An analysis of antagonistic foreign policies and their contribution to the creation of displaced people in Africa, 1975-1982

Solomon Terfa

Atlanta University

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.auctr.edu/dissertations

Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
ABSTRACT

POLITICAL SCIENCE

TERFA, SOLOMON  
B.A., University of California  
Los Angeles  
M.A., Atlanta University

An Analysis of Antagonistic Foreign Policies and Their Contribution to the Creation of Displaced People in Africa, 1975-1982

Adviser: Professor Makidi-Ku-Ntima

Disseration dated July 1985

Displaced people in Africa who are the product of antagonistic foreign policies have been unjustifiably labeled refugees. The displaced people in the Horn, Southwestern and "Heart of Africa" are only victims of external aggression who did the natural thing under the circumstances i.e. flee into safety.

This study will analyze and synthesize the causes and objectives of the foreign policies of the principal countries, namely, Somalia and Ethiopia; Zaire and Angola; and Libya and Chad chapter by chapter with the intention of unravelling the root cause of the problem. It goes without saying that the motive behind the interference of the superpowers and other interested parties in those countries internal affairs and the region is also the
object of our investigation.

The conflictual and/or cooperative relations of all the countries of our concern have to be viewed within the context of the present international system. It is our opinion that there is a dialectical relationship between the action of states in the system and the reaction of the international system. In other words, the international system could contribute to either the relaxation of tensions or exacerbation of tensions between the conflicting states and vice versa. Thus the international system, the "loose bipolar" world is the framework of our analysis.

Finally, the study recommends that all the principles of the Charters of the UNO and the OAU be respected and also pleads with the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees in collaboration with the OAU to find solutions to the predicament of the displaced people.
AN ANALYSIS OF ANTAGONISTIC FOREIGN POLICIES AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO THE CREATION OF DISPLACED PEOPLE IN AFRICA 1975-1982

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF ATLANTA UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

SOLOMON TERFA

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

ATLANTA, GEORGIA

JULY 1985
ABBREVIATIONS

ANC - African National Congress
ANZUS - Australia New Zealand United States Defense Pact
AZAP - Agence Zairoise de Presse
EDU - Ethiopian Democratic Union
ELF - Eritrean Liberation Front
ELF-PLF - Eritrean Liberation Front Popular Liberation Front
EPLF - Eritrean Popular Liberation Front
FLEC - Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda
FNLA - National Front for the Liberation of Angola
FNLC - National Liberation Front of the Congo
FRELIMO - Frente de Liberatacao de Mozambique
FROLINAT - Chad National Liberation Front
ICARA - International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa
MAAG - United States Military Assistance Advisory Group
METO - Middle East Treaty Organization
MPLA - Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAU - Organization of African Unity
OLF - Oromo Liberation Front
PLO - Palestine Liberation Organization
SEATO - South East Asian Treath Organization
SWAPO - South West Africa People's Organization
UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITA - National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNO - United Nations Organization
USIS - United States Information Service
WSLF - Western Somalia Liberation Front
ZANU - Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU - Zimbabwe African People's Union
DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my father Ato Terfa Lemmu and my mother Wzro. Fantaye G. Michael whose love for education have no limits and bounds and who patiently and supportively waited so long to see their dream come true. It is also dedicated to my sister Meaza and brother Fekadu whose financial and moral support could not have come at a better time. I am also dedicating it to my brother Tadesse, his wife Rossa and their son Michael; and also my sister Senaiet, her husband Abi and their son Ezana. Last but not least, it is also dedicated to my brother Lemmu whose moral support has been my inspiration.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my sincere thanks to the Chairman of my dissertation committee Professor Makidi-Ku-Ntima who provided me not only with his expertise in African politics and theory of international relations, but also with his moral and psychological uplift during the protracted development of this project. I would also like to thank Professor Hashim Gibrill whose knowledge of African politics and international relations and more so his open-mindedness have been invaluable. I am also thankful to Professors Danny Boston and William Boone for their time and constructive comments. Special thanks goes to my friend Leslie Belay whose constructive suggestions have helped shape my views. I am also indebted to Verona G. Iriarte who patiently and tirelessly typed this document. Finally, I would like to express my genuine appreciation to the UNHCR, Geneva, for the valuable documents which it provided me and also its regional office in Washington, D.C. for the materials it availed to me without which this project would have not materialized.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. INTRODUCTION</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem Statement</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the Problem Generalizable</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Span of Study</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II. THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS</strong></td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Present International System</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Multipolar System of Cecil Crabb</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Role of Ideology in the Struggle for Control and Influence in the Third World</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Loose Bipolar System of Morton Kaplan</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Three Worlds of the Chinese</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Three International Systems of J. Edelman Spero</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Balance of Power Thesis of President Nixon</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>III. ANTAGONISTIC FOREIGN POLICIES IN THE HORN AND THE CREATION OF DISPLACED PEOPLE IN THE REGION</strong></td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Concept of National Interest</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali-Ethiopia Conflict</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Colonial, Colonial and Post-Colonial History of the Region</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Underlying Problems Between Somalia and Ethiopia</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Soviet Union and Somalia</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The United States and Ethiopia</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Arab States and Ethiopia</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Page

The Ethiopian Revolution and the Political Situation in the Horn of Africa.............103
The July 1977 Somali-Ethiopian War and its Repercussions.............................111
Cuba and the Somali-Ethiopian War.................118
The Peoples Republic of China and Israel in the Somali-Ethiopian War..............121
Antagonistic Foreign Policies and the Creation of Displaced People in the Horn...125

IV. THE RELATION BETWEEN FOREIGN POLICIES AND DISPLACED PEOPLE IN CENTRAL AND SOUTHWESTERN AFRICA........................................131
The Liberation of Angola and the Jockeying for Strategic Position by the Superpowers..133
The Objectives of Zaire's Foreign Policy in the Angolan Civil War.........................138
The Reasons for the U.S. to Intervene in Angola's Civil War................................148
U.S. Political Interest........................................152
U.S. Military Strategic Interest.........................159
Why South Africa Intervened in Angola...............162
The Objectives of China in the Angolan Civil War........................................167
Why the Soviet Union Intervened in the Angolan Civil War.................................170
Antagonistic Foreign Policies and Their Contribution to the Creation of Displaced People in Zaire and Angola.................................182

V. FOREIGN INTERFERENCE AND THE CREATION OF DISPLACED PEOPLE IN CHAD........186
Chad Under French Colonialism......................188
Foreign Interference in Chad..............................196
Libya in Chad..................................................198
France's Intervention in Chad's Political Crisis...............................................207
Sudan's Role in the Chadian Crisis.....................219
Egypt's Foreign Policy Towards Chad............224
The United States' Policy in Chad's Political Crisis........................................227
Antagonistic Foreign Policies and the Creation of Displaced Chadians in Neighboring Countries...........234

CONCLUSION.............................................238

ANNEX.....................................................252

BIBLIOGRAPHY.............................................258
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The incessant political instability, the unslacking coups and countercoups, the fragility and snail pace development of its dependent economy, the high rate of its population growth, the declining of its mortality rate, the ever growing of its unemployment and underemployment rate, the increasing of income-gap between the top ten percent and the bottom forty percent, the frequency of its internecine wars, wars of liberation, wars of secession and wars of expansion, surely give an alarming picture in which Africa finds itself. With all these problems prevailing and escalating to the point where they are endangering the precarious existence of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the ever-spiralling of displaced people and refugees from both independent nations and settler occupied territories further aggravate and exacerbate the situation.

This is so if one looks at the picture divorced from the socioeconomic and historical development of the world. Compared to the period of the 13th and 14th centuries of Europe, Africa's present position can only make us optimistic. Irving L. Markovitz in his book *Power and Class in Africa* (1977), described the era as follows:
Famine laid waste the whole of Europe from 1315 to 1317. Thirty years later, the Black Death, the most horrible of all reported epidemics from 1347 to 1350, helped carry off a third of the population of Europe. Plague and famine followed each other in intermittent outbursts for the whole century. Political holocaust no less cruel accompanied natural devastation. Civil war and banditry were endemic, surpassed in their toll finally by the Hundred Year War, which ruined France and exhausted England...and then continues to say...could there have been a worse time to live.¹

At the outset I would like to point out that I am not trying to depict the complex and intricate problems facing Africa as simple and easily manageable. And I am aware that the above statement depicts a different reality both in magnitude and historical context from the present one. However, there are reasons to be optimistic about the future especially on the question of displaced people, which I think is surmountable provided that the principles of the OAU which are enshrined in its charter are respected. Jon Woronoff in his article, "Africa's Expanding Crisis," notes that:

after all, every major political cataclysm has left its human debris of refugee, men, women, and children without a home. Indeed the biggest refugee problem the world has ever seen, the millions upon millions of displaced persons and refugees resulting from the Second World War, had been reintegrated in their home countries or sought and found refugees abroad, in Europe, or farther off in America and Australia.²


There is no doubt that the Marshall Plan, which infused billions of dollars into Europe, had a lot to do with the economic recovery of Europe thereby facilitating the voluntary repatriation and/or settlement of refugees in their new found homes. Africa's "refugee" problem is a legacy of colonialism which carved out its boundaries, in 1875 at Berlin, arbitrarily. As pointed out in the OAU Final Report, after the conclusion of its Conference on the Legal, Economic and Social Aspect of African Refugee Problem, 1967,

the causes of the refugee problem in independent African states are...to some extent, part of the colonial legacy...As a result of rather arbitrary manner in which the continent of Africa was carved out among the colonial powers, most of the present nation-state of Africa consist of a medley of different ethnic, cultural, and tribal groups, and very often refugees are the product of clashes between these groups.³

The arbitrariness of the boundaries and the need for their rectification was the paramount concern of the First All African Peoples Conference when it met in Accra, Ghana, from the 13th to 18th of December 1958. The conference denounced the artificial frontiers drawn by imperialist powers...particularly those which cut across ethnic groups and divide people of the same stock (and) called for the abolition or adjustment of such frontiers and called upon the independent states of Africa to support a permanent solution founded upon the wishes of the people.⁴


This call for a revamping of the boundaries sent an unacceptable message not only to the leaders of Ethiopia who foresaw in it a potential and inevitable problem with their neighbor to the east but also the leaders of the then colonies like Togo and Ivory Coast whose territories were being claimed by Ghana. Also, Kenya's colonial leaders figured that they would have the same kind of problem with their neighbor to the northeast. The fears of these countries were realized when Presidents Nkrumah of Ghana and Abdulla Osman of Somalia issued a joint communique in October 1961, emphasizing the unacceptability of the boundaries drawn under colonialism. The communique read:

A union of African states as the step which would automatically make obsolete the frontiers problems inherited from the colonial regime, but also recognized the imperative need to call upon the principle of self-determination as a means of removing the artificial colonial frontiers which were drawn without respect for ethnic, cultural or economic links.5

Indeed, the call for the "unity of African states" and for "self-determination" of people must have unnerved the leaders of the newly independent nations in the 1960s. It is likely that this call was one of the factors which contributed to the creation of the Brazzaville group* in

5Ibid.

*The Brazzaville, the Casablanca and the Monrovia groups were the three political groups that were formed early in 1960 and 1961. While the Brazzaville group was composed of French colonies, with the exception of Guinea, Mali and Togo, the Casablanca group was composed of countries like Ghana, Egypt, Morocco, Guinea and Mali. These two groups had diametrically opposed positions on the independence of
1960. To counter its influence and balance its political weight, which was considered to be reactionary, there came the formation of the Casablanca group in 1961. Hence one can deduce from this that the years between 1958-1962 were a time of great antagonism and cleavages in the history of independent Africa. This heightened tension between the Brazzaville group and the Casablanca group convinced other leaders of the need to cool the political atmosphere, thus leading to the establishment of a third group called the Monrovia group in 1961. The Monrovia group, motivated by its fear of the progressive and ambitious ideas of the Casablanca group which was advocating unconditional political unity of African States, called in its resolution for "absolute equality of states, non-interference in the internal affairs of states, respect for sovereignty of each state and condemnation of outside subversive activities." 6

It is amid this complex and intricate political atmosphere ridden with contradictions and antagonisms that the OAU was born. This is not to deny the fact that the

6 Quoted in Carol Johnson, "Political and Regional Groupings in Africa," International Organization 16:2 (Spring 19620, p. 439.
then heads of state had common interest that could bind them together. They had identical stands on the question of decolonization, Apartheid, racial discrimination, maintenance of international peace and security and the need for economic cooperation.

The principles of the organization as they are laid down in the Charter reflect the overriding concern of the Monrovia group on the one hand and the common position of all three groups on the other: 1) the sovereignty equality of all member states; 2) non-interference in the internal affairs of states; 3) respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence; 4) peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiations, mediation, conciliation or arbitration; 5) unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination as well as subversive activities on the part of neighboring states or any other states; 6) absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent; 7) affirmation of policy of non-alignment with regard to blocs.

These are the principles that were agreed upon by the fathers of the organization to guide them and their policies in international relations. And these principles were, more or less, respected in the 1960s and early 1970s. It can be argued that decolonization and a concerted action against Apartheid and settlers colonialism were the call of the time. Hence, it is not surprising that in 1970 the
number of refugees in Africa was estimated to be at three-quarters of a million. However, as illustrated on the following page, the number today has reached five million.

**Problem Statement**

It is ironic that the OAU encountered the problem of refugees (displaced persons) from independent nations before it even finished celebrating the independence of Portuguese colonies. Its principles have unashamedly and unwarrantedly begun to be either ignored and/or tampered with, opening the Pandora's box of problems of displaced people. Out of the seven principles, five have been shattered, leaving the organization impotent. Aderanti Adepoju in his article, "The Dimension of the Refugee Problem in Africa," observed:

> In the 1950s and early 1970s the majority of African refugees originated mainly from three territories still under Portuguese rule, namely, Angola, Guinea Bissau and Mozambique. Correspondingly, the number of refugees was relatively small, estimated at about half a million persons.

On giving the reasons for the escalation, he says that the number took a traumatic turn in the 1970s especially during the last three years of the decade... the deteriorating situation has been caused largely by a series of political crises that meanwhile erupted in several African countries, notably, Zaire, Ethiopia, Somalia, Angola,

---

7 United Nations International Conference on Assistance to Refugees (ICARA) 9-10 April 1981, p. 3.

NUMBER OF REFUGEES IN AFRICA BY COUNTRY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>52,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>110,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>490,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroun</td>
<td>266,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>112,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>42,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1,540,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>10,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>234,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>73,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>33,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>3,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chad, and Uganda.⁹

This problem has embarrassingly become one of the major problems faced by the OAU. The U.N. Chronicle of May 1981 exposed the shocking magnitude of the displaced people's crisis when it declared "Africa, with some twelve percent of the world population, has almost fifty percent of its refugees."

It is not the intention of this study to limit the causes of the problem to only the breakdown of the peaceful coexistence of neighborly states. Natural disasters such as drought, famine, desertification and the like have also contributed to the rise of the number of displaced people. However, this study will only concentrate on the political problems.

In this review, we can detect three different approaches to the study of the causes and/or problems of refugees and displaced people in Africa. There is the work by Aderanti Adepujo discussed above. Argued along the same line is the work of Jake C. Miller. In his article, "The Homeless of Africa," Miller advances a theory contending that, "massive displacement in Africa is a result of many factors including internal conflicts, colonial/racial

⁹Ibid., pp. 21-22.
domination, oppressive governments, foreign invasion and natural disasters."\(^{10}\) Having established this, he went on to say that "many refugee situations are caused by internal oppression"\(^{11}\) and gives Uganda and Equatorial Guinea as two examples. While the above two scholars have come close to the question of "political crisis," it appears to me that they have stopped short of identifying the real cause of the problem.

