United States policy toward the recognition and admission of communist China to the United Nations, 1949 to 1960

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UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE RECOGNITION AND
ADMISSION OF COMMUNIST CHINA TO THE UNITED
NATIONS, 1949 TO 1960

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF ATLANTA UNIVERSITY IN
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

BY
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DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

ATLANTA, GEORGIA

AUGUST 1964
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

United States policy toward Communist China has been an important issue since the Communists came to power there, and it is of critical significance to the United States and the free world today. In the United States the issue is a very real one to the vast majority of the people.

Basically, the United States policy of not extending diplomatic recognition to the Communist regime in China proceeds from the conviction that such recognition would produce no tangible benefits to the United States or to the free world as a whole and would be of material assistance to Chinese Communist attempts to extend dominion throughout Asia. It is not an "inflexible" policy which cannot be altered to meet changed conditions.¹

In the days of Chinese provincial warlords, it used to be said that China is only a geographical expression. To fit the current paradox the cliche would have to read: "China is only a political expression."² Various powers define China to suit their convenience. In the eyes of our policy makers the refugee nationalist regime on Taiwan Island is used

²Ibid., p. 76.
synonymously with China, despite the fact that it exercises no power over more than 98 per cent of the Chinese population.3

In order to simplify and avoid confusion, the word "China" is here taken to mean the subcontinent or mainland territory historically known by that name. It is used interchangeably with political expressions such as the People's Government of China, the Chinese Communist regime, the Chinese People's Republic and the Peking regime.

The United States is alone among the nations in its commitment to defend the domain of Chiang Kai-shek.4 And not much longer may it hope to prevent admission of Communist China to the United Nations. Those nations willing to vote for Peking's admission have steadily grown in number from year to year. With the admission of the new African nations in the past two years, a wave of pro-Peking sentiment on this issue threatens to make Communist China's entry inevitable. Asian opinion already is overwhelmingly against United States policy of non-recognition and non-admission, a fact adverse to United States prestige in that continent. Even Great Britain, its staunchest ally, is abandoning the United States on this question.5

Meanwhile, relations between the United States and mainland China have been mutually and intensely hostile.6 Whether in Laos, the Taiwan

3Ibid.


Strait, or Korea, the danger of war between the two is real. So tempestuous is American public opinion that those still bitterly opposed to the United Nations possibly could cause United States withdrawal from that body upon Communist China's admission, a possibility—however remote—which would doom the world organization. If, on the other hand, Mao's China remains indefinitely outside the United Nations, this, too, could spell the doom of that organization. Such is the dilemma in which the United States finds itself.

Imminently facing the United States, therefore, is the necessity of revising its policy toward conflict of Chinese representation in the United Nations between Communist China and Nationalist China. Presumably, the basic requisites of a changed policy would be to (1) reduce dangers inherent in the current United States posture, (2) still safeguard Western security and interests and the growing strength of the United Nations, and (3) not further alienate the uncommitted nations. Such a policy revision is the subject of the following analysis.

**Purpose of the Study.**—The study purposes to highlight the essential points in the policy of the non-recognition and non-admission of Communist China to the United Nations.

**Significance of the Study.**—This study should provide useful information in helping to arrive at a more positive policy toward Communist China.

**Method of Research.**—The methodology for this investigation is descriptive and analytical.
Scope and Limitations.—The scope of this study is the period from 1949 to 1960.

Sources of Material.—The sources of information in this study are books, periodicals, public documents, and newspapers.
CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND OF DILEMMA

Origins.—Chiang's Republic of China is a charter member of the United Nations, having signed the organization's Charter at San Francisco on June 26, 1945, followed by its ratification on September 28, 1945.¹

Chiang's Republic of China is legally entitled to United Nations representation, so long as obstructive action is not taken by the Security Council, or its membership rights and privileges are not suspended under Article 5 of this Charter.² From 1946 to the present, the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China has been accredited as the representative of China in the United Nations.

By the end of 1949, however, the effective control of the Nationalist Government was reduced by civil war to the island of Taiwan, the Pescadores, and a few offshore islands including Quemoy and Matsu.³ Therefore, mainland China has been controlled by the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China.

In the new capital of Peking in October, 1949, the new Republic was proclaimed by Mao Tse-tung, head of the Communist party, as the sole

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²United Nations, Charter, Article 5.
legal government representing all of the people of the People's Republic of China, and he indicated willingness to establish diplomatic relations with other nations.4

Bid for Admission.—Shortly thereafter, November 13, 1949, Communist China made its first bid for China's seat in the United Nations, by sending a radio message to the United Nations repudiating the Nationalist delegation.5 The radio message was received by United Nations officials November 18 and was treated as a non-United Nations government message not to be circulated among member delegations. Peking sent further telegrams demanding that the "illegal" delegates of the Chinese Kuomintang reactionary clique be expelled by the legal delegates of the Central People's Government.

It is to be noted that the United Nations Charter was signed for the State of China, since only states may become members of the United Nations.

On the issue of states becoming members, Article 4 of the Charter says:

Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.6


The Communist Government of China calls itself the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. Thus China, under this government, adopted a name different from that under which it became an original member of the world body under Article 3 of the Charter, and a permanent member of the Security Council under Article 23, Paragraph 1.

Whenever a government wishes to and has control over the people, it can change its name. The Charter does not restrict this right, even with respect to a permanent member of the Security Council mentioned under a definite name in Article 23 of the Charter.

The mere change of title, therefore, does not necessarily involve the creation of a new Chinese state, nor does it necessarily create the status of a non-member of the United Nations whose admission might be subject to veto in the Security Council. Prior to the Chinese question, there had not been an instance of a challenge of credentials of representatives. The matter was further complicated by the General Assembly's finding that Communist China itself committed aggression by directly aiding those already committing aggression in Korea and by engaging in hostilities against the United Nations forces there.

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7United Nations, Charter, Article 3.
9United Nations, Charter, Article 23.
Security Council. -- On January 10, 1950, the Soviet delegation submitted a resolution to the Security Council demanding that the Kuomintang representative's credentials not be recognized and that he be expelled from the Security Council. The Russian delegation also declared its intention to withdraw from the Security Council if this was not done. At the time, the President of the Security Council was the representative of Nationalist China who ruled to have the Soviet proposal printed and considered at a special meeting. Russia then challenged his legal right to serve as President at all, but the Council President's ruling was sustained by eight votes to two with one abstention. The Soviet representative thereupon walked out.

