Some aspects of United States policy in Europe- 1945 to 1950

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SOME ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES POLICY IN EUROPE - 1945 TO 1950

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SOME ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES POLICY IN EUROPE - 1945 TO 1950

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CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN EUROPE

Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendship or enmities.

(From George Washington's Farewell Address)

George Washington's admonition to avoid European alliances has not or perhaps could not have been adhered to consistently. Thomas Jefferson and John Adams also urged this policy of avoiding "entangling alliances." Although in the popular mind the United States is pictured as having abstained from European Politics, this is not the complete picture. Since the inception of this Republic we have engaged in armed action with European powers six times.

According to Professor George H. Blakeslee, this policy of isolation urged by the "Founding Fathers" was based upon their belief that the European political system was different and opposed to that of the United States, and also the belief that the European powers were militaristic, monarchical, and constantly engaged in armed conflict or intriguing over the balance of power.

\[1\text{Isolationism in this paper means: Rejection of membership in the League of Nations; non-entanglement in the political controversies of Europe and Asia; non-intervention in the wars of those continents; neutrality, peace, and defense for the United States through measures appropriate to those purposes; and the pursuit of a foreign policy friendly to all nations disposed to reciprocate. This is practically the same definition as Professor Charles A. Beard uses in American Foreign Policy in the Making (New Haven, 1946), p. 17.}\]
The "Founding Fathers" seemed to have concluded, too, that the great distance between this country and Europe rendered European quarrels unimportant to us. Available evidence indicates that the "Fathers" were not adverse to "temporary alliances" that would benefit the United States.²

This Republic was born of an alliance with France. It is the opinion of Professor Blakeslee that the "Fathers" recognized the weaknesses of the young Republic, and held that alliances could further weaken and divide the nation. He asserts that the policy of isolation was meant to be temporary - until the institutions of this country had been consolidated.³

Concerning United States isolation and involvement in European affairs Professor Peter H. Odegard states:

...Our physical isolation from Europe and our cultural ties with European peoples have resulted in what can only be described as an American geopolitical paradox. We have combined a proclaimed policy of isolation with an actual practice of participation in world affairs. Except for the Crimean war we have been deeply involved in virtually every major European War...⁴

The American policy of "abstention" from European politics and her pre-dominance of interest in the Western Hemisphere was given expression by the Monroe Doctrine.⁵ American government officials held that the national interest could best be served by the young Republic concerning itself mainly

²George H. Blakeslee, Recent Foreign Policy of the United States (New York, 1925), pp. 15-20.
³Ibid., p. 21.
with commercial relations with Europe.

The war of 1793, between Great Britain and France, raised the question as to whether or not the United States was obligated under the treaties of 1778 to aid France. Washington's Cabinet seemed to have been divided over the issue, with some favoring aid to the former ally and others not favoring aid. When requested for an opinion by Washington, Alexander Hamilton replied that the interests of the United States were foremost:

...That there is a right either to refuse or consent, as shall be judged for interests of the United States...If there be such an option, there are strong reasons to show that the character and interests of the United States require that they should pursue the cause of holding the operation of the (French) treaties suspended...

A cautious foreign policy was necessary for the infant Republic if she were to survive and grow. Self-interest required the United States' policy of abstaining from European political involvement. A vast continent remained to be settled, and many other domestic matters attracted the United States' attention.

Mr. Paul Scott Mowrer, discussing isolation and cooperation between the United States and Europe, states:

Both means have been employed by us in the past, more or less in accordance with circumstances. We have remained isolated when it suited our interests, and we have cooperated when it suited our interest. Of the abstract

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6 Blakeslee, op. cit., p. 595.

arguments brought recently against cooperation, not one, in my opinion, can be successfully upheld.\(^8\)

The United States went about its task of conquering the vast interior and then turned attention to establishing hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. For all practical purposes, United States hegemony prevailed in this hemisphere by 1900.\(^9\)

American policy toward Europe before World War I was one lacking commitment to European politics and no expressed interest in showing its power in that area.\(^10\) This policy of "isolation" did not recognize the implications that a war in Europe would bring. The nature of the war of 1914 was different from the other colonial struggles that the world had witnessed in the past. The improved military technology caused this war to be the most destructive up until that time.

Upon the outbreak of hostilities President Woodrow Wilson issued the declaration that the United States would remain neutral.\(^11\) Underestimation of the nature and duration of the war is shown by President Wilson's statement:

\begin{quote}
A war with which we are having nothing to do, whose causes cannot touch us; or as he later phrased it, it looked like a natural raking out of the pent-up jealousies and rivalries of the complicated politics of Europe.\(^12\)
\end{quote}

\(^8\)Paul Scott Mowrer, *Our Foreign Affairs* (New York, 1924), p. 82.


The difficulties of maintaining neutrality in the twentieth century soon became apparent to Americans. As the struggle continued, it developed that the United States would have a decisive influence on the outcome of the war, whether she pursued a policy of intervention or non-intervention. Under the conditions existing at that time neutrality meant the right to trade with both the Central Powers and the Allied in all materials except certain contraband having direct bearing on military warfare.

Wilson envisioned the United States' role as that of assuming responsibility for mediating the dispute. He also insisted that the United States had an obligation to the rest of the world to remain neutral. "We are the mediating nation," the President stated; it was the country's duty to remain at peace so that it could exercise the full force of America — "the force of moral principle." Following his above-stated line of reasoning, President Wilson proposed a plan of a peace without victory which both sides rejected. The introduction of underwater craft into the war by Germany complicated the United States' position. The German's use of the submarine in sinking contraband carrying merchant vessels, as well as passenger-carrying vessels — resulted in the loss of American lives.

President Wilson sent a note to the German government demanding the cessation of unrestricted submarine warfare, April 6, 1916. The note

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13 Ibid., p. 91.
14 Ibid., p. 91.
15 Ibid., p. 92.
actually amounted to an ultimatum:

Unless the Imperial Government shall now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether.16

The German Government acquiesced, and until early in 1917, there were no serious incidents involving Americans and German submarines.

It is the opinion of this writer that Wilson's position was contradictory — he professed with pious statements that the United States should not become involved in the war — yet he did not prevent American citizens from traveling on belligerent vessels, although this could lead to hostilities between Germany and the United States. Another factor was that the Declaration of Paris, 1896, could not have possibly — not that it would have made a great deal of difference — regulated submarine warfare. Therefore, international law could not be cited concerning underwater craft.17

United States neutrality was further complicated by British violations of American vessels and the censorship of American mail. According to Samuel Bemis, American bankers and munition makers were enjoying a profitable business with the belligerents.18 We might add, in fairness to the bankers and munition makers, that other facets of the national economy were also profiting from the war.19 The fact was that the voices crying for an embargo were

16Ibid., p. 93.
17Snyder, op. cit., p. 27.
18Bemis, op. cit., p. 595.
19Ibid., pp. 600-603.
"lost in the din." There was also increasing sympathy in the United States for the Allied cause. Those favoring America's entry into the war on the Allied side cited as a reason the danger of a German victory to the security of America. Walter Lippmann, writing in 1943, stated that the other factors making for war would never have carried the day:

If a majority of the American people had not recognized intuitively, and if some Americans had not seen clearly, what the threatened German victory could mean to the security of the United States...20

William Jennings Bryan who resigned as Secretary of State over Wilson's position concerning the war was not alone in his belief that the United States' policy would lead to war.21 He insisted that selling munitions to the Allies, extending them financial credits, denying German submarines the right to attack contraband carrying marine craft, could not be construed as true neutrality. But the war advocates carried the day, and the United States entered the war on April 2, 1917.22

President Wilson declared that the struggle was not limited to self-interest on the part of the United States but also to promote liberty and justice. He stated:

...a universal dominion of right by such a concern of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free. To such a task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are and everything that we have,


21Ibid., p. 98.

with the pride of those who know that the day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace that she has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other.23

After the Allied victory over the Central Powers, Wilson saw his dream shattered — the dream of a world organization to keep the peace and make the world safe for democracy. Whether the United States Senate expressed the prevailing mood of American citizens in not sanctioning the League of Nations Covenant is not known, but the United States returned to the policy of "isolation" in matters of Europe which were not visualized as being in the interest of the United States.

