in the international system differing from the previously dominant bipolar relations of the Cold War and post-independence neocolonialism. These relationships are both directly and indirectly collaborative in nature, where existing patterns of domestic political behavior and choice in the African state are enabled and reinforced by the structure of the international system and actions of its most influential actors. The central determinants in the state’s behavior and relations have necessarily become an outgrowth of dual state and non-state factors not hierarchically ranked in terms of importance and impact. The theoretical frameworks used to describe and categorize the African state in the 21st century must be capable of identifying and explaining the evolution of this particular pattern of behavior.

The theoretical tools previously employed to assess the 20th century African state individually present a significant challenge to describing this defining characteristic of the 21st-century African state and correctly categorizing it relative to other states. In the post-Cold War period, liberal economics and the environment have emerged alongside security and military power as major factors in system process and organization. As a result, assessing state behavior and relations can no longer be limited to realist, liberal, or international class theories in isolation. Assuming the primacy of any one approach undermines the validity of the other viable approaches, providing only a very limited and one-sided description of the state and its relations. This study seeks to present a broader
and more inclusive framework through building a metatheory that will not invalidate viable theories but utilize their most efficient aspects in providing a more detailed explanation of African state behavior and relations.

The research focus of African international relations (IR) was proposed for a host of reasons growing out of a survey of the available literature. First, the existing literature did not provide a data-based consensus on the causal factors in African state behavior. The positions for the determinants of the state's behavior are at extremes with little to no moderated middle positions within conventional or unconventional theory. The African state is granted either too little or too much agency in its own actions relative to systemic factors. Theoretically, there is no conventional theory presently available that moderates between the impacts of system structure and state agency.

Second, within the literature, there is little evidence or justification for numerous assumptions and positions contemporarily applied to the African state within conventional theory. Numerous assumptions within realism and liberalism cannot be justifiably sustained while studying the African state, which accounts for almost 25% of all states in the international system. Particularly problematic are the assertion of the "nation state" as the base unit of the international system, the "unitary actor" conception of state rationality, and the predominating liberal ideas regarding new and classical trade theory. Continued acceptance of those assumptions creates and propagates a crisis of "general description" and "categorization" within African politics and IR, creating great difficulty in explaining the behavioral outputs and structure of the African state.

Third, there exists an urgent need to explain how there has been a general
behavioral change in the African state while its behavioral outputs and outcomes have remained similar or the same over an extended period of time. The consistency of outputs and outcomes over the fifty years of African independence easily leads to the assumption and conclusion that the determinants and processes in the state’s behavior have remained relatively unchanged. Across the period of African independence, however, distinct changes have occurred and continue to occur in the behavior and relations of the African state. These changes must be identified to account for the manner in which they continue to propagate the state’s behavior, resulting in consistent behavioral outputs such as underdevelopment and chronic debt.

Fourth, at this juncture of history, it is necessary to present a rational general study of African IR that provides a clear distinction between rational decision-making processes within the available means of the state and the deviating decisions chosen by African leaders. The African state has sufficiently aged and settled into distinct patterns of behavior within the international system to be discussed as a mature but largely dysfunctional participant in the global system. The decisions and actions of the African state must necessarily be presented as a reflection of the actual level of agency and autonomy available to the state within the constraints of the international system. The practice of exempting the African state from being discussed as an accountable rational actor has exhausted its academic utility and must now be abandoned. The African state must now be held to a new standard of accountability in the disciplines of African Politics and IR.
Statement of the Problem

The dominant behavioral and relational characteristic of the 21st-century African state is a unique pattern of collaboration and interaction between the governing elements of the state and other international actors that may be characteristically described as “matrimonial” in structure and execution. In patterns of matrimonial collaboration, indigenous domestic political behavior and choice within the state are enabled and reinforced by the structure of the international system and actions of its most influential actors. The state’s behavior and relations are the dual product of large degrees of state agency exercised by its governing elements in their interests and the position of the African state in the political and economic structure of the international system. This view is divergent from those of neorealism and international class theory suggesting that system structure rooted in power or class determinants is the independent variable in African state behavior and relations. It is also divergent from modernization theory’s or neoliberalism’s assertion that statist factors are the independent variable in African state behavior and relations. The central determinants in the state’s behavior and relations have evolved into a complex nonhierarchical combination of interlinked system and state factors that cannot necessarily be separated in terms of primary and secondary roles. As a result, descriptions of the 21st-century African state as primarily neocolonial or neopatrimonial are no longer categorically descriptive of its behavior. Those descriptions are representative of the dominant behavioral patterns of the pre-millennium period.

The fundamental problem presented in this research focuses on the inadequacy of

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IR theory and analyses of African politics in presenting a categorization and descriptive system for the African state reflective of its dominant 21st-century structural, behavioral, and relational characteristics. More specifically, the two disciplines (African politics and IR) face the challenges of adequate description and categorization and an absence of theoretical “consensus and consolidation” within the topic area. The problem of description and categorization for the African state exists both generally within IR theory and specifically within the study of African politics. The occurrence of this first problem is compounded by the occurrence of the second parallel problem. The absence of “theoretical consensus and consolidation” comes about as a result of the broad theoretical divisions in assessments of the African state, which have largely no moderated positions or theoretical consolidations. As a result, broad readings of the literature do not easily allow for a clear identification of the causal factors in the behavior and relations of the African state.

General IR theory does not present a categorization for the behavioral, relational, and structural characteristics overwhelmingly shared by the states of sub-Saharan Africa. Conventional theories such as realism, liberalism, and class analysis do not generally acknowledge or recognize the existence of a grouping of state characteristics unique to the African state. As general theories of IR, they do not present region-specific categorizations based on regionally shared characteristics. Rather, they focus primarily on the structure of the system and the general behavioral, relational, and structural state characteristics displayed by its base units. General theory grants characteristic

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3 Realist and liberal theorists have not presented a region- or state-specific categorization for the African state within their major literature pieces. Only within international class theory has the African state been specifically branded neocolonial by authors such as Kwame Nkrumah.
descriptions identifiable and applicable among all states without regional limits in application. States are categorized relative to other states displaying similar characteristics and are described by the same conceptual terminology reflective of those traits.\textsuperscript{4}

As a result, within realism, states described as "powerful" display a distinct list of characteristics while states described as "weak" display a different set of common attributes. Within liberalism, "most developed states" house a distinct set of traits while "least developed states" display another set of traits. Within the world systems school of international class theory, all "center" states display distinct characteristics while all "peripheral" states share another set of common characteristics. As such, they have no classification or designation for the shared characteristics general to the states of sub-Saharan Africa.

The problem of categorization and description is paralleled by the problem posed by an absence of theoretical consensus and consolidation in African politics and IR. The general theoretical divide between statist and system approaches to description, explanation, and categorization has not granted conclusive answers to the causal factors in African state behavior within any single theoretical tradition. Each theoretical framework has granted its own answers based on differing assumptions and theoretical traditions, providing a limited degree of causal truth. The problem is rooted in the classical behavioral question of "structure versus agency," which is the active variable in state behavior and relations? Within African politics and IR, there has not been

\textsuperscript{4} Kenneth N. Waltz, \textit{Theory of International Politics} (Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1979) 79-81.
developed a consolidation process to seamlessly integrate the select pieces of truth revealed in each approach and theory. General acknowledgement and consensus on the existence of multiple causal factors in African state behavior necessarily warrant a nonhierarchical consolidation of theoretical approaches to explain its behavior and relations. Out of a consolidation process, a description and categorization system may be developed to more accurately describe and categorize the empirical realities of the African state.

Within the field of African politics, there have been efforts to grant region- and state-specific characteristics to the African state. However, the two most common descriptive categories utilized in the field to describe the specific characteristics of the African state and region do not adequately describe its behavioral, relational, and structural characteristics in the 21st century. Neocolonialism and neopatrimonialism individually do not parallel the changes that have occurred in the general behavior of the African state in the twenty years preceding the Cold War. Neocolonialism attributes the state's behavior and relations primarily to systemic factors, while neopatrimonialism focuses primarily on state-based factors; both are reflective of the problems previously described in the field of African politics and IR. Any theoretical framework used to categorize the general, regional, or state-specific characteristics of the African state must be reflective of its hybrid contemporary pattern of political behavior. The theory must be derived from an approach simultaneously inclusive of both system and state factors as primary determinants in state behavior and inclusive of the partial truths revealed in the

differing theoretical traditions.

Research Question

This study poses and attempts to answer the following question: “Will the application of a metatheoretical framework to the study of the African state provide a more accurate description and categorization of African state behavior and relations in the 21st century than the previous general theory approaches applied to its analysis?”

Hypothesis

The application of a metatheoretical approach to African IR and politics provides the necessary framework by which to describe the changes that have occurred in African state behavior and relations over the past twenty years. The metatheoretical approach provides a feasible framework by which to simultaneously include both system and state variables as nonhierarchical primary determinants in state behavior and relations. The assumption of dual primary variables will logically result in conceptual terminology reflective of those multiple primary variables in the description of the African state. This will allow for the description of the African state beyond the traditional 20th-century assumptions of African state behavior and relations, which are the product of primary variable/primary determinant approaches.

The application of a metatheory to the study of African state behavior and relations expands the behavioral and structural assumptions given to the international environment and its primary variables beyond the linear assumptions of any one theory. This expansion of base assumptions allows for the consideration of multiple state behavioral determinants that are more representative of the multilayered structures of the
state and characteristics of the system than is a single determinant. Consideration of multiple behavioral determinants in turn provides a larger basis by which to analyze and describe the behavior and relations of the state. A metatheoretical approach allows for the consolidation of theory based on the limited truths revealed in each tradition and the building of a moderated position between system and state factors.

**Definition of Terms and Concepts**

- *African state* or *postcolonial African state* refers to any one of the 48 states of the African continent south of North Africa and the Sahara desert.

- *Aggregated state power* refers to the state’s sum of combined economic, military, and political influence and capabilities.

- *Agonistic relations* refer to a system of relations in which states primarily compete politically, economically, and militarily without imposed limits on the conflicts. Agonistic systems of relations discourage increased broad cooperation and rules among states across the system and encourage power balancing, military arms buildups, and containment as the primary means by which to settle or deter conflicts.

- *Artificial multinational state* refers to a state in which multiple national groups or nations inhabit the boundaries of the state, embracing and maintaining loyalties to social identifications of ethnicity, race, religion, and culture over an overarching state. The designation of this type of state as artificial is derived from its historical creation through European colonialism and imperialism (or other national colonialism or imperialism) culminating in its emergence as a theoretically independent entity in the 19th and 20th centuries.
-Artificial sovereignty refers to a circumstance in which the state's territorial composition and borders have essentially been determined by or in relationship to the former colonial powers of Europe, and are maintained through external relationships with international institutions and powerful state actors. Due to the inability of the state by itself to exercise and maintain all aspects of its own sovereignty, it relies on external forces. As such, the state's sovereignty and very existence are largely derived and legitimized by external elements rather than the state population.

-Civigenesis refers to the process by which states and the international system evolve as a product of the forces of natural selection, coevolution, and group/multilevel selection. Within these evolutionary processes states simultaneously compete, cooperate, and specialize in the international environment to increase the survival prospects of their populations.6

-Commensural relationships describe any relationship between two or more actors where at least one of the actors largely benefits while the others are not significantly harmed or helped. Commensural relationships are either necessary for at least one actor and nonessential for the others or nonessential for all.

-Consolidated power refers to the most constant active elements of aggregate power upon which system structures and processes may be built and maintained. These elements include a constant economic and financial revenue stream, territorial availability, an active modern communications network, modern naval and air forces, and multiregional or global diplomatic offices.

6 Civigenesis is developed as an original concept within this study.
Domestic group security dilemma refers to a circumstance in which the sociopolitical, economic, and military gains of one national group are perceived as a decrease in the sociopolitical and economic security of other competing groups in the state. This circumstance of perception arises as an outgrowth of the demographic and sociopolitical structuring of the artificial state rooted in its past colonial state's historical policy of forced population inclusion, integration, and group disempowerment.

Ecostasis refers to the constant environmental conditions necessary for the global ecosystem to sustain biological life and regenerate itself. Ecostasis represents the equilibrium point between the demands living organism's place on the ecosystem for their survival, and the ecosystem's ability to supply those demands without compromising its ability to self-regenerate. An ideal ecostatic relationship is one that grants the greatest possible social benefit to individuals, the state, and the system at the least physical cost to the environment.

Equifunctional states are those states exhibiting a general level of institutional organization and a normalized degree of structural complexity that allow for the basic functioning of their political and economic institutions towards meeting the resource and security needs of the state. Equifunctional states generally evolve from hypofunctional states or come about as the result of the developmental stagnation and regression of a hyperfunctional state. The equifunctional state's level of economic productivity and political organization has reached an acceptable point of equilibrium between the basic wants and needs of the population and the state's capacity to adequately provide them. This level of equilibrial functionality grants the state an above-average capacity to
compete, cooperate, and specialize within the international environment relative to other states. Individually, equifunctional states continue to specialize within the global resource production process, internally maintaining high levels of repetitive innovation in the production and distribution of goods and services. An equifunctional state’s primary international relationships are mutualistic with secondary parasitic and commensural relationships. Along with hyperfunctional states, equifunctional states become the primary cultural and technological developers and providers within the system. They evolve production, organizational, and cultural practices and processes adopted by the other states of the system. Together with hyperfunctional states, equifunctional states account for the largest percentage of the global production of consumer and capital goods and services. Based on the chronic diminishing returns and increasing cost inherent to military expenditure, limited developmental space, and the relative costs of military conflict versus cooperation, equifunctional states opt for cooperation and integration with other equifunctional states as the most effective means by which to provide for the essential wants and needs of the state. Equifunctional states include countries such as England, France, Russia, Italy, Spain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, among others.

-Functional composition refers to the state’s structure being comprised of interlocking units within a formally organized political and economic system. The state is formally organized into a system of institutions, infrastructure, and territory that converts societal inputs into behavioral outputs towards meeting the wants and needs of its population and aggregately addressing the challenges of the international environment. Its institutions
are organized in an equilibrial relationship in which changes in one institution will necessarily be reflected in changes in adjoining institutions or society as a whole.

- *Functionality cost* refers to the long- and short-term costs states must incur to functionalize to the hypofunctional stage and above. The most common costs to achieve greater societal complexity include environmental destruction and degradation, political repression, social and economic inequality, humanitarian disaster and underdevelopment, and large-scale debt.

- *Functional governance* refers to governance facilitating long-term increases in state functionality to the hypofunctional level and above. The elements of functional governance historically displayed across the international system to date have been responsible government, strategic vision, long-term planning, and the desire to increase human security and quality of life within the state. Functional governance may be observed across every region of the world across all forms of government from democracy to authoritarianism. The development of functional governance is inherently linked to political values, history, culture, and geography.

- *Functional transition* refers to a principle of state development suggesting that all states must go through phases of transition until they reach an evolutionary ceiling or floor in their development. State developmental transitions are an inherent part of the evolutionary pattern of states as they leave one phase of development and enter another phase above or below it. Once a state transitions into a different category, its behavior

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7 This term was developed and introduced by the researcher.

8 These traits are based on the observations of the researcher.
and relations become reflective of the transition.

- *Hierarchical anarchy* describes the systemic imposition of varying levels of anarchy on states in which relatively weak states are subject to greater levels of structural or institutional regulation and subordination bordering on governance while the most powerful and influential states experience the greatest degree of anarchy as they structure and maintain global order in an environment of ongoing self-help.

- *Hyperfunctional states* are those states housing an enhanced degree of structural organization and institutional complexity that effectively hyperaccelerates the normal functioning of institutions and societal productivity. This level of hyperfunctionality super-enhances the state's capacity to compete, cooperate, and specialize relative to other states in the international environment through repetitive innovation and security. Hyperfunctional states evolve from either hypofunctional states or equifunctional states. Hyperfunctional states presently have the greatest capacity for long-term rapid growth and development and become central hegemonic pillars within the international order. They are central to the maintenance of the system as they contain the greatest capacity to contribute to international public good. They encourage systemic and institutional participation among other states by creating conditions for those states to free ride and enjoy the benefits of the system without paying the bulk of the cost to maintain it. Hyperfunctional states' primary relationships are largely mutualistic or parasitic in nature. In their mutualistic relationships, hyperfunctional states accrue massive benefits along with the other participating parties in the relationship. In their parasitic relationships, they accrue massive benefits at the expense of the other participating
parties in the relationship. Their secondary relationships are commensural, adding to international public good and system stability. Based on the principle of diminishing returns on military expenditure and the limits of developmental space and resources, hyperfunctional states in the long term will settle into an equifunctional condition, more closely cooperating and integrating with other equifunctional states. Hyperfunctional states include states such as China, the United States, Japan, and Germany.

-Hypofunctional states are those states in which the basic level of institutional organization and structural complexity functions just below the equilibrium point between the demands of the state in terms of basic wants and needs and the state’s ability to supply and provide for those wants and needs. The state’s needs outweigh its productive capacity, where its institutions are complex enough in their organization and development to allow for rapid economic growth and development but are too limited to extend those processes and their benefits to the entire state. Their level of subequilibrial functionality grants the state an above-average capacity to compete, cooperate, and specialize within the international environment relative to other states. Hypofunctional states generally evolve from protofunctional and pathofunctional states or emerge as the result of the developmental stagnation or regression of an equifunctional state.

Hypofunctional states presently include countries such as India, Brazil, Indonesia, Turkey, Iran, Poland, Czech Republic, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, South Africa, Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina, Chile, Cuba, Bangladesh, Panama, Costa Rica, Belize, Ghana, and Senegal.

-Institutional inertia refers to the occurrence or development of unusually high levels of
organizational rigidity and complacency within national institutions that limit or constrain these institutions’ ability to evolve to reflect the changing needs of society and the state. Institutional inertia occurs when the national sociopolitical and economic institutions systematically reproduce specific sociopolitical and economic outputs regardless of the type of inputs into the state. The institutions become rigid and dogmatic in their approach to addressing societal needs and wants.

-Metafunctionalism is a metatheory of IR developed to assess state behavior and relations through a multiple-primary-determinant approach built on modified functionalist assumptions and the collective processes of evolution. It simultaneously utilizes the most common theories of IR and a host of unconventional frameworks to explain and categorize state behavior and relations. Metafunctionalism’s modified functionalist assumption maintains an analogy between the individual organism and the state or society. The state is held to be analogous to a living organism, in that both society and organisms are made up of interdependent working parts and systems that must function together in order for the greater body to function. The state is dually composed of a physical territory and infrastructure and its multiple institutions including the family, educational system, religious system, judicial system, political system, economic system, military, and other institutions. These institutions are connected in an equilibrial relationship in which significant changes in one institution will ultimately be paralleled by changes in other institutions. As a result, state behavior must be assessed in terms of its multiple societal sources working in concert to produce policy or action. Just as

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9 Metafunctionalism is a metatheory of state behavior and IR developed within this study by the researcher based on functionalism, evolution, realism, liberalism, international class theory, structural functionalism, and a select number of unconventional theories.
individual behavior is afforded to a host of factors working in unison that are studied within separate fields and different theoretical traditions, likewise the state requires multiple levels of analysis to assess its behavior and relations. The state's behavior and relations therefore require consideration of multiple primary determinants to describe and categorize its behavior.

-Metafunctionalist model of state behavior and relations refers to the behavioral model designed to operationalize and illustrate metafunctionalism. The metafunctionalist model of state behavior and relations illustrates how the structure of the international environment and the characteristics of the international system and its state units drive state behavior and relations. Its format streamlines a circular system of political inputs and outputs from the anarchical structure of the international environment to the institutional processes and outputs of the state.

-Multiunit system composition refers to the base units of the international system that include both the nation-state and artificial multinational state. These state units are rational actors seeking their own interest. Most states in the Global South characteristically fall within the description of the artificial multinational state as opposed to a functional nation-state. The functioning of their institutions and their behavioral outputs differ greatly from those of the functional nation-states primarily found in the Global North.

-Mutualistic relations describe any relationship between two or more actors where all actors derive major benefits. Mutualistic relationships may be either necessary for all actors, necessary for some actors but nonessential for the others, or nonessential for all.
**Neutrofunctional states** are structurally collapsed states in which the official formally organized political, economic, and social institutions of the state have ceased to function or no longer exist in their capacity as the organs by which to organize and order the state. The state has no formal governing authorities or standing military. A state becomes neutrofunctional through civil, national, or international conflict, economic sanctions, natural disasters, or political collapse. Somalia is a present example of a neutrofunctional state. With no functional institutions and no active political or economic system, the state is unable to serve as a mechanism to deliver scarce resources to its population. With no effective governing or societal institutions by which to effectively organize the state, the state’s structural collapse culminates in the erosion of its political, social, and territorial integrity. In essence, there is not an actual state, but a shadow of a state maintained by the juridical recognition of international institutions and other states. It has primitive forms of decentralized leadership revolving around religion, clan, tribe, and warlordism. It has no significant international relationships other than those of aid regimes. Neutrofunctional states may be resuscitated through external aid to a protofunctional or pathofunctional stage of development. Previously collapsed and failed states include Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Congo. Somalia is the African continent’s existing neutrofunctional state.

**Parasitic relations** describe any relationship between two or more actors in which one or more of the actors involved largely benefits while the others are significantly harmed. Parasitic relationships are either necessary for at least one actor but nonessential for the others or nonessential for all actors in the relationship.
-Pathofunctional states are those states in which lower levels of institutional organization and structural underdevelopment drastically impair and retard the normal functioning of the state's institutions. The state does not house enough productive capacity to independently maintain its own survival or ensure the survival of its population without external assistance. Its extreme degree of subequilibrial functionality impedes the state's ability to compete, cooperate, or specialize in any effective manner within the international environment. Pathofunctional states presently include most of the states of sub-Saharan Africa, Guyana, Paraguay, Uruguay, Guatemala, Bolivia, Columbia, Laos, Myanmar, Nepal, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria, among a host of others.

-Polar mobility refers to the ability of states to accumulate vast amounts of aggregate power within the international system structure.

-Protofunctional states are states that in practical reality have essentially no active centralized national institutions beyond their center that house governing officials, the military, and the police forces. National institutions in these states not only have failed, but also are neglected or simply not used as tools to serve the wants and needs of the population. The state government primarily acts as the prime intermediary between the state and other international actors, maintaining a military and police force to guarantee its own security, protect private and public investments, and maintain control over the population. Protofunctional states presently include states such as Afghanistan, Niger, Myanmar, Congo, Zimbabwe, Central African Republic, Guinea Bissau, Tajikistan, East Timor, and Haiti.
-Reciprocally altruistic relations refer to a system of relations that enable and encourage broad cooperation among states. States generally cooperate based on the condition that the relative cost they incur to cooperate is less than the relative benefits their cooperation grants to other participating states. Each state follows the rules and participates because the other states of the system have agreed to do the same. Reciprocally altruistic relations discourage balancing behaviors and military arms races but fail to deter conflict with states that do not wish to cooperate.

-Soft sovereignty refers to the marginal or limited application of state sovereignty, where even with the external maintenance of the state’s sovereignty, its structural and institutional weakness restricts its capacity to fully employ internal or external resources towards meeting its sovereign responsibilities in a hard application similar to fully sovereign states.

-Structural and functional independence refers to the practical condition of states primarily found in the first and upper second tiers of states whose institutions are organized in such a manner as to allow for the efficient use of resources towards the provision of the needs of the state and its inhabitants without external structural support. Their political systems serve as effective societal organizing tools by which to meet the collective interests within the state and ensure accountability and transparency in the extraction, allocation, and distribution of resources. Examples of states of this type are the United States, Russia, China, France, and Japan.

-Structural dependence and dysfunctionality refers to the practical condition of states primarily found in the lower second and third tiers of states whose institutions are
organized in a manner that hinders or negates the efficient employment of state resources towards the provision of the needs of the state and its inhabitants. Rather than serving as an effective societal organizing tool, the political system enables and facilitates institutional inefficiency and corruption without organizational or institutional accountability. The process of resource extraction, allocation, and distribution in these states is adversely affected, and each state's ability to internally provide for itself is severely compromised. The cumulative result of the institutional disorganization is a reliance on external political and economic structural support. Without external support, many states in the third tier would regress into structural collapse and institutional failure. These states' complete reliance on external structural support may also be referred to as dependency. Examples of states of this type are Togo and Benin.

*Structural dependence and functionality* refers to the practical condition of states primarily found in the lower second tier and upper third tier of states whose political systems are organized to a sufficient operational degree to work in concert with external support systems in mobilizing state resources to meet basic societal wants and needs. However, the institutions of these states are organized in a manner that allows significant institutional inefficiency and corruption to necessitate external supports to mitigate the adverse affects of institutional and organizational weakness. The political process and governing institutions ensure enough transparency and accountability to secure external assistance for a functional system of extraction, allocation, and distribution of basic and essential state resources, goods, and services. Even though existing in a state of dependency, these states engender an acceptable degree of functionality and theoretically
are on a transitional path to structural independence. Examples of states of this type are Ghana, Dominican Republic, and the Philippines.

- *Structural elasticity* refers to the capacity of the system’s structure to expand and accommodate increasing numbers of state and non-state units.

- *Structural independence and dysfunctionality* refers to the practical condition of states primarily found in the lower first and second tiers of states whose institutions are organized in such a manner as to ensure the basic employment of resources towards the provision primarily of the essential needs of the state and its inhabitants without external structural support. Their political systems are organized to an operational degree that allows resources to be mobilized to meet the most basic needs of the state but not the collective interests of its population. These state institutions are organized in a manner that facilitates institutional inefficiency and corruption that adversely affect the state’s ability to provide for itself as a fully functional entity. The political process and governments ensure only enough transparency and accountability to enable the inefficient and limited extraction, allocation, and distribution of state resources. The cumulative result of the institutional organization of the state is its partial and limited functionality. However, such states have the option of seeking external assistance in areas beyond essential goods and services. Examples of such states are India, Iran, and South Africa.

- *Structural penetration* describes the condition of a state whose internal structure and institutions are compromised by the presence of external actors whose actions undermine or supersede aspects of the state’s sovereignty to a degree that impedes its ability to act within its own interest. A structurally penetrated state’s sovereignty may be so greatly
encumbered by the presence and actions of external actors that several of its domestic and foreign policy decisions and behaviors cannot be discussed in isolation from those external actors. Examples of structurally penetrated states are Zambia and Mozambique.

- **Structural polarity** refers to the point or position of the greatest diffusion of consolidated power within the system.

- **Structural underdevelopment** describes a national condition in which both internal and external factors systematically weaken state institutions and retard the state’s ability to function effectively or expand. A state’s institutional organization and the nature of international relationships impede its ability to sufficiently expand its material capabilities towards providing basic necessities. In this condition of structural underdevelopment, the state’s sociopolitical and economic institutions are unable to efficiently process societal and international inputs and convert them into functional outputs in a manner that allows that process to be cyclically reproduced and expanded.

State structural and institutional expansion is contingent on socioeconomic growth and development in which the aggregate generation of revenue and increasing complexity of social networks and values enhance the ability of the state to satisfy an increasing number of societal wants and needs. The majority of states in sub-Saharan Africa are experiencing prolonged periods of structural underdevelopment that are plunging them further into poverty, debt, and civil instability.

- **Tangible and intangible system characteristics** refer to the dual characteristics afforded to the international system through the collective processes of evolution or civgenesis.\(^\text{10}\)

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\(^{10}\) The classification of the characteristics of the international system into tangible and intangible characteristics was developed in this study by the researcher.
Tangible characteristics describe those traits readily measurable in the international environment and physically represented. They include realist, liberal, and international class characteristics. Intangible characteristics describe those traits that cannot be readily measured and may not be physically represented in the international environment. They include relative degrees of polar mobility, structural elasticity, competitive tendencies, cooperative tendencies, and isolationist tendencies. The system’s tangible characteristics determine its intangible characteristics.

Assumptions

This study contains five central assumptions in seeking to answer its stated research question. It first assumes that African state behavior and relations regionally and internationally can be generalized across a region as vast and diverse as sub-Saharan Africa. This assumption is common in the literature and founded on similarities in geographic region, history of colonial rule, state structure, and behavioral outputs. While a few notable exceptions exist, scholars apply general political and economic theories to the region. Within general IR studies, both normative and scientific categorizations such as the west, western civilization, industrialized, nonindustrialized, most developed, least developed, first-second-third world, Arab world, and Muslim world are commonly used. sub-Saharan Africa is not exempt from the theoretical necessity to group and categorize.

Second, this study assumes that the African state must be categorized based on the collection of behavioral, relational, and structural characteristics shared by a majority of African states. Within this study, a majority of states is based minimally on a two-thirds-plus ratio (66-67%), or 32+ of the 48 states of sub-Saharan Africa. Secondary and
tertiary categorizations must be granted for the exceptions to the majority comprising the remaining one-third of sub-Saharan states. Likewise, they must be categorized based on their dominant shared characteristics and behaviors.

Third, this study assumes that there is no generally accepted theory of African IR capable of comprehensively describing African state behavior and relations in an empirically verifiable fashion by itself. The seminal texts in the field have not agreed on a comprehensive general theory of African IR, and in its place exists a plethora of theories that have attempted comprehensive descriptions but have achieved only limited and partial explanations. Fourth, this study assumes the validity of existing IR theories as partial explanations of state behavior and relations. Each theory represents only a limited and partial truth, granting an incomplete representation of the empirical realities of the state.

Fifth, this study assumes that African state behavior and relations have developed in transitional phases that can be tracked, separated, and described from independence to the present. The first phase of sub-Saharan African statehood was from 1957 to 1974, the second phase was from 1975 to 1993, the third phase was from 1994 to 2000, and the fourth phase was from 2001 to the present. This study seeks to expound on the fourth phase presently underway.

\[11\] Peter J. Schraeder, *African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation* 2nd ed. (London: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2004), 83-84. The first three phases of sub-Saharan African independence are general to African politics, coinciding with events such as the close of the Cold War. However, there is no general consensus on a fourth phase underway in the post-9/11 era. The first decade of the 21st millennium is still under observation within African politics and has not yet been identified as a fourth transitional phase within the literature. The researcher regards 2001 as the beginning of a fourth phase in the development of the independent African state even though theoretical consensus is lacking.
Methodology

This work is a review of IR theory as applied to sub-Saharan Africa. Its primary focus is the development of a new categorization and descriptive system by which to assess contemporary African state behavior. This new categorization and descriptive system will deviate from traditional approaches and be built upon a metatheoretical approach to IR theory. The metatheoretical approach is most immediately borrowed from foreign policy models and studies of state behavior and decision making of countries within the international arena. It represents a nontraditional method of theorizing the African state within African politics and IR.

The metatheoretical/multideterminant approach to analysis will be contrasted with the general theory/primary-determinant approach commonly applied in IR. The metatheory developed in this study is built upon the theories of evolution, functionalism, realism, liberalism, class, structural functionalism, psychoanalytical and perception theories, and leadership type/styles analysis. These theories were chosen based first on their descriptive utility and second on their positions as the most highly utilized theories across the spectrum of literature dedicated to the African state and its relations.

Significance of the Study

This study addresses the theoretical problems of description and categorization in the fields of African domestic and international politics that are a product of the transitional nature of the African state. It is intended to present a rational general study of the African state based on empirically verifiable assumptions within distinct behavioral phases and time periods. The fields of African politics and African IR stand
to benefit from this contemporary effort to theorize the African state and describe it in a manner reflective of the changes that have evolved in its behavior and relations in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century.

The most common approaches to describing and explaining African state behavior and relations are reflective of 20\textsuperscript{th}-century assumptions, and the development of a new description and categorization system is necessary to reflect the changes that have occurred in the African state from the close of the Cold War through the first decade of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. Categories and concepts popularized in African politics such as neocolonialism and neopatrimonialism by themselves are no longer sufficient as descriptive tools of African politics. They must be reassessed according to their ability to parallel the empirical realities of the African state. A re-categorization of the African state propels the study of African politics beyond the period of extended theoretical stagnation beginning in the 1980s.

This study hopes to begin a trend within African politics and IR in standardizing the application of the metatheoretical method to the study of the African state and its relations. Within the field, there is a need for more moderated positions between systemic and statist approaches and a consolidation of theory. Previous general theory approaches housed very narrow assumptions regarding state behavior and relations, essentially attributing state behavior to a central primary determinant represented in a single theory. Within the context of 21\textsuperscript{st}-century IR discourse, the assumption that the behavior and relations of a multilayered state entity could be limited to a single behavioral determinant faces great challenges in being substantiated by empirical data.
The assumptions contained in this study are made to reflect the empirical realities of the international environment and its primary variables as opposed to propagating assumptions that cannot be substantiated by data and are the product of theoretical tradition. In this study great effort was made to separate from the ongoing practice of building on the strict assumptions of existing theory which are no longer empirically accurate. Many of the accepted assumptions common to the African state do not reflect the fundamental changes that have occurred in the continent and international system.

The metatheoretical approach is intended to simplify the identification of the role of the state and system as either the dependent variable, independent variable, or a combination of the two in African state behavior and relations. Under the present theoretical discourse, this distinction has been very difficult to determine, given the differences in theoretical approaches and philosophy as expressed in the rhetorical and literary positions of academia, international institutions, organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and African leadership and governments.

Limitations of the Study

This study is limited to the development of a new category and system by which to describe the contemporary behavioral trends of the African state within the international environment. The states of sub-Saharan Africa are the primary regional focus, and there will be no attempt to evaluate states in other regions of the world. The metatheory employed in this study is built on a host of theories: the most conventional theories of IR and their variants (realism, liberalism, international class analysis) and alternative theories and their variants (evolution, culture, perception, psychoanalysis,
leadership type/style analysis). A metatheoretical framework is seen as ideal because of the historical limitations of the pursuit of comprehensive general theories of behavior in the social sciences that to date have yielded only limited and partial explanatory capability. Existing theories chosen for inclusion in the metatheory are in their present form sufficient for the building of a metatheory of African IR. They require no modification to be included in the metatheory.

Deficiencies of this Study

The first and most apparent deficiency of this study is its assumption that the theories upon which the metatheory is based are collectively sufficient to explain African state behavior and relations. All IR theories are continually being developed and expounded on by their proponents to be more efficient as well as to accommodate state and systemic changes. Metatheories do not automatically include an internal mechanism allowing for the expansion of the metatheory as the theories it is built on grow and are further developed. All theory is based on a host of assumptions relative to the current structure and functioning of the international system and African state. Those assumptions are subject to change as the international environment fundamentally changes, requiring the restructuring of any metatheory. The restructuring of the metatheory, in turn, may require altering the categorization and descriptive system.

Second, metatheories are finite or infinite based largely on the subjectivity of the theorist. The selection of appropriate theories is a subjective activity, and arguments may be made for more or fewer theories being included. The ideal number today may not be

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the ideal number tomorrow to achieve the level of description desirable.

**Organization of the Study**

Chapter 1 of this study was dedicated to the introduction of the research question and topic area, giving justifications for its pursuit and stating the fundamental problem it seeks to address. The research parameters were defined along with the basic assumptions and limitations of the study. A definition of terms was presented to explain all uncommon terms utilized in proceeding chapters. Chapter 2 of this study includes an extensive literature review of the theoretical frameworks applied to the study of African politics and IR by both contemporary and classical authors. Chapter 3 goes on to outline the theoretical framework employed in this study to assess the behavior and relations of the African state. The most commonly applied general theories are first evaluated and critiqued, including realism, liberalism, and class analysis. The metatheoretical method is introduced as an alternative to the general theory approach. Chapter 3 also highlights the limitations of single theory primary determinant approaches relative to the benefits of a multiple theory multideterminant approach. It goes on to introduce metafunctionalism as a metatheory for explaining state behavior and relations. The concepts of civigenesis and its variants of competition, symbiosis, and multilevel selection are explained in their relation to system and state development.

Chapter 4 is dedicated to a detailed explanation of the metafunctional model of state behavior and relations. The model is developed as a means of operationalizing metafunctional theory and illustrating how it is played out in the international environment. Section 1 of the chapter describes the major global variables of system and
state, introducing alternative concepts such as hierarchical anarchy, multiple unit system composition, the artificial multinational state, artificial sovereignty, and soft sovereignty. Sections 2 through 6 are dedicated to the behavioral determinants of state behavior and relations and their variants.

Section 2 describes the realist characteristics of state behavior and relations, explaining those influences centering on conflict and its amelioration in the absence of a global government to order the international environment and regulate state behavior. The realist characteristics' corresponding variants include power, national interest, material capability, and balance. Section 3 describes the liberal characteristics of state behavior and relations, explaining those influences centering on cooperation and global governance in the absence of a global government to order the international environment and relations between state actors. The liberal characteristics' corresponding variants include international institutionalism, complex interdependence, globalization, and international aid regimes. Section 4 describes the international class characteristics of state behavior and relations, explaining those influences centering on the establishment of an international political hierarchy and economic stratification of states within the international system and global economy. The international class characteristics' corresponding behavioral variants include class conflict, political hierarchy, economic stratification, institutional regulation, and systemic subordination.

Section 5 describes the structure and function characteristics of state behavior and relations, explaining those influences emanating out of the institutional and territorial organization of the state as a national and domestic conduit for sociopolitical inputs and
processor of policy outputs. Structure and functions’ corresponding variants include structural and functional independence and dependence, structural institutionalism and institutional inertia, structural penetration, structural underdevelopment, institutional failure, and structural collapse. Section 6 describes the leadership type/style factors in state behavior and relations, explaining those influences on state relations derived from the type/style of leadership exercised within the state’s governing structure. Its corresponding variants include national leadership, democratic leadership, kleptocratic leadership, neopatrimonialism, and clientelism. Section 6 describes the perception/worldview characteristics in state behavior and relations, explaining the influences on state behavior and relations derived from an amalgamation of elite, mass, and leadership understandings of the international environment and their preferences for both domestic and international order. The world view’s corresponding variants include globalist-regional-national views, centrist-peripheral views, polar-satellite views, racial-ethnic-religious views, and civilizational views.

Section 7 is dedicated to policy institutions and state behavioral outputs. It describes the consolidation process in state decision making as policy through both its domestic and foreign policy institutions. It presents domestic and foreign policy as being intermestic in nature, where each policy contains both domestic and foreign policy elements. It concludes with an analysis of what happens when intermestic policy exits state institutions into the international environment as behavioral outputs.

Chapter 5 categorizes and describes the dominant characteristics of a majority of African states. Additionally, the minority exceptions are outlined with detailed
justifications for their placement in select categories. Chapter 6 is dedicated to an analysis of the findings of the study, while chapter 7 summarizes its conclusions.

Conclusions are drawn regarding the descriptive utility of the metatheoretical approach and metafunctionalism in particular. The metatheoretical approach as applied in metafunctionalism will be assessed first based on its utility and accuracy as an ordering system for the international environment, the interactions within it, and its units; second based on its capacity for describing and categorizing African state behavior and relations; and third regarding the method and viability of the analytical procedure by which the integration and consolidation of theories were achieved.

Metafunctionalism will be practically evaluated based on how closely it models and parallels existing official and unofficial systemic structures, institutions and institutional policy, and structural outputs. It will be evaluated based on its creation of a logical chronology of structure and process in the form of an operational model by which it illustrates international activity and state behavior. It will be judged by the degree of effectiveness by which it negates the intertheory contradictions that may necessarily arise in theoretical combines. The metatheory developed in this study (metafunctionalism) must grant, at minimum, the same degree of accuracy in describing and categorizing the African state as existing theory. The chapter concludes with possible future questions and prescriptions for future applications of the metatheoretical method and metafunctionalism in African politics and IR.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

The primary literature reviewed discusses the behavior and relations of the African state. The pieces vary in their theoretical frameworks and are set across a time period of 60 years. The texts specifically dedicated to the area of African International Relations are limited in number both classically and contemporarily, superseded by more general studies of the African state’s sociopolitical and economic development. The literature set may be divided into classical and contemporary pieces including classic authors such as Basil Davidson, Kwame Nkrumah, Franz Fanon, Walter Rodney, and Samuel Huntington and more recent authors such as Christopher Clapham, Edmond Keller, Donald Rothchild, Ian Taylor, Paul Williams, and Daniel Offiong.

The backdrop to the study of African International Relations is the Cold War that ensued prior to the African independence period. Realism, as the conventional theoretical framework of the Cold War both classically and in the post-Cold War period was employed to describe the international relations of the African state as well as many other areas of the world. In the first 40 years of African independence, realists placed the bi-polar politics of the Cold War and neocolonial interests of the former European colonial powers as the defining element in African state relations. Its international relations merely being an extension of the geopolitical and geostrategic considerations of the United States and Soviet Union in their global competition for preeminence over the
globe.\textsuperscript{1} Realism was fundamentally rejected by African-centered scholars as an effective means to describe the behavior and relations of the African state because of their fundamentally different assumptions regarding the international environment and the post-colonial state.\textsuperscript{2} However, socialist/Marxist thought prior to and during the independence period pervaded the major literature dedicated to the relations and behavior of the African state as the nonindustrialized world harnessed it to explain its condition within the context of a Western colonialism, imperialism, and global capitalism. Marxist and Leninist concepts were used to describe the system of international order and the relationships between the actors within the system as the product of class conflict. Several of the most important African-centered pieces of forty-sixty years ago are rooted in a Marxist/socialist framework to provide the foundations for the development of their alternative theories and approaches to describing the behavior and relations of the African state.\textsuperscript{3} However, in-between these two dominant traditions a number of nonsystemic approaches in the form of statist and civilization frameworks were also applied as a means of theorizing the African state and its behavior and relations.

In the literature, the first notable theoretical framework arising to explain the behavior and relations of the African state was neocolonialism. Kwame Nkrumah, the theory's most famous African proponent, conceived the behavior and relations of the African state to be largely the product of its relationship with the former Western

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} Christopher Clapham, \textit{Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
\item \textsuperscript{2} O'o, Orwa, and Ute, 11-12.
\item \textsuperscript{3} Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild, \textit{Afro-Marxist Regimes: Ideology and Public Policy} (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1987), 1-3.
\end{itemize}
European colonizing states, their allies, international financial institutions, and international organizations. The African state even though theoretically independent is essentially a satellite or client of a former colonial state and is structured institutionally to reproduce domestic and international outputs consistent with colonial type relationships. Leadership in the African state is either manufactured internally or externally to reproduce individuals willing and able to facilitate such a relationship. The international relations and domestic politics of the state are dictated by its neocolonial relationships as opposed to concerns of national interest, security, power maximization, international institutionalism, or class.