In spite of his previous threat of non-participation, the Soviet delegate returned for subsequent meetings until his resolution was rejected by a vote of six to three with two abstentions. Again he walked out, only to return as President of the Security Council at its 480th meeting in August, 1950, shortly after the onset of the Korean War and United Nations intervention, when he moved to make another ruling to exclude the Kuomintang representative from the Council. After a short debate, this Soviet proposal was lost also, eight votes to three.

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13 Ibid., p. 29.


15 Ibid., p. 8.
Regardless of these initial reversals, the Soviet pressure was not without influence. At the opening of its fifth session the following month, in September, 1950, the General Assembly was confronted with four draft resolutions on the matter of Chinese representation, two proposed by the Russians, as expected, but one also proposed by India and another by Canada. And so the issue was shifted to the General Assembly where it was to remain for a decade or more.

The Indian draft resolution called for the recognition by the General Assembly of the Communist Government as the functioning Chinese Government. It was rejected, 33 votes to 16 with 10 abstentions. The two Soviet draft resolutions likewise failed, 37 to 11 with 8 abstentions. But the Canadian resolution called for referring the question of Chinese representation to a special ad hoc committee, which was adopted, 38 to 6 with 11 abstentions.

The second part resolved that the Nationalist Government retain her seat in the General Assembly pending the General Assembly's decision on the report of the special committee, which also was adopted, 42 to 8 with 6 nations abstaining.

The ad hoc committee reported in December, 1950, and recommended that the question of representation of a member state, in cases where more than one authority claims to be the government legally entitled to repre-

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17Ibid., p. 102.
18Ibid., p. 103.
sent it, be considered in the light of the purposes and principles of the Charter, and that the other United Nations organs should take into account the General Assembly's attitude. But it was added that the General Assembly should not affect the direct relations of the individual member states with the state concerned. This draft resolution was adopted, 36 to 6 with 9 abstentions. This was the end of the matter for the crucial year of 1950, the year in which the Korean War began.

General Assembly.---On November 13, 1959, the General Assembly approved the General Committee's recommendations to postpone consideration of a Soviet bid to include the Chinese question on the agenda for the General Assembly and any further proposals to this end during its sixth regular session. It was emphasized that the time was neither opportune nor appropriate for consideration and that circumstances had not substantially changed. Obviously, the Korean War had complicated the picture.

This recommendation was adopted by the General Assembly at each of its subsequent sessions from 1952 through 1960. The voting record, with abstentions indicated by parentheses, follows:

1952: 7th session - 42-7 (11)
1953: 8th session - 44-10 (2)
1954: 9th session - 43-11 (6)

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20Agearst, op. cit., p. 110.
1955: 10th session - 42-12 (6)
1956: 11th session - 47-24 (8)
1957: 12th session - 47-27 (7)
1958: 13th session - 44-23 (9)
1959: 14th session - 44-29 (9)
1960: 15th session - 42-34 (22)\textsuperscript{22}

Meanwhile, congressional opposition to the admission of Communist China remained firm. On August 17, 1959, the House of Representatives resolved to keep China out by a vote of 368 to 2 with 2 abstentions.\textsuperscript{23}

The question of Chinese representation has been postponed for each of the past eleven years. The General Assembly has been divided into four discernible but changing groups.

First, there are a few countries, like the United Kingdom, which have recognized Communist China but have deferred their support of admission pending appropriate conditions; but this group, very small to begin with, is diminishing for early in 1961 the United Kingdom served notice that it will vote in favor of admission.\textsuperscript{24}

Secondly, there is a growing number of nations, principally underdeveloped nations that do not yet recognize Communist China, which have


\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., p. 165.

\textsuperscript{24}"United Kingdom Changes Policy," \textit{Time}, March 9, 1961, p. 23.
withheld their votes for considering its admission by abstaining on the question, thus avoiding for the time being alignment with either side in the Cold War. Many, if not most of this group, numbering 22 in 1960, may well vote in favor of consideration of admission in the near future. 25

Thirdly, there is another growing group of nations, all but a few of which have recognized Communist China, which favors its admission. This group includes all United Nations members of the Communist bloc, plus some studiously neutral nations, like India. 26 It may be of interest to note that recent border disputes between China and India may cause a cooling of India's attempts to get Communist China a seat in the United Nations.

Finally, there is another group of nations, including the United States, which neither recognizes mainland China nor favors its admission. While the number of nations in this group has remained remarkably stable through the past decade, its percentage of total United Nations membership has declined markedly in the past five years. 27 Defections from this group likewise are imminent, as Brazil has recently given notice of such intention. Canada and some other Commonwealth nations probably will follow the new British lead on this question, while Mexico and some other Latin American countries may well follow Brazil.

26 Ibid., p. 43.
27 Newman, op. cit., p. 165.
Legal Question.--To the question who has the legal right to decide what government should represent a member state in the United Nations, two different answers are given: (1) the member states themselves, and (2) the United Nations.

Arguments that the member state has a legal right are based on the premise of sovereign equality of states. That is to say, every state under international law has the right to determine who is authorized to represent it abroad and what form of government, as well as the right to change that government at will.28

According to this reasoning as applied to the Chinese question, the term member state (China) should be taken to mean the government in effective control of its people and territory (Communist Chinese Government) rather than its recognized government (Nationalist Government), because a member state in the United Nations (State of China) cannot compel other member states in that body to recognize a particular government (Communist Chinese Government). People can express themselves in an international organization only through an organized government to which they have accorded the right to represent them abroad. In this particular case, the member state involved is China.

At the time it became a member of the United Nations, the organized government of the people of the state of China was the Nationalist Government.29 This government is no longer in effective control of the territory

or the people of the state of China.\textsuperscript{30} Hence, according to this argument, the Nationalist Government no longer represents the Chinese people who constitute the state of China; it merely represents that part of the Chinese people who live in Taiwan. Therefore, as the case stands, the state of China has only nominal representation in the United Nations. There is no substantive Chinese representation in that body.