The second approach is the one ventured by Jon Woronoff and W.T.S. Gould, respectively. After having uttered his moralistic opinion, "But there must be an end to this! It is not good for a person to remain permanently uprooted,"\(^{12}\) Woronoff goes on to undermine the severity and primordial nature of the problem:

\begin{quote}
Africa has many problems: decolonization, modernization, economic development and so on. The refugee problem is just one more. And in a continent with so few resources and so much to do, there is not much sense in insisting that the refugee problem is one of the most important or that more should be done.\(^{13}\)
\end{quote}

I have no serious disagreement with Woronoff's contention that decolonization, modernization and economic


\(^{11}\) Ibid., p. 9.


\(^{13}\) Ibid.
development are some of the problems to which Africa has to address itself. However, in light of the prevailing intra-African states' conflict which has opened doors to non-African states involvement thereby exacerbating the situation and contributing to the ever-growing number of displaced people, it is only logical that the concern of Woronoff should be relegated to secondary importance. In order to tackle these problems, African states must be able to resolve their differences and forge unity. This makes the resolution of the displaced people's problem a primary consideration whereas decolonization, modernization, and economic development become a secondary concern.

Expounding on this position is in order. The laws of dialectics teach us that nothing remains the same and that everything changes. Whatever was primary could be relegated to a secondary position and whatever was secondary could be transformed to a primary status. For instance, from the early 1930s to the end of the Second World War, when China was occupied by Japanese imperialism, the Communist Party of China took a principled political position by making Japanese imperialism the primary enemy of the Chinese people and forging a united front with the Koumintang, which was relegated to a secondary status. Right after the end of the Second World War and the defeat of Japan, however, the Kuomintang became the primary enemy. Another instance is when the Soviet Union, during the Second World War, made an
alliance with the Western capitalist countries against the then primary enemy, fascism. Right after the war, imperialism became the primary enemy.* So, depending upon time and space, one thing changes into another or one leaves its place for another and vice-versa. And this is the case with the displaced people, which became prevalent right after the independence of the Portuguese colonies, as demonstrated above, thus becoming the primary concern of African states and the OAU.

With Somalia fighting Ethiopia and vice versa, with Sudan encouraging and supporting the secessionists in the northern administrative region of Ethiopia in order to either subvert or stifle the revolution in that country, with Libya trying to incorporate Chad thereby affecting the security of Sudan, Nigeria, and Cameroon; with Zaire having its problem with Angola; Morocco waging war against the Polisario in the Western Sahara thereby alienating and antagonizing Algeria and Libya; with the OAU sick and on its deathbed as a result of its recognition of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, economic development, modernization and decolonization have been shelved to a secondary position. It is logically assumed that the resolution of the problem

*And according to the Western version of the story, Soviet communism and expansionism became the primary enemy as explained in the theory of containment, thus necessitating the establishment of NATO.
of displaced people via the recognition of the principles of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, would transform economic development, modernization and decolonization back to their original primacy.

W.T.S. Gould admittedly wrote that the purpose of his essay was not to review the historical, legal and political situation of refugees in tropical Africa, or to consider possible solutions to refugee problems...but to identify refugees as international migrants and in particular to examine their economic situation in countries of asylum.14

The third approach is that of Gaim Kibreab.15 Kibreab's work has two interrelated objectives. While the first one is to expose the fallacious nature of the theory of "tribal factor as the main cause of the refugee problem in Africa" advanced by many scholars in the West, the second objective is to establish his own theory. He contends that,

present day African societies are not only marked by international conflicts and by the presence of brutal and coercive power but it can be argued that it is these conflicts and violence unleashed to suppress them by the class that has the monopoly of state power that constitute the main problem of refugeeism.17


16 Ibid., p. 37.

17 Ibid., p. 42.
With due respect to the effort of this scholar, I would like to make the following remarks: 1) he has either shied away from giving us the whole picture of his evidence and/or refused to pursue it to its logical conclusion, and 2) he has distorted the facts and by so doing has lost himself in wishful thinking.

In order to prove my contention, I will take issue with two of his "empirical examples," Rwanda and then Eritrea.

Rwanda

After rejecting the tribal thesis about the conflict in Rwanda, Kibreab tried to depict it as a class conflict between the politically conscious oppressed majority - the Hutu - and the numerically small but economically strong ruling class - the Tutsi. He preferred not to say a word about the role and allegiance of the "Tutsi proletarians" during the so-called social revolution. Instead of giving the breakdown of what percentage of Hutu voted for the "militant" "Parti du Mouvement de L'emancipation Hutu" and what percentage of the Tutsi voted for the "Union Nationale Rwandaise" (UNAR) and vice versa, he preferred to simply state that "the monarchy as a symbol of

---

18 Ibid., pp. 50-62.
19 Ibid., p. 51.
oppression, exploitation and domination was brought to an end by eighty percent of the majority." Had we been given the breakdown of the balloting, we would have confirmed the obvious, i.e., the majority of Hutu - 84 percent of the population - had voted for the 'militant' "Parti du Mouvement de L'emancipation Hutu" and the majority of the Tutsi - 15 percent of the population - had voted for the Union Nationale Rwandaise. Thus the outcome substantiating not the class nature of the conflict but the Hutu-Tutsi historical and longstanding animosity.

One thing is certain, however; and that is, Kibreab could go down in the history of African social scientists as the first to champion a "revolution" assisted by Belgian military and police force as "a social revolution for justice, democracy, property, etc."^21

**Eritrea**

As he had tried to overlook the contradictions and conflicts between the two nationalities in Rwanda with the intention of protraying the problem as a class struggle, Kibreab has likewise attempted to portray the many nationalities that inhabit the Northern Administrative Region of Ethiopia - Eritrea - as unified, transcending their parochial interests. To prove his assertion he argued:

---

^20 Ibid., p. 52.

^21 Ibid.
In a sample of 190 households of Eritrean refugees in Qala en Nahl, refugee settlement in the Sudan, the Surveyor asked the refugees to state their "tribal affiliation" and 46 or 24 percent of the sample answered that they were Eritreans. This is very significant not only that it showed the national unity and identity of Eritreans but...22

A critical look at the quotation exposes Kibreab to a serious problem. Once again he has preferred to remain silent on the responses of the other 76 percent of the interviewees. Furthermore, in light of the propaganda bombardment and the state-of-siege the displaced people are under - by the liberation movements - how sincere and genuine would the response of the 24 percent be? In fact there are antagonistic contradictions between the different nationalities which manifest themselves at the war front. It is an open secret that the antagonistic contradictions between the three "liberation movements," EPLF, ELF-PLF and ELF* are beyond reconciliation, thus undermining once again his assertion of class solidarity.

Is the Problem Generalizable?

It is assumed that the problem outlined here and the solution that will be charted could have positive implications for areas where "interference in the internal...

22Ibid., p. 61.

*EPLF = Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front
ELF-PLF = Eritrean Liberation Front Popular Liberation Forces
ELF = Eritrean Liberation Front - Revolutionary Council
affairs of other countries" has become the order of the day, "respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of states" is neglected, where the "sovereign equality of all states" is trampled upon, and where "peaceful settlement of disputes" by negotiations, mediation, conciliation or arbitration are not exercised or opted for. In this connection it is sufficient to mention the following: the Soviet Union's involvement in and occupation of Afghanistan and the resultant problem of displaced people and Vietnam's involvement in and occupation of Cambodia and the resultant problem of displaced people are prime examples.

Hypothesis

Our hypothesis is twofold. First, we want to ascertain that, contrary to the widely accepted view that "ethnicity" and "class oppression" are the fundamental cause of the refugee problem in Africa, we shall argue that antagonistic foreign policies reflecting conflicting national interests of the countries in Groups I, II, and III are the primary causes. Second, we shall also argue that contrary to accepted wisdom, those people are displaced people and not political refugees in the true sense of the term.

Who is a refugee? The problem of the utility and applicability of the term, for the regions under study, has continuously manifested itself in many of the studies we have come across. For instance, Africa magazine, in
one of its reports, has chosen to use the terms "refugee" and "displaced person," simultaneously. It read: "Africa has some four million refugees, of which large numbers are in desperate need of assistance. The greater of these displaced persons in social and financial distress come from OAU members states." (emphasis mine).

Few studies done by the Public Information Section of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees also demonstrate the confusion that surrounds the term refugee and its applicability to the peoples of the regions of our concern. In one of its reports it said, "the overall question of uprooted people in Africa today, whether they are termed refugees, displaced persons, migrants or undocumented aliens." Sadruddin Aga Khan, Special Rapporteur, in his Study on Human Rights and Massive Exoduses seemed to air the frustration of everybody when he said, "Terminology can cause confusion, and problems of nomenclature have contributed to the lack of understanding of the phenomenon of mass exodus." He went on to say,

In recent years, greater attention has come to be paid by the media and governments to events surrounding the creation of refugees.

---


Here again, confusion in terminology is a strong contributing factor to the lack of cohesive global attitude towards the overall problems. Many different terms such as "asylum seeker," "illegal immigrant," "defector," "expelle," "migrant," "displaced person," "border-crosser" and so on are all used, just as victims of natural disasters are frequently called "refugees" as well. Various categories of people are thus lumped together under the same general heading.26

Now that we have made the problem of the utility of the concept for the regions of our concern evident, we would like to ask who is a refugee? The 1951 UN Convention gives the "universally accepted" definition:

Any person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear or for reasons other than personal convenience is unwilling to return to it.27

Does this definition apply to the displaced people of the regions of our concern? The answer is categorically no. However, what made it applicable is the 1969 OAU Convention which stipulated the following to the 1951 definition:

The term refugee shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination of events seriously disturbing public order in either part of (sic, or) the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in

26Ibid., p. 13.
order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin and [or] nationality.\textsuperscript{28}

It is our view that there are significant differences between the 1951 UN definition and that of the 1969 OAU convention. Whereas the 1951 definition depicts the situation as a clear choice of conscious free will, based on a clear understanding of the circumstances one is in and the consequences of his/her choice, the 1969 OAU convention is an imposition. It is an imposition by those who drafted the convention without taking the right of the conscious free will of the displaced people into consideration. The displaced people of the regions of our concern are victims of external aggression and in most instances are children, old men, women, etc. On giving the number of "refugees" in Somalia, the periodical \textit{Africa} observed:

Of the million refugee population in the camps, there are 41,000 men many of whom are either elderly or in poor health. And the women number 143,000, there are 153,000 children between the ages of a few weeks to six years old and 137,000 children aged seven to 14. So three out of five refugees are children.\textsuperscript{29}

And we hasten to add that the majority of displaced people in different camps in Somalia are nomads who are non-political. The same is true with Ethiopian displaced


\textsuperscript{29}John Madeley, "Who Cares About Africa's Refugees?" \textit{Africa} 103 (March 1980), p. 75.
people in the Sudan. The only difference being that the majority of the latter are peasants and sedentary farmers. To consider these people as refugees flies in the face of the truth. The same could be said of the displaced people from Chad to Cameroon and Sudan, from Angola to Zaire and vice versa. Are we then to consider and much worse to equate these people with the ones who made their conscious choice, the genuine refugees? In our opinion, of all the displaced groups, the only group that can qualify for refugee status are the 52,000 or so southern Sudanese who left their country "owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion and nationality." The refugees are Christians and animists and fleeing a government dominated by Moslem northerners and mostly Arabs. The rest of the groups are displaced or uprooted people who fled the war zones depending upon the initial stage of war, i.e. who was in the offensive? With respect to the Somali-Ethiopia war, Somalia was the aggressor and hence in the offensive the displaced people chose to cross into Somalia in order to avoid being enmeshed by the inevitable defense and counterattack of the Ethiopian forces. This situation is also true for the Chadians who fled into Cameroon and the Sudan as a result of Libya's attack.

---

31Ibid.
So also it is true for the Angolans who fled into Zaire when Zaire invaded Angola. Thus this study will adopt the concept displaced people throughout.

**Time Span of the Study**

For the purpose of analysis, a time demarcation has to be made. That is, our study will be limited to an examination of the displaced people from 1975 to 1982. The year 1975 is selected to mark the independence of Portuguese colonies, Angola, Guinea Bissau and Mozambique which by the same token became our watershed for the exodus of displaced people from independent African countries, Angola 1976, the Horn of Africa 1977-78 and Chad 1978-82. The year 1982 is chosen not because it signified or heralded the end of the problems of displaced people but because of the scant of materials and scholarly works of any scientific and academic significance.

**Methodology**

The study is an analysis of the goals and objectives behind the foreign policies of Group II and Group III countries which have interfered in Group I countries' internal affairs producing displaced peoples.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUP I</th>
<th>GROUP II</th>
<th>GROUP III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>USSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Group I countries are those countries that are the source of displaced persons. Group II countries are those African countries which have interfered in the internal affairs of Group I countries based on geographical proximity and self-proclaimed national interest. Group III countries are the non-African countries that have interfered in the internal affairs of Group I countries directly and/or indirectly based on political, economic, ideological and strategic interests.

The study utilizes case by case approach, analyzing the foreign policy objectives of all countries and their regions. In this connection, the chapters will be organized as follows: The Horn of Africa. While the main protagonists are Ethiopia and Somalia, the interferers are Somalia, Egypt, Cuba, China, USA and USSR.

In the next chapter Central and South Western Africa, the main protagonists are Zaire and Angola. The interferers in this conflict are Zaire, South Africa, USA, USSR, Cuba, and China. Angola's reactive interference in the internal affairs of Zaire will also be looked into.

Following that is the chapter on the "Heart of Africa" where the main protagonists are Chad and Libya. The interferers being Libya, Egypt, Sudan, France and the USA.

As the study is not a field study but a library one, the sources of information include such primary sources as are available: government publications and statements made
by officials. Secondary sources include books, journals, magazines, and newspapers.

It goes without saying that the study will utilize causal explanation,* such as what are the causes for the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia?; teleological explanation,* such as what motivated the superpowers to get involved in the internal affairs of Ethiopia? To the extent that the study deals with purposes, goals, and justification used by the respective governments, it will analyze the psychic element of the behaviors of the policymakers. Thus, we recognize the importance not only of empirical evidence but also of logical proposition* and psychological explanation.* For example, what were the undisclosed psychological goals of Libya's interference in the internal affairs of neighboring Chad?

While it is assumed that the foreign policy objectives of Group I countries, as related to the specific problem, is of "core value"** of first type, i.e. primarily maintaining the territorial integrity of their respective countries; Somali, Zairean and Libyan foreign policy

---


**These concepts are being utilized as understood and expounded by K.J. Holsti in his book International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977), pp. 138-163. It is wise to point out, however, that Holsti does not classify the "core value" as of first type and second type. We have taken the liberty to classify them as such to make the distinction that is so needed in this study.
objectives are assumed to be core value of the second type, i.e. interests that are motivated by the control or defense of neighboring territories that are endowed with natural resources that can enhance state's capabilities. The foreign policy objectives of Group III countries could be characterized as middle range** objectives of the third category, i.e. different forms of self-extention of imperialism.

In trying to address and analyze the foreign policy objectives of Groups I, II, and III countries as related to the specific problem, it is pertinent to raise the following questions:

I. Somalia-Ethiopia
   - What are the problems between these two neighboring countries?
   - What are the objectives of their foreign policies towards one another?
   - Do their foreign policies mirror non-alignment? If not, why not?
   - Are their conflictual relationships aggravated by superpowers involvement?

II. Zaire-Angola
   - What are the problems between these two countries?
   - What are the objectives of their foreign policies towards one another?
- Do their foreign policies reflect non-alignment? If not, why not?
- What has been the impact of superpower involvement in their relations?
- What are the objectives of the superpowers in the area, etc.?