Within the context of anti-colonial struggle and post-colonial independence, socio-psychological analytical frameworks and perception studies were introduced to explain the condition of the African state and its behavior and relations. Frantz Fanon popularized this approach as he presented the behavior and relations of the African state as the outgrowth of an ongoing internal and external battle to forge a cohesive African identity. The colonial African identity was forged through intense violence and an independent African identity must also necessarily be forged through violence within an insecure international environment. The African and African state are continually bombarded by international, state, and non-state actors with prescriptions for identities apart from that of independence. Former colonial powers reinforce an identity and

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5 Ibid.

position of subservience for the African state in spite of the independent identity struggled for through violence by the African state. The African state is itself internally torn between the identities of those individuals historically circumscribed and relegated to a menial and difficult African life, and those living a more privileged existence predicated on Western education, norms, behavior, and relationships. As a result, the relations and behaviors of the state revolve around a conflict between these two groups in economic, political, and social spheres for control over a national identity. This conflict and question of identity itself must be settled through violence and force, as these identities were established and maintained by violence and force enacted by the colonizer. The behavior and relations of the African state will be continually riddled with conflict and security issues until the internal and external question of its identity is settled.

By the mid 1970s, a host of statist approaches differing from the neocolonial and psychosocial frameworks became popularized as a means of theorizing the African state and its relations. Basil Davidson, the most famous proponent of this approach to the African state, framed its behavior and relations as an outgrowth of the historical dysfunctionality of the nation-state in sub-Saharan Africa. The nation-state that emerged in the region, initially hoped to be a means by which to introduce and integrate Africa and its peoples into the modern world, functions to reinforce domestic insecurity, civil instability, and widespread poverty. The nation-state models imposed and adopted by

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7 Ibid.
sub-Saharan Africa engendered a certain sociocultural and political incompatibility with the local populations. Particularly inasmuch as they have not been effective mechanisms by which to address the political and developmental needs of the state. Instead, these state and political models largely allowed for the manipulation of the political system in a manner that retarded the political and economic growth and development of the state.9

The international relations of the state likewise are reflective of this incompatibility between the African state’s governing structures and institutions and the sociocultural makeup of African society. Its international relationships serve to expose the state to mass exploitation and international insecurity as opposed to minimizing or mediating the insecurities and dangers the international environment imposes on the state.

In an expansion of applied systematic thinking and approaches, development and dependency theories were developed to explain Africa’s specific circumstances in the global system. The premier proponent of this approach, Walter Rodney, essentially described the relations and behavior of the African state as an outgrowth of its historical underdevelopment by Western European powers.10 The African state’s historical and contemporary relationship with Europe, its allies, and international institutions and organizations, restricted its capacity to grow and develop into a functionally independent actor capable of internal self development. Through the international system, African state’s primary resources are systematically extracted from the state in a manner that deprives the state of the breadth of the wealth those resources generate. As a result, the

9 Ibid.

state is unable to generate enough revenues to purchase or produce essential capital and consumer goods and services towards the building of its own extractive and economic capacity. The state is then relegated to dependency on goods, services, and credit from those actors who generate the most wealth from the extraction of African primary resources. As a result, the relations and behavior of the state either become an outgrowth of international efforts to reinforce the system of underdevelopment, or internal efforts to halt the system of underdevelopment and achieve development and growth. The state and its leadership will be structured to achieve either of these two goals in the conduct of both its international relations and domestic politics.

Among classic authors, on the subject of development Samuel Huntington is the chief proponent of the civilizational approach to state relations, describing state behavior and relations as the product of a global competition between the world’s most prominent civilizations. Among states, this civilizational competition manifests itself along cultural, religious, language, regional, traditional alliances, economic, and military lines. States cooperate or engage in conflict based on these varying civilizations factors in efforts to achieve influence or dominance over competing civilizations, and within their own civilizational grouping. Conflict is most likely to manifest in those geographic areas where civilizations meet or border each other, particularly where civilizational lines overlap within a state or geographic region.

11 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
Within the context of this civilizational framework, the African state since the 7th century Muslim invasions may be described as being caught in the middle of a civilizational conflict seeking to draw it into multiple civilizational groups. The state’s behavior and relations consequently reflect this tug of war, both internally and externally. On the African continent and in the African Diaspora, there are those groups and individuals seeking to establish the African region as its own civilization pole. African independence, African unity, and economic integration and regionalism, all represent efforts to establish an African centered civilization. However, the former Western European colonizers of Africa, even after the era of African independence, continually seek to reinte grate the African region into the sphere of Western civilization. Simultaneously, the broad adherence to Islam in every subregion of the continent serves to draw large portions of it into the Turko-Islamic civilization. Furthermore, the large scale entry of the Chinese and Indians into the continent further complicate the civilizational loyalties of the continent as India and China seek to extend their influence across the continent. The African state possibly suffers from a condition of civilizational schizophrenia where its relations and behavior are dictated by the civilizational forces most strongly pulling the state into its sphere of influence. The overwhelming dominance of France in Central and West Africa, the Arab domination of the sub-Saharan governments of Sudan and Mauritania, the practice of Islamic law and government in Senegal and Nigeria, the dual membership of Somalia, the Comoros, and Djibouti in the

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14 This assessment is the position of the researcher in applying a civilizational framework to Africa.

15 This assessment is the position of the researcher in applying a civilizational framework to the African continent.
African Union and Arab league, and the large multiracial compositions of Mauritania, Namibia, South Africa, Sudan, and Zimbabwe are all symptomatic of the civilizational competition existing on the African continent.

The close of the Cold War essentially ended the classic period of scholarship within African International Relations as the world transitioned to a unipolar international order based on liberal and neoliberal regimes. Existing theory was reassessed and reapplied and new theory developed to describe the behavior and relations of the African state in the face of new systemic changes. African International Relations became dominated by literature centered on African state and regional transitions from the realist frameworks of the Cold War to the neoliberal international economic order of the unipolar world. Africa’s place and position within the new international order was closely examined particularly with regards to the capacity of the African state to modernize, grow, and develop within the new order.

Among neorealists, Christopher Clapham presents a security-based framework on what he describes as the post-Cold War international relations of the African state as the product of ongoing efforts to maintain and achieve state survival from a position of relatively limited power within the international system. He develops an alternate realist framework that views international relations from the bottom up perspective from those states with extremely limited power and influence, as opposed to the traditional top down view, from the system’s most powerful states. Within this view, African state behavior and relations revolve around ongoing efforts to ensure that the state does not

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dissolve under the pressures exerted upon it by the international system and state actors. Due to its power deficit and fragile state structure, the African state has employed a host of conventional and unconventional means by which to ensure its continued existence in the international system. African states took sides and played sides during the Cold War, joined or built international and regional institutions and organizations, established one party states, maintained neocolonial relationships, and instituted authoritarian and military rule ultimately as mechanisms to ensure the ongoing survival of the state. These survival strategies and techniques determine the relations and behavior of the state with very real consequences for the lives and security of the individuals living within the state.\textsuperscript{17}

Edmond Keller and Donald Rothchild adopting a combined neorealist and neoliberal framework describe the behavior and relations of the African state in the post-Cold War as a reaction to the breakdown of the 30 year realist security frameworks of that period.\textsuperscript{18} The breakdown of the global security regimes organized and maintained by the superpowers immediately manifested itself in terms of regional and subregional balances of power, civil stability, and domestic order. Where strong stabilizing agents did not exist, interstate conflict, civil conflict, economic collapse, or chronic instability ensued regionally or subregionally. African state behavior and relations are part of a transitional global process of redefining and reconstructing regional security frameworks through which to ultimately achieve state security and a stable international order. Due

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.

to the sub-Saharan African region lacking stabilizing agents, the reestablishment of regional and subregional security frameworks and regimes has been a turbulent process. The region has required the aid of external agents such as the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to help manage the transition from the realist security frame frameworks of the Cold War, to new security frameworks facilitating African participation in the post-Cold War neoliberal economic order. As such, the African state's behavior and relations are based on efforts to achieve security through the reestablishment of national, subregional, and regional security frameworks.19

Mulugeta Agonafer goes on to utilize a political economy framework in evaluating the behavior and relations of the African state. He expresses African state behavior and relations as an outgrowth of efforts to transition from military security paradigms of the Cold War to the neoliberal economic security paradigms governing the new economic international order. This new economic order emphasizes global economic security over military security, necessitating state national participation and integration into the global economy.20 Daniel Offiong using a neoliberal framework goes on to further examine the fundamental dynamics of the new international order in which state security is increasingly defined in terms of economic participation and production value chains. In the new order, economic participation is valued over realist Cold War value system founded on geostrategic and military concerns. Each state is required to be

19 Ibid.

a global economic competitor in order to ensure its survival relative to the competitive
efforts of other states. In the 21st century era of globalization and interdependency, the
fundamental determinants in state behavior and relations revolve around healthy
participation and integration into the global economy.21 Those states best able to
participate and effectively integrate themselves into the global economy at the highest
levels, gain the greatest economic and political benefits. Those states unable to
effectively integrate, participating only at the lowest levels of the production value chain
are relegated to a position of marginality within the global economic system. However,
in sub-Saharan Africa, the civil-political-economic deterioration of the 1990s that
accompanied the breakdown of Cold War security regimes, teamed with the failures of
the structural adjustment policies of the 1980s, significantly retarded the capacity of the
African state to compete in the new neoliberal economic order. Political and civil
instability, limited infrastructure, large scale debt, wide spread disease, and a lack of
financial transparency severely curtailed the ability of the state to meaningfully
participate in the global economy.22

Offiong goes on to explain that most African states have encountered significant
challenges in achieving the necessary paradigm shifts to transition from security
paradigms to economic paradigms. Every subregion of the continent has required
external forces to maintain peace and security accompanied by large economic packages
comprising humanitarian assistance and financial aid. The short term result has been that

21 Daniel A. Offiong, *Globalization: Post-Neodependency and Poverty in Africa* (Enugu, Nigeria:

22 Ibid.
in the era of economic globalization and political interdependence, African states have
the means to participate marginally on the periphery of the global economy. 23 The
politics of the state in turn revolve around the movement of the state from a position of
economic and political marginalization to a position of meaningful inclusion and
participation. This process of transition from one security paradigm to another becomes
the central determinant and influence on African state behavior and relations.

Taylor and Williams fundamentally reject as a starting point for African
International Relations, arguments based on Africa’s international economic
marginalization and internal political decay in the neoliberal economic order. Rather,
they assert that the ongoing behavioral and relational challenges of the African state are
reflective of its ongoing interaction with the imposing forces of the outside world that
adversely affect the ability of the state to manage both its domestic and international
political affairs. 24 They describe the relations and behavior of the African state in the
post-Cold War period as the outgrowth of ongoing attempts to manage state interaction
with a host of international actors seeking to enter into relationships with the African
state beyond the realist security politics of the Cold War. These actors seek to occupy the
economic and political space left by the superpowers in their retraction from the
continent. The ongoing globalization of the world since 1989 has forced all regions of
the world to evolve and transition their behavior and conduct their relationships to reflect
this global scale economic interaction between state and non-state actors

23 Ibid.
24 Ian Taylor & Paul Williams, Africa in International Politics: External Involvement on the continent
As a result, the average African has become an ongoing participant in the contemporary globalization process and is affected both directly and indirectly by the daily requirements and adjustments those global processes impose on the state. The relations and behavior of the state are then understood to be dictated by: ongoing efforts to effectively manage its neoliberal economic relationships with state and non-state actors; the effective meeting of the basic structural requirements of globalization, and the mitigation of the adverse effects of globalization’s processes on the state and its population.

Among the literature on African international relations in both the classical and contemporary period, very few pieces presented a general study of the field collectively detailing the major approaches to African international relations. Most were either ideologically slanted or were largely critiques of other approaches. The pieces dedicated to African politics were sociopolitical and economic commentaries largely not in the form of academic text books. In the mid period between the major classical and contemporary pieces, Olatunde Ojo, D. Orwa, and C. Utete introduced the first major general study Africa international relations academic text in 1985. The text was titled “African International Relations,” and represented a significant break with the traditional style of classical texts.

For the first time the general study approach common to academic international

25 Ibid.
relations texts was applied to AIR. The text outlined the most common general theories of international relations and approaches to African Politics. The authors explained how African states have addressed the most important IR questions within their own experiences. They address questions of power, international institutionalism, conflict, foreign policy decision making, and integration. Ojo, Orwa, and Utete’s work stands out among studies in African politics as a non-ideologically aligned piece unbiased towards a specific theoretical tradition or framework.

This short review of both the classical and contemporary literature reveals two notable shortcomings endemic to the available literature set in explaining the international relations of the sub-Saharan African state in general behavioral terms.27 First, even though each author employs a theoretical framework that is clearly informative in its subfield, representing a limited truth, each assessment represents a largely linear approach to the study of the African International relations. They center largely on singular aspects of state behavior and relations as the central determinants in the ongoing management of the state’s international relationships. Regardless of considerations of perception, global security regimes, transition, development, class, global economy, or global economic and cultural imperialism; none of the theoretical approaches presented in the classical and contemporary literature represents a

27 This study is in the topic area of African international relations. It primarily addresses African state behavior and relations in the international system. The literature on African international relations (AIR) primarily discusses agency versus structural factors within the parameters of the international system. The seminal text in AIR largely do not have a primary focus on the domestic politics of the African state. This study is concerned primarily with adequate description and categorization of the African state as a unit within the system and how its unit characteristics interact with the structure of the international system. Further, general international relations texts and the most conventional IR theories do not focus primarily on domestic state behavior. Based on these collective factors I followed the pattern of the literature set on AIR, and did not pursue literature dedicated specifically to the state in Africa.
comprehensive theoretical framework inclusive of multiple behavioral determinants paralleling the multilayered structure of the state. Each author in employing a presumed general theory assumes that the determinants of the state’s behavior and relations can be isolated and narrowed to one central determinant to explain all of the state’s decisions and actions. Given the validity of the limited truth presented in each theory, this study fundamentally assumes that the behavior and relations of the state cannot be comprehensively explained utilizing a single theory presenting a single determinant.

As a multilayered entity, different aspects of the state are inherently linked to distinct behavioral determinants, those determinants to a specific set of behaviors, and those behaviors in turn impacting the other aspects of the state which are inherently linked to other behavioral determinants. No single determinant in the state’s behavior can necessarily be divorced from the impact of other behavioral determinants in a truly behavioral assessment. The state’s actions and decisions are founded on consideration of multiple factors, even if only in varying degrees, as the outcomes of those actions affect the state in a multiplicity of ways. The objective of theory ultimately is not to identify a single or central determinant in the ‘states’ behavior, but to describe as fully as possible the behavior and relations of the state.29

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28 This study assumes that it is possible to have a hierarchy of determinants in terms of “primary” and “secondary” roles. This assumption is common to conventional IR theory. Mainstream theories such as realism, liberalism, and international class analysis subordinate all other factors to their specific primary determinant. This is done in order to not isolate against the existence of those other determinants, and classify them as secondary determinants. Power may be subordinated to class, institutionalism may be class based and rely on a military element, and the diffusion of power among select states may place them in a specific class category. During the cold war all other determinants were subordinated to power. However, this study also assumes that these determinants do not have to compete in terms of primary and secondary roles, but can exist simultaneously outside of any form of hierarchy.

Examples of such theoretical shortcomings may be seen in Christopher Clapham’s realist framework in citing state survival as the African state’s central behavioral determinant. Within his assessment, there arises the distinct challenge of assessing the prevalence of state failure and collapse in every subregion of the African continent in the 1990s given that they were not inevitable events. The patterns of state failure and collapse in countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, The Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, Central African Republic, Angola, and Mozambique do not suggest that the general objective of those states was survival. Other determinants need to be identified particularly given the continuing necessity for international institutions and actors to provide international economic aid, peacekeepers, and humanitarian missions to ensure the survival of several states. Keller and Rothchild also encounter significant challenges in citing the “realist to liberal” transitions of the post-Cold War as the central determinant in African state behavior and relations. The instances of civil war during and after the Cold War continue in consistent percentages and the region’s international debt continues to climb within the neoliberal order. State expenditures in both the Cold War and post-Cold War periods have continued to be disproportionately matched in favor of military spending over infrastructure, education, and the production of essential primary agricultural goods. The argument of “transition” as the primary behavioral determinant does not account for those behaviors and actions continuing from one period into another with great consistency. The assumption of a single primary determinant to explain this phenomenon ultimately provides an incomplete understanding of the state, as its specific behaviors continue beyond the prescriptions of that single
determinant. Consideration of multiple determinants is necessary to explain the consistencies and changes in state behavior and relations that go across many periods.

The second theoretical shortcoming present in the literature set is its general founding on theoretical assumptions that do not necessarily parallel the contemporary realities of the international system and its units. Numerous realist and liberal assumptions that held true in the 1950s or 1990s simply cannot be substantiated in the post-September 11th world because the data do not uphold them. The African state largely does not meet the general state structural characteristics of realism or liberalism, nor do their system-unit descriptions wholly reflect the structure of the international system in any manner that can be empirically verified. In particular, realism assumes the unitary nature of state units in structure and behavior, and that systemic factors have a general impact on all state units. The African state is theoretically subject to the same assessments, requirements, and rules of a system it is not functionally structured to operate within. As a result, realist and liberal frameworks have been utilized to structure the international environment for the African state based on assumed general unit constants of structure, rationality, and interest that did not parallel the dominant characteristics of the African state. Within the contemporary literature, Taylor and William’s efforts at theoretical discourse through such a partial lens leads them to conclusions patterned on unconventional theory within a conventional theoretical framework.

Likewise, unconventional theory has continued to hold the general assumptions that cannot necessarily be substantiated by empirical evidence. Unconventional theory
continues to hold the assumption that the African state has only a minor degree of autonomy in its domestic and foreign policy decisions. Neocolonialism, development and dependency, and marginalization studies all support this type of position. However, the regional decision making patterns and actions of the states of sub-Saharan Africa suggest that this assumption is presently unfounded. Rather, it suggests that African state leadership may be exercising larger degrees of autonomy and agency in decision making than was previously experienced during the Cold War. Regional percentages of expenditures as a percentage of GDP on the staples of development such as education, infrastructure, and health care remain the lowest of any region in the world in the post Cold War era. Without the ongoing support of the Cold War powers to insulate it from the outcomes of poor decision making and corruption on the part of government, the failings of the leadership of the African state have become plainly obvious in its increasing post cold war underdevelopment, marginalization, and civil instability.

This study seeks to address the weaknesses of the literature through the building of a meta-theory of African International Relations utilizing a multiple theory multideterminant approach with assumptions reflecting the actual realities of the African state and international environment. It does not merely seek to build on the assumptions of previous theoretical traditions without scrutinizing those assumptions against an empirical evaluation. Such an approach to African International Relations will provide the basis for more comprehensively descriptive studies of African state behavior and relations rooted in empiricism and not merely theoretical tradition.

CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Theoretical Framework

The three primary conventional theoretical frameworks discussed and critiqued in this study are realism, liberalism, and international class theory. These theories were chosen as the most widely utilized theoretical frameworks in African international relations (AIR). Thereafter, the general theory approach to analysis is critiqued in lieu of the functionalist and evolution-based assumptions of this study followed by arguments in favor of a metatheoretical approach based on multiple primary determinants. The chapter goes on to outline the challenges of building a metatheory as well as how those challenges will be addressed within this study. The remainder of the chapter introduces metafunctionalism as a primary framework, detailing its foundational concepts of polygenesis and modified functionalism as the skeleton of the metatheory.

Theoretical Critique: Realism, Liberalism, International Class Theory

Realism, liberalism, and class analysis are the three leading paradigms utilized in IR theory. In particular, realism and liberalism are the two primary theoretical influences on international behavior and norms in the contemporary international system. Realism presupposes the centrality of state sovereignty as the principal value of the members of the international system and is state-centric, holding individual countries as the most important units of the system. Realism holds that the realization of national interests is

\[1 \text{ Kegley and Raymond, 28.} \]
the primary motivator of state behavior and interaction and that power, primarily in its military form, is the ultimate means by which the state’s interests are achieved in an anarchic system. Liberalism, however, seeks to foster peace through political and economic institutionalism as a means of fostering cooperation and mitigating conflict among states. Liberalism advocates the utilization of institutions and organizations to formally establish behavioral norms among states, utilizing the same institutions and organizations to discipline or punish states not adhering to the rules of international order.2 Today’s rapidly evolving international system is a complex interplay between the two with global governance and institutional balances of power in the absence of a global government.

Both realist and liberal forms of international order represent imperfect constructed realities that are brought into being and maintained via the exercise of power by the leading actors in the international system. They do not represent a perfect, natural, or permanent order that irrefutably must be maintained to ensure an acceptable level of international organization. Continual systemic changes and present and ongoing challenges in the international system sufficiently dispel any notions of permanence or perfection. By themselves, they are insufficient to fully describe the motivations behind state behavior and IR beyond the aversion of conflict and war through military security and the maintenance of peace through institutional cooperation.3

Power is ultimately the means by which realist and liberal orders are constructed and maintained, and power or its loss are the means by which those constructed realities were constructed and maintained.2

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2 Kegley and Raymond, 29-32.

may be changed. These power-based forms of order result in building theory on idealized forms of order that do not necessarily reflect the empirical realities of the international environment. They have a particular challenge in generalizing the behavioral motivations behind the actions of the state. Realist and liberalist scholars essentially construct their theories on the world as they think and hope it is, assuming that the exercise of power in military, economic, and institutional forms will ultimately bring that ideal into being. As a result, their foundational assumptions are rooted in an ideal environment (system) and object (nation states) constants that do not and will not necessarily hold true in all circumstances but are justified as necessary for the formulation of a rational general theory of IR. Liberalism and realism’s theoretically descriptive and analytical shortcomings are maintained through the use of power to make international order and state behavior conform to theory, even if only in a partial aesthetic form.

Proponents of realism and liberalism justify this method of structuring general theory on the idea that system-wide behavioral theories must be dependent on the actors in the system exercising the most power and influence in both the military and economic spheres, posing the most tangible threats or benefits to the functioning of the system. Weak states such as those in sub-Saharan Africa, based on their level of influence, power, and international political and economic participation in the system, are not held to be

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4 Ibid.

5 This is the position of the researcher after having reviewed both the contemporary and classical literature in the topic area.

6 Hughes, 48-50, 79-80.

7 Ibid.
significant enough international actors upon which to base a rational and general behavioral theory of system and states. These states have little impact on the structure and behavior of the system and its most influential actors and do not militarily or economically threaten the existence or functioning of the system. As such, they need not warrant full consideration in the formation of general behavioral theories of IR because their impact is minimal.

This approach poses significant challenges to an empiricist-based analysis of the state and system, as several of these generalizations do not take into consideration at minimum 25% of the states participating in the system. An example of this form of theoretical structuring may be seen in the basic ordering of IR into a system of corresponding units. Realism’s assumption of unitary consistency among states across the system as expressed in the unitary rational actor principle is intended to allow for broad generalizations regarding unit behavior. The base unit of the international system is held to be the state in its nation-state format, generally assumed to be a rational actor with similar basic responses to systemic factors. However, even the most remote empirical observation of the international system suggests that a significant percentage of states, mainly among nonindustrialized states comprising the majority of states in the international system, are structured differently and express great variation in behavior relative to industrialized and industrializing nation-states.

In spite of the structural and behavioral deviation among states in the system,

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8 The states of Africa alone comprise 54 of the world’s almost 200 states.

9 Barry Hughes, Continuity and Change in World Politics: Competing Perspectives, 3rd ed. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1997), 46-47.

realism assumes not only the structural similarity of state units (nation-states), but also similar levels of functionality between states. Participating states are assumed to be functional or on a path to becoming functional nation-states with like behaviors. Instead, realism makes distinctions between the power, capabilities, and interests of different states within the system as a means of explaining their differences.\textsuperscript{11}

However, a significant percentage of states, including those of sub-Saharan Africa, do not structurally resemble or behave in the fashion of a nation-state, and it has become highly questionable as to whether they will ever transition to functional nation-states. Global developmental projections suggest that it is likely that most of these states will either remain cyclically dependent and weak with great possibilities for future failure and collapse or evolve into another social organizational form altogether.\textsuperscript{12} Of the world’s nearly 200 states, the majority of the 48 Sub-Saharan African states arguably do not fit the description of the nation-state or general rational unitary actor relative to the functional nation-states in the international system. General assumptions of this type based “ideally” on the nation-state significantly distort the formal structure, functioning, and basic system-unit agreement of the international system for most of the states on the African continent.

The proponents of realist theory have sought to maintain theoretical consistency in structural makeup and outcomes through the use of political, economic, and institutional power. The system’s most powerful actors maintain unitary consistency in the real world through the conferring of state legitimacy within the international system

\textsuperscript{11} Hughes, 47-50.

\textsuperscript{12} Anderson, 11-13.
on states that not only fail to resemble the nation-state in any way, but also do not display the characteristics of a sovereign state to any recognizable degree. Both state power and institutional power are used to maintain a system of states through territorial, diplomatic, and institutional recognition and economic support where, according to conventional definitions, states technically would not exist.¹³

Likewise, liberalism’s preferences for international institutionalism and economic interdependence assume that participation in the first instance and cooperation in the second instance are generally desirable, rational, and in the interest of all the system units.¹⁴ Liberalism does not assume that conflict and noncooperation may rationally be in the interest of state actors, leading to greater benefits than those gained from cooperating.¹⁵ Furthermore, liberalism overlooks the possibility of preferences for class, civilization, religion, ethnicity, or race over the socioeconomic and political benefits of institutional cooperation. All of these factors may serve to obstruct the process of cooperation, which, in reality, is conditional for both applicants and participants. Due to liberal assumptions being a reflection of the preferences of the system’s most powerful and influential actors as opposed to general attitudes substantiated by data, power is exercised to bring about environmental conditions where the cost of nonparticipation is significantly higher than the cost of cooperation. Regimes of international isolation, sanctions, and force are tools in the present international order to encourage participation

¹³ Ibid.


¹⁵ Ibid.
and discourage noncooperation. However, if liberalist assumptions were generally true for all state units, no such measures would be necessary to assure participation and cooperation. Furthermore, liberalism assumes that economic and political interdependency and interconnectedness are the best method by which to reduce conflict, foster cooperation, and achieve international order. However, the structure of international institutions and their distribution of benefits may serve to reduce cooperation as opposed to encouraging it. The hierarchical nature of international financial and political institutions dictates that those states ranking highest in the international status quo of states accrue the greatest institutional benefits while those in the lowest positions accrue the least. As a result, the majority of states in the system receive the smallest tangible benefits from it and have the greatest incentive to dissociate.

International class theory in its multivariate forms has been the most consistent and common means of theorizing the African state and its relations. The variant forms of class analysis (Leninism, neocolonialism, system theory, dependency, and underdevelopment) were believed to better address the conditions of the African continent and the third world by African and other third-world scholars. Class theory suggests that production relations both domestically and internationally are the driving factors in state behavior and relations. Just as in the state where social classes have formed and are in a conflict over ownership and control of the means of production, within the international environment a hierarchy has developed among states in which

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16 Ibid., 30-31.
17 Ibid., 2.
18 Hughee, 56.
they are engaged in a conflict over control of scarce resources, ownership of capital and consumer intensive production processes, and the distribution of goods and services. International class theory assumes the existence of a dialectical relationship between social and state classes in which select groups benefit at the expense of others. Further, the international system is hierarchically structured and economically stratified between a number of metropole states in the center and a host of satellite states in the periphery and semi-periphery. The outcomes of the class-based structure of the international system for peripheral states are neocolonial- and dependency-based relationships resulting in their cyclical underdevelopment.

However, international class analysis poses several problems in theorizing African state behavior and relations. First, like other general theoretical approaches, it assumes that the state’s behavior and relations can be reduced to a single behavioral determinant of class. As stated previously, such an assumption does not parallel a functionalist assumption of the multilayered structure of the state, which implies multiple primary determinants in the state’s behavior. Second, regional development indicators and national budgetary expenditures do not indicate that African states continue to be underdeveloped primarily due to dialectical relationships with developed center states. African states are not necessarily poor because other states are rich. In the sub-Saharan region, national budgetary expenditures indicate a general diversion of resources from the foundational development areas of education, infrastructure, and essential staple agricultural products to military expenditure, personal aggrandizement, and corruption.19 Further, the global economy (GWP) has expanded significantly in size from 20.5 trillion

dollars in 1989 to 69.7 dollars in 2009 (over 200%). The African region economically accounted for only one thirtieth of the global economy over this 20-year 200% growth period. Sub-Saharan Africa did not achieve significant economic growth and development in the post-Cold War period while dramatic growth occurred in other peripheral and developing areas in Southeast Asia, Southern Asia, and Latin America.  

International class theory also assumes the position of center states to be created and maintained through exploitation of the periphery. However, the expansion of European power that allowed for the exploitation of other regions of the world was founded dually on domestic consolidation of the state through nationalism and the advancement of naval technology and prowess. These factors allowed those states to assume a position in the center from which to exploit other areas and states and were not based on a dialectical relationship with the periphery in the first instance. Without the assumption of exploitation as the fundamental means by which to enter the center, international class theory does not have prescriptions by which peripheral states may achieve a center quality of life outside of delinking. The prescriptions of socialist revolution have as yet to achieve this desired goal.

The General Theory Approach vs. Functionalist Assumptions

This study proposes a metatheoretical approach over a general theory approach to theorizing the behavior and relations of the African state. Such an approach is meant to address the multiple problems of previous general approaches by utilizing multiple theories and multiple behavioral determinants rather than a single theory and primary determinant. It is believed that such an approach provides greater theoretical parallels to

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the structure of the state, yielding greater descriptive capacity and explanatory power than previous approaches. A broader descriptive framework is necessary to describe and re-categorize the behavior and relations of the African state in order to reflect its current dominant characteristics.

This approach is inspired and borrowed from classic and contemporary U.S. foreign policy studies utilizing multilevel analysis to assess foreign policy decision making and implementation. Kegley and Wittkopf, and Kegley and Raymond, in both *U.S. Foreign Policy* and *International Relations*, developed a metatheoretical framework referred to as the “funnel of causality” to illustrate the workings of both areas. The less elaborate version is presented in the study of IR detailing the three levels of analysis including global, regional, and state sources. The causal factors in the state’s behavior are attributed to a combination of factors present in the structure of the international environment and its units. The more elaborate version of the funnel of causality is utilized in U.S. foreign policy detailing the multiple sources of foreign policy decision making within a structured chronological order of inputs and outputs. These sources are nonhierarchical and include external sources, societal sources, governmental sources, role sources, and individual sources, all of which require differing methods of analysis. Though such an approach is uncommon within IR theory, the method housed in the funnel of causality provides a sound foundation for the analysis of the collection of state foreign policies that largely comprise IR. This metatheoretical approach provides an alternative to the traditionally applied general theory approaches being founded on

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22 Ibid.
multiple nonhierarchical determinants.

General Theory

The general theory approach of description and categorization has been the most common contemporary methodological approach to scientific social theory and the social sciences generally.\(^\text{23}\) This approach to theory has been adapted from the hard sciences approach to theorizing where singular theories are comprehensive within environmental constants in explaining select phenomena.\(^\text{24}\) The most conventional theories of IR employ the general theory approach to explaining causation, commonly entailing a single theory revolving around a primary behavioral and relational determinant (Figure 1).\(^\text{25}\) Within IR, they begin with the assumption that state behavior and relations can be isolated and narrowed to a central or primary determinant that will explain most of the state’s politics, policies, decisions, actions, and relationships.\(^\text{26}\) This central determinant emerges primarily out of either a state or system environmental variable. The most common general theories of IR include realism, liberalism, and international class theory. General IR theories describe the general characteristics of state units, their interactions, and the structure and functioning of the system within which they exist.\(^\text{27}\) State characteristics are based on the aggregate behavioral and relational outputs of the states within the system. They are identified and described relative to other states displaying or


\(^{24}\) Meehan, 9-12.


\(^{26}\) Ibid.

Figure 1. General Theory Approach: Single Theory Primary Determinant Model of International Relations
not displaying those characteristics. System characteristics are based on the system’s structure and functioning in relation to the base units comprising it. Changes in the system’s characteristics are identified by changes in its base units and the relations between them. These general systems of characteristic description are presented as applicable to the entire international environment across all regions and states. 28

As such, within IR, both the state and the system have been afforded a host of characteristics within the varying theories. Within realism, state characteristic descriptions include “powerful” and “weak,” and system descriptions include “anarchic” and “unitarily rational.” Within liberalism, states are described as “interdependent” and “marginal,” with system characteristics including “institutional” and “interdependent.” Within internal class theory, states are characteristicistically described as “central,” “semi-peripheral,” “peripheral,” “dependent,” and “underdeveloped.” Likewise, the system’s characteristics are described as “hierarchical” and “stratified.” 29

The general theory approach is fundamentally limited by its assumption that the general behavior and relations of the state can be fundamentally isolated and narrowed to a single determinant. 30 Even though such an approach has feasibility within the physical sciences, it has not resulted in academic consensus regarding human behavior and social systems within the social sciences. The integrated nature and multilayered structure of human social interaction does not allow human behavior and relations on multiple levels to be studied within a single discipline or assumed to be driven by a central determinant.

28 Ibid.


30 Meehan, 12.
Within psychology Freudian theory assumes all human behavior to be the outgrowth of sexuality or the human sex drive.\textsuperscript{31} Within sociology, Social Darwinism suggests that human behavior and relations are driven by evolutionary forces in which competition among individuals, groups, nations, or ideas drives human and societal advancement.\textsuperscript{32} Within political science, Marxists believe class factors emerging out of production relations to be the central determinant in human behavior and relations. As a result, between and within social science disciplines, there has not developed a general consensus on the central determinant in human behavior and relations.\textsuperscript{33} In the 19\textsuperscript{th} and 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries, the broadest consensus across disciplines was achieved within class theory and among social evolutionary theorists in explaining human and societal behavior.\textsuperscript{34}

**Functionalism**

Functionalism is founded on a dual emphasis on the application of an analogy or metaphor between the individual organism and society, and the application of the scientific method to the study of the social world.\textsuperscript{35} Society is held to be analogous to a living organism in that both society and organisms are made up of interdependent working parts and systems that must function together in order for the greater body to function. This ‘organic analogy’ views society’s various parts as working together to


\textsuperscript{33} Bergen, 2-4.

\textsuperscript{34} Bridgeman, 12-22. Both evolution and class theory has been employed extensively in anthropology, sociology, and economics.

form a social system in the same way that the different parts of an organism form a cohesive functioning entity.\textsuperscript{36} Society is composed of multiple institutions such as the family, educational system, religious system, judicial system, political system, economic system, military, and other institutions that are connected in an equilibrial system. Significant changes in one institution will ultimately be paralleled by changes in other institutions. As a result, each institution must be assessed in terms of its role in the functioning of the whole of society, and societal behavior must be understood as the product of all of these interlinked parts working in concert.\textsuperscript{37} Structural functionalism further emphasizes the structures or specific institutions and the manner in which they operate individually towards the functioning of the entire system. The functionality of each of society's political structures must be studied in isolation as well as in concert to determine the causal factors in political and state behavior.\textsuperscript{38} These functionalist assumptions are germane to the study of political science with its focus on the systematic organization of society, the state, and the international system.

The multiple aspects of both the individual and society must be studied within an interdisciplinary framework inclusive of different theoretical traditions and approaches in order to explain and describe their behavior. Human beings are at the same time biological, psychological, social, and economic creatures, while societies are simultaneously ecological, political, economic, cultural, and religious entities. In order to understand society or the state as a product of its interlocking parts, states must also be


\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.

assessed within their various areas. The theoretical approach to assessing the African state must parallel these basic functionalist assumptions, which are indicative of the existence of multiple primary determinants in the state's behavior and relations.

**Contradictions**

Within the social sciences, however, there exists a foundational contradiction between commonly held functionalist assumptions and the general theory approaches commonly applied to the study of human behavior and social systems. Functionalism ultimately views behavior to be the product of multiple determinant factors, while the general theory approach narrows the causal factors in human social behavior to a primary or central determinant. Functionalism implies the necessity for an interdisciplinary or a metatheoretical approach, while the general theory approach hinges on a single theory and primary determinant.

The general theory approach faces the challenge of substantiating its position relative to social theory and the social science's foundational functionalist assumption of the multilayered structure of society and the individual. Each individual is a multifaceted being composed of a biological being, psychological being, emotional being, and sexual being, among other divisions. Each layer is dynamically linked to the others, and each has an impact on the behavior of the individual. Likewise, the state's structure is composed of multiple institutions and its bounded territory. The state itself is at a minimum comprised of a geographic territory, population, political system, economic system, religious system, social system, ethnic and national identities, and culture.

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39 Meehan, 12.

These different aspects of the state are inherently linked to multiple behavioral determinants that produce specific character traits in the state. Due to the state's structure being composed of interlocking parts, no single determinant can necessarily be divorced from the impact of other determinants in the state's behavior.

General theory approaches within IR face the challenge of substantiating the pursuit of a primary behavioral determinant relative to the state existing as a multilayered functionally composed entity. The assumption that the general behavior and relations of a multilayered state entity can be limited to a single behavioral determinant is an assumption imported from the hard sciences that has in recent history only proved successful in explaining the multipolar origins of WWI/II and the bipolar politics of the Cold War.41 In the post-Cold War era, however, state relations in general have moved beyond the primary security concerns of the superpowers and neocolonial interests to a host of interlinked factors also including security, economics, culture, civilization, religion, and human rights.42

Within African IR, what is contemporarily necessary is an approach paralleling functionalist assumptions of society, considering multiple primary determinants in the state's behavior based on its multilayered structure. This approach will provide greater parallels between theory and empirical reality, granting a more accurate means of examination and analysis than approaches housing only a single or primary determinant.

are taken from the chapter's comprehensive description of the state and its challenges.

41 Realism and power as the central determinant adequately explain the behavior of those periods. However, the combination of behaviors demonstrated by the United States and China in the post-Cold War era requires multiple theories to explain the complexity of their behavior towards each other and the rest of the world as the system's two most powerful states.

42 Goldstein, 102-105.
Analysis based on a single determinant does not generally parallel the structure of the state and hence is not likely to be capable of granting a comprehensive general explanation of the causal factors in its behavior.

**Challenges to African State Description and Categorization in General Theory Approaches**

Within conventional IR theory, the African state has generally faced the problem of region-specific categorization. Historically, realism and liberalism have not generally acknowledged or recognized the existence of a grouping of state characteristics unique to the states of the sub-Saharan African region.\(^{43}\) They do not present a categorization for the behavioral, relational, and structural characteristics shared by the states of sub-Saharan Africa. African states are merely described as weak, underdeveloped, pre-modern, traditional, and economically and institutionally backwards, as are many states in other regions. Even so, African states have collectively displayed a drastically different set of behavioral outputs than those of other regions. Those behaviors are observed most markedly in the political instability, economic underdevelopment, and large-scale debt of African states.\(^{44}\)

The individual characteristics displayed by African states by themselves are not unique; they are observed in numerous other states and do not require a regional categorization just because they are experienced. Such a justification would serve to create a false premise in which the deduction would be made that if a state is

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\(^{43}\) No such categorization or acknowledgment is present in classical realism, neorealism, liberalism, neoliberalism, or constructivism.

characteristically weak, it is also then located in sub-Saharan Africa. Such a conclusion would prove false, as many weak states exist outside the African continent. The factor warranting a region-specific or alternative categorization is the unique combination of select behavioral, relational, and structural characteristics shared by a majority of states in a particular region or globally.\textsuperscript{45}

Within African political literature, there has been historical acknowledgement that African states exhibit a combination of shared characteristics that account for their long-term behavior and the aggregate condition of the region. Due to realism's and liberalism's failure to address the realities of those collective characteristics and their implications, theorists of African politics turned to international class theory and statist approaches as a means to describe and categorize African state behavior and relations. International class theory, as IR theory's most popular alternative to realism and liberalism, was widely adopted and embraced among scholars of the African continent as the ideal framework by which to theorize the newly independent states of sub-Saharan Africa.\textsuperscript{46} Neocolonialism, systems theory, dependency, and underdevelopment theory's emphasis on equality and an equitable distribution of income and resources loaned greater explanation and causality for the conditions of poor states relative to conventional theory. Neomarxist theory explained the conditions of sub-Saharan African states relative to the conditions of other states within a dialectical relationship. This explanation more closely approximated the historical experience of the African state with

\textsuperscript{45} This is the position of the researcher based on his own observations and understandings of IR and comparative politics.

colonialism. Such explanations were presented in contrast to realism, which was absent of moral considerations and justified the conditions of the African state based on its lack of power, and in contrast to the modernization ideas of Neoliberals.⁴⁷

However, most of international class theory's variants ultimately adopted a general theory approach to description and categorization with all its inherent limitations. Leninism, world systems theory, dependency, and underdevelopment were all developed with largely general application throughout the international system, describing the structure of the system as the basis of the relations between its units. The categories of peripheral, dependent, and underdeveloped described the dominant general characteristics of nonindustrialized states. The international class framework emphasized the role of the system and its structure in the behavior and relations of not only the African state, but also all states in the periphery. Only neocolonialism within the context described by Kwame Nkrumah was used to specifically describe the condition and behavior of African states within international class theory. Even so, neocolonialism as a regional category faces the challenge of limiting the contemporary behavior and relations of the African state to primarily systemic forces where state-based factors are just as pervasive.

An Alternative Approach: The Metatheoretical Method

This study favors a metatheoretical approach over a general theory approach to theorizing the African state (Figure 2). The metatheoretical approach to description and categorization has been most commonly used in general-study academic texts of IR and as a primary method of study in the area of foreign policy. The metatheoretical approach is consistent with the functionalist assumptions pervading the study of the social sciences,

⁴⁷ Ibid.
Figure 2. Metatheoretical Approach: Multiple Theory Multiple Determinant Model of International Relations
warranting the consideration of multiple primary determinants to explain the behavior and relations of an individual, society, or state.

