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U.S. reaction towards U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia from 1965-1977: an analysis

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ABSTRACT

Political Science

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B.A., University of Nebraska, 1977

U.S. Reaction Towards U.N. Sanctions Against Rhodesia
From 1965-1977: An Analysis

Advisor: Dr. Shelby Lewis

Thesis dated: May, 1981

This is a study of American reactions to United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia 1965-1977. It examines in particular the reaction of four American administrations (Johnson, Nixon, Ford and Carter) towards Ian Smith's minority regime.

The study is based on a review of the literature in books, journals and newspapers on American policy towards Rhodesia and the entire Southern Africa Sub-Continent.

Chapter I looks at the theory of sanctions, defines and looks at conditions under which economic sanctions will be effective or ineffective.

Chapter II presents a chronological account of American reactions to U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia under the Johnson administration, following the 1965 Unilateral declaration of Independence. It traces the growing gap between the Johnson administration's anti-minority regime rhetoric
and its more limited anti-Smith action.

Chapter III looks at American reaction during the Nixon and Ford years. This chapter is called the "Kissingerian Period" due to the dominance of the Secretary of State in international affairs, and it traces the shift in American rhetorical support of U.N. sanctions to a policy of "Communications" and contact with the racist minority regime of Southern Africa.

Chapter IV examines the changes in the Carter administration from "Communications" to a return of rhetorical support of United Nations Sanctions on Rhodesia.

Chapter V illustrates American complicity in the erosion of U.N. sanctions by U.S. corporations. It also lists and discusses sanction breaking activities by U.S. government.

Chapter VI, concludes that the major differences in these four administrations were rhetorical. The Carter and Johnson administrations appeared to support sanctions but offered no concrete support against the illegal minority regime in Rhodesia. In the "Kissingerian Period" there was actual opposition to sanctions. The study thus concludes that the United States under all four administrations was consistently committed to preserving the status quo in Rhodesia.
DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my parents who have taught me to cultivate knowledge that endures. And who's guidance, love, encouragement and help made a few of the rough places in life a little easier to absorb.
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INTRODUCTION

When Ian Smith issued his Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 most experts foretold speedy disaster for his regime. Britain, with Commonwealth co-operation, can strangle Rhodesia's economy over a period of months argued the New York Times. The Economist was equally certain in predicting Rhodesia's economic demise:

The trade and financial sanctions imposed in November and December are now making their impact on the ordinary white Rhodesian family, the journal claimed barely two months after U.D.I. White Rhodesians have begun to lose their jobs. In another month or so, many small businesses will start going to the wall. If the rebellion survives to the end of March (1966), which it just might if the rebels are determined to hold out to the last drum of petrol...then nearly 10 percent of Rhodesia's white wage and salary earners could find themselves out of work.2

Smith's position was indeed so desperate that London should make the first move in starting talks, so as to offer Salisbury a graceful way to surrender. Smith's challenge to the world was the equivalent of throwing a lighted fuse into

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2The Economist, January 8, 1966, p. 83.
a powder magazine. Unless speedily extinguished the illegal Rhodesian regime would produce a terrible explosion. Race war might break out, with horrendous consequences.

Successful Rhodesian resistance was inconceivable. How could a white population numbering barely 220,000 people, fewer than the inhabitants of a provincial town in England, maintain their rule over nearly 5 million Africans—much less take on the world at large? Portugal was too weak to help, South Africa too frightened of its own internal troubles. Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies alike, argued a well known—American Sociologist in a book first published in 1965, were already near collapse, within five years at the most revolutionary change would probably come to South Africa itself.4

On the face of it, these predictions seemed reasonable enough. In 1966 Rhodesia was largely dependent on foreign commerce. Something like 35 to 40 percent of its gross domestic product derived from exports, of which a large proportion went to the United Kingdom. Many of the Rhodesian goods sold abroad consisted of a few commodities like tobacco, whose origins purchasers could easily identify. Rhodesia had no domestic source of oil. The Rhodesian cur-

rency appeared subject to foreign pressure and might easily lose all its value in a runaway inflation. Rhodesia's military strength was minuscule by world standards. The Rhodesian wartime establishment amounted to two infantry brigades, some supporting troops, and an airforce with no more than five squadrons. Rhodesia's total defense expenditure was less than half of Ghana's barely more than one-sixth of Algeria's, and one twenty-eight of the military budget maintained by the United Arab Republic.5

There was also the intangible factor of morale. In Victorian and Edwardian days, academic and official opinion had commonly idealized the settler as the pioneer of empire and of middle class standards in the lonely veld. After the second world war, this ill-considered stereotype was replaced by another equally inaccurate one. The settler often became the prototype of the philistine, the parasite, or even the mentally aberrant. Rhodesia was supposedly run by 'the New Bourbon;' it was a land where 'the neurotics commanded the citadel.'6

The literary image of the settler in Africa, strangely compounded Old South and New Suburbia, probably helped to further distort power assessments concerning Southern Africa.


A handful of backvelders had ignorantly challenged the Queen's Government, the might of all independent Africa, the United Nations, world opinion, and the irresistible tide of history. But faced with real hardship or danger, they would soon collapse. Harold Wilson thus seemed well advised when he prophesied early in 1966 that the rebellion might end 'within a matter of weeks rather than months.'

For more than twelve years the Rhodesian economy did not cave in. On the contrary, the country's gross domestic product has grown despite the sanctions imposed on the territory by the United Nations.

Table 6.1 presents key indicators of how they changed in the first twelve years of sanctions, 1965-1977.

What has brought about this impressive refutation of the prophets' forecasts? To understand the reasons why international sanctions failed to bring down the Smith regime for twelve years, we look at the historical developments that led to sanctions. Again we see the crucial role that the Western World has played. It was Britain's attitude which led to the betrayal of Lobegula and which allowed, without an ounce of protest or a veto, the steady erosion of African rights. Again at the time of U.D.I. in 1965, Britain with the help of the United States, stalled, blocked pretended and did everything else possible to maintain the status quo.

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<table>
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<th>INDICATORS</th>
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<th>PERCENTAGE INCREASE</th>
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<tr>
<td>Tourist From Other Countries</td>
<td>208,725</td>
<td>244,404</td>
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<td>European Consumer Price Index (1964=100)</td>
<td>101.7</td>
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<td>Sales of Principal Crops and Livestock ($M)</td>
<td>124.2</td>
<td>305.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>European Owned Cattle (M)</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>145.9</td>
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<td>Mineral Output</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>168.9</td>
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<td>Index of Volume of Manufacturing Production (1964=100)</td>
<td>108.7</td>
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<td>Rhodesia Railways - new tons hauled (M. tons, 1968-77)</td>
<td>9,886</td>
<td>12,800</td>
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<td>Retail Trade Value Index</td>
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<td>266.5</td>
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<td>Imports (M.)</td>
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<td>274.2</td>
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<td>Exports and Re-exports</td>
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<td>328.5</td>
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<td>Gross National Income ($M; 1965 prices, 1965-77)</td>
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<td>Gross public debt ($M; central and local governments)</td>
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<td>Rhodesia Stock Exchange Index</td>
<td>118.3</td>
<td>375.1</td>
<td>217.1</td>
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</table>

in Rhodesia. In most other British colonial situations, they never hesitated to use force to put down "rebellions against the crown," as they did in India, Malaya and Kenya.

The Rhodesian Front Party had been making serious threats of U.D.I. since 1963, so the West knew what to expect. When British Prime Minister Harold Wilson met Ian Smith in Salisbury on October 29, 1965, he was kind enough to inform Smith of the kind of sanctions that would be applied against Rhodesia in the event of U.D.I. So Smith was well prepared for sanctions if they came, whereas Britain and the rest of the Western countries did not even have a plan of implementation when U.D.I. was declared. Sanctions were eventually implemented, slowly, voluntarily, and selectively, with plenty of warning to the Smith regime. Nor was there a time limit saying that if sanctions did not work in two years, some other method would be used. No provisions were made for policing or enforcing sanctions.

Ian Smith declared U.D.I. for the purpose of maintaining white supremacy in Rhodesia. Rhodesia under sanctions was an embarrassment to the Western World. The principals of democracy, which the Western World claims are the standard of "civilized" governments, was openly flouted in Rhodesia.

The United States on March 17, 1970 cast its first veto at the United Nations on a resolution that would have urged the British government to use force to crush the rebellion in Rhodesia and also to bring South Africa and Portugal to
comply with the international community by stopping their sanction busting activities, with Smith's illegal regime, the resolution also included severance of all communications and transportation ties between Rhodesia and the outside World.

Frederick S. Arkurst states that the relatively substantial economic and military strength of the United States in the contemporary world makes the development of American policy, and the perception of such a policy, of vast importance to every region of the world. American policy has a considerable impact even on peripheral states that are not major actors in world power politics, as these nations are affected in a significant way by American attitudes on various issues of international relations.

The Western Massachusetts Association of Concerned African Scholars tries to shed some light on how American policy in Southern Africa is geared towards maintaining white minority regimes, and, where this is not possible, creating neo-colonial regimes that will maintain the dominance of the white settlers in the economic sphere. The book states that the issue in Southern Africa is not simply white minority rule, although that rule is brutal and pervasive. What is at stake is the political-economic structure which condemns the Black majority of the region to a life of grinding poverty.8

8Western Massachusetts Association of Concerned African
The Western powers, led by the United States, have pro-
claimed their desire to help create "moderate" governments
throughout Southern Africa. They seek to avoid a fundamental
political-economic reconstruction-like that underway in Angola
and Mozambique-which alone could give Africans meaning access
to the rich resources of their nations. American policy-
makers explicitly seek to "reconcile the Black desire for
political power-which the Blacks will get with the white de-
sire for economic control...which they will retain."9

Julius K. Nyerere, in an article states that:

The hostility aroused by the Smith Declaration of
Independence is based on rational interpretation
of its purpose and its effects in relation to the
total legitimate goals of Africa. For this re-
bellion is not an uprising of the people, it re-
presents an attempt to expand the area, and
strengthen the hold in Africa of doctrines which
are inimical to the whole future of freedom in
this continent. It represents an advance by the
forces of racialism, fascism and indeed coloni-
alism in Southern Africa. To the independent
States of Africa this is not a development which
can be viewed with Olympian detachment. We are
on the frontiers of the conflict with these
forces and our own future demands their defeat.
And while the forces of colonialism and racism
remain on this continent none of us can really
be free to live in peace and dignity, or be able
to concentrate on the purpose of our political
revolution. The Smith Declaration of Independ-
ence presents a counterattack by these forces,
and it is in that context that Africa has re-
acted and demanded its defeat.10

Scholars, U.S. Military Involvement In Southern Africa
(Boston: South End Press, 1978), pp. 4-5.

9Ibid., p. 5.

10Julius K. Nyerere, "Rhodesia in the Context of Southern
Furthermore, Nyerere states that Western governments have declared their hostility to apartheid and their adherence to the principals of racial equality. They have frequently made verbal declarations of their sympathy with the forces in opposition to South African policies. But they have excused their failure to act in support of their words on the grounds of South African sovereignty. Africa has shown a great deal of skepticism about this argument, believing that it masked a reluctance to intervene on the side of justice when white privilege is involved. Now, in the case of Rhodesia, legality is on the side of intervention. What is the West going to do? Will it justify or confound African fears. He stated also that the West had refused to challenge South Africa and Portugal to stop supporting Ian Smith. The question of what to do if sanctions fail to bring down the illegal Smith regime is not tackled. Julius Nyerere concludes that despite legality and despite the protestations of belief in human equality, the domination of a white minority over blacks is acceptable to the West.

It is my objective to conduct an analysis of American reaction to United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia under four American administrations: from President Johnson


Ibid., p. 187.
10

(1965) to Jimmy Carter (1977). This research will look at policies of the various administrations from November 11, 1965 to December 1977. I am starting from November 11, 1965 due to the fact that this was the date that Mr. Smith declared Rhodesia independent, and I am stopping in December 1977, due to the fact that in early 1978 "moderate" African leaders were brought into the Smith government as a means to bringing about his own version of majority rule.

It is the objective of this research to look at the years in which the legal regime in Rhodesia was dominated by whites with no Black participation allowed in the franchise.

It is assumed by a number of people that these administrations had policies that differed from each other. This thesis seeks to examine this assumption and to determine if in fact significant policy differences existed among the administrations.

Immediately after Ian Smith declared U.D.I. mandatory economic sanctions were brought against the illegal regime by the United Nations. The ostensible aim of these economic sanctions was to topple the illegal government in Rhodesia. During those 14 years of sanctions it was clear that many nations engaged in sanction-breaking, both legal and illegal. This research also seeks to look at American Multinational Corporations and to see how they failed to comply with sanctions against the Smith regime.

The policies and priorities of the four administrations toward corporations that violated United Nations sanctions
will also be examined.

In conducting this study my guiding hypothesis is that since the Unilateral Declaration of Independence the United States has consistently aimed at shoring up the minority regime and advancing the interests of United States capital while undermining the interests of the Black minority population.
CHAPTER I
THEORY OF SANCTIONS

In the context of international relations, Johan Galtung defines sanctions as "actions initiated by one or more international actors (the senders) against one or more others (the receivers) with either or both of two purposes: to punish the receivers by depriving them of some value and/or to make the receivers comply with certain norms the senders deem important."¹ As Roger Fisher notes, "in international conflict as elsewhere our first reaction to somebody's doing something we don't like is to think of doing something unpleasant to them." Fisher goes on to note that the purpose of sanctions is to exert influence on the "receivers" to make some decisions; we want to cause them to change their mind.²

In the case of Rhodesia the United Nations applied sanctions to bring down the minority regime and institute majority rule.

Galtung further delineates sanctions according to their

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²Robert Fisher, International Conflict For Beginners
scope and magnitude:

1. Negative or Positive
2. Individual or Collective
3. Internal or External
4. Unilateral, Multilateral or Universal
5. General or Selective
6. Total or Partial

He lists three broad inclusive types of sanctions:

A. Diplomatic Sanctions
   1. Non-Recognition
   2. Rupture of Diplomatic Relations
   3. Non-co-operation by International Organizations

B. Communication Sanctions
   1. Rupture of Telecommunications
   2. Rupture of Mail Contact
   3. Rupture of Transportation (Ship, Railroad, Air)
   4. Rupture of News Communication (Radio, Newspaper, Press Agencies)
   5. Rupture of Personal Contact (Tourism Family Visits)

C. Economic Sanctions
   1. Rupture of Trade Relations (Economic Boycott)
      a. Import boycott
      b. Export boycott

In order for sanctions to be effective it is necessary to determine the type of sanction to be used and concentrate in that area. Thus vulnerability is the key and careful inspection of the economy of the receiving nation is necessary to determine what type of sanctions would have the greatest impact without severely affecting the economy of the sender nations. If the goal is to damage the economic system of the receiving nation without similarly damaging the sending nations, this can obviously be attained if a number of con-

ditions that Galtung refer to as "the ideal case for an economic boycott" are fulfilled. The ideal conditions would be more or less as follows:

1. that imports have a very high loading on important sectors of the economy of the receiving nation;
2. that there is no internal substitute for imports;
3. that a high loading of the important imports comes from the sending nation(s);
4. that there is no external substitute for these imports, so that the receiving nation cannot threaten to change trade partners;
5. that the imports make up a very small part of the exports of the sending nation(s), and/or that the products can be exported to other nations;
6. that the exports from the receiving nation are sent mainly to the sending nation(s), and that there are no easy substitutes for them, so that the receiving nation cannot obtain income easily;
7. that these exports from the receiving nation can easily be obtained elsewhere by the sender(s) so that the sending nation(s) are not hurt economically and can threaten to change trade-partners, or that the exports cannot be obtained elsewhere by the sending nation(s) so that the sending nation(s) can demonstrate that they would rather suffer deprivation than touch products from the receiving nation, and
8. that trade relations are easily supervised and even controlled (as when the receiving nation is an island or is surrounded either by impenetrable terrain, such as swamps or deserts, or by nations, that participate in the boycott).³

The crucial concept here is vulnerability which has an external and an internal component. The key to the under-

standing of vulnerability seems to be concentration the more a country's economy depends on one product, and the more its exports consist of one product and the more its exports and imports are concentrated on one trade-partner the more vulnerable is the country. To launch economic sanctions without a careful examination of all these factors would be like launching a military campaign without military analysis.

Without going into a great many details, it is interesting to determine which countries rank highest in external vulnerability. Among the first ten countries in the list given in the *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* are four islands (Barbados, Mauritius, Cyprus and Malta)\(^4\) and among the first ten countries in a similar list in the U.N.'s *Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1964* are three islands, Mauritius, Trinidad, Iceland and Hong Kong, which for all practical reasons is an island. The two ranking lists are not identical, which reflects problems in connection with national accounts statistics more so than changes between the periods of time the two lists cover. However it is interesting to note that six of the first seven countries on the U.N. list are or have been under British rule. Also the superpowers, the United States and the USSR, rank eighty-first and eighty-first on the *World Handbook* list which marks them as particularly invulnerable. The Peoples Republic of

\(^4\)Bruce M. Russet, *World Handbook of Political And Social Indicators* (New Haven, 1964), Table 46.
China ranks seventy-ninth, France ranks sixty-seven, and the United Kingdom, fifty-first. Clearly, the big powers are very different from the smaller powers in external vulnerability. A high score on this index means, low vulnerability and a low score means high vulnerability. Rhodesia ranked eight on the list of most vulnerable countries on the World Handbook.

The determination of a nation's external vulnerability reflects only some of the ideal conditions for economic boycott described earlier. There are still the problems of how important the imports actually are, how easily internal or external substitutes can be found, and so on. Imagine then that all external conditions listed above (conditions 3-8) are obtained by extending the boycott from a unilateral through a regional to a universal action. Then the receiving nation is left with only three counterstrategies:

1. to train itself in sacrifice by doing without certain commodities, and preferably even liking it;
2. to restructure the national economy so as to absorb the shock of the boycott, by producing locally the imported commodities denied it or by making some substitutes for them, by finding alternative employment for people made jobless, and so forth; and
3. to organize changes of trade with third parties,

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5 Ibid., p. 147.

or via third parties, or if the boycott is truly universal, to engage in smuggling.

To what extent these counterstrategies are sufficient as defense will be discussed later, here it will be noted that this repertory of defense measures is already quite limited. On the other hand, the World has yet to see a universal boycott.

The theory of the effects of economic warfare is now fairly similar to the theory of military warfare. Both kinds of warfare are means toward the same end; disintegration of the enemy so that he gives up the pursuit of his goals. The method used is value deprivation, which may or may not increase with time according to how the action proceeds and what countermeasures are enacted. Countermeasures may take the form of offensive measures (value deprivation from the attacker) or defensive measures (reducing the value deprivation inflicted upon oneself) of active or passive varieties.

Johan Galtung, distinguishes between a naive and a revised theory of the effects of economic warfare. The "naive" theory of sanctions asserts a direct, positive correlation

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7 An excellent account of how South Africa was able to get around the Idian boycott launched against it in July 1946 by means of trade via third parties is given in K.N. Raj, "Sanctions and the Indian Experience," in Ronald Segel ed., Sanctions Against South Africa (London 1964), pp. 197-203.

8 Ibid., p. 388; See also Margaret P. Doxey, Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement (New York: Oxford
between value deprivation and political disintegration. The idea is that there is a limit to how much value-deprivation the system can stand and that once this limit is reached (resulting in a split in leadership or between leadership and people), then political disintegration will proceed very rapidly and will lead to surrender or willingness to negotiate.

However this theory disregards the simple principle of adaptation: that which seems unacceptable at the beginning of the conflict becomes acceptable as one gets use to life under hardship. This theory is referred to as "naive" also because it does not take into account the possibility that value-deprivation may initially lead to political integration and only later—perhaps much later, or even never—to political disintegration.

T.R.C. Curtin and David Murray support the "naive" theory of sanction and claim that this theory depends on the notion that threatening peoples' incomes is as effective as threatening their lives and that, in the case of Rhodesia, a decline in real income of the country's inhabitants should lead either to the desired political changes or substantial (white) emigration.


9This must, have been a major theory behind many efforts in recent history to bomb an adversary into submission.

10T.R.C. Curtin and David Murray, Economic Sanctions
Far from provoking political change or disintegration, sanctions may well do precisely the opposite—namely, enhance the solidarity, cohesion, and popular support of the target. The generalized siege mentality induced by sanctions may make dissidents or potential dissidents more suspect to appeals for national unity. Wallerstein indicates that "the theory that economic sanctions would be an act of support for the opposing groups in the receiver is not validated."  