The rationale that the United Nations should decide who may represent one of its member states rests on identification of the right of a member state to representation with the right of the organs of the United Nations to approve credentials. Credentials may accredit the powers conferred by a government on its representatives. Representation is the right of the government to act on behalf of the State.

So far as the United Nations is concerned, each organ has the legal right to approve the credentials presented to it. This is essential for the integrity of these organs in the exercise of their functions. Their actions have been a matter of form, however, which have not involved consideration of the legitimacy of constitutional or legal powers of the government of the member state in an international organization which rest with the member state itself; and, in this sense, it is unsound to confuse the right to decide the right of a state to representation by its government with the right of the organs of the United Nations to approve credentials.

In order for the state of China, however, to have substantive, rather than nominal, representation in the United Nations, the various

\textsuperscript{30}Mao Tse-tung Takes Over China, "U. S. News and World Report, October 8, 1949, p. 10.
organs of that body must approve the credentials of the Communist Chinese Government while refusing the credentials of the Nationalist Government. 31

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CHAPTER III

THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES

Major Considerations.—From the beginning of the dispute over Chinese representation, the United States has relentlessly supported postponement of the question, ostensibly until time and circumstances prove favorable for its consideration. Not content with merely casting its vote, the United States has been unflagging in taking the initiative in securing each postponement. By assuming the leading role, the United States has posed itself as the major obstacle to Communist China's admission.1

United States policy has been strongly committed to the maximum isolation of Communist China and the continued recognition of the National Government on Taiwan as the Government of China.2 Toward the mainland, the core of United States policy is composed of: (1) political non-recognition, (2) economic embargo, and (3) opposition to almost all forms of interaction between the non-Communist world and Communist China, including opposition to its admission to the United Nations.3


2Ibid.

Political non-recognition is entirely a United States or unilateral decision. Economic embargo, however, involves consideration of other nations, few of which have followed this lead. Furthermore, opposition to all forms of interaction requires active cooperation and support which are rapidly waning.

Numerous reasons have been given in defense of this policy. A good summary of the major arguments is set forth in a recent study prepared for the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate, as follows:

(a) The recognition of Communist China in any degree or form is not in the national interest of the United States because that Government has shown implacable hostility to us, is guilty of grossly immoral actions, is dedicated to the establishment of world communism, and has given no indication of being willing to fulfill its international obligations.

(b) Communist China stands condemned as an aggressor by the United Nations, and any recognition or admission to the United Nations would seriously damage the meaning and effectiveness of that body. Moreover, it would result in the weakening or destruction of the Republic of China to which we are committed.

(c) We cannot see clearly into the future at this time. It is always possible that Communist China will collapse or that some colossal upheaval will take place. We can afford to wait.

(d) If we were to shift our China policy, it would be taken as a sign of weakness or capitulation by many of the free people of the world, and particularly the weak nations of Asia which look to our firmness for support. By our unyielding stand, we have bolstered the Asian will to resist.

(e) There is some basis for treating the Soviet Union differently from Communist China. There are signs indicating that the Soviet Union for various reasons
may be interested in an accommodation with the United States, but Communist China is in an entirely different era and mood.  

The underlying assumption for this China policy is that upon which all fundamentals of United States foreign policy are predicated, namely, that international Communist imperialism threatens the freedom of the world.

Views of Some Top Political Leaders.—At this point, the author wishes to discuss views and attitudes of some of the top political leaders who have been instrumental in formulating the China policy.

The postwar period posed a dilemma for the Truman administration on what policy to follow in dealing with the Chinese civil war. General Albert C. Wedemeyer, then commanding the United States forces in China, clearly stated the dilemma confronting the American Government. Wedemeyer flatly recommended either the immediate withdrawal of all American troops from China or all-out support of the Nationalist regime. In a cable dated November 23, 1945, the General said:

Support to the National government will definitely involve American forces in warfare. There can be no mistake about this. . . . If the unification of China and Manchuria under Chinese Nationalist forces is to be a United States policy, involvement in fratricide warfare, and possibly in war with the Soviet Union, must be accepted and would definitely require United States forces far beyond those presently in the theater to implement this policy.  

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In 1945, President Truman stated that the administration would follow a non-intervention policy. President Truman's statement of December 15, 1945, was:

The U. S. government has long subscribed to the principle that the management of internal affairs is the responsibility of the peoples of sovereign nations. . . . U. S. support will not be extended to U. S. military intervention to influence the course of any Chinese internal strife. . . . The U. S. government considers that the detailed steps necessary to the achievement of political unity in China must be worked out by the Chinese themselves and that intervention by any foreign government in these matters would be inappropriate.6

Faced with this dilemma, the Truman administration did intervene on behalf of the Nationalists, thus incurring the lasting enmity of the Chinese Communist leadership without intervening with sufficient force, wisdom or determination to make its intervention effective.

On October 1, 1949, the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek was forced from the mainland of China and the Communists took over the entire country. The new government of Mao Tse-tung was met with mixed emotions throughout the world. Many nations such as Britain, Russia, Soviet satellite countries, and India immediately recognized the new government.7

On January 5, 1950, President Truman declared "that the United States accepted the fact of Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan, that the United States had no designs on that island, that it would not give mili-

6Herbert Aptheker, "The United States and China," Political Affairs, XXXVII (October, 1958), 20.

tary aid or advice to Chiang on the island, and that it would follow a policy of strict non-involvement in the Chinese civil war.\textsuperscript{8}

The Secretary of State of the United States on January 6, 1950, declared:

The world must believe that the new government in China stands for principle and that they are honorable and decent people and that they do not put forward words, as propagandists do in other countries, to serve their advantage, only to throw them overboard when some change in events makes the position difficult for us.\textsuperscript{9}

The official United States policy was one of "letting the dust settle."\textsuperscript{10}

By late spring of 1950, there were indications that the United States would not oppose the seating of China in the United Nations. The outbreak of hostilities in Korea on June 25, 1950, changed everything and has profoundly affected America's whole policy in Asia ever since.\textsuperscript{11}

At this time the official policy of "letting the dust settle" was changed to a policy of "containment" of the Chinese. In Korea, President Truman attempted to hold the line militarily while preventing a general war.\textsuperscript{12} General Omar Bradley summarized the Administration's position

\textsuperscript{8}Harry Truman, "Civil War in China," \textit{The Nation}, January 10, 1950, p. 21.