Metatheoretical approaches must hold the possibility of inclusion of multiple theories or theoretical traditions, an acceptance of multiple primary behavioral and relational determinants, and an acknowledgement that those determinants may emerge simultaneously out of multiple variables. Metatheoretical approaches (multiple theory - multiple determinant approaches) begin with the assumption that general theories represent partial explanations revealing only limited causal truths in explaining state behavior and relations. Such an approach immediately addresses the limitations of the general theory approach by acknowledging its shortcomings and recognizing the necessity of utilizing multiple theories as tools to achieve greater accuracy and explanatory power. It allows for the consideration of a nonhierarchical set of behavioral determinants largely unavailable in most conventional IR theory.

**Building a Metatheoretical Framework**

The metatheory built in this study will be constructed through a nonhierarchical consolidation of theoretical approaches. Given the assumption of the validity of existing IR theories as partial behavioral truths, within the metatheory must be developed a means of employing existing theory cooperatively while eliminating intertheory contradictions. Consolidating preexisting theory presents a foundational problem, as there are fundamental differences between the philosophical approaches and assumptions of each of the theories. First, each theory approaches IR from a unique philosophical base that differentiates it from other approaches. Second, each theory assumes the primacy of a central determinant in the state’s behavior and assumes that its particular determinant is

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48 Goldstein, 6-9. The assumptions of IR theories are different based on philosophy.
the most prominent factor in state relations. Third, the base assumptions and system-unit
descriptions regarding the international environment are fundamentally different based on
the theoretical tradition.

Of the three foundational problems, the philosophical bases upon which the
theories are formed cannot be changed, as those are the factors that grant theoretical
diversity, allowing each theory to describe different aspects of state behavior and
relations. The absence of philosophical diversity in IR theory would destroy any basis
upon which to pursue a metatheory of IR. The second and third factors, however, may be
changed in such a manner as to allow for a theoretical consolidation without destroying
the fundamental utility and uniqueness of the theory in its present form.

Regarding the second operational challenge to building a metatheory, this study,
as stated earlier, fundamentally rejects the position that in the post-Cold War era a single
central or primary determinant can generally explain state behavior and relations. The
verifiability or parallels of the assumptions of each theory to empirical reality suggest
there is inherent credibility in each of the theories from different points of view regarding
the same events. Though base assumptions vary across theories, they are inherently
rooted in examining the same international environmental variables of state and system.
Each philosophical position simply views the same events through different eyes and
expresses some explanatory power in IR. The contradictions occur between the theories
as each framework regards the determinant unique to its philosophical view as primary
and general across the entire international environment.

However, the occurrence of one explanatory truth does not necessarily negate the
existence of other explanatory truths, nor does it necessarily warrant the branding of such
a position as universal or primary. Due to all the primary theories holding elements of empirical truth, they all may be considered general or primary. Likewise, if they all dually house true and false elements, then all may be considered partially general or not general at all. Under such circumstances, a metatheory may only be conceived of as possible if the empirically verifiable findings of each theory can harmoniously coexist. For in the event that the verifiable findings of each theory can harmoniously coexist without contradiction, then likewise the empirically verifiable assumptions of each theory may also coexist harmoniously without contradiction. The elimination of contradictions in assumptions would then allow the third operational challenge to be immediately overcome. Even so, the empirically false statements or aspects of any of the theories need not be considered at all, as they are not the elements upon which an empirically based metatheory would be formed.

In addressing the challenge of diverging theoretical assumptions and linking the theories, a general set of verifiable assumptions regarding the international environment and its variables must be formed to provide a basis for each theory's individual execution without destroying its philosophical roots. The simplest scenario by which to achieve this assumption consolidation involves maintaining all of the empirically verifiable assumptions of each theory (for without them there would be no theory), disregarding those assumptions that cannot be substantiated by data, and merely adding where empirical data further necessitate. Even so, the question remains as to whether these verifiable assumptions can coexist without negating the explanatory capacity of each theory. This study answers that question in the affirmative, as empiricism is isomorphic,

49 Meehan, 12.

50 Ibid.
not internally contradictory, where empirically verifiable environmental assumptions do not falsify each other.\footnote{Meehan, 57-58.} There is empirical consistency between systems and their units, structures and their functions, and institutions and their outputs.

As such, realism’s propositions of power, interest, material capability, and balance are not nullified by international class theory’s assumption of a center and periphery, or liberalism’s international institutionalism and complex interdependence. Likewise, realism’s premise of unit rationality is not destroyed based on liberalism’s assumption of rationality based on institutional rules and norms of participation and cooperation, as rationality is an outgrowth of state interests and germane to institutional participation as well as to state security. The concept of unit rationality remains without the concept of the unitary rational actor, as rationality is not preponderant on like units, but on the base interests of units that are collectively constrained by the structure of the international system. Those rational interests may lead states to voluntarily cooperate or engage in conflict to provide for the basic needs that are general to all states.

International class theory’s assertion of the existence of multiple divisions within the structure of the international system leaves adequate room for the existence of institutional and interest-based actor rationality. Liberalism’s assumption of international institutionalism and interdependence is not made less relevant because of class theory’s assertion that they are dominated by hierarchy and stratification factors. International institutions are hierarchical, based primarily on economic and military power and to a lesser extent on other normative factors.\footnote{G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the future of the West,” Foreign Affairs vol. 87, no. 1 (January/February 2008) : 33.} The global economy is itself stratified based
on the international division of production and labor, and each state’s position in the
global economic value chain in the center or periphery.\textsuperscript{53} Regimes of dependency exist
within international institutionalism and complex interdependence and are maintained
based on power considerations and national interests.

From the position that these verifiable general assumptions germane to each
theory do not nullify the explanatory capacity of the other relevant theories, those same
assumptions will form the base general assumptions of the metatheory. The assumptions
imported from each theory ultimately allow for the identification of each of the primary
determinants in the state’s behavior and relations without eliminating the validity or role
played by each of those determinants.

The process of expanding the structural assumptions given to the international
environment beyond the linear assumptions of any one theory effectively expands the
number of behavioral determinants under consideration in a state action. Under common
assumptions, each general theory merely becomes an identification tool for a specific
behavioral determinant, differentiated from the others only by its philosophical approach
to describing behavior. This process mitigates the conflict between the theories, allowing
for a seamless integration of theory. Contradictions that arise within the metatheory
would likely be reflective of internal structural contradictions arising within the system
and states themselves as opposed the structure of the metatheory.

\textsuperscript{53} Hughes, 352, 354.
Biological Evolution

The metatheory developed in this study assumes the philosophical position of Social Darwinists and evolutionary psychologists holding biological processes of evolution to have distinct and direct parallels in human social and societal development. In maintaining the state as analogous to the individual, evolution is considered the driving factor not only in human development, but also in societal-state-system development. It is the assumption of this study that these biological processes and forces are also present in the human social world, giving ultimate direction to its highest form of development in the form of state and system relations. The primary evolutionary processes of natural selection, coevolution, and group/multilevel selection all may be identified in the social world of human beings. These processes developed as a means of ensuring the long-term survival of life on Planet Earth, which is cyclically riddled with the challenge of scarcity and security relative the needs of all life on it. The evolutionary processes proceed through stages and continue simultaneously in a cyclical fashion in which they are all present.

Natural selection is the starting process of biological evolution in nature, where organisms possessing certain genotypic characteristics are better adjusted to an environment and are thus better able to survive, reproduce, and increase in number or frequency relative to other organisms. Natural selection acts on the phenotype, or the observable characteristics, of an organism, but the genetic (heritable) basis of any

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54 Bridgeman, 12-21.
56 Ibid., 13-16.
phenotype that gives a reproductive advantage will increase in frequency over the following generations. Organisms are then able to transmit and perpetuate their essential genotypic qualities to succeeding generations, enhancing their prospects for survival. In this process, heritable traits that increase an organism’s chances of survival and reproduction are favored over less beneficial traits. As a result of the natural genetic variation within a population of organisms, some organisms will survive and reproduce more successfully than others in their current environment. Over time, the process of natural selection can result in adaptations that specialize organisms for particular ecological niches and may eventually result in the emergence of a new species.\(^{57}\)

Coevolution, the second major process of evolution, describes cases where two (or more) species reciprocally affect each other’s evolution. It is the biological process in which the change of a biological object is triggered by the change of a related biological object.\(^{58}\) Each party in a coevolutionary relationship exerts selective pressures on the other, thereby affecting the other’s evolution. Species-level coevolution includes the evolution of a host species and its parasites, as well as mutualism evolving over time. One-on-one interactions such as predator-prey, host-symbiont, or host-parasitic pair are all coevolutionary relationships. Within diffuse coevolution, a species may evolve in response to a number of other species, each of which is also evolving in response to a set of species. Coevolution is likely to happen when different species have close ecological interactions with one another. Plants and insects represent a classic case of coevolution.

\(^{57}\) Ibid.

that is often mutualistic in nature.\textsuperscript{59}

Group-level selection/multilevel selection occurs when the traits that allow a specific group within a species to systematically out-reproduce other competing groups eventually come to characterize the species itself.\textsuperscript{60} Group selection is a possible natural explanation for apparently altruistic traits in humans such as group defensive behaviors that advance the group's interests over those of the individual bearing the trait. To succeed, group/multilevel selection requires that local groups differ substantially in the proportion of the selected trait, that local groups be ephemeral, and that the productivity of each local group be a positive function of the proportion of its individuals that bear the selected trait. When these conditions are met, group selection of the type called "trait-group" selection can occur. Within group selection, multilevel selection suggests that groups can have functional organization in the same way individuals do and consequently can also be "vehicles" for selection. Therefore, if group cooperation is a trait ensuring greater survival and reproduction, the groups better at achieving cooperation may out-reproduce those that are not prone to cooperation.\textsuperscript{61}

**Sociopolitical Evolution**

-Natural Selection (Political Application)

The selective pressures of resource and security scarcity within the international environment prompted human beings over an extended period of time to develop states as the highest level of social organization by which to ensure their greater survival. Natural selection is the process by which the development and reproduction of select societal

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{60} Goodson, 24-26.

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.
characteristics allow a state to effectively compete with other states or forms of social organization in order to ensure the more efficient survival of its population. Those characteristics that successfully increase the likelihood of societal or state survival are eventually adopted by other states or forms of social organization and multiply across the international environment to become more numerically common. These social and structural characteristics grant distinct developmental advantages to those states and other forms of social organization able to achieve them. However, due to the diversity among different social networks and social organizations within the international environment, not all societies and states will develop or adapt those attributes. Consequently, many will not survive, develop, or reproduce as successfully as those that have due to their inability to provide scarce resources and security to their populations.

The long-term reproduction of social and structural characteristics that grant reproductive developmental advantages results in cultural adaptations that specialize a society or state towards specific developmental niches. These developmental niches allow that state or society to continually transform and reinvent both itself and the key processes necessary to survive and progress. The structural adaptations are physical features of society or the state such as political and economic institutions, infrastructure, the military, and territorial borders. Behavioral adaptations are composed of inherited behavior chains and the aggregate ability to learn. They may be inherited through institutional structures such as the political system, educational system, and family, or they may be facilitated by inherited attitudes towards learning and adaptation present in the dominant culture, philosophy, and religion. Both long- and short-term adaptations allow societies and states to adequately compete for scarce resources by innovating and
successfully engaging in conflicts with other actors. The most competitive states survive and have the highest rates of long-term development.\textsuperscript{62}

- \textbf{Coevolution (Political Application)}

Coevolution is the process by which states develop and reproduce the characteristics necessary to allow them to cooperate in and through interdependent relationships as a means of ensuring the more efficient survival of their populations. Each party in a coevolutionary relationship exerts selective pressures on the other, forcing that party to evolve beyond the process of pure competition to a pattern of behavior facilitating mutual survival. State relationships become founded on a pattern of symbiotic relationships ultimately laying the basis for the organization of the international environment into a complex set of political, economic, and ecological systems (the international system). The international system simultaneously sets parameters and limits for competition while housing institutional structures facilitating formal and informal means for cooperation. This systematization of the international environment provides rules and order to the interactions and relationships of the actors within the system. This grants a great degree of predictability and repetition to the relationships and interactions of the international environment.

Coevolution is largely founded on variations of symbiotic relationships. Symbiosis refers to the long- and short-term cooperative or interdependent relationships between actors in the international environment. Symbiotic relationships are either necessary for the survival of at least one actor in the relationship (obligate), beneficial but not essential to the survival of one or more of the actors in the relationship (facultative),

\textsuperscript{62} The political applications of the biological evolutionary processes are the interpretation of the researcher.
or some combination of the two. These symbiotic relationships within the international environment take on three basic forms: mutualistic, commensural, or parasitic.

A mutualistic relationship is any relationship between two or more actors where all actors derive major benefits. Mutualistic relationships may be either necessary for all actors, necessary for some actors but nonessential for the others, or nonessential for all. A commensural relationship is any relationship between two or more actors where at least one of the actors largely benefits while the others are not significantly harmed or helped. Commensural relationships are either necessary for at least one actor and nonessential for the others or nonessential for all. A parasitic relationship is any relationship between two or more actors in which one or more of the actors involved largely benefits while the others are significantly harmed. Parasitic relationships may result in varying degrees of maldevelopment or underdevelopment in the harmed state but may also be key to the short- or long-term survival of the harmed state. They are played out either within the state being harmed or in a space outside the harming state. Parasitic relationships are either necessary for at least one actor but nonessential for the others or nonessential for all actors in the relationship.

Mutualistic, commensural, and parasitic relationships generally involve security, economics, trade, and travel agreements. The economic trade agreements between the USA and Canada are largely mutualistic, while the diplomatic and political relations of the USA with the former Soviet Bloc of Eastern European states is commensural. French trade agreements with most Francophone African states are generally parasitic in nature. The French derive the greater benefit while the African states become dependent and underdeveloped. Even so, the parasitic relationship between the French and Francophone
West Africa allows those states a degree of survival that keeps them from structural collapse and failure.63

Contemporarily, parasitic relations take on four basic forms: colonial, neocolonial, matrimonial, coercive and compellant, and neoliberal.64 Colonial parasitic relationships occur when the actor primarily benefiting maintains the relationship by force through directly controlling the physical territory and institutions of the harmed state. Neocolonial parasitic relationships occur when the actor primarily benefiting maintains the relationship with its former colony by indirectly controlling its leadership and influencing its institutions. This is done through regimes of dependency, threats of economic sanction, or threats of force towards the state being harmed. Matrimonial parasitic relationships occur when the relationship is maintained by the consent of the leadership elements of the actors benefiting and being harmed. The relationship is maintained in the interest of the leadership elements of both actors. Coercive and compellant parasitic relationships occur where the parasitic relationship is isolated from the overall external control of the harmed state and centered only on a specific area of interest to the benefiting state. The harmed actor is forced into that isolated relationship by the threat of economic and political coercion or military force. In this relationship, the benefiting actor does not control the overall behavior and actions of the harmed state. Neoliberal parasitic relationships occur when the structure of the global economy and the politics of its relations (international political economy) force the state into harmful

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63 The political applications of the biological evolutionary processes are the interpretation of the researcher.

64 The concept of "parasitic relations" existing in the form of colonial, neocolonial, matrimonial, coercive and compellant, and neoliberal relations was developed and applied within this study by the researcher.
relationships as the only economic alternative for revenue and development towards its survival. International aid and foreign direct investment from international organizations, multinational companies, and developed states become the primary alternatives for undertaking modernization and technological transfer. The most harmful effects of this type of parasitic relationship are large-scale debt and the mass exploitation of state resources.

-Group/Multilevel Selection (Political Application)

Multilevel selection is the process by which groups of states begin collectively developing and reproducing the select characteristics that enhance their capacity for dual competition, cooperation, and resource production specialization within the international environment. In order to further improve their development and survival prospects, select groups of states are prompted to develop structural and behavioral adaptations and resource production specializations that further integrate them into the regional or global system. Greater integration provides for greater gains to those groups of states, by which they achieve the greatest developmental and survival prospects relative to other states. The benefits of enhanced cooperation and integration allow those benefiting state groups to cyclically reproduce those traits amongst themselves and enhance them in order to make them more efficient at cooperating and specializing. As a result, the groups of states best able to dually compete, cooperate, integrate, and specialize maintain higher rates of development and survival prospects relative to those states not as adept at those practices.65 The states of the European Union have achieved the highest levels of regional integration, specialization, and group production in the international system.

65 The political applications of the biological evolutionary processes are the interpretation of the researcher.
This enhanced degree of cooperation and specialization has broadened and increased the scope of those states’ long-term development relative to existing and emerging powerful states.

**Metafunctionalism**

Metafunctionalism is the metatheory of IR developed within this study to assess state behavior and relations through a multiple primary determinant approach built on modified functionalist assumptions and the collective processes of evolution. It simultaneously utilizes the most common theories of IR and a host of unconventional frameworks to explain and categorize state behavior and relations. Metafunctionalism’s modified functionalist assumption maintains an analogy or metaphor between the individual organism and the state or society. The state is held to be analogous to a living organism in that both society and organisms are made up of interdependent working parts and systems that must work together in order for the greater body to function. The state is dually composed of a physical territory and infrastructure and its multiple institutions including the family, educational system, religious system, judicial system, political system, economic system, military, and other institutions. These institutions are connected in an equilibrial relationship in which significant changes in one institution will ultimately be paralleled by changes in other institutions. As a result, state behavior must be assessed in terms of its multiple societal sources working in concert to produce policy or action. Just as individual behavior is attributed to a host of factors working in unison that are studied within separate fields and different theoretical traditions, likewise the state requires multiple levels of analysis to assess its behavior and relations. The

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66 Metafunctionalism is a metatheory of state behavior and IR developed within this study by the researcher based on functionalism, evolution, realism, liberalism, international class theory, structural functionalism, and a select number of unconventional theories.
state's behavior and relations consequently require consideration of multiple primary determinants to describe and categorize its behavior.

In maintaining society or the state as analogous to the individual, metafunctionalism considers evolution to be the driving factor in not only biological development, but also societal, state, and system development. Behavior and relations from the level of the individual to the international system are rooted in the evolutionary processes of natural selection, coevolution, and group selection. By necessity, all complex human biological systems have evolved as a function of human survival and development. Likewise, complex state and international systems have evolved as a function of the state existing as a means of ensuring more efficient human survival and development. The dominant characteristics of the international system and its state base units are the product of evolutionary forces at work in response to scarcity and security concerns in the international environment. The primary systemic determinants of power, institutionalism, interdependency, and class are all products of the processes of evolution. They have come into being as the international environment has evolved from simple power-based competition between units to a highly stratified and hierarchical system of institutions and interdependent units.

**Basic Assumptions**

Metafunctionalism holds six basic assumptions regarding the structure and functioning of the international environment and its primary system and state variables. First, the state and international system and their relations are the product of the combined processes of evolution collectively referred to as *civigenesis*.\(^67\) The

\(^67\) This term was adapted from evolutionary biology's concepts of biogenesis and symbiogenesis.
evolutionary forces of natural selection, coevolution, and multilevel selection are the simultaneous driving forces in the development of human social organization. Changes in international order do not occur at random, based solely on a principle of chaos, but are the product of general evolving social systems of order that are subject to occasional random changes.

Second, metafunctionalism begins with a metatheoretical assumption holding that elements of realism, liberalism, and neomarxism are all active factors in the international environment identifiable in the structure and relations of the international system. Determinant factors of power, interdependence, institutionalism, and class are all present and active realities in the behavior and relations of modern states. By extension, it further assumes that as the active factors of IR today, they are also the central factors to be considered in an analysis of system change, state behavior, and IR. Taking these factors collectively, metafunctionalism assumes that power, interdependence, institutionalism, and class (the sum of realist, liberal, and class factors of behavior) are reflective of the degree of functional complexity of both the state and the system. Collectively, these factors may be aggregated to reflect the state’s capacity to engage in security competitions based on military power, to cooperate institutionally and interdependently in the realm of politics and economics, and to specialize by economic stratification.

The aggregation of these collective factors, or the degree of functional complexity displayed across states of the system, is in turn reflected in its structure and relations. The state’s degree of functional complexity is dynamically linked to its capacity to accumulate aggregated political, economic, and military power. The greater the
complexity, the greater the capacity for the accumulation of aggregate power. The state's degree of functional complexity, and by extension its amount of accumulated aggregate power, informs its relations with other states. As its degree of functional complexity and aggregate power changes, its interactions with other states likewise change. The behavior that the state's degree of functional complexity facilitates most efficiently (competition, cooperation, specialization) forms its general relational paradigm. The international system is then structured to accommodate the dominant behavioral trend among the most influential states in the international environment. When the structure of the system can no longer accommodate the dominant behavioral trend among the most influential and powerful states, the system structure necessarily transitions to a structure better able to accommodate the behavioral changes.

Third, the international environment is characteristically anarchical, where states are their own highest governing authority in the absence of a global government or supranational governing authority over states. Anarchy is the product of the processes of evolution in which the international environment is evolving from a state of simple decentralized competition between actors to increasingly complex levels of systemic organization based on institutionalism and unit interdependence. The ongoing systemization of the international environment into a system of institutions and interdependent units serves to mitigate the effects of anarchy by achieving global governance and order in the absence of a global government. The mitigation of the effects of the anarchical structure of international order through international institutionalism and complex interdependence in turn cause the effects of anarchy to be
experienced in varying degrees among states. These variations are hierarchical in nature, where the degree of anarchy experienced is based on the relative power, material capabilities, military strength, economic strength, and degree of dependence or interdependence of the state. Relatively weak states subject to greater levels of institutional subordination and dependence experience lower degrees of anarchy within the system relative to the most powerful states. The most powerful and influential states experience the greatest degree of anarchy, as they are responsible for maintaining the global system of order and pose the greatest threats to each other.

Fourth, based on the processes of civigenesis, the relations of the international environment are governed by competitive and cooperative behaviors. As a result, states simultaneously engage in relationships that are either conflictual, mutualistic, commensural, or parasitic in an effort to ensure their efficient and long-term survival.

Fifth, the contemporary international environment is understood to be an ecosocial and political space composed of interlocking social and ecological systems. The international environment is minimally composed of the global ecological system or the environment, the international political system, the global economic system, and an emerging global material culture. These social and biological systems essentially cannot be separated, as they are dynamically linked and changes or actions in any one affect the functioning of the others with global reverberations.

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68 The concept of hierarchical anarchy is defined and explained in chapter 4.

69 The concept of anarchy is a philosophical position on the question of system structure. The researcher holds a differing philosophical position on the degrees of anarchy experienced with the system.

70 Competitive and cooperative behaviors are explained and defined in sections of chapter 3.

Sixth, the international system’s base units are states of different compositions and structure (multiunit system composition) accompanied by a host of non-state actors including IGOs, NGOs, IFIs, MNCs, international terrorist organizations, national liberation movements, political parties, and transnational crime syndicates. The state units forming the base of the system include both the nation-state and artificial multinational state. The states within the international system are assumed to comprise three broad tiers of states that are further subdivided into six specific categories. The first and smallest numerical tier is composed of the system’s strongest states; the second tier is composed of mid-range-strength states; and the third and largest numerical tier is composed of the system’s weakest states. The six state categories within the three general tiers are hyperfunctional, equifunctional, hypofunctional, pathofunctional, protofunctional, and neutrofunctional states.

Seventh, these multiple state units are generally held to be rational actors based on the pursuit of their own self-interest.

Civigenesis

Civigenesis holds system and state behavior, relations, and structure to be largely the product of the evolutionary processes of natural selection, coevolution, and group/multilevel selection. Through these processes, states and the system advance

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72 The concepts of the multiunit composition of the state and the multinational state are defined and explained in chapter 4.

73 Goldstein, 78-81.

74 The 6 categorical subdivisions have been developed as original concepts within this study.

75 Goldstein, 102-103, 126-127. Neoliberal and constructivist thought has expanded conceptions of rationality that go beyond the realist concept of rationality based the unitary actor principle.

76 Civigenesis is developed as an original concept within this study.
through simultaneously occurring phases of competition, cooperation, and specialization. Changes in international order do not occur at random based solely on a principle of chaos, but are the product of general evolving social systems of order that are subject to occasional random changes. These evolutionary processes are practically played out within the international environment as economic and military power competitions, state cooperation and interdependence, and economic specialization and stratification.

Civigenesis occurs in response to the scarcity and anarchy characterizing the international environment in which states as instruments of human security seek to ensure the more efficient survival of their populations. The selective pressures within the international environment constantly force states to compete, cooperate, engage in conflict, innovate, adapt, and specialize in order to ensure the efficient survival of their populations. This evolutionary process has ultimately resulted in the organization of the international environment into a complex system of actors interacting under a formal set of rules and guidelines both institutionally and noninstitutionally. This complex level of social organization has led to the rapid expansion of the human population while systematically destroying the ecological system in which humans live.

The evolution of the state and state system through civigenesis proceeds sequentially yet simultaneously in reoccurring stages of development beginning with natural selection, continuing through coevolution, and climaxing in group/multilevel selection. Within natural selection, scarcity throughout the international environment prompted human beings over an extended period of time to develop states as the highest level of social organization by which to ensure their greater survival. In order to provide scarce resources and security to their populations, states compete with each other.
economically, militarily, and politically, engaging in physical conflict as the ultimate arbiter of disputes between themselves. Unbridled competition, however, faces significant challenges and limitations as an efficient means to secure scarce resources and security due to the physical costs of military conflict and limitations of economic autarky.

In order to increase prospects for human survival, states began a process of coevolution in which weak and strong states utilize cooperation, mutual engagement, institutionalism, and interdependence as more secure means by which to ensure their survival than pure competition and conflict. Cooperation results in significant net increases in the production and extraction of resources and physical security at a significantly lower cost than military conflict or autarky to participating states. As a result of the greater short-term effectiveness and net benefits of cooperation and interdependence, states begin to specialize in different areas of the resource production process and evolve more efficient mechanisms for enhanced cooperation with each other. More states begin to rationalize their interests towards cooperation, and the traits necessary for it are adopted throughout the international system.

Group/multilevel selection then begins to occur within the international environment as the states and groups of states that develop the greatest capacity for both competition and cooperation reap the greatest benefits in terms of resource provision and physical security for their populations. They achieve the greatest rates of long-term development among states and are able to survive, providing a higher quality of life than states not as adept at simultaneously competing, cooperating, and specializing.

Simultaneous power competition and cooperation through resource production specialization result in the economic stratification of the international environment and
development of a political hierarchy among states. This hierarchy among states is based primarily on each state's relative aggregated power and economic position in the global production process. The states most central to the functioning and maintenance of the evolved global system determine the structure and rules of competition, conflict, resource production specialization, and institutionalism. The states least central to the evolved global system must evolve the characteristic adaptations necessary to make them more proficient at simultaneously competing, cooperating, and specializing relative to the states most proficient at those activities.

**Ecotasis**

Civigenesis necessarily occurs within the context of the ongoing environmental conditions necessary to sustain life on earth. However, this evolutionary process has come into conflict with the evolution of human beings' capacity to increase their survival prospects by changing the earth's environmental conditions. *Ecotasis*, or the constant environmental conditions necessary for the global ecosystem to sustain biological life and regenerate itself, is under the present threat of destructive human production processes. Within the international environment, the relationship among individuals, the state, the system, and the environment should ultimately be ideally structured in an equilibrial fashion that grants the greatest possible social benefit to individuals, the state, and the system at the least physical cost to the environment. Presently, the relationship is structured in a manner that diffuses the greatest cost to the environment and the greatest benefit to a minority of states and their populations.

In practical terms, ecotasis represents the equilibrium point between the cost of living organisms' demands on the ecosystem for survival, the ecosystem's ability to
supply those demands without compromising its ability to self-sustain, and the effects of external pressures posed by extra-earth forces on earth’s internal environment. The structure of earth’s state of equilibrium necessarily dictates that the organisms within earth’s ecosystem should not impose a greater cost or demand on the ecosystem than its capacity to sustain life and renew itself. The means of survival for life on earth, human or otherwise, ultimately should not detract from the earth’s ability to maintain constant ecostasis. Changing galactic and extraterrestrial phenomena theoretically also pose a constant possible threat of placing the earth in a state of ecostatic imbalance where it cannot maintain life, but those factors are presently outside the control of human beings.

The earth normally regulates its internal environmental conditions through a complex balance among biological life, atmospheric conditions, water bodies, surface changes, and imposing spacial galactic factors in order to maintain a healthy functioning ecological system. Paralleling the evolution of life on earth, the earth developed the ability to maintain internal environmental equilibrium as a mechanism for dealing with external galactic changes that would threaten the survival of biological life. However, the evolution of human life on Planet Earth has changed the dynamic of the earth’s equilibrial balance. Human beings are the only biological life form that has evolved the ability to manipulate the materials and resources within the physical environment to develop a means of production not purely dependent on natural processes. Through mechanization, industrialization, and information technology, human beings rapidly change and combine earth’s natural resources in a mode of production, allowing the mass production of goods and services beyond the earth’s natural ability to produce. Humans have developed technology to overcome the transportation, environmental, and
communication limitations naturally present on earth.

Prior to the industrial era, all life on earth was subject to naturally occurring environmental self-correcting patterns that minimized biological organisms’ ability to negatively impact earth’s ability to maintain internal equilibrium. As a result, animal populations didn’t expand beyond earth’s natural ability to provide for their survival needs. Human beings have evolved beyond earth’s ability to self-correct the costs of human production and consumption patterns. Rather, human production and consumption patterns have begun a process of changing the structure of the ecosystem in a manner that detracts from earth’s ability to maintain ecostasis. The current pattern of human life is founded on the mass consumption of renewable and nonrenewable resources fundamental to ecosystem regeneration without parallel plans for their replacement. Teamed with the resulting pollution of water, air, and land sources with foreign contaminants, these dual factors do not permit the earth to effectively recreate the conditions necessary to maintain life in the long term.

The modern state has been the tool or mechanism by which human beings have organized and maintained this form of production and consumption. The world now exists in a global system of states and international institutions that pollute and utilize resources at a simultaneous national and global level. The byproduct of this evolution of human ingenuity and mass state organization has been the mass expansion of human life expectancy and population along with the rapid environmental destruction that has made that expansion possible. Even so, the processes of civgenesis and ecostasis must become mutually reinforcing to allow for the persistence of both in the future. Human ingenuity must become a tool to ensure ongoing ecostasis as opposed to destroying it.
State and System Characteristics

The dominant characteristics of the international system and its state base units are also the product of the collective processes of evolution. The system's characteristics have developed as the international environment has evolved from simple power-based competitions to a highly stratified and hierarchical system of institutions and interdependent units. These structural and relational characteristics determine the specifics of state behavior and system function, as they house the primary determinants of state behavior and system change. State-based determinants of structure, leadership, and worldview emerge out of the state's functional composition, governance, and cognition/perception characteristics. Systemic determinants of power, institutionalism, interdependency, and class likewise emerge as the product of realist, liberal, and international class characteristics.

State Characteristics

In maintaining a metaphor or analogy between the individual and the state, the state may necessarily be regarded as housing anthropomorphic or human-type characteristics. It reflects human development, preferences, thinking, and needs to survive. As such, the state is representative of human interests towards ensuring more efficient human survival and as a result has evolved a host of anthropomorphic characteristics. Its functional composition, perception and cognitive awareness, and decision-making capacity are ultimately the factors allowing it to compete, cooperate, and specialize to varying degrees within the international environment. 77

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77 The state's development of these biological, neurological, and psychological traits parallels the broad developmental patterns of human development. This characterization and description of the state and its development was adopted from human development studies within psychology and sociology by the researcher. The descriptions and terminology were developed and applied by the researcher within this
-Functional Composition

The state’s functional composition refers to its structure being composed of interlocking units within a formally organized political and economic system. The state as reflective of the individual is functionally composed like all biological organisms and the ecosystems within which they exist.\(^7^8\) The state is formally organized into a system of institutions, infrastructure, and territory that convert societal inputs into behavioral outputs towards meeting the wants and needs of its population and aggregately addressing the challenges of the international environment. Its political, economic, and military institutions all serve the specific function of giving society and the state long-term cohesion and social stability. Its institutions are organized in an equilibrial relationship in which changes in one institution will necessarily be reflected in changes in adjoining institutions or society as a whole. The actual day-to-day functions of society’s institutions are the tangible factors making the state operable. The electoral system, the party system, the system of government, the judicial system, the economic system, civil society, interest groups, the media, and the military all serve particular functions in mobilizing the system. The state’s behavior is ultimately a reflection of its level of institutional organization and development and will only be as productive as its level institutional organization will permit.\(^7^9\)

The resulting behavioral determinant growing out of the state’s functional composition is “structure.” Within this study, structure refers to the manner in which a study.

\(^7^8\) Goodson, 37-38. All complex life forms are functionally composed with every trait within their biological systems serving a function towards their survival. Life and its differing characteristics evolve based on the principle of functional causality.

\(^7^9\) Almond, Dalton, Powell, Strom, 31-35.
society or state is systematically organized and the organizing principle upon which the relationship between its parts is formed. The state's abilities to compete, cooperate, and specialize are all enabled or limited by the manner or principle upon which it is structured. The state ultimately will only function as it is structured to, and changes in its behavioral outputs will be the product of changes in either the state's structure or the structure of the international system itself. State structures are largely based on normative ideological, religious, or philosophical preferences such as liberalism, socialism, or Islam. The structural preference informs the type of political system or formal type of institutional organization adopted by the state. If liberalism is adopted as the state's structural preference, the political system will likely be based on democracy of some type with capitalism as the dominant economic component. Likewise, if socialism is the structural preference, the political system will likely be based on socialism or communism, with a command or mixed-economy component. Where there is a divergence between the structural preference and the functioning of political and economic institutions, state dysfunction will necessarily be present.

- Perception and Cognitive Awareness

The systematic organization of national institutions within formal territorial boundaries provides an environment within which to form and build a central national social unit. State institutions in the service of the population create a common entity all individuals have an interest in maintaining as a provider of their individual scarce resources and security needs. Individuals in the population are serviced by the state in a

80 Waltz, 1-2.

81 Almond, Dalton, Powell, Strom, 31-35.
contractual exchange of allegiance for services. Through national participation in group servicing by state institutional bodies, a national-group level of awareness attached to the political and economic system develops. Within this group level of awareness, the members of the population become cognizant of not only their collective interests, but also the interests of populations in other states competing for similar resources and security. In the international arena, group-level awareness and interests become formally articulated as the national interest pursued by policy institutions. The national unit acting through national institutions in pursuit of its interest has the effect of transforming the state into a perceptive and cognitively aware entity. On a macro level, through its formal political and economic institutions, it is aware of its environment (the international environment), scarcity, other actors, and its position relative to those actors. The state develops its own identity and understanding, perceiving its own interests, needs, and ability to act on behalf of its population. In servicing or acting on behalf of the population, state institutions have a national reach and service base.  

-Decision-Making Capacity (Centralized Leadership and Government)  

As a cognizant and perceptively aware entity, the state characteristically has developed the rational capacity to measure the costs versus benefits of its decisions. Aware of its capacity to act in its own interest, the state via its population centralizes its decision-making and policy processes, affording those tasks to a governing body. Every governing body is headed by an individual who, based on the system of government, acts in concert with the governing body on behalf of the state. The individuals occupying leadership and government positions within the process are as important to the state’s

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82 The concept of state-level cognitive awareness was developed in this study.
capacity to act as the institutions and population they represent.83

The ultimate result of the state having its own decision-making capacity is that the type and style of leadership exercised on behalf of the state dynamically affect the manner in which it will act or behave. Leadership type and style are major determinants of the state’s behavior, as the governing body or leader may ultimately enhance or stifle the ability of the state to ensure the more efficient survival of its population.84 Leadership factors have great bearing on the state’s ability to compete, cooperate, and specialize relative to other states.

**International System Characteristics**

The evolutionary processes driving the state’s development and behavior have resulted in the transformation of the international environment into a highly complex political and economic system of state interactions. Through the process of civigenesis, the international system’s general characteristics have developed according to the evolution based principles of competition, cooperation, and specialization. These general characteristics are broadly divided into **intangible** and **tangible characteristics**.85 Tangible characteristics are those active characteristics readily measurable in the international environment and physically represented. They include realist, liberal, and international class characteristics. Intangible characteristics are those active characteristics that cannot be readily measured and may not be physically represented in the international environment. They include relative degrees of polar mobility, structural elasticity,

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83 Kegley and Wittkopf, 464-465, 503-504.

84 Ibid.

85 The classification of the characteristics of the international system into tangible and intangible characteristics was developed in this study by the researcher.
competitive tendencies, cooperative tendencies, and isolationist tendencies.

**Tangible Characteristics**

The international system is characterized by simultaneous competition, cooperation, and specialization among its base units. These characteristics are individually representative of realist (natural selection), liberal (coevolution), and class (group/multilevel selection) characteristics, each of which dynamically influences the general behavioral responses of the state and other actors to each other and their environment.

**Realist Characteristics (Natural Selection)**

In response to the scarcity of resources and security (anarchy) within the international environment, the forces of natural selection have resulted in a number of systemic attributes paralleling those of realism. Survival-based competition and conflict are the primary attributes of natural selection and likewise characterize realism politically and mercantilism economically. The behavioral determinants emerging out of the system's realist attributes are both “power” and “structure,” with an emphasis on relative gains for each state.\(^{86}\)

Within the anarchical structure of the international environment, the pursuit of scarce resources and security creates competition between actors seeking to ensure their more efficient survival. This competition at its base is decided by the amount of power amassed and exercised by each actor relative to other actors. The states amassing and maintaining the most power become the most adept at competing for scarce resources and maintaining their security. Physical conflict or power in the form of brute force becomes

\(^{86}\) Goldstein, 55-58.
the ultimate arbiter of any competition between states in both its active and latent forms. The distribution of power between actors within the structure of the international system ultimately serves to constrain each state’s ability to act in pursuit of its own interests. All states’ decisions must be measured against the possibility and potential costs of conflict with other actors.87

As a result, in order to effectively compete for scarce resources and security, states must continually seek to augment their power by enhancing their material capabilities via structural adaptations and innovation. The building of material capabilities enhances their ability to compete, engage in conflict, and ultimately establish a sphere of influence for themselves in which to exercise their power. Among competing states, conflict continues until a balance of power develops among them conducive to their survival and security needs. Where a balance of power has not developed, conflict continues among competing states to supply their material and security needs.88

**Liberal Characteristics (Coevolution)**

In response to the costs of conflict and limitations of economic autarky present in natural selection, states within the international system have developed a coevolutionary pattern of relations paralleling the dominant attributes of liberalism. Cooperation and interdependence are dominant characteristics of coevolution and likewise of liberalism. The behavioral determinants emerging out of the liberal characteristics of the international system are institutionalism and interdependence.89

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87 Ibid.

88 Ibid.

89 Goldstein, 101-107.
Within the international system, states must engage in relationships of cooperation, interdependence, and mutual coexistence beyond pure competition and conflict in order to ensure their more efficient long-term survival. States seek to better meet their survival needs collectively than on their own by creating organizations and institutions to facilitate cooperation, manage competition, and limit conflict. Such efforts grant greater possibilities of survival for both powerful and weak actors in an environment of scarcity. Through institutional cooperation, large degrees of interdependence develop between actors, linking their survival to the system’s institutions and other states. States begin specializing within resource production processes for exchanges with other specializing states. Survival prospects and developmental gains in terms of scarce resources become interpreted in terms of absolute gains, and relative security gains become secondary.  

International Class Characteristics (Group Selection/Multilevel Selection)

The process of group/multilevel selection grants characteristics to the international system paralleling those of international class conflict. Class division or class conflict is the major behavioral determinant emerging from the system’s class characteristics, which, in turn, are further factored into variants of stratification and hierarchy. Within the process of group selection, those states most adept at simultaneously competing, cooperating, and specializing begin to collectively accrue benefits to themselves that reinforce their ability to repeat and improve those processes over time.

An international division of production develops in which the states that

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90 Ibid.
collectively reproduce high development attributes form a center and those that do not form a periphery. Based on resource production specialization, the international environment creates an economic stratification from which a global hierarchy among states is derived. This hierarchy is based primarily on each state's relative aggregate power and position in the global production process. As a result, the states most central to the functioning and maintenance of the evolved global system determine the structure and rules of competition, conflict, resource production specialization, and institutionalism. The system's most peripheral states and the states furthest down in the global resource production process are highly subordinated to the preferences of center states.\textsuperscript{91}

**Intangible Characteristics**

International systems themselves are defined or likened to one another by their general component parts inclusive of a system structure (the formal and informal organization of its base units), and unit relations (the general behavioral tendencies of the base units towards each other). International systems are differentiated from each other by their allowable degrees of polar mobility, or the ability of states to accumulate vast amounts of aggregate power within the system structure; structural elasticity, or the capacity of the system's structure to expand and accommodate increasing numbers of state and non-state actors; and degrees of competition or cooperation displayed among their base units. The system's degrees of polar mobility and structural elasticity are its most important structural characteristics, as these two factors primarily dictate the parameters of state behavior and relations. The system's degrees of general behavioral

\textsuperscript{91} Goldstein, 467-470, 475-477.
slants towards competition, cooperation, and isolationism are its most important relational characteristics, as those three factors dictate the structures necessary to manage the dominant relational behaviors.

**Polar Mobility and Structural Elasticity**

System structures impose varying degrees of limits on the state’s accumulation of aggregate state power, serving to either restrict or enable the status mobility of the state within the system. *Aggregate state power* here refers to the state’s sum of combined economic, military, and political influence and capabilities. International system structures have historically either been characteristically polar static, limiting the integration or rise of new political, economic, and military powers within the system, or polar dynamic, allowing the integration or rise of new political, economic, and military powers within the system. Different structures impose varying degrees of constraints on the expansion of the number of units in the system at different periods during the lifespan of the system.

Exclusively defined, a polar static structure limits the vertical mobility of states in the system by limiting the amount of aggregate state power they can accumulate themselves. Polar static structures discourage increased state participation in the system by restricting the numerical multiplying of state units within it, commonly resulting in the development of an international status quo among states. An exclusively polar dynamic structure does not limit the vertical mobility or accumulation of aggregate power among states but encourages increased systemic participation with few limits on the number of states in the system. States may accumulate increasing amounts of aggregate state power

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92 Polar mobility and structural elasticity are original terms and concepts created by the researcher within this study.
and may enter the international status quo of states as their influence increases.