The punitive Treaty of Versailles, United States' rejection of the League Covenant, and the violations of the Covenant by Germany, Japan and Italy, paved the way for World War II.24 Lloyd George, in his memoirs, held that the Treaty of Versailles might have ushered in a long era of peace had the post-war leaders grasped the opportunity.25

The early withdrawals from the League weakened it considerably and also subsequent failure to take effective action against Italy in her campaign against Ethiopia. The League could restrain small powers but had little, if any, control over large powers.26

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26Schuman, op. cit., pp. 218-225.
The lack of support for the German Republic by America, Britain and France aided in Hitler's march to power in Germany. According to some sectors of opinion, it seemed that England and France wanted a favor from Adolf Hitler—that he would prove to be an effective block to the Soviet Union.\(^{27}\) After 1929, Americans were involved in a grave domestic struggle (the great depression) and domestic problems absorbed their attention.\(^{28}\)

So, with impunity, Adolf Hitler systematically destroyed the Treaty of Versailles, later attacked and occupied other countries of Europe, thereby precipitating what later became the Second World War. The United States, following her steps in World War I, declared her neutrality. Neutrality legislation was passed by the Congress in 1935 and amended in 1936 and 1937.\(^{29}\) The Neutrality Acts prohibited in time of war between foreign states or of civil strife, "United States exportation of arms, ammunitions, or implements of war, as defined by the President's proclamation, to any part of such belligerent state, or to any neutral port for transshipment to, or for the use of, a belligerent country."\(^{30}\) Loans and credits were also prohibited to belligerents by American nationals. The 1937 Neutrality Act gave the President discretionary power to forbid the export of other materials to belligerents. The Neutrality Acts also covered other actions by this country that might involve it in war.\(^{31}\)

\(^{27}\) Ibid., p. 257.
\(^{28}\) Snyder, op. cit., pp. 40-41.
\(^{29}\) Bemis, op. cit., p. 666.
\(^{30}\) Ibid., p. 667.
\(^{31}\) Ibid., pp. 667-669.
It is no doubt true that President Franklin D. Roosevelt recognized the dangers involved in remaining aloof from the struggle against the Axis. Professor Beard suggests that the President sensed the prevailing isolationist mood of public opinion; therefore, he treaded carefully. The Roosevelt Administration attempted, between 1936 and 1941, to awaken the American citizens to the danger of totalitarianism.

Hitler and Mussolini were aware of the isolationist sentiments in the United States. As a result, Roosevelt's warnings and appeals were largely ignored by them. Actually the Neutrality Acts, when applied to Ethiopia and the Spanish Civil War, helped the Fascists cause by also denying aid to the victims of aggression. As Italian and German armies attacked France, Mr. Roosevelt declared:

On this 10th day of June, 1940, the hand that held the dagger has struck it into the back of its neighbor... In our American unity, we will pursue two obvious and simultaneous courses; we will extend to the opponents of force the material resources of this nation, and at the same time, we will harness and speed up the use of those resources in order that we ourselves in the Americas may have equipment and training equal to the task of any emergency and every defense. All roads leading to the accomplishment of their objectives must be kept clear of obstructions. We will not slow down or detour. Signs and signals call for full speed ahead.


Roosevelt was unable to shake loose the isolationist hold on the Congress until March, 1941. At this time the Lend-Lease Act was passed which provided for aid to the Allied powers.\textsuperscript{36} This appeared, at that time, to have been the eleventh hour for England.

Evidence seems to lend credence to the thesis of Walter Lippman that until 1945 the United States approached foreign affairs with the main ideas of provincial America. These were the ideas held before America became a Great Power. These ideas, he contends, are the traditional and fundamental themes of American foreign policy now called isolationism.\textsuperscript{37}

That the United States has been traditionally aloof from European affairs when those affairs were not in her interest, there is no doubt, but that aloofness precluded cooperation is a myth. The term American abstention from Europe is really at best a half-truth, for we have involved ourselves in European affairs many times. In this writer's opinion the reasons for the United States not having involved itself more frequently in European affairs, as cited in this paper, are the following: (1) A large interior to settle; (2) all of the Americas to establish hegemony over; (3) four thousand miles of ocean between it and Europe; and (4) enlightened self-interest.

The fruition of Wilson's dream of a United States exercising world leadership had to await the aftermath of the great holocaust — World War II.

\textsuperscript{36} Leonard, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 261.

CHAPTER II

UNITED STATES-SOVET RELATIONS SINCE 1945

An understanding of United States-Soviet relations since 1945 requires some knowledge of the relationship prior to that date.

The American Government welcomed the overthrow of the corrupt and tyrannical Czarist regime. According to Professors Richard Snyder and Edgar Furniss, the establishment of a "so-called" democratic government by Kerensky in March, 1917, would render public opinion more favorable to America's entry into World War I on the Allied side. United States participation could then be described as a crusade by the democratic governments to eliminate tyranny.\(^1\)

In a move designed to strengthen the Kerensky government, and keep it in the war against Germany, the United States advanced cash and credits to it.\(^2\)

Professor Frederick L. Schuman asserts that by October, 1917, the Kerensky government had lost most of its political support, and the support of the army and navy.\(^3\) It seemed that America's Ambassador Francis underestimated the following and strength of the Bolshevik Party. On the morning


\(^3\)Ibid., p. 91.

of November 7, 1917, the Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, proclaimed the overthrow of the Kerensky government.⁵

The Communist rulers of Russia signed a separate peace treaty with the Germans, published the secret treaties of 1915-16, which, among other factors, exposed the "war to end wars" as a war for markets and repudiated the war debts and pre-war obligations to foreign creditors and the confiscation of all foreign-owned properties and investments.⁶ The above, coupled with an appeal for workers of the world to revolt, sent a chill through the Western Powers. Professor Schuman states:

...When the Allies failed to respond to Trotsky's overtures for general peace negotiations, he published, out of the Tsarist archives, the 'secret treaties' of 1915-16, which even the most casual reader could interpret as meaning that the sanctimonious 'war to end war' and 'make the world safe for democracy' was in fact a war for markets, spheres of influence, annexations, and the other customary stakes of 'capitalistic' power politics...⁷

The appeal for workers of the world to revolt stated:

The army of the Russian Revolution derives its strength from countless reserves. The oppressed nations of Asia are as eager for the fall of the regime of capitalistic oppression as are the oppressed proletarian masses of Europe. To fuse these forces in a world revolution against the imperialistic bourgeoisie is the mission of the Workers' and Peasants' Russia. The flame of the Petrograd November Revolution will inevitably grow into a fiery hurricane that will strike to the ground the sword of this piratic war and turn the dominion of capital to ashes.⁸

The Soviets also appropriated two million rubles to promote international

⁵Schuman, op. cit., p. 90.
⁶Ibid., p. 95.
⁷Ibid., p. 95.
⁸Ibid., p. 96.
Within the Soviet Union the situation was one of confusion; Ukrainians, Reds, Whites, Czechs, and Germans were fighting battles on several fronts. United States policy-makers were unable to decide what course of action to take against the menace of Communism. United States policy-makers wanted to "strangle" the Soviet Union at its birth. On the other hand, many United States policy-makers felt that the Reds would not be able to win the struggle against its combined opposition.

According to George F. Kennan, Wilson was opposed to American troops being used to aid in defeating the Bolsheviks. It seems that Wilson handled the problem unwisely by failing to consult the allies after reaching a decision to intervene. Instead he made an agreement with the Japanese to go into Siberia jointly. After the United States informed the allies of its decision to dispatch troops, the latter also sent troops. The manifested purpose for sending troops was the evacuation of the two Czech divisions and to prevent the Japanese from gaining control of the area. The record, as presented by Major General William S. Graves, who commanded the eighty-five hundred American troops dispatched to Siberia, does not bear this assertion out. He stated:

The only logical conclusion one, who was present in Siberia during the intervention and knew the sidelights, can come to is that the main reason for intervention was not made

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10Schuman, op. cit., p. 94.

11George F. Kennan, The Decision to Intervene (New Jersey, 1958), pp. 405-08.

12Schuman, op. cit., p. 110.
public. The action of the representatives of the allies, as well as that of the Consul General of the United States, justifies the belief that all allied and associated nations had in mind to check the spread of Communism when troops went to Russia. As a further proof of this statement, there was and is a widespread belief, in the United States, at least, to this effect. After the Armistice there was no effort made to conceal the fact that allied troops were trying to destroy bolshevism. As a matter of fact, this was the only logical reason that can be advanced for keeping foreign troops in Siberia.13

It is no doubt true that the allied command wanted the Czechs evacuated to fight on the Western front. After the Soviet Union signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk ending its part in the war with Germany, the Czechs were not serving any useful purpose in the war effort.14 The combined efforts of the Allies, perhaps, could have disposed of Lenin, but the war and lack of agreement among the allies on a definite plan of action resulted in Lenin's victory.15

The foreign policy of the United States toward Russia in 1918 was one of isolating her from other European states and non-recognition.16 The policy of non-recognition of the Soviet government continued until 1933. The Soviet government exhibited its hostility toward the United States and other capitalist nations. This hostility was very evident by the formation of Communist parties in other countries — parties that pledged primary allegiance to the Comintern, which had its headquarters in Moscow.17

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13 Major General William S. Graves, America's Siberian Adventure (New York, 1931), pp. 192-95.
14 Kennan, op. cit., p. 137.
15 Ibid., pp. 408-429.
16 Snyder and Furniss, op. cit., p. 581.
17 Ibid., pp. 580-81.
A number of American businessmen established relations with the Soviet government — as soon as the Soviets could gather a few rubles — prior to recognition. Americans responded to the relief program during the Russian famine of 1922. The above factors and the low trade level of the depression made recognition less difficult for the Roosevelt Administration on November 16, 1933. Recognition in 1933 had been long overdue. Even before 1933, it had become apparent to Western statesmen that the Communist regime was not going to be overthrown. Non-recognition was delayed partly by the Wilsonian concept of applying moral criteria to recognition.