III. Libya-Chad
- What are the problems between these two countries?
- What are the reasons for Libya's involvement in Chad's affairs?
- What has been the response of Chad's neighboring countries, namely, Egypt and Sudan, towards Libya's involvement in Chad's internal affairs?
CHAPTER II

THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

In studying the conflict among states, the first thing to consider is the system in which relations take place. Just as relations among individuals are influenced above all by conventions and customs of the society within which they live, so the relations of states themselves are influenced by the conventions and customs of their system.¹

The above quotation recognizes the dialectical relations between the states, which in this case are the actors, and the international system to which they are part. The type of relationship - cooperative or conflictual - between the actors in the system determines the general atmosphere of the environment. While the international system is a reflection of the type of relation that prevails among the actors, their relationship is in turn affected or influenced by the system.

In order to concretize this theoretical underpinning, we would empirically investigate the conflictual relationship between Angola and Zaire, between Ethiopia and Somalia, and between Chad and Libya. It goes without saying that the international system is also the object of this study.

Within what type of international system do these conflictual relationships take place? Are the problems between these countries aggravated and exacerbated by the international system? What are the problems between Angola and Zaire, between Ethiopia and Somalia, between Chad and Libya? What are the objectives of their foreign policies towards one another? What are the objectives of the superpowers in these countries and their geographical location? Pertinent questions of these types would be entertained.

It has been claimed that "all politics is a mixture of conflict and cooperation but international politics has less cooperation and more conflicts."² Is it so? If so, why? Before we delve into the analysis of why conflictual relation is dominant and prevalent in international politics, it is imperative that we examine the definition of the concept "conflict" for the development of our theoretical framework.

Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf offer a succinct definition of the concept:

Conflict entails, at a minimum, the existence of two or more parties who perceive differences between or among them and who are committed to resolving those differences to their own satisfaction. Conflict may be seen as an intrinsic product of communication and contact between people; when groups interact, some conflict is inevitable...conflict should not necessarily

---

be regarded as either infrequent or an anomaly.  

Arguing along the same line, Synder and Mack set the following conditions that characterize every conflict:
1) Two (or more) distinctive parties must exist and have contact with each other. 2) They must pursue mutually exclusive, and/or mutually incompatible, scarce values.
3) This gives rise to mutually opposed actions and reactions. 4) Those actions exhibit behavior aiming at the destruction, injury, impediment or control of the other party or parties. 5) Attempts are made to acquire power by acquiring scarce resources used to pressure the opposed parties.

The consensus among many scholars of international politics that international politics is conflict-ridden forces us to investigate every conflict thoroughly so as to reach the root cause of it.

Many divergent theories ranging from the teaching of the Bible to the biology of human nature, i.e. the search for power and overdrive of nationalism have been propounded.

Perhaps the popularity of this theory (human nature) is a legacy of the Christian tradition, for it has been the orthodox Christian view. Christian teachers have held that human nature is not basically good or even (by itself)

---


4 Quoted in Friedrich V. Kratochwil, International Order and Foreign Policy (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1980),
capable of becoming good...according to Christian teaching, every person has inherent evil desires, sometimes called "Original Sin," a metaphor derived from the biblical story of Adam's fall from grace...collective violence, carried out by states against each other, is in the Christian view only a manifestation of this basic individual nature, because states are composed of individuals.\(^5\)

Advancing his "search for power" theory, Hans J. Morgenthau has the following to say:

It is sufficient to state that the struggle for power is universal in time and space and is an undeniable fact of experience. It cannot be denied that throughout historic time, regardless of social, economic, and political conditions, states have met each other in contests for power...if the desire for power cannot be abolished everywhere in the world, those who might be cured would simply fall victims to the power of others...the drives to live, to propagate and dominate are common to all men.\(^6\)

Morgenthau's contention of man's innate wish to dominate and the drive for power has of late, obtained the support of biologists, particularly those who concentrate and specialize in the branch of biology known as ethology or the study of animal behavior. The reputed biologist, Konrad Lorenz, argued in 1962 that human beings, like other animals, have instincts which are inherited. Among the instincts discovered by Lorenz is aggressiveness. This is why he argues that human beings are ready to counterfight

\(^5\) Ziegler, War, Peace and International Politics, pp. 114-115.

when challenged by another. 7

Although we would accept the second premise that human beings are ready to counterfight when challenged, Lorenz has failed to explain the initial motive and reason for the one to provoke the other. As quoted above, Christian teaching has no difficulty in explaining this for it has ascertained from the outset that human nature is basically evil. Hence it can be inferred that both the biologist and the theoretician of power politics have failed to dissociate and/or differentiate their argument from that of biblical teaching. Put succinctly, Christian teaching would say "these desires (evil) make people want what they have no business wanting and prompt them to use violence if that is necessary to fulfill these desires." 8

Another theory of conflict is that of "troublemakers." In this case individuals who are trigger-happy are the culprits. Eliminate these troublemakers, the theory goes, and you eliminate war. 9 Ziegler reminds us that Alan Bullock's book on Hitler portrays the subject as the devil who is to blame for the Second World War. 10 By the same token, could we argue that President Mobutu is responsible for the conflict between Zaire and Angola? Is President

7 Ziegler, War, Peace and International Politics, p. 115.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., p. 118.
10 Ibid.
Siad Barre responsible for the many wars between Somalia and Ethiopia? Should we hold President Gadaffi responsible for the ongoing war between Libya and Chad? While our theory does not contest the role of individuals in history, we prefer a holistic approach. We argue that the role of these individuals has to be explained within the global context of the international environment. It would be unwise not to look at the class and mode of production these individuals represent. Theodore Abel comes close to this position when he writes:

Throughout recorded human history, the initiators of war were individuals and groups who held power: political power, control over natural resources, means of production, land, markets, credits and other sources of domination.11

Although we are in complete agreement with Abel's contention, we would, however, like to point out one significant difference between the wars of yesteryears and present day wars, especially those fought by small nations. Today's wars are not absolutely limited to the nations waging them. There is superpower involvement based on ideological commitment, geo-political and strategic concern as well as economic interests. This has in fact become commonplace, influencing the outcome of wars one way or the other.

A third theory to explain international conflict is

that of "nationalism." It is argued, for example that the Austrians went to war with Serbia in 1914 because of Serbian nationalist claims. France went to war to retrieve her lost provinces, Alsace and Lorraine. It goes without saying that in the 1930s Hitler argued for the right of the Germans to live together in one state. Thus the theory would argue that nationalism is a cause of war. We will not dispute such a claim. It could be a factor just as is the theory of the "troublemakers." However, our endeavour is to find the root cause of war. There is an underlying reason that could accommodate all other suggested reasons and explain them. Those who attribute evilness to human nature, who allege that the drive for power is the supreme goal of human beings, and those advocates of the theories of "troublemakers" and "nationalism," consciously or unconsciously, overlook the importance of natural resources which are responsible for our continued existence. It is the scarcity of natural resources which is significantly responsible for our development and/or underdevelopment and that is the underlying cause of war. It should also be stressed that not only the scarcity of these resources but also their uneven distribution compounds the problem. Hence the drive for conquest and domination!

Politics has argued eloquently and convincingly that it is not the biological nature of human beings that is to blame. He observed:

Marxist theory rejects biological reductionism in explaining social phenomena, and criticizes both the application of Darwin's theory to society and Spencer's organicism. Rather, Marxists hold that while society certainly comprises biological processes, it represents a more complex type of material unity qualitatively different from the biological aggregate. In society, biological laws are integrated within the economic and social relations established among people as well as within the political and ideological conceptions generated by this framework, eventually forming a whole that functions in accordance with social laws that are distinct in many ways from biological principles. Accordingly men who are biologically strong may well become socially underprivileged and economically poor because of specific societal conditions. Marxists thus maintain that power should be explained in social rather than biological terms; in society power is an effect rather than a cause, a means rather than an end. Far from being the prime mover in international politics, power is the result of historical states of affairs defined both by material conditions of society and by social and national inequalities. Power politics would not and could not exist if nations were equal in size and might. While Morgenthau's proposition that power is a major factor in both domestic and international politics is valid, his generalization that the struggle for power is a permanent element of all social relations is highly debatable. Hypothetically, if one eliminates the main cause of power, namely, social and national inequality, there would be no reason for domination and struggle against domination; there would be no reason to exercise power. Nor could industrially advanced nations exploit poorer countries if all nations were at the same level of economic and technological development. In the real world, however, nations are great and small, mighty and weak, developed and underdeveloped, rich and poor. As long as such differences exist power will remain
an important factor in international politics.\textsuperscript{13}

We can therefore conclude that the scarcity and uneven distribution of these natural resources which determine our strengths and weaknesses, our development and underdevelopment and the blind but compelling drive for control of these resources, is the prime cause of war. To this we would like to add that the strategic location of a country endowed with resources and the desire to control such a country have contributed significantly to the deterioration of relations among states. The fact that Ethiopia and Somalia are located in the Horn of Africa forming part of the "arc of crisis;" and the fact that Chad is situated in North Africa sharing a boundary line with "expansionist" Libya to the north, and Sudan to the east, Niger and Nigeria to the west, and the fact that the resource rich Angola is located in southwestern Africa bordered by Namibia to the south which in turn shares a borderline with Apartheid South Africa that illegally occupies it; and the fact that socialist Angola shares a boundary line with capitalist and Western oriented Zaire to its northeast and the fact that Angola is on the Atlantic Coast with access to the sea lanes have all to be seen within the context of present international system as factors contributing to conflicts between and among states. It is a truism to

\textsuperscript{13}Silviu Brucan, The Dialectic of World Politics (New York: Free Press, 1978),
state that nations formulate their foreign policies based on their national interest. To this we would like to add that the international system affects and influences the formation of policies of member states of the system. The following pages examine the type of international system the world has today and discusses how it affects member nations in their relations with one another.

The Present International System

We start from the following observations that contributed to the modification of the post World War II international system: 1) the emergence of the Soviet Union - a socialist country - as one of the two superpowers; 2) the emergence of the United States - a capitalist country - as the other superpower; and 3) the emergence of the Third World, a bloc of countries with a declared motto of non-alignment.14

It is evident, however that many scholars have been at variance in their depiction of the present international system. While Cecil Crabb sees a multipolar world system,15 Morton Kaplan sees a loose bipolar world system16 and the

---


15 Ibid., p. 10.

Chinese theoreticians see Three Worlds. Joan Edelman Spero in her book, *The Politics of International Economic Relations*, sees Three Systems, i.e. the Western system of interdependence, the North-South system of dependence and the East-West system of independence. Henry Kissinger and former President Nixon shared the perception of achieving peace only when there is a balance of power. And to that end they saw a strong and healthy United States, Europe, Soviet Union, China, and Japan balancing each other.

**The Multipolar System of Cecil V. Crabb**

Crabb contends that the bipolar world which came into being at the end of World War II ceased to be a reality around 1960. According to him what distinguished the bipolar system from the previous international system—balance of power—was the acquisition and use of atomic bombs by America in 1945 and the successful development of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union a few years later. Added to this is the fact that most crucial decisions

---


19 President Nixon in Kegley and Wittkopf, p. 391.
affecting the global system were made by the two superpowers.\textsuperscript{20} We believe an analysis of the causes for the degeneration of the system into multipolarity as seen by Crabb and his peers should be in order. Kegley and Wittkopf seemed to read Crabb's mind when they said the following:

The decline of East-West tension in Europe, the emergence of Japan and the European community as significant and powerful new actors, the rise of China and its open conflict with the Soviet Union are all ingredients of a transforming international political system. These trends make a multipolar system a potential model for describing emerging political realities.\textsuperscript{21}

Crabb supplements the above contention by including the Third World countries in the picture. He argues that while the Soviet Union and the United States are, militarily speaking, the two superpowers of the system, neither has been able to impose its will upon the Third World.\textsuperscript{22}

We are convinced that the above contention, on close ideological, empirical and theoretical scrutiny is only sophistry. It is so because, ideologically it fails to acknowledge the antagonistic and contradictory nature of the two antipodal systems. Whether we try to cover it up or not, the planet earth is divided into the socialist camp and the capitalist camp. It is due to the non-

\textsuperscript{20}Crabb, American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{21}Kegley and Wittkopf, World Politics: Trend and Transformation, pp. 395-396.

\textsuperscript{22}Crabb, American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age, p. 10.
existence of any other camp that we witness the vascillation of the so-called non-aligned countries between the two camps. It is a weak argument because the non-antagonistic and easily reconcilable differences between the Western capitalist countries have been taken at their face value thus convincing them of a split in the camp.

France for example, is a country that has earned notoriety for encouraging dissension and supernationalism in the Western world. However, an empirical study of its ideological and policy relations with the Western countries in general and the United States in particular, would reveal no qualitative differences. It is true that France and the United States may not see each other eye to eye on the problem and solutions in Latin America. However, this does not demonstrate France's ideological independence vis-a-vis the U.S. It merely shows that France's position is dictated by its national interest which in the case of Latin America is very insignificant. It would be ridiculous to construe this as an ideological difference. Let us not forget Vietnam, which was France's colonial war initially and which was passed on to the United States. It did so not because it was convinced that the war it was conducting was unjust but because it lost the war both in the military and political field. Nor should we be

23 Jean-Pierre Cot, "Winning East-West in North-South," Foreign Policy 46 (Spring 1982), pp. 3-18.
oblivious to the fact that it is the intransigent Western countries of which France is part and parcel that stubbornly resist pressuring for changes in South Africa. It has stood, and firmly so, shoulder to shoulder with the United States in defending Apartheid South Africa and obstructing and/or delaying the independence of Namibia. With the collusion of the United States it has frustrated and thwarted people's uprising in Zaire\textsuperscript{24} and elsewhere. It has recently sent its soldiers as part of the so-called peace-keeping force - which is a misnomer - to Lebanon. The actual responsibility of the force is to protect from collapse the American backed government of Gemayel.\textsuperscript{25} Under the pressure of the Reagan administration it has also sent its soldiers to Chad to frustrate the expansionist moves of Colonel Gaddafi. And detente with the Soviet Union might have brought Western European, France included, the benefits of trade with the socialist camp. The West Germans could be enthusiastic about detente for it has brought the repatriation of 200,000 Germans from the East.\textsuperscript{26}


\textsuperscript{26}Robert J. Art, "Fixing the Atlantic Bridges," Foreign Policy 46 (Spring 1982), pp. 67-85.
Europeans could opt for "east-west dialogue" while the Reagan administration stresses increasing the strength of the U.S. and its allies. It would be spurious to consider these differences as a rupture in the alliance of the capitalist world. When the chips are down they are in the same camp. The affirmative position taken by the Western countries on the deployment of new U.S. ground launched cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles in their countries is an eloquent testimony of their unity. Margaret Thatcher, on a recent visit with President Reagan had the following to say, "the United States should proceed with its planned deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe in December." Explaining France's position on the matter, Jean-Pierre Cot, Minister for Cooperation and Development in Mitterrand's government wrote:

Contrary to certain predictions, the French government has taken a firm attitude toward problems such as the deployment of U.S. intermediate range nuclear forces in Western Europe and the Polish crisis. The presence of Communist ministers in the French government has at no time impaired France's reliability as a partner within the Atlantic alliance.