\textsuperscript{10}Snow, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 77.

\textsuperscript{11}Ibid., p. 78.

when he declared that any expansion of the Korean conflict would "involve us in the wrong war at the wrong place at the wrong time."13

On February 9, 1952, the late Joseph McCarthy, senator from Wisconsin, made his now famous speech in Wheeling, West Virginia, announcing that he held in his hands the names of 205 Communists in the State Department. The Senator blamed them for loss of China to the Communists.14 He further stated that the United States should withdraw from the United Nations and branded the United Nations as "deplorably and unforgivably shameful."15

As a result of the 1952 presidential election, the Eisenhower administration rode into power on the crest of a wave of enthusiasm for a popular hero and revulsion against overlong Democratic rule, petty corruption, and the war in Korea. General Eisenhower promised to end the was, and did, on terms which would have been violently denounced had they been accepted a few months earlier by the Truman administration.16

On January 21, 1953, President Eisenhower appointed John Foster Dulles Secretary of State. One of the first and most significant

13 Ibid.
15 Cited in Mark Goyn, "Will They Wreck the U. S. ?," The Nation, October 24, 1953, p. 327.
changes made by the Eisenhower administration was to change from the containment policy to a policy of "liberation." 17

The Eisenhower-Dulles policy was characterized by slogans such as "New Look," "Massive Retaliation," and the "unleashing of Chiang Kai-shek." Also added was the policy of complete non-recognition and non-admission to the United Nations. 18

The United States has officially justified non-recognition on the ground that international law places no limitations on the discretion of states in recognizing new governments and that non-recognition. 19

Mr. Dulles expressed the opinion that the National Government "represents the true aspirations and hope of the Chinese people." 20 He further states:

The United States holds the view that Communist China will one day pass. By withholding diplomatic recognition from Peiping it seeks to hasten that passing. 21

On the issue of non-admission to the United Nations, Secretary Dulles shows a complete moralistic attitude in the formation of this policy. 22

17Graebner, op. cit., p. 10.

18Ibid.


20Ibid., p. 485.

21Snow, op. cit., p. 76.

The first and major point in the policy is that the admission of Communist China would violate Article 4 of the United Nations Charter which states:

Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations. 23

In an attempt to show that Communist China is not a peace-loving nation, such issues as China's invasion of Tibet, Korea, and the tense situation in the Formosan Strait are all evidence of being war-like, according to the official policy.

Writing in the New York Times, Secretary Dulles stated:

Internationally, the Chinese Communist regime does not conform to the practices of civilized nations; does not live up to its international obligations; has not been peaceful in the past and gives no evidence of being peaceful in the future. Its foreign policies are hostile to us and our Asian allies. Under these circumstances it would be folly for us to establish relations. 24

The strongest statement came from Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs. On April 6, 1959, he stated:

By no stretch of interpretation of the United Nations Charter could Red China qualify under that Charter as a peace-loving nation eligible for membership. 25

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On April 10, 1959, Secretary Dulles was asked to give a short statement in defense of the Communist China policy. His statement was:

This policy was not the product of any strange emotionalism; it was based on soberly rational consideration of Peking's consistent hostility to the United States. 26

Congressional attitude toward the policy of non-recognition and non-admission has been unequivocal. One of the strongest supporters of this policy was former Senator William F. Knowland of California. In a speech in 1953, the former Senator had this to say about admitting Communist China to the United Nations:

I believe that this would be a great mistake for several reasons. In the first place, it would be in fact, allowing the Chinese Communist aggressors to shoot their way into membership. It would be a violation of at least six or eight of the sections of the United Nations Charter, and I believe would be destructive of the moral principles upon which that organization is supposed to rest.

Therefore, I believe that our government should maintain the position it has already announced that we will oppose the admission into the General Assembly and we will oppose the admission into the Security Council. And I think we ought to use every ounce of leadership that we have, including the veto if need be, to keep Communist China out of that organization. 27

Further, he stated:

On the day when Communist China is voted into membership into the United Nations, I shall resign my majority leadership in the Senate, so that without embarrassment to any of my colleagues or to the


administration I can devote my full efforts in the Senate and throughout the country to terminating United States membership in that organization and our financial support to it. My conscience would not permit me to remain silent or inactive if this last grand appeasement takes place.28

Senator Lyndon Johnson, the majority leader, declared that the American people would refuse to support the United Nations if Communist China becomes a member.

Senator Smith of Maine has not gone so far as to propose that the United States should withdraw in the event Communist China is admitted to the United Nations, but she has declared that such an act would mean the "death knell" of the Organization.29

Senator Barry Goldwater had this to say on the same subject:

I think we can safely predict that were Red China admitted to the United Nations it would not be very long before the United Nations would be as defunct an organization as the old League of Nations.30

The July, 1957, issue of the State Department Bulletin carries an article written by President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles. The article justifies the keeping of Communist China out of the United Nations on the grounds that it was a bad government. "The United Nations is an association of peace-loving states devoted to their obligations


29Ibid.

under the Charter; the United Nations is not a reformatory for bad government.\(^3\)\(^1\)

As far as Congress is concerned there is limited opposition to the administration policy. What opposition there is is led by Senator J. W. Fulbright of Arkansas. Senator Fulbright expresses complete disapproval of the policy; hence he calls for a thorough reconsideration and reorientation. He states further that our China policy is inadequate, outmoded and misdirected.\(^3\)\(^2\)

Public Opinion.—Public opinion on the China policy has been one of mixed emotions and conflicting views. Communist China's intervention in the Korean War brought about massive dislike of that government. Surveys, conducted from 1950 to 1954, show that public opinion increased 21 per cent in favor of the administration policy.\(^3\)\(^3\)

A survey conducted in 1958 showed that only 47 per cent of the people questioned were in favor of the policy.\(^3\)\(^4\) There has been criticism in national magazines, editorial newspapers, and television programs. Some of the criticism can be found in the following magazines: Life, U. S. News and World Report, Time and Newsweek. Also, criticism can be found in the editorials of most of the major newspapers. There also are many books on the subject, such as Communist China and Asia, China Shakes the

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\(^3\)\(^1\) Cited in James P. Warburg, *op. cit.*, p. 80.