**Agonistic and Reciprocally Altruistic Relations**

The system's unit relations are distinguished by the general tendencies of the most influential and powerful states to compete or cooperate with each other militarily, economically, politically, and institutionally. The international system's unit relations have historically been either characteristically agonistic, facilitating unit competition without imposed limits on conflict, or reciprocally altruistic, facilitating unit cooperation with imposed limits on conflict.

Exclusively agonistic systems of relations encourage states to compete politically, economically, and militarily without imposed limits on the conflicts that inevitably arise in relation to resource and security scarcity. Agonistic systems of relations discourage increased broad cooperation and rules among states across the system. They instead encourage power balancing, military arms buildups, and containment as the primary means by which to settle or deter conflicts. The systems structure may enable or encourage conflict among agonistic states by not providing other viable means by which to achieve material and physical security.

Exclusively altruistic reciprocal systems of relations enable and encourage broad cooperation among states that perceive them as the most effective means of addressing the scarcity of material and physical security. States generally opt to cooperate rather than competing when the cost of competing is greater than the cost of cooperating and the benefits of cooperating are greater than the gains of competing. Within a reciprocal altruistic system of relations, states generally cooperate based on the condition that the relative cost they incur to cooperate is less than the relative benefits their cooperation
grants to other participating states. The process of cooperation must not undermine one state’s material and physical security while enhancing the material and physical security of other states. Each state follows the rules and participates because the other states of the system have agreed to do the same.

Reciprocally altruistic systems of relations generally resolve conflict through mediation, reward, and punishment by consensus. Reciprocal altruistic systems of relations discourage balancing behaviors and military arms races and thus have the shortcoming of failing to deter conflict with states that do not wish to cooperate. Noncooperative behaviors may be necessary to deter aggressive competitive states that would disrupt broad cooperative efforts.

Based on the specific characteristics of structure and unit relations, international systems will likely be either polar static and agonistic, polar static and reciprocally altruistic, polar dynamic and reciprocally altruistic, or polar dynamic and agonistic. Each combination results in its own processes, functions, and outcomes, accompanied by a specific diffusion of consolidated power within the system. For the system to be functional, there must be congruency between its structural and relational characteristics at any given point in the life of the system. The dominant characteristics must parallel each other and be mutually reinforcing, as opposed to mutually exclusive, or the system will quickly collapse and disintegrate.

**Structural and Relational Change in the International System**

The tangible characteristics of the system primarily dictate its intangible
characteristics. The realist, liberal, and class characteristics of the system, or the system’s base unit tendencies towards competition, cooperation, and specialization, ultimately dictate the system’s structure.

In the establishment of a first or new system, it is the general pre-system behavioral disposition of the most influential and powerful states in the international environment that determine the structure and unit relations of the system. The pre-system behavioral tendencies or general behavioral slant of the most powerful and influential states towards competition, cooperation, or isolationism determine how states construct the system’s structure. A general behavioral slant among states develops across the international environment based on general perceptions of the most efficient means by which to achieve survival relative to other states. As such, the system’s structure is developed to formalize and regulate the general behavioral and relational tendencies among previously interacting states. The structure is geared towards minimalizing the most harmful effects of those behaviors by granting predictability and parameters to state actions and interactions. The system’s structure operates as a function of the dominant relational paradigm of its units and serves as a mechanism by which to constrain or direct their behavior.

As a result, as general state behavior varies, polar mobility and structural elasticity must also change over time for the system to remain functional. Static polarity historically has been a necessary structural condition to achieve systemic stability among

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93 This principle is adapted from the practice and process within genetics or evolutionary biology of mapping a set of genotypes to a set of phenotypes (genotype–phenotype map), where an organism’s genotype is considered the major influencing factor in the development of its phenotype.
state units with largely agonistic behavior. Static polarity functions to limit the scope of conflict among competitive units by dually limiting the diffusion of consolidated power and the number of units in the system. However, as state units inevitably increase and consolidated power diffuses across the system over time, more dynamism is reflected in the system, and its relations must transition from a dominant agonistic form of interaction to a more reciprocally altruistic one to accommodate the unit changes.

Likewise, reciprocally altruistic relations may be a necessary behavioral disposition to achieve systemic stability within a polar dynamic structure composed of mostly weak states. Reciprocal altruistic relations function to limit the scope of conflict among an increasing number of weak states by discouraging power-balancing behaviors among them and allowing them to act in concert where they could not act alone. As more functional states unilaterally arise within or outside a polar dynamic integrative system, the system must transition to a more agonistic form of relations in order to deter conflict in the event those states do not wish to cooperate. Functional stability has historically been achieved through organizing the system’s structure and relations according to the principles of either a fixed regime of interactions based on limited state mobility or a floating regime of transitionary interactions based on the vertical mobility of states.94 The fixed or floating principle has been necessary to manage transitions in structure as the unit composition of the system changes and as systemic transitions occur from periods of instability to periods of stability.

Systemic transitions in structure and unit relations are initiated by changes in the system’s unit composition. The unit composition of the system changes as its number of

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94 The fixed and floating principles of monetary policy originally applied to the concept of international system change and transition by the researcher within this study.
state units increases or decreases and as individual states increase or decrease their aggregate power over time. The state’s ability to accumulate aggregated power is ultimately limited by its degree of structural complexity or ability to simultaneously compete, cooperate, and specialize in varying degrees. As states become more complex and functional, their capacity to accumulate vast amounts of aggregated power dramatically increases. As a result, increases in state functionality are accompanied by increases in aggregate state power. As the state’s degree of functionality and accumulation of aggregate power change, its relations with other states necessarily also change to reflect the increase or decrease. The dominant behavior emerging out of these changes among the most influential and powerful states in the system then forms its general relational pattern. That general relational pattern, in turn, determines how the system’s structure will function; either functionally or dysfunctionally. In either scenario, the system must act to either accommodate or constrain the behaviors brought about by the changes in the system.

The Metafunctionalist Model of State Behavior and Relations

The metafunctionalist model of state behavior and relations illustrates how the structure of the international environment and the tangible characteristics of the international system and its state units drive state behavior and relations (Figure 3). The model presents a system of ordering the international environment and outlining the processes by which its relations and interactions occur. It utilizes a metatheoretical approach to highlighting multiple primary behavioral determinants emerging out of both system and state variables. Its format streamlines a circular system of political inputs and outputs from the anarchical structure of the international environment to the institutional
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<td>Environmental Inputs</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>Functional Composition</td>
<td>Structural and Functional Dependence &amp; Independence</td>
<td>(Consolidation Process)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Evolution</td>
<td>Centralized Leadership</td>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>National Leadership, Democracy, Keptocracy</td>
<td>(Consolidation Process)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3. The Metafunctionalist Model of State Behavior and Relations
processes and outputs of the state. The model is subdivided into seven segments occurring in sequential order: environment inputs, global variables, system and state characteristics, behavioral determinants, variants, policy institutions, and behavioral outputs. These broad headings house the foundational general assumptions regarding the international environment, international system, state units, and the multiple theories describing each behavioral determinant.

**International Environment (3a)**

This model begins with the assumption that there is an international environment existent on the globe in which all human beings and life exist and contend for order and fulfillment of their needs and wants. More specifically, the international environment refers to the collective territorial and social organizations of the globe and their constant internal actions and external interactions with each other from a position of limited resources and scarcity. These actions and interactions constitute specific behavioral patterns that may be systematically examined and measured to identify the motives or basis for those particular actions. On an ongoing basis, the international environment constantly bombards the state with requirements, requests, challenges, and obstacles that must be effectively addressed to ensure the state's survival and effective interaction with other international actors. The collective environmental dynamics constantly facing the state are referred to as *environmental inputs*.

**Global Variables (3b)**

A secondary assumption is that the international environment is organized into a

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95 Kegley and Raymond, 55.

96 Ibid., 53-54.
system (international system) founded upon the anarchical structure of the international environment. That system is composed of multiple base units (multiunit system composition); the state units dominating the international environment are generally rational actors based on pursuit of their national interests. The multiunit composition of the international system includes the nation-state as well as the artificial multinational state historically emerging out of European colonialism. The determinants in the state’s behavior and relations emerge as outgrowths of the primary global variables of state and system. The systemic influences on state relations refer to those influences emanating from the structure and order of the international environment, while state influences refer to those influences emanating from the structure and organization of the state.

System and State Characteristics (3c)

The dominant characteristics of both the system and state are the products of collective processes of evolution and have evolved over an extended period of time. System-based characteristics include realist, liberal, and international class characteristics, while the state’s dominant characteristics include its functional composition, perception and cognitive awareness, and decision-making capacity. These characteristics are identified through the theories of functionalism and evolution and in turn house the behavioral determinants dictating state behavior and relations.

97 Goldstein, 10.
98 Ibid., 10.
99 Ibid., 68, 102.
100 This term and its definition have been introduced by the researcher.
101 Goldstein, 16.
Behavioral Determinants and Variants (3d)

The central determinants of the state’s behavior are an outgrowth of the dominant characteristics of the system and state that have evolved over time. The behavioral determinants emerging out of the system’s realist characteristics are power and balance. Their corresponding variants include national interest, material capability, and structure.\(^{102}\) The behavioral determinants emerging out of the system’s liberal characteristics are institutionalism and interdependence. Their corresponding variants include international institutionalism, complex interdependence, and globalization.\(^{103}\) The behavioral determinants emerging out of the system’s international class characteristics are economic stratification and political hierarchy.\(^{104}\) The international class characteristics’ corresponding variants include neocolonialism, dependency, and underdevelopment.

The behavioral determinants emerging out of the state’s functional composition are structure and function. The state structure and function factors refer to those influences emanating out of the institutional and territorial organization of the state as a national and domestic conduit for sociopolitical inputs and processor of its outputs.\(^{105}\) Its corresponding variants include structural and functional independence and dependence. The behavioral determinant emerging out of the state’s perception and cognitive awareness is a predominating worldview. The state’s worldview is derived from an amalgamation of elite, mass, and leadership understandings of the international

\(^{102}\) Hughes, 47, 48.
\(^{103}\) Ibid., 53-56.
\(^{104}\) Kegley and Raymond, 40-42.
\(^{105}\) Chilcote, 133,135.
environment and their preferences for both domestic and international order. Its corresponding variants include globalist-regional-national views, centrist-peripheral views, polar-satellite views, racial-ethnic-religious views, and civilizational views. The behavioral determinant emerging out of the state’s decision-making capacity is leadership type or style. Its corresponding variants include national-leadership, democratic leadership, kleptocratic leadership, neopatrimonialism, and clientelism.

Institutions (3e) and Behavioral Outputs (3f)

Through institutional processes, the environmental inputs bombarding the state are systematically converted into behavioral outputs. The inputs and requirements imposed on the state are filtered through state institutions that ideally, in consideration of all pertinent factors, develop formal behavioral responses in the form of foreign and domestic (public) policy. These institutions vary and may be centralized or decentralized based on the governing structure of the state. In the 21st-century era of globalization and complex interdependence, policy formulation has emerged largely as intermestic in nature. Intermestic policy refers to the development of domestic and foreign policies so closely linked to both national and international outcomes that they cannot generally be separated from each other in the process of policy formulation.

106 Hughes, 39-40.
107 Kegley and Raymond, 63-65.
110 Kegley and Raymond, 59-60.
111 Keohane and Milner, 3-4.
112 Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process 5th
Intemestic policy exits the state as behavioral outputs, entering the international environment, where it adds to the milieu of activity comprising the environmental inputs constantly bombarding all states in the system. Beginning again with the assumption of the international environment, the process restarts itself in continuity with the ongoing behavioral life cycle of the state and maintenance of the international system.

**System Relations: Competitive, Cooperative, and Self-Isolating Behaviors**

Based on the dominant characteristics afforded to the international system by the dominant evolutionary processes governing the international environment, the behavior and relations of its dominant actors are governed by a combination of competitive, cooperative, specialist, and isolationist behaviors geared towards their more efficient survival.¹¹² States in relation to each other and their interests either: (i) compete; (ii) cooperate; (iii) compete and cooperate; (v) compete, cooperate, and specialize; or (vi) self-isolate (delink). The relations of the international system generally take the forms of political, economic, and military relationships and interactions. States dually engage in multiples of these behaviors depending on the actors they interact with.

Competitive behaviors, as dictated by natural selection within the realist characteristics of the system, are either conflictual, of an antagonistic military, economic, and political nature, or enhancing, resulting in economic and political innovation that ultimately paves the way for greater cooperation. Cooperative behaviors, as dictated by coevolution within the liberal characteristics of the system, are either mutualistic (dually beneficial) based on collective interests; commensural (unnecessary) based on public

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¹¹² Competitive, cooperative, and self-isolating behaviors are based on evolutionary patterns of behavior present within each of the major processes of evolution outlined in this study.
goods, friendship, and symbolism; or parasitic (dually beneficial and harmful) based on diverging long-term and short-term interests. Specialization, as dictated by group/multilevel selection within the class characteristics of the system, is based on either enhanced multistate cooperation or state competition. States within a system of economic interdependence specialize in order to reap the greater benefits of international trade. States within a largely competitive environment specialize to grant themselves a competitive edge or advantage over other states also competing for scarce resources and security. Self-isolating behaviors occur when states wish to neither compete nor cooperate with other states, opting to delink from the international political and economic system.

These broad state behavioral choices are generally chosen or pursued based on a cost-benefit analysis of how one behavioral choice relative to the others enhances the state’s prospects for more efficient survival.\textsuperscript{114} Generally, where it is more beneficial to compete rather than cooperate, states will choose to compete and vice versa. Where it is more beneficial and possible to do both, states will undertake both activities. Likewise, states will specialize based on which behaviors grant the greatest benefits. If the costs of undertaking both cooperative and competitive behaviors are greater than the costs of delinking from the system, states will then choose to self-isolate.

**State Categories**

The determinants in the state’s behavior and relations are the products of the characteristic attributes of the international system and the state. Based on the combination of active determinants in state behavior, states exhibit distinct sets of

\textsuperscript{114} Goodson, 38. Rational choice, decision making, and actions towards more efficient survival are based on the evolution-based principle of functional causality.
structural characteristics and behavioral patterns. These groupings of state characteristics and behavioral patterns have been reproduced among states to a degree warranting broad categorizations in a process paralleling evolution’s biological speciation. The categories representative of these select patterns of behavior and structural characteristics have evolved over a period of time in response to the selective pressures within the international environment. The selective pressures of resource and security scarcity drive states to evolve and develop at different rates and times based on their geography, population makeup, and proximity to other states or social formations.

The states of the international system in the post-WWII era have traditionally been broadly informally divided into a hierarchy of three tiers of states based on their aggregate state power and influence: the first and smallest numerical tier composed of the system’s most powerful and influential states, the second tier composed of mid-range strength states, and the third and largest numerical tier composed of the system’s weakest states.¹¹⁵

However, within these broad tiers, six specific categories of states may be identified based on the combination of general behavioral responses to each of the dominant behavioral determinants. These broad categories include hyperfunctional states, equifunctional states, hypofunctional states, pathofunctional states, protofunctional states, and neutrofunctional states.¹¹⁶ Within the first tier are all hyperfunctional states and the most powerful and influential equifunctional states. Within the second tier are the weaker and less influential equifunctional states and most

¹¹⁵ Goldstein, 79-81.

¹¹⁶ The six categories of states have been originally developed and defined within this study.
powerful hypofunctional states, and in the third tier are pathofunctional, protofunctional, and neutrofunctional states.

Modern states either progress or regress through these six categorical behavioral stages, but from differing starting points based on the historical manner and period of a state’s formation. Modern states have a host of historical origination points, including 19th- and 20th-century colonialism, indigenous or heterogeneous population expansion, empire regression, ethnic and tribal consolidation, migration, security-based consolidation, and religious isolation or consolidation.\textsuperscript{117}

To date, the general pattern of historical progression indicates that states generally proceed from a protofunctional or pathofunctional state to a hypofunctional state; from a hypofunctional state to an equifunctional or hyperfunctional state; and from a hypofunctional state to an equifunctional state. Hyperfunctional states have historically eventually regressed to an equifunctional condition in which they begin an integration process with other equifunctional states. Pathofunctional states have in multiple instances demonstrated the ability and tendency to regress to a protofunctional or neutrofunctional stage. All states are subject to regression where they are not able to adequately compete, cooperate, and specialize relative to other states in the system or adapt to significant changes in the international environment.\textsuperscript{118}

**Hyperfunctional States**


\textsuperscript{117} Goldstein, 29-33, 43-45.

\textsuperscript{118} Goodson, 46-49. Survival dictates that evolution is an ongoing process of successful and unsuccessful adaptations to changing environmental conditions. States likewise evolve and regress based on their ability to adapt more efficient survival traits and techniques.
structurally independent. **Leadership Type/Style:** democratic, authoritarian moralist, nationalist. **Perception/Worldview:** globalist, regional, polar.

**Example:** The United States, China, Japan, and Germany.

Hyperfunctional states are those states housing an enhanced degree of structural organization and institutional complexity that effectively hyperaccelerates the normal functioning of its institutions and societal productivity. This level of hyperfunctionality super-enhances the state’s capacity to compete, cooperate, and specialize relative to other states in the international environment through repetitive innovation and security. Hyperfunctional states evolve from either hypofunctional states or equifunctional states. These states become cultural and technological staples of the system, evolving cultural and structural adaptations adopted by other states. Hyperfunctional states have the greatest capacity for long-term rapid growth and development and become central hegemonic pillars within the international order. They are central to the maintenance of the system, as they contain the greatest capacity to contribute to international public goods. They encourage systemic and institutional participation among other states by creating conditions for those states to free ride and enjoy the benefits of the system without paying the bulk of the cost to maintain it. However, based on the principle of diminishing returns on military expenditure and the limits of developmental space and resources, hyperfunctional states in the long term will settle into an equifunctional condition, more closely cooperating and integrating with other equifunctional states.

Hyperfunctional states’ primary relationships are largely mutualistic or parasitic in nature. In their mutualistic relationships, hyperfunctional states accrue massive benefits along with the other participating parties in the relationship. In their parasitic
relationships, they accrue massive benefits at the expense of the other participating parties in the relationship. Their secondary relationships are commensural, adding to international public goods and system stability.

Hyperfunctionalism represents a supra-normal state condition in which the state exhibits behavior markedly beyond the most functional actors in the system. Even so, hyperfunctional behavior hinders the state’s capacity for integration with other hyperfunctional or equifunctional states. Their adeptness at unilateral competition, security maintenance, and political and economic specialization limit their political cooperation to multilateral regimes, international institutionalism, and bilateral agreements. The benefits of political autonomy and hegemonic influence within the system are significantly greater than the benefits of greater political and economic integration under a supranational authority. Being central providers of international public goods, hyperfunctional states necessarily rationalize that other states need the benefits of their independent capacity more than the hyperfunctional states need their participation and cooperation. As a result, with the exception of Germany, hyperfunctional states generally have not sought greater political integration with other states.

Within the hyperfunctional state, the degrees of institutional strength, development, and systematic organization result in extreme socioeconomic functionality with manageable degrees of structural and behavioral dysfunction. The most significant societal dysfunctions present in the hyperfunctional state have been great disparities in economic wealth, immigration issues, and either extremely limited or overactive political participation. However, along with equifunctional and hypofunctional states, their degree
of environmental destruction and degradation is beyond an acceptable point of management.

**Equifunctional States**

**Characteristics** - **Realist**: great power, middle-range powers. **Liberal**: interdependent.

**Int. Class**: center. **Structure and Function**: functionally independent, structurally independent. **Leadership Type/Style**: democratic, authoritarian moralist, nationalist.

**Perception/Worldview**: regional, multiregional, multipolar, civilizational.

**Examples**: England, France, Russia, Italy, Spain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Brunei, and Dubai, among others.

Equifunctional states are those states exhibiting a general level of institutional organization and normalized degree of structural complexity that allow for the basic functioning of their political and economic institutions towards meeting the resource and security needs of the state. Equifunctional states generally evolve from hypofunctional states or come about as the result of the developmental stagnation and regression of a hyperfunctional state. The equifunctional state's level of economic productivity and political organization has reached an acceptable point of equilibrium between the basic wants and needs of the population and the state's capacity to adequately provide them. This level of equilibrail functionality grants the state an above-average capacity to compete, cooperate, and specialize within the international environment relative to other states. Individually, they continue to specialize within the global resource production process, internally maintaining high levels of repetitive innovation in the production and distribution of goods and services. An equifunctional state's primary international relationships are mutualistic with secondary parasitic and commensural relationships.
Equifunctionalism represents the most normal state condition, exhibiting the most consistent behavior among functional actors and the second most consistent behavioral patterns of all actors in the system. Along with hyperfunctional states, equifunctional states become the primary cultural and technological developers and providers within the system. They evolve production, organizational, and cultural practices and processes adopted by the other states of the system. The structure of the international system hinges in part on the formal organizational cooperation of groups of equifunctional states. Together with hyperfunctional states, equifunctional states account for the largest percentage of the global production of consumer and capital goods and services. Based on the costs of diminishing military returns, limited developmental space, and the relative costs of military conflict versus cooperation, equifunctional states opt for cooperation with hyperfunctional and equifunctional states, and, where possible, integration with other equifunctional states as the most effective means by which to provide for the essential wants and needs of the state. In groups and partnerships, these states are adept at competition in the security and economic spheres, and politically have an advanced capacity for cooperation to a degree allowing for political integration beyond economics. The equifunctional state's limited accumulation of aggregate power and enhanced functional complexity fundamentally allow it to integrate with other equifunctional states as opposed to hindering such processes, as is the case with hypofunctional states.

Due to their institutions functioning at a level of equilibrium, equifunctional states do not house great enough productive capacity to individually extend international public goods and benefits to the system or other states. However, in concert, they are able to maintain consistent degrees of innovation and security, collectively contributing to
international public goods in a degree beyond their individual capacity.

The equifunctional state is subject to largely manageable degrees of social, political, and economic dysfunctions. These dysfunctions include terrorism, immigration issues, ethnic and racial discrimination, and religious discrimination. However, along with hyperfunctional and hypofunctional states, their degree of environmental destruction and degradation is beyond an acceptable point of management.

**Hypofunctional States**

**Characteristics** — Realist: ascending powers, middle-range powers, regional powers, minor powers. Liberal: emerging markets. Int. Class: semi-peripheral, developing.

**Structure and function:** dysfunctional and structurally independent, functional and structurally dependent. Leadership Type/Style: democratic leadership, authoritarian moralist leadership, nationalist leadership. Perception/Worldview: regional, multiregional, multipolar, civilizational.

**Examples:** India, Brazil, Indonesia, Turkey, Iran, Libya, Poland, Czech Republic, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, South Africa, Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina, Chile, Cuba, Bangladesh, Panama, Costa Rica, Belize, among others.

Hypofunctional states are those states in which the basic level of institutional organization and structural complexity function just below the equilibrium point between the demands of the state in terms of basic wants and needs and the state’s ability to supply and provide for those wants and needs. The state’s needs outweigh its productive capacity, where its institutions are complex enough in their organization and development to allow for rapid economic growth and development but are too limited to extend those processes and their benefits to the entire state. This level of subequilibrrial functionality
grants the state an above-average capacity to compete, cooperate, and specialize within the international environment relative to other states. Hypofunctional states generally evolve from protofunctional and pathofunctional states or emerge as the result of the developmental stagnation or regression of an equifunctional state. Their primary relationships are mutualistic, in which they accrue great benefits from the relationship along with other participants, and secondarily commensural, of a symbolic or political nature. Hypofunctional states generally do not have the aggregate power necessary to enforce and maintain parasitic international relationships in which they primarily benefit. They are powerful enough, however, not to be forced into parasitic relationships with other states in which they are hurt.

Hypofunctional states are the second smallest group of states functioning below the normal equilibrium middle state condition of equifunctional states. They exhibit both partial equifunctional and pathofunctional behaviors, with a great capacity for growth even beyond the equifunctional level. Hypofunctional states are important within the international system as secondary replicators of cultural adaptations and technological innovations developed in hyperfunctional and equifunctional states. They are key components of the international system as agents of regional stability. Their degree of technological and cultural innovation is low, with little contribution to international security and public international goods. They are adept at competition in terms of state security but house a significantly lower degree of economic specialization than equifunctional and hyperfunctional states.

Hypofunctional states are adept at international cooperation through multilateral institutions and organizations, successfully participating in most international regimes.
They are also party to numerous bilateral agreements with hyperfunctional and equifunctional states in which they trade and insource foreign resource production processes. Internally, their level of institutional development and systematic organization result in below-average socioeconomic functionality and considerable degrees of social, political, economic, and environmental dysfunctions that are increasingly difficult to manage. These dysfunctions include massive poverty, extensive national debt, brain drain, high levels of unemployment, population displacement, terrorism, and environmental degradation.

The level of state dysfunction growing out of the underdevelopment of the state's political and economic institutional structures teamed with their large size generally hinders the hypofunctional state’s ability to engage in advanced cooperation in the form of political integration with hyperfunctional, equifunctional, and other hypofunctional states. Hypofunctional states are prone to cooperation with pathofunctional and neutrofunctional states, often having common interests with those groups of states.

Pathofunctional States

Characteristics — **Realist:** weak. **Liberal:** marginal. **Int. Class:** peripheral, dependent, underdeveloped. **Structure and function:** dysfunctional and structurally dependent. **Leadership type:** authoritarian survivalist, neopatrimonial, matrimonial, nationalist, neocolonial, pseudo-democratic. **Perception/Worldview:** regional, national, satellite, racial, unarticulated and loosely defined, donor-recipient.

**Examples:** Most of the states of sub-Saharan Africa, Guyana, Suriname, Guatemala, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia, Columbia, Laos, Myanmar, Nepal, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, among a host of others.
Pathofunctional states are those states in which lower levels of institutional organization and structural underdevelopment drastically impair and retard the normal functioning of the state's institutions. The state does not house enough productive capacity to independently maintain its own survival or ensure the survival of its population without external assistance. Its extreme degree of subequilibrational functionality impedes the state's ability to compete, cooperate, or specialize in any effective manner within the international environment. The retardation of the pathofunctional state's institutions is produced by an inversion of their bureaucratic processes that causes them to work in the reverse, underdeveloping the state in a manner that makes it an instrument of human insecurity as opposed to security.

The inversion of institutional bureaucratic processes and resulting fiscal deviation from rational-choice decision making is rooted in an institutional culture clash (or incompatibility) between the prescribed values for the institutions and the values of the individuals staffing them. Based on this incongruence of values, state institutions begin working against the interests of the population as the centralized government actively undermines the population's survival and development prospects through corruption, incompetence, and the rape of state resources. The state becomes a domestic antagonizing force whose institutions are inefficient tools for addressing both domestic political needs and the challenges of the international environment. This reversal of institutional functioning systematically destroys each institution's capacity to autonomously maintain, repair, or reinvent itself, ultimately crippling the state's capacity to act effectively.
The pathofunctional state’s extended degrees of institutional underdevelopment and absence of structural complexity produce only marginal socioeconomic functionality in the state’s political and economic centers. Beyond those centers, without the centralized government as a major organizing instrument of societal order, there is statewide societal dysfunction. These dysfunctions include massive poverty, extensive national debt, brain drain, high levels of unemployment, population displacement, civil and political instability, civil conflict, underdevelopment, and ethnic and racial conflict, among a host of behaviors atypical of functional healthy states. Pathofunctional behavior does not easily allow for the integration or adoption of structural and behavioral innovations produced domestically or externally. With few exceptions, the underdevelopment of the state’s political and economic institutional structures hinders the pathofunctional state’s ability to achieve basic political or economic integration with states of most other types beyond parasitic relations. The East African Community (Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania) present an exceptional case, as they have achieved advanced political and economic cooperation at the pathofunctional stage of development. Southern Africa also presents a special case, as South Africa as a hypofunctional state has facilitated political cooperation among the pathofunctional states of Southern Africa through the South African Development Community (SADC).

Pathofunctional states represent the largest group of states within the international environment exhibiting behaviors drastically different from those of the most functional states in the system. They have generally evolved as the products of parasitic relationships with hyperfunctional and equifunctional states in the 19th and 20th centuries. These postcolonial states emerged from 19th- and 20th-century colonialism as extra-state...
extensions of hyperfunctional and equifunctional states maintained by force. As the productive and functional capacity of hyperfunctional and equifunctional states declined, these extra-state extensions became independent entities.

Since their emergence as independent entities, pathofunctional states' relationships have been primarily dominated by parasitic relations in the form of neocolonialism, matrimonialism, and dependency. In these parasitic relationships, the state and its population are significantly harmed by resource exploitation but dependent on the relationship to ward off structural collapse and institutional failure. Pathofunctional states' secondary relationships are largely commensural in nature, where they benefit at the leisure of more functional states and maintain cordial relationships with other pathofunctional and protofunctional states. Pathofunctional states are regularly dominated by hypofunctional and equifunctional states but engage in cooperation with hypofunctional states. They have the tendency to compete with protofunctional states and other pathofunctional states for access to international aid and select resources.

Pathofunctionalism or pathofunctional behavior represents an abnormal behavioral condition and structural disorder that, without external aid, will ultimately lead to state structural collapse and institutional failure. The structure of the international system reinforces pathofunctional behavior through regimes of dependency, international aid, juridical recognition, and the political interests driving the economic stratification of the global economy. Pathofunctional behavior may necessarily lead to similar problems in bordering states constantly in contact with the pathofunctional state politically,
economically, socially, and culturally. Its social dysfunctions may be extended to neighboring states through both social and economic exchanges.

**Protofunctional**

**Characteristics** – **Realist:** weak. **Liberal:** marginal. **Int. Class:** peripheral, dependent, underdeveloped. **Structure and function:** dysfunctional and structurally dependent. **Leadership type:** authoritarian survivalist, neopatrimonial, neocolonial, matrimonial. **Perception/Worldview:** national, satellite, racial, tribal, clan, religious, unarticulated and loosely defined, donor-recipient.

**Examples:** Afghanistan, Haiti, Niger, Myanmar, Congo, Zimbabwe, Central African Republic, Sudan, Tajikistan, East Timor, among other states.

Protofunctional states are states that in practical reality have essentially no active centralized national institutions beyond their centers, which house their governing officials, military, and police forces. National institutions in these states not only have failed, but also have been neglected or are simply not used as tools to service the wants and needs of the population statewide. The state government primarily acts as the prime intermediary between the state and other international actors, maintaining a military and police force to guarantee its own security, protect private and public investments, and maintain control of the population. The state performs no significant functions outside of maintaining its capacity to interact with extrastate actors and control the population. The state is essentially decentralized and does not entail significant degrees of systematic organization beyond its administrative center. It is territorially maintained by the juridical recognition of other states and essentially supported by regimes of international economic and security aid from other states and organizations. Its relations are
essentially parasitic, as it feeds off of the international system and its actors to maintain any semblance of statehood. Without external aid, protofunctional states will regress into a neutrofunctional stage and structurally collapse, as the government and military have no resources by which to support themselves and maintain their functions. Protofunctional states hold the possibility of evolution into pathofunctional states through drastic reform and external developmental aid.

Protofunctional states have also generally evolved as the product of parasitic colonial relationships with hyperfunctional and equifunctional states in the 19th and 20th centuries. They also come about as the product of conflict and postconflict states. These states are completely dysfunctional and do not compete, cooperate, or specialize in any significant degree in the international environment. Protofunctional states are dominated by hyperfunctional and equifunctional states, cooperate with hypofunctional states, and compete with pathofunctional and other protofunctional states for international aid and select resources.

Neutrofunctional


Examples: Somalia, Afghanistan. Previously collapsed and failed states include Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Congo.

Neutrofunctional states are structurally collapsed states in which the official formally organized political, economic, and social institutions of the state have ceased to
function or no longer exist in their capacity as the organs by which to organize and order the state. The state has no formal governing authorities or standing military. A state becomes neurofunctional through civil, national, or international conflict; economic sanctions; natural disasters; or political collapse. With no functional institutions and no active political or economic system, the state is unable to serve as a mechanism to deliver scarce resources to its population. With no effective governing or societal institutions by which to effectively organize it, the state experiences structural collapse culminating in the erosion of its political, social, and, territorial integrity. In essence, there is not an actual state but a shadow of a state maintained by the juridical recognition of international institutions and other states. It has primitive forms of decentralized leadership revolving around religion, clan, tribe, warlordism, and quasi-states. It has no significant international relationships other than those of foreign aid regimes and private businesses. Neurofunctional states may be resuscitated through external aid to a protofunctional or pathofunctional stage of development.

Transitioning States

Examples: Ghana, Bangladesh, Peru (pathofunctional to hypofunctional)

Within the six state categories, select states are in a transitional phase where they display the characteristics of two state categories to a lesser or greater degree as they transition from one category to another. The state’s characteristics tend to lean more greatly toward one category of state than the other and may be categorized based on the more dominant characteristics. They also must necessarily be described and


120 Ibid.
acknowledged as *transitioning states* to adequately describe the characteristics and behavior of the state. Ghana is the foremost example on the African continent of a transitioning state displaying the distinct dual characteristics of a pathofunctional and hypofunctional state, though leaning more towards its pathofunctional behaviors.

State developmental transitions are an inherent part of the evolutionary pattern of states as they leave one phase of development and enter another phase above or below it. Under the principle of functional transition, all states must go through phases of transition until they reach an evolutionary ceiling or floor in their development. Each state's category and behavioral characteristics determine its relations with other states and state types in the international environment. Once the state transitions into a different category, its behavior and pattern of relations with other types of states also change to reflect the transition.

**General Patterns of State Behavior**

Based on the collective characteristics of the six state categories, five general patterns of behavioral interaction occur between the different state types as they seek to survive and interact with each other within the international system and international environment.

1. Historically hyperfunctional states have generally competed with each other until being essentially forced into long-term cooperation through military or political applications of force. Voluntary long-term cooperation between hyperfunctional states presently has no historical precedent but stands to possibly evolve between the United States and China. Hyperfunctional states have generally cooperated

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121 Goodson, 37-38. The principle of functional transitions is an original concept developed in this study based on the evolutionary principle of functional causality, where an organism's behavior is always reflective of the structural and behavioral characteristics of the organism in its present state.
with equifunctional and hypofunctional states while dominating pathofunctional, protofunctional, and neutrofunctional states.

2. Equifunctional states have historically cooperated with hyperfunctional states; cooperated, specialized, or integrated with other equifunctional states; competed with hypofunctional states; and dominated pathofunctional, protofunctional, and neutrofunctional states.

3. Hypofunctional states have presently displayed trends in which they generally either cooperate with or self-isolate from hyperfunctional states; compete with equifunctional states; cooperate with other hypofunctional states; and cooperate with pathofunctional, protofunctional, and neutrofunctional states.

4. Historically, pathofunctional states have competed with protofunctional and other pathofunctional states and sought to cooperate with states of all other types.

5. Historically, protofunctional states have generally either cooperated or self-isolated from states of all other types.

6. Elements within neutrofunctional states by necessity will cooperate where possible with states of all other types.

In practical application, the principle of functional transition would dictate that as a hypofunctional state transitions to a hyperfunctional state, it will likely dominate as opposed to cooperate with pathofunctional and neutrofunctional states. Likewise, if a hypofunctional state transitions to an equifunctional state, it will no longer compete with other equifunctional states. It will instead seek to cooperate, specialize, and possibly integrate. Likewise, if a pathofunctional state such as Mali successfully transitions to a hypofunctional state, it will likely go on to compete with hyperfunctional states such as
the United States and China as opposed to being dominated by them, continue to cooperate with hypofunctional states such as India and Brazil, compete with equifunctional states such as Britain and France as opposed to being dominated by them, and cooperate as opposed to compete with pathofunctional and protofunctional states such as Cameroon and Niger.

**Systemic Structural Transitions**

Systemic transitions in structure and unit relations are initiated by changes in the system’s unit composition. The unit composition of the system changes as its number of state units increases or decreases, and as individual states increase or decrease their aggregate power over time. The state’s ability to accumulate aggregated power is limited by its degree of functional complexity. As the state becomes more socially, economically, politically, and institutionally complex, its capacity to accumulate vast amounts of aggregated power dramatically increases. Increases in state functionality are accompanied by increases in aggregate power as the state transitions from one category to another. As it changes category, the state’s behavior towards other units necessarily changes to reflect its degree of functionality. The dominant relational pattern of the most powerful and influential states towards each other then forms the general relational pattern of the system. When the structure of the system can no longer accommodate the dominant behavioral trend, the system structure transitions to one better able to accommodate those behavioral changes. The general relational pattern of the system fundamentally shifts or changes as the diffusion of state functionality and aggregate power across the system increases or decreases over time. Changes in the general relational pattern, in turn, eventually warrant changes in the system’s structure.
Changes in pathofunctional states and below essentially have little bearing on the general interactions of the system, due to the very small reach afforded the state by lower degrees of functionality. Downward and upward changes outside of conflict in most equifunctional states have generally been uncommon in the modern history of the international system, which has displayed a remarkable degree of consistency in this regard. Historically, it has primarily been the emergence or disappearance of multiple or single hyperfunctional states, or the emergence of multiple hypofunctional states that has fundamentally impacted the unit relations of the system. Based on the scope and size of hyperfunctional states’ interactions with other states, significant changes in their degree of functionality impact the interactions of a significant percentage of the system’s actors. Based on the behavioral disposition of those states towards competition, cooperation, or self-isolation, the system must act to either accommodate or constrain the behavior brought about by changes in those states.

**Evolution by Necessity/Regression by Adaptability & Inefficiency**

The state has evolved as the primary mechanism by which to provide resource and physical security for individuals within an environment of resource and security scarcity. At history’s present juncture, the state has become the most efficient form of social organization to provide for the wants and needs of most individuals on Planet Earth. Due to the changing nature of the international environment and the continual contraction of global resources, states must continually evolve and adapt to remain efficient mechanisms for providing resource and physical security for their populations. Hyperfunctional, equifunctional, and hypofunctional states have the capacity to provide for basic wants and needs of the majority of individuals within the state at a degree of
efficiency prompting future growth and development. Pathofunctional, protofunctional, and neutrofunctional states are significantly less adept at undertaking those same processes and are prone to patterns of regression, underdevelopment, and maldevelopment. They provide minimally for the wants and needs of a minority of their populations and in many cases offer no resource security for the majority of individuals. The majority of the population is left to subsist, rely on international aid, or defer to other de facto forms of social organization such as clans or tribes.

If any state is unable to effectively manage its internal institutional organization towards adapting to the ecological, economic, and political changes in the international environment, it will regress increasingly towards a highly dysfunctional condition and ultimately become a source of human insecurity. As a source of human insecurity, the state will serve to hinder the capacity of the individuals within its boundaries to meet their basic wants and needs. Resources and physical security may become scarcer within the state than outside its territorial boundaries. Analogous to biological evolution, the state will continue to evolve with both structural and behavioral adaptations until it reaches an evolutionary ceiling. At that point, it will either mutate and fundamentally change form, be overtaken by a competing form of social organization, or decline and become extinct due to its inadaptability as a source of human security.
CHAPTER 4

THE METAFUNCTIONALIST MODEL OF STATE BEHAVIOR AND RELATIONS

Global Variables

The System (The International System)

Metafunctionalism first assumes that in the absence of a global government, the international environment exists in a state of anarchy with no world government to provide for the needs of all of its inhabitants.¹ Within this state of anarchy, the international environment is organized into a political and economic system² dominated by multiple state units at its base³ (multiunit system composition).⁴ However, the state of anarchy is hierarchical in nature, experienced in varying degrees across states based on their relative strength and position within the tiers of. The international system itself is

¹ Goldstein, 74.

² Ibid., 74, 76, 104.

³ The position of the state as the base unit of the international system is common to the most conventional theories and major scholars of IR. Realism, liberalism, and international class theory all consider the state as the primal base of systemic activity. I agree with this view and do not accept the alternate views as they relate to IR. The degree of influence that states have as enablers or constrainers of activity within the system is well beyond the scope, influence, and power of all other actors. The state as the base unit of the international system provides the operational base from which all other institutional and non-institutional actors must move. States must fundamentally contend with the actions of numerous nonstate actors in the system. Several of these nonstate actors seek to influence both the state and system in order to use them as tools to amass wealth and influence. In most instances they do not seek to superecede the state as it is essential to their goals. Select other nonstate actors seek to destroy the state and international system in order to impose a different form of order conducive to their interests. International institutions as instruments of governance and not government, are still reliant upon states for funding, housing, personnel, and implementation of major social, economic, and security initiatives. However, international institutions have become necessary to manage state relations in order to prevent conflict and address international level disasters.

⁴ Ibid, 10.
organized through a number of international political and financial institutions and organizations. These institutions and organizations are hierarchically structured and stratified according to power, material capability, class, civilization, ethnicity, race, religion, and ideology among other factors. Its state units are accompanied by a host of non-state actors both inside and outside the system including IGOs, NGOs, IFIs, multinational corporations (MNCs), international terrorist organizations, national liberation movements, political parties, and transnational crime syndicates.

Hierarchical Anarchy
Hierarchical anarchy describes the systemic imposition of varying levels of anarchy on states in which relatively weak states are subject to greater levels of structural or institutional regulation and subordination bordering on governance; while the most powerful and influential states experience the greatest degree of anarchy as they structure and maintain global order in an environment of ongoing self-help.

Conventional conceptions of systemic anarchy present it as a system wide condition generally experienced by all state units. However, this study deviates from conventional conceptions of anarchy instead holding it to be experienced in varying degrees across

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3 Ibid., 74, 76, 104.

6 Ikenberry, 33.

7 Goldstien, 12-14.

5 The international system is first a means of organizing the interactions of states and regularizing their behavior with predictability relative to each other. International institutions exist and are maintained by the purview of states. Nonfinancial or political institutions do not fundamentally serve as a basis for organizing states and mediating conflict among them in the post Napoleonic international system. Institutions such as the Roman Catholic Church do not organize states or dictate state policy formulation at the domestic or international level. Conflictual and aggressive organizations such as terrorist networks incur the wrath of states for the activities they commit and recruit primarily from states.