After studying the sanctions against Italy in 1935 and in 1936, George W. Baer concludes "What was meant to be only instrumental economic pressure to elicit internal protest was transformed by the Italian government into a cause for rapid intensification of integral economic and political nationalism." According to Doxey, "a siege psychosis, once engendered, can be a powerful factor in sustaining the will to resist, and it will also enable the government to take
unpopular steps such as rationing consumer goods or increasing taxes."\(^{14}\)

There are three conditions under which the revised theory is more valid than the naive theory, such conditions include:

1. The attack from the outside is seen as an attack as a whole, not on only a fraction of it;
2. There is very weak identification with the attacker, preferably even negative identification; and
3. There is belief in the value of one's own goals in the sense that no alternative is seen as better?\(^{15}\)

The interesting thing is that in economic warfare, often even more than in military warfare, the first condition is almost immediately and automatically satisfied. The collective nature of economic sanctions makes them hit the innocent along with the guilty. They are in practice, if not in theory, an application of the principle of collective guilty.\(^{16}\) However, if the other two conditions are not satisfied, then this may turn to the benefit of the attacker. Internal dissension in the receiving nation may result when the people feel harassed. The people may then bring pressure


\(^{16}\) During the Nigerian Civil War when the federal Government of Nigeria, imposed an economic blockade on then Biafra, it affected both the minorities and the people responsible for the Biafran secession, the people responsible for the secession.
upon the leaders to change their policy—in other words political disintegration.

Defense Against Economic Sanctions

Two principles for discussing counterstrategies against economic sanctions have been presented. One of them follows from the logic of the attacker. There are three holes in this system, however, even when sanctions are universal (adaptation to sacrifices, restructuring the economy to absorb the shock, and smuggling). The other principles follows from the logic behind what Galtung called the revised theory (that the collectivity is threatened, that there is no identification with the attacker, and that there is firm belief in one's own values).

The details about how the first three counterstrategies work out in the Rhodesian case are in a sense obvious aspects of the total situation. More important is the question the social scientist observing the situation will immediately ask: Are these strategies self-reinforcing so that some immediate benefit or reward can be derived from engaging in them, and so that one does not have to rely on belief in ultimate victory or loyalty to the regime alone? The following accounts seem to indicate that this is the case for all three.

Q: How do you manage with so little petrol?

A: Oh, that is easy enough. You know, if a family has two cars and receives some petrol for both, to put one car in the garage is not very much of
a sacrifice. Because some of us who live in the countryside and have offices in Salisbury join our nations and form a car pool and go in together. It is strange to see how much better friends one becomes with ones neighbours in such a situation, we really did not know them before. An if even this should not work, this may be the great impetus that forces the city to develop adequate collective transportation, and if even that does not work, doctors are almost unanimous that working is good for you.17

Thus an important mechanism increasing group solidarity is revealed. The car pool seems to have some of the same functions as the bomb shelter during an air raid.18 Adaptive measures have become goals in themselves.

Let us now turn to the possible consequences of restructuring the economy. People in key economic positions are also usually people with political influence. An economic boycott may reshuffle the relative importance of economic sectors so that new economic elites emerge. The question is, will the new elites be more or less willing to comply with the norms of the sending nations? Since economic boycott in general implies a rapid decrease or import-export business and a change toward home-based production, the question is whether the cosmopolitan layer of the tertiary sector (engaged in trade), which stands to lose some of its significance, is more or less amenable to compliance than are the


18 A good account of the effects of air raids on Britain is found in R.M. Titmuss, "Argument of Strain," in Eric and
emerging leaders of home-based industry or agriculture (or other primary activities). In the Rhodesian case, the farmers are seen as the group most solidly behind Smith.

CHAPTER II

U.S. REACTION TO U.N. SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA: THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION

When Ian Smith declared U.D.I., President Johnson on that same day was having a full scale foreign policy review with his senior advisers at his ranch. Secretaries Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, and Walt Rostow, then the chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council, were in Texas when the African Bureau of State began to consider the appropriate American response to the news of U.D.I. A telephone call was reportedly placed from the Bureau to Rusk. His reaction was cautious.¹ Speaking to the press after the policy review, Rusk said that the American government deplored the "unilateral action of the white minority government of Rhodesia in illegally seizing power."² The United States, he said, would recall its Consul General in Rhodesia and terminate the activities of the United States Information Services there. Further sanctions would be withheld, however, until Ambassador


²Ibid., p. 81. See also United States Department of State Bulletin, December, 1965, p. 908.
Goldberg stated the full American position on Rhodesia at the United Nations the following day and "We see what Britain does."

Rusk's statement suggested that American policy on Southern Rhodesia would remain within the old parameters. The State Department, would not get out in front of the British but would make the gestures necessary to keep the Africans and others from singling out the United States for particular pressure on the issue.

By the day following U.D.I., however, decisions as to the first full response of the United States had been made, and Ambassador Goldberg announced at the United Nations a series of American measures: A comprehensive embargo was being placed on the shipment of all arms and military equipment to Rhodesia; American private travel to Rhodesia was discouraged; Americans were advised they could no longer be required to have British not Rhodesia, visas; U.S. quotas for the importation of Rhodesia sugar were suspended; action on all applications for U.S. government loans and credit and investment guarantees to Rhodesia was suspended, and diplomatic status was withdrawn from the minister for Rhodesian Affairs in the British embassy in Washington and from his staff.

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4 Ibid., p. 908.
After Ian Smith declared independence, reaction was swift at the United Nations Headquarters. At an emergency meeting on November 11, 1965, the Assembly condemned the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by a vote of 107 to 2 (Portugal and South Africa) with one abstention (France). The Assembly asked the United Kingdom to implement the previous resolution "in order to put an end to the rebellion by the unlawful authorities in Rhodesia," and it recommended that the Security Council consider the situation as very urgent.

On November 20, 1965, the Security Council passed Resolution 217 condemning U.D.I. and called upon the United Kingdom to quell the rebellion. It also called upon all states to neither recognize the Smith regime nor to entertain any diplomatic or other relations with it; to provide it with no arms or other military equipment, to do their utmost to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, and to include in these efforts an embargo on oil and petroleum products. The Resolution represented a compromise between drafts submitted by the British and 36 African states. The African draft would have imposed an oil embargo instead of asking member states to cut oil exports of Southern Rhodesia. It would also have included a provision for employing "all enforcement measures," which implied the use of

force. Ambassador Goldberg played a key role in finding the compromise that helped the British avoid casting a veto. Goldberg, who had been ill with a virus infection and did not participate in the negotiations over the draft resolution until the very last stages, suggested a key amendment to the African draft. The draft had stated that "the situation constituted a threat to international peace and security." Such a finding by the Security Council would have opened the way to the use of force or mandatory sanctions. Goldberg suggested rephrasing the statement to read that "the situation ...is of extreme seriousness...its continuance in time constitutes a threat to international peace and security." The phrase "its continuance in time" allowed the British to interpret the resolution as calling for the possible application of Article 33. This section of the charter provides that in any situation "the continuation of which" is likely to endanger peace and security, efforts be made to find a solution by negotiations and other peaceful means. The Africans, on the other hand, interpreted Goldberg's phrase to mean that, if the situation persisted, the Security Council would reopen discussion of the question of further sanctions or even force. Calculated and precise ambiguity often lies at the heart of successful diplomacy. Ambassador


7Ibid., p. 86.
Golberg's intervention was a model of its kind. Adding a rhetorical bouquet to the diplomatic assistance he had given the British as they wriggled away from the veto, Goldberg's statement on the resolution praised the "galant" and prodigous efforts made by Prime Minister Wilson to bring the rebellion to an end. The Africans were disappointed, but U.D.I. had at least made the British agree that the Security Council should be involved in the Rhodesian question. And immediately after the vote on Resolution 217, Ambassador Goldberg provided a small sweetener. He announced that the United States would do more than cancel the 1966 quota for sugar imports from Rhodesia. It had since been learned he said, that "the entire 1,905 sugar quota, amounting to approximately 9,500 tons is now on the high seas in transit to the United States." The President had ordered the suspension of the sugar quota for 1965 as well, and had directed that, Shipment from Rhodesia would not be accepted.

But these few American measures, and the measures taken by the British, were clearly not enough, the African group wanted a commitment and an inclusion in Resolution 217 for force to be used to bring down the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia but the British and the Americans were not willing

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9Ibid., p. 914.
to support them. Speaking at a meeting of the State Department American Legion Post, Assistant Secretary G.M. Williams emphasized the readiness of the United States to support further economic measures by British against the Rhodesian regime, and noted that the British had already applied a "broad range" of sanctions. Then he went further "speed is a critical factor in the situation," however, he added:

African nations already are impatient with Britain's choice of measures. Many of them are pressing for direct military action. And a few would consider turning to the communist for help on the ground that the West is not moving fast enough. Obviously, the Communists would be happy to rush into this situation if they get a chance.  

Despite all these beautiful speeches no American official suggested or encouraged the British to use force, whereas in other situations force was used.  

In May 1966, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara made a major policy address in Montreal, Canada where he said "the United States has no mandate on high to police the world


12In November 24-26, 1964, American and Belgian armed forces carried out an airborn "rescue" of several hundred white hostages being held by rebel forces in Stanleyville. The impact of the operation was that it helped persuade Johnson that the U.S. should avoid future "Stanleyville's" anywhere in Africa, including Southern Rhodesia; yet in retrospect to the African, it was proof that Europe and America would intervene against black rebels in the Congo but would flinch from military confrontation with white rebels like Ian Smith. (See Waldemar Nelson, The Great Powers And Africa (New York: Praeger Books, 1969), p. 308.
and no inclination to do so. There have been classic cases in which our deliberate nonaction was the wisest action of all." To Africans, by then ardent press for Great Britain to use force in disposing of the illegal Rhodesian regime, McNamara’s statement not only seemed a transparently veiled promise of the administration to congressional critics not to embark on intervention again, as in Vietnam, but it was also read as a clue that in the unlikely event Britain might employ military measures in Southern Rhodesia, the United States would not join.

American support for the British against African attacks and pressure on the British to take firmer action against the rebels in Rhodesia was balanced by the general rhetoric of American leaders on the Southern Rhodesian question. On May 26, 1966, President Johnson invited a group of African Ambassadors to the White House to observe the third anniversary of the founding of the Organization of African Unity. In the first major speech by an American President devoted exclusively to African questions Johnson said:

As a basic part of our national tradition we support self determination and an orderly transition to majority rule in every corner of the globe. These principles have guided American policy from India to the Philippines from Vietnam to Pakistan. They guide our policy today toward Rhodesia. We are giving every encouragement and support to the efforts of the United Kingdom and the United Nations.

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to restore legitimate government in Rhodesia. Only when this is accomplished can steps be taken to open full power and responsibility of Nationhood to the people of Rhodesia— not just six percent of them.14

But the President did not commit himself to any new, specific action on the issue.

Due to the rhetorical support by the United States and pressure from the African's British Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced at the Commonwealth Conference in Lagos in January 1966, that on the basis of "expert advice available to him the cumulative effects of the economic and financial sanctions might well bring the rebellion to an end within a matter of weeks rather than months."15

In December 1966, Arthur Goldberg said that due to violations of human rights the situation in Rhodesia was a threat to international peace.16 It was this designation of the situation in Southern Rhodesia as one of "world concern," but of the violations of human rights, that enabled the Western Nations to justify in December 1966, their acceptance of the British proposition that the situation in Southern Rhodesia had become "a threat to international peace and security." It was a justification that was necessary in or-


der to invoke mandatory economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. Thus on December 16, 1966, the Security Council passed Resolution 232 and for the first time in U.N. history imposed mandatory economic sanctions.  

Under this resolution, the Council prohibited importation of the following Rhodesian commodities: asbestos, iron-ore, chrome, pig-iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, meat and meat products, and hides, skins and leather. Also banned was the export to Rhodesia of oil or oil products, arms and military equipment, aircraft and motor vehicles. Unlike other United Nations resolutions which merely "requested" or "urged" action by Governments, the terms of resolution 232 (1966) demanded compliance. The council, the resolution stated, "decides that all members of the United Nations shall prevent" the import of the listed commodities. To emphasize the mandatory nature of its action, the Council reminded all United Nations members that failure or refusal to carry out the sanctions would violate Article 25 of the Charter, which states: "The members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter." The next step for American officials was to issue an Executive Order

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17 Ibid., p. 101.

18 See Appendix I (for full text of U.N. restrictions)

19 See Appendix II (on full text of Resolution 232).
implementing the sanctions. This was left to the Treasury and Commerce Department and the Office of the Legal Adviser in the State Department. There was little argument among agencies or bureaus over the text of the order, which listed the various prohibited activities and assigned responsibility for implementation of the American sanctions program among the Secretaries of State, Commerce and Treasury. The only controversy came when the order was issued on January 5, 1967. The White House press release, apparently drafted in the Treasury Department and not widely cleared within the State Department, announced that implementing regulations would be issued by the Departments shortly, and would be effective as of the date of the Executive Order. The news release then stated: "A violation of an executive order is a criminal offense. Provision will be made in the regulations to deal with cases of undue hardship arising from transactions commenced before the date of the Order." A similar reference to a hardship exception was contained in the subsequent Treasury Department press release that accompanied the Department's sanctions regulations. A hardship exception was not mentioned anywhere in the Executive Order.


21 Ibid. pp. 295-297. Appendix II (See full text of Executive Order 11322).
But this ex-post facto definition of such an exception was to become the basis for claims by Union Carbide and the Foote Mineral Company of the right to import certain allotment of Southern Rhodesia chrome. Union Carbide was to claim that it had paid for approximately 150,000 tons of chrome after passage of the U.N. resolution but before the issuance of the Executive Order, and that it would be a hardship on the company not to be allowed to import the chrome it had purchased.22

After selective mandatory sanctions did not topple the Ian Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia, the Security Council, convened on March 19, 1968 at the request of 36 African states, heard a number of statements deploring the executions of Africans in Southern Rhodesia, and calling for more effective action against the regime.23 Algeria, Ethiopia, India, Pakistan and Senegal proposed in the draft resolution that the Council call upon all states to sever all relations with the regime, censure Portugal and South Africa for their assistance to Southern Rhodesia in defiance of the Security Council, decide to take action against Portugal and South Africa if they persisted in defying council decisions, and urge the United Kingdom to take all necessary measures including the use of force to end the rebellion.24 The African group also emphasized the need to cut consular and trade re-

22Ibid., p. 102.
23Ibid., p. 46.
24Office of Public Information, A Principle In Torment:
presentation in Southern Rhodesia, in fact to terminate all communications with the rebel colony. Britain and the United States demurred, the former because as administering authority it wished to keep open a channel for communication with Southern Rhodesia and the United States because the requirement to interdict communications would have raised serious constitutional problems. Britain submitted a draft resolution calling for comprehensive mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, affecting all trade and economic relations, to augment the selective actions imposed in December 1966. After consultation among Council members a new draft resolution emerged, and was adopted unanimously on May 29, 1968. Under this measure, resolution 253 (1968), the Council acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter-decided that all member states "Shall Prevent:"

The import of all commodities and products originating in Southern Rhodesia;

Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which would promote the export of any commodities or products from Southern Rhodesia, and any dealings by their nationals or in their territories in any such products, including in particular transfer of funds for the purpose of such activities;

The shipment in their vessels or aircraft of any Southern Rhodesian commodities or products to any person or body in Rhodesia or to any other person or body for the purposes of any business operated from Rhodesia (except for medical and educational material, publications, new materials, and in special humani-


Ibid., p. 102.
tarian circumstances, foodstuffs);

The shipment in their vessels or aircrafts or the trans-
port across their territories of any commodities con-
signed to Southern Rhodesia; The provision of any funds
for investment or any other financial or economic re-
sources, or the remitting of any funds except pension
payments or funds for strictly medical, humanitarian
or educational purposes and in special humanitarian
circumstances, foodstuffs.

The entry into their territories, save on exceptional
humanitarian groups, of any person traveling on a
Southern Rhodesian passport or any person ordinarily
resident in Southern Rhodesia, believed to have en-
couraged the unlawful actions of the illegal regimes' oper-
ations by airlines to or from Southern Rhodesia.26

The United States supported this British resolution and
on May 29, 1968 President Johnson issued Executive Order
11419.27

Despite these executive orders and U.S. support for
sanctions at the United Nations, the Treasury and Commerce
Departments reportedly were not in favor of United Nations
sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. Treasury officials are
said to have argued that a sanctions program against Southern
Rhodesia could not prove successful and would damage the con-
cept of sanctions. This could, in turn interfere with Treas-
ury's sanctions program against Albania, Cuba, the Peoples
Republic of China and other communist nations. Treasury was
also concerned about the effect on the American balance of

26 See Appendix III for full text of Resolutions 253
(1968). Anthony Lake, The "Tar Baby" Option (Columbia

27 See full text of Executive Order 11419 (May 29, 1968),
payments and gold position if American relations with South Africa became involved. The CIA, like the Treasury, doubted that sanctions would succeed.²⁸

The Undersecretary of State George Ball believed that liberalization of the societies of Southern Africa depended on economic development, and ridiculed the concept of economic sanctions. As he was to write later in his book, The Discipline of Power:

Rhodesia is now caught in the movement of swiftly paced history and there is little that I can usefully say about it at this time, other than to express the feeling-which I have long felt-that economic sanctions are, in the modern day, a romantic delusion—a wishful expression of man's hope to find some means, short of direct military force, to compel nations and people to take the desired military force to compel nations and peoples to take the desired political decisions....Where military power is not employed and the enforcement of an embargo depends merely on the agreement of nations—whether or not expressed in a United Nations resolution—the result will more likely be annoyance than hardship.²⁹

Appendix IV. Ibid., pp. 298-300.


CHAPTER III

U.S. REACTION TO U.N. SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA: THE KISSINGER PERIOD

In a pre-election interview in 1972, former President Nixon said:

I wouldn't want to leave the impression that.... Africa will not get attention...(it) will, because none of our present policies are sacred cows. I am going to look at the African policy to see how our programs can be improved in those areas.¹

The "improvements" made under the Nixon administration are indicative of the direction of United States policy toward Southern Africa.

The United States voted to support sanctions, and various executive orders made it unlawful for anyone in the United States to trade with Rhodesia. The penalties were severe and on paper it seemed that the United States was committed to implementing sanctions. In practice however the United States has been second only to South Africa in sanction-busting. The reason is to be found in the secret 1969 National Security Study Memorandum 39.²


²Mohammed El-Kawas and Barry Cohen, "The Kissinger Study
In April 1969, Dr. Henry Kissinger directed the preparation of a comprehensive review of United States policy toward Southern Africa by the National Security Council Inter-departmental Group for Africa-composed primarily of representatives of the State Department, the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. Treasury, Commerce, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Aid for International Development and NASA-added their special knowledge. The emphasis was to be on broadening the range of views and presenting alternative policies.

The Kissinger policy toward Southern Africa formally enunciated after the completion of NSSM 39, favoured the "maintenance of the status quo in Southern Africa to whatever extent possible."  

Kissinger's policy recommendations derived from three NSSM assumptions:

1. If violence in the area escalated, U.S. interest will be threatened.

2. The whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them.

3. There is no hope for blacks to gain political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the communists.


Ibid., p. 28.
Kissinger's immediate concern revolved around preventing open war in Southern Africa, like that of Vietnam, that might happen at a time when the enormous outlays of money, equipment and personnel for the Indochina war left little time, energy or money for other problems.

The new policy was to be based on "communications," United Nations rhetoric and voting patterns which detracted from "communications," which the white ruled states were to be minimized. In accordance with this new policy, American officials were instructed to limit any criticisms they might have of white minority regimes and to virtually remain silent on racial and colonial conflicts in the area of Southern Africa. Instructions such as these issued in January of 1970 "...marked the beginning of the new Nixon-Kissinger policy of Communication and a departure from the Johnson policies, which had been designed to maintain some kind of credibility with African leaders."^5

The Nixon-Kissinger policy was directed toward constructing links with the racist white Rhodesian government. Option Two of NSSM 39, which laid the basis for Richard Nixon's policy toward Southern Africa, states that the United States should "be more flexible in its attitude towards the Smith regime" and specifically states that the United States should "gradually relax sanctions." Kissinger's letter to President Nixon in January, 1970, states: "Recommendation

^5Ibid., p. 25.
...that State, Treasury and Commerce begin to formulate for your consideration, alternative approaches concerning United States participation in Sanctions if other nations continue to relax."6

The purpose of such a policy therefore became an attempt to balance United States economic, strategic and scientific interest in Rhodesia with the political affect of dissociating the United States from the White minority regime and their stifling racial tactics. The result of such a position, (a) led to increased contact with minority regimes at the cost of decreased access for African diplomats and leaders ...(b) a policy that would remain unchanged so long as the Soviet Union and China made no attempts to extend their sphere of influence in Southern Africa-a move that would not be tolerated by the Nixon administration...(c) rejection of the concept (by the U.S.) of one man one vote (majority rule) and its consequences.7

By the autumn of 1971, this new policy of "communication" was receiving strong support from the State Department. In September 1971, a speech by Assistant Secretary Newsom stated-in very strong terms-the reasoning behind "communication." "Isolation can breed resistance to change. Open doors can accelerate it."

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6 Edgar Lockwood, Issues, No. 3 (Fall 1974), p. 73.
Indeed, in his flat prediction that "economic and demographic pressures" made change in South Africa "inevitable," Newsom was expressing a certainty which went beyond the strong hopes of the framers of "tar baby (Option Two)."  