World, and Recognition of Communist China, just to name a few of the many.

At this time the author wishes to extract quotes from newspapers, magazines and other sources which reflect the attitudes generated by the present policy of the United States toward China.

The editor of The Nation concludes that:

One searches in vain for some rationale; it can do no better than ascribe "the utter folly of our China policy" to an obsession suffered by Mr. Dulles.\(^{35}\)

The editorial page of the Commonwealth, a Catholic publication, summarizes the China policy as "confusion, misrepresentation and irresponsibility.\(^{36}\)

The Atlanta Journal and Constitution stated that "it is now time to put aside the foolish hopes that Chaing Kai-Shek will ever be able to regain the Mainland, and treat Communist China as the controlling and representative government of the Chinese people."\(^{37}\)

The United Church Observer asserts that Dulles is the enemy of the United Nations and the United States.\(^{38}\)

These quotations are but a few of the many that have grown and will continue to grow from the present United States policy toward Communist China.

\(^{35}\)Editorial, The Nation, November 5, 1959, p. 5.

\(^{36}\)Editorial, Commonwealth, September 19, 1958, p. 3.


CHAPTER IV

ISSUES FOR DECISION

Admission and Recognition.—Any change in United States policy toward Communist China's admission requires objective and logical consideration of these basic issues: (1) is the problem of Chinese representation in the United Nations separable from the question of recognition, or in other words, is the question of admission separable from the question of recognition; (2) is a change of Chinese representation in the United Nations so likely to impair the security of the Western alliance that the alliance, including the United States, should exert every effort to prevent or delay consideration of this matter; and (3) what procedure should the United States adopt to implement a new policy toward Communist China?

Is admission of Communist China to the United Nations capable of being isolated from the question of recognition of the government of that nation? Either the issue of admission can or cannot be divorced from the question of recognition.\(^1\)

Arguments that the issues cannot be divorced (that recognition must also be considered) are these: (1) common criteria for both de facto recognition of a new government and its representation in the United

Nations are its ability to carry out international obligations and to maintain effective control over its national territory and population.\(^2\)

(2) Admission to the United Nations constitutes an involuntary step toward recognition of a new government, because all members of that organization, regardless of whether they voted for or against its admission, are under definite obligations toward that government.\(^3\)

(3) Approval of credentials of a representative by the General Assembly, Security Council, or any other United Nations organ necessarily implies that the credentials are held by the legitimate government of that member state. All members of the approving body are bound by this decision.\(^4\)

Accordingly, they violate their United Nations Charter obligations if they refuse to consider that government as the legitimate government of the member state concerned.

(4) Both representation and recognition indicate the political orientation of the granter; both involve physical, political, legal, moral and social considerations.

Arguments that the issues of admission and recognition are separable (hence, recognition need not be considered) are these: (1) Criteria for recognition are not the same as criteria for admission to the United Nations because the former are based on political considerations and also moral factors whereas the latter need not be based on these con-


\(^4\)Ibid., p. 12.
siderations.\(^5\) (2) It is an unquestioned fact that the government of a state is separable from the state itself. Under international law, recognition of a government is not requisite for that government to represent and bind the state it purports to bind. (3) By unbroken practice, the members of the United Nations have made it clear that a member government may vote to accept a representative of a government which it does not recognize and that such a vote does not imply recognition. The Federation of Malaya has declared its intention to favor Communist China's admission to the United Nations while at the same time, to withhold its recognition of that government.\(^6\) (4) Recognition is not essential for the conduct of business among member states in the United Nations. (5) Separation of the problem of representation from that of recognition, which is essentially a political question, would give the United States freedom to act. (6) Linking the two problems together is unfortunate from the practical standpoint and wrong from the standpoint of legal theory.\(^7\)

The reason why the General Assembly should vote to admit mainland China to the United Nations will now be discussed. Representation in the United Nations does not depend upon any numerical count of members of the General Assembly which recognize Mao's government, nor does it depend upon recognition of a government by the respective councils of the United Na-

\(^5\)Ibid., p. 14.

\(^6\)Newman, op. cit., p. 165.

\(^7\)Herbert Aptheker, "The United States and China," Political Affairs, XXXVII (October, 1958), 19.
tions. If this were so, continuing adjustments would have to be made in United Nations organs according to the recognitions, accorded by one government to another or to other governments, which are outstanding at any given moment. Recognition of a new government of an existing state is an individual and unilateral act which a member state may or may not accord as it chooses. Any argument, therefore, which holds that recognition is a condition of admission appears inadequate and inadmissible from both legal and practical considerations. The problem of Chinese representation in the United Nations should be divorced from the question of recognition and solved as a separate issue.

Mr. J. B. Godber, in a speech on December 12, 1960, stated:

When a foreign government is in obvious control of the territory it claims to govern, it should be recognized as the government of that country; and this is a purely practical matter and has nothing to do with the way that the government assumed power or the way it controls its people.

Recognition is regarded simply as a matter of acknowledging a fact. It is also a fact that Communist China is in complete control of China.

Admission to the United Nations is a step to be distinguished from that of recognition. It is legally possible for countries that recognize the Peking government to oppose its admission to the United Nations, whether because of its hostile attitude toward the United Nations

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9Ibid., p. 8.

10Arnold Brecht, "Fairness in Foreign Policy," Social Research, XXVII (March, 1961), 97.
in the Korean War or for other reasons. Britain, Pakistan and the Netherlands are among those countries that have recognized Communist China; but in 1960, they voted along with the United States to postpone the question of Chinese representation.

Western Security.——A second major issue is whether change of Chinese representation in the United Nations would so impair Western security as to induce members of the Western alliance to exert every effort to delay or prevent consideration of such change.