From 1933 to 1939, the United States and the Soviet Union carried on fairly normal relations. Relations between the two countries became strained in 1939. After the Soviets signed a non-aggression pact with Germany which enabled Hitler to attack and destroy Poland and turn his armed might upon Britain and France. The Soviets in turn invaded Finland — which fought the mighty Red Army to a standstill for a while — and finally occupied the little country. This aggression on the part of the Soviet government created an unfavorable attitude in the United States.

The Soviet leaders had expressed fear and concern about the rise of fascism, hence their support of the League of Nations. It is generally

18 Schuman, op. cit., p. 166.
19 Ibid., p. 146.
21 Schuman, op. cit., pp. 163-64.
agreed that the Soviet-German rapprochement was made by the Soviet government to buy time for the coming struggle with the Germans. 22

In June, 1941, Hitler attacked the Soviet Union; this placed American foreign policy in a difficult position. Should the United States offer lend-lease assistance to the Soviet Union? Many high-ranking diplomatic and military leaders predicted that the powerful Wehrmacht would conquer the Russians in perhaps ten weeks. 23 Why not increase shipments to Britain rather than waste them on Russia? The Roosevelt Administration made the decision to send lend-lease to the Soviet Union and the British government was in agreement. The goal was to defeat Germany and any help was welcomed. The formal agreement among America, Britain, and Russia climaxed in the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942. 24

The Soviet Union suffered greatly from the invading German Army. On the morning of June 22, 1941, Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister informed the Russian people:

Today at 4 a.m., without any claims having been presented to the Soviet Union, without a declaration of war, German troops attacked our country...This war has been forced upon us not by the German people, not by German workers, peasants, and intellectuals, whose suffering we well understand, but by the clique of bloodthirsty Fascist rulers of Germany...This is not the first time that our people have had to deal with an attack of an arrogant foe. At the time of Napoleon's invasion...our people's reply

22 Ibid., p. 286.
23 Snyder, op. cit., p. 584.
was War for the Fatherland... The Red Army and our whole people will again wage victorious war for the Fatherland...  

It is estimated that the Soviet Union suffered at least a ten per cent loss in population and many billions in property damage. It is also estimated that the Soviet Union incurred heavier losses than the combined losses of all other belligerents of World War II. Perhaps this can, in part, explain the Russian attitude after World War II.

Much is made of the war-time disputes between the United States and the Soviet Union, but little (understandable in the present climate) is said of the cooperation of the two. We can point to the cooperation of the two countries, the United States and the Soviet Union. Both fought Hitler to total defeat. They also agreed on lend-lease, the undesirability of a Polish-Czech federation, Teheran, and the awarding of honors by the Soviet Union to American officers and vice versa. The United States and the Soviet Union cooperated in many other ways that are not necessary to list here.

Admittedly, there were many war-time disputes between the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States was not allowed to see Soviet battle plans; the Russians wanted lend-lease supplied in greater quantities, a

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27 Schuman, op. cit., 298-305.

second front in Europe, and refused any invasion route except across the English Channel. The Soviets were suspicious of the Allies and they wondered whether the West wanted the Germans to inflict as much damage as possible. The Russians received the brunt of the Wehrmact from June, 1941, until June, 1944. The landings in Italy in 1943, and Africa in 1942, were not regarded as a second front.

The United States' ambassador in Moscow charged (March 8, 1943) that the Soviet government was keeping the Russian people ignorant of the scope and magnitude of United States aid. The above disputes and the myth circulated in Russia that the Red Army and its equipment alone turned back the German tide contributed much to postwar tensions between the two countries.

The United States was not without fault. It withheld military and political information from the Soviets. And the abrupt termination of the lend-lease program to Russia did not make matters better.

It seems that after Germany's defeat became apparent, the Soviet leaders began political planning for dominating Eastern Europe. The "underground" groups in Europe which were dominated by communists began attempting to seize the governments in their respective countries. These were the countries freed of German Armies. Conversely, Americans subordinated the winning of

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30 Ibid., pp. 811-813.
31 Ibid., p. 815.
32 Snyder and Furniss, op. cit., 585.
33 George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950 (Chicago, 1951), p. 76.
34 Berle, op. cit., pp. 102-08.
the war to political considerations. There was considerable alarm over the political activities of the Soviet armed forces and pro-Soviet groups; hence the Yalta conference was called. Roosevelt wanted political considerations to wait until after the war.

The end of World War II, in 1945, saw the return of power politics. The United States emerged as the strongest nation on earth militarily and economically. The Soviet Union, although suffering heavy losses in life and property at the hands of the Wehrmacht, emerged the second greatest power. The post-war power struggle between East and West hinged upon the provisional character of the status quo. The considerations are primarily political in nature; Germany, the Eastern European countries, and other problems.

Hans J. Morgenthau states that there are three logically possible answers to the question of the real issue between the Soviet Union and the United States: (1) No real political issue separating the two, just propaganda and suspicion; (2) World revolution to which the Soviet Union is irrevocably committed; (3) Russian imperialism, which is used for world revolution by the Soviet Union.

This writer follows practically the same line of reasoning as George F. Kennan on the primary cause of the differences between the Soviet Union and

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35 Ibid., p. 106.
36 Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 384.
the United States:

...The next fact we must note is the congenital and deep-seated hostility of the Soviet regime to the older and larger countries of the Western World, and particularly to the United States. There has been much argument as to what caused this hostility: whether it was a preconception of the communist movement or whether it was something provoked by western policies toward the Soviet regime in the years of its infancy. Actually, both factors enter in, but the more important of the two has been by far the ideological prejudice entertained by the Soviet leaders long before they seized power in Petrograd in 1917....

The "Cold War" and the nature of the ideological struggle will be dealt with in the following chapter.

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CHAPTER III

THE "COLD WAR" AND SOME AREAS OF TENSION

There are at the present time two great nations in the world, which started from different points, but seem to tend toward the same end. I allude to the Russians and the Americans...Their starting-point is different and their courses are not the same; yet each of them seem marked out by the will of heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe.

Alexis De Tocqueville in Democracy in America

At the end of World War II, in 1945, the United States emerged as the strongest nation on earth, militarily and economically. The Soviet Union, although suffering heavy losses in life and property at the hands of Wehrmacht, entered the world stage as the second most potent power after World War II.

Many in the West held high hopes that the Soviet Union would cooperate with other nations to create a world of peace through the United Nations. This was not to be. It became apparent in 1946, that the war-time agreements between the allies had been expressed in such vague terms that they were left open to a number of interpretations, including contradictory ones.

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2Ibid., p. 55.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt knew in March, 1945, that the Soviet Union was taking over in Poland and Rumania contrary to the United States' interpretation of the Yalta pledges. As early as January 6, 1945, President Roosevelt made the following prophecy:

We delude ourselves, if we believe that the surrender of the armies of our enemies will make the peace we long for. The nearer we come to vanquishing our enemies, the more we inevitably become conscious of differences among the victors.

The split between the Soviet Union and the West was brought into the open by the failure to arrive at a peace settlement. In September, 1945, the foreign ministers of the victorious nations met in London to begin work on an Italian peace treaty. The principal opponents, V. M. Molotov, Soviet Foreign Minister, and James F. Byrnes, United States Secretary of State, could not agree on procedural matters. After three weeks of futile negotiations, the meeting was adjourned. Three subsequent foreign ministers meetings and more than a year after the Second World War, the Paris peace conference met. At this meeting five peace treaties were drafted, they were the Hungarian, Bulgarian, Rumanian, Finnish, and Italian.