9 Ibid., 74.
states based on their power, material capability, structural composition, type of economic system, and rank in the international hierarchy of states.\textsuperscript{10} A critical evaluation of systemic anarchy versus the mixed structure of the contemporary international system suggests that the weaker the state and the lower its position in the international hierarchy of states, the greater its regulation and subordination to international institutions and organizations to a degree bordering on governance.\textsuperscript{11}

The states of the international system may be broadly divided into a hierarchy of three broad tiers of states. The three tiers are further subcategorized into six specific categories of states within the three tiers. The first and smallest numerical tier is comprised of the system’s most powerful and influential states. The first tier includes subcategories of hyperfunctional, select equifunctional, and select hypofunctional states. The second tier is comprised of mid-ranged strength states with subcategories including most equifunctional and hypofunctional states. The third and largest numerical tier is comprised of the system’s weakest states. The third tier includes subcategories of pathofunctional, protofunctional, neutrofunctional states.\textsuperscript{12}

The third tier states experience the smallest degrees of anarchy within the system due to their dependence on the system itself. The third tier states are the most highly subject to the system’s rules and conventions and largely have no means by which to affect the rules from their relative position in the system. The first tier of states


\textsuperscript{11} This analysis is the position of the researcher after examining both anarchy and liberal institutionalism.

\textsuperscript{12} Goldstein, 79-81.
contemporarily experiences the greatest degree of anarchy within the international system as they maintain the system of international order. However, most first tier states are not materially dependent upon the international system for their material well being and survival. First tier states face the greatest security threats from other first tier states, second tier states wishing to forcefully enter the first tier, and non-state actors wishing to fundamentally alter or break the system. The second tier of states experiences a degree of anarchy greater than the third tier, but significantly less than the first tier. Second tier states may or may not be dependent on the system for their survival and material needs, but stand to benefit greatly from participating in the system and following its rules. Some second tier states have the potential or possibility to enter the first tier and may pose a substantial threat to the first tier based on aspirations to join it.  

The position of weaker states in the system make them reliant on it for survival as the system makes available necessary resources in the form of international aid that enable states to survive. Ongoing access to those resources requires adherence to systemic rules and norms set by the most powerful and influential states that enforce them on systemic participants to ensure their compliance. These institutional forces mitigate the effects of anarchy as the weaker and least influential states as a consequence of participation must answer in some degree to governing bodies of these institutions and organizations. Further, within an environment of self-help, international aid regimes are made available to the weakest and least influential states mitigating the effects of the

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13 The positions on the degrees of anarchy are the theoretical conclusions of the researcher after examining anarchy, structural realism, and liberal institutionalism.

14 Goldmann, 30.
security dilemma on those states as they rely on international institutions, organizations, and powerful states for their survival.\textsuperscript{15}

The greater role of international institutionalism in the post-World War II international system along with the onset of globalization and complex interdependency in the post-Cold War world are responsible for the imposition of intense levels of regulation and subordination on the weaker and less influential states.\textsuperscript{16} The intense levels of systemic regulation over the system's weakest states is largely rooted in their dependence on the system's institutions and most powerful actors for the maintenance of their territorial integrity and daily material survival.\textsuperscript{17} In many areas, this relegation and regulation by the system's institutions goes beyond the realm of choice for the state where adherence to international rules and norms are a requirement for systemic participation and access to vital tools, resources, and services. The international system's institutions and most powerful states take on a paralleling role to governance for weak states in regulating international economics and trade, aiding in the provision of regional and civil security, and providing aid packages, credit, and financing.\textsuperscript{18}

The most powerful states undergirding and maintaining the system exist within an environment of complete self-help with no higher governing authorities to whom they must answer. They maintain the system as a means of mitigating interstate conflict and

\textsuperscript{15} Goldstein, 476-478, 522-525, 526-528.

\textsuperscript{16} Hughes, 329.

\textsuperscript{17} Goldstein, 476-478.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 476-478, 522-525, 526-528.
maximizing the benefits of interstate cooperation. Powerful and influential states set the rules and norms of the international system and make their resources available within a systemic institutional pool to aid weaker states as it meets their interests to do so. They do not necessarily need the system to survive and are not reliant on it to secure their own material survival or to receive essential resources. The absolute anarchy experienced by the most powerful states relative to each other, with no higher organization authority existing, warrants international institutionalism and international regimes to mitigate the security dilemma growing out of international anarchy. As a result of being the most powerful and influential actors in the system, the system’s top tier states experience the greatest degrees of anarchy with no greater authority over them to order their interactions.

**Multiple Unit Composition**

Metafunctionalism assumes the multiunit composition of the international system with state units being generally rational actors pursuing their own's interests. The base units of the international system are structurally composed of two distinct state types: the nation-state and artificial multinational state. Numerically, a majority of states in the Global South characteristically fall within the description of the artificial multinational state as opposed to functional nation-states. The functioning of their institutions and behavioral outputs differ greatly from the functional nation-states primarily occupying

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19 Hughes, 47-48, 53.

20 Goldmann, 27, 28.

21 Hughes, 352-354, 369.

22 Kegley and Raymond, 34-35.
the Global North. The founding of behavioral generalizations solely on any one form of state unit will necessarily lead to inaccurate and poorly descriptive conclusions of the other. Such an act will distort the basic consistency of the "system-unit structure of the international system upon which IR theory is built." Therefore, by necessity either two sets of generalizations must be introduced, or the most dominant similar characteristics of both types of state must be presented as the features of the state. Within this study the first option has been opted for in order to elaborate on the characteristic structure and functioning of both types of state and how those differences affect their behavior and relations.

The State

Metafunctionalism conceives of the state as a multilayered ecosocial and political organism structured minimally to comprise a geographically bounded territory, population, governing system, economic system, material culture system/set, and language system/set. It is the base unit of the international system carrying the most influence and is the platform from which most other actors in the system act. The state is formally defined as the sovereign political entity organizing and governing a defined national territory and the population within it. It is politically organized under a sovereign governing authority accepted nationally and internationally as the supreme authority over the state. The state and its governing authorities derive their legitimacy and sovereign authority from their citizenry, the international system, or both. It is

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23 Meehan, 57-58.

diplomatically recognized by other states and international institutions who acknowledge its territorial borders and governing authorities.\(^\text{25}\) States are generally rational actors in their behavior and relations based on the pursuit of their own self interest.\(^\text{26}\) In the twenty-first century, the state units of the system include both the nation-state and a second form of state\(^\text{27}\) here referred to as “the artificial multinational state.” Each state houses its own set of characteristics and behavioral responses to the system and international environment.

Within the hierarchical anarchy state of the international system, the state must employ any strategy available to it by which to ensure its survival. State survival is a systematic and rational process of negating or minimalizing the failure of national institutions and collapse of state structures by both internal and external elements. The state must prevent its destruction through the dissolution of its territorial integrity by military conflict, the natural environment, or structural collapse from internal and external sociopolitical and economic pressures. The national interest of the state pursued through its foreign policy and international relations must have at its base the goal of state survival which may be achieved through enhancing state power and influence, expanding state material capabilities, participating in international institutions, economic or political integration, institutional restructuring, establishing strategic alliances, force via large scale military conflict, among a grand host of means. The identification of the

\(^{25}\) Goldstein, 10.

\(^{26}\) Goldstein, 68-69, 102-103.

\(^{27}\) Ibid, 10-11.
base goal of the state as survival necessarily suggests that the international relations of
the state must revolve around fostering external relationships that will contribute to the
maintenance of the state’s integrity.

The Nation-State

The nation-state refers to a state where the national group identification of its
population (nation) approximates the territorial boundaries of the state.28 Within this
form of state, national identification and allegiance to an overarching state national
identity take primacy over other forms of social identifications such as ethnicity, race,
religion, and culture. The nation-state may be multinational or multiethnic in
composition where the population chooses first to collectively identify with the national
identity over allegiances and loyalties to other forms of social and national identity.29
The functional nation-state’s allegiance to an overarching national identity and agreed
societal norms of behavior and political process have historically allowed for great civil
stability, economic growth, development, and a genuine pursuit of a truly national
interest. Functional nation-states categorically engender great degrees of sovereignty and
the internal means by which to maintain that sovereignty and are largely found in the first
and second tiers of states within the global north.30 Nation-states are found primarily in
the first and second state tier within the categories of hyperfunctional, equifunctional, and
hypofunctional states.

28 Ibid, 10.
29 Nana Poku, “Colonialism and Sub-Saharan Identities” Identities in International Relations, Jill
30 Goldstein, 10-11, 78-81.
The Artificial Multinational State

In contrast to the general conventional assumption that the nation-state forms the central base unit of the system, this study assumes the greater numerical proliferation of a significant second state formation existing and acting within the international system. This second state unit is referred to as the Artificial Multinational State. The artificial multinational state is one in which multiple national groups or nations inhabit the boundaries of the state, embracing and maintaining loyalties to social identifications of ethnicity, race, religion, and culture over the embrace of an overarching national identity. The designation of this form of state as artificial is derived from its historical emergence out of European imperialism and colonization (non-settler) of groups of non-European peoples. These states became theoretically independent states in the 19th and 20th centuries. Most artificial multinational states through the process of colonialism have externally imposed multinational, multiethnic, and multireligious population compositions and are mostly located in the third tier of states.

Artificial multinational states have generally been characterized by domestic group insecurity, ethno-racial and religious interpretation and determination of the national interest, extracontinental maintenance of territorial and political sovereignty, and soft sovereignty regimes. These characteristics have contributed to a host of challenges

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31 Kegley and Raymond, 54.

32 Goldstein, 10-11.

33 This term and its definition have been introduced by the researcher.

34 Ibid., 10-11.

35 Most artificial multi-national states characteristically fall into the category of lesser developed
endemic to the states of the Global South such as political instability, civil conflict, and institutional corruption. Very few artificial multinational states have been able to develop the political tools and mechanisms in the long term to absorb, ameliorate, and resolve the complexity of the issues arising out of the structure and history of this type of state. States such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, and South Africa have with some level of success, addressed these problems in such a manner as to allow for long term political, civil, and economic growth and stability. However, the majority of artificial multinational states have not successfully developed the sociopolitical mechanisms necessary to mitigate or insulate against the effects of its multinational composition and resulting multinationalisms. The structure of the artificial multinational state creates sociopolitical and economic conditions that serve to foster excessive degrees of substate nationalism within the state. Within these excessive degrees of substate nationalism, individual identifications and allegiances within the state are first to identities of culture, ethnicity, race, or religion over a unitary national identification and allegiance to the state. Excessive degrees of multinationalism within the artificial multinational state in turn foster unstable levels of group insecurity within the state based on assumed zero sum

countries/states occupying the “Third World” or “Global South” consistent with the sociopolitical and economic behavior of those categories. Hughes, 346-347.

39 Kegley and Raymond, 107-108.

37 Goldstein, 80-81.

38 Poku, 188.

39 Ibid., 182.
interpretations of socioeconomic and political security. In environments of extreme imagined or real resource scarcity and institutional weakness, the level of group insecurity becomes greatly exacerbated leading to extreme responses in the state's domestic and international behavior. Artificial multinational states are found primarily in the third tier and segments of the second tier among pathofunctional, protofunctional, and neutrofunctional states.

**Domestic Group Insecurity**

Unstable levels of national group insecurity in the state are reflective of an active and ongoing Domestic Group Security Dilemma within its boundaries. The Domestic Group Security Dilemma refers to the zero-sum interpretation of the sociopolitical, economic, and military gains of one national group as a decrease in the sociopolitical and economic security of other competing groups in the state. This circumstance of perception within the artificial multinational state is an outgrowth of its colonial history in which the colonial state was built and maintained on forced population inclusion, integration, group disempowerment, and subordination to a central authority. This arrangement was structured to order colonial society in such a manner as to allow for the effective administration and ongoing subordination of all native groups within the colony to a central foreign minority authority.

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40 Ibid., 185.
41 This term has been quoted by the researcher to describe the application of the international Security Dilemma of realism to domestic politics of the artificial multi-national state. Hughes, 47.
42 Poku, 183-185.
43 Ibid., 182.
Contemporarily, without strong central institutions or external mediators to guarantee egalitarian group security within the artificial multinational state, modern Western political institutions function to reinforce domestic insecurity among national groups. As a result, it has become common place for individual or multiple groups to seek external or international support to strengthen their position within the state. Within this insecure environment, the government as the primary instrument for establishing and maintaining external/international relationships is perceived as the central instrument within the artificial multinational state to enhance individual group security relative to all other groups. This interpreted role of government teamed with real and imagined perceptions of limited resource access, and historical group incompatibility, results in the zero sum competition within the state for control over its governing instruments and resources. The political process is reduced to a competition of relative gains and losses between national groups for control of the instruments of political power that guarantee group security through unfettered access to national and international resources. These absolute gains and losses become extremely important in subnational group behavior when faced with the very real prospects of economic marginalization, military suppression, and genocide via military force by those in control of the state. At present, these processes dominate the governing process of most artificial...

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44 Ibid., 184-185, 188.


46 Taylor, 414.

47 Poku, 185, 187.
multinational states in the third tier in difference to conventional modern conceptions of government. The zero sum game of domestic politics serves as the instrument and tool by which to settle societal disputes, ensure group security, and distribute national wealth and income within the state.

**National Interest in the Artificial Multinational State**

Based on the politics growing out of the domestic group security dilemma within the artificial multinational state, the pursuit of the national interest is reduced to the security considerations of the those groups controlling the state rather than a collusion of competing domestic interests. This occurs in the absence of effective political instruments and institutions by which to build and establish a national consensus among competing groups on the composition of interests and objectives to be pursued by the state in the international environment. The pursuit of individual group interest via international means reinforces the environment of insecurity as participating groups perceive the pursuit of those interests by the governing elite as undermining the meeting of their own interests. Faced with an overwhelmingly powerful state ruling group, non-ruling groups may abandon political processes in favor of force or autonomy seeking, establishing their own substate or non-state foreign policy interests and relations.

**Artificial and Soft Sovereignty**

The third dominant characteristic of the artificial multinational state is its artificiality and soft structure. Within realist and liberal theory the modern state system is founded on the principle of state sovereignty and functions by the dictates of that
regime.\textsuperscript{48} State sovereignty referring to the ability and capacity of the state to control, maintain, and protect its territorial integrity and national boarders while maintaining internal order, stability, physical security, and essential material security for its population.\textsuperscript{49} A state’s sovereignty is legitimized essentially by three dominant factors: first, by its ability to act out all aspects of its sovereign responsibilities to a degree capable of maintaining its structural and territorial integrity, second, by the conferring of ultimate governing authority over its territory and inhabitants to governing officials by the population, and last, by the recognition of other states and international institutions in the international system.\textsuperscript{50} The majority of functional nation states of the first and second tier of states generally display all the requisite characteristics of a sovereign state. Their sovereign state characteristics greatly contribute to their ongoing stability.

However, the larger percentages of artificial multinational states in the third tier of states do not engender or practice state sovereignty according to conventional definitions and descriptions of state sovereignty. These states have historically been unable to maintain or enact all aspects of their sovereignty within an acceptable degree of effectiveness as compared to the system’s fully sovereign states.\textsuperscript{51} Rather, most artificial multinational states may instead be described as adhering to regimes of Artificial and Soft

\textsuperscript{48} Examples of the sovereignty regime: States generally respect and do not impinge on the territorial rights of other states. In diplomatic exchanges most states generally accept the governing regime as the legitimate authority within that country.

\textsuperscript{49} Goldstein, 74, 76.


\textsuperscript{51} Anderson, 9-10.
Sovereignty. Within this regime of Artificial Sovereignty, the state’s territorial composition and borders have essentially been determined by or in relationship to the former colonial powers of Europe and the Middle East and are maintained by international conventions and agreements regionally and through the United Nations.\(^{52}\) However, due to general inability of third tier states to practically perform all aspects of their sovereign responsibilities to a functional degree, they consequently must rely on international assistance to meet their sovereign obligations. As such, the state’s sovereignty and very existence are largely derived and legitimized by external elements rather than internal elements. Without the internal means by which to maintain the sovereignty of the state, external actors effectively grant the state’s governing officials and offices the sovereign authority to govern the state and manage its international relationships.\(^{53}\) The historical background of this artificial sovereignty regime is rooted in the artificial state’s transition from colonialism to independence, where even though theoretically independent, it did not have the practical means to fully exercise sovereign authority over its territory and population.\(^{54}\)

Artificial sovereignty regimes have had a host of historical problems contributing to the challenges of state building in the artificial multinational states. These include limited or absent popular political legitimacy, irredentism, civil instability, and international aid dependency.\(^{55}\) Within the limits of artificial sovereignty regimes, the

\(^{52}\) Ibid.

\(^{53}\) Ibid.

\(^{54}\) Ibid.

\(^{55}\) Ibid, 11-12.
practical application and implementation of state sovereignty is soft or lightly administered relative to the hard applications of fully sovereign states. As such, soft sovereignty may be described as the limited or marginal application and execution of the elements of state sovereignty as prescribed by the modern state system. The structural weakness and institutional inefficiency of weak states restricts their ability to fully employ their internal resources toward fully meeting their sovereign responsibilities. The state cannot by itself effectively control and protect its territorial integrity and national borders, ensure internal domestic security, provide for domestic social and political order, facilitate economic stability, or ensure the essential material security of its population. Weak states, most of which are in the third tier of states, are unable to undertake all of these roles simultaneously or individually to a practically effective degree. This is in contrast to the hard applications and executions of fully sovereign states in carrying out their sovereign responsibilities.

The State: Complex Coexistence and Transition

The nation-state and artificial multinational state exist in a continually frictional relationship as nation-states dominate the international system even though numerically outnumbered by artificial multinational states. This friction is institutionally evident in the structure of the United Nations system as the Security Council’s (15 members) power and authority outweigh that of the General Assembly (all other members), and the diffusion of economic power towards the minority of states in the Global North as

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56 This definition is introduced by the researcher.

57 Lawson and Rothchild, 230.
evidenced in the breakdown of World Trade Organization negotiations due to Global South state opposition. The nation-states of the global North account for the bulk of international economic activity and resource consumption, generally enjoying higher standards of living. Most artificial multinational states are in the Global South, nonindustrialized, and generally have lower standards of living than functional nation-states in the Global North. They consume significantly smaller percentages of global resources and account for a significantly smaller portion of international economic and political activity in the international system. In its current structure, the internal system facilitates a system of cyclical dependency in which most artificial multinational states have historically been economically dependent on functional nation-states and carry only 20% of global income though accounting for 80% of its populations. The possibility of structural transition from the artificial multinational state to the nation remains questionable, particularly as a means by which to alleviate the problems posed by state artificiality, multinationalism, and soft sovereignty.

System and State Characteristics, Behavioral Determinants, and Variants:

Realist Characteristics

In response to the scarcity of resources and security (anarchy) within the international environment, the forces of natural selection have resulted in a number of systemic attributes paralleling those of realism. The realist characteristics of the system

59 Kegley and Raymond, 99-100, 107-108.
60 Ibid., 111.
61 Ibid., 99, 107.
are those attributes dictating physical force and relative gains as a means of providing for wants, needs, and physical security. Realism's primary attributes of "power" and "structure" form the central behavioral determinants emerging out of the system's realist characteristics. Their variants include national interest, balance, bandwagonning, and material capability.\textsuperscript{62}

In order to compete effectively for scarce resources and security, states must continually seek to augment their power by enhancing their material capabilities via growth, development, and alliance building. The building of material capabilities enhances the state's ability to compete, engage in conflict, and ultimately establish a sphere of influence for themselves. Competing states will continue to build their material capabilities until a balance of power develops among them conducive to their survival and security needs. Where a balance of power has not developed, conflict will likely ensue among competing states for scarce resources and security.\textsuperscript{63}

**Power (Determinant)**

In the international environment the pursuit of resource and security scarcity creates competition between states seeking to ensure their survival. This competition at its base is decided by the amount of relative power amassed and exercised by each state. The states amassing and maintaining the most power become the most adept at competing for scarce resources and maintaining their security. The exercise and calculation of power in its multivariant forms is one of the core elements upon which

\textsuperscript{62} Goldstein, 55-58.

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid.
state relations are based. Power in its hard and soft forms is enacted through different political and security instruments that ultimately allow a system of international cooperation to be formed and maintained. Historically state power has been directed into the pursuit of state interests (national interest), diffused and distributed through balancing, and limited by structural and institutional regimes. Realists emphasize the role of hard power in its military form as the ultimate instrument of averting conflict through deterrence. Realists also maintain that liberal institutionalism and economic interdependency are reliant on the aggregate power of a hegemonic actor in the system to achieve order. States seek power and as a means to influence the structure of international order in a manner amenable to their long term interests.

Structure (Determinant)

The distribution of power between actors within the structure of the international system ultimately serves to constrain each state’s ability to act in pursuit of their own interests. All state decisions must be measured against the potential costs and conflict their actions will bring from other actors. Structuralism serves as a formal means of managing regional and subregional balances of power between states by creating parameters and limits within which states must act. The distribution of capabilities between states within the system’s parameters allow for greater levels of predictability in state behavior among competing states. Security treaties and arms agreements

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64 Hughes, 48-50, 79-80.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Hughes, 53.
formalizing the distribution of capabilities in the system allow for the management of hegemonic power, limiting of arms races, information sharing, and relative increases in state power without conflict. The United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), and numerous regional organizations set the structural parameters for the exercise of state power.

**National Interest (Variant)**

State resources and power ideally are not used randomly without direction and purpose, but directed and employed specifically towards meeting the specific national interests of the state. The core interests of the state ideally include maintaining and protecting its territorial integrity, its population, and its sovereignty authority; while its instrumental interests theoretically include enhancing or maintaining its economic and military capabilities and power. It is the pursuit of its interests that leads the state to establish and maintain specific international relationships and act out select behaviors relative to other actors. However, there are significant challenges to state decision makers in deciding what actions are required and necessary in the pursuit of which interests. State decision makers must make complex short-term and long-term calculations regarding the costs and benefits of pursuing particular actions relative to the value placed on specific interests.

**Balance of Power (Variant)**

The behavior and relations of states may also be attributed in part to ongoing

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65 Hughes, 77-78.

69 Ibid.
struggles to establish global, regional, and subregional balances of power amenable to a broad range of state interests. Balance of power refers to the concept of state power being used to limit the actions and choices of other states in a given region or area.\footnote{Goldstein, 77-78.}

Considerations in balance of power systems are national security, material capabilities, and geo-politics. The enhancing of state material capabilities and alliance building have been effective means of creating balances of power. Effective balance of power systems adequately provide for the security needs of each state, result in long term stability, and limit conflict between the parties involved.\footnote{Ibid., 48, 124-126.}

Balance of power systems are limited in their effectiveness to the cooperation of states in the region or subregion. Each actor’s cooperation is based on a rational calculation of the benefits and costs of cooperation and participation versus defection. State perception of the international environment and understanding of the distribution of capabilities across the system relative to its own power dramatically affect its ability to rationally calculate its alternatives. Without a constant flow of accurate information about competing states, the state will have to act on the unitary rational assumptions deemed most likely to guarantee its security.\footnote{Kegley and Raymond, 221-222.}

Balances of power not inclusive of the most powerful states in the region or subregion do not necessarily mitigate conflict as outlying states are not bound by those rules and may not adhere to them. As a result, states may have incentives to act outside of established frameworks to ensure their security. Further, states for varying reasons

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\footnote{Goldstein, 77-78.}
\footnote{Ibid., 48, 124-126.}
\footnote{Kegley and Raymond, 221-222.}
may choose not to act to balance the power of other states, but may instead jump on the bandwagon of aggressive states seeking to alter the current balance of power.\textsuperscript{73}

Bipolarity and even multipolarity have great potential to deadlock the active capacity of institutions and regimes where major actors cannot come to agreement. Balance of power systems do not conceive of alternative means to power via the threat of force as a means by which to achieve a system of peace and order. Within a balance of power system, force and its threat is the only means by which to punish actors acting outside of the system’s rules.\textsuperscript{74} Balance of power politics practically plays itself out in a number of security enhancing behaviors including spheres of influence, balancing, and bandwagonning.

**Spheres of Influence**

Within balance of power systems competing states may establish formally or informally recognized spheres of influence. Along with power and geographic proximity, spheres of influence may be assumed based on historical relationships, race and ethnicity, and cultural association. Formalized spheres of influence established in concerts or treaties are intended to mitigate or minimize conflict through mutual recognition of the power and influence of a given actor or actors over a defined territorial space.\textsuperscript{75} Informal spheres of influence are based on a rational calculation and projection of state power militarily in the absence of a consistent flow of information and

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 222-223.
communication.

However, concerts and treaty systems may represent a fragile balance of power system due to the lack of incentives for political cooperation relative to increases in state power and a system of alliances. A state may seek to expand their sphere of influence or increase its territory based on a rational calculation of the diffusion of power among actors beyond the obligations of any treaty or regime. Calculated expansions of state influence based solely on power the form of force then lead to states utilizing it to meet their interests.

Balancing Behavior

When faced with the potential or real threat of a significantly more powerful regional or subregional actor, weaker states will seek to balance the power, influence, and capabilities of the stronger state. The foundational principles of balancing behavior suggest that the more powerful the state, the greater the threat perception and insecurity of its regional neighbors; and the farther away the potentially threatening state, the greater the likelihood of states to take steps to balance its power. Those states may form a larger competing unit through political, economic, and security agreements or alliances with one another. Balancing may be accomplished unilaterally, bilaterally, multilaterally, organizationally or institutionally through diplomatic action, treaties, international regimes, financial censure, containment, and deterrence. States may

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77 Ibid., 27-32.

78 Goldstein, 77-78, 86-88.
dramatically increase their own arms (deterrence) or voluntarily participate in the reduction of their security apparatus (arms control and reductions) based rational self calculations such as mutually assured destruction or detente. States may also seek to utilize international or regional institutions and organizations in which most or all of the regional actors participate to bind or check the power and actions of a threatening state. The ultimate balancing option available to the state is the reduction of the threatening state’s material capabilities and security apparatus through military action. Through force (warfare) a state may neutralize a neighboring state’s ability to act in any significant fashion by destroying it partially or completely.\(^79\)

**Bandwagonning Behaviors (Variant)**

State behavioral responses in seeking to achieve or maintain regional and subregional security necessarily changes when a more powerful potentially threatening state is in close proximity to that state. Relatively weak states when faced with a more powerful and potentially threatening state actor near to their borders will likely display a form of bandwagonning behavior.\(^80\) The foundational principles of bandwagonning behavior suggest that the closer the threatening state to a relatively weak state, the greater the threat perception and the greater the likelihood of the weaker state cooperating. Likewise, the farther away the threatening state, the lesser the threat perception of its activities. Given the greater distance, weaker states will be less likely to cooperate and

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\(^79\) Walt, 32.

\(^80\) Ibid, 17-21.
more likely to exhibit balancing behaviors. The potential or real security threat may be of both a military or economic nature.

Bandwagonning behaviors are characterized by the cooperation of the weaker state with the more powerful state actor in order to maintain their security and survival. The weaker state may accede or submit to annexation or becoming a participant in political, economic, and security alliances and agreements with the threatening or potentially threatening state. They may grant unconditional political and diplomatic support to the stronger state in international or regional institutions and organizations such as the United Nations and African Union, or ally with the stronger state in an interstate or regional conflict. This cooperation is undertaken if necessary even at the expense of select segments of the bandwagonning state’s national interests and alliances, or the compromise of a third states’ security and integrity.

Material Capability (Variant)

The power available to the state is practically expressed or understood in terms of material capabilities or the sum total of tangible and intangible resources the state may employee in pursuing its national interests. The state’s material capabilities are themselves largely the outgrowth of the state’s sociocultural makeup, political and physical structure, geography, military, natural resource endowment, physical environment, and population factors. The distribution of capabilities across the

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81 Ibid, 27-32.
82 Ibid., 27-32.
83 Waltz, 87-89.
84 Ibid., 80, 84-85.
international system determines its structure and the relationship of the units to each other. State material capability in turn informs the power position of the state within the international system and determines its capacity to interact with other state and non-state actors. The greater the state's material capabilities, the greater the options available to it to act within the system. Conversely, the lesser the state material capabilities, the less the alternatives available to the state in managing its international relationships and the lower its power position within the international system.

**Liberal Characteristics:**

In response to the costs of conflict and limitations of economic autarky, the international system has developed structural and relational characteristics paralleling the dominant attributes of liberalism. The liberal characteristics of the international system are those attributes facilitating cooperation and global governance in the absence of a global government. The dominant liberal attributes of institutionalism and interdependence are the behavioral determinants emerging out of the system's liberal characteristics. Their corresponding variants include globalization, regionalism, and international aid regimes.

**International Institutionalism (Determinant)**

States within the system engage in relationships of cooperation, interdependence, and mutual coexistence as a more efficient alternative to pure competition and conflict. States seek to better meet their survival needs by collectively creating institutions that facilitate cooperation, manage competition, and limit conflict.

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85 Ibid.
International institutionalism suggests that international order through cooperation may be achieved by institutionalizing behavioral norms and rules. Institutions contribute to state behavior by systematically structuring choices, providing incentives, distributing power, and defining roles within the international system.\footnote{Goldstein, 109, 256-259.} International institutionalism is housed on the principle of absolute gains and provides a framework for mutual wins beyond a zero sum political game.\footnote{Hughes, 54-55.} Institutionalism is successful where the benefits of cooperation and participation are greater than the benefits of defection.\footnote{Goldstein, 102-103, 105.} Punishment for not adhering to international standards and rules of behavior are meted out institutionally by restricting participation.

International institutions provide a steady source of information regarding actor behavior that limits the need for rational actors to base their relations solely on assumed unitary rationality. Actors can instead base their relations with other actors on agreed institutional principles and rules of interaction. Institutionalism helps to dispel the security concerns of actors outside of the system and provides incentives for their participation by addressing the same rules to all participants. International institutionalism is a part of evolving efforts to achieve global governance in the absence of a global government.\footnote{Thid, 109, 256-259.}

The contemporary international system is institutionally organized through the United Nations system and Bretton Woods financial institutions. The United Nations

\footnote{Goldstein, 109, 256-259.}
\footnote{Hughes, 54-55.}
\footnote{Goldstein, 102-103, 105.}
\footnote{Ibid, 109, 256-259}
provides for the system’s political organization, while the Bretton Woods institutions provide the system’s financial and economic organization. The primary decision making institutions in the system are the UN Security Council, UN General Assembly, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and the World Trade Organization.

**Complex Interdependence (Determinant)**

This condition of complex interdependence describes a structural characteristic of the international system in which the formal and informal relationships between states actors are dynamically linked across economic, political, and security spheres. The states in the system are linked in a manner hinging the survival of each on the others and international institutions. Institutional cooperation and international trade have facilitated the development of system wide interdependence. States depend on each other for international markets for raw materials, labor, production centers, consumer goods and services, and consumers. In order to produce goods and services more efficiently, states engage in resource production specialization for exchanges with other specializing states. This form of international trade produces a higher and more efficient global yield of goods and services than economic autarky. The process of complex interdependence results in absolute economic gains taking precedence over relative security gains.

The interdependence of the international system has both simplified and

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90 Ibid., 259-260, 327-329, 351-353.

91 Hughes, 242-243.


93 Ibid.
complicated the relations between powerful and wealthy states. Military force is no longer a first means to settle state disputes because conflict serves to obstruct regional and international trade.94 Each state must seek to cope with the challenges imposed by global level phenomena utilizing the state level instruments at their disposal. States are now increasingly dependent on international institutions to help them manage the various aspects of globalization. Institutional management of the global economy and international system are required to mediate and settle state disputes in order to avert the conflicts arising out of complex interdependence.

Globalization (Variant)

The post-Cold War world has seen the rapid expansion and development of capitalism into every region of the world. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and its competing globalized system of state-sponsored communism and socialism allowed for the full global extension of capitalism. The unipolar international system has facilitated the full participation in the global economy of the world’s largest and most promising regional economies including China, Russia, India, Brazil, Indonesia, and South Africa. The production of goods and services is now diffused across the globe as the capital and resources necessary for the production process gravitates to those areas promising the most efficient return. The component parts of consumer and capital goods and services may be produced in any number of states, assembled in another, and sold in yet another. The net result of these collective processes has been the unleashing of a period of global economic growth unprecedented in the world’s history.

This evolving political phenomenon commonly referred to as globalization

94 Jones, 213.
characteristically includes rapid technological advances in communications and information technology, highly efficient and globally available transportation services, the global liquidity and rapid movement of capital, a globally competitive labor market, state level competition to host production centers, the global diffusion of media, the internationalization of crime syndicates, unparalleled environmental destruction, and the development of paralleling socio-political and financial institutions by which to govern it. The behavior and relations of the state are in part characterized by an ongoing process of elevating the state’s position in the value chain of the global economy. The state actively engages in this process while synonymously positioning itself to benefit from the production and position of other competing states in the system.

Regionalism (Variant)

Institutionalism has also diffused to the regional and subregional levels. This diffusion of international institutionalism by region has become known as regionalism in which multiple states in similar geographic proximity formally organize themselves institutionally to address their collective needs. States act in concert to address issues more effectively than they have the capacity to manage themselves. Regional integration has today become a staunch facet of the international system that provides the benefits of enhanced regional political stability, economics and trade, collective security, and conflict management. Regional institutions have been used by states to

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95 Goldstein, 304-305.
96 Ibid., 307-308.
97 Kegley and Raymond, 262-263.
amplify their own power while restricting the power of their neighbors. This is accomplished through collective security regimes, economic agreements, and institutional management of regional conflicts. The diffusing of the responsibilities of the maintenance of peace and security to neighboring states reduces the likelihood of escalating conflict between member states. Collective security lightens the burden of any one state having to maintain their own security relative to all of their neighbors.98

International Aid Regimes (Variant)

International aid regimes have become a key and defining facet in the behavior and relations of the third tier of states to which most sub-Saharan African states categorically fall. More than 90% of all development and humanitarian aid to poor Global South states is provided by the wealthy states of the Global North and select semi-periphery states (North America, Western Europe, Japan, and China).99 International aid theoretically serves as a means by which to develop the state through enhancing its material capabilities, functionalizing the state structure, strengthening societal institutions, and aid in the creation of an environment conducive to political stability. However, when not strategically and meaningfully applied aid regimes have been counterproductive effectively bolstering ethnic and class divisions, militarizing the state, destabilizing the economy, foster corruption, and encourage political and civil instability.100

99 Ibid., 528.
Within the third tier of states, international aid regimes have generally led to the development of international relationships centered on debt accumulation that subordinate debtor states to the dictates and interests of aid providers.¹⁰¹ The manner in which international aid has been distributed in regions such as sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and South Asia has not directed the assistance to the key areas that most significantly enhance the capabilities and institutions of the state. Aid packages have not served to alleviate state structural handicaps nor eliminated the systemic handicaps weak states face within the international system. Aid in both the Cold War and post-Cold War period have not focused on national economic and social development, but have included disproportionate amounts of military aid, industrial oil and mineral extraction equipment, and personal political aggrandizement and corruption.¹⁰² The ultimate outcome of western aid packages to third tier states has been the mass accumulation of large-scale debt¹⁰³ and reinforcement of dependency among recipient states.

International aid packages have encountered the challenges of absorptive capacity in donor states, and the immoral or self-interested conditionalities of donor states. African and other states often have severely limited structural and moral capacities by which to receive and productively implement aid. Donor states often attach self serving conditions and applications to aid resulting ultimately in a hire cost to the recipient state. Liberal international aid packages to poor nonindustrialized states have served both as a tool by which politicians ingratiate themselves domestically, and as a tool of wealthy

¹⁰¹ Ibid, 670.


¹⁰³ Ibid., 17.
countries to maintain the hierarchical and stratified structure of the global economic and political system.\textsuperscript{104} In practical terms, aid packages have directed assistance primarily to infrastructural support of existing extraction and distribution centers, debt servicing and forgiveness, budget support, and military aid.

International aid regimes are also part of a system wide economic and political process that serves to continually undermine the position of weak global south states in the third tier of states in a manner that contributes to their underdevelopment and keeps them cyclically dependent.\textsuperscript{105} Those same processes act to maintain the position of developed industrialized states atop of the global hierarchy of states enhancing their national development. The global system is politically and economically structured to create and perpetuate the conditions and relationships that require African and other poor states to seek international aid in the first instance.

Within the production value chain of the global economic system and its paralleling global division of labor and production, third tier states have been limited to the lowest level of production providing primary agricultural and mineral goods. Primary resource extraction and production yield the lowest value and generate the smallest amount of income and revenue in the production value chain and are absolutely vital to the higher level production processes of developed and developing states. Secondary and tertiary production processes in contrast yield the greatest value and revenue in the global production process and consequently engender the highest cost in their distribution on the

\textsuperscript{104} Jagdish Bhagwati, "Development Aid: Getting it Right" \textit{The OECD Observer Paris} iss. 249 (May 2005) : 27-29.

global market. The cumulative result of this in the structure of the production value chain is that the primary resource exporting states receives the smallest amount of revenue for its main exports of goods and services, but pays a disproportionately high price for the capital and consumer goods and services produced form those resources in industrial states.\textsuperscript{106}

The dependent states in the third tier face the distinct challenge of meeting the deficit between their limited purchasing power and meeting the financial obligations of the state. To account for this deficit, the states utilize international aid assistance to meet its daily budgetary, structural, developmental, and societal needs. In this manner the structure of the global economy facilitates a systematic process by which poor states are pushed to incur large scale debt accumulation through credit and loan financing to make up for the limitations of their national revenue base.\textsuperscript{107} The donor states of the Global North in the first tier actively maintain the global economic system facilitating dependency and underdevelopment which subsequently necessitates the availability of international aid. Third tier states in the Global South are systematically placed in a position where they must seek aid from the very same state and nonstate sources that generate the most wealth from the exploitation of their resources.

\textbf{International Class Characteristics}

The process of group/multilevel selection grants characteristics to the international system paralleling those of international class conflict. The international class characteristics of the system are those attributes facilitating the economic

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., 232-234.

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., 233.
stratification and global division of production and labor. The defining attribute of the international class characteristics of the system is class conflict or struggle. Class conflict’s variants include hierarchy, stratification, and subordination.

**Class Conflict/Struggle (Determinant)**

The behavior and relations of the states are due in part to a system-wide social and political class struggle between elite and the mass groups over control of the state to determine the ownership and distribution of its resources. Domestically, through control of government institutions and resources, the masses or elites are able to determine how the accrued benefits of the production process will be distributed throughout the state and how it will ultimately be structurally organized. Elites in each state throughout the system ally themselves to maintain elite dominated states within the international system.\(^{108}\) They seek to control state resources and the means of production through the state’s governing institutions to maintain their position at the top of the class hierarchy over the masses of workers.

Likewise, within a framework of international class conflict elite states also seek to dominate the international system with a corresponding distribution of political power and economic stratification.\(^{109}\) Once it is in the interest of the maintenance of their power and position, the ruling elites in each state furnish support to the ruling elites of other states in an effort to secure the superstructure of the world system and their states

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\(^{108}\) Chilcote, 284.

position within it.\textsuperscript{110} If it is outside of the interest of the maintenance of elite power positions to support a particular state's controlling elite, other elite groups will not grant support and likely work towards the removal and exchange of one ruling elite in that state for another more amenable to their interest. As a result, ruling elites in third tier states in Africa, Latin America, and Asia receive state level support and aid from regional and extra-regional elites in the second and third tiers of states of the center and semi-periphery. These relationships largely play themselves out along the lines of dependency, underdevelopment, and neocolonialism as elite support is not given freely and comes with a price.\textsuperscript{111}

The masses worldwide are theoretically in a constant struggle to wrestle control of the state from elite groups to employ state power and resources in their interest. The masses do not consider elite control of the state to be in their interests as elites constantly seek to distribute state resources, the benefits of production, and the benefits of international relationships to themselves at the expense of the livelihood and welfare of the masses. Elites use their power position to subjugate and exploit the masses themselves or allow the same to be done to them by external actors. The masses initially may seek to utilize democratic political process in the form of party politics and popular or representative elections to place popular leaders in control of the state to act in their interests. However, if the masses are unable to meet their objectives through democratic process they employ force or violence towards state infrastructure, institutions, officials,

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{111} Goldstein, 474-475.
personnel, or assume control of state resources and infrastructure in revolutionary efforts to have their interests met. Civil conflict may ensue if the masses are provided continual access to the resources necessary to maintain ongoing action against the state and its ruling elite.\textsuperscript{112}

**Political Hierarchy and Economic Stratification (Variant)**

Within the post-Cold War international system, the center-periphery\textsuperscript{113} relations of the international system have been institutionalized and regimented to govern the relations between the first tier states of the global north and the second and third tier states of the global south.\textsuperscript{114} Both the UN system and Bretton Woods Institutions along with the WTO are elitist instruments by which to maintain the class structure of the international system with its corresponding political hierarchy and economic stratification. Within the international environment there exists both a formal and informal hierarchy among states determined by a host of factors including the international division of labor and production, military power, economic power, geostrategic value, population, religion, ethnicity, race, culture, and civilization.

The system of global order was established and is maintained by the most powerful and influential states in a manner to maintain their elite positions in the system while undermining the power and sociopolitical mobility of weaker or ascending states that may seek to change or destabilize the system. International institutions,

\textsuperscript{112} Goldstein, 464.

\textsuperscript{113} Wallerstein.

\textsuperscript{114} This study goes beyond Immanuel Wallerstein's World Systems model of international class analysis to suggest that center-periphery relations have been institutionalized and regimented in the UN and Bretton Woods systems. The United Nations, World Bank, IMF, and WTO are elitist instruments by which to maintain the class structure and economic stratification of the international system.
organizations, and regimes are the primary instruments used to govern and maintain the international status quo.\textsuperscript{115} The United Nations and International Financial Institutions (IMF, World Bank) may all be considered elitist institutions with the permanent members of the UN Security Council and their closest allies representing the elite group of states in the system. The distribution of military power among states necessitated the development of a hierarchy among states within an institutionalized framework that mitigates conflict and provides for peaceful relations between those states with the greatest military capability. The destructive potential of these states to threaten different regions and each other raise them to the top of the hierarchy along with states essential to the maintenance of the stability and functioning of the system. The states with the least destructive capacity and least bearing on its stability and functioning are consequently pushed down to the bottom of the hierarchy.

Both the digital divide and North-South gap\textsuperscript{116} are descriptive terms around the stratified structure of the global economy describing the diffusion of economic and productive capacity between first, second and third tier states. Secondary and tertiary advanced techno-industrial processes, capital accumulation, and mass market exchange largely reside in the global North and select states in the semi-periphery. Those processes and goods and services yield the highest value in the global economic value chain. Energy supplies and extraction resides largely in select second tier, and primarily in third tier states. Energy extraction to supply the techno-industrial processes of the

\textsuperscript{115} Ikenberry, 24, 26.