Terrence Smith's article of April 2, 1972 in The New York Times provided the first public description in the United States of the relationship between a series of practical steps taken by the administration toward closer relations with the white minority regimes and the fact that a fundamental shift in approach had taken place more than two years earlier. These steps, not all of which were directly related to the policy review, included a redefinition of embargoes on military equipment for Portugal and South Africa, which permitted the sale of two Boeing 707 Airliners to the Portuguese and the authorization for sale of executive jet aircraft to South African military (ironically, after the administration had made this gesture, the South Africans failed to purchase any of these aircraft); a new agreement with the Portuguese government on American bases in the Azores and authority for the Export-Import Bank to loan Portugal up to $400 million; a new agreement covering the sale of South African gold to the International Monetary Fund on terms highly favourable to Pretoria; and a series of ab-

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stention and negative votes at the United Nations on measures condemning apartheid and white regimes of Southern Africa.9

The impact of the American policy of "Communications" on Rhodesia's white minority government can be seen through the examination of three issues, the maintenance of the American Consulate in Rhodesia, American votes at the United Nations and the granting of an exception to the sanctions requested by the Union Carbide Corporation.

The American Consulate In Rhodesia

On June 27, 1969, Roger P. Morris who was responsible for African Affairs in the National Security Council Staff met with Kenneth Towsey, the head of the Rhodesian Information Office in Washington. The meeting had been arranged by John Jordi of the South African Press. Jordi had previously complained to Morris that American officials lacked any real communication with the Rhodesians in Washington and that this was a mistake.10 And since the NSSM 39 policy review stressed communications with white minority regimes in Southern Africa, the meeting was held.

This meeting brought Morris to the question of the American Consulate in Salisbury. On June 20, 1969, the Rhodesian white electorate voted overwhelmingly that Rhodesia should become a Republic. While Smith had not yet declared

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the Republic, Rhodesia's final break with Britain was assured. On June 24, 1969 London withdrew its residual mission in Salisbury. This raised, of course, the question of the continued status of the American Consulate there. Its removal or retention would make little actual difference, but it was a symbol of American policy to the Rhodesians the British and others. The continued presence of the Consulate would affirm a continuing American interest in events within Rhodesia; it would also imply American unwillingness to accept Britain's complete jurisdiction over Rhodesian Affairs.

Morris saw Towsey again in August, and then in October at a party given by Jordi. Towsey reportedly said that his government would not raise the issue of the legal status of the Consulate. The United States government was welcome to stay there as long as it wished. Even as a Republic, Rhodesia would not insist that the Consulate be accredited to it. The United States could maintain the "fiction" of accreditation to the British or even to the Matabele Kingdom, if it wished. The important thing is that some contact was maintained. Morris reportedly informed Kissinger and the President of these conversations, suggesting that the Rhodesians were not going to push the United States Consulate out of Salisbury but that at some point the legal issue would probably arise with Britain.

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11 Ibid., p. 135.
12 Ibid., p. 136.
13 Ibid., p. 136
U.S. Consul General Paul O'Neill returned to Salisbury in Mid-September 1969, after a home leave in the United States. According to a story by R.W. Apple, Jr. in the New York Times, many Rhodesians rejoiced at his return. One official privately told a visiting American, "I can't think of anything that would have been a better morale booster for us at the moment." O'Neill who himself had recommended the closure of the Consulate, had become a symbol for white Rhodesians of their importance to the United States. Another Rhodesian official was quoted by Apple as saying: "I know some people in the world would like to pretend that we don't exist, but as you can see, we do exist, and no amount of bullying will make us cease to exist."\(^4\)

The "tar baby" Option included a decision to retain the Consulate and even to move eventually to recognition of the Smith government; the State Department wanted to close the Consulate. The President's decision was a compromise: no immediate action would be taken.\(^5\)

In Mid-January of 1970 prompted by the Sanction Committee, Secretary-General U Thant sent letters to the governments still maintaining Consular and other representation in Salisbury, asking them in effect to pull out.\(^6\)


\(^5\)Congressional Digest, February 1973, pp. 33-64.

\(^6\)Anthony Lake, The "Tar Baby" Option (Columbia University
The United Nations Security Council Resolution 253 of May, 1968, which had ordered comprehensive mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia had recommended that all Consular and trade representation in Rhodesia be terminated.

At midnight, March 1-2, 1970, Ian Smith formally declared Rhodesia a Republic. Yet the American position on the Consulate did not change. The State Department Spokesman said that the matter was "Still under active consideration." Secretary Rogers, who had returned from Africa in late February and had submitted another memorandum to the President urging the Consulate's withdrawal.

In London, British officials at the working level raised the issue with the American embassy, referring to the fact that it was the British and not the Rhodesians who had provided the Consulate with its exequatur. The White House would not move.17

In the end, the British dislodge the administration from its position. On March 5, 1970, foreign and commonwealth Secretary Michael Stewart called Ambassador Anneberg to the foreign office to discuss the situation. Stewart gave Anneberg a formal, clear message. If the United States did not withdraw the Consulate, the British would in the very near future, consider withdrawing the exequatur. Similar


17Ibid., p. 142. See also Hearings of Subcommittee On Africa, October 17, 1969.
messages were being passed to the other nations which retained representation in Salisbury faced with an open break with the British, the President gave in. On March 9, Secretary Rogers happily announced that the Consulate would be closed on March 17.

One week after the Consulate was closed Robert Good, who had left the State Department and was then a Professor at John Hopkins University, told the House Subcommittee on Africa:

The 1970s in Africa Mr. Nixon asserts, will be years of hard choice. Evidently he is right. He equivocated for eight months over the decision to close our Consulate in Rhodesia when it was an open secret that his Secretary of State strongly advised that it be closed and a patent fact that the British urged its closure. If Mr. Nixon found in that issue a hard choice, one can only wonder how he will respond should the going get rough in Southern Africa.18

**America Breaks Its Virginity At The U.N.**

On March 17, 1970, the day that Consul O'Neill left Salisbury the United States cast its first veto at the United Nations-on a resolution concerning Rhodesia. While it was an accident that the two events occurred on the same day, they symbolized the administration's intention to give in no more on Rhodesia.

With Smith's declaration of a Republic at the beginning of the month, African delegations at the United Nations had

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begun to urge again that the British use force to crush the rebellion. A tough resolution along these lines was drafted; it also included the mandatory withdrawal of foreign Consulates in Salisbury. On March 6, the British introduced their own resolution, designed once again to finesse the Africans, which called on all countries to neither recognize the Rhodesian Republican regime nor to give it any assistance. The Africans with their Asian allies, went ahead with their draft. As presented to the Security Council, it extended sanctions to Portugal and South Africa, condemned the British for their refusal to use force, and called for the severance of all communications and transportation ties between Rhodesia and the outside world. The British and the American delegations at first thought that no veto would be necessary, since it appeared that the draft resolution would have only eight affirmative votes, one short of the necessary majority. But the drafts' sponsors gained Spain's support. No longer inhibited by loyalty to its neighbor, Spain agreed to vote against the British. In doing so, they apparently calculated that, that would both improve their relations with the Afro-Asians world and pick up support for their position against the British on Gibraltar.

The Spanish defection meant that a veto would be necessary to defeat the Afro-Asian draft resolution. The State

Department which had supported removal of the Consulate and had opposed "tar baby" felt that it was time that the United States come out from behind Britain's skirts and show the Africans at the United Nations that the use of force, the extension of sanctions to South Africa and Portugal, and the severance of the communications links to Rhodesia were simply not in the cards. Both the African Bureau and the Bureau of International Organization Affairs reportedly agreed, therefore that the United States should join the British in their expected veto. As is customary on major U.S. votes in the United Nations, the final decision was left to the White House, the American Ambassador received a phone call from the White House telling him to cast a U.S. veto.20

Thus American Ambassador to the U.N. Mr. Yost and Lord Caradon, the British representative, joined in killing the measure. The American veto was thus unnecessary; but it probably would have been cast even if American officials had known all along that the British would act as they did. The United States cast its veto at the United Nations it seems out of choice rather than necessity.

By mid-1973, the United States had vetoed four more measures in the Security Council. The fourth again concerned Rhodesia and again the United States acted with the British.

They struck down a draft resolution which would have limited the purchase by all states of any products from South Africa and the Portuguese territories to the quantitative levels prevailing in 1965 and would have extended the Beira blockade to cover the commodities and products travelling between Rhodesia and the Port of Laurenco Marques. The draft resolution would also have had the Council urge the British to implement fully the extension of the blockade and sought the cooperation of other states in doing so. The United States decided to veto this resolution. And, explaining on May 22 why the United States was joining in the veto of this measure, Ambassador John Scali said,

> While we can well understand the sentiment behind the draft resolution, we consider it unrealistic to call for broader sanctions until the full membership of the United Nations has demonstrated its willingness to take more seriously the sanctions already in force.  

**Union Carbide Breaks Sanctions Officially**

Union Carbide, Foote Mineral and Corning Glass applied for exceptions under the terms of the "hardship" provision of the press release accompanying the President's Executive Order of January 1967, and a Treasury Department press release of March 1, 1967. The Treasury release had stated that, "in general," Rhodesian goods which had been paid for but not exported before January 5, 1967, would be licensed for import into the United States, if it were a case of "undue
hardship." Corning Glass's application for license to import petalite clearly did not meet this criterion. Foote Minerals' request was also not accepted.

Union Carbide in November and mid-December, 1966, had transferred approximately $3 million to a South African subsidiary Ruighoek Chrome Mines. On December 21, five days after the United Nations had passed its mandatory embargo against Rhodesian Chrome, Ruighoek sent $2,680,000 to another Union Carbide subsidiary, Rhodesian Chrome Mines, as payment for 150,000 tons of chromite. Union Carbide officials claim that some of these 150,000 tons would have been imported before the mandatory sanctions had been voted if they had not agreed to observe the voluntary sanctions program of 1966. This transparent maneuver was rejected by administration officials under the Johnson administration.

The Nixon White House was, of course, far more sympathetic to business generally than the Johnson administration. And Union Carbide itself was in good standing. President Nixon's new Ambassador to Bonn, Kenneth Rush after teaching Nixon at Duke Law School, had served in important positions at Union Carbide for more than thirty years.

The Union Carbide case was less clear. While it fell

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22 Testimony by J. Clayton Stephenson before the House Subcommittee on Africa.

under the prohibitions of the Executive Order and would violate the intent if not the letter of the United Nations Sanctions resolution of December, 1966, granting the exception might still be justified publicly on hardship grounds. The legal office of the State Department stated that "in strictly legal terms," the Union Carbide request fell under the provisions of the Executive Orders on Rhodesia and clearly violated the intent of the Security Councils Sanctions.  

The President subsequently decided that if Union Carbide established to the satisfaction of the Treasury Department that it had paid for the chrome before the date of the January 5, 1967, Executive Order, the license would be issued. The decision was also reached that American firms with assets in Rhodesia could sell those assets freely. This meant that certain American subsidiaries could be sold to Rhodesia as well as to South African and Portuguese buyers. The Union Carbide exception was granted on September 18, 1970. This made the Nixon administration the first United States administration to officially violate United Nations sanctions, thus making the United States and the White minority regimes of Portugal and South Africa International outlaws who refused to comply with United Nations Sanctions.


\[25\] Ibid., p. 155.
Furthermore, the granting of this exception to Union Carbide and the decision to allow American firms to sell their Rhodesian assets to all comers suggests that there had been during 1970, a chance that a key part of the original "tar baby" (option two) concept might have become a reality. As originally framed in the Interdepartmental Group discussion a year before, this option had included a gradual relaxation of American Sanctions.

"Communication," then, had become by late 1970, a conceptual cover for a series of moves that favoured the Smith regime. It also included American advice to Salisbury. In early fall of 1971, the United States indicated to Smith its interest in a negotiated solution.26

The message stated that the United States believed a settlement was in Rhodesia's interest. The American effort to influence Smith in the direction of some sort of compromise was consistent with the policy of "communication" as it was first designed in the summer of 1969. The United States in 1971 indicated to Smith this policy of a negotiated solution when Smith was negotiating the terms of his agreement with Mr. Home, British Foreign Secretary. But the failure of the Home-Smith agreement demonstrates the fact that the white regime must go much faster than it has ever suggested it would in meeting African demands, if there is to be an agreement between black and white leaders that can

26 Ibid., p. 156.
provide a lasting and peaceful solution.

And an American policy of "communication" which consisted of potentially bigger carrots and smaller sticks could only have provided Smith with more comfort than concern.

**The Byrd Amendment**

Opposition to any kind of pressure against Rhodesia surfaced in the Congress soon after U.D.I. In 1966, Senator James O. Eastland introduced a resolution calling for an end to American economic measures against Rhodesia. But 1967, several bills had been introduced in the House which condemned the United Nation's response to U.D.I. and urged the United States to end its observation of sanctions. None of these measures mentioned chrome.

The Rhodesian issue lay dormant in the Congress in 1968, but in 1969, thirteen anti-sanctions resolutions were introduced in the House. By 1970, the argument in the Congress had changed somewhat, although the sponsor of the Rhodesian-related resolution in the Senate-S. Res. 367-was again Senator Eastland. The thrust of Eastland's measure was now two fold: to restore trading relations and to recognize the Ian Smith government.²⁷

And a new argument was introduced: that sanctions had

made the United States dependent on the Soviet Union for a strategic material, chrome ore. In the House six resolutions were introduced in the autumn of 1970, all urging violation of the sanction in some form.  

None of these measures passed. In 1971, it was to be a different story. Early in the year, Rep. James Collins of Texas introduced H.R. 4712, which foreshadowed the Byrd Amendment. Collins' bill was a full-fledged assault: it called for rewriting the UN Participation Act of 1945 to prevent import prohibitions on "any metal bearing ore from any free world country for so long as the importation of like ore from any Communist country is not prohibited by Law." As a proposed Amendment to the U.N. participation Act, Collins' bill was in the purview of the House Foreign Affairs Committee (where it was assigned to the Subcommittee On International Organizations and Movements). A similar bill, introduced in the Senate in March by Senator Harry S. Byrd, Jr., was assigned to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. After hearings were held in June 1971, in the House Subcommittee On International Organizations and Movements and in early July in the Senate Subcommittee On Africa, both committees with jurisdiction essentially killed the

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measures. Proponents of the legislation then decided on another tactic: by removing all mention of the United Nations from the bill and framing it in terms of national security and strategic materials, they were able to move it to the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committees. This accomplished, the Byrd amendment was reported to the Senate floor attached to a previously passed House bill, the Military Procurement Act of 1971, by a unanimous 13-0 vote in the Senate Armed Services Committee. After several attempts to delete the Rhodesian chrome provision had failed, it was passed first by the Senate, and then by the House in October, 1971. Section 503 stated that:

Nothwithstanding any other provision of law, on and after January 1, 1972, the President may not prohibit or regulate the importation into the United States of any material determined to be strategic and critical pursuant to the provisions of this Act, if such material is the product of any foreign country or area not listed as a communist-dominated country or area in general headnote 3 (d) of the Tariff schedules of the United States (19 U.S.C. 1202), for so long as the importation into the United States of material that kind which is the product of such communist-dominated countries or areas is not prohibited by any provision of law.

Interests involved in the passage of the Byrd Amendment include the chrome-mining companies. Union Carbide, Foote

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30 "The U.S. Congress And the Rhodesian Chrome," Issue, p. 3.

31 Congressional Record, November 10, 1971.

Mineral and Allegheny Ludlum, the Rhodesia Information Office (whose lobbying activities raise serious questions of violation of Resolution 253) and some pro-South African Organizations. A New York Times article reported that, "shortly before the vote, a Union Carbide Lobbyist gleefully told a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff, we've got the votes."33

The arguments made by those who opposed the Byrd Amendments were:

--It would violate an international treaty obligation. This would harm U.S. reputation for reliability and would have a deleterious effect on the observation by others of international law itself. In the long run, at least, the growth of international laws is in the American interests.

--It would damage the U.S. reputation in predominantly black Africa, by providing aid and comfort to a white minority regime in Southern Africa.

--It would hurt the United States' position at the United Nations, and harm the U.N. itself.

--It would undermine the British negotiating position. (As the debate on the Byrd Amendment proceeded in September and October 1971, the British were negotiating with Smith in an effort to arrange terms of independence that would satisfy Britain's commitment to the rights of the Black majority. A provisional agreement was reached in November, subject to approval of the Rhodesian majority. A British commission sent to Rhodesia in 1972 to test the reaction of the majority found the weight of opinion clearly opposed to the terms of the proposed settlement. The agreement therefore fell through).

--It would give both psychological and economic relief to the illegal Rhodesian regime and support development of an apartheid system there; thus it would adversely affect the well-being of the Black population.

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and the future of Southern Rhodesia.\textsuperscript{34}

None of these points touched many sensitive nerves in Congress. And the groups that opposed the Byrd Amendments were Senators Gale McGee, Congressmen Charles Diggs Jr., and Donald Fraser. But allied groups such as the American Committee on Africa, the United Steelworkers and the Congressional Black Caucus were generally late in getting started, badly coordinated and poorly financed in their Lobbying efforts. The most persistent Lobbyist against the Byrd Amendment was the State Department—and its efforts were vitiated by the refusal of the White House to weigh in with phone calls to wavering Senators.

On November 8, 1971, a month after the Amendment's passage, the African Group at the United Nations issued a statement attacking the amendment. On November 16, the General Assembly appealed to the U.S. government not to implement it. On December 3, the (U.N. Sanctions Committee recommended that the Security Council call on all states not to pass or implement legislation which would allow the import of prohibited goods. The Security Council did so, in effect, in resolutions of February 28, July 28 and September 29, 1972. And on May 22, 1973, it requested "States with legislation permitting importation of minerals and other

products from Rhodesia to repeal it immediately.\textsuperscript{35}

During the period, prior to the passage of the Byrd Amendment, on September 27, Senator Fulbright introduced a new amendment which was co-sponsored by Senator Gale McGee to give the president the option of determining "that the national interest or a treaty obligation of the United States might prevent implementation of Section 503.\textsuperscript{36} This amendment was defeated and Senator McGee blamed the White House for the passage of the Byrd Amendment. He said:

At this point one must note with great regret that during these proceedings, as well as during the following week's delay, the White House maintained a Sphinx-like attitude. Even the Department of State was content to let its interest be conveyed only by a relatively low-ranking, albeit highly capable, civil servant in the Office of Congressional relations. To our knowledge, no official of greater rank than an Assistant Secretary of State made more than a token effort to support the Fulbright-McGee amendment. And this bureaucratic inertia—although inexcusable in itself—seemed directly traceable to the White House attitude. When a Foreign Relations Committee Staffman asked a State Department representative to try to elicit the White House view, he was told it was better not to press for an answer because the result might be counterproductive to the Senators' position. While the Senate is by no means slavishly follows the direction of the Chief Executive, it is equally the case that White House intervention can always influence a substantial body of votes. There is absolutely no doubt in my mind that a strong expression of

\textsuperscript{35}Ibid., p. 13.

interest by the White House—or even the personal activity of the top State Department officials could have resulted in upholding U.S. policy on U.N. sanctions.37

The Senate on October 6 rejected the Fulbright-McGee amendment by a vote of 38-44 and thus approved Section 503. After the Senate approved the Byrd Amendment the House finally accepted it by a vote of 252-101.

Senator McGee said:

Even after President Nixon signed the military procurement bill into law—and it was obvious he would not veto a $21 billion measure to try to delete one item, in the entirely doubtful event he wished to do so—there were legal scholars who suggested means whereby the effect of section 503 might be avoided or mitigated. In the circumstances, however, this eventuated in nothing more than fruitless speculation. The executive branch response was to the effect that the President could not flaunt the supposedly clearly expressed view of the Congress. No matter that the White House had much to do in a negative way in shaping those views.38

After the passage of the Byrd Amendment in a victory song, the lobbying team toasted all the participants on Rhodesia's side as working together for a common cause.