The United States temporary monopoly of the atomic bomb, bomber bases within striking distance of the Soviet Union, the halt of lend-lease shipments, and the failure to lend the Soviets 6,000,000,000 dollars added to

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4 Ibid., p. 858.
6 *Bailey*, *op. cit.*, pp. 858-859.
7 Ibid., p. 859.
Soviet distrust of the United States.\textsuperscript{8} Perhaps the first indication that the Soviet Union was gaining advantages by acting unilaterally was her actions in Eastern Europe. The events of World War II in Europe laid the foundation for Soviet influence in Eastern Europe after the war. The Yalta Declaration on liberated Europe attempted to reach some agreement between Russia and the Western powers which would leave the liberated countries free to determine their own governments.\textsuperscript{9} By this agreement the United States, Britain, and Russia were to "consult together" on measures taken in the liberated countries. Free elections were to be held in these liberated countries under the supervision of the three great powers.\textsuperscript{10} With the Soviet army in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania, governments friendly to the Soviet Union were set up. Although there were no Red army troops in Yugoslavia, Marshal Josip Broz Tito followed a pro-Soviet policy. The fall of the Czechoslovakian government in 1948 completed Soviet subjugation of the Eastern European countries, Professor John G. Stoessinger asserts:

\begin{quote}
\ldots During the last two years of the war, preparations were worked out for the satellization of eight Eastern European countries. In carrying out this objective, the Soviet Union operated in three stages: first, a genuine anti-Nazi resistance coalition was to be formed with existing socialist and peasant parties;
\end{quote}

\begin{thebibliography}{11}
\bibitem{8} Ibid., p. 858.
\bibitem{9} Frederick L. Schuman, \textit{Russia Since 1917} (New York, 1957), p. 311.
\end{thebibliography}
second, the Communist Party would attempt to split the opposition parties by exploiting regional and ethnic jealousies, thereby transforming the coalition into a bogus alliance controlled by the Communist Party; and finally, a coup d'état would establish complete Soviet control.12

The Soviet Union had also reverted to its pre-war policy of world revolution which added to postwar tensions between Russia and the West. The War had weakened Britain and France to the extent that they could not provide European leadership.13 The economies of the two countries were near exhaustion. The United States, then the most powerful nation, was forced into a position of leadership.14 Whether she wanted it or not the United States had the mantle of leadership thrust upon her. American foreign policy had to assume a new role, that of major concern in European politics.

As the expansionist policies of the Soviet Union became apparent the deterioration of the United States' military power became a cause for grave concern to foreign policy makers. The United States had quickly demobilized her armed forces after World War II, so that in July, 1946, she had just above one and one-half million men in the army.15 On the other hand, the Soviet Union had about six million men in the army and her aircraft industry had undergone re-tooling. The feeling in the West can perhaps best be shown by the two extreme positions taken, one by Sir Winston Churchill, speaking in

12Ibid., p. 51.


15Dulles, op. cit., p. 222.
Fulton, Missouri, March 5, 1946:

From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. All these famous cities and the populations around them lie in the Soviet sphere and are subject, in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and increasing measure of control from Moscow. Athens alone, with its immortal glories, is free to decide its future at an election under British, American and French supervision...If the Western democracies stand together in strict adherence to the principles of the UN charter, their influence for furthering those principles will be immense, and no one is likely to molest them...If the population of the English-speaking Commonwealth be added to that of the United States, with all that such cooperation implies in the air, on the sea, and in science and industry...there will be an overwhelming assurance of security...Fraternal association requires not only growing friendship and mutual understanding between our two vast but kindred systems of society, but the continuance of the intimate relations between our military advisers...It should carry with it a continuance of the present facilities of all naval and air force bases in the possession of either country all over the world.16

He concluded by saying: "Neither the sure prevention of War, nor the continuous rise of World organization will be gained without...a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States."17 This position called for an organized bloc outside of the United Nations to halt Soviet expansion. Mr. Wallace took the position which has been called the "soft" line—which was an effort toward understanding between the super powers18


18Dulles, op. cit., p. 228.
he stated:

...Enemies of yesterday and false friends of today continually try to provoke war between the United States and Russia...On our part, we should recognize that we have no more business in the political affairs of Eastern Europe than Russia has in the political affairs of Latin America...Under friendly competition the Russian world and the American world will become more alike...Russia must be convinced that we are not planning for war against her and we must be certain that Russia is not carrying on territorial expansion or world domination through native communists...19

This position asserted that some blame for the "Cold War" fell to the United States and that agreement was possible if confidence between the two parties could be restored. We must hasten to point out that Mr. Wallace's position was not the policy of the Truman administration. In fact, Secretary of State James Byrnes felt that the official position of the United States was being undermined at the Paris Peace Conference.20 According to Professor Frederick L. Schuman, Mr. Truman had endorsed Secretary Wallace's speech but after the storm broke over the speech Mr. Truman said he had only supported Mr. Wallace's right to make the speech.21 On September 20, 1946, Secretary Wallace was asked to resign.22

Soviet controlled regimes in Eastern Europe brought to realization an age-old Slavic dream.23 And the Soviet Union was now in control of half of

19 Reitzel, op. cit., p. 90.
21 Ibid., p. 353.
22 Ibid., p. 353.
23 Ibid., p. 309.
Europe and the "Power" on the continent. Ironically enough, the doctrine of "unconditional surrender" aided in Soviet mastery of half of Europe.24

Professor Schuman takes the position that American policy-makers were blinded by "legalistic moralistic abstractions," and were unable to face the issue until too late.25

Churchill understood the implications of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and sought to check or limit Soviet aggrandizement by opening the second front through the Balkans. Both Moscow and Washington vested this idea.26 Churchill then worked out an agreement with Joseph Stalin, whereby the British would not be excluded completely from the Eastern European countries. Discussing British influence in Eastern Europe with Stalin, Churchill relates the following:

...Let us settle about our affairs in the Balkans. Your armies are in Rumania and Bulgaria. We have interests, missions, and agents there. Don't let us get at cross-purposes in small ways. So far as Britain and Russia are concerned, how would it do for you to have ninety per cent predominance in Rumania, for us to have ninety per cent of the say in Greece, and go fifty-fifty about Yugoslavia? While this was being translated I wrote out on a half-sheet of paper:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Others</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(in accord with USA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>50-50%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>50-50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>50-50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Others</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

24 Ibid., p. 309.
25 Ibid., p. 309.
26 Ibid., p. 309.
President Roosevelt and his advisors felt that political considerations should be dealt with after the war. And that all allied efforts should be directed toward winning the war. The Soviet policy-makers did not view the problem in the same light as the Americans.  

As indicated earlier Eastern Europe is one of the key points of conflicts between the Soviet Union and the United States. This area is a vital security zone for the Soviet Union. The United States has faced the fact that the Soviet Union has special interests in Eastern Europe, but does not accept the idea of complete Soviet domination in that area. American foreign policy-makers had hoped for free elections and governments by the majority in this area. Governments controlled by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe posed a threat to the democratic regimes in Western Europe and ultimately to the United States. Viewing the problem of Eastern Europe through the eyes of the Soviets one arrives at a different conclusion. The Soviets feel that the interests of the United States are not crucial in Eastern Europe and the area does not concern the United States.

George F. Kennan places the blame, in part, for the Eastern European problem on the manner in which the war was allowed to end. He states:

28Stoessinger, op. cit., p. 51.
30Ibid., p. 545.
31Ibid., pp. 545-547.
32Ibid., pp. 545-547.
I would know of no basic issues of genuine gravity between Russia and the West other than those arising directly from the manner in which the recent World War was allowed to come to an end. I am referring here particularly to the fact that the authority of a United German government was expunged on the territory of Germany itself and throughout large areas of Eastern Europe, and the armies of the Soviet Union and the Western democracies were permitted to meet in the middle of this territory and to take control of it before there was any adequate agreement among them as to its future permanent status. This was of course, the combined result of the unconditional surrender policy, which relieved the Germans of all responsibility for the future status of this area, and the failure of the allied governments to arrive at any realistic understandings among themselves while the war was on. Since it has not been possible to reach such understandings subsequently, except in the case of Austria, the provisorium flowing from these circumstances had endured. It is this that we are faced with today.33

Thus, a power vacuum was created in Eastern Europe by the demise of Germany and here again, the Western powers and Russia ran into the problem of words and their meanings.