\textsuperscript{116} Kegley and Raymond, 107, 274.
center and semi-periphery yield the second highest value in the global economic value chain. Primary resource commodity agriculture and mineral extraction reside primarily in the peripheral third tier states of the global south yielding the lowest value on the global economic value chain.  

Primary resource extraction and production yield the lowest value and generate the smallest amount of income and revenue, but are vital to the higher level production processes of developed and developing states. Secondary and tertiary production processes in contrast yield the greatest value and revenue in the global production process, and consequently engender the highest cost in their distribution in the global market. The cumulative result of the stratified structure of the global economy and its production value chain is that the poorest and least influential states of the periphery receive the smallest amount of value (revenue) for the production of their goods and services, but pay a disproportionately high price for the capital and consumer goods and services produced from those resources in first and second tier industrial states. Conversely, first and select second tier states in the global north receive the highest value for their goods and services, but with the exception of energy pay a comparatively low price for the agro-mineral resources produced in third tier states. As a result there develops an economic hierarchy of importance among the different tiers of states with the first ranking as the most important and the third as the least important.  

The states of the upper tiers of the international hierarchy of states work to

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117 Hughes, 352-355.

118 Dos Santos, 231-254.
remove or undermine ruling elites and popular leaders who seek to alter the order of the
global hierarchy of states by enhancing their state's position through expanding state
material capabilities, enhancing state security, military conflict, and amplification of the
state's power through international institutions. Elite actions against such state leadership
effectively discourage national leaders from taking positive actions in their states interest
that would possibly upset the status quo. As a result, in third tier states there has been a
preponderance of leadership willing to maintain the status quo at the expense of state
interests.

**Institutional Subordination (Variant)**

State behavior and relations are also in part shaped by the parameters imposed on
the state by the rules and regimes of international institutions and organizations in
managing the international system. Those elitist institutions and organizations impose
numerous regulations developed by first tier states on the weaker and less influential
states within the system which both directly and indirectly subordinate the decisions,
actions, and behaviors of the weakest states to the dictates of the system elitist controlling
elements.

The greater role of international institutionalism in the post-World War II
international system along with the onset of globalization and complex interdependency
in the post-Cold War world are responsible for the imposition of intense levels of
regulation and subordination on the weaker and less influential states.\(^{119}\) The intense
levels of systemic regulation over the system's weakest states is largely rooted in their
dependence on the system's institutions and most powerful actors for the maintenance of

\(^{119}\) Hughes, 329.
their territorial integrity and daily material survival. In many areas this institutional regulation goes beyond a system of sovereign participation by choice for the state, where adherence to international rules and norms are a requirement for participation and access to necessary and financial resources and services. The international system’s institutions and most powerful states take on a parallel role to governance for weak states in regulating international economics and trade, aiding in the provision of regional and civil security, and providing aid packages, credit, and financing.

Compliance with institutional and international rules and regulations is held as perquisite and requirement for access to international financial and security instruments necessary for economic and national security. Financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF have evolved relationships with several states in which they essentially take on roles paramount to national governance and policy determination in those states. Common fiscal areas in which this occurrence is repeated are economics and trade, domestic civil security, and the material provision of select essential goods and services such as food provision and disease control. The weaker and least influential states as a consequence of participation must answer in some degree to governing bodies of these institutions and organizations. Weak states are placed in a subordinate position to international institutions and powerful actors based primarily on their almost absolute dependence on the system’s institutions and powerful state actors for their material

120 Goldstein, 476-478.
121 Goldstein, 476-478, 522-525, 526-528.
122 Goldmann, 30.
survival.

**Functional Composition Characteristics**

The state’s functional composition characteristics refer to those attributes growing out of its organism type structure comprised of interlocking social, political, and economic institutions. State institutions are organized in an equilibrial relationship in which changes in one institution are reflected in changes in adjoining institutions. The behavioral determinant emerging out of the state’s functional composition characteristics are “structure and function.” Structure and function’s corresponding variants are structural and functional dependence and independence, and structural institutionalism.

**Structure and Function (Determinant)**

The structure and function factors of state behavior and relations describe those influences emanating out of the institutional and territorial organization of the state. The behavior and relations of the state are in part a product of the degree to which the state is able to functionalize its political, economic, territorial, and social structures towards independent survival. Within this study structure describes both the manner in which the parts of an institution, society, state, or system are systematically organized, and the principle upon which the relationship between the parts are formed. Function refers to the manner in which the parts of an institution, society, state, or system interact with each other to produce specific outputs. The state’s ability to compete, cooperate,

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123 Goodson, 37-38. All complex life forms are functionally composed with every trait in their biological system serving a function towards survival. Life and its differing characteristics evolve based on the principle of functional causality.

124 Chilcote, 135-136.

125 Waltz, 1-2.
and specialize in the international environment are all enabled or limited by the manner and principle upon which it is structured, and the effective functioning of its institutions. Functional outputs are generally dictated by structural organization and as a result the state will only function as it is structured to. Changes in the state’s behavioral outputs will either be the product of changes in the state’s internal structure, or changes in the structure of the international system.

State structures are largely based on normative ideological, religious, or philosophical preferences such as liberalism, socialism, or Islam. The structural preference informs the type of political system adopted by the state. 126 If liberalism is adopted as the state’s structural preference, the political system will likely be based on a form of democracy. Paralleling the system of democratic government capitalism would dominate the state’s economic structure. Likewise, if socialism is adopted as the state’s structural preference the political system will likely be based on socialism or communism. Paralleling the socialist system of government a command or mixed economy would dominate the state’s economic structure. Where there is a general divergence between the normative preferences of the society and the state’s political and economic structure, institutional dysfunction and civil unrest will occur constantly.

**Structural and Functional Independence and Dependence (Variant)**

Structural dependence and independence are the products of institutional and systemic factors interacting in a manner that either hinders or enhances the state’s ability to provide for its own needs. States are structured to function in a variety of ways based

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126 Almond, Dalton, Powell, Strom, 31-35.
on their historical development. States are generally structured to be either functionally independent, able to provide for their own basic needs and wants; functionally dependent, largely reliant on the efforts of other actors to provide for their basic needs and wants; or a position in-between with varying degrees of both. States also display different combinations of dependence and independence in their structure and functioning. States may be structurally independent and functional, structurally independent and dysfunctional, structurally dependent and functional, and structurally dependent and dysfunctional. Some states have no degree of functionality due to national structural collapse and institutional failure.¹²⁷

**Structural and Functional Independence**

Structural and functionally independent states are found primarily in the first and upper second tiers of states. These states' institutions are organized in such a manner as to allow for the efficient use of resources towards providing for the needs of the state without external support. Their political systems serve as effective societal organizing tools by which to meet the collective interests within the state. Government in these states have great degrees of accountability and transparency in the extraction, allocation, and distribution of resources. Examples of states of this type are the United States, Canada, Australia, Germany, England, France Russia, Japan and China.

**Structural Independence and Dysfunctionality**

Structurally independent yet dysfunctional states are found in the lower first and second tiers of states. These states' institutions are organized in a manner ensuring only

¹²⁷ The concept of structural and functional dependence and independence have been introduced and defined by the researcher after having examined theories of statism, structure and function, and dependency.
the most basic employ of resources towards the provision of the state’s essential needs
without external support. These states’ degree of institutional organization facilitates
institutional inefficiency and corruption that adversely affects the states productivity.
The state’s political process and governing institutions ensure only enough transparency
and accountability to enable an inefficient and limited production of goods and services.
These independent states have the option of seeking external assistance and support in
areas beyond essential goods and services production. Examples of independent and
dysfunctional states are India, Iran, Indonesia, and South Africa.

**Structural Dependence and Functionality**

Structurally dependent and functional states are found primarily in the lower
second tier and upper third tier of states. Their political systems are organized to a
sufficient operational degree to work in concert with external structural support systems
to mobilize state resources to meet the basic needs of the state. These states’ institutions
are organized in a manner that facilitates significant enough degrees of institutional
inefficiency and corruption to necessitate external support structural support. The
political process and governing institutions ensure enough transparency and
accountability to secure external assistance to operate maintain a functional system of
production of goods and services. Even though existing in a state of dependency, these
states engender an acceptable degree of functionality and have the possibility of
transitioning to a condition of structural independence. Examples of states of this type
are Ghana, the Dominican Republic, and the Philippines.
Structural Dependence and Dysfunctionality

Structurally dependent and dysfunctional states are found primarily in the lower second and third tiers of states. These states' institutions are organized in a manner that hinders or negates the efficient employ of state resources towards the provision of essential goods and services. Rather than serving as an effective societal organizing tool, the political system facilitates institutional inefficiency and corruption without a system of accountability. The state's ability to internally provide for itself severely compromised and process of resource extraction, allocation, and distribution is adversely affected. The cumulative result of the level of institutional organization is the state's complete reliance on external support to maintain the institutional and territorial structures of the state. These states exist in a condition of chronic dependency completely reliant on external support mechanisms to provide essential goods and services to the state. Without external support many states in the third tier would regress into a state of structural collapse and institutional failure. Examples of states of this type are Togo and Benin.

Institutional Inertia

State decision making and policy formulation may be constrained by the occurrence or development of unusually high levels of organizational rigidity and complacency within national institutions that constrain their ability to evolve to reflect the changing needs of society and the state. This element of institutional inertia develops when the sociopolitical and economic institutions of the state systematically reproduce specific behavioral outputs regardless of the type of societal inputs. The institutions
become rigid and dogmatic, reinforced in their approach to addressing societal needs and wants.\textsuperscript{128}

This condition is often precipitated by leadership styles and perceptions which may be conservative and invested in existing institutional processes and outcomes. Ongoing occurrences of dependency, underdevelopment, neocolonialism, debt, corruption, poverty, and civil conflict may be assumed to be facilitated and perpetuated by national institutions. These institutions are often sufficiently rigid that even with new reformist leadership, tremendous influxes of international aid, and favorable trade agreements institutional outcomes continue to be similar. To produce different institutional behavior, the state must fundamentally restructure or reconstruct its central institutions.

**Institutional Culture Clash**

The structure and functioning of the state is dynamically affected by incompatibilities between the institutional culture of modern institutions and the political culture of the populations utilizing them. National institutions may suffer from an incompatibility between the values of society and those required for national institutions to function effectively.\textsuperscript{129} The incompatibility of societal and national institutional values refers to the occurrence of an *institutional culture clash*. Institutional culture clashes serve to minimalize the functionality and efficiency of an institution rendering it largely ineffective and dysfunctional. The indigenous populations of most Global South states

\textsuperscript{128} Kegley and Wittkopf, 486.

\textsuperscript{129} Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith, *Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974).
have been dealt the task of adapting their traditional political ideas and institutions to the modern state. The integration of traditional political cultures into Western and Eastern political and economic institutions has not been perfect or seamless. The governing elements of third tier states have been unable to secure an efficient mode of operation resulting in socio-political and economic fallout. The most common fallouts have been zero sum interpretations of western democratic political processes, bureaucratic inefficiency, rent seeking, nepotism, and an absence of financial and economic transparency.

Structural Collapse and Institutional Failure

State collapse and institutional failure generally occur in the third tier of states, with the possibility of occurring in any state as a result of military conflict. A structurally collapsed state may be described as one in which the formal political, economic, and social institutions of the state have failed, ceased to function, or no longer exist to order the state. Structural collapse and institutional failure occur when the state’s political and economic system are no longer able to convert political inputs into policy outputs. The institutions become overwhelmed with inputs and begin to falter in their inability to process the growing number of societal demands. They eventually cease to function as an effective means by which to order society. With no effective governing institutions by which to effectively organize it, the state’s structural collapse culminates in the erosion of

130 Ibid.


its political, social, and, territorial integrity. The collapse and failure of the state are paralleled by infrastructural collapse as the resources required for their maintenance are no longer available.\textsuperscript{133}

However, state collapse may also occur due to civil or intrastate conflict in which the state’s institutions and infrastructure are destroyed in military conflict.\textsuperscript{134} State collapse may also describe a condition in which the state’s material capabilities are reduced to such a degree that the state is no longer able to maintain the elements of its’ own sovereignty. The state essentially has no means by which to pursue its national interest, enhance its material capabilities, or provide for its national security. The state is essentially powerless to act. To ward off the continual possibility and likelihood of state failure and collapse, its governing elements seek out international relationships that will maintain the integrity of the state. External assistance and intervention serves as a means to secure the state’s immediate survival and facilitate its rehabilitation. United Nations peace keeping and humanitarian regimes, international aid regimes in the form of loans and credit financing from the IMF and World Bank, and institution building assistance from wealthy developed and developing states all aid in keeping the state from disintegrating.\textsuperscript{135} Collectively these measures have all become necessary within the international system to halt state failure and collapse in multiple regions of the world.

\textsuperscript{133} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., 8-9.

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., 207-209, 211-212, 215-217.
Cognition and Perception based Characteristics

The cognition and perception characteristics of the state are those attributes allowing the state to collectively perceive itself, its environment, and its collective wants and needs relative to other actors. The state’s primary cognitive and perceptive attribute is a nationally shared and articulated worldview that forms the normative basis for collective state action. The worldview is one of the primary determinants in state behavior and relations and numerous types of views have broadly developed among different states.

State institutions in the service of the population create a common entity most individuals have an interest in maintaining as a provider of their resources and security needs. Individuals in the population are serviced by the state in a contractual exchange of allegiance for services. Through state institutional bodies a national level of awareness linked to the political and economic system develops within the state population. Through this group level of awareness the populations becomes cognizant of not only their collective interests, but also of the interests of the populations of other states. In the international arena the group level of awareness and interests are formally articulated as the national interests pursued by policy institutions. By formally pursuing the broad interest of the population through national institutions the state is transformed into a perceptive and cognitively aware entity.\textsuperscript{136}

Perception/World View (Determinant)

The behavior and relations of the state are also in part an outgrowth of the

\textsuperscript{136} The concept of state-level cognitive awareness was developed in this study.
combined perceptions and world view of the state. The state’s broad world view is a sum combination of the preferences of the masses, elites, government institutions, and national leadership of the state. Leadership perceptions and world views are derived from the background, culture, education, experiences, and personality of governing officials. Institutional perceptions and worldviews are derived from institutional specialization, tradition, and bureaucratic process. The perceptions and world view of individuals and institutions create the normative parameters for the decision making process by shaping the lenses through which the decision maker perceives political realities. Preferences for domestic and international order, and epistemological orientation preclude any rational pursuit of domestic or international interests.\(^\text{137}\) The variants in perception and worldview factors include globalist-regional-national views, center-/polar-satellite views, racial and ethnic views, religious views, and civilizational views.

**Global, Regional, and National Views**

Drawing dually from their populations and governing officials, states have a general view of themselves and their role in the international environment based on the extent to which they are able to project power and influence. State power and influence may be projected at the national, regional, global, and atmospheric levels.\(^\text{138}\) The elite group of first tier states with the greatest economic, military, political, and diplomatic capacity, perceive the international environment in global terms. Their pursuit of

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\(^{137}\) Kegley and Wittkopf, 483-484, 506, 528.

\(^{138}\) This study holds power projection in both military and non-military forms as a key facet of the imagery state leaders and institutions hold of themselves and the world in establishing their preferences for domestic and international order.
national interests through foreign policy and international relations are global in scale and reach. The relationships of these states extend into the most important regions of the world and account for the greatest percentage of international activity. These states include the United States, Japan, China, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Brazil, Russia, India and the European Union.\textsuperscript{139}

Select other states in the first, second, and third tiers do not have global reach, but have positioned themselves within the global economy and political system to make them globally relevant. States such as Taiwan, South Korea, Iran, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Switzerland, and Cuba have assumed such positions. The remaining first and second tier states subscribe to a regional view in formulating foreign policy and conducting international relations. In terms of economics, military, and political influence, they do not have the capacity for global reach or expansion. Their national interests are best pursued and realized through a regional approach. Individually their influence largely does not extend beyond their neighbors and they may seek to act in concert or through international institutions to augment their influence. Examples of states with an overwhelmingly regional view are Malaysia, Norway, Portugal, Poland, Ghana, Argentina, and Chile among others.\textsuperscript{140}

Most third tier states participate in some form of regional organization or institution, but subscribe to an overwhelmingly national world view. Their foreign policy and international relations are conditioned primarily by domestic concerns and how to

\textsuperscript{139} Goldstein, 78-80.

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., 80-81.
overcome their domestic problems. They do not house the structural capacity to
effectively project political or military power beyond their own boarders.\footnote{Ibid., 81.} This national
view is practically played out in isolationist and dependency relations. States subscribing
to a largely national world view generally weight bilateral relations with first and second
tier states over those of regional relations. Examples of third tier states with a largely
national view include Zimbabwe, Myanmar, and Tajikistan among others.

**Polar-Satellite/Center-Periphery**

Several states subscribe to a polar-satellite view of the world occurring within the
context of center periphery relations.\footnote{Within this study dependency and the world system’s framework are also considered to be general views that inform institutional culture and policy formulation.} Within this view the world is ultimately divided
into a series of poles of power where states fall under the polar influence of one of the
system’s most powerful state actors.\footnote{Chilcote, 240.} These global metropoles constitute the center of
the global economic and political system and are primarily made up of first tier states.
The elite group of first tier states and select second tier states with the greatest power and
influence, perceive the international environment in terms of a global division of spheres
of influence. Their behavior and relations are determined the international distribution of
power. States overwhelmingly subscribing to this polar view include the United States,
Japan, China, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, Brazil, Russia, India, and
the European Union.

The system’s metropoles maintain satellite states in the system’s periphery from
the second and third tiers. Satellite states are determined by their geostrategic value, resources, sphere of influence, and historical relationships. Satellite states perceive their existence and role in the international environment within the parameters of existing international power poles. Their foreign policy and international relations are conditioned by their relationship with a metropole. As a result, the pursuit of the national interest, institutional participation, and development efforts are based first on considerations of polar interests. The greater percentage of independent Francophone states in Central and West Africa essentially view themselves and behave as satellites of France.

However, select second tier states in the system are not classified as metropoles nor as satellites. These states form a semi-periphery in the system and display both the characteristics of satellites states and of metropoles. This group includes states such as Argentina, Nigeria, and Indonesia among others.

**Centralized Leadership Characteristics**

The centralized leadership characteristics of the state are those attributes facilitating centralized national decision making within the state. As a cognizant and perceptively aware entity, the state characteristically has developed the rational capacity to measure the costs and benefits of its decisions. Aware of its capacity to act in its own interest, the population centralizes its decision making and policy processes in the form of a governing body. Every governing body is headed by an individual who, based on the system of government, acts in concert with the governing body on behalf of the state.

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144 Wallerstein.
The individuals occupying leadership and government positions are as important to the state's capacity to act as the institutions themselves.145

**Leadership Style/Type (Determinant)**

The ultimate result of the state centralizing its own decision-making capacity are conditions in which the type and style of leadership exercised on behalf of the state dynamically affect the manner in which it will act or behave. Leadership type and style are one of the primary determinants in state behavior and relations. State leadership ultimately either enhances or stifles the ability of the state to effectively act in the interest of its population.146 Leadership type and style are an outgrowth of the impact of the state's culture, institutions, social composition, and education on the personality, character, and background of its governing officials. Both individual and group decision making in policy formulation are the byproduct of the intersection of institutional structures and the worldview governing officials.147 State leadership acts as a central institution in facilitating either structural dependence and dysfunctionality, or structural independence and functionality. The variations in leadership style and type broadly include authoritarian-moralist, authoritarian-survivalist, democratic, kleptocratic, nationalist, neopatrimonial, neocolonial, and theocratic style rule.

**Authoritarian-Moralist**

Authoritarian-moralist leadership is preoccupied with systematic efforts to

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145 Kegley and Wittkopf, 464-465, 503-504.

146 Ibid.

147 Kegley and Wittkopf, 503, 506, 517.
preserve, maintain, and extend leadership offices beyond any democratic or constitutional mandate in order to build a functional state. Authoritarian moralists seek to establish strong institutions and a national identity while minimizing domestic opposition. Leadership seeks to govern in the broad interests of the state by focusing on enhancing the population's material well being and quality of life. Both foreign and domestic policy serve as tools by which the governing elements of the state secure their regime's survival. Leadership positions are gained both through democratic and nondemocratic means, and maintained by any method necessary to retain power. Justifications for leadership positions are based dually on the moral capacity of state leadership to act in the interest of the population, and on the ability of the ruling regime to maintain their power and position. State leadership domestically wards off competition through incremental limited political participation, financial co-optation, and the application of force. International relationships are utilized by moral-authoritarians as a tool to bolster and reinforce their power position in efforts to control opposition groups. Ghana's Jerry Rawlings was an example of this form of leadership.

Authoritarian-Survivalist

Authoritarian-survivalist leadership is preoccupied with systematic efforts to preserve, maintain, and extend leadership offices for an undefined period of time beyond any democratic or constitutional mandate. This form of leadership is common in

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148 The term authoritarian-moralist has been used to describe authoritarian regimes which engage in developmental governance and have elements of nationalist leadership.

149 Alence, 164, 176-177. Rod Alence makes reference to the effectiveness and virtues of non-democratic regimes in developmental governance in Africa.

150 The term authoritarian-survivalist was utilized to represent both personalistic and militaristic forms
unsecure environments housing competing national, ethnic, and race groups. Both foreign and domestic policy serve as tools by which the governing elements of the state secure their regime’s survival and hold on to national power. International relationships are utilized as a tool to bolster and reinforce the power position of an individual leader or group in an effort to control competing or threatening internal state elements. State leadership domestically wards off competition through incremental limited political participation, financial co-optation, and the application of force.\textsuperscript{151}

Justifications for leadership positions are based on the ability of the ruling regime to maintain their power and position relative to political competitors. Leadership positions are gained through democratic and nondemocratic means, but are maintained by any means necessary and available inclusive of external assistance. Small inner circle groups are employed in the decision making process for policy formulation. Survivalist regimes may forgo the pursuit of national security objectives in exchange for regime security guarantees by facilitating relationships of neocolonialism, dependency, and underdevelopment with other international actors. Nigeria’s late dictator Sani Abacha is an example of this form of leadership.

\textbf{Democratic}

Democratic leadership centers on decision making through a majority rule system designed to mediate or arrive at a consensus between competing interests. Justifications for leadership positions are based on a system of open elections and maintained by the

\footnote{\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., 177-179.}
rule of law. Leadership seeks to govern by satisfying the broadest range of group and individual interests. Pluralistic and liberal institutions are utilized in the decision making process and policy formulation. The power of the executive office is checked by secondary and tertiary branches of government in order to limit the possibility of the abuse of executive power. Leadership positions are justified based on the popular consent of the population.\textsuperscript{152} Ghana’s Samuel Kuffour is an example of democratic leadership.

\textbf{-Kleptocratic}

Kleptocratic rule refers to a form of leadership where the decisions, actions, and behavior of the state domestically and internationally are merely an extension of the leader’s personality and personal preferences. Both domestic and foreign policy are an outgrowth of the personality type, education, self perception, and sum total of the life experiences of the national leader. The behavior and relations of the state may be predicted with great degrees of accuracy based on an assessment of the leader. The population of the state in turn suffers or benefits from the determinations of the national leader whether it be prospects for modernization or ongoing dependency and underdevelopment. The international relationships formed and maintained by the state become the sole determination of the national leader with little or no domestic accountability for the repercussions of their decisions or actions. Kleptocratic leaders gain their positions by varying means but maintain their position through a combination of co-optation, domestic repression, force, and external assistance. Power is the central

\textsuperscript{152} Lim, 159-161.
basis by which leadership positions are justified. Uganda’s Idi Amin and Zaire’s Mobutu are examples of the kleptocratic form of rulership.

**Nationalist**

Nationalist leadership focuses on creating a structurally independent and functional state through building internal institutions and emphasizing a national state identity. Leadership seeks to govern in the interest of the state national group defined in terms of enhancing their material well being. Justifications for leadership positions are based on the moral authority and capacity of the leaders to act in the interest of the national group. Leadership positions are gained and maintained both through systems of fair elections and by force and power. Both authoritarian and pluralistic political institutions are employed in the policy decision making process of nationalist leaders and governments. Tanzania’s Julius Nyere was an example of a nationalistic leader.

**Neo-patrimonial**

Neo-patrimonial rule refers to a form of leadership in which the national leader rules primarily in their own personal interest, and second in the interests of societal clients through a network of patron-client relationships. Neo-patrimonial rule employs executive power dually in their personal interests and the interest of their clients and patrons towards enriching the national leader and maintaining their power. Neo-patrimonial rule combines the characteristics of classical patrimonialism, presidentialism, and clientelism within the structure and institutions of modern government. Like patrimonialism, it suggests that the possessions and resources of the national territory are

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153 Kegley and Wittkopf, 517, 520.
at the disposal of the leader to do with as they see necessary. Neopatrimonialism’s elements of presidentialism centralize government and state power solely into the executive office with essentially no high level checks or balances on their actions. Its clientelist elements allow for the granting of personal favors, resources, and services to varying societal groups and individuals to solicit unbridled political and personal support.154

Justifications for leadership positions are based on the ability and capacity of the leaders to satisfy interests and maintain the loyalty of their patrons. Leadership positions may be gained and maintained either through a system of elections or by force and power. Executive decision making utilizes group consultation with patrons and allies in the formulation of domestic and foreign policy. The interests of ethnic, tribal, and class groups are met through their representative in the executive office’s unlimited access to the resources and tools of the state. The international relationships of the state become a tool to secure the domestic interests of select groups within the state. Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni is an example of neopatrimonial style rule.

Neo-colonial

Neo-colonial style leadership is a system of leadership in which the national leaders of the state govern according to the directives and interests of its former colonizer or other external powers.155 Irrespective of the manner in which they come to power or maintain their rulership, they govern and maintain international relationships according to

154 Kebonang, 5-6.

155 This study interprets Kwame Nkrumah’s “Neo-Colonialism” not only in international class and political economy terms, but also as a type or style of state leadership.
the dictates of an external power. Authoritarian or democratic means may be utilized to achieve the directives of the foreign state based on whether or not the masses perceive such a relationship to be in their interests. Irrespective of how the decision making process occurs or the institutions and groups involved, state decisions reflect a neocolonial relationship. Justifications for leadership positions are generally externally based primarily on the willingness and ability of the leadership to execute the directives of the former colonizer. If the executive office cannot act in the interests of the former colonizer and maintain domestic order and stability, that leader is subsequently removed and a new leader installed. The Republic of Chad’s president Idriss Derby is representative of such a leadership style in the relationship he maintains with France.

**Theocratic Rule**

Theocratic leadership is a system of leadership in which the national leaders of the state govern according to the directives and interests of a specific religion. Leadership seeks to govern in the interest of the moral and spiritual development of the population while attending to their material well being and needs. Justifications for leadership positions are based on the moral and spiritual authority of the leaders as granted by God and the religious body to govern in the interest of the population. The rulers believe themselves to be guided specifically by their religious beliefs and both they and their religious advisors see themselves as emissaries of their god. Leadership positions are gained and maintained both through appointments, systems of fair elections, and by force or power. Both authoritarian and pluralistic political institutions are employed in the policy building and execution process to enact directives based on divine
revelation and inspiration.

This type of rule is largely exercised in a theocratic form of government where rule is directed by a nationally held belief in a specific deity or religion. This is the case in the Vatican City State where the Pope is both the head of government and the head of the Roman Catholic Church. Iran maintains elements of theocratic rule within its democracy as elected officials running the day-to-day practical aspects of Iran’s government answer to the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council which are Islamic religious authorities. Likewise, Saudi Arabia also entails elements of theocratic rule within its monarchy as the government is largely run according to Sharia law and the Qu’ran is the foundational document of the constitution.

Policy Institutions and State Behavioral Outputs

In response to the inputs imposed on the state by the international and domestic environment, the state responds through developing policy that practically addresses its wants and needs. State decision-making is consolidated and formalized through its policy making institutions in which the determinant influences on the state’s behavior are filtered through its domestic and foreign policy institutions. The state’s foreign policy institutions are responsible for the official actions or inactions of the state as sanctioned by its governing authorities towards other actors and the international system.156 Whereas, the state’s domestic policy institutions are responsible for the official actions or inactions of the state’s governing officials towards the state and its internal elements to

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156 Kegley and Wittkopf, 7.
address its internal needs and requirements.\textsuperscript{157}

However, rather than emerging as wholly divided and separate entities, in the age of globalization and interdependency state behavioral outputs increasingly emerge in the form of intermestic policy. Intermestic policy suggests that states' foreign policies are so closely linked to national domestic outcomes that they cannot be wholly separated from domestic policy considerations and vice versa.\textsuperscript{158} The globalized and interconnected structure of the international political and economic system dynamically link the domestic issues of most states to the international issues of the international system in the post-cold war era. As a result, foreign and domestic policy both have either a directly or indirectly corresponding foreign or domestic policies to balance their internal and external effects. Policy balancing is managed institutionally where governments have developed the means by which to mediate or moderate between foreign interests and domestic interests in order to negate policy clashes.\textsuperscript{159}

However, where government instruments are not present to moderate or mediate between domestic and foreign policy effects and outcomes, foreign policy effects on domestic policy and vice versa, are determined by the dominant political paradigm or organizing principle around which the state government functions.\textsuperscript{160} In such an instance there may be no counter balancing between the effects of domestic and foreign policy on


\textsuperscript{158} Kegley and Wittkopf, 373-374.

\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., 373-374.

\textsuperscript{160} Kegley and Raymond, 59-60.
each other. As a result, policy linked to globalization and the interconnected structure of
the international system, along with the general international effects of those phenomena,
may adversely affect the state domestically. In the African region where
multinationalism overwhelmingly dominates the political process and democratic
government has not fully taken hold, the domestic political fallout and impact of foreign
policy on the state plays itself out along neopatrimonial, neocolonial, kleptocratic, ethnic,
tribal, religious, and class lines.\textsuperscript{161} This occurs particularly in regards to the process by
which determinations for the expenditure of government revenues, disbursal of
international aid, and management of the economic exploitation of national resources and
wealth are made.

The intermestic policy of the state then enters the international environment as
behavioral outputs to which other international actors and the international system itself
must contend as environmental inputs.\textsuperscript{162} Each state, theoretically adding to the milieu of
activity comprising international relations, actively engaging in the process of statehood
and with active systemic participation. From the assumption of the existence of an
international environment with dominating system and state variables, the process begins
again in continuity of the ongoing behavioral life cycle and maintenance of the
international system and its states.\textsuperscript{163}

\textsuperscript{161} Kebonang, 5-6.

\textsuperscript{162} Kegley and Wittkopf, 15. Kegley and Wittkopf's "Funnel of Causality" foreign policy model
illustrates the emergence of policy as outputs that generate feedback into the international environment and
tenter the state as inputs.

\textsuperscript{163} Ibid., 15-16.
CHAPTER 5
CATEGORIZING THE AFRICAN STATE

The Majority: Pathofunctional States

Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Comoros, Congo Brazzaville, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Lesotho, Swaziland (31 states)


With few exceptions, a majority of sub-Saharan African states overwhelmingly display the dominant characteristics of the pathofunctional state. Within the metafunctional model of state behavior and relations, states are categorized according to the manner in which the central determinants in state behavior and relations are factored and played out. The African state is described generally as weak within its realist characteristics, marginal within its liberal characteristics, peripheral-dependent-underdeveloped-neocolonial within international class characteristics, and dysfunctional and dependent within its functional composition characteristics. Within its cognitive and
perceptive characteristics, the worldviews generally predominating the African state are regional, national, satellite, racial, tribal, clan, and religious views. The African state overwhelmingly practices authoritarian survivalist, neopatrimonial, matrimonial, nationalist, and neocolonial forms of leadership within its centralized leadership characteristics.

Economically, pathofunctional states in Africa have general figures of unemployment averaging 40 to 45%, with an average of 45 to 50% of the population below the poverty line. The top 10% of the population generally accounts for at least 30% of the resource consumption and consumer spending in these countries. They generally are running high trade deficits, and public debt generally averages 20 to 30% of GDP.¹ Their United Nations Human Development Index scores are all below 0.66 in the medium and low human development category.²

Realist Characteristics:

Weakness

The realist characteristic overwhelmingly shared by a majority of sub-Saharan African states is state-level “weakness,” or a relative absence of accumulated aggregate state power.³ All African states save South Africa are relatively weak in comparison to

¹ These figures were calculated by the researcher based on individual country figures taken from the CIA World Factbook. CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos(so).html. [accessed May 1, 2010].


the super, great, and middle-range power states of the international system. 4 Regional measures of military expenditure, GDP, GNP, PCI, and percentage of votes in international institutions are all indicators of region-wide weakness among African states. 5 Since their independence, African states have generally been unable to enhance or maximize their relative power internally or externally in pursuit of their national interest or the greater survival of their populations. 6 The absence of increasing societal complexity in the African state curtails its ability to accumulate aggregate power. The African state’s power deficit is historical, and its limited functionality impedes its ability to simultaneously compete, cooperate, and specialize within the system. 7

The relatively limited power position of the African state dictates that it has little leverage by which to influence the system and is more influenced and regulated by it than the system’s most powerful actors. The African state does not have significant or sufficient military, economic, or political sanctions to bring to bear on the system and its most powerful actors to affect its structure or functioning. The power deficit facing the African state is so significant that the state historically and presently has been unable to prevent penetration by external actors into its domestic affairs. 8 The states of the sub-Saharan region of Africa continue to face an elusive quest and dilemma as to how to

6 Lawson and Rothchild, 228-230.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
substantially increase the aggregate power of the state within the present international order.

**National Interest**

Within pathofunctional and protofunctional African states, the pursuit of the national interest is reduced to the economic and physical security considerations of those groups controlling the state as opposed to a collusion of competing domestic interests. The multinational structure of the African state has proven a major obstacle to state building and the formation of a liberal or consensus-based national interest. Ethnic, tribal, and class politics have proven a destabilizing agent leading to a zero-sum interpretation of politics in the African state. The conduct of foreign policy and IR becomes reflective of the domestic group insecurity dominating the politics of the state.

Most African states generally lack effective political instruments and institutions by which to build and establish national consensus among competing groups on the composition of interests and objectives to be pursued by the state in the international environment. Each sub-national or class group within leadership positions seeks to act in its own interest as opposed to those of the state, where the pursuit of a truly national interest is of secondary importance to the practice of rentierism and government

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9 Taylor, 411-414.


11 Poku, 184-186.

corruption. The immediate individual benefits of self and group aggrandizement outweigh the political and economic costs of addressing and mediating between competing state interests.

Within this environment of zero-sum politics, it is perceived to be more conducive to individual and group interests to maintain political office by pursuing policies that reinforce the international status quo and power structure of the system than to lack the support and aid of the international community and neighboring states. The pursuit of individual and group interests via international means reinforces the environment of insecurity, as subnational and class groups perceive the narrow pursuit of private and communal interests by the governing elite as undermining the meeting of their own interests. Faced with an overwhelmingly powerful state ruling group, nonruling groups may abandon political processes in favor of force or autonomy seeking, establishing their own substate foreign policy interests and relations. The cumulative result of the zero-sum political game within African politics is the long-term failure to establish and pursue a truly national interest based on consensus and competing domestic interests.

**African State Material Capabilities**

The fundamental weakness of the African state lies in its underdeveloped material capabilities. The limited material capabilities of the states of sub-Saharan Africa were inherited by the newly independent governments from the colonial state structure of the

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13 Poku, 184-186.

14 Taylor, 414-415.

15 Forrest, 1-2.

predecessor states. The structural handicaps limiting the state’s ability to develop its material capabilities were written into the state structure in the negotiated and conflict-induced transitions from colonies to independent states. Many of these handicaps were subsequently reinforced during the Cold War and through neocolonial relationships with the former colonizing states of Western Europe and other actors. These structural handicaps include the following: the inherited absence of a military industrial complex and limited military and police forces capable of adequately policing and protecting the state from internal and external threats; the acceptance and reinforcement of national boundaries along colonial lines inconsistent with the ethnic and tribal realities of the region; and the absence of strategic material capability enhancing alliances or agreements with powerful and influential actors.

The first and most significant factor limiting the development of the material capabilities of the African state is the inherited absence of a military industrial complex and limited military and police forces capable of adequately policing the state and protecting it from internal and external threats. With the exception of South Africa, no sub-Saharan African state possesses the industrial capacity to produce advanced military

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17 Tordoff, 40.
18 Ibid.
19 Ansamoa, 136-137, 158-161. Tordoff, 37-41. I linked the development of state material capabilities to the limitations and challenges of the colonial legacies inherited by the African state. It is my position that these legacies are among the fundamental factors limiting the enhancement of African states’ material capabilities.
20 Ali A. Mazrui, Africa’s International Relations: The Diplomacy of Dependency and Change (London: Westview Press, 1977). It is the position of the researcher after surveying the available literature that territorial security is the most important factor in developing states’ material capabilities.
weapons, equipment, and training. Very few have the capacity to make long-term modernizing purchases and maintain such equipment along with conducting advanced indigenous police and military training. These limitations minimize the ability of the African state to independently exercise domestic coercive power over the entire state or project military power beyond its borders in defense of its national interest. All Sub-Saharan African states are reliant upon military support from extra-continental actors to maintain internal and external security. In order to maintain its security, the African state is subject to continual dependency on external actors for the means by which to do so.

External actors provide military support only in amounts nonthreatening to themselves or the system. This support is conditioned by terms regulated by the system’s most influential actors, requiring the political and economic compliance of national governments to varying international regimes and political and financial agreements. These agreements, however, are generally not in the best interests of the state.

The acquisition of military equipment is also a function of the state’s ability to finance its security needs. In the sub-Saharan African region, based on the limited revenues and purchasing power of the state, the countries of the region face severe financial constraints in what they are able to purchase and maintain relative to their needs. The economic structure of most sub-Saharan African states generally does not

\[21\] Mazrui, 240-242.

\[22\] McKay (William J. Foltz), 79-81.

\[23\] Ibid.

\[24\] Mazrui, 241-242.
allow for continual large-scale military purchases and upgrades in a measure satisfying the national security requirements of the state. Their military and security needs are supplemented through international aid packages from select states with large military industrial complexes. Even so, among exceptionally wealthy regional states with significant financial resources, military purchases and aid are limited to amounts necessary to maintain domestic security and limited regional power projections. The regional implication of these circumstances is that the African state does not generally have the military instrument of force available to it by which to influence the system and its actors in its interest.

The combination of dependency-based security and limited advanced police and military forces, in turn, limits the ability of the state’s internal elements to elect, appoint, maintain, influence, and protect capable, responsible, and legitimate leadership. This factor was most evident in the first two decades of African independence wrought with a host of both externally funded and internally generated coups. In order to undertake measures to enhance its relative power position, each state must establish and maintain capable leadership and institutions that will act to develop the state’s material capabilities in its national interests as opposed to those of small groups and external actors. The absence of a credible military threat greatly limits the ability of the state to protect its leadership or deter external efforts to destabilize and remove it. Leadership within the


26 This is the position of the researcher. An effective security apparatus is a necessary requirement to maintain legitimate, responsible, and capable leadership in the executive office.

state that acts against the interests of the system and its strongest actors historically has been a target for removal, coercion, or punishment into complying with the interests of foreign actors.  

The third factor limiting the development of the material capabilities of the African state is that with few notable exceptions, most African states lack strategic alliances or agreements with the most influential actors in the system that significantly enhance their security, material capabilities, or power positions relative to the most powerful states in the international system. In order to supplement the military, economic, and industrial deficits of smaller or weaker states, alliances or agreements with more powerful and influential state or non-state actors may be formed to elevate the power position and negotiating power of the state. African states generally have not secured relationships that facilitate the industrialization process or the ability to project military force beyond their sub-region or region. Instead, the majority of sub-Saharan African states have participated in long-term relationships of dependency, neocolonialism, and exploitation.

During the Cold War period, the United States and Soviet Union pursued the policies of bipolar politics through proxy conflicts and state militarization. The military aid granted to African states was based on regimes of security dependency that did not


29 McKay, 59-63, 64-65 (Andrew M. Kamarck).

30 Ibid., 56-58, 79-81.

enhance the state’s ability to indigenously manufacture its security from within or spur its development. As a result, the exit of the superpowers from the continent in the immediate post-Cold War period resulted in massive chaos and increasing underdevelopment and marginalization for over a decade across the continent. These relationships of dependency and exploitation continue to undermine the development and advancement of the African state and undermine its position in the international system. They occur in stark contrast to the relations of the most powerful and influential actors in the international system, who maintain strategic alliances and trade agreements with other key actors in order to consolidate and maintain their power positions within the system.

African states have little to offer major actors in terms of security, technology, or trade beyond raw material extraction. African states pose a major liability due to their high levels of civil and political instability as well as chronic underdevelopment and debt. Only a few states such as Angola, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sudan have been able to secure significant agreements with powerful states that significantly enhance the material capabilities of the state. However, the large-scale entry of the Chinese into the continent in the post-9/11 era may hold some long-term prospects for alliances or agreements that significantly expand the material capabilities of the African state. This has already been observed in Sudan’s relationship with the Chinese.

The fourth significant factor limiting the development of the material capabilities of the African state is the acceptance and reinforcement of national boundaries along

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32 Keller and Rothchild, 16-17.
colonial lines inconsistent with the ethnic and tribal realities of the region. The multinational structure of the African state dictated by its colonial boundaries has proven a major obstacle to state building and the formation of a liberal or consensus-based national interest. Ethnic, tribal, and class politics have proven a destabilizing agent leading to a zero-sum interpretation of politics in the African state. Each sub-national or class group within leadership positions seeks to act first in its self-interest or small-group interests, holding the enhancement of state material capabilities secondary in importance. As a result, within the African state, the long-term relative development of state material capabilities is not a major objective within political office.

**Balances of Power and sub-Saharan Africa**

On the African continent in the Cold War and thereafter, the balance of power politics among the competing states of sub-Saharan Africa has largely revolved around international aid and trade, regional security and stability, and the strategic interests of the international system's most powerful and influential actors. International organizations such as the United Nations, regional organizations such as the African Union, and sub-regional organizations such as the Economic Community Of West African States have been necessary in managing the balance of power among a region

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33 The observation of the relative impact of the retention of colonial boundaries on the enhancement of state material capabilities reflects the position of the researcher.