"Oh, 503; Oh 503 Rhodesia's future rode with thee."39

Attempts To Repeal The Byrd Amendment

In President Nixon's third annual report on the State of U.S. Foreign Policy issued on February 9, 1972, the Presi-

37Ibid., p. 5.
38Ibid., p. 6.
dent discussed the potential of the United Nations, his continued belief in this vital institution, and his concern for the U.N. in deploving certain congressional actions which is felt were detrimental to the U.N., the President specified the point that: "Congress exempted strategic and critical materials, notably chrome, from the U.S. implementation of the mandatory U.N. sanctions on imports from Rhodesia."40

Moreover, in a report issued by the Secretary of State just last March, 1972 the following statement was made:

U.N. sanctions, adopted in response to Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence, remain in effect. The U.S. firm and effective support of the U.N. measures is qualified only by the recent Congressional adoption of the Byrd Amendment which in effect freed chrome ore from the U.S. application of sanctions. The Administration made clear its opposition to that amendment.41

Due to these pronouncements by the Nixon administration after the passage of the Byrd Amendment, Mr. Nixon told Senator McGee that things would be different the next time around. McGee took Nixon at his word and introduced a measure which would reverse the Byrd Amendment. What happened next was predictable to cynical veterans of Nixon's Southern strategy, but to McGee it came as a great shock. He said later:

It was my belief that at this point the Administration was fully committed to utilizing whatever means it had at its disposal to see a successful reversal of October 1972 vote. However, shortly before the May 21st vote on my

41 Ibid., p. 6.
amendment, and much to my concern, it became apparent that the handling of the Rhodesian chrome ore question by the administration was no different than it was last October. This time I personally appealed to the White House for assistance. I asked that they make only five or six telephone calls to marginal Senators on the administration's side of the Senate aisle—several of whom had already told me "a call from the administration would be necessary to change my vote." As it turned out the White House would have to make only two calls to turn the tide in favor of repealing the Byrd Amendment.42

But not one call was made. The Nixon administration had put its rhetoric behind Senator McGee's bill and the United Nations, but it did not lift the telephone even once to back that rhetoric up. Therefore, it is imperative to set the record completely straight. After all the high sounding rhetoric, the White House alone must bear the burden and the responsibility for the failure of legislative efforts to turn the United States around on the issue of sanctions against Rhodesia.

After Senator McGee's bill failed to pass the Senate and after the Nixon Administration's high sounding rhetoric was not converted into real support by the Nixon administration McGee said:

....A high principle is at stake and we cannot afford to project an image of hypocrisy to the world by saying one thing and doing another. The world has become too sophisticated to accept double talk. The time has come when the African Nations will also no longer accept

42 George M. Daniels, Drums of War (New York: Third Press, 1974).
double talk and hypocrisy from the United States as it concerns their vital interests and needs. Either we believe in the aspirations of the Black African nations, or we do not. Either we believe in the United Nations, or not. We cannot have it both ways. The charade must end if we are to maintain any credibility in the world at all.43

In March of 1972 the first small shipment of Rhodesian chrome ore arrived in the United States, and the Senate Armed Services Committee voted to approve S. 773, releasing it from its role as hostage to the objectives of Senator Byrd. In the first year since Section 503, total U.S. imports of ferro-chrome almost doubled over the preceding year, 1971.44 The greater part of that increase was due to massive shipments from both South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. For example, total high and low-carbon ferrochrome imports for 1971 were approximately 85,000 tons gross weight, according to the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Of that total, almost 22,000 tons came from South Africa about 26%.45 In 1972, total U.S. high and low carbon ferrochrome imports jumped to over 141,000 tons gross weight—an increase of 66%. South Africa accounted for almost 56,000 tons gross weight. Rhodesia, exporting ferrochrome to the U.S. for the first time since sanctions began, provided an additional 13,000 tons (gross weight).

43Ibid., p. 169.


45Diane Polan, Irony In Chrome: The Byrd Amendment,
The significant increase in South African imports—up to 44,000 tons—plus the Rhodesian imports together accounted for 49% of U.S. ferrochrome imports in 1972.\(^{46}\)

And in the first few months of 1973, Rhodesia provided 16,000 tons or nearly 45% of the 36,000 tons of high-carbon ferrochrome brought into the U.S. In 1973, 48,213 tons (gross weight) have been imported; 22,572, tons—or 46%—came from Rhodesia. An additional 14,888 tons was from South Africa.\(^{47}\)

And U.N. Security Council Sanctions Committee said 19 ship loads of Rhodesian strategic materials were imported into the U.S. between April 1 and October 1 of 1972, in violation of U.N. sanctions. The items shipped were chrome ore and nickel.\(^{48}\)

The United States by allowing the passage of the Byrd Amendment and by allowing Rhodesian chrome into the United States had violated article 25 of the U.N. charter which binds all states to the decision of the Security Council. As a permanent member of the Security Council, the United States could have vetoed the sanctions resolutions and thus avoided the obligation. It did not. In fact it supported

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\(^{46}\) Ibid., p. 24.

\(^{47}\) Ibid., p. 24.

and voted for them. Another question concerns the President's power to implement the sanctions. Did his Executive Orders implementing sanctions not violate the constitutional powers of the Congress to regulate foreign trade? In fact, in passing the United Nations Participation Act 1945, the Congress gave the President express authority to implement sanctions. That was one of the purpose of the Act. Section 5(a) of the Act authorized the President, "through any agency which he may designate," to investigate, regulate, or prohibit, in whole or in part economic relations..." when the Security Council called on the U.S. to apply mandatory sanctions.

Thus, since the passage of Section 503, the U.S. has been in violation of a legal international obligations.

Nixon's abrupt departure from the White House did not result in any immediate changes in U.S. policy regarding sanctions against Rhodesia, largely because Kissinger, who in trying to resolve the Middle East Crisis between Egypt and Israel, found it necessary to leave foreign policy matters regarding Rhodesia in the hands of State Department officials.

The Ford Administration

During the two years Ford was in office American policy towards United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia was not changed. The United States continued to violate sanctions legally, and like his predecessor Ford failed to translate

49 Diane Polan, *Irony In Chrome: The Byrd Amendment*
its repeated promises into active support of Congressional efforts to repeal the Byrd Amendment. In August, 1974, President Ford made a strong statement in favor of the repeal and promised the Black Congressional Caucus that he would lobby among Republicans toward that end. He changed his mind, however and backed away from a pledge to send personal letters to key Republican members of the House of Representatives urging them to support the repeal bill. Without the president's support the sponsors of the Bill decided to withdraw its "minutes before it was scheduled for consideration" because there were not sufficient votes for passage.

During 1975, Kissinger continued to suggest that the Ford administration was in favor of repeal efforts. On September 23, 1975, for example he told the OAU representatives in New York that President Ford and his entire cabinet continue to urged repeal of the Byrd Amendment and expect this will be accomplished during the current session of the Congress. Only two days later, the measure was defeated.

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52 Congressional Record, September 25, 1975, H.9107.
in the House by a margin of 22 votes. The Washington Office On Africa, which has actively lobbied for the repeal since 1972 accused the administration of total responsibility for the defeat because it had failed "to act on its statements of support for sanctions.

Furthermore, the seriousness of Ford's convictions were reflected in March of 1976, with the administration's condemnation of Mozambique for its decision to enforce U.N. sanctions by closing its 800 mile border with Rhodesia.


\[54^{54}\text{New York Times, April 28, 1976.}\]
CHAPTER IV

CARTER'S REACTION TO U.N. SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA

Although the Carter administration differs from its predecessors in some respects, by and large it has continued with previous policies, slightly adjusted to changing African realities. Most significantly, American policy now perceives Africa as a new terrain in the Cold War. The Carter administration has clearly given African issues a high priority. This was inevitable, unless the United States was to withdraw from the World.¹

The old order has collapsed, Africa is no longer simply a collection of colonies, and the struggle for independence and self-determination is now challenging the long unchallenged dominance of interests in the whole continent.

This change began at the tail end of the Ford administration with the struggle for power in Angola. The incoming President in January 1977 offered the post of United Nations Amabassador to Andrew Young, who then claimed responsibility for U.S. policy in Africa as well. The symbolism in appointing Young was clear to all: the United States would now make

it look as if a black man is in charge of American policy in Africa. Andrew Young was instructed to deal not only with the black regimes in Africa, but also with the governments in South Africa and Rhodesia. The change in style demonstrated by Young's appointment involved more than race, though, for it was Young who most strongly backed Carter's desire for a more open policy. As a result, it was in Africa that Carter's open policy got its first and greatest test as directed by Carter and executed by former Ambassador Andrew Young.

In terms of style, the initial steps of President Carter clearly expressed a desire to depart from the Kissinger pattern. The second step undertaken by the administration was the repeal of the Byrd Amendment.

In 1966 the United Nations Security Council voted 11-0 to impose mandatory sanctions against imports of all Rhodesian products, including chrome. In 1967 and again in 1968, President Johnson ordered the United States to comply with the U.N. action.

But in 1971 Congress attached the Byrd amendment to a military procurement authorization bill (PL92-156). The effect of the amendment was to exempt Rhodesian chrome ore and ferrochrome (refine chroming) from the U.N. sanctions. This placed the United States in direct violation of international law. While dozens of nations carried on a lively, if surreptitious, trade with Rhodesia from 1965 onwards, the United States suffered the embarrassment of having put into
law what other nations did convertly. As a statement of ideal policy direction and reassurance to the black Africans, the Carter administration strongly backed the repeal of the Byrd Amendment.

Congress on March 15, 1977 cleared legislation (HR 1746-PL 95-12)\(^2\) giving President Carter the authority he wanted to halt U.S. imports of chrome ore from Rhodesia, whose white minority-ruled government was opposed by most nations of the world.

The Carter administration called for the trade ban power as a way to show black Africans that the United States was committed—beyond policy statements—to majority rule and equal rights in Rhodesia. Congress completed action on the bill in time for the President's March 17 address to the United Nations, which had adopted trade sanctions against Rhodesia in 1966. The Senate approved HR 1746 March 15 by a 66-26 vote. The House had passed the bill on March 14 by a 250-146 vote.\(^3\)

Although the United States implemented the U.N. policy in 1968, Congress three years later approved an amendment sponsored by Sen. Harry F. Byrd Jr. (Ind. Va.) that barred the President from refusing to import strategic metals from non-communist countries.\(^4\) HR 1746 the so-called Byrd amend-


\(^3\)Ibid., p. 328.

\(^4\)Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1971, p. 305.
ment as law, but suspended its provisions as it applied to imports from Rhodesia. The bill also required foreign steel suppliers to certify that their products did not contain Rhodesian chromium.

Congress' success in 1977 in overturning the Byrd amendment where it had failed in the past was attributed to two factors, one political, one economic. In 1976 the United States announced that it would support majority rule initiatives in Southern Africa, a policy the Carter administration quickly endorsed. In addition, the chrome-dependent stainless steel industry had announced that it was no longer dependent on Rhodesian chromium, the key argument by supporters of the Byrd amendment in previous debates.

Since 1971, technological advances had permitted the processing of low quality chromium ore from other sources, chiefly South Africa and Brazil. But it was the political argument that dominated debate in the House and Senate. "President Carter has made it clear that the adoption of this measure is important to his leadership in the conduct of African foreign policy," the bill's floor manager Donald M. Fraser (D. Minn.) told the House.

In the Senate, sponsor Dick Clark (D. Iowa) said the existing chromium trade gave hope to Rhodesian leader Ian

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6 Ibid., p. 328.
Smith "that in the end the United States will come to his aid...." U.S. compliance with the United Nations sanctions Clark added, "will help to encourage Smith to accept a peaceful settlement...that is short of war."  

The problem with the Byrd amendment its opponents said was that it undermined the credibility of President Carter's support of self-determination and majority rule in Rhodesia and created hostility to the United States among black African nations, which in the long view could be essential to U.S. trade interests. Furthermore, they said the amendment weakened the United Nations as an instrument of peaceful change and gave the impression that the United States was not willing to sacrifice a small commercial interest for the principle of democracy and racial equality. 

Tourism represented the second largest source of sorely needed foreign exchange for the Smith regime. Based on statistics from surrounding areas, U.S. tourists represented at least 20 percent of those visitors. The Carter administration did nothing to stop that illegal travel by Americans. Neither did the administration do anything to close the Rhodesian Information Office in Washington, D.C. or the Air Rhodesia Office in New York City which had been a major arm of the Rhodesian regime in the United States, Renten Cowley, general manager of the New York Air Rhodesia Office, also

7Ibid., p. 239.

acted on behalf of Rhodesia's United Touring Company. The office operated under the guise of being a noncommercial tourist information office. Despite U.S. government investigations in 1965, 1968 and 1971, Mr. Cowley maintained a license from the Treasury department to receive and send monies to Rhodesia under the "humanitarian" provisions of the federal government regulations on sanctions.

U.N. Resolution 253 tightened and expanded sanctions, calling for an end to all trade with Rhodesia. Executive Order 11419 (1968) implemented the second U.N. resolution banning all imports from and exports to Rhodesia, except for humanitarian purposes. All violations under the executive orders are subject to fines up to $10,000 and/or prison terms up to ten years.

The executive orders were further spelled out in regulations issued by the enforcing departments. Regulations of the Department of Transportation's Federal Aviation Administration govern many aspects of tourism.

Special FAA Regulation 21 provided in Section 2 that:

c. No U.S. air carrier may operate any aircraft....

1. To or from Southern Rhodesia; or

2. In coordination with any airlines company, or aircraft registered, in Southern Rhodesia, whether by connecting flight, interline agreement, block booking, ticketing, or any other method or linking up.

d. The prohibitions in this section apply to the owner, lessee, operator, or character of the aircraft, and any other officer, employee, or agent of any of them who participates in the prohibited carriage or operator.
e. Any carriage or operation the purpose or effect of which is to evade any prohibition of this section is also prohibited.

The Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control was assigned to monitor any transfer of funds to Rhodesia. The office handled this through a licensing procedure to permit only legal transactions. The Carter administration knew about this sanction breaking activity by Americans and the Air Rhodesia Office but did not stop the activities and the Treasury Department continued sending money to Rhodesia on the pretext that the travels were humanitarian.

The Carter administration refused to close the Rhodesian Information Office, but only prohibited its future funding by Rhodesia, when they knew that getting funds for the Rhodesian Information Office will not be a problem. Thus by allowing the Rhodesian Information Office to open, the Carter administration gave Smith's illegal regime tacit recognition. The United States, Australia, South Africa and Portugal are the only countries that allowed Rhodesia to have an Information Office when sanctions were in effect.

9 The Corporate Examiner, October 1977, P-C.
10 Ibid., P-C.
CHAPTER V

SANCTION BUSTING AMERICAN STYLE

How Rhodesia Got Its Oil

In 1973, Americans learned during the Arab oil embargo, just what a shortage of Petroleum could do to their livelihood. Supposedly a much more serious trade embargo has been in force against Rhodesia's white minority regime for the past decade. But petroleum shipments to Rhodesia have continued almost without disruption, in spite of the mandatory United Nations sanctions which were aimed at achieving majority rule.

When sanctions was in effect the tiny white population of Rhodesia hung onto power with a tenacity few could have foreseen. But no amount of determination by them could have kept their economy and military machine operating if they had not received a steady flow of oil supplies.

The Center for Social Action of the United Church of Christ, obtained a series of revealing secret documents, which appear to show that the Mobil Oil Corporation subsidiary in South Africa and its subsidiary in Rhodesia jointly planned and implemented a decade long-campaign to provide Rhodesia's oil needs.

Mobil repeatedly denied any sanction breaking activity.
Mobil's Chairman, Rawleigh Warner, Jr., has said that since U.S. law forbids Mobil and its affiliates from engaging in any transactions involving goods destined for Rhodesia, "the management of Mobil International Division has gone to considerable effort to make sure that we have complied fully with the restrictions imposed upon us by the U.S. government in this connection."¹

Yet it would appear that if he consulted with his international Division Executive Vice President who is also a director of Mobil (South Africa), he might learn that a highly sophisticated scheme seems to have been operated by Mobil (South Africa) for ten years whereby the latter sold oil products to Rhodesia through an agreed chain of intermediary South African Companies, most of which were in fact bogus.² These products were ultimately retailed by oil companies within Rhodesia, including Mobils Rhodesia subsidiary. The intention of the scheme seems to have been to allow oil products to get through this chain without the eventual destination being discovered by outside observers.

Shortly before UDI, a pipeline to carry crude oil was built from Beira on the Mozambican coast to Umtali in

¹Center For Social Action, The Oil Conspiracy (United Church of Christ, 1976), p. 3.

Rhodesia. At Umtali an oil refinery was built by a consortium in which the principal partners were Mobil, Caltex, Total, Shell and BP; these were the five foreign oil companies marketing oil products in Rhodesia. This refinery could produce virtually all the oil products that Rhodesia needed. However, after the imposition of voluntary sanctions in November 1965, the refinery was starved of Crude oil.

In the Spring of 1966, the Ian Smith regime attempted to get around sanctions regulations by arranging through intermediaries for an oil tanker, the Joann V, to be purchased while on the high seas. It then sailed to Beira with its Cargo of some 400,000 tons of crude oil, which was then enough to provide Rhodesia oil needs for about a year. After intensive diplomatic activity, the Joanna V was prevented from unloading its cargo and Britain was empowered by the United Nations to use force to prevent other tankers from bringing crude oil to Beira. Britain's naval blockade of Beira continued until 1976, when the newly independent Mozambique declared that it would enforce sanctions. (Before independence, Mozambique had been a Portuguese colony, and Portugal under Salazar and Caetano had refused to implement sanctions).

Unfortunately for Southern Rhodesia, there was no re

4Center For Social Action, The Oil Conspiracy (United Church of Christ, 1976), p. 6.
finery at the other end of the Beira pipeline. Since early 1966, the pipeline has not been used and the Rhodesian refinery has fallen into dispair. The oil left in the pipeline—some 14,000 tons of it—has lain dormant, and there has even been dispute as to who owns it.5

Many thought that this represented the beginning of the end of Rhodesia. It was impossible to import crude oil, and the only alternative was to import a whole range of different oil products over lengthy land routes. This would not only be expensive, but it would also involve evading sanctions regulations for the importation of each product. However, to the consternation of those who maintained that sanctions regulations would finish the Smith regime "within weeks, not months," it became clear from the reports of visitors to Rhodesia that oil products were still arriving from somewhere. Gas stations operated by the Rhodesian subsidiaries of Mobil, Caltex, Shell, BP and Total continued selling their usual range of products.6 The most that the oil companies in Rhodesia would say was that they bought their products from a government agency within Southern Rhodesia, yet their parent companies outside Rhodesia denied supplying Rhodesia and said that their Rhodesian subsidiaries were being answerable to the illegal Rhodesian

5Ibid., p. 6.

The Rhodesian government set up a secret agency called GENTA. Ostensibly a private company, it is obscurely listed in the Rhodesian telephone book as "GENTA (Pvt.) Limited," with an address in Central Salisbury. In fact, it is 100 percent owned by the Rhodesian government, and its chairman (George Atmore) and operations manager (D. Airey) were previously civil servants in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Few people in Southern Rhodesia know of Genta's existence, let alone its role.

Genta's actual role since its establishment has been two-fold: firstly, it serves as a front, to act on behalf of the government; secondly, it exerts a tight control over the importation into Southern Rhodesia of the principal oil products and over the activities of the Southern Rhodesian subsidiaries of the various oil companies. Indeed, it was Genta which arranged the purchasing of the oil tanker Joanna V, mentioned earlier.

Genta's first significant act was to tell the oil companies that it would be responsible for the importation into Southern Rhodesia of all fuel products. It would then sell these to the oil companies within Southern Rhodesia for subsequent marketing at their respective gas stations. But

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7Rand Daily Mail, February 16, 1966. See also U.D.I. by Robert Good (Faber and Faber, London, 1973)

8Center For Social Action, The Oil Conspiracy (The United Church of Christ, 1976), p. 7.
for non-fuel oil products, such as lubricants, the oil companies would have to arrange their own importation. Genta allocated the importation of Southern Rhodesia's gasoline (both premium and regular) and diesel and Avtur to one company—Mobil. Other companies were allocated the task of importing Rhodesia's requirements of the other fuels—for instance, Shell imported the Avgas 100/130.9

Before explaining Mobil's role in providing Rhodesia's fuel needs, it is necessary to provide a little information on some of the companies and subsidiaries involved.

The Mobil Oil Corporation (USA) is the world's eighth largest company, with assets and annual sales both valued at around $9 billion. It is a U.S.-registered company, but it has subsidiaries registered in dozens of other countries. Its own principal subsidiaries in South Africa, both wholly-owned, are:

(a) Mobil oil Southern Africa (Proprietary) limited, which I will refer to as Mobil (South Africa), and which internal Mobil documents refer to as MOSA;

(b) The Mobil Refining Company Southern Africa (Proprietary) limited, which I will refer to as "the" Mobil Refinery (because it runs Mobil's only refinery in the Southern half of Africa, at Durban in South Africa), and which internal Mobil documents refer to as 'Moref'.

Mobil's principal subsidiary in Southern Rhodesia, also wholly owned, is Mobil oil Southern Rhodesia (Private) limited. I will refer to this as Mobil (Rhodesia), and internal Mobil

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9Ibid., p. 8.
documents refer to it as MOSR.

Once the oil refinery in Southern Rhodesia became Starved of Crude oil, Mobil (Rhodesia) had to obtain nearly all of its oil products from the Mobil Refinery at Durban. All marketing of Mobil Refinery, products is carried out by Mobil (South Africa), so that for Mobil (Rhodesia) to obtain its oil products, it had to purchase them from Mobil (South Africa). But here there was a problem, brought about by sanctions regulations. In the words of Mobil chairman Warner, these regulations "had the effect of prohibiting the Mobil group of companies from engaging outside Rhodesia in any transactions involving goods...destined for Rhodesia...."¹⁰ Thus it seems that in order for Mobil (South Africa) to supply Mobil (Rhodesia), some way had to be found to cloak the transactions so as to get around sanctions regulations.