The question of a German peace treaty, according to Kennan, stands at the center of United States - Soviet tensions.34 Allied with the matter of a German peace treaty were the problems of reparations, and the rearmament of Germany. From all indications, the fall of Germany in the Spring of 1945, found the United States without a definite official policy for that country.35 At the Quebec meeting in 1944, the then Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, revealed the so-called "Morgenthau Plan" for Germany. This plan proposed that Germany be stripped of all industrial plants, that the Ruhr coal

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33George F. Kennan, Russia, the Atom and the West (New York, 1957), p. 32.
34Ibid., p. 34.
35Chamberlain, op. cit., p. 581.
mines be closed, that Germans be used as forced laborers abroad, that the
country be dismembered and reduced to a pastoral economy. 36

Although the "Morgenthau Plan" had important supporters in Washington,
it was never adopted by the State Department. A few months prior to Germany's
surrender several decisions regarding the nation had been taken at Yalta. They
were:

...The Russo-Polish boundary was fixed at roughly the
Curzon line and Poland was promised "substantial ac-
cessions of territory in the North and West; Germany was
divided into separate zones of occupation coordinated
by an allied control council in Berlin; France was ad-
mitted as the fourth occupying power; broad principles
of disarmament and denazification were agreed to; war
criminals were to be punished; and Germany was to be
assessed reparation in kind for damages inflicted.
German industry that could be used for military pro-
duction would be eliminated or controlled.... 37

The Yalta proposals above clearly advocated destroying the industrial power of
Germany and thereby weakening the economy. Joint Chiefs of Staff 1067 served
as occupation policy for the American Zone until superseded in July, 1947. 38

At the Potsdam Conference of July 17-August 2, 1945, attended by Truman
and Byrnes, Stalin and Molotov, Churchill and Eden, Clement Attlee and Ernest
Bevin joined the meeting after the Labor party victory in England - Soviet
and Western views clashed head-on. 39 The differences between East and West
were brought more into the open. 40 The essential provisions of the Potsdam

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36 Ibid., p. 581.
37 Ruhl J. Bartlett, The Record of American Diplomacy (New York, 1947),
p. 663-664.
38 Chamberlain, op. cit., p. 582.
39 Schuman, op. cit., p. 313.
40 Dulles, op. cit., p. 223.
accord may be summarized as follows:

Germany was to be disarmed and demilitarized completely; war criminals were to be punished, and Nazi officials, party structure and doctrine were to be destroyed. Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union agreed on the 'elimination of all German industry that could be used for military production.' Every effort was to be made to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for Germany's peaceful cooperation in international life. The victors looked toward the decentralization of the political structure and the development of local self-government based on democratic principles; all democratic political parties with rights of assembly and public discussion were to be permitted. Representative and elective principles were to be introduced in regions, provinces, and States. Central German administrative departments were to be established to direct certain essential economic activities on a nation-wide basis; finance, transportation, communication, foreign trade, and industry. Freedom of speech, press, religion, and trade-unionism were to be guaranteed in each zone. During the period of occupation Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit; common economic policies were to be evolved by the Allied Control Council in Berlin. Production of war materials was prohibited and production of metals, chemicals and machinery 'rigidly controlled and restricted to Germany's approved postwar peacetime needs.' Excess productive capacity might be used for reparation purposes. Proceeds from German exports were, in the first instance, to pay for imports.41

The three great powers agreed at Potsdam that their reparations claims would be taken from German external assets in their control and from the removals of capital equipment in the respective occupation zones.42 The Soviet wanted, in addition to capital equipment and plant removals, reparations out of current production. The United States resisted the Soviet's demands for raids on current production which would require deliveries of food and raw materials into the western zones at Western expense.

41 Chamberlain, op. cit., p. 582.
42 Ibid., p. 583.
What were the initial purposes of United States occupation of Germany? At the beginning the problem was viewed primarily as one preventing Germany from reorganizing and traveling the path of an aggressor nation. The United States and Great Britain were cognizant of the importance of the German economy to that of the European economy. No so with the Soviet Union, she was concerned with the reconstruction of her economy and permanently weakening the economy of Western Europe. Perhaps the Soviet position concerning the German economy is best demonstrated by her demand for $10,000,000,000 in reparations, and this out of current production. Also the Soviet Union refused to account for many industrial plants removed from its zone to the Soviet Union. In essence the Russians - in violation of agreements made at Potsdam - devised its own plan for reparations and refused to treat Germany as an economic unit.

There were many problems in Germany that required some consultation among the officials in the four zones. These problems were: displaced persons, inter-zonal movement, refugees, expelles, and currency. In many cases the Russians refused to cooperate. The growing hostility between East and West as well as the inability to reach mutually satisfactory agreement within the Allied Control Council, caused the United States to chart a different course in Germany.

On September 6, 1946, Secretary of State Byrnes in a speech at Stuttgart, Germany outlined the change in United States policy toward Germany. He

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43 Reitzel, op. cit., p. 143.
44 Dulles, op. cit., p. 227.
45 Reitzel, op. cit., p. 144.
asserted:

The United States is firmly of the belief that Germany should be administered as an economic unit and that zonal barriers should be completely obliterated so far as the economic life and activity in Germany are concerned. The condition which now exists in Germany make it impossible for industrial production to reach the levels which the occupying powers agreed were essential for a minimum German peacetime economy. Obviously, if the agreed levels of industry are to be reached, we cannot continue to restrict the free exchange of commodities, persons, and ideas throughout Germany.\textsuperscript{47}

This "new approach" involved joining the American and British zones and later the French sector in a tri-zonal arrangement.\textsuperscript{48} This policy shift was also due to lack of progress on a German Peace treaty. Peace treaties were concluded with Italy, and the "captive" countries of Eastern Europe, but the Council of Foreign Ministers could not agree on peace treaties for Austria and Germany.\textsuperscript{49}

The intransigency of the Soviet policy-makers led to the decision of the United States to establish a West German government. A civilian occupation government replaced the military occupation administration, and later administration was given to the West German government.\textsuperscript{50} In view of East-West differences, and the expansionist designs of the Soviet Union, it was inevitable that the idea of rearming West Germany would occur to American policy-makers.

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., p. 355.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., p. 350.
\textsuperscript{49} Dulles, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 229-231.
\textsuperscript{50} Leonard, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 351.
On September 4, 1950, John J. McCloy, United States Commissioner for Germany, stated:

In some manner, in some form the Germans should be enabled, if they want to, to defend their own country. It seems so difficult to say to these people that you can't share in the defense of your country if you're attacked. If that sounds like rearmament then it's rearmament.51

The French objected to the rearmament of West Germany. The French did not want Germany's rearmament without controls, for a rearmed Germany, with no strings attached, would place France's "Old enemy" in a position to dominate Western Europe.52

The French were aware that they could not block West German rearmament indefinitely, especially in view of the military weakness in the other Western European nations, and the pressure from the United States to accept the plan.53 In order to get the best possible deal out of German rearmament, French diplomats tied approval of the Schuman and Plenen plans to German rearmament.54 The Schuman plan called for a merger of Western European steel producing facilities. The Pleven Plan consisted of the assimilation of West German units into a European army.55 West German leaders took the position that if the West wanted West Germany rearmed, West Germany should be given sovereign status.

52 Ibid., p. 703.
54 Ibid., p. 152.
55 Snyder, op. cit., 703.
Three elements were involved in West German rearmament: a European army, a merger of West European steel-producing facilities, and the resumption of full sovereignty by Germany. After many months of negotiation the rearmament of West Germany was approved by the United States, France and Britain.

The Soviet Union vigorously protested the West's action in Germany. Soviet counter-action to the West policy in West Germany included the Berlin blockade (June, 1948 to May, 1949), the establishment of a German state in her zone, and the consolidation of her control in Eastern Europe.

The Soviet Union next applied pressure to West Berlin, which is deep within the Soviet Zone of Germany, causing a threat to peace in June, 1948. The Russian military authorities cut off all supplies by road, canal, and rail, thus isolating West Berlin. The allies had agreed that the city of Berlin would be divided into four zones, each to be occupied by one of the four great powers, a governing body, composed of four city commandants selected by their respective commanders-in-chief, would be organized to direct its administration jointly. It appears that the Western powers did not take into consideration the military implications of their location in Berlin. Western military authorities did not attempt to acquire a written agreement pledging Western personnel access to Berlin.

57Ibid., pp. 156-157.
This effort on the part of the Russians to force the Western powers out of Berlin was met by bold counter-action. General Lucius D. Clay, American Commander, asked permission to send an armed convoy into the Soviet zone. This recommendation was turned down. American policy-makers decided to oppose Soviet power politics in the city by airlifting 8,000 tons of supplies per month to the two and one-half million people. The Berlin blockade created a highly critical situation, in fact, American military planners seriously discussed the possibility of war with the Soviet Union. President Truman indicated that the idea of withdrawing from Berlin had or would not be considered. The Berlin blockade was lifted in May of 1949.

The Berlin airlift demonstrated that the United States was determined to block Soviet expansion and aggression. The question is often asked "What is the importance of Berlin?" Militarily it is of little or no value but politically it serves as an outpost within the "iron curtain," and perhaps as long as Western forces remain in this enclave, Berlin will serve as a symbol for the future unification of Germany.

Another area of tension between the United States and Russia included the demands placed upon Turkey by Russia in 1946. The Soviet Union notified the Turks that the twenty-year-old Treaty of Friendship and neutrality between the two countries was terminated. Foreign minister Molotov informed the

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61Chamberlin, op. cit., p. 95.
62Ibid., p. 96.
64Ibid., p. 241.
Turkish ambassador that Turkey could have a new treaty if she agreed to the following demands:

1. Cession to the Soviet Union of the Turkish districts of Kars, Ardahan, Artvin, near Russo-Turkish border in the Caucasus. These had been acquired by the Russians in 1878 and returned to the Turks after World War I.

2. Revision of the Montreux convention governing the Straits. The Russians wanted a new regime administered by the Black Sea powers (Russia and Turkey) with third-nation interest eliminated.