---

29 Cot, "Winning East-West in North-South," p. 3.
And the West German position was expressed by President Karl Carstens, he said:

His country would not waiver in its commitment to strengthen the Western alliance. We are dealing with a highly armed superpower which is making great efforts in order to increase its influence in many parts of the world.30

It is clear that the struggle between the two social systems is not limited to the spheres of military and economic power only. It is also waged in the field of politico-ideology. In addition to the print and radio media such as BBC, VOA, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Moscow, etc. there are Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and philanthropic organizations like the World Council of Churches, Amnesty International, World Peace Council, the Norwegian Nobel Committee and many more which have become the mouthpiece of their respective sponsors thus forfeiting their objectivity and neutrality. For instance, the Peace Prize to Henry Kissinger, in 1970 for his effort in trying to bring a "peaceful solution" to the U.S.-Vietnam conflict.31 In 1983 the Nobel Committee awarded its peace prize to Lech Walesa, the "founder of Poland's Solidarity

31 It was a sad irony for the world to witness Kissinger, who was directly responsible for the escalation of the war into Cambodia, receive the award.
Labor Union." The timing of the selection of Walesa by the Committee manifests the politico-ideological motives not only of the Committee but also of the Western countries which exploited the occasion and the opportunity as a pretext to interfere in the internal affairs of Poland. Reagan claimed that it was "a triumph of moral force over brute force." French Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy told France's parliament that "Walesa is a man who fights for freedom in an almost universal way." A foreign ministry spokesman in the Hague said, "The Dutch government hopes that the award to Lech Walesa will act as a stimulus for the Polish government to open a constructive dialogue with the free trade unions." The Polish government, cognizant of the motive and intention of the ballyhoo, had the following to say:

The Norwegian jury awarded this year's prize in conditions of a vehement rise of international tension and an escalating propaganda aggression against Poland and the other socialist countries...voices were heard in world opinion that the humanitarian idea behind the Nobel Peace Prize is abused for political struggles ends in international relations.

33 Ibid., p. 8.
34 Ibid.
35 Atlanta Constitution, 6 October 1983, p. 6-A.
36 Ibid.
Closing the chapter on the Europeans theater, we would now go to the so-called third force - the non-aligned movement and see if it is actually a real independent force.

To begin with, what were the causes for the creation of the so-called non-aligned movement? How did the capitalist camp and the socialist camp react to the formation of the group? Has there been any effort by either or both camps to woo the movement? Has the movement been able to live up to its intended and initial declaration? A methodological study of this sort will validate or invalidate Crabb's contention of the independent role of the group vis-a-vis the two camps.

It is an open secret that the purpose of founding the movement was to assist the newly independent nation-states to play an independent role vis-a-vis the two blocs. Complementary to this noble intention was the wish of the founding fathers, Nehru, Nasser, Sukahrno, Tito among them, to ensure a conducive and peaceful world atmosphere in which to build their nations. Margret Legum in her article, "Africa and Non-Alignment" outlines three broad common interests shared by the then 32 independent African states which they expected the movement would address and advance. According to her, the first was to establish the principle and the practice that the sovereignty of small states is as
important as the interest of the large ones. The second major objective "was to abolish colonialism and alien rule throughout the African continent...while these systems remain in Southern Africa the dignity of Africa's people is felt to be violated." The third objective was the interest in a rapid economic development through the application of capital from the developed world to the resources of Africa. For this to be possible aid must be obtained free of political conditions.\textsuperscript{37} It is fair to assume that the concerns of the rest of the members were similar to those of Africa. If there were additional points, they would be complimentary. The additional points were the criteria that were adopted at their preparatory meeting in Cairo from June 5 to 8, 1961: 1) a country should pursue an independent policy based on coexistence of states with differing political and social systems and on non-alignment or demonstrate a desire to conduct such a policy; 2) a country must not be a member of a multilateral military alliance concluded in the context of big power confrontation; 3) a country should permanently support movements for national independence; 4) if a country has concluded a bilateral military agreement with a great power or is a

member of a regional defense treaty, such an agreement or treaty must not have been concluded expressly in the context of big power confrontation; and 5) if a country has ceded military bases to a foreign power, this concession must not have been made in the context of big power confrontation.38

The criteria confirm our original contention: a) the existence of two different socio-political systems; and b) that the confrontation in the world is between or involves the two antagonistic social systems led by the two superpowers.

On reading between the lines of the criteria, it would seem that the movement at its birth recognized the difficulties it was to encounter. Constituted of small newly independent states tied to the metropoles economically, culturally and politically (neo-colonialism) the movement's efficacy in international relations was to be very limited. However, at the time both the Soviet Union and the United States viewed the movement as immoral. The Soviet perception was later to change with the death of Stalin, while the U.S. persisted until President Kennedy came to power.39 Leaving the ideological competition of the two superpowers in the newly independent states for a later


39 Ziegler, War, Peace and International Politics, pp. 53-54.
discussion, it is necessary to examine whether the non-aligned countries have lived up to their pledges.

This question will be explored in the case studies presented in the following three chapters. Ethiopia, once a neo-colonial empire of U.S. imperialism, was host to the U.S. military and had given it a base in its northern province, Eritrea. The Republic of Somalia on adopting "socialism" in 1969 as its socio-economic system, was host to the Soviet Union and had provided it with a naval base at Barbara. The irony is that both Ethiopia and Somalia were to exchange guests as Ethiopia became socialist and summoned the Soviet Union to replace the U.S. and Somalia invited the United States to substitute the Soviet Union. The problems of Angola and Zaire and Chad and Libya should be viewed within the same prism. The problems in the Middle East and the problems in Latin America can all be viewed in the same light. Tito of Yugoslavia illuminated this point as follows:

The picture of the world today is still a far cry from what we would like it to be. The world continues to be divided into blocs and is encumbered by dangerous confrontations which are more and more frequently being transferred into the regions of the non-aligned and other developing countries. Far from being eliminated, new hotbeds of conflict are unfortunately cropping up.40

Speaking about the problems that confront the non-aligned movement, J.R. Jayewardene, President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka said:

Several of the political issues that threaten to divide us, and therefore catch our attention and consume our time, are intrinsically important. They cannot be glossed over because if they are neglected, they will continue to grow until they are beyond solution.41

Miljan Komatina, Yugoslavia's Ambassador to the United Nations, put the difficulties encountered by the movement in perspective as follows:

The end of the seventies and the beginning of the eighties has likewise brought with them new problems for the non-aligned, for they will now have to find answers to a series of new events, phenomena and trends in international relations. What they have to do now is above all, to ensure the independent anti-bloc character of the non-aligned movement, not by "purging" it from countries which have voluntarily or involuntarily become part and parcel of political alliances and blocs, but by creating such as will make it easier for these countries to act in a truly non-aligned manner. In other words, the issue at stake is how to protect the non-aligned countries from bloc inroads, how to transcend polarization on bloc foundations in situations when non-alignment is exposed to attempt subjection of individual or groups of countries to bloc interests, trying to transform them into a reserve of bloc policy or into a "natural ally" of one or the other bloc. These pressures were clearly evident as far back as the 1978 ministerial conference in Belgrade, and more especially so during preparations for the sixth non-aligned summit in Havana. The discussions conducted during preparations for both these meetings clearly showed that

41President J.R. Jayewardene's Statement to the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, September 3-7, 1979, Havana, Cuba, p. 12.
some of the non-aligned countries, hiding behind the cloak of "progressiveness" or equi-distance in relationship to the blocs, are trying to introduce bloc criteria of behavior among the non-aligned, which nears turning these countries into the protagonists of one or the other bloc, even in the cases of blatant intervention and aggression. 42

The above three straightforward statements unequivocally depict the problems that the non-aligned movement, constituted mainly of Third World countries, is encountering. Unlike, Crabb who viewed the Third World as another bloc, and who stated that these countries have been able to resist the influences of the superpowers, the three contend otherwise. Although they stop short of spelling it out in black and white, their contention is tantamount to recognizing the existence of only two blocs, thus contradicting Crabb's, Kegley's and Wittkopf's assertion of a multipolar international system.

The Role of Ideology in the Struggle for Control and Influence of the Third World

The struggle for control of the minds of the leadership of the Third World countries thereby charting the avenues of the socio-economic development in these countries, is pursued by all means. However, for the sake of clarity and in keeping with the scope of this work, the analysis will concentrate on the following key works: The Stages of Economic Growth: A

Non-Communist Manifesto by W.W. Rostow and the Non-Capitalist Path of Development by R. Ulyanovsky.

Rostow presents the reader with a methodology for the "modernization" of the independent nations which is an antithesis to Marxist methodology. He argued:

If this system is to challenge and supplant Marxism as a way of looking at modern history it must answer, in its own way, the question posed under the rubric of 'imperialism' by the Marxist analysis, as elaborated by Marx's successors.43

And on explaining the importance of the Third World to the capitalist world he said:

We must demonstrate that the underdeveloped nations - now the main focus of communist hopes - can move successfully through the preconditions into a well established take-off within the orbit of the democratic world, resisting the blandishment and temptations of communism. This is, I believe, the most important single item on the Western agenda.44

Rostow's book is based on the latter question, an assumption which led him to indulge in intellectual speculation. Such approach has been blind to objective historical reality. We say this because it is our belief that underdeveloped countries as we observe them today are a product of historical forces, especially of those forces released by European expansion...Europe did not discover the underdeveloped countries, on the contrary she created them.45

44 Ibid., p. 134.
45 Keith Griffin, "Underdevelopment in History," in
Rostow assumes that "preconditions are created generally in response to the intrusion of foreign power." No one would disagree with him on the issue of capital flow or the intrusion of capital into the newly independent nations. The problem, however, is his assertion that it had and could set a precondition. Paul Baran, in his article, "The Political Economy of Backwardness," notes:

There were, no doubt, colonies and dependencies where the populations profited from inflow of foreign capital. These benefits, however, were few and far between, while exploitation and stagnations were the prevailing rule.

The author, in a desperate move called upon the elites of the developing countries to take the initiative and responsibility of their country. He pleaded:

The non-communist literate elites in these transitional societies bear a heavy responsibility for the future of their people. They have the right to expect the world of advanced democracies to help on an enlarged scale...it is they who must focus their minds on the talks of development.

Rostow, on behalf of the Western capitalist countries, reminded the newly independent states of the Third World of the possibility of modernization by embarking on the path

---


traversed by those capitalist countries. We would, however, like to close Rostow's discussion by pointing out the following. His assumption neglects: 1) the political and economic effects of the era of imperialism, 2) the neo-colonial economy of the newly independent nations (dependency) and 3) the functioning of these countries economies within the international trade system which was established by and for the sole interests of the metropole.

The Soviet theoreticians, on the other hand, have misused the names of Marx and Lenin in their theory of the non-capitalist path of development for sheer political purpose. A critical investigation of the theory exposes its faults. It reconciles class struggle and advocates the subordination of communists aims to those of national democratic parties. When one asks why, the response further exposed their opportunistic line:

Marxists-Leninist have always upheld the decisive role of the working class in the advance of the socialsit revolution, in socialist construction, and they continue to do so; however, in countries where a working class has not yet taken shape, this approach to the leading role of the working class is something that the country can attain at a specific stage of non-capitalist development after first rejecting the capitalist path.

---


50 Ibid.
Marxism-Leninism has no double standard nor does it advocate a transition to working class rule after the consummation of the so-called non-capitalist development. Empirical evidence based on the Chinese and Vietnamese experience teach us that countries with a relatively small working class can transform a semi-feudal and semi-capitalist society into a socialist society under the dictatorship of the proletariat. The vanguard role in both countries was played by the proletariat with the support of the peasantry and the progressive segment of the petty bourgeoisie. And the socio-economic reality of the countries alleged to follow the non-capitalist development, "Algeria, Syria, South Yemen, Somalia, Tanzania, the Peoples Republic of the Congo, Guinea and Burma"51 depicts nothing so much as dependency. Ulyanvosky admits that the non-capitalist development approach has not been accepted by the international communist movement,52 thus further strengthening our position that the theory advanced in the names of Marx and Lenin is only to disguise the political motive of the Soviet Union. In fact, the theory of "non-capitalist development" is simply a rebuttal of the theory of "the stages of economic growth." This becomes obvious when we look at the following argument:

51Ibid., p. 67.
52Ibid., p. 55.
The objective need for cooperation between the socialist countries and the national democracy makes specific demands on the latter. The foreign policy tenets and concepts which at one time served as a common platform for all Third World countries now require to be developed and hence defined more precisely. Positive neutrality and non-interference can no longer be interpreted as an effort to steer a course of balance between the two systems. Non-capitalist development is not possible on such a basis. It demands closer relations with the socialist community in the common struggle against the imperialists and a clear understanding of the social implications of socialism and imperialism, opposition to the theory of "rich and poor nations" or that of the two superpowers based on a rejection of the class character of the two camps in the modern world.  

To Reiterate

The above discussion should convince us to reject the theory of multipolarity of the world system as advanced by Crabb, Kegley and Wiftkoff. We have shown that the differences that exist among the capitalist countries are non-antagonistic in nature and reconcilable. As has been made evident in the above discussion, the quantitative differences that exist among those countries have not nor will it prevent them from taking a united and strong ideological stand against the "Soviet threat" in Europe and the containment of "Soviet expansionism" throughout the world. We have also depicted the Third World countries as being perturbed and bewildered in this politically

\[53^{Ibid., p. 65.}\]
complex but ideologically bipolar world. The efforts of both blocs to woo the support of these countries have been described. It has become common knowledge that the ideological contradictions between the so-called moderates and progressives that persist within the non-aligned movement is a clear and potent testimony of their inability to play an independent role vis-a-vis the two blocs. The sum total of all these shows the superficiality of the theory of multipolarity.

The Loose Bipolar System of Morton Kaplan

Kaplan in his study observes that there are six alternative theoretical models of international systems out of which only two of them, the "balance of power system" and the "loose bipolar system" have historical parallel or correlate. In the balance of power, international system, it is argued that all the actors are nation-states such as France, Germany, Italy, etc. and that the system needs the equal participation of each - at the minimum five. However, this system was overtaken by new developments and was transformed into a "loose bipolar system" when deviant but powerful actors emerged and the non-deviant actors failed to take countermeasures. New international ideologies and supranational organizations like

the communist bloc, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and also universal organization like the United Nations made their appearance and pledge to stay.  

The loose bipolar system reflects the existing reality where interactions and activities are carried out by the supranational actors and the universal actor. It is true that almost all the national actors are members of the universal actor and that most of the major national actors belong to one or the other major supranational bloc. It is equally true that some national actors are not members of any of the major blocs.  

Kaplan further introduces us to the type of structural relation that prevails in the supranational organizations. While he characterizes NATO as relatively non-hierarchical, he identifies the Warsaw Pact as hierarchical. This structural relation, he believes, determines the cohesiveness of the national actors in the bloc. He argues that since the functional integration in the hierarchical bloc is so great, it would be difficult for satellite members to withdraw or to form a viable national entity if they did. On the other hand, the non-hierarchical bloc has a looser hold over its members. In this connection we would like to point out that geographical proximity must

55 Ibid., p. 296.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid., pp. 296-297.
have played a part in the determination of the nature of the structural relations of national actors in their membership in their respective supranational organizations. The Warsaw Pact is hierarchical not only because the Soviet Union is economically and militarily stronger than its allies, but also because most of the so-called satellite countries are its neighbors and depend on it for protection and economic development. Unlike the Warsaw Pact, NATO is non-hierarchical because the United States, the strongest nation of the bloc, is geographically located thousands of miles away from its allies. Had they all shared the same geographical location, the nature of the relationship in the structure of NATO would have been different. It was the U.S., through the Marshall Plan program, that reanimated and resuscitated the economics of its allies. Just like the Soviet Union reacts to any kind of change in the leadership of its allies, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the rest so also America had on many occasions expressed its resentment and displeasure when the "socialists" or the "communists" assumed power in the countries of its allies, France, Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, etc. With allies that are geographically close subversion and coup d'etat are commonplace as in the Dominican Republic, Chile, Cuba and now Nicaragua and El Salvador.