An elaborate scheme was then devised to make it look as if Mobil (South Africa) was not involved in any trade with Southern Rhodesia. The physical transportation of oil products from the Mobil refinery to Southern Rhodesia posed no real problem, since unmarked railway cars were used. The problem lay in the paperwork, because nowhere in Mobil (South Africa's) accounts department should there be a copy of an invoice billing a Southern Rhodesian company.

The scheme consisted of creating what was termed a "paper-chase"—in Watergate parlance it might be called "laun-

¹⁰Ibid., p. 6.
dering the gasoline." This paper-chase was a system whereby sales and payments would be passed through various South African companies which acted as intermediaries. Thus Mobil (South Africa) could sell products to a South African company, knowing that they would eventually sell them to the required in Southern Rhodesia.

Gasoline Paper-Chase

The method used until August 1968 for the importation of most of Southern Rhodesia's gasoline requirements, which is illustrated in Diagram 1, was as follows: On receiving instructions concerning the quantities required by Genta, Mobil (South Africa) sold the required amount of gasoline to Sasol. (This is the South African Coal, Oil and Gas Corporation, all of whose shares are owned by the Industrial Development Corporation, itself owned by South African government). Sasol in turn sold exactly the same amount of gasoline to a South African company called Parry Leon and Hayhoe, at P.O. Box 1101, Johannesburg. Parry Leon and Hayhoe then sent to Mobil (Rhodesia) a copy of the invoice that they had just received from Sasol.12

This was because it was generally agreed that Parry Leon should avoid writing out any invoice on which Mobil (Rhodesia's) name was mentioned; so Mobil (Rhodesia) promised

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11 Financial Mail, March 5, 1971.

12 Center For Social Action, The Oil Conspiracy. (The United Church of Christ, 1976), pp. 7-8.
to treat this copy (of an invoice from Sasol to Parry Leon) as if it were an invoice made out to them. Mobil (Rhodesia) then sold the gasoline to Genta. Finally, Genta sold the gasoline in agreed proportions to the five oil companies in Rhodesia (Mobil, Caltex, Total, Shell and BP. This meant that Mobil (Rhodesia) bought back from Genta some of the fuel it had imported on Genta's behalf. It also meant that gas stations in Rhodesia belonging to Shell, BP, Total and Caltex were all selling gasoline that had been produced at the Mobil Refinery. The payment scheme then took place in reverse. Genta paid Mobil (Rhodesia) who paid Parry Leon and Hayhoe, who paid Sasol, who paid Mobil (South Africa).

Thus a way had been found for getting gasoline from Mobil (South Africa) to Genta via Mobil (Rhodesia), with the active assistance of a South African state-owned Corporation (Sasol) and without there being any documentary evidence of a sale to a Rhodesian company by any of the three companies involved in South Africa.¹³

**Improved Paper Chase**

At Genta's insistence, Mobil (Rhodesia) and Mobil (South Africa) then devised a more sophisticated method for importing gasoline. By this time Parry Leon and Hayhoe had been amalgamated into a large South African firm called Freight Services Ltd., a shipping and forwarding company based in Johannesburg, Freight Services Ltd. has from the

¹³Ibid., p. 10.
beginning played an absolutely crucial role as a middle-man in evading of Rhodesian sanctions. The first thing that Freight Services Ltd. did as part of the "new" method of sending gasoline to Rhodesia was to rent P.O. Box 31883 at Braamfontein (in Johannesburg), and to use this as the address for a bogus company they invented called Minerals Exploration Ltd. 14

Two other bogus companies were also invented. The first was called Rand Oils Ltd., this used the mailing address P.O. Box 2581, Johannesburg, and was operated by a man called David D. Patrick. The second was named the Western Transvaal Development and Exploration Company, and used the address P.O. Box 677, Lichtenburg, Transvaal. This was operated by an attorney called Arnold Jacobus Oberholzer, of the legal firm Oberholzer and Van Straaten, at P.O. Box 396, Lichtenburg. 15

The ordering of gasoline was a relatively simple process. Genta specified to Mobil (Rhodesia) how much gasoline they wanted from Mobil (South Africa); Mobil (Rhodesia) then passed this request on by letter, tellex or telephone. As was illustrated in diagram 1, consecutive shipments of gasoline were handled in different ways. All would be sold first


15 Center For Social Action, The Oil Conspiracy (The United Church of Christ, 1976), p. 10.
by Mobil (South Africa) to Sasol but then took varying paths. One shipment would be apparently resold by Sasol to Rand Oils Ltd., who would "resell" it to the Western Transvaal Development and Exploration Company (W.T. Development). They, in turn, would be sold directly by Sasol to Minerals Exploration. The third would be sold by Sasol to W.T. Development, who would "resell" it to Rand Oils, who would it to Mineral Exploration. The fourth shipment would then take the first route again and so on.16

However, it was not only the companies involved that were bogus: at certain stages the very sales were bogus too.

Let us take as an example a shipment of 10,000 litres of premium gasoline sold along the right hand line, i.e. from Mobil (South Africa) to Sasol to W.T. Development to Rand Oils to Minerals Exploration. The first sale, from Mobil (South Africa) was genuine enough. But then things became a little more clouded (which was of course the intention). Sasol filled in an invoice (for example, invoice number 12345), billing W.T. Development for sale of 10,000 litres of Premium. On receiving this, W.T. Development filled in an invoice form with the W.T. Development letterhead billing Rand Oils for the sale of 10,000 litres of premium. On it Mr. Oberholzer attorney of W.T. Development put the same date and same invoices number as he found on the invoice he had

just received from Sasol. When Mr. Patrick of Rand Oils, received this invoice, he filled in an invoice from with the bogus Rand Oil letterhead, again putting the same date and invoice number and billing Minerals Exploration for the sale of 10,000 litres of premium.

Minerals Exploration then filled in an invoice billing a Genta account at the Netherlands Bank (a South African Bank). The Netherlands Bank had standing instructions to pay Minerals Exploration out of the Genta account on receiving such an invoice from Minerals Exploration. But Minerals Exploration instead of paying Rand Oils (who had theoretically sold them the consignment of premium), bypass both them and W.T. Development, and made a payment direct to Sasol—despite the fact that Sasol had never made out a bill to them. Finally, Sasol paid Mobil (South Africa).\(^1\)

To avoid the delays that sometimes resulted from the large number of middle-men involved, Sasol arranged to send directly to Minerals Exploration, in a sealed envelope, a copy of the invoice selling the gasoline to W.T. Development. Thus Minerals Exploration received a copy of invoice number 12345 from Sasol to W.T. Development billing the latter for 10,000 litres of premium. Although Minerals Exploration was not mentioned anywhere on that invoice, they then knew that the paper-chase had begun and that some time later they would receive an invoice number 12345 from Rand Oils billing them

\(^1\)\textit{\ldots}, p. 10.
for the same amount of premium.\textsuperscript{18} The receipt of the duplicate invoice from Sasol to W.T. Development therefore served as an authorization for Minerals Exploration to proceed immediately with billing the Netherlands Bank (Genta account) for the amount of premium mentioned in that duplicate. In fact, that meant that the bank could then pay them for the premium before they even received the invoice actually made out to them by Rands Oils. In Mobil Parlance, Minerals Exploration was authorized to use the duplicate invoice from Sasol as their "action document."\textsuperscript{19}

Genta was able to keep track of the whole procedure at one step removed, because whenever the Netherlands Bank received an invoice from Minerals Exploration, they sent to Genta a copy of that invoice.

The only place where Mobil (Rhodesia) featured in the whole business was when Minerals Exploration sent them, for statistical purposes, those very same copy invoices that they had received directly from Sasol.

By 1971, the payment procedure had been modified slightly, in that the Minerals Exploration bills to Genta were sent care of the Rhodesian Mission in Johannesburg rather than


\textsuperscript{19} Center For Social Action, The Oil Conspiracy (The United Church of Christ, 1976), p. 11.
care of the Netherlands Banks.²⁰

The most significant aspect of the whole operation was that Mobil (Rhodesia) could claim that it was not buying gasoline from outside Rhodesia. But what was happening was that Mobil (South Africa) was secreting arranging to supply Rhodesia with its gasoline requirements. The role of Mobil (Rhodesia) was to help set up the paper-chase, i.e. the chain of intermediaries, whereby Genta could import gasoline. Genta then resold this gasoline to all the oil companies in Rhodesia-including Mobil.

Various other objectives were achieved by this apparently laborious procedure. Firstly, none of the companies concerned sold the premium to an address in Rhodesia - the nearest they came to it was when Minerals Exploration sold it to Genta care of their agents in South Africa (i.e. the Netherlands Bank). Secondly, Minerals Exploration was a front behind which the company doing most of the crucial work (i.e. Freight Services Ltd.) was able to hide. Thirdly, neither Rand Oils nor W.T. Development had to be entrusted with actually handling the vast quantities of money involved in paying for these shipments. Fourthly, neither of these two companies was able to compile statistics on the full extent of the traffic, because neither was involved in all of the shipments. Finally, there was nowhere within Sasol's sales department anywhere that Minerals Exploration was buying

²⁰ Ibid., p. 11.
so much gasoline from Sasol to Rand Oils or W.T. Development. This was important, because Sasol is owned by the South African government, and it could have caused embarrassment if it was realised that Sasol was selling so much gasoline to a company acting as a front for Freight Services Ltd., which was involved in a number of other sanction-breaking activities. The fact that Sasol was secretly sending duplicate invoices directly to Minerals Exploration provides some evidence that Sasol was aware of the true nature of the whole operation.21

The Diesel Paper Chase

As with gasoline, the method whereby diesel fuel was imported into Southern Rhodesia was rendered considerably more sophisticated from September 1968. Again, most of Southern Rhodesia's requirements were provided by Mobil (South Africa) and Minerals Exploration was the key link between them and Genta. The middle-men between Mobil (South Africa) and Minerals Exploration (See Diagram 2) were the bogus companies, Rand Oils, and W.T. Development plus two more (probably bogus) called Botswana Carriers and Botswana Transport, plus one whose name was not mentioned and will be called company X. The payment procedures and the use of copy invoices were the same as for gasoline importation.

However, by 1971, the procedure had been somewhat simplified, in that the number of middle-men between Mobil (South Africa) and Minerals Exploration were reduced to one,

namely, the Motor and Industrial Transport Corporation, a subsidiary of a large South African Company called Bonuskor Ltd. When Mobil (South Africa) sent an invoice to Motor and Industrial, they sent it not to their official address, but to Box 31883 in Braamfontein—which happens to be the address of Minerals Exploration, itself a front for Freight Services Ltd.22 Thus there was not need for Motor and Industrial to make out an invoice to Minerals Exploration; the Freight Services employee who handled the mail coming into Box 31883 opened the letters containing invoices addressed to Motor and Industrial, and then made out similar invoices to Genta on Minerals Exploration paper as before.

Aviation Turbine Fuel (Avtur)

This, again was imported by Genta from Mobil (South Africa), who provided all of Rhodesia's requirements. This time the paper-chase was relatively simple; Freight Services brought the Avtur from Mobil (South Africa) and sold it directly to Genta.

Aviation Gasoline (AVGAS)

This was imported in two ways, according to the type of Avgas. All Rhodesia's requirements of Avgas 100/130 were imported by GENTA from Shell (South Africa). Avgas 115/145 and Avgas 80 were imported by Genta from Mobil (South Africa) using two alternative middle men: Trek (a haulage company, not the better known Trek Petroleum Company) and caritas (a

22Ibid., p. 7.
firm of clearing agents).

When Mobil (Rhodesia), acting for Genta, ordered Avgas 115/145 by telex from Mobil (South Africa), the code word "pineapples" was used; and the word "paw-paws" was used for Avtar.23

**Non-Fuel Oil Products**

Mobil also used the paper-chase concept for importing into Southern Rhodesia various non-fuel oil products such as lubricants. Different intermediaries were used for different products, just as with fuels. Again, as with fuels, the Mobil refinery in South Africa was almost always the source of the products. But with these non-fuel products, Genta did not feature in the buying chain; as has already been stated, Genta left it to the various oil companies to arrange their own importation of these products.

**The Evidence (Document #1)**

From Genta to the Managing Director of Mobil (Rhodesia).

"...we attach a statement detailing estimated requirements of Petroleum fuels for the period January/April 1974 (...) we shall be obliged if you will also pass this information to your associates i.e. Mobil (South Africa)."

(Quote taken from Document #1)²⁴

Document #1 is a letter from D. Airey, who is Operations

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²³ Center For Social Action, The Oil Conspiracy (The United Church of Christ, 1976), p. 12.

Manager of Genta, the semi-secret Rhodesian government agency controlling fuel imports. It is addressed to Berwick Nicol, Managing Director of Mobil (Rhodesia). Mr. Atmore is Chairman of Genta. The "visit to Capetwon" refers to visiting the head office of Mobil South Africa. "Your associate" refers to Mobil (South Africa).

Document # 2

From Mobil (South Africa) to Mobil (Rhodesia): "... we should be able to supply your initial requirements of Hexane without too much trouble. (...) I think you can tell Rhodesian Industries that we will be able to supply them during 1974...."

(Quote taken from Document #2). 25

Note the marked sections, including: (a) the crucial reference to supplying Mobil (Rhodesia) with some Hexane apparently originating in the U.S.A. (b) the reference to the possibility of an embargo being imposed by the American government on oil exports from U.S.A. to South Africa or by the South African government on exports to Rhodesia.

This is a letter from M.H.W. Gubb of Mobil (South Africa), to Bill Jackson of Mobil (Rhodesia).

Document # 16

From Mobil (Rhodesia) to Mobil (South Africa), concerning the flow-diagram for the paper-chase for importing diesel fuel (See Diagram 2):

The important feature of this plan is that the original billings by MOSA Mobil (South Africa to the two or three organizations in the top line and the subsequent re-billing by those organizations to the second line and ultimately the third re-billing by the second line to the third line are, to all intents and purposes, meaningless and are merely our false trail being laid....

You might consider that the procedure that we have adopted is unduly complicated and unnecessary, but as was conveyed to you when you were here, it is the wish of George's people a reference to Genta, whose chairman is George Atmore that we involve and complicate this matter to a far greater degree than pertains at present in the hope that it will discourage an investigation.

(Quote taken from Document #16).

**Document #17**

From an internal Mobil (Rhodesia) report:

When orders for lubricants and solvents are placed on our South African associates i.e. Mobil (South Africa), a carefully planned paper-chase is used to disguise the final destination of these products. This is necessary in order to make sure that there is no link between MOSA Mobil (Rhodesia's) supplies....

This paper-chase which costs very little to administer, is done primarily to hide the fact that MOSA is in fact supplying MOSR with product in contravention of U.S. sanctions regulations....

Genta allocates to Mobil the importation of Premium, Regular, ADO diesel fuel, and Avtur Aviation turbine fuel. Avtur is imported on behalf of industry despite frequent attempts by Shell to stop this....While Mobil imports Avtur, other companies import kerosene, argas....

(Quotes taken from Documents #17).

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From another internal Mobil (Rhodesia) report:

With U.D.I., it became necessary to impose certain security restrictions so as not to link Mobil South Africa with Mobil Rhodesia. The East Coast route i.e. by shio from South Africa to Mozambique, and thence by rail to Rhodesia was therefore, overlooked for the following reasons: (...) With the East Coast being under heavy surveillance it was considered undesirable to have Mobil drums stacked at Mozambique ports, even though the names of the drums had been painted out.

(Quote taken from Document #18). 28

Document #11

This part of a 1973 Mobil (Rhodesia) report. Paragraph four is very important. It suggests that there was a direct payment from Mobil (Rhodesia) to Mobil (South Africa), which would be a particular blatant evasion of sanctions regulations. 29

Legal Points

We will not attempt here to carry out a definite interpretation of the law as it applies to sanctions: that will be left to Mobil's Chairman, who has been quoted. In this regard it is appropriate here to quote some sections from U.S. Treasury regulation:

530.201

"All of the following direct or indirect transactions by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States

Transfers of property which involve merchandise destined to Southern Rhodesia or to or for the account of business nationals thereof;

"Other transfers of property to or on behalf of or for the benefit of any person in Southern Rhodesia (including the authorities thereof)...."

530.301

"The term "person" means an individual, partnership, association, corporation, or other organization."

530.307

The term person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States includes:

1. Any person, wheresoever located, who is a citizen or resident of the United States;

2. Any person actually within the United States;

3. Any Corporation organized under the laws of the United States or of any state territory, possession, or district of the United States; and

4. Any partnership, association, corporation, or other organization organized under the laws of, or having its principal place of business in, Southern Rhodesia which is owned or controlled by persons specified in subparagraphs (1), (2) or (3) of this paragraph.

530.404

Section 530.201 prohibits persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States who are officers, directors or principal managerial personnel of business enterprises in foreign countries from being involved in any transaction subject to 530.201. Such persons are involved in transactions when they authorize or permit the foreign business enterprise to engage in a transaction subject to 530.201, even if they do not themselves actively engage in the transaction.
"Section 530.201 prohibits persons who directly or indirectly own or control any person in Southern Rhodesia from authorizing or permitting the latter to engage in any transfer of property prohibited by 530.20."\(^\text{30}\)

It will be noted that subsidiaries of U.S. corporations which are not organized under the laws of Rhodesia or which have their principal place of business outside Rhodesia—for example, a South African subsidiary—are not listed as "included" in this administrative interpretation of the Executive Order. This constitutes a major apparent loophole which is found in parallel regulations dealing with trading with other "enemies." However, the sanctions regulations do cover Rhodesian subsidiaries, and goods of U.S. origin and U.S. citizens.

The Mobil case would seem to involve all of these. It must be presumed that Mobil (U.S.A.) and/or its officers and managers had reason to know of the activities which Mobil Rhodesia was carrying on with Mobil South African subsidiary.

Bearing in mind the evidence on sanctions evasion that has been presented, it would appear that section 530.404 applies to any American citizen such as the director of Mobil (South Africa) who has knowledge of an illegal transaction.

—Everett S. Checket is an American citizen. He is a member of board of directors of Mobil (South Africa). He is

\(^{30}\)Ibid., pp. 30-31, (or check Executive Orders).
also Executive Vice President (second only to the President) if the International Division of Mobil Oil Corporation, which owns Mobil (South Africa). One of the countries he is responsible for within the Mobil empire is South Africa. It is to him that William Beck, Chairman of Mobil (South Africa) has to report.31

In November 1975, the chairman of Mobil wrote the letter we have already quoted, in which he said: "The management of our international division has gone to considerable effort to make sure that we have complied fully with the restrictions imposed upon us by the U.S. government in connection with sanctions regulations."

---Charles E. Solomon is an American citizen. At the time when almost all of the documents I have quoted when this report was written, he was a member of the board of Mobil (Southern Africa). He was also President of the International Division of Mobil Oil Corporation, and a member of its board.

---Faneuil Adams Jr is an American citizen. He is Vice President of Planning in the International Division of Mobil Oil Corporation. From 1972 to 1975 he was President of Mobil South Inc. At that time he was also on the board of Mobil (South Africa) and it was to him that William Beck then reported.32

---Ibid., p. 31.

---Ibid., p. 31.
It is hard to imagine that the sanctions breaking activities of Mobil (South Africa) were unknown to its board; after all they involved business worth tens of millions of dollars, which would normally be reported on and evaluated at board meetings. And with three U.S. citizens who are or have been directors of Mobil (South Africa) and every senior executives within Mobil (USA), it is difficult to see how Mobil (USA) could be said not to know of the sanctions-breaking activities of its subsidiary.

American Carriers And Sanctions Busting

Flying to Rhodesia can be one of the easiest experiences an American traveller might have if he has visited or is planning to visit foreign lands. No Visa is required, just one or two innoculations, a passport, and a confirmed onward reservation. And your air travel reservations? Drop by your Pan American ticket counter here in the United States and in seconds the computer will confirm your space on an Air Rhodesia flight from Johannesburg, South Africa to the Rhodesian Capital of Salisbury.

This has been the experience, at least, of many Americans who travelled to Rhodesia during the past few years. It is all very convenient. The trouble is that when Pan American, TWA and other American carriers help make the going great to Salisbury, they apparently do it illegally.

Acting under authority granted by the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, the President issued Executive Orders 11322 and 11419 dated January 5, 1967 and July 29,
1968, which defined American participation in the sanctions. These orders have the force of law. Under Section 5(b) of the United Nations Participation Act, any person "who willfully violates or evades or attempts to violate or evade" such an Order is subject, upon conviction, to a fine of not more than $10,000, imprisonment for not more than ten years or both.

The Executive Orders prohibited, with certain humanitarian, educational and other exceptions:

---Transfer of Funds directly or indirectly to any person or body in Rhodesia;

---Operation of any United States Air Carrier or aircraft owned or chartered by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or of United States registration (i) to or from Southern Rhodesia or (ii) in coordination with any airline company constituted or aircraft registered in Rhodesia.33

Thus, the regulations issued by the American government appear explicit. And, considering the penalties for their violation, they have teeth. But somehow their bite has been less inhibiting than it could be.