3. Lease to the Soviet Union of strategic bases for naval and land forces in the Straits for "joint defense" purposes.

4. Abandonment by Turkey of her British associations and the conclusion of a treaty similar to those the Soviets were concluding with their Balkan Satellites. 66

The Turks, with the knowledge that the United States would support their position, refused these demands. The Soviet Union also addressed notes to the United States and Great Britain concerning her demands of Turkey. President Truman and his advisers agreed that the Soviet proposals be rejected regardless of the consequences. 67 The United States' reply to the Soviet Union stated:

It is the firm opinion of this government that Turkey should continue to be primarily responsible for the defense of the Straits. Should the Straits become the object of attack or threat of attack by an aggressor the resulting situation would constitute a threat to international security and could clearly be a matter for action on the post of the Security Council of the United Nations. 68

66 Ibid., p. 62.

67 Ibid., p. 61.

68 Ibid., p. 64.
The Soviet government reacted to the refusal of Turkey to accede to her demands by moving troops along the Russo-Turkish border, diplomatic pressure, and a barrage of propaganda. Following the now familiar pattern of "cold war chess," the United States ordered a task force to the Mediterranean Sea. American authorities felt that accession to Soviet proposals would lead to communist control of Turkey and thereby open a gateway to the Middle East for further Soviet expansion. In the face of Western opposition the Soviet Union backed down.

In Greece Soviet interest and Western security clashed. Communist control of Greece would flank the Straits and open the way to Soviet influence over Turkey and Italy. Greece was in a critical condition as a result of the military defeat administered at the hands of the German war machine and four years of occupation. After World War II a group of communists led guerrillas sought to bring Greece into the Soviet sphere of influence.

The Greek problem was further complicated by the desperate condition of its economy, and whether the Greek government enjoyed popular support.

In February, 1947, the British government gave Washington notice that she would no longer be able to support the Greek government, economically or militarily, in the bitter civil war. This action by the British would leave the area open for further Soviet penetration into the Eastern Mediterranean.

69Ibid., p. 62.
70Ibid., p. 65.
72Ibid., p. 146.
73Ibid., p. 147.
and the Middle East. The British notice also applied to Turkey. It was under these pressures that Mr. Truman went to Congress requesting 400 million dollars to aid Greece and Turkey in their struggle against communism. President Truman requested the aid on the grounds that it promoted the security of the United States. Congress approved the request. In 1948, a report of the United Nations special Balkans Committee stated that "Greek guerrillas had received war materials and other supplies from Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, and that the rebels had been allowed to use the territories of these countries for tactical retreats from Greece." The Greek rebels were defeated with the assistance of the Military Aid Program and remedial internal measures taken by the Greek government.

The Middle East is also a point of contention between the "Super Powers." The changed status of Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the creation of Israel invited power politics between the East and West. This region is caught up in the anti-colonial revolution, and is striving for self-expression. After shaking off the chain of colonialism these countries are not economically or militarily able to defend themselves against the advances of a great or strong power. The region is rich in oil and supplies about 80 per cent of the oil for Western Europe. The region has thus become

74 Dulles, *op. cit.*, p. 111.
76 Ibid., p. 148.
77 Jones, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-77.
78 Chamberlin, *op. cit.*, pp. 613-615.
another facet of the East-West struggle, strategic and economic.\textsuperscript{80}

After the wane of British influence in the area the United States took the leadership of preventing Soviet control. The first case the United Nations was called upon to settle involved the Western powers and the Soviet Union. The dispute concerned the refusal of Russia to withdraw her troops from Iran.\textsuperscript{81} The sovereignty of Iran had been guaranteed by the Teheran accord.\textsuperscript{82} The Soviet Union attempted to establish autonomy for the province of Azerbaijan which borders the Soviet Union, and also pressured Iran to join the Soviet Union in a petroleum exploitation deal on Iranian territory.\textsuperscript{83} America aided Iran by extending credits and military advisers and weapons. Russia finally withdrew its troops from Iran and eased the pressure.\textsuperscript{84}

A major area of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union is disarmament, both conventional and nuclear. The possession of nuclear weapons by the "Super Powers" raised the possibility of the extinction of man as a form of life on earth. Below Philip Noel-Baker describes Hiroshima shortly after the city was devastated by an atomic bomb in 1945:

People are still dying, mysteriously and horribly - people who were uninjured in the cataclysm - from an unknown something which I can only describe as the atomic plague. Hiroshima does not look like a bombed city...I write these facts as dispassionately as I can, in the hope that they will act as a warning to the world. In this first testing ground of the atomic bomb...it gives you an empty feeling in the stomach to see such man-made devastation...I could

\textsuperscript{80} Chamberlin, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 615.

\textsuperscript{81} Dulles, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 227.

\textsuperscript{82} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 227.

\textsuperscript{83} Brookings Institution, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 153.

\textsuperscript{84} \textit{Ibid.}, 153.
see about three miles of reddish rubble. That is all the atomic bomb left...The Police Chief of Hiroshima...took me to hospitals where the victims of the bombs are still being treated. In these hospitals I found people who, when the bomb fell, suffered absolutely no injuries, but now are dying from the uncanny after-effects. For no apparent reason their health began to fail. They lost appetite. Their hair fell out. Bluish spots appeared on their bodies and then bleeding began from the ears, nose and mouth. At first, the doctors told me, they thought these were the symptoms of general debility. They gave their patients Vitamin A injections. The results were horrible. The flesh started rotting away from the hole caused by the injection of the needle and in every case the victim died. A peculiar odour...given off by the poisonous gas still issues from the earth soaked with radioactivity; against this the inhabitants all wear gauze over their mouths and noses; many thousands of people have simply vanished - the atomic heat was so great that they burned instantly to ashes - except that there were no ashes - they were vaporised.85

The hydrogen bomb now out-ranks the above described atomic bomb in destructive capacity. The problem of disarmament has occupied the thinking of statesmen and policy-makers since 1945.86

The United States proposed in 1945 some form of international control over the development of atomic energy. And that this energy be channeled into peaceful uses. The United States stated its willingness to share atomic energy secrets if proper safeguards concerning inspection and control could be established.87 According to the United States proposal, the United Nations would have the responsibility of seeing that atomic energy was used for

86 Ibid., p. 344.
87 Dulles, op. cit., p. 225.
peaceful purposes, after adequate measures for control and inspection had been enacted. Bernard Baruch, American representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, presented the formal proposal which also provides for elimination of the veto in matters concerning the illegal manufacture of atomic bombs. The Baruch Plan also called for an international authority that would own all atomic plants and would have the powers of licensing, accounting, and inspection. At this time the United States alone had the bomb.

The Soviet Union countered the Baruch proposal with a plan which sought the destruction of all existing nuclear weapons and legal restrictions against their future manufacture. After the destruction of all nuclear weapons and a treaty outlawing atomic weapons, the Soviets would then approve international inspection. The obstacle in this case appears to be one of priorities. The United States insisted upon international inspection and control of atomic energy prior to the destruction of existing nuclear weapons and the Soviets wanted disarmament first and control later. The failure to achieve disarmament is centered around mutual distrust between the super powers.

According to Professor John G. Stoessinger the matter of priorities still obstructs disarmament agreement. He stated:

The United States and the Soviet Union have both agreed that a variable disarmament treaty would have to include provisions for the prohibition of nuclear weapons as well as acceptable arrangements for control. The Soviet Union has consistently defended the priority of prohibition in numerous "ban the bomb" proposals. The proposals have been unacceptable to the United States,

88 Ibid., p. 225.
89 Stoessinger, op. cit., pp. 350-351.
90 Ibid., pp. 350-351.
which fears that the Soviet Union would not accede to control once prohibition is accepted...Should this occur, the United States would find itself confronted by the combined land armies of the Soviet Union and Communist China...without an atomic bomb...The Soviets regard international inspection as a form of espionage.91

The nuclear stalemate also hopelessly deadlocked the prospect of limiting conventional armaments. Today the super powers - with lesser powers attempting to get nuclear power - are engaged in a massive nuclear race of which the outcome is uncertain.

91Ibid., pp. 351-352.
CHAPTER IV

EMERGENCE OF A STRATEGIC CONCEPT

As American foreign policy-makers became aware of the aggrandizement motives of the Soviet Union, the question arose, in what manner should Soviet moves be combatted. In the search for a policy to counter Soviet expansion United States policy-makers had to consider the military, political, and economic capabilities of the United States. Also of paramount importance was the traditional content of American foreign policy as it relates to Europe and the world. Then too, the ideologies of the two super-powers had to be taken into consideration.