Arguments that consideration would jeopardize Western security and should be prevented are these: (1) Change of Chinese representation is a highly controversial issue requiring considerable time which should be devoted to other world problems. (2) Consideration of Chinese representation would not further the successful activity of the United Nations. Indeed, it would weaken that organization by widening the chasm between the Communist bloc and the Western powers; it would create difficulties and differences among the members of the Western alliance itself; and it would cause ill-effects among neutral and uncommitted nations. (3) Whatever can be said in support of consideration of this issue, consideration is not yet timely; in any event, "no" does not mean "never." (4) Avoiding consideration of the issue presents less risk than dealing with the substantive question of Communist China's admission concerning which existing

11 Ibid.

12 Aptheke, op. cit., p. 30.
differences are so grave, particularly between East and West, that both the United Nations and Western security would be adversely affected.  

Arguments that consideration is a lesser threat to Western security than further delay or continuance of the current deadlock (and hence the United States should not obstruct consideration) are these: (1) All issues considered by the General Assembly are controversial. The Assembly's prestige can ill-afford further delays, neither can its attention to other pressing issues. (2) The issue will not disappear simply because the General Assembly refuses to consider it. Rejection, or further delay, of consideration provides a basis for effectively hostile propaganda against the West, particularly the United States, and thereby increases tensions in the General Assembly. (4) Avoidance of a question involving a nation of the importance of Communist China is unrealistic and detrimental to the cause of world peace. (5) Inclusion of this item on the agenda of the General Assembly will help reduce suspicion and tension. Both sides to the issues could establish their cases before the world. The substantive view of the majority would be determined. Greater delay will cause greater embarrassment to those opposing the inevitable.

Since Great Britain and other members of the Western alliance are defecting from the United States' position, it appears that further avoidance of consideration of the question of mainland China's admission can only cause a greater, rather than a lesser, threat to Western security.

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13 Ibid., p. 32.
14 Brecht, op. cit., p. 98.
In 1953, the Western alliance under pressure from the United States placed embargo on trade with Communist China. Since then, businessmen in half a dozen leading nations in Europe and Asia are bidding to trade with China. For Britons and Norwegians, the path has been cleared by governmental action, abolishing special control over strategic shipments to the Chinese Communists. More than two hundred products, including industrial machinery, tractors, locomotives, and chemicals, are being shipped. More countries such as France, Germany, Italy and Japan are believed ready to follow suit. The United States still wants to keep the embargo going and is trying to put pressure on the members of the Western alliance to keep this policy. Also, more of the members of the Western alliance want to recognize China and vote for its admission to the United Nations. These problems constitute the greatest threat to Western security.

Accordingly, inclusion of this item on the General Assembly agenda should be permitted. Assuming that the substantive question of Communist China's admission soon will be considered by the General Assembly, what should be the United States' position?

Alternatives for the United States.--There appear four alternative courses of action confronting the United States. These alternatives are: first, continuation of the present policy of isolation and contain-


16Ibid.
ment. Secondly, the United States could continue its two-China policy which could take one of two forms: (1) keep the Nationalist Chinese Government merely to a seat in the General Assembly or (2) the converse of this, through approval of the respective Chinese governments by the respective organ or council of the United Nations.\textsuperscript{17} Thirdly, the United States could advocate seating both Chinese governments in the General Assembly, while seating another Asian nation in the Security Council in the place of the Nationalist Chinese Government. Finally, the United States could permit seating the Chinese Communist Government in all organs of the United Nations, while advocating the admission of Taiwan to the United Nations membership as an independent state.\textsuperscript{18} Each of these four alternatives merits evaluation.

\textbf{Continuing isolation.--}Arguments which support continuation of present United States policy of squarely opposing admission of the Communist Chinese Government are these: (1) Opposing admission is in the national interest of the United States. Admission would not benefit the non-Communist world, but it would benefit the Peking regime by enhancing its international prestige and facilitating its influence in international affairs. (2) Having branded the Communist Government as an aggressor in Korea, its admission now would be a confession of United Nations weakness which would reduce the prospect of future United Nations actions against

\textsuperscript{17}Brown, \emph{op. cit.}, p. 15.

\textsuperscript{18}Ibid., p. 17.
aggressors.19 (3) The Nationalist Chinese would be forsaken if the United States disavowed its opposition to admission of Communist China to the United Nations. Opposition to Peking's admission is consistent with both the Charter declaration that only "peace-loving" nations may become United Nations members and other United States policies as, for example, support of the Republic of Korea, not the Communist Government of North Korea; support of South Vietnam, not Communist North Vietnam; and support of the Federal Republic of West Germany, not the Communist regime of East Germany.20

The Asian nations that are actively supported by the United States and also the uncommitted Asian nations would suffer greatly by a favorable United States policy toward Communist China's admission. (4) United States' isolation of Peking serves the interests of the Chinese people, because it is a realistic response to the fact that the Communists are entrenched illegally on the mainland—a fact which neither calls for nor warrants Peking's representation in the United Nations.21

Arguments that the United States should abandon its policy of opposing admission of Mao's Government are these: (1) Admission should be considered and favored as merely a diplomatic technicality and as an act of moral judgment.22 (2) By isolating Communist China, the United States isolates itself in terms of influencing the direction of that nation.

With its admission to the United Nations, Communist China thereby will be

19Ibid., p. 20.
21Ibid., p. 173.
22Aptheker, op. cit., p. 47.
exposed to United States influence. Negotiations of Asian disputes require an institutionalized framework of which Communist China is a part. (3) There can be no effective agreements on disarmament, arms controls, or nuclear testing unless Communist China participates in their formulation and is bound by their terms.23 These are major practical and moral considerations ordaining United Nations membership of Communist China which override whatever moral principles the United States can claim in support of its policy of isolation and containment. Otherwise, Communist China, with its enormous population and resources, will be free to pursue a unilateral path toward world war and catastrophe. Though its admission would involve rights, it also would involve obligations and responsibilities. (4) Asian opinion overwhelmingly is against the United States opposition to admission, including Communist China, India, Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, and Cambodia.24 Outside of Taiwan, the United States' policy has been supported in the United Nations by only two populous nations, Pakistan and Japan, both of which are defecting, plus the smaller Asian states of Thailand and the Philippines.25

The policy of so-called continuing isolation is a useless and impractical policy that even John Foster Dulles realized. On December 4, 1958, in an address in San Francisco, he stated:

23Ibid., p. 49.
25Ibid.
We deal with the Chinese Communist regime whenever that is expedient. We do not pretend that it does not exist. We have been in almost constant negotiations with it for particular purposes, at Panmunjom, at the Geneva Conference on Indo-China, in bilateral negotiations at Geneva, and now at Warsaw.26

A "Two-China" policy.--The "Two-China" concept is designed as a means of obtaining international sanction for the perpetuation of the present division of the Chinese people into the separate political units.27

The arguments for the "Two-China" concept fall generally into two categories: (1) that it is "realistic" to establish formal diplomatic relations with those in actual control of mainland China and that it is inevitable anyway, sooner or later; and (2) that there are definite advantages to be gained from such a step, such as reducing tension in the Far East, influencing the Chinese Communist leaders, driving a wedge between Moscow and Peking or improving the relations between the United States and those Asian countries where a vocal element of the population is critical of present United States-China policy.