And from 1972-1974 a study on Rhodesia was carried out by Anthony Lake with funding from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. On July 15, 1973, Mr. Lake went to Pan-American offices in Washington and made a reservation in the name of Lake on Air Rhodesia flight 876 for October 7, 1973, from the Rhodesian capital, Salisbury, to Bantyre, Malawi. Reservations were also made for other flights in a planned

33 Full text of Executive Orders and U.N. Resolutions in Appendix.
journey from Washington to Salisbury and back. The reservation was confirmed within seconds by Pan American's computer. On August 8, 1973, a reservation was made in the name of Stephen Park at the TWA office in Washington for travel to Africa and back. It included Air Rhodesia flights 873 and 731. The tickets for all the flights from Washington to Salisbury and back were paid for by major American credit cards.  

Pan American and TWA were asked by these two gentlemen if there would be problems getting into Rhodesia due to the sanctions program. In neither case did their ticket agents seem particularly aware of the sanctions. Both offices assured Mr. Lake and Mr. Park that all that is required to enter Rhodesia is a valid passport, an onward reservation, and a smallpox vaccination (according to Pan American) or a yellow fever inoculation (According to TWA).  

Pan American is apparently acting in violation of two sections of Executive Order 11419, and TWA is probably in violation of at least one, if not both of them.

Section 1(g) of the Order prohibits "Operation of any U.S. carrier or aircraft owned or chartered by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or of United States registration (i) to or from Southern Rhodesia or

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(ii) in coordination with any airline company constituted or aircraft registered in Southern Rhodesia." (Emphasis added). 36

The Executive Order was defined in greater detail by Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 21, promulgated September 18, 1968 by the Federal Aviation Administration: "No U.S. air carrier may operate any aircraft....(2) In coordination with any airline company constituted, or aircraft registered, in Southern Rhodesia, whether by connecting flight, inter-line agreement, block booking, ticketing, or any other method of link up." 37

Both Pan American and TWA will make reservation for connecting flights into or from Rhodesia on South African Airways, Air Rhodesia or Air Malawi. In addition, tickets for these connecting flights will be issued by Pan American and TWA.

Pan American airline does hold a block of seats on Air Rhodesia flights that it can sell up to four days before any particular flight. This arrangement, is part of an inter-line agreement between Pan American and Air Rhodesia. 38 Thus Pan American is acting in violation of the specific provisions of special federal aviation regulation No. 21. TWA also has an inter-line agreement with Air Rhodesia.

36 See Appendix.


38 Ibid., p. 7.
Section 1(f) of Executive Order 11419 prohibits "transfer by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States directly or indirectly to any person or body in Southern Rhodesia of any finds or other financial or economic resources."\(^{39}\)

Both Pan American and TWA receive from the customer the full payment of the airfare from Washington to Salisbury and return, including payment for flights on other airlines. They then transfer those payments to connecting carriers.

When the connecting carrier is Air Rhodesia, this would seem clearly to be a "transfer of funds to a person or body in Southern Rhodesia."

Transfer of funds among international air carriers reportedly takes place in one of two ways. The most common method is through the International Air Transport Association (IATA), an independent organization which, among other functions, serves as a clearing house through which international airlines settle accounts with each other. And Air-Rhodesia is not a member of this organization.

This leaves the second method of payment, direct billing, as the means by which Pan American and TWA apparently transferred funds to Air Rhodesia. In the study by Anthony Lake a Pan American official confirmed in a telephone interview that, that was the method used by that airline. Also in the report Pan American stated that it transferred to Air Rhodesia

\(^{39}\)See Appendix.
in 1972 approximately $200,000.\textsuperscript{40}

This raise questions, of course, about how the Executive Orders were implemented by the U.S. government. According to Lake's report, there is some doubt the meticulousness with which the government had monitored compliance by American air carriers with the executive order and the FAA regulation. In the report it is stated that:

Some government officials recall that checks were made some years ago with Pan American and others. Other officials aren't able to substantiate this and one Pan American official who had some responsibility in this area could not recall such attention from the government. An FAA official, after reviewing his files, stated that no contact with members of the airlines industry was ever made.\textsuperscript{41}

Section 2(b) of the Executive Order delegates "To the Secretary of Transportation, the function and responsibility of enforcement relating to the operation of air carriers and aircraft...." With the Department of Transportation, the Federal Aviation Administration has been given enforcement responsibility. In the report by Lake the FAA does not have any monitoring system to keep the Agency informed of what the airlines are doing with regard to Rhodesia sanctions.

The FAA thus apparently relies on the knowledge of the regulations by officials of American Air Carriers, and their willingness to comply with them. And, Pan American, TWA and


\textsuperscript{41}Ibid., p. 9.
perhaps other American carriers are apparently unaware of the regulations or consciously acting in violation of them.

Section 2(c) of the Executive Order 11419 delegates to the Secretary of the Treasury in effect, responsibility for enforcement of Section 1(d), which governs the transfer of "financial or economic resources" to Rhodesia. Pan American and TWA and perhaps other carriers were remitting funds to Air Rhodesia, their apparent violation of the executive order would fall within the Treasury Department's purview. Yet somehow the Treasury Department was apparently unaware of these and other transfers.

Rent A Car In Rhodesia

While American carriers will smooth your way into Salisbury, Hertz and Avis offices in the United States are apparently glad to reserve a Hertz or Avis car for your use in Rhodesia.

In the report by Lake, a letter from Avis dated August 2, 1973, stated that Avis in Rhodesia is an independent company-an "independent sub-license"-which has a sub-license to operate under Avis' name. This licensing arrangement came into being approximately September 1971, according to the letter from Avis. In the same report a Hertz official confirmed Hertz has the same arrangement with a subsidiary in Rhodesia.

These arrangements are in violation of Sanction 1(d) of Executive Order 11419. As noted previously, this section prohibits the sale or supply of any commodities or products
to any person or body in Southern Rhodesia or to any person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from Southern Rhodesia, then Hertz and Avis are clearly supplying commodities to Rhodesian companies. One common definition of "commodity" is that it is something useful or valuable. Since their foreign licenses and sub-licensees pay for the right to use the names of Avis and Hertz, those names are something useful or valuable. And, obviously these names are used for business purposes.

Tourism To Rhodesia

A visitor to the Office of Air Rhodesia and the Rhodesian National Touris Board in New York can pick up travel brochures advertising package tours to Africa, including Rhodesia, run by Bennet Tours, Percival Tours, Merriman and Finnerty Associates, Orbitair International and United Touring Company. (All but the last are American-based companies. United Touring Company is a Rhodesian concern). Included in these brochures are invitations to visit the "garden capital" and Rhodesia's Victoria Falls, "quite likely to be one of the great memories of your life. An indescribable experience. Words fail...."

There is no mention that the U.N. has imposed sanctions against Rhodesia. Nor that Security Council resolution 253

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42 Corporate Information Center Brief, October 1974, p. D.

of May 29, 1968;

4 decides that all member states of the U.N. shall not make available to the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia or to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking, including tourist enterprises, in Southern Rhodesia—any funds for investment or any other financial or economic resources and shall prevent their nationals and any person within their territories from making available to the regime or to any such undertaking any such funds or resources....

On August 20, 1974, columnist Jack Anderson revealed that hundreds of travel agencies in the U.S. have for years been violating federal regulations on sanctions by arranging tourism to Rhodesia. 44

Tourism represents the second largest source of sorely needed foreign exchange for the illegal Smith Regime. United States tourists represent at least 20 percent of all visitors to Rhodesia. Air Rhodesia's computer print-outs for March 1974 showed 16,406 persons booked by U.S. travel agents and airlines on flights connecting with Air Rhodesia for the rest of the year. And such an influx nets Rhodesia at least $16.3 million per year in foreign exchange. 45

Despite regulatory actions there remain ways in which travel agencies can arrange tourism from the U.S. to Rhodesia (via South Africa). The Treasury Department continues to issue licenses to travel agencies on behalf of tourists to expend money within Rhodesia, as well as transfer money to ground tour companies in Rhodesia such as United Touring. 46

44 Corporate Information Center Brief, October 1974, p. A.
45 Ibid., p. B.
46 Ibid., p. D.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

For at least 12 years, the United States pursued a double-faced policy towards Rhodesia—openly claiming to support the demand of the 96 percent African population for majority rule but covertly giving a steady stream of material and psychological support to the illegitimate minority regime. The United States voted to support sanctions, and various executive orders made it unlawful for anyone in the U.S. to trade with Rhodesia in any way. The penalties were severe, and on paper it seemed that the U.S. was committed to implementing sanctions. In practice, however the United States has been second only to South Africa in sanction-busting. The reason is to be found in the secret 1969 National Security Study Memorandum 39 (NSSM 39). The first and undoubtedly the most desirable option from the standpoint of imperialist interests is support for the status quo. A prosettler option, as attested by Dr. Henry Kissinger's first major Southern Africa policy in the form of option 2 of the National Security Study Memorandum 39 of 1969,¹ is based on two basic assumptions that white settlers are the most dependable allies of imperialism. They are especially valuable from the standpoint of the stake Western countries

¹Mohammed El-Kawas and Barry Cohen (eds.), The Kissinger
have in maintaining their access to the enormous mineral wealth in Southern Africa. Unlike the imperialists' non-European allies, they cannot be expected to deny their countries of origin or of reference access to those raw materials vital to the functioning of their economies. With fresh memories of how the most reactionary Arab Sheiks joined the oil embargo following the October war, the authors of the December 1974 special of the U.S. Council On International Economic Policy on "Critical Imported Materials" concluded that "South Africa would be unlikely to participate in any embargo of exports to the United States, Western Europe, or Japan."² As embargo-proof areas, colonial-settler formations deserve the strongest Western or imperialistic support. This support is gladly provided, even when ritualist denunciations of racism, illegal statehood or occupation and violations of human rights seem to be calling it into question. The support itself is based on the second basic assumption that the settlers have the situation under control. This is what the authors of the NSSM 39 thought obtained in Southern Africa in 1969.

The Byrd amendment ripped a hole in the sanctions dike.


Between 1972 and January 1973 the value of Rhodesian exports to the United States amounted to $13.3 million. This was only slightly less than the exports in 1965 prior to UDI when they reached $14.1 million.  

Rhodesia was not a country to which the Secretary of State forbade Americans to travel. An American passport states that it is not good for travel to Cuba, North Vietnam and North Korea. Some way or another the United States seemed to find the legal authority to ban travel to communist countries even though they are not under international interdict, while the U.S. cannot find legal grounds to restrict travel to Rhodesia. The most effective way to prevent American travelers from spending money in Rhodesia in violation of Resolution 253 would be to restrict their right to travel under American passport to that country, but no American Administration have ever tried to use this route to stop Americans traveling to Rhodesia.

Notwithstanding Sections 5(a) and (b) of Security Council Resolution 253, the State Department did not refuse visas to known agents of Rhodesian business including tourism. Mr. Traves Nettleton, a principal agent of Rhodesia's tourist industry, was allowed to enter the United States to make his pitch in New York for breaking sanctions in March 1975.  

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In 1973 the Rhodesian airline, through its assistant general manager, Merrin Eyett, purchased three Boeing 720's from Carl Hirshmann, a Swiss banker who has large business interests in Europe, Africa and the United States. Hirshmann had obtained U.S. export licenses in 1970 for the purchase of these planes and in 1973 for spare parts worth over $500,000. The license contained a standard clause that the U.S. government must authorize all resale, but little or nothing was done to prosecute Hirshmann or to prevent him from making such sales again. His firm Jet Aviation was taken off the "Station license" list, but this does not necessarily mean that he will not be able to buy or export U.S. planes again.\footnote{David Ottaway, Washington Post, A23 (January 25, 1974).}

The Boeings have boosted Rhodesia's traffic to Johannesburg by 53 percent and to Durbann by 62 percent for the year ending June, 1974. Captain Pat Travers, the Chief Executive of Air Rhodesia was quoted by the Johannesburg Star as saying: "The impact of the Boeings has been far greater than we ever imagined...beyond our wildest dreams." Air Rhodesia had a neat $705,600 profit in a year which was a disaster for most airlines.\footnote{Johannesburg Star (October 12, 1974), Airmail Edition.}

The United States government have allowed Rhodesia to recruit mercenaries in the U.S., the U.S. is the only country in the World that allows the Rhodesian information office to operate. Furthermore, the U.S. allows the Journal of Commerce to con-
continue to publish advertisements which promote activities which are violations of sanctions, namely investments and business dealings with Rhodesia. The first amendment clearly does not give persons the right to openly promote violation of the law.

The Carter administration increased its verbal support for the bringing down of the minority regime of Ian Smith, but when the first test of closing the Rhodesian Information Office in Washington came up the Carter administration refused to close it down. Thus we see a parallel between the Carter and Johnson administration, with high sounding rhetoric but extremely limited anti-Smith action. Furthermore, the Carter administration's sudden interest in Southern Africa is not because the administration wants change but rather it is due to the cold world mentality. On July 1, 1977 Secretary of State Vance's statement on African policy said:

A negative, reactive American policy that seeks only to oppose Soviet or Cuban involvement in Africa would be dangerous and futile. Our best course is to help resolve the problems which create opportunities for external intervention. Specifically, on the Katangan action in Shaba in March 1977, Vance said, We see no advantage in unilateral responses and emphasizing their East-West implications.?

Among the 147 members of the Assembly at its close in December of 1976, the United States had compiled a unique record: it was the only country that did not vote "yes" on

a single Southern Africa resolution put to a role call vote. Of the 25 resolutions submitted for roll call tallies, all passed with more than 90 countries in favor. The U.S., on the other hand abstained 13 times, voted against 10 times, did not vote twice and never cast a vote in favor. 8

Why did this "great democracy" that had condemned UDI and the oppressiveness of the Rhodesian political system violate the sanction resolutions of the United Nations? The answer is clear. Condemning UDI is one thing; participating in the overthrow of a white government to be replaced by an African government is another. The Western states are not prepared to throw one of their own to the dogs. Since economic sanctions were directed towards overthrowing the Rhodesian government, the Western World was not prepared to take active part. And yet these same governments had to appear to be supporting the sanction measures. Furthermore, the Western World did not want sanctions to be effective due to the fact that this could have set a precedent for sanctions on South Africa.

The strategic and economic interests of the United States in Southern Africa are of major importance and explains why the United States did not want sanctions to bring down the Smith regime during the time period in question. The strategic interest of U.S. policy stemmed from South Africa's

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geographical location, especially the cape coast sea route to oil in the Middle East. The U.S. position in the Indian Ocean was once supported by the Simonstown Naval Base and by missile-tracking stations established on South African territory; these operations have been relocated on Diego Garcia, a small island situated in the Indian Ocean off the coast of South Africa. With the continent's most military capability, including nuclear capacity, South Africa was perceived as a pro-Western outpost against Soviet and Chinese incursions into the whole region.

The economic interest in Southern Africa was also of great direct importance to the United States. Of about $700 million in private investment in South Africa, $528 million is direct investment and the remainder portfolio investment.9

As such, the white settler dictatorship of Pretoria emerged as a bulwark to the NATO economies of Europe, which would collapse without Middle East oil. Thus, even if the U.S. could satisfy American needs from domestic sources, it had to act to preserve the economic and defense interests of the Western World alliance.

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APPENDIX I

UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS ON RHODESIA

Text of Resolution 232 (1966)

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 216 (1965) of November 12, 1965, 217 (1965) of November 20, 1965, and 221 (1966) of April 9, 1966, and in particular its appeal to all States to do their utmost in order to break off economic relations with Southern Rhodesia.

Deeply concerned that the Council's efforts so far and the measures taken by the administering Power have failed to bring the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia to an end.

Reaffirming that to the extent not suspended in this resolution, the measures provided for in resolution 217 (1965) of November 20, 1965, as well as those initiated by Member States in implementation of that resolution, shall continue in effect.

Acting in accordance with Articles 39 and 41 of the United Nations Charter,

1. Determines that the present situation in Southern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace and security;

2. Decides that all States Members of the United Nations
shall prevent:

(a) the import into their territories of asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig-iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, meat and meat products and hides, skins and leather originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution;

(b) any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote the export of these commodities from Southern Rhodesia and any dealings by their nationals or in their territories in any of these commodities originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to Southern Rhodesia for the purposes of such activities or dealings;

(c) shipment in vessels or aircraft of their registration of any of these commodities originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution;

(d) any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote the sale or shipment to Southern Rhodesia of arms, ammunition of all types, military aircraft, military vehicles, and equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition in Southern Rhodesia;

(e) any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote the supply to Southern Rhodesia of all other aircraft and motor vehicles and of equipment and materials for the manufacture, assembly
of maintenance of aircraft and motor vehicles in Southern Rhodesia: the shipment in vessels and aircraft of their registration of any such goods destined for Southern Rhodesia: and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote the manufacture or assembly of aircraft or motor vehicles in Southern Rhodesia;

(f) participation in their territories or territories under their administration or in land or air transport facilities or by their nationals or vessels of their registration in the supply of oil or oil products in Southern Rhodesia; notwithstanding any contracts entered into or licenses granted before the date of this resolution;

3. Reminds Member States that the failure or refusal by any of them to implement the present resolution shall constitute a violation of Article 25 of the Charter;

4. Reaffirms the inalienable rights of the people of Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV); and recognizes the legitimacy of their struggle to secure the enjoyment of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations;

5. Calls upon all States not to render financial or other economic aid to the illegal racist regime in Southern Rhodesia;

6. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations to carry out this decision of the Security Council in accordance with Article 25 of the United Nations Charter;
7. Urges, having regard to the principles stated in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, States not Members of the United Nations to act in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of the present resolution;

8. Call upon States Member of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies to report to the Secretary-General the measures each has taken in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of the present resolution;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the progress of the implementation of the present resolution, the first report to be submitted not later than March 1, 1967;

10. Decides to keep this item on its agenda for further action as appropriate in the light of developments.

Text of Resolution 253 (1968)

The Security Council,


Taking note of resolution 2262 (XXII) adopted by the General Assembly on 3 November 1967,

Noting with great concern that the measures taken so far have failed to bring the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia to an end,

Reaffirming that to the extent not superseded in this resolution, the measures provided in resolutions 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, and 232 (1966) of December 1966,
as well as those initiated by Member States in implementation of those resolutions, shall continue in effect.

Gravely concerned that the measures taken by the Security Council have not been complied with by all States and that some States, contrary to resolution 232 (1966) of the Security Council and to their obligations under Article 25 of the Charter, have failed to prevent trade with the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia,

Condemning the recent inhuman executions carried out by the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia which have flagrantly affronted the conscience of mankind and have been universally condemned.