With the expansionist design of the Soviet Union made abundantly clear, how did the United States stack up militarily against the Soviet Union? At the end of World War II, American armed forces were rapidly returned home, and Congress cut appropriations for the military.¹

This action placed American policy-makers in a dilemma; how to play the role of a leading world power without the military force that is very essential to translate foreign policy into action.² The army was reduced from eight million to two million men by July, 1946. This small army held positions in Europe and the Far East. Out of the 218 combat air groups in 1945, only two worthy of the name remained in 1947. The manpower of the navy was reduced

from 3.4 to 1.6 million by 1947. As indicated above, the United States' forces were weak. The one major advantage held by the United States was that of the atomic bomb. This atomic monopoly by the United States was estimated at that time to be good for at least seven years.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union had six million men under arms and an effective air force. Information also indicated that the Soviet aircraft industry was re-tooling in order to build newer and better planes. Compulsory military training was also in effect in the Soviet Union which enabled it to keep its armed forces in a state of effectiveness. American military planners estimated that if the Soviet Union so desired, it could over-run all of Europe, except possibly Great Britain.

What is the nature of the ideological clash of the two super-powers as it relates to the power struggle? In the Soviet Union the notion is held that capitalism is basically "evil" and that it will inevitably be destroyed. The Soviets feel that they are the only direct heirs of Karl Marx and thus the only "truly" socialist nation. The Soviet Union and the United States represent two different political, economic and social systems. There is a thread of innate antagonism between capitalism and socialism. George F.

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3Reitzel, op. cit., pp. 89-91.
5Reitzel, op. cit.
6Ibid., p. 100.
7George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950 (Chicago, 1951), p. 95.
8Ibid., p. 95.
Kennan asserts:

The first of these concepts is that of the innate antagonism between capitalism and socialism. We have seen how deeply that concept has become imbedded in foundations of Soviet power. It has profound implications for Russia's conduct as a member of international society. It means that there can never be on Moscow's side any sincere assumption of a community of aims between the Soviet Union and powers which are regarded as capitalism. It must invariably be assumed in Moscow that the aims of the capitalist world are antagonistic to the Soviet regime and, therefore, to the interests of the peoples it controls. ...[^9]

Today, we find western democratic ideology on the defensive. This is a reversal of the early position of democratic ideology.[^10] Communism attempts to equate western democracy with fascism, that is, fascism is indigenous to the social, economic, and political structure of the West.[^11] Communism's appeal is not limited to any particular race or ethnic group nor to a certain geographic area. It is not dependent upon a particular form or structure of government. It may also be an underground organization, or a major political party appealing to the people. Communists may utilize subversion and sabotage to win control.[^12]

Finally, Communist ideology is much more difficult to combat than fascism because of its broad base of appeal. Its dogma is sophisticated and offers something to practically everyone: the dialectic to the intellectual, better conditions for the worker, humanitarianism and equality in the future.

[^9]: Ibid., p. 95.
[^12]: Ibid., p. 592.
for the democrat. As Professor Stoessinger states, it offers a coherent secular religion:

The dictator becomes God, the only God for that matter; and the Party becomes the Church. As a variant, collective leadership becomes a sort of Trinity. The central committee and the local leaders take care of polytheistic needs. The parallels could be pressed further. The point is that all essential mundane elements of religion except the Virgin Mother are represented.¹³

And to further compound the problem the Soviet Union lays claim to the terminology of the Western Democratic Nations: equality, liberty, popular rights, sovereignty, and democracy.¹⁴

The foregoing demonstrates that the Soviet Union has at its command foreign policy instruments that vary greatly from traditional foreign policy devices. If this is true, then it follows that the search for a policy presents a difficult problem for planners in an attempt to counter Soviet moves. Now this writer is not implying that ideological considerations are the central themes in the cold war struggle, but that ideology plays a major role.

We will briefly examine the political and economic conditions of the major countries in Western Europe at the emergence of the policy of containment. In 1947, Great Britain's economy was very weak. The heavy damages inflicted on the British during the war began their telling effects.¹⁵ American policy-makers knew that the economy of Great Britain was essential to the recovery of Western Europe. The loan of 1946 proved to be only a shot in the

¹⁴Snyder, op. cit., p. 592.
¹⁵Frederick L. Schuman, Russia Since 1917 (New York, 1957), p. 357.
arm for the British economy. In France and Italy the conditions were similar, except in these two countries the largest communist parties outside the Soviet Union existed. There was danger that the communist parties would take over power in France and Italy, thereby opening the floodgate of Communism to Western Europe. The United States, after the War, had made a large number of loans and grants to England, France, and Italy. Also the United States provided the bulk of the four billion dollars spent by UNRRA to aid war-torn areas. It became apparent in 1947, that the piecemeal progress, being employed, would not solve the economic problems of the above named countries. Some long range plans that would get at the root of Western Europe's economic ills had to be placed in operation. This was part of the problem for American policy-makers if Europe was to be saved from Communism. America took the lead in attempting to mobilize the countries of Western Europe against communist control. This was a struggle for political power, and a struggle between incompatible ideologies. The stakes involved not only national security but also whether Western type democracy would continue to exist in Western Europe.

It was against the backdrop of the above-stated forces that a strategic concept was developed. According to William Reitzel, Morton A. Kaplan, and Constance G. Coblenz, the high level conduct of foreign relations, as in the

16Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Tides of Crises (New York, 1957), pp. 112-114.
17Ibid., p. 287.
19Ibid., p. 230.
20Ibid., p. 230.
high level planning of "organized violence," a pattern of objectives and policies cannot be reoriented without the development of a parallel strategic concept. This is an "agreed view on how to proceed; in which places, by what means, at what times, and in what order." A strategic concept involves policy decisions, that is, a set of rules to guide future conduct within a set pattern of objectives. Decision makers agree on a definite set of rules for the interpretation of anticipated events, for the solution of recurring problems and also for guidance in the selection of objectives and techniques for future action. Out of the strategic concept grew the policy of containment. The containment policy meant that certain acts of the Soviet Union would be regarded as detrimental to the interests of the United States, and therefore, would be opposed by positive acts by the United States. According to this policy the United States would confine the Soviet Union within its spheres of influence at that time.

The concept containment was publicly stated by George F. Kennan, writing under the pseudonym "X" in Foreign Affairs in 1947. Mr. Kennan held that the United States policy should be to "contain Soviet power by adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers

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22 Ibid., p. 99.
23 Snyder, op. cit., p. 98.
24 Ibid., p. 98.
of Soviet Policy." The United States' official policy now reflected the view that the United States and Russia had basically conflicting philosophies and that the world was divided into two camps.

The concept of containment was first given expression in the Truman Doctrine in March, 1947. The Truman Doctrine was first applied in Greece and Turkey. As cited earlier in this paper, the British government notified Washington in February, 1947, that she would no longer be able to support the Greek government, which was engaged in a civil war with local communists, economically or militarily. The fall of the Greek government to the insurgents would open the area to further Soviet expansion.

On March 12, 1947, President Truman addressed a joint session of the House and Senate of the United States concerning aid to Greece and Turkey. He stated:

...the gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my appearance before a joint session of the Congress. The foreign policy and the national security of this country are involved.... One aspect of the present situation...concerns Greece and Turkey...Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-respecting democracy. The United States must supply this assistance. There is no other country to which democratic Greece can turn. No other nation is willing and able to provide necessary support for a democratic Greek government. One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion....

Thus Truman gave the broad outlines of the Truman Doctrine, a policy that was radically different from traditional American foreign policy. This policy

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was the forerunner of even broader and more extensive foreign assistance. Through military assistance, economic aid and American military advisers, the Greek government was saved from Soviet domination.27

Secretary of State George C. Marshall, in a speech at Harvard University June 5, 1947, made public a new approach to the containment policy. This was the Marshall Plan, a massive plan aimed at the economic reconstruction of Europe. Secretary Marshall said: "It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically.... The initiative, I think, must come from Europe."28 It will be recalled that Western Europe at this time was dangerously close to economic collapse and it was feared that local communists would use this opportunity to take power.

The Marshall Plan called for an economic program for nations on both sides of the "iron curtain" to be jointly administered by the United States, France, and Great Britain and the Soviet Union. The objective of this plan was to rebuild a prosperous Europe.29 A conference was held in Paris to iron out details of the program. The Soviet Union's delegation did not agree with the plan and left the meeting denouncing the program as one of economic imperialism.30 The Soviets contended that the Marshall Plan was designed to relegate Europe to the status of an economic vassal of the United States. Thus the United States was saved from the problem of Soviet participation by

27 Ibid., pp. 67-77.
28 Reitzel, op. cit., p. 118.
29 Berle, op. cit., p. 112.
30 Ibid., pp. 112-113.
the Soviet walk-out. In view of the anti-Soviet climate of opinion in the United States at that time, it is doubtful whether the Congress would have approved the Marshall Plan had the Soviet Union been included.\textsuperscript{31}

The Marshall Plan or Economic Cooperation Act passed the Congress and went into effect April 3, 1948. Fourteen Western European countries accepted the Marshall Plan and agreed to establish the Committee of European Economic Cooperation (CEEC) to gather information and co-ordinate the policies of the participating countries. The four year program amounted to about twelve billion dollars in American aid. The European Recovery Program was not completely altruistic even from an economic point of view. This program extended the market for American goods and aided the economy of the United States.\textsuperscript{32} The program also served to raise the standard of living among the peoples of Western Europe and checked the advance of Communism.\textsuperscript{33}

The Marshall Plan, which was primarily economic, aided the participating nations in rebuilding their cities, put new machinery in factories, and a host of other things necessary to rebuild the economies of these countries. The program succeeded and, by 1955, the gross national product in most member countries had increased to a point well above the pre-war level.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{31}Snyder, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 685.
\textsuperscript{32}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 233.
\textsuperscript{33}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 233.
\textsuperscript{34}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 287-288.
The Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, (Marshall Plan) intended that:

1. The recovery of Europe as a whole was vital to world recovery and was a prerequisite for achieving the general aims of the United States commercial and financial policy.