_U.S. News and World Report_ corroborated this contention:
Over a period of nearly 150 years, U.S. armed forces swept into Central America and the Caribbean more than 60 times to topple governments, install friendly regimes, and or suppress revolutions and support American business interests.

While Kaplan has argued unequivocally that the nature of the present international system is bipolar, he has however, qualified it as "loose' for the reasons outlined above.

Unlike Crabb, Kegley and Wittkopf, who suggested that the non-antagonistic contradictions that exist among Western countries signal the deterioration and breakup of the alliance system, Kaplan argues that these differences are not sufficient to reach such a conclusion. Hence, he coins his own terminology "non-hierarchical" to show the looser hold of the bloc on its members. This structural relationship gives the members of the supranational actor leeway to express their differences while simultaneously maintaining their cohesiveness vis-a-vis the other bloc, for the rule of the game is the elimination of the rival bloc. Of the many rules enunciated by Kaplan, the following are relevant to this discussion. 1) All blocks subscribing to hierarchical or mixed hierarchical integrating principles are to eliminate the rival bloc. 2) All blocs subscribing to hierarchical or mixed hierarchical inte-

grating principles are to negotiate rather than to fight, to fight minor wars rather than major wars, and to fight major wars - under given risk and cost factors - rather than to fail to eliminate the rival bloc. 3) All bloc actors are to increase their capabilities relative to those of the opposing bloc. 4) All bloc actors are to engage in major war rather than to permit the rival bloc to attain a position of preponderant strength. 5) Non-bloc member national actors are to act to reduce the danger of war between the bloc actors. 6) Non-bloc members are to refuse to support the policies of one bloc actor as against the other except in their roles as members of universal actors. 59

Rules one through four give a clear picture of the antagonistic nature of the relations between the two blocs. They also put in perspective the current tense relations between the two blocs. The recent harsh exchange of unfriendly words between the leaders of the two blocs is a fervent attestation. Reagan reminded the United Nations:

Reactions to the Korean airliner tragedy are a timely reminder of just how different the Soviets' concept of truth and international cooperation is from the rest of the world...peace cannot be served by pseudo arms control. We need reliable reciprocal reductions. I call upon the Soviet Union today to reduce the tension it has heaped on the world in the past few weeks. 60


To which Andropov replied:

The Soviet state has successfully overcome many trials, including crucial ones, during the six and half decades of its existence. Those who encroached on the integrity of our state, its independence and our system found themselves on the garbage heap of history. It is high time that everyone to whom this applies understood that we shall be able to insure the security of our country, the security of our friends and allies under any circumstances.61

Coming back to the analysis of the rules of the loose bipolar system, rules five and six refer to the small and so-called non-aligned countries which are supposed to play a mediatory role lessening tensions between the two blocs. But since these countries are in fact ideologically sympathetic to one or the other bloc, depending upon the socio-economic and political system of their countries, they have found themselves exacerbating the already shaky relationship between the two blocs. This will be substantiated in the following three chapters.

The Three Worlds of the Chinese Theoreticians

It is alleged that Chairman Mao advanced the theory of three worlds "at a time when the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States became locked in a cut-throat struggle for world hegemony and were actively preparing for a new war."62 It is contended that the Chairman told a


visiting leader of a Third World country that the United States and the Soviet Union constituted the First World and Japan, Europe and Canada formed the Second World. The Third World is made up of countries from Africa, Latin America and Asia including China with the exception of Japan. 63

Since this theory is an extension of the theory of "Soviet social imperialism" and "capitalism has been restored to the Soviet Union," discussion to clarify this contention is in order. It is obvious that the Chairman did not stand alone in this belief. Although the number of Western "revolutionary intellectuals" who are convinced of the "restoration of capitalism in the USSR" is not known, Charles Bettelheim, Martin Nicolaus and the lately converted Paul Sweezy are at the vanguard. Since Nicolaus' book entitled _A Critical Study of the Restoration of Capitalism in the USSR_ is at the forefront of all the work done on the topic, we would take issue with some of its arguments. 64

They all agree that the restoration of capitalism in the USSR came after the death of Stalin and during the assumption of the leadership by Krushchev, Malinkov and Marshal Zhukov, who are considered the "bourgeois officers

63 Ibid.

corps" by Martin Nicolaus. He contends that it was after 1953 that the dictatorship of the proletariat degenerated when it slipped into the hands of those "reactionaries."

The takeover was bloodless and completely 'legal' according to party rules; but it was nevertheless in essence a right-wing military coup that insured the Krushchev victory. Without a doubt, his power grew out of the barrel of a gun, only not the gun of the revolutionary soldiers and peasants, but the gun of a bourgeois officers corps.\(^6\)

On recalling the Soviet Union of the Stalin era, he declared:

Its elementary features were that state power was solidly in the hands of the working class, the major power opposition bloc within the party had been exposed and defeated and unity of the party was strong.\(^6\)

While the so-called "bourgeois officers corps," were still members of the party, to say that state power was solidly in the hands of the "working class" weakens the argument. It weakens the argument for the simple reason that it is contradictory. If the major opposition bloc was defeated and "the unity of the party were strong" where did the "bourgeois officer corps" come from to subvert it? Were not they members of the party? How can one speak of "strength" and "unity" while the "bourgeois forces" were still members of the party. They have failed

---

\(^{65}\) Ibid.

\(^{66}\) Ibid.

\(^{67}\) Ibid., p. 31.
to relate it to the means of production. They merely assert. Nicolaus wrote, "But others of the leading neo-bourgeois forces that took power after Stalin's death had party careers that involved them rather more heavily in the affairs of engineering and industry." 68

Why "neo-bourgeois forces?" Do they own the means of production? Is this usage within the context of a Marxist definition of classes? Classically, bourgeois refers to someone who owns a means of production. Nicolaus has coined another term "bureaucrat capitalist." These people are according to him, accomplices who are assigned to function as capitalists. He declared: "He (she) is a 'bureaucrat capitalist'...put into his post in order to function as capitalist and if he fails in this role, the bureaucracy relieves him of his duties." 69

These pseudo-Marxist concepts are consciously used to implicitly ingrain biases of his own in his readers mentality to conclude, without scientific analysis, that there is in fact, a "bourgeois force" and/or "bureaucratic/capitalist" that exist in the Soviet Union. We are yet to be convinced that capitalism has been restored in the Soviet Union. Until evidence is provided to the contrary, we will continue to work under the assumption that the Soviet Union is a socialist country.

68 Ibid., p. 46.
69 Ibid., p. 124.
The Chinese theoreticians swear that Lenin was the one, in his thesis on imperialism, who pointed out that imperialism means the progressively mounting oppression of the nations of the world by a handful of Great Powers. Their interpretation of the situation is that:

This handful of imperialist powers has been reduced to only two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States which are capable of contending for world hegemony and all the other imperialist powers have been relegated to the status of second or even third rate powers.

This is a degeneration of Marxism-Leninism par excellence, where class analysis has been forfeited to satisfy one's political interest. This interest is glaringly manifested in the claim that China, a socialist "big nation" is considered a member of the Third World. China's political struggle with the superpowers in the effort to control the Third World countries has gotten ideological cover thereby allotting itself the vanguard position in the struggle against hegemonism. What is the theoretical base for the alliance of the Third World with the Second World? They argued:

The establishment of the Common Market in Western Europe, the independent policies pursued by France under de Gaulle, the collapse of the dollar centered monetary

---

71 Ibid.
system in the capitalist world and the sharpening trade and currency wars between Western Europe and Japan on the one hand and the United States on the other...all these facts mark the disintegration of the former imperialist camp headed by the United States.\textsuperscript{73}

The reason(s) for the socialist East European countries to join the United Front? It is contended: "the East European countries have never ceased waging struggles against Soviet control. Since the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, the people's resistance has continued to grow."\textsuperscript{74}

We feel that the analysis of the situation in both western and eastern Europe is devoid of Marxist-Leninist theoretical underpinnings and is a mere reflection of parochial political interest. Earlier it was argued that the differences among imperialist countries are non-antagonistic and hence easily reconcilable. The Chinese theoreticians who have been preaching for a united front of the "Third World" and the "Second World" against the "First World" betrayed this cause when they aligned themselves with the United States and Apartheid South Africa against the revolution in Angola and when once again they found themselves in alliance with the United States to

\textsuperscript{73}"Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds," p. 30.

\textsuperscript{74}Ibid., p. 31.
subvert the revolutionary uprising in Zaire. Expressing their praise for Mobutu they said: "The Zairian people are a heroic people. United under the leadership of President Mobutu, they have, in the past few years, repeatedly stood up to the social-imperialists' blackmail and pressure."\(^7\)

Should we be surprised at the degeneration of the Chinese theoreticians? The answer is both yes and no. We should be surprised because it was Chairman Mao, of all theoreticians, who amplified and expounded on the theory of contradiction. At the same time we respond in the negative because almost all communist countries use Marxism-Leninism to rationalize and justify their foreign policies, thereby displaying realism and pragmatism. Put another way, this an example of the primacy of national interest over proletarian internationalism. So we conclude that the theory of the Three Worlds is a theoretical construct which does not depict the reality of the world.

The Three International Systems of J. Edelman Spero

Spero in her superb book, which is considered to be among the best of its kind to date, has amply demonstrated the hitherto neglected interrelationship of economics and politics. According to the author, her effort is to reinstate the natural relationship of the two disciplines which

have been artificially divorced by liberal theorists.\textsuperscript{76}

However Spero sees three international systems, her analysis recognizes two things. First, it recognizes the dialectical relationship between the dominant economy of the center and the dependent economy of the periphery, which is an explicit revelation of the neo-colonial relations between North and South. It also recognizes the fact that most of the so-called Third World countries are capitalist-oriented in their development. Thus, unlike Crabb, who contends that these countries play an independent role in international relations, Spero's analysis implicitly suggests that they can only play a subordinate role.

Secondly, her analysis recognizes the antithetical nature of the relationship between the Western capitalist countries and the Eastern socialist countries, thus in effect dividing the world into two antagonistic social systems.\textsuperscript{77} She observes:

> In the West, the Bretton Woods System of international economic management established the rules for commercial and financial relations among the major industrial states. In the East, Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe provided the foundation for a separate and international economic system. Finally, during the first postwar decade, the greater part of the Third World remained politically and economically subordinated. Linked with the developed countries of the West in formal and informal imperial relations, these states

\textsuperscript{76}Spero, \textit{The Politics of International Economic Relations}, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{77}Ibid., pp. 1-18.
had little choice but to acquiesce to the international economic system established for them.78

Contrary to Crabb, who concludes that a multipolar world exists due to the split in the Western world and the existence of the Third World, Spero contends that the differences are only family affairs. She says:

Most international interaction involves elements of both conflict and cooperation. ...in situations involving high levels of cooperation, there is often an element of conflict; and even when groups share interests, there is usually conflict over specific interests and specific solutions. ...thus within a framework of common goals, states conflict over the best means to achieve their common end.79

The author initially drafts a picture of economic independence between the two antipode social systems, and to that extent quotes Stalin as follows:

China and European people's democracies broke away from the capitalist system and, together with the Soviet Union, formed a united and powerful socialist camp confronting the camp of capitalism.80

She consummates her picture and updates her analysis when she discloses that detente, lagging agricultural and industrial growth, and retarded technological development in the East have all contributed to economic interaction.

78 Ibid., p. 2.
79 Ibid., p. 10.
80 Stalin quoted in Spero, p. 290.
81 Ibid., pp. 289-328.
with the West. However, it should be stressed that this
economic interaction has not changed the fundamental
nature of the bipolar world. What it has done, more than
anything else, is strengthen Kaplan's thesis of the loose
bipolar world!

The Balance of Power Thesis of President Nixon

Former President Nixon is quoted as pleading:

We must remember the only time in the
history of the world that we have had
any extended period of peace is when there
has been a balance of power...it will be a
safer world...if we have a strong, healthy
United States, Europe, Soviet Union, China,
Japan, each balancing the other.82

At the outset, we would like to state that the former
President did not speak of the existence of balance of
power systems currently but simply shared his firm
conviction that peace is only possible when there is a
balance of power. With all due respect to the President
and most of all being fully cognizant of the intri-
cacies and complexities of world problems, we would like
to differ with his contention both theoretically and
ideologically.

Theoretically, the contention is ignorant of what
constitutes power and the importance of capabilities in
the whole scenario. Hans J. Morgenthau, in his famous
book Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and

82 Nixon quoted in Kegley and Wittkopf, World Politics:
Trend and Transformation, p. 391.
Peace, gives a succinct analysis of the elements of power. He contends that geography, natural resources, food, raw materials, industrial capacity, military preparedness, technology, leadership quality, quality of armed forces, population, national morale, etc., are the salient factors on which power of any nation depends.  

Using Morgenthau's thesis as a frame for analysis, President Nixon's reason(s) for selecting Japan as one of the countries in the balance of power scheme escapes us. Japan is an island nation formed of four main islands, Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu and Hokaido. Collier's Encyclopedia points out that the soils of Japan are "generally infertile and unproductive." With a population of 11,938,811, "Japan is the most industrialized Asian country, and the only one so highly developed that its standard of living matches that of many Western European countries." However, on the natural mineral resources, Hasley et al., wrote: "Japan's mineral resources are meager...the bulk of the minerals used in Japanese industry must be imported." (See table below).

---

83 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 112-148.
85 Ibid., p. 459.
86 Ibid., p. 463.
TABLE 1
JAPANESE IMPORTS IN RELATION TO DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION AND TOTAL OECD IMPORTS OF SELECTED RAW MATERIALS, 1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Imports as a share of Japanese consumption</th>
<th>Japanese imports as a share of total OECD imports in %</th>
<th>Ranking of Japan in importance as an importer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crude petroleum</td>
<td>99.7</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron ore</td>
<td>99.3</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manganese ore</td>
<td>91.1</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper ore</td>
<td>94.2</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zinc ore</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead ore</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauxite</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Having studied the elements of power Japan posses, we have come to the conclusion that Nixon's choice of Japan is solely based on his own predisposed picture of the country based on its miraculous industrial and technological development. With only one-half of the population of either the United States or the USSR and one-ninth that of the Peoples Republic of China, and a miniscule army (250,000) it cannot be considered a power. Japan's military superiority is long gone.

With respect to Europe, in addition to saying that the same argument can be applicable, we would like to point out, however, that Europe is divided into two antagonistic
socio-economic and political systems. And any analysis of the European situation should benefit from this empirical reality. Apparently Nixon was oblivious to this obvious fact when he argued that Europe (both East and West) is one of the balancing powers. His proposition begs for a reconciliation of the two systems which is, to say the least, not realistic. Statesmen and social scientists have found it difficult to develop a theory on which Western European countries could be united for the simple but important reason that the differences that exist among these countries are real problems to reckon with.

R. MacFarquhar, writing on European federation, observed:

The obstacles will be considerable. In contemporary Europe we are nine nations speaking seven languages, attempting to unite after centuries of independent development and mutual strife...Yet despite the progress so far made, a new strategy is almost certainly needed if the long march to union is to resume.

Finally, as regard to Nixon's views on the global balance of power we ask, what about China? Could it be one of the balancing powers? Although China is endowed with all the elements that make it a potential world power, that has yet to materialize. By the then ideological and other differences with the Soviet Union and the rest of the socialist countries would have been resolved. That is,

either China will be part of the socialist bloc, or its flirtation with the United States and Western Europe will have derailed it from its course and it will join that camp. This is assuming that there could only be two antagonistic systems. Thus, we would conclude that the balance of power system advocated by Nixon is unrealistic.