34 Poku, 184-186.

35 Poku, 184-186.

36 McKay (Zartman), 30-31.
composed of mostly pathofunctional, protofunctional, and neutrofunctional states.\textsuperscript{37}

In sub-Saharan Africa, due to the severely limited military power and capability of most states to successfully wage sustained interstate warfare in their interest, balance of power considerations regarding state security do not strongly revolve around military threats or buildups from other states. Juridical sovereignty regimes established by the United Nations and the system’s most powerful actors essentially guarantee the territorial integrity of the African state and discourage territorial or resource aggrandizement on the continent. As a result, state security considerations revolve around domestic security, civil stability, national resource exploitation, the distribution of national wealth and benefits, and international aid and trade considerations.\textsuperscript{38}

In the post-Cold War period, throughout the African region, military force is applied largely in a domestic fashion to enforce civil stability and facilitate or protect natural resource exploitation. With few notable exceptions,\textsuperscript{39} minor military skirmishes/standoffs and limited territorial occupation have been employed by African states to settle bilateral state disputes. Conflicts over these disputed areas are generally minor, limited to the area under dispute as opposed to any full national extension of the conflict into a neighboring state. Even so, large-scale military force has been applied by multilateral organizations to settle domestic civil conflict within African states.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{37} McKay, 7-10.

\textsuperscript{38} McKay, 28-29 (Zartman).

\textsuperscript{39} Ethiopia Somalia conflicts, Ethiopia Eritrea conflicts.

\textsuperscript{40} ECOWAS/ECOMOG interventions into Sierra Leone and Liberia, SADC interventions into Congo (Brazzaville, United Nations missions in Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi).
Liberal Characteristics:

Marginality

The liberal characteristic overwhelmingly shared by a majority of sub-Saharan African states within the international system is economic and political “marginality.” African states have a relatively low degree of participation in the global economy and international political system as compared to the most integrated states in the system. \(^{41}\) African states generally exhibit only limited degrees of interdependence in the global economy and hold no significant voting power in the most important international institutions and organizations. At its current rate of growth and development, sub-Saharan Africa will continue to be the most highly underdeveloped region in the world throughout the first half of the 21st century.

Interdependence

The relatively low degree of economic integration of most African states into the global economy, teamed with meager levels of formal regional sub-Saharan trade, contribute significantly to the marginalization of the African state in the neoliberal economic order. The sub-Saharan region of Africa continues to have the second lowest cumulative percentage of global (international) and intraregional trade, as well as the lowest GNP, PCI, and regional growth percentages in the world. \(^{42}\) In the post-Cold War period, the sub-Saharan region from 1990 to 2006 accounted cumulatively for less than 3% of global trade, whereas Asia by 2006 accounted for 27.8% of all global trade. In this

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period, sub-Saharan Africa accounted for only 3.1% of global exports and 2.4% of global imports. Sub-Saharan Africa’s intraregional trade has also been extremely limited, with only 15% of regional merchandise exports going to other countries in the region. Only 10% of those merchandise imports actually originated inside the region.43

African economies are structurally underdeveloped, with little portfolio diversity. Structured in a largely linear fashion, African states generally participate at only the lowest level of added value processes in the global production chain.44 African economies continue to be based on agro-mineral and energy extraction, as opposed to the foundational industrial and technological elements driving the latest wave of globalization.45 In order to broaden its economic participation, the African state must engage in the secondary and tertiary levels of the production process that will make it economically diverse.

However, at present, the structure of most African economies and societies does not require the rapid integration of new technology into daily life or a national education base beyond the primary level to continue at the current rate of development. Modern advances in construction, telecommunications, information technology, satellite technology, and rapid transportation have not diffused in large degrees throughout African society. Where some diffusion has occurred, it has been limited to the most

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44 Bora, Bouet, Roy, 1.

urbanized areas of the state. As low-density, low-consumption societies, African states
do not constitute major primary and secondary markets for modern consumables from
industrial states. Many of the consumer items of industrial societies are not highly
profitable items to be sold in African spaces, due to lifestyle differences and the
underdeveloped nature of those societies. The general education level and lifestyle of the
state must significantly advance to present a mass market for advanced consumer and
capital goods.

Further, due to the intense levels of state dysfunction across the region, Sub-
Saharan Africa has not been globally pursued by private capital for foreign direct
investment. Foreign investment fails to gravitate to Africa due to the limitations posed
by political and civil instability, undereducated and unskilled labor, high labor costs, and
inadequate national infrastructure across the continent. The region has not been
considered an environment in which secure returns on foreign direct investment in sectors
beyond mining, oil, and telecommunications (mobile phones) will be successfully
realized.

The nonliberalized or under-liberalized structure of the African state’s economy
and its chronic underdevelopment do not easily allow African states to integrate or
participate in the global economy beyond marginal participation. To participate beyond a
marginal position, African states require more capital and industrial, educational, and
political tools, which are necessary prerequisites for greater integration into the global

46 Taylor, 214-217.

47 Taylor, 216-217.
economic and political system.

**International Institutionalism**

With the exception of South Africa (G20), African states hold no permanent votes or significant voting power in the most important institutions and organizations of the international system (UN Security Council, G20, OECD, etc.). The bulk of global production, technology, and political activity is generated by the most wealthy and developed states, which dictate the production process and structure of international order. 48 African states are dependent on North American, European, and Asian states for markets to sell their primary goods. Demand in the industrial and industrializing states for commodity goods has been the engine of African economies since the colonial era. Save South Africa, African states have little or no significant impact on the functioning of the international system and thus are not entitled to decision-making positions in the most important political and economic institutions or organizations. The most important institutional vote African countries hold is the rotating seat afforded to the region on the UN Security Council by the permanent council members.

Even so, African states have to some effective degree utilized regional institutions and organizations in the areas of economics, trade, and crisis management to their benefit. Regional organizations have been essential in managing regional informal economic interdependence as well as in serving as organizing bodies and mediators in conflicts. 49 The informal economy accounts for significant percentages of trade, income,

48 Wallerstein, 139-142.

and employment in the region due to historical ties, the porous nature of African borders, and the irredentist makeup of the states of the region.\textsuperscript{50}

Within the formal economy, regional organizations such as the South African Development Community have facilitated South Africa's regional economic penetration of its neighboring states while granting those states access to goods and services available through the South African economy. In West Africa, the Economic Community of West African States has been key to Nigerian economic penetration of the region as well as managing regional conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Ivory Coast. In East Africa, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development has also been essential in managing crises in Sudan, Somalia, and the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflicts. In the west, east, and central African sub-regions, neighboring states have managed refugee movements wrought by civil conflict in conjunction with the United Nations. To date, the East African Community inclusive of Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Uganda has demonstrated the greatest degree of political integration and central coordination of economic policy.\textsuperscript{51}

\textbf{Marginality and Education}

African governments in the era of globalization have the challenge of preparing the population to compete in the international labor market. This entails providing a necessary education base for a literate and skilled population as well as maintaining a


stable and conflict-free political climate within the state. From the inception of independence to the present, African states have largely failed to provide an educational base that produces individuals who are able to rapidly produce or integrate technology into production processes or draw foreign investment. Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest primary education completion rate of any region in the world, with only 60% of all enrollees finishing. Further, only 30% of the population of sub-Saharan Africa is composed of recipients of a primary education, and only 26.5% is composed of education recipients at the secondary level.\textsuperscript{52}

\textbf{International Class Determinants: Peripherality, Dependency, Underdevelopment}

\textbf{Peripherality}

Africa’s pathofunctional and protofunctional states display three distinct international class characteristics: peripherality, dependency, and underdevelopment. The first and most significant of these characteristics, from which the final two characteristics emerge, is economic and political "peripherality."\textsuperscript{53} African states generally function as primary production and extraction points in the global economy. By contrast, North America, Europe, Asia, and areas of South America function as capital goods, consumer goods, and primary goods producers that house secondary and tertiary production processes. Within the stratified structure the global economy, sub-Saharan Africa receives the lowest value for its cash crops and minerals while North America, Europe, East Asia, and areas of South America receive the highest value for

\textsuperscript{52} Taylor, 216.

\textsuperscript{53} Wallerstein, 101-103.
their capital and consumer goods and services.  

The agro-mineral economies of a majority of African states were directly inherited from the state economic structure of the colonial state and maintained by the succeeding national governments. The region is the least industrialized in the world, accounting for the smallest percentage of industrial output of any region in the world at under 2% of global output. Excluding South Africa, sub-Saharan Africa’s share of global industrial output measures under 0.30% of total global output. Consistent with this economic position, the region accounts for the smallest revenue base of any equivalent population in the world, with a per-capita income average of $1968.00 and 36.2% of the population living on less than a dollar a day. Based on the region’s peripheral income base, African states will necessarily be low-demand, low-consumption societies based on their limited purchasing power. This degree of economic peripherality further dictates that its global market position also be necessarily tertiary for most goods and services.

**Dependency**

The second international class characteristic overwhelmingly shared by sub-Saharan African states within the international system is *dependency*. Dependency describes a condition in which the center-periphery structure of the international system makes the states of the periphery dependent on the production processes and trade of

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54 Immanuel Wallerstein, 4-7. Wallerstein, 139-142.

55 Tordoff, 40-41.


center states for their material survival and development.\textsuperscript{58} At independence, the postcolonial African state was still economically structured in the same dependent form as the colonial state from which it evolved.\textsuperscript{59} The artificial multinational structure of the African state in conjunction with the political bias employed against it by its former European colonizers and their American allies reinforced this condition of dependence.

Within the value chain of global production and labor, the African state as a primary goods producer receives the lowest value for the goods upon which its economy is based. With this comparatively small revenue base, the African state pays a disproportionally high cost for necessary capital and consumer goods relative to its revenue stream. Cash-crop agriculture and mineral extraction yield the lowest value and generate the smallest amounts of income while staple crops, capital and consumer goods, and information technology generate the highest revenue and the greatest cost of purchase. Without the capacity to produce those essential goods and services itself, the African state is dependent on industrialized and industrializing states for the conversion of its primary resources into essential goods and services. In this structurally repetitive cycle, African state resources and labor are continually exploited at the lowest cumulative costs within the global economy.

**Aid Dependency**

International aid since the 1970s has become a core component of the African state's chronic regime of dependency. The sub-Saharan region of Africa, after over forty

\textsuperscript{58} Dos Santos, 231-232.

\textsuperscript{59} Tordoff, 40-41.
years of the continuous receipt of international aid in amounts well beyond $500 billion, remains the poorest and most underdeveloped region of the world. Sub-Saharan Africa has received larger amounts of aid per capita than any other region of the world, yet the region’s level of dependency on external aid is annually increasing as opposed to decreasing. Even with substantial extended aid, the states of the region have been unable to significantly improve the conditions existing within the state. Instead, they have regressed in a cycle of underdevelopment and exponential increases in poverty. The conditions and direction of aid distribution have had the result of most African states becoming chronically dependent on aid and unable to function without it.

International aid regimes are a part of a systematic economic and political process that serves to continually undermine the development of the African state in a manner that reinforces its position in the periphery and donor states’ position in the center. The class structure of the international system is politically and economically structured to create and perpetuate the conditions that require African states to seek aid in the first instance. In practical terms, this has translated to economic aid being directed primarily to the infrastructure of extraction and distribution centers in the form of ports, roads, rail, power generation, and communications networks to and from extraction centers.

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61 Goldsmith, 411-412.
63 Dos Santos, 231-232.
64 Glennie, 205-209.
Military assistance is provided in a disproportionate amount relative to education, health services, and industrial development, which are vital to the internal growth and development of the state in conjunction with domestic civil security. Aid towards education, social services, and health programs is only given in amounts and areas necessary to ward off social and civil collapse around vital resource areas and labor supplies. Military aid is distributed only in amounts necessary to maintain regional stability and domestic order within the state and to maintain the power and control of the groups that facilitate resource exploitation and corruption.

Aid packages to sub-Saharan Africa have not directed assistance to the key areas that significantly build the institutions of the state and beneficially integrate it into the international system. Aid in both the Cold War and post-Cold War periods have not focused on national economic and social development or served to alleviate the structural handicaps African countries face in the international system. Most importantly, in spite of the gross mismanagement of international economic aid in the form of loans, international aid continues to be funneled to sub-Saharan African states by international financial institutions and developed and developing states without any significant prospects for improvement.

Aid packages have been systematically structured to be cyclical in nature. Based on the disproportionate revenue streams and costs within the global economy, African states face the distinct challenge of meeting the deficit between their limited purchasing

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65 Ibid.

66 Goldsmith, 413-414.
power and the essential needs of the state. To account for this deficit, the states utilize international aid assistance to meet their daily fiscal and societal needs. In this manner, the structure of the global economy facilitates the systematic process by which African states are pushed to incur large-scale debt through credit and loan financing to make up for the limitations of their national revenue base. African states are systematically placed in a position where they must seek aid from the very same state and non-state sources that generate wealth from the exploitation of African resources. These same actors actively maintain the global economic system contributing to the African state’s peripherality.

Aid dependency is a contributing factor in African states generally being unable to modernize their state structures or achieve the level of sustainable development and economic growth necessary to make the state functional. The material and financial states of dependency together constitute a condition of “systemic dependency” in which systemic collapse or failure would adversely affect the structural and territorial integrity of the African state. This condition relegates the African state to the periphery of world politics and economics, where it faces increasing underdevelopment.

**Underdevelopment**

The third international class characteristic overwhelmingly shared by sub-Saharan African states within the international system is structural, economic, and political *underdevelopment*. The center-periphery relations of the international system and the resulting regimes of cyclical dependency have resulted in the underdevelopment of most

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67 Glennie, 208-209.

68 Walter Rodney, 18-42.
African states to the pathofunctional degree and below. The extraction and exploitation of the region’s primary resources by center and semiperiphery states restricts the ability of the African state to fully develop its own resources. The extraction of primary goods from the periphery towards industrial development in the center results in long-term production learning effects in the center as opposed to the periphery. North American, European, and East Asian development is spurred utilizing African raw materials, but African states do not receive the same learning effects from the production of capital and consumer goods that they are dependent on from these states. The regimes of dependency created by the center-periphery relations of the international system restrict the technical expertise necessary to build secondary and tertiary production processes to center states. The result is the long-term economic underdevelopment of the sub-Saharan African region, accompanied by political and social underdevelopment in those societies.69

The ultimate indicator in per-capita terms of the sub-Saharan region’s general underdevelopment is the region’s housing of the largest percentage of individuals living in abject poverty, with 36.2% of the population in 2009 living on less than a dollar a day.70 A second noteworthy indicator of the region’s social underdevelopment is sub-Saharan Africa’s rate of infection of HIV and AIDS, which is the highest in the world, with an estimated 22.4 million people living with HIV in 2009. Sub-Saharan Africa constitutes

69 Rodney, 18-30.
two-thirds of the global total of individuals infected with HIV. The most telling indicator of the African state’s political underdevelopment is its post-independence rate of coups and coup attempts. Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest rate of coup and coup attempts in the first decade of the second millennium, as well as the second highest regional rate in history. Between 1961 and 2004, the region experienced a reported 80 successful coups and 181 failed coups.

**Structural Functional Characteristics:**

**Dysfunctional Dependency**

The structural functionalist characteristic overwhelmingly displayed by a majority of African states is *dysfunctional dependency*. Most of Africa’s independent states are structured as dependent entities within an international system founded on independent sovereign states. The contradiction between the African state’s independent status and its dependent structure result in society-wide dysfunctions as the state’s efforts to act independently and utilize modern political institutions are limited by the outputs of the state’s dependent structure. Governing officials’ attempts to act in the greater interest of the state are limited and restricted by a colonial structure designed to act in the interest of a foreign colonizing state.

The superstructure of the African state was inherited from the colonial state and built upon using modern western political and social institutions. As a result, African

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73. This term and its application within a structural functional analysis have been introduced by the researcher.
governments have had the task of functionalizing a forced pluralism within artificial territorial boundaries utilizing institutions founded on foreign cultural and societal values. The national institutions and economic systems of the African state were designed to meet the national and personal interests of external actors as opposed to meeting the national interests of the state. As such, the international relationships of the sub-Saharan African state have been more beneficial to those external actors than to itself and its population.

African states share a host of common structural characteristics that directly impact the institutional behavior of the state and its capacity for managing its international relationships. The first and highest-impact characteristic is the retention of the artificial state boundaries introduced and established by European colonialism. The territorial boundaries of both the colonial state and postcolonial state reflected primarily European rational as opposed to indigenous African interests, with grave implications for political stability and the establishment of interest groups. Artificial state boundaries force traditionally separated and autonomous ethnic groups to live and be governed in the same space under a central authority without their consultation or approval. In the colonial state, this arrangement served to allow for the stable governance of the colony but fostered strong problematic sentiments of ethno-nationalism within the state. What was required in the new states was nationalism as a necessary component of nation and state building.

The second structural characteristic shared by African states is the introduction of western political and economic institutions as the means to organize and order the
modern state. Within the African state, there are tremendous incompatibilities between the institutional culture of national institutions and the political socialization and culture of the populations utilizing and staffing them. National institutions suffer from an incompatibility between the values of African societies and those required for their national institutions to function effectively. These institutional culture clashes minimalize the functionality and efficiency of an institution, rendering it largely ineffective and dysfunctional.

The third structural characteristic shared by African states is the continued undermining and eroding of traditional authority and institutions in the state. The employment of modern political institutions by the new national governments further isolated traditional authorities and institutions from the process of modern state building and national political participation. Colonial administrations utilizing direct rule (French, Portuguese, Belgian colonies) largely bypassed the chieftaincy and directly administered the colony from the home government. Where possible, traditional chiefs and leaders were undermined by the appointment of nontraditional European chiefs to secure political order. Where colonial administrations employed a system of indirect rule (British colonies) utilizing local systems of authority, colonial authority still superseded all others. In like fashion, the postcolonial state's central power and authority reside with the national government above that of the traditional authorities and institutions. Despite being closer to the population, the authority of traditional leaders in the independence era

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74 Ansamoaa, 3-5.

75 Ibid.
is subordinated to the authority of the national government.

The fourth structural characteristic shared by African states is an urban-extractive developmental bias. The African colonial state administrations concentrated funding towards developing state infrastructure, transportation networks, public and financial administration services, and socio-cultural services to essential areas of agro-mineral extraction, production, transportation, distribution, and administration. This policy was pursued to the neglect of the majority of the territorial areas of the state classified as nonessential to the production and extraction process. The long-term results were the uneven development of the colony as a small number of urban areas connected to large agricultural production and mineral extraction centers advanced. These areas attracted large amounts of landless peasant workers from rural areas seeking employment, with the consequence of infrastructural overstretch and mass unemployment. As a result, the urban extractive bias of the colonizer served to curtail development in the urban centers.

The national governments of independent African states continued this policy of urban developmental bias, funneling financial and infrastructural resources to urban centers and agro-mineral extraction points. They took no substantive measures to develop the large rural areas, resulting in the same mass migration of peasant workers to the cities seeking employment. Most major cities of the region are presently faced with infrastructural overstretch and high unemployment.

The fifth structural characteristic overwhelmingly shared by African states is structural dependency. The colonial state in Africa was dependent on its relations with the home state to maintain the structural integrity of the colony in terms of security and
economy. So too is the postcolonial state dependent on the system's developed states and international institutions to secure its survival. With few exceptions, independent African states have not made significant efforts to restructure their economies to be self-sufficient or provide for a vast majority of their own needs. International aid has become a staple upon which the state survives, warding off collapse and failure. This systemic regime of dependency has allowed the continuation of the exploitation of African state resources that began in the colonial period.

The sixth structural characteristic overwhelmingly shared by African states is the militarization of the state as means of maintaining social and civil order. The African colony was established and maintained by force and violence through locally stationed foreign military and police forces to ensure social order and compliance with the system of colonial exploitation. Likewise, in the African state, civil and social order is largely maintained and enforced via military and police forces that are the ultimate guarantors of political power and legitimacy. The results of this policy have been a reinforcing of ongoing sociopolitical and civil instability and disproportionate expenditure on military and police forces.

**Leadership Style/Type Characteristics:**

The leadership style/type characteristics overwhelmingly exhibited by the pathofunctional and protofunctional states of sub-Saharan Africa are neopatrimonialism, authoritarianism (survivalist), and neocolonialism. These traits are often veiled and presented under a façade of pseudo-democracy and liberal democratic-style institutions.76

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76 Asamoah, 108-111.
Contemporary African styles of political leadership are generally the collective product of the people's precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial experience. Their leadership values reflect an aggregation of the social values accumulated over those periods. The marginalization of traditional authorities and institutions and introduction of foreign institutions within an artificial multinational state have produced forms of leadership prone to corruption and inefficiency. The integration of African political cultures into western political and economic institutions in a postcolonial setting has been neither perfect nor seamless. Most African governments have been unable to secure an efficient mode of operation 50 years after independence. African leadership has acted as the central institution facilitating dependence, underdevelopment, and neocolonialism in the state.

The African state has historically suffered from institutional culture clashes based on incongruence between the values required for the institutions to function and the values of the states utilizing them. On the African continent, it has ultimately led to a zero-sum interpretation of the democratic political process, bureaucratic inefficiency, and the large-scale absence of financial and economic transparency referred to as corruption.

The African state suffers from a general zero-sum interpretation of modern state governing institutions closely linked to the multiethnic and multinational makeup of the state. Within the democratic political process, party politics and elections are viewed as competitions between diverse interest groups for control of state resources to be directed

77 Kebonang, 5-6. Asamoah, 7.
78 Asamoah, 3-5.
primarily to the winning group. State resources are to be redirected from the national interest to the interests of individuals and specific groups at the expense of the livelihood and welfare of the entire state.

The zero-sum game of domestic politics fosters broad ethnic and class group insecurity within the state as each group faces a security dilemma with the continual possibility of being excluded from access to political power. For each group, exclusion from executive political power is accompanied by the ongoing possibility of being deprived of access to state resources and subject to state-sponsored suppression. The result has been a situation in which these longstanding and reinforced collective factors and attitudes inhibit the development of the collective identity necessary to implement policies founded on the principles of collective state security found in hypofunctional states and above.

**Authoritarianism (Survivalist)**

The first general attribute of African state leadership from which its other leadership characteristics are enabled is authoritarianism. Authoritarian government in the African state is characterized by the central weighting of power into the executive offices of government with little or no institutional checks and balances on executive power. The internal politics of the African state have been defined by struggles to control the executive office, as control of the executive grants leadership and its accompanying interest groups unfettered access to state resources and the international community. \(^{79}\)

The first independent African governments assumed power through relatively

\(^{79}\) Kebonang, 8.
democratic elections but were quickly superseded by one-party authoritarian states. The justifications given for this transition were made in relation to the postcolonial state’s territorial boundaries, multiethnic composition, and goals of development. Based on the multiethnic composition of the state, single-party systems of an authoritarian character were theoretically thought more suitable to addressing the nation- and state-building challenges of the postcolonial state. Multiparty democratic systems of rule were thought to lead to the fracturing of the state along tribal and ethnic lines and to encourage dissent.

Across the African continent, one-party centralized states took root in which political opposition and dissent were outlawed. In this process, the leaders of the African state rhetorically claimed to be primarily concerned with development, linking one-party rule to the idea of national unity. Development efforts were theorized to require a unified political base, and multiparty democratic systems opened the door for opposition. Development goals were used to further justify the centralizing of power in the executive and to eliminate governmental checks on executive power. From the centralizing of power in the executive and a single party, the expansion of state activity in the economic field was then justified based on the weakness of the indigenous private sector. Based on this weakness, African leaders justified the need to centralize state power and grant a few individuals the authority to pursue the state’s development agenda through unrestricted access to state resources and their allocation.

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80 Kebonang, 4-5.

81 Kebonang, 4, 5, 8.
However, most African governments did not pursue effective development strategies or any strategy at all but repeatedly fell into a pattern of self-aggrandizement and corruption. Due to the constant ineffectiveness of government and the general authoritarian character of African governments, regime survival above good governance became a key fixture of African government. The military, as the state’s most physically powerful and mobilized institution, was utilized to maintain the power of the executive in the emerging authoritarian regimes in sub-Saharan Africa. Access to the military more than popular legitimacy became the means of justifying and maintaining the positions of state leaders and maintaining an authoritarian government.\(^{82}\) The international relations of the state became a tool to ensure regime security by making alliances and bilateral or multilateral agreements that maintained the regime in power.\(^{83}\)

Contemporarily, the authoritarian character of the African state has been masked by a façade of pseudo-democracy practiced among pathofunctional and protofunctional African states. These states have a system of elections inclusive of opposition parties and occasional international observers. However, the elections are often flawed and the opposition subject to massive intimidation and marginalization. The realities of governance in pathofunctional and protofunctional states revolve minimally around democratic processes, institutions, and accountability and to a great extent around neopatrimonial principles enacted in an authoritarian manner.\(^{84}\)

\(^{82}\) McGowan, 237-238.

\(^{83}\) Taylor, 415.

Neopatrimonialism

The second leadership style characteristic shared by a majority of African states is neopatrimonialism. Neopatrimonial rule is the dominant political paradigm informing the leadership and governing practices of the African state in the postcolonial era. Neopatrimonialism emerged within the context of the centralization of political power and entrenchment of authoritarianism in the African state. The departure from initial attempts at democratic rule and the minimization of opposition essentially legitimized an African patrimonial power structure founded on a system of presidential and clientelist relations.85

Government in the independent African state blended elements of patrimonial traditional rule with features of a bureaucratic model of government. In African neopatrimonial systems, the right to rule is ascribed to an individual as opposed to an office. The formal political administration and offices are operationalized as a chain of dense networks of dependent relationships where governing officials maintain networks of reciprocal reinforcement with their subordinates and superiors in order to meet their individual interests. The African neopatrimonial system is headed by a “strong-man” or “big-man” leader occupying the executive office, from which he dominates the state without accountability to legislative and judicial laws and rules.86

Like authoritarianism, this neopatrimonial system of governance in the African state is continually enabled, maintained, and financed through external alliances and

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85 Kebonang, 5-8.
86 Ibid.
agreements with international institutions and hyperfunctional, equifunctional, and hypofunctional states. They continue to maintain these strong-man leaders by continually granting them international aid and support. Neopatrimonial leaders in Africa have most often been deposed by military or political coups that reestablish a similar system upon the change of leadership. They otherwise have historically retained power over the long term through militaristic means and repression. However, in the post-9/11 era, increasing international pressure has been brought to bear on several African leaders to adhere to democratic and constitutional processes in transitioning their states from multiple decades of rule by single dictators.

**Neocolonialism**

Just as systems of neopatrimonial rule in the African state have been enabled by the centralized authoritarian character of government, authoritarianism and neopatrimonialism have facilitated neocolonial international relationships to take root on the continent. As a result, in several states, primarily those of Francophone Africa, neocolonial rule is the dominant leadership attribute. Numerous leaders in states such as Chad and Congo Brazzaville have ruled in the neocolonial interests of their former colonizing state of France.\(^87\) France or another external power maintains the neocolonial leader’s political power and position in office in exchange for the executive carrying out its neocolonial mandate. In the case of Francophone West Africa, there has been historical difficulty in breaking from the neocolonial relationship with France. France underwrites the currency of the subregional grouping, maintains advanced security

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\(^87\) This study interprets Kwame N’Krumah’s “Neo-Colonialism” not only in political economy, development, and IR terms, but also as a type or style of state leadership.
treaties with most of the states, and most often is the chief trading partner of its former 
West and Central African colonies. Irrespective of the manner in which they come to 
power or maintain their rulership, neocolonial leaders govern according to the dictates of 
their former colonizer or other external power.

Perception/Worldview Characteristics

In the post-Cold War era, the general worldview and perception of 
pathofunctional states in Africa have been dominated by two distinct characteristics: an 
absence of concrete definition and loose articulation, and a donor-recipient view within 
the context of a polar-satellite division of the international environment. The dominant 
ideas informing or comprising the African state’s worldview were more clearly 
articulated and identifiable during the Cold War period than in the post-Cold War era. 
Due to the predominance of ideology, there was considerable ease in identifying the 
worldviews of the newly independent African states on either side of the east–west 
divide. The Cold War informed the dominant ideas upon which the many worldviews 
across the continent were based. The most important and prevalent of these included 
western capitalism, eastern communism and socialism, pan-Africanism and African 
unity, European neocolonialism, Islamic pan-Arabism, and global non-alignment.

88 Individual country statistics show France to be the major import partner of a majority of its former 
West and Central African colonies. CIA World Factbook. [accessed May 1, 2010].

89 In reviewing the literature and numerous country overviews of the African region, great difficulties 
were found in identifying succinct stated or implied worldviews in the official documentation or rhetoric of 
most African states in the post-Cold War era. As a result, there was great difficulty identifying a general 
commonality among the worldviews of African states. This absence of clarity was identified as a 
worldview in and of itself. Further, based on the similar experience of underdevelopment region-wide and 
the massive amounts of aid funneled to the region, the donor-recipient worldview has been introduced by 
the researcher. In the view of the researcher, these two concepts best represent the worldview of a majority 
of continental African states.
Most African states aligned themselves with either the United States and the west according to a capitalist and neocolonial ideology (Nigeria, Zaire, Ivory Coast); with the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc according to a socialist/communist ideology (Angola, Mozambique, Somalia, Ethiopia); or according to a pan-Arab ideology (Chad, Djibouti, Mauritania, Sudan, Somalia). The former Portuguese colonies upon independence were predisposed to socialism and communism during their independence struggle, whereas the major states of the horn of Africa eventually chose a relationship with the Soviet superpower without neocolonial alliances. Sub-Saharan states with significantly large Arab and Islamic populations (Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania, Sudan, Somalia) expressed or pursued solidarity with the states of North Africa and the Middle East. They interpreted issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as conflicts between Islam and the west as opposed to isolated regional events. For other groups of states, nonalignment was central to their foreign policy and development strategies.\(^9^0\)

Kwame Nkrumah’s Ghana, Julius Nyerere’s Tanzania, and Sekou Toure’s Guinea at different periods during the Cold War all sought a policy of nonalignment, opting instead for some regional or subregional form of pan-Africanism (African Unity). Ghana sought to play both sides of the global ideological war between the United States and Soviet Union to quickly build necessary infrastructure and industrialize the state. Other states espoused a distinct neocolonial view, seeing their development and survival as intrinsically hinged on a close relationship with the former colonizer. African states such as Ivory Coast and Congo Brazzaville subscribed to an overwhelmingly neocolonial

\(^9^0\) Olatunde, Ojo and D.K. Orwa, and C. M. B. Utete, 73-80.
view, perceiving their future as inherently linked to France.

**Loosely Defined/Unarticulated:**

Contemporarily, there is much difficulty in identifying and isolating what comprises African state worldviews. The post-Cold War worldview of a majority of African states has not been clearly defined or articulated in succinct terms by the state's governing bodies in domestic politics or foreign policy. One of the key features distinguishing hyperfunctional, equifunctional, and hypofunctional states from all other state types is a well defined and articulated worldview entailing present and future preferences for state and international order. Pathofunctional, protofunctional, and neutrofunctional states generally do not entail or espouse greatly detailed worldviews or environmental preferences.

The challenge of definition and articulation is further compounded by the challenge of distinguishing between the ideas, views, and preferences of African government and foreign policy elites and those of the continent's masses. African leaders and governing officials are often leery of articulating a worldview inconsistent with domestic public opinion, international liberal conceptions of morality, and anti-imperial sentiment throughout the continent. As such, states with highly neocolonial views in particular have generally not espoused those views publicly in domestic or international forums. There has also been an absence of data on the post-Cold War worldview of the masses in most African states, consistent with the general absence of a thriving civil society expressing its views across the region.91

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91 There was great difficulty in finding literature on the worldview and general preferences of the masses of African states.
Donor-Recipient

However, there is a common thread in perception among the states of sub-Saharan Africa concerning the reality of the underdevelopment of the region and the historical lack of indigenous capacity to address this development problem. International aid and development support has been repeatedly sought after as a foreign policy objective for all sub-Saharan African countries save South Africa in the post-independence era. All of these countries, currently or in the past, have been indebted to international financial institutions and developed or developing states. A donor-recipient view of the international environment has informed the views of the African state since independence, acting as one of the major deciding factors in the sides taken in the Cold War, the pursuit of neocolonial relationships, and post-Cold War economic liberalization. Sources of donations are found primarily among hyperfunctional, equifunctional, and hypofunctional states and international financial institutions. The objective of the African state as an undeveloped dysfunctional state is to seek assistance from developed and more functional states as a means to functionalize itself. Aid to the African region has grown exponentially since the 1970s, and the region’s states are slated to require greater aid in the second decade of the new millennium.

The Minority: Protofunctional States

Chad, Central African Republic, Guinea, Niger, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan,

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93 The donor-recipient worldview has been introduced by the researcher as a general worldview among states within the region. This view, in the view of the researcher, best represents the worldview of a majority of continental African states, as they are generally underdeveloped and have all been ongoing recipients of international aid.
Zimbabwe

(7 states)


Currently, seven sub-Saharan African states overwhelmingly display protofunctional characteristics consistent with other protofunctional states within the international system. Consistent behavioral and structural characteristic patterns among protofunctional states in Africa have been chronic budget deficits, partial absence of governing and territorial authority, absence of infrastructural development, chronic food insecurity, warlordism, and lawlessness. All protofunctional states in Africa are reliant on international aid assistance for the daily operation of government. They increasingly do not have control over considerable portions of their territory and face open rebellion, insurgency, secession movements, and long-term civil conflict from their own populations. Each faces chronic food insecurity, experiencing major famine and crop failure every couple of years, requiring constant food aid.

Although sharing many of the dominant characteristics of pathofunctional states, protofunctional states are in constant danger of further regressing to a neutrofunctional stage. They are structurally fragile to the degree that any major internal or external trauma to the state (famine, civil war, regional conflict, refugee influx, sanctions, natural
disasters, global economic downturn) without external assistance will plunge the state into a neutrofunctional stage of functionality. Protofunctional states in Africa are further distinguished from pathofunctional states by a greater degree of neocolonialism or an extreme reaction against neocolonialism that dominates their leadership and worldview. Most governments in protofunctional African states serve largely as go-betweens for the extraction of state resources by multinational companies and governments of equifunctional and hyperfunctional states. A select few others such as Zimbabwe have taken extreme positions against neocolonialism and international institutional subordination. As a result, the state is sufficiently at odds with many of the system’s most powerful actors, facing international pressure geared towards collapsing its leadership.

With the exceptions of the per capita incomes of Sudan ($2300.00) and Chad ($1900.00), economically protofunctional states in Africa all fall into the lower income bracket of formal sector employment. Protofunctional states have average incomes of $1000.00 and below. With the exceptions of Zimbabwe (95%), Sudan (18.7%), and Central African Republic (8%), protofunctional African states do not maintain formal statistical records of the state’s unemployment average. The average percentage of the population below the poverty line in these states is 65%, with Chad being the extreme case with 80% of the population in poverty. The top 10% of the population accounts for an average of 36% of resource consumption and consumer spending in those countries. They generally are running high trade deficits and public debt averaging 8.84 billion U.S. dollars, with Zimbabwe being the extreme case with public debt at 282.6% of GDP.
Protofunctional states in Africa have widely varying populations, with Chad at the low extreme of 4.5 million people and the Democratic Republic of Congo at the high extreme of 68.7 million.\textsuperscript{94} Their United Nations Human Development Index scores are all below 0.46 in the low human development category.\textsuperscript{95} Each of these protofunctional states has been cited multiple times on the Foreign Policy and Fund for Peace failed state indexes between 2001 and 2009.\textsuperscript{96} This low rate of general human development teamed with low per-capita income across states with significantly differing populations and resource bases indicates that the quality of governance as opposed to income is the basis for these states' intense degrees of state dysfunctionality.

The Exceptions: Hypofunctional States – South Africa, Mauritius, Seychelles

(3 states)


Structure and function: dysfunctional and structurally independent, functional and structurally dependent. Leadership Type/Style: democratic leadership.

Perception/Worldview: regional, multipolar.

\textsuperscript{94} These figures were calculated by the researcher based on individual country figures taken from the CIA World Factbook. [accessed May 1, 2010].

\textsuperscript{95} These figures were calculated by the researcher based on individual country figures taken from the United Nations Human Development Report. Human Development Report 2009.

South Africa

South Africa is the only continental sub-Saharan state overwhelmingly displaying hypofunctional characteristics comparable to those of other hypofunctional states within the international system. Economically, South Africa has a per-capita income of $10,300.00, an unemployment rate of 20%, 50% of the population below the poverty line, an ongoing trade deficit, and public debt averaging 29.5% GDP. South Africa’s Human Development Index score of 0.683 places the state in the medium human development category. South Africa has a large population of 49.05 million, of which 79% are black Africans. Even though classified as a hypofunctional state, South Africa shares notable population and historical parallels with other states in the Southern African region.

Post-apartheid South Africa holds a unique position in sub-Saharan Africa and the world, being a higher capacity industrial state than most states in Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, the Middle East, and South Asia. Its worldview has been clearly defined and articulated both nationally and globally, entailing a primary regional focus and secondary global focus. Its first three post-apartheid presidents and their administrations assumed that post-apartheid South Africa would play the role of de facto leader of the African continent based on its material capability and moral transformation and transition to democratic government. South Africa moved from a racially dominated worldview to a complex mix of neoliberal and realist views reflective of the post-Cold War world.

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97 These figures are drawn from figures taken from the CIA World Factbook. CIA World Factbook. [accessed May 1, 2010].


99 Le Pere, 283, 286, 289.
The post-apartheid administrations established and maintained the goals of attaining a middle power, middle income, upper second tier state status in the political and economic hierarchy of states of the international system by the first third of the second millennium. They assumed the position that the goals within that worldview ultimately could not be realized apart from the aggregate development of the region as a whole. This worldview dynamically affected the leadership style of post-apartheid South Africa, which was firmly rooted in democratic leadership within modern liberal institutions. Under President Nelson Mandela, the personality of the president was initially extremely pervasive in policy formulation, but under the presidencies of Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, democratic state decision-making became decidedly more the product of institutional processes.

The realist characteristics influencing South Africa’s degree of functionality begin with its traditional power position as the subregional hegemon in Southern Africa and its regional position as one of the continent’s four most powerful states by any measure. In the sub-Saharan African region, South Africa is the most industrialized state (limited industrialization) with the greatest material capabilities economically and militarily. South Africa has the largest national gross domestic product (GDP), second or third highest continental per-capita income, and most advanced military in terms of equipment and training. Due to the extremely limited regional diffusion of state power in post-

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100 Le Pere, 283, 288, 290-292.
101 Ibid., 287-288. At the time of the posting of this article, Jacob Zuma was not president, but the first year of his presidency indicates a continuity of core policy and process from his predecessor Thabo Mbeki.
102 CIA World Factbook. [accessed May 1, 2010].
Cold War Africa, South Africa has no military challengers in its subregion and few possible contenders on the continent beyond Nigeria, Egypt, or possibly Ethiopia. As a result, with no significant security challenges from other states, South Africa’s primary interests revolve around the establishment and maintenance of subregional and regional peace and security as a precursor to further integrating itself and the continent into the neoliberal structure of the global economy.103

Overlapping the realist characteristics in South Africa’s behavior and relations are its structural and functional characteristics. South Africa may be considered only one of two structurally dysfunctional but independent states in the sub-Saharan region, along with Botswana. The state is able to sufficiently provide for the daily requirements and necessities of the state without external assistance while at the same time absorbing the fallouts of its dysfunctional institutions and social system. The racial legacy of apartheid has remained within the economic structure of the state and the distribution of its benefits. Black Africans still are greatly marginalized educationally and economically even though they have been politically empowered within the electoral process. As a result, among that group there is massive poverty, marginalization, and peripherality within a state with massive industrial capacity.

The liberal characteristics in South Africa’s behavior and relations crossect the realist factors in its international relations as South Africa’s governing officials seek to utilize liberal economics and multilateral institutions to enhance the state’s power and material capabilities. Its governing officials are fundamentally interested in expanding

103 Tieku, 253-255.
South Africa’s economic base and development domestically, maintaining its subregional position as economic and security hub, encouraging foreign direct investment in the continent, and further integrating post-apartheid South Africa into the global economy.

South Africa seeks to position itself as Africa’s central economic, trading, and production hub for commodity and select capital goods. Its leadership wishes to extend South Africa’s economic reach and influence across the continent with their own investments and extensions of regional trade. South Africa holds as a core goal the making of itself and the African continent into attractive destinations for foreign direct investment from industrialized and industrializing states.104

Regionally, within the parameters of institutionalism, South Africa has favored the establishment of a four- to five-state balance of power and regional conflict management system by which to achieve a sociopolitical environment conducive to the growth of investment and trade. The five to seven most powerful and influential African subregional actors within the international status quo (South Africa, Nigeria, Libya, Algeria, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Senegal or Ghana) would manage conflict resolution and the promotion of peace and stability across the continent through subregional, regional, and international institutions and organizations. South Africa would play a unique role in this regional management system by positioning itself as the central diplomatic mediator on the continent.105 This role would be undertaken alongside Nigeria’s position as the primary provider of military assistance in peacekeeping initiatives. The promotion of

104 Le Pere, 287, 292-294.

105 Ibid., 287, 290.
democratic leadership and norms, good governance, and the development of civil society
would form an intricate facet of this institutional approach to developing the region.\textsuperscript{106}

However, within its international class characteristics, South African leadership
has adopted the position that in order for South Africa to maintain its position in the
semiperiphery and eventually move to the center, the region must aggregately develop as
a whole.\textsuperscript{107} Continued region-wide underdevelopment is considered a considerable
obstacle to South Africa's upward mobility in the international status quo. South Africa
requires the upward development of its surrounding states to create larger and more
profitable markets for its consumer, capital, and primary goods and services.

The pursuit of South Africa's class and liberal economic goals requires region-
wide interstate and domestic civil stability and cooperation to be effectively undertaken.
The magnitude of the tasks involved is sufficiently beyond the military, economic, and
political power and influence of the South African state to undertake on its own. As
such, South Africa's leadership has sought to utilize multilateralism and institutionalism
as the central mechanisms by which to pursue its subregional, regional, and global class
interests.\textsuperscript{108} In an action of great foresight, South Africa was one of the three states at the
forefront of the transformation of the Organization of African Unity into the African
Union as a necessary step to accomplish South African domestic and foreign policy
goals.\textsuperscript{109}

\textsuperscript{106} Tieku, 255.