Affirming the primary responsibility of the Government of the United Kingdom to enable the people of Southern Rhodesia to achieve self-determination and independence, and in particular their responsibility for dealing with the prevailing situation,

Recognizing the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Southern Rhodesia to secure the enjoyment of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in conformity with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV),

Reaffirming its determination that the present situation in Southern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter,

1. Condemns all measures of political repression, in-
cluding arrests, detentions, trials and executions which violate fundamental freedoms and rights of the people of Southern Rhodesia, and calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom to take all possible measures to put an end to such actions;

2. Calls upon the United Kingdom as the administering Power in the discharge of its responsibility to take urgently all effective measures to bring to an end the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia, and enable the people to secure the enjoyment of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in conformity with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

3. Decides that, in furtherance of the objective of ending the rebellion, all States Members of the United Nations shall prevent:

(a) The import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution (whether or not the commodities or products are for consumption or processing in their territories, whether or not they are imported in bond and whether or not any special legal status with respect to the import of goods is enjoyed by the port or other place where they are imported or stored);

(b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which would promote or are calculated to promote the export of any commodities or products from Southern Rhodesia; and any dealings by their nationals or in their territories
in any commodities or products originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to Southern Rhodesia for the purposes of such activities or dealings;

(c) The shipment in vessels or aircraft of their registration or under charter to their nationals, or the carriage (whether or not in bond) by land transport facilities across their territories of any commodities or products originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution;

(d) The sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories of any commodities or products (whether or not originating in their territories, but not including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, educational equipment and material for use in schools and other educational institutions, publications, news material and, in special humanitarian circumstances, food-stuffs) to any person or body in Southern Rhodesia or to any other person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from Southern Rhodesia, and any activities which promote or are calculated to promote such sale or supply;

(e) The shipment in vessels or aircraft of their registration, or under charter to their nationals or the carriage (whether or not in bond) by land transport facilities across their territories of any such commodities or products which are consigned to any person or body in Southern Rhodesia, or to any other person or body for the purposes of any business...
carried on in or operated from Southern Rhodesia;

4. Decides that all States Members of the United Nations shall not make available to the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia or to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking, including tourist enterprises, in Southern Rhodesia any funds for investment or any other financial or economic resources and shall prevent their nationals and any persons within their territories from making available to the regime or to any such undertaking any such funds or resources and from remitting any other funds to persons or bodies within Southern Rhodesia except payments exclusively for pensions or for strictly medical, humanitarian or educational purposes or for the provision of news material and in special humanitarian circumstances, food-stuffs;

5. Decides that all States Members of the United Nations shall:

(a) Prevent the entry into their territories, save on exceptional humanitarian grounds, of any person travelling on a Southern Rhodesian passport, regardless of its date of issue, or on a purported passport issued by or on behalf of the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia; and

(b) Take all possible measures to prevent the entry into their territories of persons whom they have reason to believe to be ordinarily residents in Southern Rhodesia and whom they have reason to believe to have further or encouraged, or to be likely to further or encourage, the unlawful actions of the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia or any activities
which are calculated to evade any measure decided upon in this resolution or resolution 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966;

6. Decides that all States Members of the United Nations shall prevent airline companies constituted in their territories and aircraft of their registration or under charter to their nationals from operating on or from Southern Rhodesia and from linking up with any airline company constituted or aircraft registered in Southern Rhodesia;

7. Decides that all States Members of the United Nations shall give effect to the decisions set out in operative paragraphs 3, 4, 5, and 6 of this resolution notwithstanding any contract entered into or license granted before the date of this resolution;

8. Calls upon States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies to take all possible measures to prevent activities by their nationals and persons in their territories promoting, assisting or encouraging emigration to Southern Rhodesia, with a view to stopping such emigration;

9. Requests all States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies to take all possible further action under Article 41 of the Charter to deal with the situation in Southern Rhodesia, nor excluding any of the measures provided in that Article;

10. Emphasizes the need for the withdrawal of all consular and trade representation in Southern Rhodesia, in addition to the provisions of operative paragraph 6 of resolution 217 (1965);
11. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations to carry out these decisions of the Security Council in accordance with Article 25 of the United Nations Charter and reminds them that failure or refusal by any one of them to do so would constitute a violation of that Article;

12. Deplores the attitude of States that have not complied with their obligations under Article 25 of the Charter, and censures in particular those States which have persisted in trading with the illegal regime in defiance of the resolutions of the Security Council, and which have given active assistance to the regime;

13. Urges all States Members of the United to render moral and material assistance to the people of Southern Rhodesia in their struggle to achieve their freedom and independence;

14. Urges, having regard to the principles stated in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, States not Members of the United Nations to act in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution;

15. Requests States Members of the United Nations, the Nations Organization, the specialized agencies, and other international organizations in the United Nations system to extend assistance to Zambia as a matter of priority with a view to helping her solve such special economic problems as she may be confronted with arising from the carrying out of these decisions of the Security Council;

16. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations,
and in particular those with primary responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, to assist effectively in the implementation of the measures called for by the present resolution;

17. Considers that the United Kingdom as the administering Power should ensure that no settlement is reached without taking into account the views of the people of Southern Rhodesia, and in particular the political parties favouring majority rule, and that it is acceptable to the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole;

18. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations of the specialized agencies to report to the Secretary-General by 1 August 1968 on measures taken to implement the present resolution;

19. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the implementation of this resolution, the first report to be made not later than 1 September 1968;

20. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, a committee of the Security Council to undertake the following tasks and to report to it with its observations;

(a) To examine such reports on the implementation of the present resolution as are submitted by the Secretary-General;

(b) To seek from any States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies such further information regarding the trade of that State (including information regard-
ing the commodities and products exempted from the pro-
hibition contained in operative paragraph 3 (d) above) or re-
arding any activities by any nationals of that State or in
its territories that may constitute an evasion of the measures
decided upon in this resolution as it may consider necessary
for the proper discharge of its duty to report to the Secu-

rity Council;

21. Requests the United Kingdom, as the administering
Power, to give maximum assistance to the committee, and to
provide the committee with any information which it may re-
ceive in order that the measures envisaged in this resolution
and resolution 232 (1966) may be rendered fully effective;

22. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations,
or of the specialized agencies, as well as the specialized
agencies themselves, to supply such further information as
may be sought by the Committee in pursuance of this resolution;

23. Decides to maintain this item on its agenda for
further action as appropriate in the light of developments.
APPENDIX II

EXECUTIVE ORDER 11322

Relating to Trade and Other Transactions Involving Southern Rhodesia

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, including section 5 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (59 Stat. 620), as amended (22 U.S.C. 287 c), and section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code, and as President of the United States, and considering the measures which the Security Council of the United Nations, by Security Council Resolution No. 232 adopted December 16, 1966, has decided upon pursuant to article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations and which it has called upon all members of the United Nations, including the United States to apply, it is hereby ordered:

Section 1. The following are prohibited effective immediately, notwithstanding any contracts entered into or licenses granted before the date of this Order:

(a) The importation into the United States of asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig-iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, meat and meat products, and hides, skins and leather originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after December 16, 1966, or products made therefrom in Southern Rhodesia or else-

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where.

(b) Any activities by any person subject to the juris-
diction of the United States, which promote or are calculated
to promote the export from Southern Rhodes after December
16, 1966, of any of the commodities specified in subsection
(a) of this section originating in Southern Rhodesia, and
any dealings by such person in any such commodities or in
products made therefrom in Southern Rhodesia or elsewhere,
including in particular any transfer of funds to Southern
Rhodesia for the purposes of such activities or dealings:
Provided, however, that the prohibition against the dealing
in commodities exported from Southern Rhodesia or products
made therefrom shall not apply to any commodities or products
which prior to the date of this Order, had been imported into
the United States.

(c) Shipment in vessels or aircraft of United States
registration of any of the commodities specified in subsection
(a) of this section originating in Southern Rhodesia and ex-
ported therefrom after December 16, 1966, or products made
therefrom in Southern Rhodesia or elsewhere.

(d) Any activities by any person subject to the juris-
diction of the United States, which promote or are calculated
to promote the sale or shipment to Southern Rhodesia of arms,
ammunition of all types, military aircraft, military vehicles
and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and
ammunition in Southern Rhodesia.
(e) Any activities by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, which promote or are calculated to promote the supply to Southern Rhodesia of all other aircraft and motor vehicles, and of equipment and materials for the manufacture, assembly, or maintenance of aircraft or motor vehicles in Southern Rhodesia; the shipment in vessels or aircraft of United States registration of any such goods destined for Southern Rhodesia; and any activities by any persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, which promote or are calculated to promote the manufacture or assembly of aircraft or motor vehicles in Southern Rhodesia.

(f) Any participation in the supply of oil or oil products to Southern Rhodesia (i) by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, or (ii) by vessels or aircraft of United States registration, or (iii) by the use of any land or air transport facility located in the United States.

Sec. 2. The functions and responsibilities for the enforcement of the foregoing prohibitions are delegated as follows:

(a) To the Secretary of State, the function and responsibility of enforcement relating to the importation into, or exportation from the United States of articles, including technical data, the control of the importation or exportation of which is provided for in section 414 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 (68 Stat. 848) as amended (22 U.S.C. 1934), and has been delegated to the Secretary of State by section

(b) To the Secretary of Commerce, the function and responsibility of enforcement relating to-

(i) the exportation from the United States of articles other than the articles, including technical data, referred to in subsection (a) of this section; and

(ii) the transportation in vessels or aircraft of United States registration of any commodities the transportation of which is prohibited by section 1 of this Order.

(c) To the Secretary of the Treasury, the function and responsibility of enforcement to the extent not delegated under subsections (a) or (b) of this section.

Sec. 3. The Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Commerce shall exercise any authority which such officer may have part from the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 or this Order so as to give full effect to this Order and Security Council Resolution No. 232.

Sec. 4. (a) In carrying out their respective functions and responsibilities under this Order, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Commerce shall consult with the Secretary of State. Each such Secretary shall consult, as appropriate, with other government agencies and private persons.

(b) Each such Secretary shall issue such registrations, licenses, or other authorizations as he considers necessary
to carry out the purposes of this Order and Security Resolution No. 232.

Sec. 5. (a) The term "United States," as used in this Order in a geographical sense, means all territory subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

(b) The term "person" means an individual partnership association, or other unincorporated body of individuals, or corporation.

The White House,
January 5, 1967
(F.R. Doc. 67-241; Filed, Jan. 5, 1967; 1:23 p.m.)
APPENDIX III

EXECUTIVE ORDER 11419

Relating to Trade and Other Transactions Involving Southern Rhodesia

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, including section 5 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (59 Stat. 620), as amended (22 U.S.C. 287c), and section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code, and as President of the United States, and considering the measures which the Security Council of the United Nations by Security Council Resolution No. 253 adopted May 29, 1968, has decided upon pursuant to article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, and which it has called upon all members of the United Nations, including the United States, to apply, it is hereby ordered:

Section 1. In addition to the prohibitions of section 1 of Executive Order No. 11322 of January 5, 1967, the following are prohibited effective immediately, not withstanding any contracts entered into or licenses granted before the date of this Order:

(a) Importation into the United States of any commodities or products originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after May 29, 1968.

(b) Any activities by any person subject to the juris-
diction of the United States which promote or are calculated
to promote the export from Southern Rhodesia after May 29, 1968,
of any commodities or products originating in Southern Rhodesia,
and any dealings by any such person in any such commodities
or products, including in particular any transfer of funds
to Southern Rhodesia for the purposes of such activities or
dealings; Provided, however, that the prohibition against the
dealing in commodities or products exported from Southern
Rhodesia shall not apply to any such commodities or products
which, prior to the date of this Order, had been lawfully im-
ported into the United States.

(c) Carriage in vessels or aircraft of United States
registration or under charter to any person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States of any commodities or pro-
ducts originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom
after May 29, 1968.

(d) Sale or supply by any person subject to the juris-
diction of the United States, or any other activities by any
such person which promote or are calculated to promote the
sale or supply, to any person or body in Southern Rhodesia or
to any person or body for the purposes of any business carried
on in or operated from Southern Rhodesia of any commodities
or products. Such activities, including carriage in vessels
or aircraft, may be authorized with respect to supplies in-
tended strictly for medical purposes, educational equipment
and material for use in schools and other educational institu-
tions, publications, news material, and foodstuffs required
by special humanitarian circumstances.

(e) Carriage in vessels or aircraft of United States registration or under charter to any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States of any commodities or products consigned to any person or body in Southern Rhodesia, or to any person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from Southern Rhodesia.

(f) Transfer by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States directly or indirectly to any person or body in Southern Rhodesia of any funds or other financial or economic resources. Payments exclusively for pensions, for strictly medical, humanitarian or educational purposes, for the provision of news material or for foodstuffs required by special humanitarian circumstances may be authorized.

(g) Operation of any United States air carrier or aircraft owned or chartered by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or of United States registration (i) to or from Southern Rhodesia or (ii) in coordination with any airline company constituted or aircraft registered in Southern Rhodesia.

Sec. 2. The functions and responsibilities for the enforcement of the foregoing prohibitions, and of those prohibitions of the Executive Order No. 11322 of January 5, 1967 specified below, are delegated as follows:

(a) To the Secretary of Commerce, the function and responsibility of enforcement relating to-

(i) the exportation from the United States of commodities
such Secretary shall consult, as appropriate, with other government agencies and private persons.

(b) Each such Secretary shall issue such regulations, licenses or other authorizations as he considers necessary to carry out the purposes of this Order and Security Council Resolution No. 253.

Sec. 5. (a) The term "United States," as used in this Orders in a geographical sense, means all territory subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

(b) The term "person" means an individual, partnership, association or other unincorporated body of individuals, or corporation.


The White House,
July 29, 1968.

(F.R.Doc 68-9212; Filed, July 29, 1968; 4:04 p.m.)
and products other than those articles referred to in section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 11322 of January 5, 1967; and

(ii) the carriage in vessels of any commodities or products the carriage of which is prohibited by section 1 of this Order or by section 1 of Executive Order No. 11322 of January 5, 1967.

(b) To the Secretary of Transportation, the function and responsibility of enforcement relating to the operation of air carriers and aircraft and the carriage in aircraft of any commodities or products the carriage of which is prohibited by section 1 of this Order or by section 1 of Executive Order No. 11322 of January 5, 1967.

(c) To the Secretary of the Treasury, the function and responsibility of enforcement to the extent not previously delegated in section 2 of Executive Order No. 11322 of January 5, 1967, and not delegated under subsections (a) and (b) of this section.

Sec. 3. The Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Transportation shall exercise any authority which such officer may have apart from the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 or this Order so as to give full effect to this Order and Security Council Resolution No. 253.

Sec. 4. (a) In carrying out their respective functions and responsibilities under this Order, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Transportation shall consult with the Secretary of State. Each
Flow diagram showing how gasoline was apparently sold by Mobil (South Africa) to Genta after September 1968.

Principal foreign oil refineries:

- Mobil
- Shell and B.P.
- Caltex

Routes whereby oil products have reached Rhodesia:
- by ship from South Africa to Lourenco Marques (and occasionally Beira), and then by train to Rhodesia
- by train from South Africa via Lourenco Marques to Rhodesia
- by train from South Africa through Botswana to Rhodesia
- by train from South Africa direct to Rhodesia (since 1974 only)
- by road from South Africa direct to Rhodesia
- from the Persian Gulf to Beira, and then by train to Rhodesia
5.3 LETTER FROM GENTA TO MOBIL (RHODESIA)

APPENDIX VI
DOCUMENT #1

GENTA
(PVT.) LIMITED
IMPORTERS AND EXPORTERS

FIRST FLOOR LINGUENDA HOUSE
SALISBURY
TELEPHONES 25113-4-7-8-0
TELEGRAMS 'GENTA'
P.O. BOX 8442
CAUSEWAY
RHODESIA
TELEX RH2228

Our Ref : DA/EY/8135


Mobil Oil Rhodesia (Pvt) Ltd.,
P. O. Box 791,
SALISBURY

For attention : Mr. J. B. Nicol

Dear Sir,

Referring to our letter 7852 of 31st July, 1973, we attach a statement detailing estimated requirements of Petroleum Fuels for the period January/April, 1974. These again are expressed in cubic metres.

Mr. Atmore has taken a copy of this statement with him on his present visit to Capetown, but we shall be obliged if you will also pass this information to your associates. The same details have been supplied to our Agents in Lourenco Marques.

Yours faithfully,

D. Airey
OPERATIONS MANAGER

Encl.
### ESTIMATED REQUIREMENTS

**JANUARY - APRIL, 1974**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX VII
DOCUMENT II

DOCUMENT #2

Mr. J.J.K. Jackson,
[Address]


Dear Bill,

Hi! Fibreglass

Immediate Future

Our next bulk shipment is due in Durban in late December, and, although our original order for 700 mettons may be reduced (through a force majeure claim by the suppliers -挝ovable in Rotterdam) to 500 mettons, our bulk tank in Durban will be fairly full, after arrival of this shipment.

The bulk tank, capacity 1,400 mettons, should have 1,100 mettons in it at the end of December, against an average monthly offtake of 260 mettons, giving 3.3 months cover, or nearly 3.7 months including the additional 20 mettons/month you will require.

The next bulk import after December will be in March/April. Therefore, with your requirement of up to 60 mettons by March, 1974, we will have to work on a bulk import arriving before mid-April to insure against run-out.

From this picture, you can see that we should be able to supply your initial requirements of 60 mt without too much trouble.

1974

We have got cover for 4,050 mettons from a US Gulf source for 1974 at going US market prices. This is in excess of current offtake and can easily take care of your 20 mettons/month. However, the price will be negotiated quarterly. We have already got the first quarter price, which is up on our current price but this is already taken care of in our latest price to Uemoa.

After the first quarter, prices will almost certainly escalate but we do not know to what extent and will only know in March/April for the June/July shipment.

In theory, therefore, we will have adequate supplies for the whole of 1974, but we cannot disregard the possibility of an embargo of exports from the US, or from South Africa to Rhodesia, or our supplier calling force majeure because of feedstock shortage.

They drew their hexane from Sudan and are probably more vulnerable than we are to supplies being cut off. I think you can tell Rhodesian industries that we will be able to supply them during 1974 during any severe crisis, but naturally we can not give any guarantee of continuity of supplies.

Wishing you all a Happy Xmas!

Regards,

L.H., Fibreglass

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DOCUMENT #11

1. CASH:

Cash on call with Merchant Bankers at present amounts to R21,000,000. It is not envisaged that it will be possible to remit any of these funds in the medium term, i.e., within 3 years.

2. OVERDRAFT FACILITIES:

Overdraft facilities are at present R620,000. Those are not required for normal day to day business operations but are available for special projects. The current rate of overdraft interest is 7.5%.

3. CASH GENERATION:

It is envisaged that surplus cash will be generated at the rate of R330,000 per month in 1973, resulting in an end-year projected cash balance of R1,360,000 before deducting special investment opportunities totalling R1,014,000.

4. SERVICE CHARGES:

Annual service charges payable to Mobil Oil Southern Africa (Pty.) Ltd. amount to R140,000.

5. SALARIES AND RELATED EXPENSES:

Projected 1973 Salaries and Related amount to R5,686,000 out of a total expenditure of R6,695,000. This represents 42.6%.
Letter from Richard van Niekerk of Mobil (Rhodesia) to R.H. Maskew of Mobil (South Africa)

2nd September, 1968.

R.H. Maskew, Esq.,
Mobil,
Cape Town.

Dear Mr. Maskew,

Further to our discussions of last week we enclose herewith three Flow Diagrams covering the arrangements that we have put in hand for the procurement of gasolines, diesel and lubricating oils.

A.D.O.

When we talked on the telephone the other day we mentioned that the addresses for Botswana Carriers and Botswana Transport should be, P.O. Box 1101, Johannesburg; since talking to you, I have obtained the concurrence of Masana, Coley and Ward respectively to the use of their organisations' names. Rather than use P.O. Box 1101, Johannesburg for both accounts we deem it advisable that you should use a different address for Botswana Transport; the full address that we propose that you use is recorded on the Flow Diagram. If you are able to think up a suitable third name for invoicing purposes, we ask that you kindly record that name on the Flow Diagram and advise us of the organisation involved. It will be necessary to prepare invoice pads for that organisation so that they might be able to re-invoice Rand Oils with the volumes invoiced to them by MOSA (from the flow on the right hand side of the chart) and from Botswana Carriers to be re-invoiced to Minerals Exploration (from the flow on the left hand side of the chart).

Peter Faure is thoroughly au fait with these arrangements and it would be necessary for him to write to the organisation that you propose using, spelling out what it is that we want of them.

The important feature of this plan is that the original billings by MOSA to the two or three organisations in the top line and the subsequent re-billing by those organisations to the second line and ultimately the third re-billings by the second line to the third line are, to all intents and purposes, meaningless and are merely our false trail being laid. The important and action document is the copy of MOSA's invoice which will flow along the dotted line direct to Minerals Exploration; that is to say that when MOSA bills Botswana Carriers a duplicate of that invoice is to be mailed in a sealed envelope direct to Minerals Exploration, Braamfontein.

On receipt of this duplicate, Minerals Exploration will type onto their invoice pad the same information billing Genta, c/o the Netherlands Bank. Minerals Exploration will, some weeks later, receive an invoice via Western Transvaal Development, if we follow the centre column of the Flow Diagram, containing precisely the same information as was contained on the duplicate which they received and billed Genta. Since the Western Transvaal development invoice will carry the same number as the duplicate from MOSA there will be no risk of duplication; as an additional safeguard, Minerals Exploration have been instructed to ignore invoices flowing to them from the intermediaries but to bill only on duplicates received from MOSA direct.

MOSA's two or three statements billing Botswana Carriers, Botswana Transport and the third account are to be sent direct to Minerals Exploration in a sealed envelope, they will in turn mail these documents to us and we will conduct a reconciliation of the accounts here.
Centa will have authorised the Netherlands Bank to pay from their revolving Letter of Credit, invoices rendered to them by Minerals Exploration Co. in respect of Supplies of Mobil Diesel. On payment of such invoices by the Bank, they will forward the invoices to Centa who will conduct their own reconciliation of withdrawals from their revolving Letter of Credit. A duplicate of Minerals Exploration invoice will be mailed to MOSR for statistical purposes.

This payment procedure will greatly speed up the ultimate receipt by your good selves of payments and we foresee therefore, a substantial reduction in the T.A.R. as presently reflected against Anglo American's number two or development account.

You might consider that the procedure that we have adopted is unduly complicated and unnecessary, but as was conveyed to you when you were here, it is the wish of George's people that we involve and complicate this matter to a far greater degree than pertains at present in the hope that it will discourage an investigation.

Gasolines

The principle as expounded in detail under A.D.O. above applies to gasolines and we have received Sasol's concurrence hereto.

They will from the commencement of their September Accounting Month open three trade accounts, one each in the name of Rand Oils, Minerals Exploration and Western Transvaal Development and Exploration Company, billing these three organisations on a rotational basis. In turn the accounts billed will re-bill as is depicted on the diagram and ultimately Minerals Exploration will receive a billing for the gasoline which passes from Sasol to us.