To Reiterate

In this chapter, we have been able to ascertain two important points. First, after examining various theories that attempt to explain the causes of conflict and war, we conclude that Silviu Brucan's theory of scarce and uneven distribution of resources identifies the supreme cause of conflict and war. It should be pointed out, however, that other factors could play secondary roles. The second conclusion is that, after examining different theories on international systems, we find that Morton Kaplan's "loose bipolar system" comes closest to depicting the reality of the present world. Hence, these two elements form the framework of this analysis.
CHAPTER III

ANTAGONISTIC FOREIGN POLICIES IN THE HORN OF AFRICA AND THE CREATION OF DISPLACED PEOPLE IN THE REGION

The antagonistic nature of the foreign policies of the two principal countries of the Horn of Africa, Somalia and Ethiopia, has resulted in many wars. Thus contributing to the unacceptable number of lives lost, developmental infrastructures destroyed and millions of displaced people created.

The conflictual relationship of the two states has not only encouraged the participation of the superpowers, who have been locked in competing and jockeying for geopolitical and strategic positions, but also has resulted in a revamp of alliance of forces unwitnessed in the history of the region. For example:

- Who could have imagined the coming of Israel and Libya (two enemies par excellence) to the side of Ethiopia?
- Who could have envisioned Israel on the same side with the Soviet Union against the United States?
- Who has contemplated the two superpowers switching
sides in the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia?
- Who had expected the Peoples Republic of China
to support Somalia's expansionist war, onceagain being the same camp with the UnitedStates as it once had in Angola?

Clearly, these scenarios are products of clashes ofmany and varied national interests pursued by theirrespective governments. Tension areas like the Horn, theHeart and Southwestern Africa depict the global nature ofthe security of the superpowers. At the same timetheyremind us that the security concerns of the smallercountries remain, as always, safe and secure borders,friendly neighbors and possibly a stable region.

The Concept of National Interest

Students of international relations who have studiedthe evolution of the concept ascribe to it "vagueness,"¹"broadness and generality."² Nevertheless, the definitionof the concept, developing from its initial narrow definition of "dynastic interest"³ has grown to incorporate"values held by some, many, perhaps even all of the

³Charles A. Beard quoted in Sondermann, p. 122.
members of a given society."\(^4\)

Robert E. Osgood, among others, breaking from the traditional taboo of defining and operationalizing the concept ventured to describe it as follows,

National interest is understood to mean a state of affairs valued solely for its benefit to the nation. The motive of national egoism, which leads men to seek this end, is marked by the disposition to concern oneself with the welfare of one's own nation; it is self-love transferred to the national group.\(^5\)

Recognizing the ambiguity and vagueness of the concept of national interest, Holsti chose to employ the surrogate concept "objective" and applied it in his critical study of foreign policy. In his version of the development of the concept of objectives, he pointed out that there was a dichotomy between the "state" and the "monarchs" who ascribed their "sovereignty" and "absolution" to God. Thus, he argued that the state could only serve as a vehicle for protecting the wealth, security and patrimony of a particular dynastic line. Relating these types of leaders to their opposite extremes, he observed that there are governments that gladly commit the wealth of the nation to the growth and expansion of ideologies and messianic philosophies. Holsti is not forgetful of the centrists,

\(^4\)Sondermann, p. 124.

those countries which he considers to be "modern states" that give priorities to the well being and development of the nation, welfare and security of the citizens, access to trade routes, markets and vital resources.\(^6\)

Having convincingly pointed out the different types of leadership and their objectives, Holsti, however, runs into difficulties with his classification of them. He declared:

We will employ a combination of three criteria: 1. the value placed on the objective, or the extent to which policy makers commit themselves and their countries' resources to achieving a particular objective; 2. the time element placed on its achievement; and 3. the kinds of demands the objective imposes on other states in the system.\(^7\)

From these we can construct categories of objectives such as the following: 1) "core values" of the first type to which governments and nations commit their very existence and that must be preserved or extended at all times; 2) "core values" of the second type i.e. interest that are motivated by the control and defense of neighboring territories enclosed with national resources; 3) middle range objectives of the third category where many different forms of self-extension and imperialism are perpetrated; 4) long range goals which concern the ultimate political


\(^7\)Ibid., p. 144.
or ideological organization of the international system. Holsti's approach will therefore assist us to analyze the objectives of the various states' foreign policies towards each other and the region. The chapter will therefore be organized as follows: first, the long standing conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia is investigated. Questions of the following type are entertained: What are the problems between these two neighboring countries? What are the objectives of their foreign policies towards one another? Are these conflicts aggravated by superpower involvement and intervention?

Second, the interests, objectives and roles of the superpowers is explored, and third the motives of the Arab countries towards the region are examined.

**Somalia-Ethiopia Conflict**

Since the emergence of a Somali nation-state and its joining the family of nations in July 1960, successive governments of that nation have refused to accept the boundaries between Somalia and Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya and Somalia and the Republic of Djibouti. It is this rather quixotic political stand with its equally irrational foreign policies that has made the Horn of Africa a hotbed of tensions. To explain why Somalia stubbornly insists and persists in its position, a short history of the area is appropriate.

---

Pre-colonial, Colonial and Post-colonial History of the Region

Unlike the colonial history of the other countries in Africa whose fates were negotiated and determined at the Berlin Conference in 1870, colonialism in the Horn of Africa and especially in Somalia was quite different. The areas that had been inhabited by Somalis experienced not only European colonialism but also Egyptian expansionism. Egypt then was an autonomous Ottoman province. This drive was aborted and hence halted by the unflinching spirit of Ethiopian nationalism at Harar (its Eastern province) and the subsequent Mahadist rebellion in the Sudan in 1883. The Egyptian Army had to be withdrawn and redeployed in Sudan to quell the insurgency there hence giving the Ethiopians the needed time to consolidate their still shaky hold of Harar.  

No matter how scanty, the few studies done on the area agree that a "Somali nation," argued by the leaders of the Republic of Somalia, had never been in existence. Scholars such as Kaplan et al. have even gone to the extent of suggesting that much of the central and parts of northern Somalia had at one time been inhabited by Oromo peoples many of whom now live in Ethiopia and Kenya. This was the case from the first quarter of the seventeenth century until the 1860s when they were evicted by the

---

newcomers, Somalis, who made their way from the lower Juba River. Even today remnants of Oromo and Swahili speaking people still persist in Somalia. 10

J.H. Spencer, writing on the same topic has the following to say:

Somalia itself had never existed as a separate entity. Before the advent of the Italians much of the coastal area was claimed by the Sultan of Zanzibar from whom Italy purchased the Benadir coast by agreement in 1905 for the sum of €144,000 payments which continued until 1937. Other areas were claimed by various Sultans who readily sold themselves into Italian protection, such as the Sultan of Obbia. 11

Brownlee, corroborating Spencer's historical recital forwarded his share:

In a series of treaties between 1884 and 1886, the tribes on the northern Somali coast were made the object of British Protectorates. Italy established protectorates over a large sector of the Indian Ocean littoral in a series of treaties with the tribes, principally in the years 1887 to 1896. 12

As the undisguised ambitions and objectives of Italy had repeatedly manifested later, the territory held by the Somalis was only meant to serve as a springboard for landing into the rich, fertile, and potentially prosperous Ethiopia. The 1891 and 1894 treaties between Britain and


Italy defining their respective sphere of influence without the knowledge and participation of Ethiopia\(^\text{13}\) was only a prelude to their ultimate objectives. The 1896 debacle which Italy suffered at Adowa at the hands of the Ethiopian warriors led by Emperor Menelik, and the war of 1935, the eve of the Second World War, declared by Italy against Ethiopia are potent testimonies. In the words of Holsti, "imperialistic" and "self-extension" thus manifesting the second priorities of their foreign-policies - middle range objectives of the third category. Spencer observed, "In 1935 Ethiopia went to war in defense of the Ogaden when it was invaded by Italy,"\(^\text{14}\) thus displaying the primary objective of its foreign policy - and in the words of Holsti, once again, core interest of the first type.

While the victory at Adowa brought recognition of Ethiopia's boundary defining the Ogaden as part and parcel of Ethiopia's territory, the Italian invasion in 1935 and the subsequent annexation of the Ogaden thereof voided any such claim. Nelson remarked, "The Ogaden was detached from Ethiopia and included in the new, enlarged province of Somalia...nearly 40,000 Somalis had been mobilized to service in the war with Ethiopia."\(^\text{15}\)

\(^{13}\) Ibid., p. 14.

\(^{14}\) Spencer, Ethiopia, The Horn of Africa and U.S. Policy, p. 10.

The occupation of the Ogaden was later to change hands when Britain launched an offensive against Italian occupation forces in February 1941 and liberated both Mogadishu and Addis Ababa. However Britain's true motives were then revealed when, instead of returning the Ogaden back to Ethiopia, it chose to set up its own military administration. The occupation was working against Ethiopia's interest by undermining its sovereignty. As the contradictions deepened Italians in the British occupied areas formed political organizations and started calling for a return to Italian rule. To counter this demand, Britain encouraged the creation of the Somali Youth Club which later changed its name to the Somali Youth League. One can argue that the formation of the Somali Youth League marked the birth of the idea of "Greater Somalia" or the unification of all territories where Somalis reside. And this idea is the brainchild of British colonialism.

As in all other disputed colonial territories after the end of the Second World War, the contradictory positions that were simmering in that region were forwarded to the Allied Council of Foreign Ministers at their Potsdam Conference. The positions adopted by the four allies reflected their basic national interests. France threatened by the idea of "Greater Somalia," which would contribute to its loss of Djibouti, advocated a return of Italian rule. Britain unashamedly stated its position for British super-
vised trusteeship over all territory with the eventual birth of a "Greater Somalia" nation. The Soviet Union, fearing the entrenchment of Great Britain in that strategically located region and wishing to express its support for the Italian Communist Party which has the prospect of coming to power in Italy, condemned Britain's position. The U.S. also opposed Britain's aim for two important reasons: first, the loss of the Ogaden would have jeopardized the Sinclair Oil Concession and second, the President wanted to court the Italian-Americans in order to obtain their support in his upcoming election. The Americans called for an international administration. The four failed to reach a consensus. Britain returned the Ogaden to Ethiopia in 1948 and in December 1949 the General Assembly of the United Nations took a position on the unresolved issue of Somalia. The Assembly assigned Italy to administer the territory for ten years under the supervision of the United Nations.\(^\text{16}\)

The Somali Nation (the amalgamation of the British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland) was born on July 1, 1960. Ever since its independence, the new nation has continued the foreign policies of its departed colonial masters, i.e. the extension of their domination over the adjoining territories under the pretext of creating "Greater Somalia."

\(^{16}\text{Ibid.}\)
In other words, Somalia's foreign policy has, ever since then, been dictated by its desire to incorporate the modestly rich regions of its neighbors. Thus we can argue that its foreign policy has been dictated by what Holsti would refer to as its core interest of the second type.

The antagonistic political relation that the Republic of Somalia has with its neighbors Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti, stems from its unrealistic and unacceptable demand for the territories of these countries. Kaplan, et al. in their introductory chapter observed that the "reason for claiming major portions of neighboring territories is the fact that these areas are inhabited principally by ethnic Somalis." The same authors testified also that remnants of the Oromo and the Swahili speaking nationalities linger in the Republic of Somalia today. Would the world condone it if Ethiopia and/or Kenya declared war against the Republic of Somalia to liberate their "colonized" brethren? How would this policy, if it were to be pursued, be different from the present policies of the leadership of the Republic of Somalia? What then would be the logical conclusion of this kind of unrealistic demand both in terms of regional and continental peace and stability."

Exposing the source of the problem from the rostrum

of the United Nations General Assembly, the Foreign Minister of Ethiopia reminded the world that:

Over the years, successive governments and leaders of Somalia have publicly reiterated their ambition, which is enshrined in the Somali constitution and encrusted on the Somali national flag in the form of a five-pointed star. While the two points on the Somali flag represent the former British and Italian colonies, the rest are supposed to symbolize Eastern Ethiopia, the Republic of Djibouti and the Northern region of Kenya.18

The clear implication of the above is that so long as the Republic of Somalia maintains and entertains this aspiration, peace and security for the countries of the area in particular and to the whole region in general is impossible.

In a nutshell, this short colonial history of the region reveals the following important points: a) colonialism with respect to Somali inhabited territory was unique in the history of European colonization in that it was of voluntary nature where the leaders surrendered their inalienable right to constitute and form a government of their own; b) the interests of the colonizers were not actually in the colony they held but the territories of the adjacent countries; c) the territories of the adjacent countries temporarily occupied as a result of a colonial war of expansion have been claimed by the leaders of the

18 Feleke Gedle-Giorgis, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, Statement to the 32nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 10 October 1977, pp. 16-17.
Republic of Somalia; d) finally, the foreign policy objectives of the other three countries of the region, Kenya and Djibouti (since independence) and Ethiopia ever since the scramble for colonies in the region, spring from their core interest of the first type, i.e. the maintenance of their territorial integrity, thus giving due respect to the principles of the Charters of the United Nations Organization and the Organization of African Unity. 19

What are the Underlying Problems Between Somalia and Ethiopia?

The seemingly irreconcilable differences between the Republic of Somalia and Ethiopia, can be understood by applying the theory advanced by Silviu Brucan, addressed in Chapter Two, i.e. the theory of scarce and uneven distribution of resources and social and national inequality as a culprit of conflict and war.

In this connection, one can apply the theory by comparing the resource endowments of Somalia and Ethiopia. As mentioned before, the underlying point of Brucan's thesis is that nature has not been equitable in its distribution of natural resources which are of primary necessity for the propagation of life and the development of our material and cultural needs.

The Republic of Somalia is a country in which

---

19 For more read Article 2, paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of the UNO Charter.
three-fifths of its three million people are nomadic.²⁰ What does this mean in terms of the political economy of the country? It means that the government reaches only two-fifths of the population on a regular and immediate basis. It also means that due to the relatively small population, the country lacks labor power for its socio-economic development. It also means that the government is not able to collect enough revenues to meet or even to plan its annual program. The sum total of these and other deficiencies is the retardation of the country's progress which also contributes to the ever-deepening dependent nature of the country's politico-economic relations to the center.

This problem is compounded further by the dearth of proven mineral resources. This is not to suggest or to imply that the country does not have any mineral resources. The northern part of the country is known to posses - although in very limited amounts - copper, chromium, lead, manganese, molybdenum, nickel, zinc, etc.²¹ Nonetheless, the mining industry in Somalia is barely in its infancy.

Somalia, a country which is mostly desert has only two permenantly flowing rivers, the Juba and the Shebelle, both of which originate in Ethiopia. I.M. Lewis observed:

²¹ Ibid., pp. 51-52.
Both rivers contain water in all seasons and together make up the main river system of the whole Somalia...the southern part of the Somali Republic between the Shebelle and Juba rivers...constitute the richest arable zone.22

The unfairness of nature towards Somalia becomes glaringly evident when one looks across the border into Ethiopia. Ethiopia's geographical location and topographical diversities account for three distinct climatic zones. According to Robert L. Hess, the Dega zone is defined as any area over 8,000 feet in elevation with the temperature rarely rising above 60 degrees (F). The Woinadege has an elevation between 5,000 feet and 8,000 feet above sea level with a mean temperature range between 60 and 80 degrees (F). And the Qolla zone includes areas below 5,000 feet.23 John Spencer, recognizing the problem that the natural riches have brought to Ethiopia, made the following observation:

By her size, population...and resources, Ethiopia dominates the Horn. Yet at the same time, her fertile farming grazing lands and temperate climate and strategic location on the shores of the Red Sea and its exit at the Strait of Bab-el Mandeb have rendered her an attractive and vulnerable target. The sources of all of the water of Somalia and Djibouti and of 80% of the waters of the lower Nile, Ethiopia


has been throughout history the object of covetous design.\textsuperscript{24}

We have tried to demonstrate that the Ogaden has been coveted not only by Somalia but also by Italy and Britain. The picture depicted by Spencer clearly suggests that the glaring differences in the distribution of natural resources and the desire to control these has always been the cardinal problem between Ethiopia and Somalia. Nevertheless, this objective reality, which we consider as the primary cause, has been subordinated by the Somali government to the subjective and secondary cause which is ethnicity. The weakness of this argument has been pointed out above. Heedless of this, successive governments of the Republic of Somalia have made irredentism the supreme priority of their policies. The establishment of diplomatic, trade and cultural relations have all been motivated by this ulterior motive. Kaplan et al. have pointed out that, the issue that dominates all other considerations of foreign relations for the majority of Somalis is the status of their fellow Somali in adjacent countries.\textsuperscript{25}

To translate this into a reality, the establishment of a strong Somali army has been of paramount importance. We would not be too far from the truth if we assert, as would become evident as this chapter develops, that the adoption

\textsuperscript{24}Spencer, Ethiopia: The Horn of Africa and U.S. Policy, p. 5.

in Somalia of "scientific socialism" was nothing but a tactic to obtain the all-out support of the Soviet Union in particular and the progressive world in general against Ethiopia and its supporters particularly the United States. This alliance of forces demonstrates the loose bipolar nature of the international system.