The arguments against the "Two-China" concept fall generally into two categories: (1) Seating of Communist China in the General Assembly inevitably would cause it to be seated in all organs of the United Nations, except perhaps the Security Council where possibly a


veto could bar its entry. (2) Such a concept would not serve the enlightened self-interest of the United States and its allies, especially Nationalist China. 28

The main flaw in the scheme, which invalidates the claim of "realism" advanced for it, is the fact that it has been vehemently denounced by both Peiping and Taipei. No Chinese leader on either side has given the slightest indication that it would be acceptable. 29

Another Asian nation.—A third alternative for United States policy is to propose seating both Chinas in the General Assembly, while seating another Asian nation in the Security Council in place of China. 30

Arguments favoring this course of action are these: (1) A question of preference between the Chinas for representation in the Security Council would be avoided; (2) The people who want Communist China in the United Nations would be pleased, and so would the United States; (3) Tensions created by the deadlock on the issue of Chinese representation thereby would be eased. 31 All of the tension between the Western Alliance over trade and recognition would be settled. Also, the deadlock over China and Formosa would be settled and both would be in the United Nations.

Arguments against this proposal are these: (1) Keeping Communist China, with its over 600 million population, out of the Security Council would produce no tangible benefits. (2) To eliminate Chinese representa-

29Ibid., p. 25.
30Ibid., p. 33.
tion in the Security Council would require a Charter amendment which would occasion further United Nations tensions and widen East-West differences. Once the Charter undergoes consideration for any revision, moreover, opportunity is provided for the Soviet attempt to replace the office of the Secretary General with a triumvirate secretariat, a proposal opposed by the West. Such a proposal could be defeated easily on a procedural basis and would be opposed by Communist bloc members. (4) Neither China, moreover, would tolerate such a solution. (5) Besides these objections, it is highly unlikely that agreement could be reached as to what other Asian nation, if any, should be seated in the Security Council.

It is a fact that the strength of Communist China is growing, and the present industrialization program will greatly increase China's independent basis for military power within a relatively few years. With Soviet assistance, Communist China's actual military power has already expanded to the point where China is clearly the strongest country in Asia.

The State of Taiwan.—A fourth alternative for United States policy is to permit the seating of the Peking Government in all organs of the United Nations as the representatives of China proper, while bringing pressure for the admission of Taiwan to the United Nations as an independent member state.

Many arguments support this alternative, as follows: (1) It represents a permanent solution which could gain the support of most member nations. (2) By permitting this course of action, the United States

\[32 \text{Ibid., p. 444.}\]
would avoid the embarrassment of being out-voted.\textsuperscript{33} (3) It provides an institutionalized framework for dealing with Communist China. Otherwise, the United Nations would remain handicapped as a forum and mediator with respect to Asian crises. (4) Solutions to other problems would be possible, such as a plebiscite in Korea, and an end to a state of war between Chiang's and Mao's regimes. (5) Taiwan could be admitted as a new member state or possibly the membership could be regarded as that of an already recognized government with a changed name. (6) Not only might the threat of aggression cease in the Taiwan Strait, but less justification for hostile propaganda would exist; and negotiations for disarmament, arms controls and the ending of nuclear testing would have greater opportunity for success. (7) The United States still could meet its treaty commitments in support of the integrity of Taiwan and the Pescadores, while continuing to withhold its recognition of Communist China.\textsuperscript{34} (8) Above all, this solution is geared to the political realities of Asia.

Arguments against such a policy are these: (1) The will and ability to resist communism in Asia would be further undermined. (2) South Korea, South Vietnam, and other Asian nations would be demoralized and would interpret such a solution as abandonment of their cause. (3) Admission of Communist China to the United Nations would vitiate, if not destroy, the United Nations as an instrument for the maintenance of world peace.

\textsuperscript{33}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 461.

\textsuperscript{34}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 464.
The Charter would become another scrap of paper in the pile of discarded international documents. If such a regime is judged worthy of United Nations membership, then the United Nations is not worthy of its Charter and its universal declaration of human rights. 35

To admit Communist China to all organs, while at the same time admitting the State of Taiwan to membership in the General Assembly, appears the most efficacious course of action for the United Nations, because it permits a political settlement in Asia which respects the integrity of Taiwan while advancing the cause of peace. 36 A two-thirds majority of the members present and voting in the General Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council would admit Taiwan, which Communist China would be expected to oppose. With permanent membership in the Security Council, Communist China could veto Taiwan admission. Therefore, a condition for Communist Chinese representation should be the admission of Taiwan.


36 Ibid., p. 174.
CHAPTER V

EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION

The problem of Chinese representation in the United Nations has become a political issue of the first magnitude, raising fundamental questions concerning the Organization and its future.

In 1950, a few months after Communist China came to power, our political leaders made statements to the effect that the Peking government was illegitimate. This government was wrongfully imposed upon the Chinese people by the Soviet Union and was likely to fall of its own weakness and moral corruption. None of these things are true.

The Mao regime is no more illegitimate than any government which comes to power through revolution. If this is not true, then all of the governments that have ever come into being by revolution including the United States, Russia, Cuba and France, to name a few, are all illegitimate. This government came into being through the help of most of the Chinese people.