2. In the interest of American security, strong measurements had to be taken to check the advance of Communism in Europe.

3. The Communist threat took the form of exploiting low standards of living and economic stagnation, rather than avert military aggression.

4. The most suitable way to counteract this form of threat was to use economic and financial resources.\(^{35}\)

There is little doubt that the Marshall Plan improved the economy of Western Europe and helped to prevent it from going Communist. This program also brought about a great deal of cooperation among the countries of Western Europe. An example of this is the European Payments Union (EPU) which enables trade to flow freely among the member countries.

American policy-makers felt that it was not enough to place Western Europe on its feet economically. They saw the need for some type of regional defense set up. After talks with the Brussels Pact members and Canada, the Truman Administration presented to the Senate the North Atlantic Treaty. President Truman reported that negotiations were proceeding and that:

The primary purpose of these agreements is to provide unmistakable proof of the joint determination of the free countries to resist armed attack from any quarter... If we can make it sufficiently clear, in advance, that any armed attack affecting our national security would be met with overwhelming force, the

\(^{35}\)Reitzel, *op. cit.*, p. 376.
armed attack might never occur.\textsuperscript{36} The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in July, 1948. This pact, which now includes fifteen members, provides for mutual defense and aid in case of attack. The North Atlantic Treaty was attacked by many on the grounds that it by-passed the United Nations, and sanctioned the commitment of United States troops to Europe.\textsuperscript{37} A group of senators opposed to alliances, attempted to amend the treaty against stationing United States troops in Europe, against furnishing arms, armaments, military, naval, or air-craft, and atomic information or bombs.\textsuperscript{38} The opposition lost and on July 21, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was approved by a vote of 82 to 13.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was found under Article 51 of the United Nations which authorizes regional pacts. There are indications that American policy has shifted the United Nations to a secondary role. Article five of the pact states:

\begin{quote}
The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic Area.\textsuperscript{39}
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[36]Ibid., p. 126.
\item[37]Berle, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 244.
\item[38]Reitzel, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 127.
\item[39]Ibid., p. 127.
\end{footnotes}
The North Atlantic Treaty was a clear break with tradition for the United States and its relation with Europe.

NATO also provides for economic collaboration among the member countries. The North Atlantic Council, in 1950, approved an integrated defense plan for the member countries. An elaborate land, sea, and air defense was set up on paper, but until this date it has not been fully realized. Some of the member countries have not made the necessary military contributions. The Mutual Assistance Act was passed in October, 1949. This Act provides one and one-half billion for the first year of the program. This appropriation provided the funds necessary to implement NATO. Funds to the NATO members would be released upon bilateral agreements with the requesting country to insure that the military planning satisfied the United States. The military spending in Western Europe also aided the economies, for example, aircraft contracts to build NATO planes were given to France. It also aided the economy of the United States. The explosion of the Soviet atomic bomb in 1949, and the hydrogen bomb in 1953, encouraged NATO members to greater effort.

The Soviets contended that NATO violated the Anglo-Soviet and French-Soviet treaties of 1942 and 1944, and was also a violation of the U. N. Charter. The Soviets then formed its counter-part of NATO, the Warsaw Pact.

With the charting of NATO extended, the strategy of containment to include the concept of collective security alliances. The methods and objectives of the strategic concept changes as the situations change. The goal is the same, to prevent further Soviet expansion.

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40 Ibid., p. 133.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND EVALUATION

In the years immediately following the Second World War the United States found that she could not depend completely upon the United Nations to insure peace in the world. America had to re-examine her entire conception of world affairs. Among other factors, the pressures of Soviet expansion, and the weaknesses of France and Great Britain, forced the United States into the position of world leadership. As the Soviet Union attempted to spread her influence beyond the areas held at the end of World War II, the United States sought to contain communism through economic and military assistance, collective defense agreements, and when necessary, military force.¹

Some sectors of American public opinion objected to these "entangling alliances." Some of the more extreme voices suggested that the Western Hemisphere did not need Europe for its defense, that it could stand alone in a sea of communism. Other "neo-isolationists" felt that United States defense outside the Western Hemisphere should depend upon naval and air power. The "new isolationists" stated that American policy in Europe was likely to cause war. Unlike the "old-isolationists," the "new isolationists" wanted the Soviet Union checked, or so they stated, but this group opposed programs designed to halt Communism's spread. The "new isolationists," a conservative

group, were led by the late Senator Robert A. Taft.²

The proponents of collective security struck back at their critics by attempting to show the calamitous results of a retreat by the United States from world responsibilities. President Truman and Secretary Acheson stated the security of the United States was dependent upon American commitment to Europe and that there could be no return to the past. Policy-makers pointed out that the job of safe-guarding peace and democracy had to be done by the United States and her allies in the West.³

In this work we have pointed up the paradoxical nature of the United States' isolationist policy toward Europe. Although George Washington and other "Founding Fathers" admonished the United States to stay out of European politics, this country has engaged in armed action with European powers six times. This writer's contention is that the United States has remained isolated when it served the interests of this nation, and cooperated when cooperation best served her interests. Some of the reasons the United States has not been involved in European affairs more frequently, are the following: (1) A large interior to settle; (2) all of the Americas to establish hegemony over; (3) four thousand miles of ocean between it and Europe; and (4) enlighten self-interest.⁴

We noted that some of the factors contributing to feelings of hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union were: (1) United States intervention in Siberia; (2) delayed recognition of the Soviet government by the

³Ibid., p. 233.
⁴George H. Blakeslee, Recent Foreign Policy of the United States (New York, 1925), pp. 15-20.
United States; (3) world revolution to which the Soviet Union is committed; (4) the sudden termination of lend-lease to the Soviet Union, and (5) ideological prejudices. No solutions to the problems between the super-powers appear at this time.

None of the major areas of tension between the Soviet Union and the United States has been solved. Germany is still divided, Berlin is still a "hot spot," and there is a deadlock on disarmament, plus a host of other problems.

In this writer's opinion, Europe is important in the East-West Conflict, for the most part, because of its great intellectual and industrial productivity. This area has also contributed much to the cultural heritage of the United States. Western Europe is still the "heartland" of Europe and will be fundamental in determining the outcome of the struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States. Another important factor in the United States' commitments to Western Europe is the matter of market areas. These areas of central and Eastern Europe, now dominated by the Soviets, were formerly outlets for manufactured goods from the West.

As a result of the lessons of two world wars, and radical development in military technology, the United States has been forced to alter its foreign policy. After World War II, the balance of power concept was discarded. There was no third state or combination of states that could equal the power of the United States or the Soviet Union. The radical change in military technology saw the development of atomic weapons, guided missiles,

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the alteration of sea power, and the increase in fire power and mobility of land troops. Greater dependence was also placed upon air power. The shift to "global responsibilities" in American foreign policy thinking was facilitated in some degree by Soviet actions in Eastern Europe, Berlin, and other areas.\(^6\)

It is unquestionable that the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, NATO, and the Mutual Assistance Program have helped to prevent Western Europe from falling into the Soviet orbit. Although containment, as envisaged by the United States, is essentially a negative policy, it prevented Soviet domination of Western Europe. This writer feels that the concept of containment can be formulated into a bold imaginative policy that will take the initiative away from the Soviet Union. This could be done by not waiting until an area is threatened by communism to act. Organizations such as the Common Market in Europe could be supported by the United States in other areas. The Alliance for Progress is a case in point. The United States allowed the communists to gain a foothold in Latin America before acting. An imaginative policy of containment would attempt to support governments in troubled areas that are democratic or at least pressure the officials of the particular governments into social, economic and political reforms. Basic reforms would insure more United States aid reaching the masses in the particular countries.

Barring some dramatic settlement between the United States and the Soviet Union, such as military disengagement from Europe by the United States and mutual withdrawal of Soviet and Western forces from Germany, American foreign policy in Europe will continue to be a cancer.

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