\textsuperscript{107} Le Pere, 283, 288, 290-292.

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., 284, 290-291.

\textsuperscript{109} Tieku, 253-255.
Mauritius and Seychelles

Of African states within the Indian Ocean, there are two states overwhelmingly displaying hypofunctional characteristics: Mauritius and Seychelles. However, these Indian Ocean states share little similarity with a majority of continental sub-Saharan African states, in that their ethnic and racial makeup has no similarity with continental Africa, being 85% Asian and 75% mixed French descent, respectively. Those states also have a colonial history and postcolonial political history that differs from those of a majority of continental states. These states were founded on massive migration of Asian laborers and indentured laborers to Mauritius and mass migration of French settlers and African slaves to the uninhabited Seychelles islands.  

Mauritius’s and the Seychelles’ human development averages, pattern of political leadership, trends of economic development, and state behavior have greater parallels to East Asia and Southern and Eastern Europe than to continental Africa. Economically, these Indian Ocean African states have per-capita incomes of $13,000.00 and $20,000.00, unemployment rates of 7.3% and 2%, and 8% and 0% of the population living below the poverty line. They are also running high trade deficits and public debt averaging 58.7% and 60.2% of GDP, respectively.  Their United Nations Human Development Index scores are in the high human development category at 0.804 and 0.845.  These African states in the Indian Ocean do not share many similarities with the continental states of

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110 These figures are drawn from figures taken from the CIA World Factbook. [accessed May 1, 2010].

111 CIA World Factbook. [accessed May 1, 2010].

112 These figures are drawn from the United Nations Human Development Report 2009. [accessed May 1, 2010].
Sub-Saharan Africa.

Transitioning States

Botswana, Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Namibia (6 states)


Sub-Saharan Africa houses a group of states displaying both pathofunctional and hypofunctional characteristics. Even though sharing the same realist, liberal, and partial international class characteristics as pathofunctional states, these transitioning states share structure and function, leadership, and perception/worldview characteristics with hypofunctional states. These states are transitioning from a pathofunctional condition towards a hypofunctional condition as a result of policy-led growth, increasing productivity, increasing economic diversity, infrastructural development, foreign direct investment, new capital markets, or mineral and energy extraction.

This group of developing states has over an extended period achieved and maintained consistent GDP and per-capita economic growth rates, stable democratic and authoritarian transitions of political power, and moral and fiscally responsible government. Their revenues are increasingly invested into societal development and decreasingly siphoned off by government corruption and economic mismanagement. As a result, these states are achieving sustained development and effectively reducing their degree of internal dysfunction. These strides have been achieved by adaptations of moral
leadership, institution building, fiscal responsibility, and corruption minimization within the state.

Within transitioning African states, there is increasing complexity of institutions, infrastructure, and intrastate relationships. Pathofunctional states and below generally do not exhibit increasing institutional complexity but are in a stagnant or regressive condition. By contrast, hypofunctional states and above generally display increasing levels of functional complexity or maintenance of advanced levels of functionality. States transitioning from a pathofunctional stage display consistent aspects of increasing functional complexity. These changes are rooted in policy implementation as opposed to a lone increase in state revenues based on newly founded natural resources without significant parallel changes in society.

Economically, in 2010, transitioning states in Africa with the exception of Equatorial Guinea ($37,500) had formal sector per-capita incomes averaging $7700.00. These incomes varied from $37,000.00 in Equatorial Guinea to $1500.00 in Ghana. These transitioning states had general figures of unemployment averaging 23.6%, with extremes of 7.5% in Botswana and 51.2% in Namibia. The average population below the poverty line in these states was 24.1%, with extremes of 28.5% in Ghana and 55.8% in Namibia. The top 10% of the population accounted for an average of 39.7% of resource consumption and consumer spending in these countries. They generally were running high trade deficits, with public debt averaging 24.46% of GDP, with extremes of 5% in Equatorial Guinea and 53% in Namibia.

All transitioning states with the exception of Ghana (23.8 million) have relatively
small populations under 2.2 million people. The United Nations Human Development Index scores of all of Africa’s transitioning states with the exception of Ghana (0.526) are above 0.686, in the middle third of the medium human development category. This medium-range quality of general human development across states with significantly differing incomes indicates that policy implementation as opposed to new revenue streams based on energy or mineral finds is the basis for their increasing state functionality. However, with the exception of Ghana, their small populations, along with those of Mauritius and Seychelles, suggest that functional transitions in sub-Saharan Africa are more effectively managed across states with smaller populations.

**Neurofunctional States: Somalia**

(1 State)

- **Characteristics** – **Realist**: weak. **Liberal**: marginal. **Int. Class**: peripheral, maldeveloped. **Structure and function**: structural collapse, institutional failure, quasi-statism. **Leadership type**: warlordism, tribal, clan, religious/clerical.

**Perception/Worldview**: racial, tribal, clan, religious.

The African continent’s only neurofunctional state is Somalia. Somalia is a shell of a state whose territorial boundaries are maintained by the juridical recognition of its neighbors and the international community. There is no effectively functioning state apparatus, and the Somali state is absent of any formal institutional complexity. Somalia has no centralized state institutions, no domestically recognized governing authority, and no significant military or police forces. Stateless society in Somalia is characterized by

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113 These figures were calculated by the researcher based on individual country figures taken from the CIA World Factbook. CIA World Factbook. [accessed May 1, 2010].
factionalism, quasi-statism, warlordism, civil conflict, chronic food insecurity, absence of governing authority, and absence of infrastructural development. In Somalia, formal state institutions do not exist to maintain public infrastructure, provide education, or enforce laws. Somalia is unable to police its waters to protect them from international dumping or from local pirates. There is no formal economy to speak of, and the entire population survives on subsistence agriculture, fishing, cattle herding, and humanitarian aid. Crime and lawlessness are rampant within the capital, Mogadishu, and the coast and southern countryside are unmonitored as police and military forces do not exist to police the state. Somalia is distinguished from underdeveloped protofunctional African states by its condition of maldevelopedment, in which development has ceased and been reversed. The state exists in a completely dysfunctional condition, serving as a primary agent of human insecurity for its population.

Somalia’s interim transitional government (the Somalia Transitional Federal Institutions or Transitional Federal Government), inclusive of an elected president and parliamentary body (Transitional Federal Assembly), does not formally govern Somalia at present. Its primary function is overseeing the process of restoring the Somali state through conducting national elections, transitioning to a representative government, and reestablishing a new Somali constitution by 2011. Even though extremely weak, the interim government seeks to broker lasting political agreements across Somalia and work

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114 Zartman, 78-79.

with international donors to restore governance capacity and distribute international aid.\textsuperscript{116}

In the absence of formal state institutions, other forms of sociopolitical authority have formed in Somalia along regional, ethnic, clan, tribal, and religious lines. Self-sustaining quasi-state formations and warlords have arisen in the wake of state failure and institutional collapse, taking the place of the state as a guarantor of physical security and material well-being.\textsuperscript{117} In May 1991 in northwestern Somalia, secessionist clans declared “Somaliland” an independent republic, while Puntland in northeastern Somalia has existed as a semi-autonomous self-governing state since 1998. Both have maintained a stable existence, moving towards democratic representative government. An insurgency group, the Islamic Courts Union, temporarily took military control of the capital, Mogadishu, in 2006 and was expelled by the Ethiopian military in alliance with the Transitional Federal Government and United States in January 2007. Other insurgency groups such as Hizbul Shabaab and the Popular Resistance Movement are Islamist insurgency groups in Somalia. An estimated 3,000 members are conducting an underground insurgency, with armed cells across Mogadishu conducting attacks against the interim government.\textsuperscript{118}

Somaliland and Puntland account for the formal sector statistics of the Somali state, where the average per-capita income is $600. In the central and southern portions

\textsuperscript{116} CIA World Factbook. [accessed May 1, 2010].


\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.
of the state, there is an absence of statistical economic data without formal state institutions. Without the element of effective national governance, Somalia’s informal economy continues to function based on livestock, remittance/money transfer companies, and telecommunications. Agriculture constitutes the primary sector, with livestock averaging 40% of GDP and an excess of 50% of export earnings from trade with Somalia’s closest regional neighbors. In the absence of a state-based judicial system, to resolve disputes most regions of the state utilize local forms of conflict resolution inclusive of traditional Somali customary and sharia laws.\textsuperscript{119}

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid.
CHAPTER 6
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Functional Cost: The Cost of Functionality

The development of a metafunctional analysis within this study ultimately indicates that there is a requisite cost, or functional cost,\(^1\) to both the presence and absence of greater state functionality. Significant increases in degrees of functionality within the modern state must incur a requisite cost to society, as modern states are the product of human necessity and not naturally occurring phenomena. The natural environment does not reproduce state organizations of any type and as a result is not structured to cope with the ability of the modern state to physically alter the environment. As a result, there must be a cost to be paid in varying degrees for the world being populated by states within a global production and political system.

Functional costs include environmental destruction and degradation, political repression, social and economic inequality, human rights constriction, and economic underdevelopment. The greatest collective cost of increasing degrees of state functionality has been global environmental destruction by the most functional states. The industrial production of advanced functional states provides for the techno-industrial needs of the entire planet but extends the environmental cost to states without the capacity to do the same degree of environmental harm. The greatest cost of the absence

\(^1\) Functional Cost refers to the requisite cost or price to be paid to achieve and maintain greater degrees of state functionality.
of increasing state functionality has been declining human security and survival among less functional states. Their pattern of underdevelopment and limited societal complexity dramatically decrease the quality of life and life expectancy within them.

In hypofunctional states and above, ongoing environmental problems are paralleled by political and social costs. Political rights and participation may be severely curtailed, as evidenced within the hyperfunctional Chinese state, the equifunctional state of Singapore, and the hypofunctional states of Cuba, Libya, Iran, and Vietnam. Massive social and economic inequalities may be perpetuated or exploited to achieve greater functionality, as evidenced in the hypofunctional states of India, Indonesia, Brazil, and South Africa. Likewise, large-scale financial debt is emerging as the major cost being borne by states transitioning from a pathofunctional stage to the hypofunctional stage such as Ghana and Cape Verde. In those states, development is being financed by massive amounts of loans and international aid.

The cost of the absence of greater degrees of state complexity in pathofunctional states and below is unmanageable degrees of state dysfunction characterized by chronic human insecurity. Not only are political rights circumscribed along with ongoing inequitable distributions of income, but survival prospects are extremely limited due to fiscal irresponsibility, chronic food insecurity, health disparities, and educational shortfalls. The state itself is a predatory entity subjecting the population to urban and rural poverty, mass exploitation, a peasant lifestyle, and state-sponsored violence. The populations of pathofunctional states and below are confined to a territorial space in which their basic wants and needs cannot be met. Their interests are tertiary to those of
the governing authorities, elites, and international interests.

The short-term social, political, and humanitarian costs of the absence of greater state functionality at the pathofunctional level and below are significantly higher than the short-term environmental costs associated with hypofunctional states and above. By contrast, the long-term environmental costs of attaining greater state functionality at the hypofunctional level and above are significantly higher than the long-term social, political, and humanitarian costs in pathofunctional states and below. The short-term costs to the less functional states only threaten the ongoing existence of the populations of those states, whereas the long-term environmental costs posed by the most functional states ultimately threaten the survival of the earth and the entire human race.

The long-term functional cost of increasing state complexity could be minimized by simultaneously transforming production and consumption patterns to a sustainable green environmental model and mass producing the renewable resources necessary to maintain earth’s eostasis. Due to the system-wide structure of the environmental ordeal, these activities must be addressed at the international institutional level to adequately address the problem. The avenue of market forces and regional institutional participation has served to reduce political, social, and humanitarian costs but has failed to produce the level of state action necessary to minimize environmental costs. The likely solution must involve reorganizing the state system in a manner that diffuses the greatest long-term cost to an area other than the environment. The long-term costs could possibly be diffused to the state in terms of some loss of state sovereignty to institutional environmental authorities within the United Nations system. In this scenario, the system and
environment would benefit from the increased power of international institutions and enforcement of international environmental regulations.

**Ecostasis and Environmental Preservation**

A metafunctional analysis dictates that state development in its current form is inherently linked to the natural environment and earth's ability to maintain ecostasis. There is a consequential existential fallout to human beings when the relationship among states, the system, and the environment is structured in a manner diffusing the greatest cost to the environment. The relationship ultimately should be structured in an equilibrial fashion that grants the greatest possible benefit to the state and system, at the least cost to the environment. During the 20th century, human beings by their own means caused greater environmental destruction and degradation to the earth than humans had in their entire recorded history before that period. The next 100 years will more than double the damage done to the earth as the rate and pace of population expansion, increasing life expectancy, and expanding industrialization impose greater environmental costs on the earth.

The evolution of human life on Planet Earth has changed the dynamic of the earth's equilibrial balance. Human beings are the only biological life forms that have evolved the ability to manipulate earth's physical resources towards the development of a system of production not entirely dependent on natural processes. Through mechanization, industrialization, and information technology, human beings rapidly change and combine earth's natural resources into necessary goods and services. The current mode of production allows for the mass production of these goods and services in
numbers far beyond the earth's natural ability to produce for human consumption. Humans have developed technology to overcome naturally occurring transportation, environmental, and communication limitations.

Prior to the industrial era, all life on earth was subject to naturally occurring environmental self-correcting patterns. These patterns minimized biological organisms' ability to negatively impact earth's ability to maintain internal equilibrium. As a result, animal populations didn't expand beyond earth's natural ability to provide for their survival needs. Human beings have evolved beyond earth's ability to self-correct the costs of human production and consumption patterns. As a result, humans have begun a process of changing the structure of the ecosystem in a manner that detracts from earth's ability to maintain ecostasis. The current pattern of human survival is founded on the mass consumption of renewable and nonrenewable resources fundamental to ecosystem regeneration. No significant long-term plans have been initiated to replace or restore those resources. Teamed with increasing water, air, and land pollution, the current pattern of human resource use does not permit the earth to effectively recreate the conditions necessary to maintain life in the long term.

This problem of long-term damage to the environment is arguably linked to states and state development. The modern state has been the tool or mechanism by which human beings have organized and maintained their present form of production and consumption. The world now exists in a global system of states and international institutions that pollute and utilize resources at a simultaneously national and global level. Functional states allow human beings to populate and congregate in numbers that
place unusually high demands on earth's natural resources. This level of strain on the earth's natural resources has resulted in greater human security, but at an inevitably high environmental cost.

Even so, the pursuit of greater human security continues to drive states to choose greater state functionality over long-term environmental security. Corrective measures are immediately necessary in the modern production and consumption pattern to guarantee the ongoing survival of humanity. The processes of civigenesis and ecostasis must become mutually reinforcing to allow for the persistence of both in the future. Human ingenuity must become a tool to ensure ongoing ecostasis as opposed to a means of destroying it.

**An Ecosocial Contract?**

After 350 years of the modern state system and 300 years of the development and global expansion of industrialization, ecostasis should be raised to a level of importance paralleling the aversion of war and maintenance of peace through security alliances and a liberal economic system. Presently, the threat to human life posed by environmental destruction and degradation in the coming 100 years is greater than the likelihood of a third global war between the system's leading states. The long-term damage to the planet from the current pattern of production and consumption will only be exceeded by the event of regional nuclear fallout in any given period.

Due to the long-term environmental threat posed by the present mode of state development, IR discourse must address the possibility of developing a social contract among individuals, states, the international system, and the environment. An ecosocial
contract akin to the social contracts of modern democracy has now become necessary to
aven the largest functional cost modern states incur to achieve greater human security.
Economic incentives, market forces, and institutional consensus have been insufficient to
bring about the requisite production and lifestyle changes on a scale necessary to avert
long-term disaster.

International-level contracts paralleling those of democratic systems of
government and capitalist trade currently exist in the system founded on reciprocity,
rationality, and security. These contracts are observable in state sovereignty regimes
(juridical recognition), trade and exchange (neoliberal economics, reciprocity),
international institutionalism (international public goods, mediation), and security
(collective security, security alliances, nonaggression pacts). Within the global economy,
states and their business entities agree to participate in the international trade system
founded on the global currency system coordinated by the International Monetary Fund.
International trade honoring trade agreements and contracts is a regular feature of the
contemporary international system, with relatively few breaks in contractual
arrangements. Most states generally adhere to regional and international nonaggression
agreements respecting the sovereignty of neighboring states. Collective security regimes
have proliferated regional organizations in the post-World War II era and have been
essential to the foundations of the United Nations system.

In consideration of the existing contractual elements present in the international
system, a number of philosophical questions must be addressed in order to build a theory
of ecosocial relations. First, is an ecosocial contract possible within an anarchical
international environment? Can such an undertaking be accomplished in the absence of a global government? Second, who are the parties to the contract? Will the contract be between states and citizens, multiple states, states and the system, citizens and the environment, states and the environment, the system and the environment, or all of the above? Third, if the environment is a party to the agreement, who is its representative, as it cannot speak for itself? Is the environment a victimized, damaged party that cannot represent itself and that is in need of counsel appointed on its behalf for its protection and repair of damages? Fourth, if international institutional consensus has failed to result in adequate action to protect and preserve the environment, can the central institutions of the international system be relied upon to coordinate the development and execution of such a contract? Fifth, does an ecosocial contract need to be based on a collective security regime, strategic alliances, or a nonaggression pact? Is it necessary to elevate environmental preservation to the level of security in international affairs? Sixth, under an ecosocial contract, to whom are individuals, states, and businesses responsible: state government, other states, or international institutions? Seventh, what would be the consequence for breaking the terms of the contract? Are sanctions on regimes sufficient to deter and punish environmental breaches, or does the threat of military force need to be a critical aspect of environmental enforcement? Would the International Court of Justice provide an applicable model of accountability for the breaking of international laws and contracts, or do the World Trade Organization and United Nations Security Council provide a better alternative to resolving environmental disputes? In each of these scenarios, what would constitute international environmental justice, and how should it
be conceptualized?

As the number of advanced functional states increases and the damage to the environment accelerates towards an irreversible stage, these questions must be addressed in order to resolve the long-term destruction of the global ecosystem. This study does not attempt to answer these questions but suggests ideas that should inform environmental questions as primary in IR discourse. Before the earth passes a stage of irreparable damage, a mechanism must be found by which to elevate environmental questions to the level of the most pressing security and economic issues taking precedence in international institutions. It is perceivable that in addressing environmental questions, solutions to numerous other intractable problems and issues will also be found.

**Functional Governance**

The ultimate shortcoming of metafunctionalism is its failure to generally explain the development and occurrence of functional governance. Functional governance describes the leadership and government practices facilitating long-term increases in state functionality to the hypofunctional level and above. Metafunctionalism categorizes the different levels of state functionality without a complete explanation of how the governance aspect of functional transitions comes into being. The elements of functional governance historically displayed across the international system to date have been fiscal responsibility, strategic vision, long-term planning, and the desire to increase human security and quality of life within the state. Functional governance may be observed from transitioning to hyperfunctional states and across governments from democracy to

2 This term was developed and introduced by the researcher.
authority. There is no ideal type of government more conducive or fitted to the
practice of functional governance than any other at this point in history. Functional
governance has historically been achieved utilizing monarchies, democracy, socialism,
communism, authoritarianism, and military government. An adherence to the principles
and replication of the characteristics of functional governance in any form of government
are sufficient to bring it into existence and practice.

Functional governance is a necessary prerequisite to the state transitioning
upwards from a pathoffunctional or lower stage of development to a more advanced level
of functionality. Without the element of functional governance, the state will
immediately stagnate or regress regardless of the functional category it falls within.
Metafunctionalism fails to generally explain how functional governance forms within
society and government due to the limitations of its philosophical assumptions. The
factors revolving around functional governance in the modern era appear to be
dynamically rooted and linked to the values, history, culture, and geography of the
population under consideration. By contrast, metafunctionalism is philosophically rooted
in functionalism and evolution. Functional governance is merely regarded as a necessary
adaptation for survival in which individuals perceive their survival prospects to be greater
within the general benefit of a group than individually. They make short-term sacrifices
of individual sovereignty and material gain for the long-term survival of the population.
Functional governance evolves as a tool by which to achieve order among group
members and direct their collective survival pattern.

However, the complexity of societal institutions and tendencies towards
competition, cooperation, and specialization cannot fully account for the development of functional governance. Metafunctionalism’s linear explanation does not address the value, culture, history, and geographical factors identified as central to state development within comparative politics. The Confucian ethic, Protestant ethic, Islamism, feudalism, nationalism, tribalism, colonialism, and dialectical materialism have all been cited as key factors in state and societal development. Neither evolution nor functionalism has refuted the validity of these factors and provides no alternative explanation for their role or existence. As a result, metafunctionalism is unable to make prescriptions for the state as to how to achieve functional governance. When one is analyzing the African state, this is a significant shortcoming because leadership and quality of governance have been primary obstacles to state development. For African states to progress, a prescription for the development of functional governance must be presented by which to overcome the region’s functional deficit.

**Metafunctional Recommendations for African States**

Based on the long- and short-term costs associated with the present developmental pattern of advanced functional states, African states should seek to functionalize through a different pattern than those pursued in North America and Europe. Japan, East Asia, and China have all followed a similar pattern of development as North America and Europe, incurring the same environmental costs. The goal of African states should be to functionalize in a manner that bears a different or less destructive functional cost to the state, system, and environment.

Cost-efficient environmental technology was not widely available at the close of
WWII as a tool for state development. Presently, incremental environmental measures have been placed on the international institutional agenda, and green technology is being produced at an increasingly cost-effective rate. African states have the opportunity to build from scratch modern, environmentally efficient states utilizing green technology from advanced functional states.

As an overwhelmingly underdeveloped pathofunctional region, sub-Saharan Africa it is not confined by the same transitional environmental constraints on development as established hypofunctional, equifunctional, and hyperfunctional states. African traditional society is arguably closer to the modern concept of a green society than is industrial society. Traditional society does not entail a lifestyle or population numbers imposing massive strains on natural resources or the environment. Traditional society incurs relatively insignificant environmental costs when measured against industrial societies. It is plausible to assume that African states could leapfrog the industrial stage of development to a lower cost green environmental stage.

African states have the opportunity to chart a different and more cost-efficient path to greater state functionality through the building of green societies. Green societies are Africa’s most feasible alternative to industrialization and should become the basis for the region’s long-term sustainable development. The building of modern green societies in Africa should be modeled on a low-cost, moderate consumption pattern paralleling rural and village life. The strongest positive elements of the existing lifestyle should be merged with green technology to create a new pattern of living. African society has survived for centuries on a low-density, small-housing, low-consumption lifestyle within
a largely informal economy. These characteristics easily blend with modern conceptions of a green lifestyle and technology. The product of such a merger will be a unique modernity based on the modernization of the village concept that has existed for centuries. The pursuit of this model of development should be the basis for functionalizing the African state beyond a pathofunctional stage to the hypofunctional level and above.

There is no model of government or ideal state type upon which to build a modern green society. The only prerequisite is responsible moral government dedicated to environmental sustainable development. The same government and leadership factors constraining the development prospects for an industrial state in Africa would constrain any efforts at developing a green society. Once the African region begins to address its long-term governance and corruption problems, its states can begin the pursuit of this new form of development.
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

At the opening of this study, it was hypothesized that a metatheoretical approach was necessary to describe the changes that have occurred in African state behavior and relations over the past twenty years. A metatheoretical framework was thought necessary to include system and state variables as dual primary determinants of state behavior. At its close, this study concludes that the metatheoretical approach grants an inherently more descriptive means of analyzing state behavior and relations than the previous general-theory approach. By incorporating aspects of the major conventional theories of IR and comparative politics, a metatheory grants a broader base of possible description than any of the theories upon which it is built. As a result, its description and analysis carry a higher degree of detail that grant greater accuracy in identifying the basis for state behavior. Only international class theory begins to approach the level of broad description and detail provided by the metatheoretical approach due to its large number of variants.

The metatheoretical approach is today of inherently greater utility than previous approaches due to the evolution of the importance of liberal economic power and the environment in the post Cold War period. Its greatest inherent value is derived from its consolidation of mainstream approaches, centralizing information in a manner reducing the possibility of extreme dogmatic positions towards any one theory. The metatheoretical approach necessitates a balanced and holistic approach to the study of
African politics and IR. Within the greater descriptive detail of this type of framework, the African state may be described and categorized more accurately than it has been by attempts to theorize it in the past.

In building a metatheory of state behavior and relations, this study regards the relative degree of state functionality as a characteristically inclusive measure of the determinants in the state’s behavior and relations. The relative degree of state functionality is in turn a product of the collective forces of evolution at the societal level. Metafunctionalism is therefore founded on the wedding of a modified functionalism to the collective processes of evolution, linking realism, liberalism, neomarxism, and structural functionalism in a theoretical combine.

Metafunctionalism dictates that the purpose of the state is to ensure the greater survival of its population by enhancing the state’s level of functionality. The state increases the level of human security within it by enhancing the degree of complexity of its institutions, infrastructure, territory, and institutional relationships. Metafunctionalism prescribes that state behavior should be dictated by the pursuit of greater functionality and human security over all other goals. War, international cooperation, human rights, regional integration, regulation, and trade should only be pursued if they enhance the degree of state functionality.

**Evaluation**

Evaluation of any new social theory at the state and system level immediately faces the challenge of time and consensus. Verification and predictive capacity regarding state and system behavior have the challenge of case studies to be completed and elapsed
time for future events to occur. Judgments based on time-sensitive criteria would require making a prediction about a given circumstance and waiting for an undefined period to evaluate those claims. That undefined period is beyond the parameters and scope of this study. The challenge of time as related to awareness of new theory is ever present among the academic community within which consensus must be built for or against the theory.

Based on these limitations imposed by time, predictive capacity will not be a measure by which theory is judged. An explanation or application of statistical data will also not be considered in the evaluation due to this study not being based on quantitative analysis.

However, some criteria must be presented by which to evaluate the metatheory in its completed stage. Metafunctionalism in this instance will be evaluated on its structure and application, as well as the plausibility of claims regarding the topic area. The theory will be practically judged on how closely it parallels existing formal and informal system and state structures, describes system and state characteristics, explains system and unit behavior, creates a logical chronology of international events and processes, and justifies its philosophical background. Metafunctionalism will also be judged by the degree of effectiveness through which it combines theory and negates possible inter-theory contradictions.

**System and State Characteristic Parallels to Empirical Reality**

Metafunctionalism was designed to parallel the official and unofficial system-unit structures of the international system. These parallels are generally acknowledged throughout IR literature and are at the same time obvious in a structured observation of the international environment. Metafunctionalism begins with recognition of the global
ecological system and its primary importance in IR. Only within the past fifteen years has the global ecological system gained significant recognition within IR discourse. Attention to its importance has been acknowledged within metafunctionalism paralleling its new recognition within IR. Thereafter, metafunctionalism assumes the existence of a political and economic international system composed of state base units along with a host of nonstate actors. Paralleling liberalism, state base units are considered to be generally rational actors based on the pursuit of their national interests. Just as in the marketplace, self-interest takes precedence in the international system as states pursue greater economic and physical security. The United Nations, Bretton Woods institutions, and World Trade Organization are acknowledged within metafunctionalism as the formal institutional organization of the international system.

Metafunctionalism's deviation from conventional theory lies in the structure of the state base units and assumptions regarding the basis for their behavior. It is generally acknowledged within IR literature that states as like units house significant differences in structure, behavior, rationality, and decision making. Distinctions are regularly made in realism, liberalism, and international class theory between categories of states as powerful, weak, first world, third world, most developed, least developed, core, semiperipheral, and peripheral. Likewise, within this study, states are understood to share general characteristics and are distinguished by the degree of characteristics displayed. States are in turn categorized by similarities in the degrees of character traits displayed. This method of classification and categorization is consistent with the method utilized in realism, liberalism, and international class theory.
Metafunctionalism acknowledges nation-states as the most dominant actors in the system but recognizes a second form of state existing beside them. At least a quarter of all existing states do not characteristically fit into the category of nation-state according to Westphalian definitions. Based on their shared characteristics, this form of state has been designated as the artificial multinational state. This difference in state form has been generally acknowledged in both IR and African politics, but without a general designation or state classification. In analyses of the African state, there is great impracticality in continuing the assumption of general Westphalian sovereignty when the reality of the region invalidates such a claim.

Metafunctionalism also significantly deviates from common assumptions regarding the purpose of the state, regarding it as a tool of evolution humans have developed to enhance their survival prospects. Such a claim is highly plausible, considering the parallels between historic increases in life expectancy, population expansion, economic expansion, and expansion of states during the 20th century. In the 20th century, humans achieved the highest life expectancy and population expansion in the world's history. During the same period, the number of states in the international system more than quadrupled as the world experienced the greatest economic expansion in history. These parallels indicate social evolution where socioeconomic changes have dramatically improved human security and survival prospects.

Metafunctionalism also significantly deviates from conventional theory in its basis for system change and transition. Stemming from its evolution-based philosophical roots, metafunctionalism does not accept the general view that events of international
order occur at random according to a theory of chaos. Rather, system order and change are the products of a chronological pattern of events linked to the tangible and intangible characteristics of the system. The principles of biological life and universal organization suggest that both complex and simple systems come into being as products of purposeful chronological events and processes. This principle holds true in the social world, where the evolution of the international system has an ultimately mappable pattern. This method of mapping system change parallels the process of genome mapping developed within genetics. In this study, the system's mappable characteristics have been identified and presented in a logical chronology of events along with broad predictions of future changes. This approach significantly deviates from mainstream IR theory and will require a significant period of time to gain consensus on its validity.

Metafunctionalism further deviates from conventional theory in its identification of the anarchical structure of international order as a hierarchically experienced phenomenon. The weakest states in the system are more highly subject to regimes of global governance and regulation than the most powerful states. Based on the characteristics and position of the state within the international system, the degree of anarchy it experiences varies. General observations of the structure of the United Nations system, Bretton Woods financial institutions, and global economy justify the assertion that weak states are more highly subject to the rules and regulations of international order than powerful and influential states. The permanent seats of the UN Security Council, distribution of votes and exchange capacity in the IMF, breakdown of trade talks within the WTO, and nuclear nonproliferation regimes all illustrate the international hierarchy
existing among the system’s states.

Weak states must act within the confines and parameters of a system they did not establish and do not maintain. In order to participate, they must follow the rules or seek to establish their own system. The cost and consequences for not following established rules and norms are significantly higher for weaker states than for the most powerful states. In the post-World War II international system, there have been no significant disciplinary measures against great powers or superpowers for not following the rules, whereas weaker states such as Iraq, Panama, Syria, Iran, and Libya have all been significantly punished for seeking to assert their autonomy.

The global diffusion of international manufacturing and industry worldwide versus single- or dual-commodity exports and oil extraction further indicates the economic stratification of the global economy. Perhaps the strongest evidence for the existence of hierarchical anarchy is international aid dependency. Weak and poorer states require the aid of more developed states and institutions for their daily survival but are subject to the dictates of donors to receive it.

**Logical Chronology of International Events and Processes**

In creating a logical chronology of events, metafunctionalism’s basis for system and state advancement throughout history already paralleled the most important principles of process and change generally accepted within conventional IR theory. Its assertion that state behavior and system process are driven by evolutionary factors of competition, cooperation, and specialization is already existent within realism’s power and security competitions, liberalism’s economic and institutional cooperation, and
international class theory's production stratification principles. For over 100 years, these theories have asserted that each of these principles govern international order. Metafunctionalism's concept of civigenesis merely suggests that these principles are occurring simultaneously yet chronologically towards ensuring human survival.

Where metafunctionalism is unique is in its suggestion that each major advancement in the international environment is by necessity based on the principle of functional causality. The process by which competition is eventually superseded by cooperation, and cooperation is eventually enhanced through specialization, is based on the utility of each in increasing human security. Once the governing principle fails to grant efficient results, a transition is made to a more efficient mode of operation. The formulation of system and state chronology based on the principle of functional causality is directly patterned after methods in evolutionary biology. The principle of functional causality has been accepted as feasible within the hard sciences and carries the same validity within the social sciences.

Quality of Theoretical Structure and Combine

At the opening of this study, dual nonhierarchical determinants were stated as essential to describing state behavior and relations in the post-Cold War era. African state behavior could no longer be categorized based on a single determinant such as power, interdependence, or class, because each of these factors had evolved as core aspects of the post-Cold War international system. The question remained as to how to simultaneously utilize each within a metatheory without intertheory contradictions. This goal was achieved within metafunctionalism through the structuring of its categorization
and descriptive system to reflect both system and state variables. From the multiple
theories housed in the metatheory, a broad base of system and state determinants could be
built by which to describe the state. These include power, institutionalism,
interdependence, hierarchy, stratification, structural and functional dependence and
independence, worldview/perception, and leadership type/style. Based on the
combinations of characteristic variations displayed across the system, a number of
categories could be formulated by which to describe general patterns of state behavior
and structure. By design, every category of state within metafunctionalism immediately
describes both system and state determinants. In building this unique system of
categorization, the objective of theoretical consolidation was achieved within this study.

However, it is important to note that there were distinct challenges in attempting
to create a region-specific categorization. Ultimately, this study concluded that a valid
theory of state behavior and relations could not be based on the African state and region
in isolation. An isolated regional approach could not be successfully pursued because of
the necessity for relative characteristic comparisons within a system-unit descriptive
system. A theory of state behavior and relations within an international system required a
general description of unit characteristics that could be categorized by the degree of those
characteristics displayed among like units. IR and comparative politics theories required
a system-wide comparative element to distinguish between the degrees of general
characteristics shared by African states and the degrees of those same characteristics
displayed across the system. Without this relative comparative element,
metafunctionalism could not be a valid theory of either discipline. As a region-specific
theory, it would fundamentally assume that all the characteristics it identifies are unique to sub-Saharan Africa. Similar characteristics displayed by other states in the system invalidate that assumption and the region-specific approach.

As a result, metafunctionalism had to be structured as a system-wide general theory in similarity to realism, liberalism, and international class theory. However, it is significantly differentiated from those theories by its multideterminant/multitheory metatheoretical approach. Metafunctionalism is categorized as both a comparative and IR theory based on its strong comparative elements and focus on system structure and relations.

**Challenges of Philosophical Preference**

The most difficult justification for the validity of metafunctionalism is its philosophical preference for evolution as the basis for a metatheory of state behavior and relations. The choice of evolution over other philosophical positions is ultimately the normative preference of the researcher. Enhancing human survival prospects through competition, cooperation, and specialization presented the most feasible means to address behavioral and structural questions within this research model. Evolution was the only theory available having a broad enough fundamental assumption upon which multiple theories could be linked without contradiction. As ported from the hard sciences, evolution housed the primary assumption of the survival of life through biological adaptation and change. That core assumption closely paralleled political science's core concerns regarding quality of life without being beholden to any one IR theory.

Even so, the normative preference for evolution is practically justified by its
scientific parallels to historical state and system development. The foundational principles of the collective processes of evolution mimic the historical patterns of state and system development. State power competitions within realism, economic and institutional cooperation within liberalism, and stratification within international class theory are reflected in the competition-cooperation-specialization principles of evolution. These principles merely had to be matched between the hard and social sciences, mapping their logical pattern and creating a chronology of their occurrence in IR.

A second normative position fundamental to metafunctionalism also requires justification as a nontraditional preference in IR. An ecosocial view of the system and state was adopted in lieu of the traditional nonenvironmental views of realism, liberalism, and international class theory. An ecosocial view of the system and state was necessary to present the ecosystem as integral to IR discourse. Metafunctionalism had to reflect the growing importance of environmental preservation that has evolved in the past twenty years. Without an ecosocial view, the state cannot truly be viewed in a holistic fashion. The principles of ecostasis and functional cost are dynamically linked to the environment and would have little operational value without the state being perceived in environmental terms.

**The Problem of Repetitiveness**

This study is inherently repetitive due to the interlinked nature of the determinants in the state’s behavior. This study holds realist, liberal, international class, structure and function, leadership style, and worldview characteristics as inherently linked in varying degrees. As a result, discussing the determinants of each characteristic necessarily
involves a discussion of other related determinant characteristics. This occurs in the
discussion of each of the characteristics and becomes increasingly repetitive in any
regional study. The problem of repetition does not detract from the validity of the
findings but requires multiple rehearsals of similar information.
Metafunctionalism: Structural Polarity and the Diffusion of Consolidated State Power

Based on the specific characteristics of structure and unit relations, international systems will likely be either polar static and agonistic, polar static and reciprocally altruistic, polar dynamic and reciprocally altruistic, or polar dynamic and agonistic. Each combination results in its own processes, functions, and outcomes, accompanied by a specific diffusion of consolidated power within the system. Select combinations of structural and relational characteristics engender greater degrees of compatibility leading to systemic stability, while other combinations of characteristics are highly incompatible, producing increasing levels of dysfunctionality and instability.¹

Historically, since the mid 17th century most functional international systems for a majority of their lifespan have been either polar static and agonistic, creating stability through limited competition, or polar dynamic and reciprocally altruistic, creating stability through increased cooperation and expansion. Most dysfunctional systems have historically been polar dynamic and agonistic, resulting in greater conflict between a larger bloc of vertically mobile competing states, or polar static and reciprocally altruistic, resulting in conflict due to restricted vertical mobility and reward for increasing

¹ This particular explanation of the diffusion of consolidated power and structural polarity was developed by the researcher within this study.
cooperation and participation.

However, the most important outcome of the state’s characteristics is the resulting diffusion of consolidated power. Consolidated power refers to the most constant active elements of aggregate power upon which system structures and processes may be built and maintained. These elements include a constant economic and financial revenue stream, territorial availability, an active modern communications network, modern naval and air forces, and multiregional or global diplomatic offices. Consolidated state power diffuses around the core processes through which the system functions and as a result place key states at the center of systemic organization. The different combinations of structural and relational characteristics upon which the system is constructed result in varying patterns in the diffusion of consolidated power throughout the system. Structural polarity, or the point of greatest diffusion of consolidated power within the system, becomes the basis around which system organization revolves.

Historically, polar static agonistic systems have limited the accumulation of vast consolidated power to between 4 and 10 states, resulting in a multipolar diffusion of structural polarity. The processes of the system are managed by this limited number of states, decreasing the probability of major conflict that exponentially increases as the number of powerful states increases. Likewise, polar static altruistic systems have also historically resulted in a multipolar diffusion of consolidated power by limiting the accumulation of vast aggregate state power to between 4 and 10 states. Systemic processes and mechanisms facilitating both broad and specific state cooperation are managed by this limited number of states. The limited number facilitates cooperation,
which is most easily established and feasibly managed among smaller rather than larger groups. Increasing numbers of vertically mobile states decrease the prospects for early cooperation by presenting too many interests to be taken into consideration in the decision-making process.

Historically, polar dynamic agonistic systems have placed no structural limits on the accumulation of vast aggregate state power. States in the system are generally vertically mobile with the ability to rise within the international status quo. This form of system develops in an environment where the general interests of the states of the system converge around two opposing positions. The dominant relational paradigm of the system is competition, which is defined by these two divergent positions or ideologies. The states on either side cooperate with each other in order to effectively compete and balance the opposing side. The cooperation on each side of the system is managed by the state that has accumulated enough aggregate power to facilitate the processes and mechanisms of cooperation on its side. Those two states then further manage the competition of convergent interests and ideology for their respective sides between themselves. As a result, the polar dynamic agonistic system produces a bipolar diffusion of systemic polarity that diffuses the greatest accumulation of consolidated power to two states. The bipolarity within the system hinges the processes of competition, conflict management, and limited cooperation on the aggregate capabilities of 2 states as opposed to 4 to 10.

Historically, polar dynamic altruistic systems have produced a unipolar diffusion of systemic polarity. This type of system has historically emerged proceeding the
collapse of a bipolar ordering of the international system in which one of the two primary centers of the diffusion of consolidated power collapses or ceases to exist. The largest diffusion of consolidated power continues to accumulate to the only remaining state with enough aggregate power to facilitate and manage the processes and functions of the entire system. With only a single state capable of maintaining and managing the system, general state interests converge around the hegemonic state in the interest of maintaining systemic order and stability. Without the element of bipolar competing interests, the general behavioral tendency of the states of the system transitions from competition and limited cooperation to general cooperation facilitated by a single hegemonic state. With few exceptions, the structure of the system generally continues to place no formal limitations on the accumulation of vast aggregate power. States continue to be generally vertically mobile with the ability to rise within the international status quo. The organization of the system in terms of its processes, functions, and outcomes is dynamically linked to the aggregate capabilities of a single state.

A second possible outcome of a polar dynamic altruistic system is a symbiopolar diffusion of systemic polarity. In a symbiopolar diffusion of power, the organization of the system’s processes and functions is facilitated by the interdependence and intercooperation of the two states with the largest accumulation of aggregate power. The structure and stability of the system is dynamically linked to the aggregate capabilities of two states as opposed to one, or more than three. A symbiopolar diffusion of consolidated state power occurs where the two states having amassed the greatest accumulation of aggregate power do not have enough consolidated power to manage or
maintain the system individually. In a system predicated on cooperative relations, each is individually incapable of sufficiently facilitating the mechanisms by which to foster and maintain system-wide cooperation.

However, even though insufficient individually, together in concert, these two states have sufficient consolidated power to maintain and manage a functional system structure. Through establishing a symbiotic relationship, they are able to facilitate a greater degree of system-wide cooperation, balance, and deterrence than either state could achieve by itself. Their cooperation produces economic and political incentives for system-wide cooperation and dissuades them from engaging in conflict based on the overwhelming size of their combined security deterrents. Management of the system occurs within the context of negotiations between two interdependent parties, creating great degrees of stability based on a confluence of intermingled interests.

A symbiopolar ordering of the international system is without historical precedent at the international level but has been observed at the regional level. Symbiopolarity is significantly distinguished from bipolarity by its predominantly cooperative relations within a reciprocally altruistic system. In contrast, bipolarity is historically predicated on competition and limited cooperation within a predominantly agonistic system of relations.²

² The term and concept of "symbiopolarity" was originally developed by the researcher in this study.
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