The Mao regime was not imposed or even originally backed by any foreign power. In 1945, the Soviet leaders had little use for the Chinese Communists; they were, in fact, backing Chiang Kai-shek when the civil war

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2Herbert Aptheker, "The United States and China," Political Affairs, XXXVII (October, 1958), 19.
began; they switched their support only when they realized that they were backing the wrong horse. Until after the Chinese Communists had destroyed the flower of the Nationalist armies, they received far less help from Russia than Chiang Kai-shek obtained from the United States.  

Another favorite charge for keeping Communist China out of the United Nations is that she is not a peace-loving nation. Communist China's intervention in the Korean War is the cause of such a statement, but the facts actually proved opposite to the statement.

Regardless of one's views on the origins of the fighting in the Korean civil war, the fact is that China did not intervene until the United Nations forces, commanded by General McArthur, crossed the 38th parallel and drove well up towards the Chinese border. This was done despite President Truman's earlier pledge that it would not be done; it was done despite advice against it by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff; it was done despite, as Walter Lippman noted at the time, "the critical importance of Korea in the foreign policy of any Chinese government, no matter what its ideology." He had added that "in its geography, Korea is to China what Florida is to the United States."  

The attack north of the 38th parallel was undertaken although the Chinese Premier had told the Indian Ambassador that China would not tolerate having American troops in force so near its own border. He had

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3 Cited in Ibid., p. 15.
4 Ibid., p. 8.
5 Ibid.
added that this warning did not apply to South Korean troops since China acknowledges the existence of civil war in Korea, but it did apply to American troops.6

Our moral judgment, of course, is influenced by the attitude of the Mao regime toward us. This attitude has been hostile, and why not? What has our attitude been, if not hostile?

Our policy toward the Mao regime has been a hostile one, considering the fact that we interfered in a civil war. The United States has furnished Nationalist China with money, weapons and even our navy with the stated purpose of continuing war with Communist China. This fact would certainly seem to show that we are morally and legally wrong.

Not so long ago, President Eisenhower said that he did not think the American people would want to have anything to do with a regime "whose hands are dripping with the blood of American soldiers."7 Well, what about Germany? What about Japan? What former enemy's hands have not been dripping with our blood? Does the fact we have been at war mean that we must never make peace?

"Every nation is guided by self-interest, and does not support values which transcend its life, if the defense of these values imperils its existence. A statesman who sought to follow such a course would be accused of treason."8 These words of the theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr,

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6Ibid.


epitomize the attitude of most political scientists toward international problems such as recognition of new governments. Most of their discussion of such is set in the framework of political self-interest, or expediency, or utilitarianism. They are concerned with the results of their own country. But in this day of atomic bombs, missiles, rockets and other war-making objects, is it safe to follow such a policy and say it is in self-interest?

Since the United Nations is the only global forum for the peaceful settlement of disputes between East and West, continued refusal by the United States to recognize Communist China entails a calculated risk of war with a country of vast manpower resources. And, most important of all, it is pointed out that once Communist China becomes an atomic power, it might not accede to any controls for nuclear disarmament initiated by the United States or by the United Nations.9

As same test ban negotiations progress toward a possible agreement between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, our so-called "China policy" becomes as obsolete as George Washington's stand against "entangling alliances."10

It is now common knowledge that Communist China obtained its first nuclear reactor in June of 1958. The installation, which is of medium

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size, is located near Peking and is said to have the capacity to produce enough plutonium in a three-year period to permit an atomic explosion.\textsuperscript{11} China's Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, is reported to have stated that "any international disarmament agreement which is arrived at without formal participation of the Chinese People's Republic, or signature of its delegates, cannot, of course, have any binding effect on China." In the fall of 1959 after Khruschev's visit to the United States, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai gave notice that China "must have the right to participate in any important international issue which concerns her own interest or the interest of world peace."\textsuperscript{12}

On this issue, Communist China and United States leaders, such as Secretary of State Christian Herter and President Eisenhower, seem to be of one accord.

Secretary of State Christian Herter told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 21, 1960, that Communist China's participation is "inevitable" if a disarmament agreement between East and West is to be effective.\textsuperscript{13} President Eisenhower indicated a concurrence in this view at his March 16 press conference when he stated that the Chinese "will have to be taken into account" when disarmament agreements "come into the realm of practical negotiation and enforcement." All Western disarmament experts who have voiced opinions on the question share these views.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{11}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 56.
\textsuperscript{12}Cited in \textit{Ibid.}, p. 57.
\textsuperscript{13}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 55.
\textsuperscript{14}\textit{Ibid.}
What are some of the possible consequences of our present policy?

(1) Our present policy is enriching the Communist appeal to the African and Asian countries. Many of these countries believe that America is a country for whites only and associate this with our policy toward Communist China. (2) If the United Nations votes to admit Communist China over American protest, then it would be a slap in the face of the United States' position as leader of the free world. (3) It is expected in the future that more and more Western countries will follow the leadership of Britain and recognize, trade with, and vote for admission of Red China into the United Nations. It is also safe to say that in the future there will be much argument from American businessmen who also wish to trade with China. (4) There is a strong possibility that if the present policy is continued the United States may find itself in a war started by either Nationalist China or Communist China, and attack by either party would bring the United States into it because we have pledged ourselves to the defined Nationalist China. (5) Any treaties made on disarmament and atomic warfare would not be worth the paper they are written on, unless Communist China is a party to the treaty. The only sound place for such a treaty is in the United Nations, to which China has not yet been admitted. If any treaty is signed without them, it would be similar to taxation without representation; and we all know what happened to that situation.

In concluding this analysis, the problem dealing with the Chinese case must come to grips with at least three different modes of thinking. First, the statesman must ask the question of power: Can the United States afford to ignore the increasing strength of the Communist regime?
Second, the question of morality must be asked: Should the United States deal with an aggressor nation? And third, the question of law must be asked: Can the United Nations expect Communist China to obey an international law by which China itself is not recognized? Morgenthau maintains that the statesman, if he is a political realist, should maintain the autonomy of the political sphere and merely ask himself the question of power. 15

The United States must now recognize that by continuing to isolate Communist China it perhaps weakens its own world influence. The United Nations is not a league of the pure and politically moral; it is an international forum, an area of contact, and a valuable instrument for world social development—considerations, among others, which make universal membership desirable.

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