The Soviet Union and Somalia

Under this subheading, we will try to analyze why Somalia invited the Soviet Union to be its ally, why the Soviet Union accepted this invitation, and the degree of influence of the Soviet Union on Somalia.

Just after its independence the government of Somalia sought financial support from the United States for an army it intended to create. However, cognizant of the fact that Somalia had a stated goal of expanding its territory at the expense of its neighbors (and especially Ethiopia which was then very closely allied with the U.S) and also cognizant of the fact that this unrealistic priority of militarism would jeopardize Somalia's economic development, Washington expressed its dissension and offered only $10,000,000, enough to build 5,000 man force oriented towards internal security. The Somali government then turned to the Soviet Union which granted it $320,000,000 to expand and modernize its army. This loan was later to reach $55 million and Moscow began to take the responsibility of training and equipping the Somali army. In return
Somalia provided Moscow with its first naval base at Berbera and an airfield of 5,000 meters, long enough to land and accommodate large bombers.²⁶

_Africa Report_, gives a chronological description of the development of the arms race in the region:

In an attempt to put some muscle behind its irredentist claims on parts of Ethiopia and Kenyan territory, Somalia increased its military expenditures from $7 million in 1966, to $21 million in 1975. Somalia military spending in 1975 accounted for 6.7 percent of the Gross National Product. During this period the Soviets pumped in $134 million in arms another $500 million 1975-76 with more scheduled for this year 1977...Kenya's military expenditures moved up to $51 million in 1975 from $11 million in 1966. An increase from 1.6 to 34. percent of the Kenyan Gross National Product. Ethiopia's military expenditures increased from $32 million in 1966 (2.4 percent of the Gross National Product) to $110 million (3.8 percent of the GNP) in 1975. Most of its $183 million in arms imports during the decade came from the United States.²⁷

A similar picture is presented here by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Somalia government when their aggregate data record shows that defense expenditures have surpassed the combined amounts budgeted for health and education. In addition, the 1977 World Bank figures show that the government had appropriated in equivalent per capita amounts of about $7 for defense,


while education and health received $5 and $2 respectively.\textsuperscript{28}

After signing the 1974 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Moscow, Somalia was provided with the latest and most sophisticated weapons in the Soviet Union's arsenal. This included MIG 21 supersonic jets, T54 tanks, Sam 2 missiles, etc. Furthermore, Soviet military advisors were increased to 1,500 supplemented by fifty Cubans.\textsuperscript{29}

The obsession with "Greater Somalia" and the need to maximize its capabilities to realize these objectives coincided with the equal obsession of the Soviet Union to expand its sphere of influence via the Middle East to the Indian Ocean. Somalia was then found to be an ideal country. It is no secret that the Soviet Union's objective in this regard is to break the containment knot tied by the United States and its allies since the end of the Second World War. In this connection we would mention NATO, SEATO, METO, ANZUS, etc. As METO (Middle East Treaty Organization) was meant to contain the Soviet Union from expanding in and around the Middle Eastern countries, the Soviet Union had to do everything possible to abort this measure. Why? Anatoly Gromyko hit the nail on the head when he said:

First of all, the USSR has a stake in preventing the appearance of a strategic threat to it from the southern direction.


\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., p. 259.
It is no secret that dozens of planes based on American aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf have a wide range of operation and can carry nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union, just as all littoral and hinterland countries, is interested in the safety of sea routes passing through the Indian Ocean because they not only link the USSR with the littoral states but are also the only year-round sea routes linking the European parts of the USSR with its far Eastern parts.\textsuperscript{30} (Emphasis mine).

In order to guarantee its security and maintain its national interest, the Soviet Union has found it necessary to compete with the United States for influence among the Third World countries.\textsuperscript{*} In the process they ended up substituting ideological purity for ideological opportunism. What do we mean by ideological purity? In short, class analysis and class approach have taken a secondary importance. Support of developing countries has become the clarion call. A resolution adopted by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee on the 60th anniversary of the October Revolution stated that the

\textsuperscript{30} Anatoly Gromyko, "The Imperialist Threat to Africa," \textit{International Affairs} 7 (July 1981), p. 44.

\textsuperscript{*} This is true especially in those countries that have been receiving U.S. and Western military and economic aid. While Annex I, Table 1 shows the military aid that some Third World countries receive from the Soviet Union (1959-1980), Annex II, Table 2 shows the regional distribution of this aid (1955-1979), Annex II, Table 3 displays the major recipients of the Soviet Bloc economic aid (1955-1980). It should be mentioned that the majority of the recipients are countries strategically located, i.e. Middle East, Indian Ocean and South Asia. See Stephen T. Hosmer and Thomas W. Wolfe, \textit{Soviet Policy and Practice Toward Third World} (Lexington, MASS.: Lexington Books, 1983).
Soviet Union and the socialist countries are and have been giving all kinds of support to the developing countries in their legitimate struggle against imperialism.\textsuperscript{31} It is this ideological impurity that exposed it in Egypt and Sudan where Presidents Sadat and Nimeiri respectively - two anti-communist and notorious for imprisoning and executing communists - benefitted from the labor of the socialist workers of the Soviet Union before they ended their relationship and ignominiously expelled their Soviet advisors. It is this ideological opportunism that urged to give the Republic of Somalia a "socialist" license under the cover of "socialist orientation." Vorobyov underscored this fact when he said, "A considerable number of young independent states are carrying out programmes of national construction which are socialist in orientation."\textsuperscript{32} Gromyko writing on the same issues observed that "most of the socialist oriented countries - over a dozen of them - are in Africa accounting for 30 percent of its territory and nearly 25 percent of its population."\textsuperscript{33}

How genuine are the so-called "socialist oriented"

\textsuperscript{31}Anatoly Gromyko, "The October Revolution and Africa's Destiny," \textit{International Affairs} 9 (September 1977), p. 98.


\textsuperscript{33}Anatoly Gromyko, "Socialist Orientation in Africa," \textit{International Affairs} 11 (September 1979), p. 95.
countries in their effort to build a scientific socialist society? What do they understand by socialism? Somalia's Minister of Information and National Guidance, Mohamed Sheikh Aden, responding to a question posed to him by Anthony J. Hughes, said:

The main objective of the revolution has been to transfer the economy from the hands of the new colonial masters, the petit bourgeoisie or compradors...and by breaking away from that pattern we arrived at the socialist system.34 (Emphasis mine).

Hence, it is a small wonder when we learn that the "socialist orientation" was only superficial and indeed a misnomer for state capitalism. Steward Powell of U.S. News and World Report, observed: "Soviet prestige is declining steadily across much of Africa as one country after another discovers that Russia is able to provide little help beyond weapons."35 An anonymous Somalia official is then quoted as saying, "the whole idea behind the socialist orientation was that it was the quick way to development. But the only thing the Soviet Union supplies is arms. What we need is economic aid."36

Hence it is legitimate to ask why the Soviet Union should consider these countries "socialist oriented." The

36 Ibid.
answer is partly revealed by Eugene J. Meehan's psychological explanation, in which motives, objectives and goals explain the unstated intentions of human beings. Thus is revealed the truth behind the seeming insincerity of Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev who declared:

Our Party supports and will continue to support peoples fighting for their freedom. In so doing, the Soviet Union does not look for advantages, does not hunt for concessions, does not seek political domination and is not after military bases. We act as we are bound by our revolutionary conscience, our communist convictions.\(^{37}\)

Soviet activities in the Middle East, especially in Syria and Iraq, (at one time in Egypt and Sudan which are anti-communist of the highest degree) and its former relation with Somalia were motivated purely by its national interest. And in this connection we would say that foreign policy, instead of reflecting domestic policy, as is claimed by Kapchenko,\(^{38}\) is a reflection of the national interest, which in turn is influenced by the international system. In this case, competition with the United States in this loose bipolar system has influenced Soviet foreign policy. It should be recalled that Moscow's objection to the creation of "Greater Somalia" in the late 1940s was not based on the conviction that the Ogaden belonged to Ethiopia but on the

---

\(^{37}\) Quoted in Gromyko, "The October Revolution and Africa's Destiny," p. 98.

desire to expel Great Britain, then a relatively strong nation, from that strategically important region. Hence, the Soviet Union's policies are consistent not only in their efforts to thwart imperialism in the area, but also to gain access to naval bases in the region. This it did in Berbera, Somalia. It should be stressed that the Soviet Union equipped and trained the armed forces of Somalia knowing fully the ambitions and motives of that government. By doing so, the Soviet Union implicitly endorsed not only the objectives but also the means that the government of Somalia was to employ in the invasion of Ethiopia's territory.

The United States and Ethiopia

The relations between the two countries were founded on Ethiopia's core interest and the United States' middle range objectives of the third category. Ethiopia's longstanding fear of encirclement and domination by the Arabs and U.S. interest of expanding its influence in the newly independent countries of Africa were the primary reasons for relations. Speaking about the importance of Ethiopia to the United States, William E. Schaufele, Jr., Assistant Secretary for African Affairs said:

During the early post-World War II period our interests in Ethiopia were primarily continental and bilateral, we hope that our longstanding relationship with

---

Ethiopia would assist us in establishing good relations with the newly independent states of Africa.40

Realistically speaking, U.S. support for the reinstatement of Eritrea to Ethiopia was not based on the historical argument of Ethiopia's right to claim its lost territory, but on its own interest in obtaining access to Ethiopia's envied strategic location. Schaufele, expressing the significance of the Kagnew Station stated:

We developed our important communications facility at Kagnew in Asmara; and we benefitted from access to Ethiopia's ports and airfields. In the past few years the relationship with Ethiopia has also acquired increased regional and strategic importance...the Kagnew Naval Communications Unit remains important to us as does access to Ethiopia's airfields and ports at a time when our interests and operation in this increasingly important area have grown.41

For Ethiopia, we can say that it was fear of Arab domination that pushed her into signing a Mutual Defense Agreement with the United States in 1953.42 Ethiopia, a Christian ruled weak nation increasingly found its national security, i.e. its core interest of the first type becoming entangled in Middle Eastern politics. Convinced that it was out-muscled by its Arab neighbors, it became close to Israel. As the saying goes, the enemy of my


41 Ibid.

42 Spencer, Ethiopia: The Horn of Africa and U.S.
enemy is my friend. Expressing his opinion on the issue, Spencer said, "confronted with this hostility...Ethiopia did what might be expected under the circumstances: she drew closer to the other non-Moslem, non-Arab state at the northern end of the Red Sea, Israel."\(^43\)

As has become evident in this analysis, Ethiopia's geographical location vis-a-vis the rest of Africa has not much to do with determining its foreign policy. It is the strategic location of the country on the Horn of Africa, vis-a-vis the Red Sea, Bab el Mandeb and Indian Ocean that influence its relations with the outside world. The fact that both superpowers consider the region to be of paramount importance to their respective interests has made the area a hotbed of tension.

On closing this sub-topic, we would point out that in order to maintain its special relation with Ethiopia the United States has provided the country with a sum total of $575 million in aid. Schaufele said:

> The extent of our relationship with this nation of 28 million can be measured by the amount of aid we have provided. This has amounted to over $350 million in economic aid since 1952 and over $275 million in military assistance.\(^44\)

In this connection, if one looks at the argument of Francis Moore Lappe, et al. that aid from the Economic Support Fund

---

\(^43\) Ibid., p. 21.

\(^44\) Schaufele, p. 301.
goes "to regions of the world in which the United States has special foreign policy and security interests,"\textsuperscript{45} carries very little weight.* If the amounts of aid, both military and economic, were a measurement of the importance of Ethiopia, the fact that the Soviet Union provided a billion dollars in just three years (1977-80) surely shows that it and not its counterpart coveted Ethiopia most.

Corroborating our analysis but writing more in regional terms F.S.B. Kazadi, in his article in \textit{Africa Report} observed:

A look at recent foreign aid budgets reveal that Africa receives less U.S. foreign assistance than Asia, far less than the Near (or Middle) East, and only slightly more than Latin America...For example, the Carter Administration, in its assistance proposal for fiscal year 1981, has asked for $54 million in aid for African refugees, which total more than three million, or approximately one-half of the world's displaced persons. In the same budget proposals, however, the Administration requested $323 million for Kampuchean refugees.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{45}Francis Moore Lappe, et al., \textit{Aid As Obstacle} (San Francisco: Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1980), p. 15.


The Arab States and Ethiopia

The Arab states have manifested their intolerance for this economically and militarily weak and Christian dominated country. It should be underlined that their dislike, motivated by religious fanaticism and reaction to its socialist revolution, is exacerbated by the strategic location which Ethiopia happens to occupy, thus leading many a scholar to view the struggle over Eritrea and the Horn of Africa as part and parcel of the Red Sea and the Middle Eastern affairs.  

Ethiopia, as pointed out above, had fought and repulsed invasions by Egypt in both the Ogaden and Eritrea in the 1880s. History shows that Egypt had argued against the return of the Ogaden and the federation and unification of Eritrea with Ethiopia. However it is important to point out that despite conflicting reports with respect to Egypt's position on the question of the federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia, in favor and opposition, there is a consensus on the Egyptian behavior towards Ethiopia; it was antagonistic, unfriendly,

---


48 Ibid., p. 61.

49 Ibid., p. 62.

and against the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. In addition to the severe negative propaganda from Egypt against Ethiopia,* it advanced its fantasy by calling for the Unity of the Valley of the Nile under its leadership. In 1958 it organized the secessionists which led to the birth of the so-called Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELF) in 1961. These and other similar activities directed against the territorial integrity and national security of Ethiopia, i.e. its core interest, constituted a grave threat to peace in the region.

Following the creation of the Organization of African Unity in 1963 and a rapprochement between Egypt and Ethiopia, anti-Ethiopian activities were carried out by Syria, Libya, Iraq, the Peoples Republic of Yemen, Saudi Arabia, etc. Writing on Syrian and Libyan positions on the territorial integrity of Ethiopia, Spencer said:

For example at the World Islam Congress converged in Mogadishu in December 1964, the Syrian representative called for the support of all Moslems for the Greater Somaliland movement. At the OAU summit conference at Addis Ababa in 1973, Libya proclaimed Ethiopia to be an imperialist

*Spencer observed that at the Paris Peace Conference of 1946, Egypt laid claim to Eritrea.