Sasol have agreed to create as an action document a duplicate of their original billing passing this direct to Minerals Exploration. Minerals Exploration will then bill Centa c/o the Netherlands Bank and pass a copy of Sasol's invoice to us for statistical purposes. The payment route will be as for A.D.O., whereby Minerals Exploration will be paid by the Netherlands Bank from funds held under a revolving letter of credit issued by Centa; as such payment to Sasol will be made at more frequent intervals than hitherto and in turn payments from Sasol to you should be speeded up.

Lubricating Products

We have obtained Semco's Agreement to our opening a number 3 account in their name at the address of their Attorneys. The Attorneys will receive the original billing from MOSA together with a copy of a loading note. On receipt of these documents they will type onto a Semco invoice pad a simplified version of the contents of MOSA's original invoice, billing on a rotational basis, "Rand Oils, Village Main Distributors and Western Transvaal Development. The MOSA invoice will then be mailed in a sealed envelope to Minerals Exploration. This latter organisation will then on their invoices pad bill Semco of Rhodesia extracting the detailed information from the Mobil invoice, and of course, giving their invoice the same number as MOSA's. In the same way as we described for A.D.O., ultimately an invoice will come to Minerals Exploration from one or the other of the intermediaries quoting the same number as the invoice that has come to Minerals Exploration along the direct route but this will be ignored by Minerals Exploration since they will have already billed Semco.

Semco's handling charges will be raised on a separate debit by the legitimate Semco organisation from the information contained on the loading note which will have passed from the Semco number 3 set-up to Semco.
One of the disadvantages which both yourselves and ourselves have had to contend with under the old set-up was the delay in the receipt of payment from Seaco by yourselves and the numerous accounting discrepancies which occurred when Seaco re-invoiced us. Under the proposed method it will be we who conduct the reconciliation of the Seaco number 3 account and will have a direct control over the payments being made against that account. Under the present arrangements we pay Seaco on receipt of goods, but we know, that they delay up to 90 days before passing these payments to you. Under our proposed arrangements we will continue to pay via Minerals Exploration to the Durban Attorney on the receipt of goods, as this payment will be made into the Attorney’s trust account and accompanied by full details of what is being paid which will be obliged to pass the funds to MOSA promptly. This proposal therefore, excludes Seaco’s accounting organisation entirely from this procurement programme, but does not in any way alter the procedure as applied to the physical aspect of the transactions. Seaco in Jacobs will continue to receive consignment details of trucks, they will be responsible for the customs clearing of same and consigning: they will also continue to be responsible for mailing to us promptly such customs documents as are necessary to facilitate customs clearances at the destinations. In view of what Mr. Baker had said about the continued satisfactory relationship between Seaco and yourselves we did not broach the subject of handling charges but left this matter on the same basis as hitherto.

Service Charges

It has been necessary to commit ourselves to make payment to certain of the organisations who are acting as intermediaries and we list below the relative charges that we have incurred:

- Rand Oils: £20 per month
- Western Transvaal Development and Exploration Company, P.O. Box 677, Lichtenburg:
  - Minerals Exploration: To be advised.
  - Botswana Carriers: No charge.
  - Botswana Transport: No charge.
  - Seaco Number 3 Account, conducted by Mooney, Ford and Partners, Durban: To be advised.

As Messrs. Minerals Exploration and Mooney Ford, in that order will have the greatest amount of retyping and re-directing to do we expect their charges to be rather more than the nominal figures quoted to us by Western Transvaal Development and Rand Oils.

When we have had an opportunity of assessing our annual involvement in service charges we will if we consider it necessary, make representation to Genta for some relief.

Be trust that the Flow Diagrams and the foregoing is sufficiently explicit, but if there are any points on which you require clarification please revert.

Billings to Genta

You will recall that in June I made representations to you with the request that the abnormal freight element be included in monthly billings to Genta rather than be the subject of a separate debit.

On the 27th June your people wrote to Mosambique, reference MGVR/EC Code WG8-5600C, advising Mosambique that with effect from the July accounting month the billings to the various organisations would be as follows:
On receipt of this copy letter we informed Genta of the July charge-outs and it was only some considerable time later that the Sasol billings started coming into us at 1 of a cent higher than we had anticipated.

We were vaguely aware that Sasol was receiving remuneration for their service but expected the service fee to have been included in the figures advised by you to us as being the applicable charge-outs. This contention is reinforced by the telex which came from Cape Town on the 12th August, 1968:

*09309 09951 FOR VAN NIESKERN AUGUST CHARGE OUTS PREMIUM 10.3 REGULAR 8.3 JET 10.7 A.D.O. 8.4 ALL S.A. CENTS PER IMPERIAL GALLON 5600C* 

This same information was communicated to Genta and we have been recovering .1 cent per gallon less than Sasol’s billing to us.

The upshot of all this is that we have under-recovered for July billings to the extent of 565.90 Rand, and as we no longer enjoy any service charge against which we could debit this amount we write to ask that you bear the Sasol service charge.

We are not able to raise our billings to Genta since this would mean that we were at a higher level than others.

When you have given us your decision in this regard we will revert with full details of the under-recoveries quoting the appropriate Sasol invoices.

Supply Sales Premium vs. Regular

As was communicated to you on the telephone on Friday morning we have held further discussions with Genta here on this matter and they are aware that we are going back to Shell with an offer to accommodate them at L.W. for Regular. If Shell refuses this offer there will be no justification for Genta favouring them on Premium at our expense.

Airy has tentatively agreed that the procurement programme could be adjusted in October to reallocate the premium to us if the accommodation arrangement can be implemented by them.

Dealing briefly with the question of our, and others, being unable to supply Premium from L.W. for a period of 3 weeks, Airy has said that his people in Lourenco Marques are, to a large extent, ignoring the procurement programme and purchasing Premium where they are able to get it because the programme has fallen more than 1j million gallons in arrear. May we suggest that you, if your replenishment programme can be organised to cater for additional afloats, instruct your Lourenco Marques people to make an offer to the appropriate organisations in Lourenco Marques for whatever volume you can spare in excess of our normal commitment.

Looking forward to hearing from you, with kind personal regards.

Yours sincerely,

Richard van Nieskern.
Situation:
When orders for lubricants and solvents are placed on our South African associate, a carefully planned "paper chase" is used to disguise the final destination of these products. This is necessary in order to make sure that there is no link between MOSA and MOSR's supplies.

What happens is this:
MOSR places orders for lubes and greases on Chemico through Warriak Ward in Central Region. MOSA then sells to Chemico who in turn supply MOSR.

The order is billed and consigned by MOSA to Chemico No. 3 account with the Durban attorneys, Mooney Ford, and Partners' box number. Mooney Ford and Partners then make out two debits: the first of these is to Mineral Exploration (Freight Services) and the other to either -

Band Oils
Village Main Distributors, or
W.F. Development

who in turn circulate it to the other (e.g. Village Main Distributors debits Band Oils) before it finally again comes to Mineral Exploration. Mineral Exploration set on the first advice and debit reson of Rhodesia (MOSR). Payment is made by MOSA to Chemico No. 3 account through Mooney Ford and Partners.

A similar setup, but using different parties is used for the procurement of solvents.

This "paper chase" which costs very little to administer, is done primarily to hide the fact that MOSA is in fact supplying MOSR with product in contravention of U.S. Sanctions Regulations.

Recommendation:
It is recommended that no attempt be made to change the present procurement setup, because:

1) The cost is minimal
2) It is not too cumbersome
3) It is working efficiently, and
4) Any risks resulting from a change in the system would be borne by MOSA and we should therefore leave it up to them to reduce the extent of the "paper chase" if they deem fit.
PRODUCT PROCUREMENT

CONTACTS

Mobil
Northern Region: Ron Glover
Central Region: Warrick Ward
               Jack Hilliard
Cape Town: E. Bedford
           R. Camp
Refinery: (only approached through Central Region)
           E. Milne
           T. Dryer
           T. Cairn
L.M.: G. C. Halazandaris (through R. Glover, E. Bedford, R. Camp)

Other
1) Freight Services, P.O. Box 1101, JOHANNESBURG: A.E. Morris or R.G. Meier
2) Village Main Distributors, P.O. Box 324, Bryanston: Mrs. Anne Beard
3) Rand Oils, P.O. Box 2561, JOHANNESBURG: David D. Patrick
4) Western Transvaal Development, P.O. Box 396, Lichtenburg: A.J. Oberholzer, who is a lawyer
5) Sense
6) Caritas, P.O. Box 8873, JOHANNESBURG: G. Solomon
7) Consolidated Stevedoring & Forwarding Agency, P.O. Box 3 Point, NATAL: R. Winkelman
8) Cliffe Decker & Todd, P.O. Box 3382, JOHANNESBURG: Attorneys contact Mr. J.K. Jasper
9) Monney, Ford & Partners, DURBAN: Attorneys contact Mr. Dugmore
10) Sasol
11) Minerals Exploration

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The above plus others, as applicable, are sent lottery tickets at Christmas with a letter of appreciation.

I. Refined Products (excluding solvents and aviation)

On the face of it, it is a straight transaction between ourselves and Genta. Product is received from them based on our stock from our depot stock - levels as provided by Mr. J. Gray and he liaises with Genta on Product Movement. The product is received by depot at 20°C and these quantities are used for payment purposes. There are, however, additional aspects to this:

(a) Genta allocation - Genta allocates to Mobil the importation of Premium, Regular, ADO, and Aviation. Aviation is imported on behalf of Industry despite frequent attempts by Shell to stop this; they claim product contamination etc. This is resolved by a sample to them from each batch. While Mobil imports Aviation, other companies import kerosene avgas etc. Genta makes these allocations every four months and we send our allocation figures to Mr. E. Bedford, who informs S & D who in turn liaise with the Genta agent.

(1) Petrol - The attached schedule shows the method whereby Genta is debited by Moref. You will note that there are three 'agents':

A. Rand Oils
B. W.T. Development
C. Minerals Exploration.

Rand Oils and W.T. Development are purely a "paper-chase" and Minerals Exploration debits Genta at Rhodesta Mission, Maritime House, Johannesburg.

(2) ADO - Moref debits the Motor and Industrial Transport using the Minerals Exploration box number; Minerals Exploration in turn debits Genta in the same way as petrol.

(3) Aviation - Genta is billed direct by Freight Services.

II. Aviation Refined

(a) Avgas 115/145 for Air Trans Africa ordered by telex on Ron Glover of Northern Region for onward transmission to L.M. Glover advises details on availability etc. to Moref. Moref debits either Trek or Garik, who debits Genta in Johannesburg. Payment by Moref to Genta is done on the same basis as Refined above.
(b) Avgas 80 as per (a) above
(e) Avgas 100/130 imported from Shell by Centa. Our supplies are obtained Ex Centa.

III SOLVENTS
These are obtained from:
(a) Toluol and Xylol Ex IECOR and paid for via IECOR, Bulawayo.
(b) Petroleum and White Spirit Ex Hubet Evans Durban and paid for by Bank Draft.
(c) Others Ex Northern Region via Freight Services Pleasen account.
Product is mainly in bulk.

IV WAXES AND PETROL ATEX
Indents are dependent upon:
(a) Import allocations
(b) Forward requirements as determined by Commercial Department.
Orders are initiated against:
  Richard Daggitt
  AGL (Alan Mack & Shepherd)
  Highfield Agencies
  D.L. Petroleum
  Samco (Moref)

The above are asked for prices, availability, technical details etc. and in the case of AGL, depending on agents response, they are asked to contact their agents. Should a quote be acceptable, an Agreement of Sale is entered into and the agent instructed; insurance taken out; import permit and order issued etc. All the above agents are paid locally except AGL on a Letter of Credit and Samco on a Bank Draft.

V ASPHALTS
(a) Industrial: These are obtained Ex Moref by Samco. A telex or phone call is made to W. Ward giving particulars and making for details.
(b) Road Laying: These are obtained Ex Centa in the normal way in which Centa is dealt with.
VI SPECIAL PRODUCTS
Examples wax emulsions, white oils etc. The initial approach is made by letter or telephone to Northern Region (Glover), Central Region (Ward) or Cape Town (Diamond) for prices and availability. A permit is applied for, if necessary, dependent on product and an order is passed on either Freight Services or Caritas.
Mr. Legge is responsible for placing the orders which are initiated on the advice of Mr. Jackson.

VII LIQUID PETROLEUM GAS
L.P. Gas is obtained from Genta (who obtain it Ex Sonarep and Sasol). Mr Legge is responsible for the orders which are made according to stock levels.

VIII L.P. GAS EQUIPMENT
These can be divided into:
(a) Local Manufacture e.g. Monarch
(b) Imported items which are currently Genta equipment, and Northern Region (via Caritas) for Kosangas regulators.
This function is controlled by Mr. Gallagher.
Orders for L.P. Gas equipment require import licences and the volume of import is therefore regulated. Mr. F. Preston is responsible for keeping interested parties informed of the level of currency allocations.

IX OILS AND GREASES (Local Manufacture)
The indent for these is done by Mr. Legge. The procedure is to do a firm indent by product, pack and destination monthly and against this supplementary index can be made. In addition anticipated future months indent is done purely for refinery planning purposes. This indent is controlled by Mr. Legge in collaboration with W. Ward (Central Region). The indent is billed and consigned by Moso to Samco No. 3 Account with the Durban Attorneys, Mooney Ford, box number. In regard to the billing Mooney Ford write out two debit; the firm of these is to Minerals Exploration (Freight Services) and the other either to:
- Rand Oils
- Village Main Distributors
- W.T. Development
who in turn circulate it to the other (e.g. Village Main Distributors debit

5/ .........
Hand Oils) before it finally again comes to Minerals Exploration. Minerals Exploration act on the first advice and debit Remcom of Rhodesia. This is either addressed to P.O. Box 39, Southerton or alternatively delivered to Moor by hand, marked for the attention of the writer. Payment is made to Sacco No. 3 Account (Mooney Ford) due to previous delays encountered when Freight Services were paid and then Mooney Ford.

Mr. Legge is responsible for all orders.

X AVIATION OILS

The stock position is reviewed by G. Legge and G. Russell. G. Russell then decides on order quantities and writes to E. Bedford requesting availability, prices etc. On receipt of this information the necessary documentation is prepared and the product obtained via Caritas.

XI BRAKE FLUIDS AND DEPSEMENTS

These are obtained locally by Mr. G. Legge. The former Ex Pfizer and the latter from Chemical Services.

XII HYDRAULIC FLUIDS

These are obtained Ex Mores via Caritas.
PROCUREMENT ROUTES

1. OBJECTIVE:
   To consider the alternative procurement routes available to us with a view to ascertaining which is the most economical, and which one to utilise should the most economical route be closed to us.

2. ROUTES
   There are three routes which we could utilise at present.

   2.1. Road transport in bulk to Bulawayo and Salisbury.
   2.2. Rail via Botswana to destinations in Rhodesia.
   2.3. East Coast shipping to Lourenco Marques and Beira, and rail to destinations in Rhodesia.

   For the purposes of this study Bulawayo and Salisbury shall be the only destinations to be considered, as they are usually the base depots from where product is re-routed to other destinations.

   No account is taken of the planned new rail link via Beit Bridge and Rutenga as any estimate of rail rates on this line would be pure conjecture.

3. ASSUMPTIONS
   It is assumed that there will be no change in the current sanctions position in the foreseeable future, and that the Fronka Refinery will remain out of action.

4. Lubricating Oils
   At present lubricating oils are transshipped from Durban to destinations in Rhodesia by road in bulk (51%), and by rail (via Botswana) in drums (49%). Only the faster moving lubricating oils are transshipped in bulk, but they do comprise the majority of our purchases.
ATTACHMENT 3.

N.K.-FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS.

1. Lubricating Oils and Greases
   In the early 1960's the East Coast route via Lourenco Marques and Beira was used to supply points in Rhodesia. This was changed (prior to U.D.I.) for the following reasons:

   1.1. There were considerable delays on this route, delays which are not experienced when the rail route is used.

   1.2. The incidence of damage to product on this route was high.

   1.3. For supplies destined for Bulawayo the rail route was more economical.

   With U.D.I., it became necessary to impose certain security restrictions so as not to link Mobil South Africa with Mobil Rhodesia. The East Coast route was, therefore, overlooked for the following reasons:

   1.4. It was easier to have one purchasing agent in South Africa (SEMCU) with whom to deal, rather than having a purchasing agent in South Africa and forwarding agents in Lourenco Marques and Beira. (Note: The additional agency charges would not significantly affect the economics of the East Coast route).

   1.5. With the East Coast being under heavy surveillance it was considered undesirable to have Mobil drums stacked at Mozambique ports, even though the names on the drums had been painted out.

   1.6. Mobil in Lourenco Marques and Beira would have nothing to do with such arrangements.

   The points mentioned above still pertain today and should be considered when deciding on supply routes.

2. Industrial Bitumens
   Until fairly recently the supply route for industrial bitumens was via Lourenco Marques. This was because our purchasing agent was African Bitumen Emulsion who were invoiced in Lourenco Marques. Freight Services in L.H. would then take over on this invoice and rail the product to Salisbury or Bulawayo.
4.1. **Road Transport in bulk to Bulawayo and Salisbury (see attachment 2).**

4.1.1. The present cost of moving lubricating oils in this manner is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Road (bulk)</th>
<th>Rail (drum)</th>
<th>East Coast (drum)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Durban/Salisbury</td>
<td>3.7633</td>
<td>2.8990</td>
<td>3.9595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durban/Bulawayo</td>
<td>2.8990</td>
<td>3.9595</td>
<td>3.4096</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.1.2. Our road transport operators have, however, indicated to us that they wish to increase these prices in the near future. The proposed new prices are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Road (bulk)</th>
<th>Rail (drum)</th>
<th>East Coast (drum)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Durban/Salisbury</td>
<td>3.9595</td>
<td>3.4096</td>
<td>3.9595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durban/Bulawayo</td>
<td>3.4096</td>
<td>3.4096</td>
<td>3.4096</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2. **Rail via Botswana in drums to Bulawayo and Salisbury.**

4.2.1. Durban/Salisbury 3.7107 cents per litre

4.2.2. Durban/Bulawayo 3.4682 cents per litre

4.3. **East Coast shipping to L.M. and Beira, and rail from port to destination in Rhodesia. (See attachment 1).**

4.3.1. Durban/L.M./Beira:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ocean Freight etc</th>
<th>Railage</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Durban/Salisbury</td>
<td>1.7023</td>
<td>3.4682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durban/Bulawayo</td>
<td>2.1469</td>
<td>4.3181</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3.2. Durban/Beira/Salisbury:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ocean Freight etc</th>
<th>Railage</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Durban/Bulawayo</td>
<td>2.8990</td>
<td>5.7107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durban/Salisbury</td>
<td>3.9595</td>
<td>6.8590</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To these prices must be added any agency fees which we would have to incur through using this route.

4.4. **Recommendation for Procurement Route of Lubricating Oils.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Road (bulk)</th>
<th>Rail (drum)</th>
<th>East Coast (drum)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Durban/Salisbury</td>
<td>3.7633</td>
<td>2.8990</td>
<td>3.9595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durban/Bulawayo</td>
<td>2.8990</td>
<td>3.9595</td>
<td>3.4096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Proposed new rates in brackets)</td>
<td>2.8990 (3.4096)</td>
<td>3.9595 (3.4096)</td>
<td>3.9595 (3.4096)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.4.1. Lubricating Oils at Present transhipped in Bulk.

As can be seen from the above, transhipping costs are lowest when lubricating oils are transported by road tank wagons in bulk. This is our present route of supply for the majority of our lubricating oils and it is recommended that we continue using this route for as long as we are able to secure the necessary Road Transport Carriers certificates.

If at some time in the future we are unable to utilise this route due to the withdrawal of our certificates, the rail route via Botswana should be used to supply Bulawayo, and the East Coast route via Beira to supply Salisbury. (The use of the East Coast route is of course dependent on there being no adverse security or publicity risk involved.)

4.4.2. Lubricating Oils at Present imported in Drums.

We at present import the slower moving oils in drums by rail via Botswana.

We recommend that this route be retained for supplies consigned to Bulawayo, but believe that supplies destined for Salisbury should use the East Coast route (if security considerations allow this).

5. LUBRICATING GREASES

At present all lubricating greases are transported by rail via Botswana to Salisbury and Bulawayo. (Greases can only be transhipped in drums).

The alternative routes and costs for transhipping greases are:

5.1. By Rail via Botswana to Bulawayo and Salisbury.
   5.1.1. Durban/Salisbury  6.6623 cents per kg.
   5.1.2. Durban/Bulawayo  5.8995 cents per kg.

5.2. East Coast Shipping to L.M. and Beira, and Rail to destination in Rhodesia.
   5.2.1. Durban/L.M./Bulawayo  6.3796 cents per kg.
   5.2.2. Durban/Beira/Salisbury  5.9945 cents per kg.

5.3. / ...