51 Ibid.
52 Erlich, p. 62.
53 Spencer, p. 31.
54 Ibid.
state, faithless to African traditions, because of her opposition to the aspirations of the Somalis for a Greater Somaliland and called for the removal of OAU headquarters from Addis Ababa.\textsuperscript{55}

Tunisia, expressing its dislike for Ethiopia, proposed the representation of the Eritrean Liberation Front at the 1975 OAU summit in Kampala.\textsuperscript{56} A Palestine Liberation Organization journalist, writing on the linkages of the Eritrean "revolution" with that of "Arab liberation" and "Palestine liberation," urged his fellow Moslems to support Eritrea by saying:

\begin{quote}
The Arabs have to understand that (in Eritrea) a revolution in an Arab country is in the making, a revolution that is inseparable from the liberation movement or from the struggle to liberate Palestine or from the Arab revolution in any other Arab country. We are therefore obliged to sympathize with the struggle of this people.\textsuperscript{57}
\end{quote}

The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen expressed its position by allying itself with Libya, serving as a conduit for the transfer of arms to the "Eritrean nationalists."\textsuperscript{58} The only Arab state that Ethiopia can check is the Sudan with which it shares a long border. Resisting actual open conflict between each other, they however have interfered in each other's internal affairs by

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., p. 30.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., p. 32.
\textsuperscript{57} Erlich, \textit{The Struggle Over Eritrea, 1962-1978}, p. 60.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., p. 61.
backing liberation movements in each other's countries.\footnote{59}

Why should Ethiopia be the object of antagonism by its surroundings? Among other factors that have already been expressed that contributed to this unenviable position, we believe that the potential natural resources that the country posses are the underpinnings. Spencer eloquently testified:

\begin{quote}
Ethiopia is the ganglion of the network of rivers that radiate outwards - north-east, southeast, and south...Ethiopia supplies 100 percent of the waters of the three Somalilands, and over 80 percent of those of the Nile in Egypt.\footnote{60}
\end{quote}

The possession of these natural resources, have compounded and deepened the historical religio-political enmity between Ethiopia and its Arab neighbors.

The Ethiopian Revolution and the Political Situation in the Horn of Africa

Observed within the context of the loose bipolar world or the East-West relations, the Ethiopian revolution, it is contended, has contributed to the deterioration of world peace and hence to the start of the Second cold war.\footnote{61} We should add to this that the "thoroughgoing and

\footnote{59}Ibid., p. 64.

\footnote{60}Spencer, \textit{Ethiopia: The Horn of Africa and U.S. Policy}, p. 48.

far reaching revolution" had alienated its foremost enemies, the surrounding Arab states, and has eventually brought a restructuring of the alliance of forces in the region.

The conservative Arab governments of the area, threatened by the revolution in Ethiopia, and more so by the eventual solidarity between Ethiopia, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and Libya, encouraged the deterioration of already chilly relations between Sudan and the Soviet Union as a result of the latter's involvement in two aborted coups. In order to obtain the financial backing for his ambitious economic development program, Nimeiry had to subscribe to their policies and objectives, i.e. providing sanctuary and transferring arms to the "Eritrean Liberation fighters" with the purpose of overthrowing the revolutionary government in Ethiopia.

This unfriendly behavior from the Sudanese government coincided with a change of policy in Libya which abandoned its material and political support for the government of Somalia and the "Eritrean Liberation fighters." The common dislike for and threat from the Sudanese government

---


coalesced the two, Ethiopia and Libya, to overthrow the Nimeiry government. The aborted coup of July 1976 was a joint effort of the two countries.\textsuperscript{64}

The threat from the two countries convinced Nimeiry of the need to associate himself more with Egypt. In fact, right after the coup attempt

\begin{quote}
Nimeiry traveled to Cairo...to sign [a] defense pact with President Sadat, who took him on to Riyadh to meet the Saudi King Khalid and discuss the burgeoning political and economic cooperation between their three countries.\textsuperscript{65}
\end{quote}

Thereafter, Nimeiry became the self-appointed mouthpiece of all reactionary regimes in the region. He threatened the government of Ethiopia with the "250,000 refugees,"\textsuperscript{66} mostly Eritreans, and openly associated himself with the demand of the "Eritrean Liberation fighters" by calling it just and right. He is quoted as saying, "the people of Eritrea were demanding a just right...I will work with the people of Sudan to return this right to its owners."\textsuperscript{67} The Somali Minister of Health, Musa Rabili, expressed his country's solidarity with the Sudan at the Second National Congress of the Sudanese Socialist Union, against Ethiopia.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{64}Ottaway, p. 113.
\item \textsuperscript{66}\textit{Africa Research Bulletin} 14:1 (January 1-31, 1977), p. 4281.
\item \textsuperscript{67}Ibid., p. 4282.
\end{itemize}
and seconded Nimeiri's call for the withdrawal of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) from Addis Ababa.\(^\text{68}\) Ethiopia's response was to call the world's attention to the violation of the UN and OAU charters perpetrated by Nimeiry.\(^\text{69}\) *Africa Research Bulletin* reported that on February 4, Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam told the world that except for South Yemen, Ethiopia had no friends in the region and accused Saudi Arabian royalists and anti-communist reactionaries in the Sudan of supporting anti-government elements in Addis Ababa.\(^\text{70}\) The position taken by the government of Nimeiry with regard to Ethiopia's territorial integrity was finally endorsed by the People's Assembly when the Assistant Secretary of the Sudanese Party called upon African states and other Third World countries to sympathize with the Eritrean tragedy.\(^\text{71}\)

These unfriendly relations and the contempt exhibited by the Arab states towards Ethiopia show the discordant politics between the Arabs and Black Africa. This was to manifest itself when Senegal and Nigeria expressed their solidarity with Ethiopia. The *Daily Times* (Lagos) observed:

\^[68]Ibid.\(^\text{68}\)
\^[69]Ibid.\(^\text{69}\)
\^[70]Africa Research Bulletin* 14:2 (February 1-28, 1977), p. 4323.\(^\text{70}\)
\^[71]Ibid., p. 4324.\(^\text{71}\)
We hasten to deplore the role of Sudan and some members of the Arab League...Sudan in particular has not only been ungrateful, in forgetting so soon what weight Ethiopia brought to bear in stemming the threat of Southern secession but has also seemed shamelessly unimpressed by the injunction on the territorial integrity of member states contained in the Charters of the United Nations and the OAU. About two weeks after asking for the removal of the OAU headquarters from Addis Ababa, Sudan's Jaefar El Nimeiry has now called for the UN to intervene in Ethiopia on the part of the Eritreans. We do not endorse the removal of the OAU capital from Ethiopia...We are aware of the religious bias that Sudan might have for Eritrea...once secessionist attempts succeed in Ethiopia, other incipient secessionist organizations could blossom. Then Africa will be engulfed by civil wars, since no African nation is completely free from the danger of disintegration.72

In April, Africa Research Bulletin reported the accusation of Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam against the Sudanese government of violating the territorial integrity of Ethiopia and for arming and extending artillery and tank support to the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU), remnant of the ancient regime.73

What was the position of the United States towards the revolution in Ethiopia? The United States, which entered a binding agreement to assist, arm, and train the Ethiopian army for 25 years (1953-1978), declared, in February 1977, its intention to cancel all military aid

---

72 Ibid., p. 4325.
to Ethiopia under the pretext of "human rights violations."\textsuperscript{74} At the same time the Carter Administration promised to sell arms to Sudan and Somalia, two arch enemies of Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{75} In April 1977, President Carter is quoted as telling his Secretary of State, Vance, and National Security Advisor, Brzezinski "to move in every possible way to get Somalia to be our friend."\textsuperscript{76} Disappointed and frustrated by the behavior of the Carter Administration, the Ethiopian government ordered the closing down of the Kagnew communication station; the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), the U.S. Naval Medical Research Group and the U.S. Information Service (USIS) and condemned the administration for not having spoken against the violation of human rights during Haile Selassies' time.\textsuperscript{77} The hypocrisy of the Carter Administrations' human rights policy manifested itself when the President, despite the plea of the assassinate Archbishop, Oscar A. Romero, urged the Congress to increase economic and military aid to El Salvador,\textsuperscript{78} a government which was notorious for human rights violations.

\textsuperscript{74}Secretary of State Vance quoted in Halliday, The Ethiopian Revolution, p. 223.

\textsuperscript{75}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{76}Ibid., p. 226.


\textsuperscript{78}Frances Moore Lappe, et al., Aid as Obstacle, p. 26.
Of the ten countries which receive ninety percent of U.S. military assistance (Annex V), Israel, Egypt, Turkey, South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand are widely accused of trampling upon human rights. Explaining the hypocrisy of the Carter policy, Francis M. Lappe and et al., noted: "The truth is that however abhorrent such regimes are to most Americans, they share common interest with U.S. corporate lobbyists and foreign policy decision makers." Thus, we can deduce that the socialist path chosen by the Ethiopian government was the main reason for the volte face in U.S. policy towards Ethiopia. History recalls Chile, Ghana, Jamaica and now Nicaragua and El Salvador. As will be made evident in the next section, we will find the U.S. joining with the surrounding reactionary governments to subvert the revolution in Ethiopia.

The Soviet Union was not only trying to strengthen its position, but was also trying to get the United States out of the Horn of Africa. The Soviets had already had a base in Berbera and South Yemen. Access into Ethiopia would have completed its triangular objectives. And it is to this end that President Nikolai Podgorny visited Africa. Complimenting this effort, President Castro of Cuba tried to reconcile the differences between the leaders of

79 Ibid., p. 28.
Somalia and Ethiopia in Aden, South Yemen. Arthur Gavshon observed:

In Aden, Castro proposed the formation of an Ethiopian-Somali-South Yemen commission to take the confederation project further. The South Yemenis countered with the suggestion that Cuba, too, should join the group as its fourth member. Siad refused both propositions and the talks broke down.80

Exacerbating the problem between Ethiopia and the United States, the Soviets promised the high level delegation from Ethiopia that visited Moscow in December 1976, $386 million worth of military aid.81 It should be pointed out that consistent with their policy of weakening the U.S. hold in Ethiopia and in the region, the Soviet Union, in 1960, had offered Ethiopia $100 million worth of weapons. Cognizant of the motive of this gesture and convinced that Ethiopia would accept the offer, the United States increased its military aid to Ethiopia.82 But that was a different time and an altogether different social system. This was the picture of the politico-military situation in Horn of Africa on the eve of the 1977 Somalia-Ethiopian war.


82 Ottaway, Soviet and American Influence in the Horn of Africa, p. 27.
The July 1977 Somali-Ethiopian War and its Repercussions

In retrospect, we could say that the war between Somalia and Ethiopia was inevitable. We say this because we realize now that a politico-military balance did not exist and was in favor of Somalia. The government of Somalia had not discarded its expansionist demand. And President Barre has rejected the call for a confederation between Ethiopia, Somalia and South Yemen. Moreover, he has armed his military forces heavily and their morale was high. Ethiopia, on the other hand, was bogged down by secessionist wars in its northern province, Eritrea, in the south against the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and in the northwest against the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU). The Derg was not only in disarray but also at each other's throat for it is believed that there were sympathizers of all the anti-revolution forces within it. In short, both the internal and the external conditions were ripe for the Somalis to invade and realize their longtime dream.

How did it all begin? What role did the United States play in the war? What role did the Soviet Union play in war? What about Cuba? And the Arab states?

However preoccupied the Ethiopian government had been in fighting secessionists and internal reactionary forces, its vigilance on its border with Somalia, it seems, was as strong as ever. Its intelligence, as early as January 1976, had shown troop movements on the Somali side indicating
preparation for war. The memorandum distributed to many
African Heads of State in January 1976 noted:

While the ultimate objective is to recover
by force what Somalia calls her "lost
territories" - the Ogaden, the territory
of Djibouti and the former Northern
Frontier District of Kenya - by forment-
ing a war of subversion in Southern and
Eastern Ethiopia, by helping to intensify
the secessionist war in Eritrea, and
finally by creating a situation of con-
frontation around the territory of Djibouti,
the immediate objective is to force Ethiopian
forces into being deployed thinly in many
parts of the country, so that Somali forces
in areas bordering Ethiopia would have the
maximum freedom of action to make a move
against Ethiopia at a time and place of
their choosing.83

That is exactly what happened. But the government of
Somalia contended that while the decision to invade was
its own, it was, however, encouraged by the Carter Adminis-
tration through messages transmitted to it through its
Ambassador to Washington who had met with President Carter
on two different occasions, May and June 1977,84 and also
by Kevin Cahill. Newsweek reported:

Cahill, who is no stranger to the world of
secret diplomacy, flew to Mogadishu in
mid-June after conferring with Mathew
Nimetz, the top troubleshooter for
Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, and one
of his former law partners. Cahill told
Siad Barre that he had a message from "the
very top" of the U.S. government. Washington
was "not averse to further guerilla pressure

83 Quoted in Marina Ottaway and David Ottaway, Ethiopia:
Empire in Revolution (New York: Africana Publishing

84 Halliday, The Ethiopian Revolution, p. 228.
in the Ogaden," he said and was now prepared to consider sympathetically Somalia's legitimate defense needs.\(^{85}\)

This was the time when the alliance of forces started to take shape. The Carter Administration made it amply clear that it was to subvert the revolution in Ethiopia. To that end the U.S. pledged to Somalia instruments of war. However, in order to avoid accusation for direct involvement in the war, it tried to hide behind its surrogates in the region. The Shah's subordinates have openly acknowledged that Iran had been encouraged by the U.S. to arm Siad. And the Egyptians, having received the same encouragement, provided $30 million in Russian equipment. The CIA provided the government of Somalia with $7 million worth of arms towards the end of 1977.\(^{86}\) The government of Saudi Arabia, in addition to the already $400 million promised, added $60 million more.\(^{87}\) Annex IV, outlining international attitudes towards the war in the Horn, demonstrates that. The war, as one can discern had already been internationalized. It is wise, however, to point out that in the initial stages of war, the government of Somalia insisted that it was the "Western Somali Liberation Front" (WSLF) that was doing the fighting. But then it

\(^{85}\) Newsweek, 26 September 1977, p. 42.

\(^{86}\) Halliday, The Ethiopian Revolution, p. 229.

hastened to add that "we will not stop nor shall we ever stop to take sides with our brothers who are struggling for their freedom."  

The role of the Soviet Union during the initial stage of the war seemed very ambiguous. It was supplying weapons to both warring countries. In fact, the record shows that the Ethiopian government, suspicious of Somalia's intentions, asked the Soviet Union to confirm or deny its suspicion. The Soviet Union assured the Ethiopian government that its suspicion was unfounded and that it could move the Third Division - a division that up to that point was permanently deployed on the Somali-Ethiopian border - northwards to fight the EDU. The Ethiopian government, inexperienced in international politics, and more so because of its crude and hence dogmatic ideological position (socialist Somalia would not invade socialist Ethiopia) moved its troops thus giving Somalia a chance to invade in July 1977. Could the Soviet Union have known Somali's intentions? If it did, then why did it not stop it or why did it give the Ethiopian government wrong information? What was its motive?

It is fair to assert that the mere fact that the Soviet Union had a strong influence both in the military

---

89 Ibid.
and security of the Somali superstructure, it must have known the making and preparation of the war. Brian Cozier observed:

The Russians have access to all investigations and reports [of the National Security Office], and advise their Somali counterparts in evaluation and administration. They are thus in a unique position to influence security activities, and by the same token to protect their own position in the country, since the NSS now has a network of informers from the top levels of government down to the villagers. 91

Tom J. Farer, writing on the same issue said, "the Somalis were deeply dependent not only on Soviet materials, but also, it is believed, on direct Soviet participation in logistics." 92 Failing to obtain plausible evidence otherwise, we would then ask a very pertinent question: Why did the Soviet Union choose not to alert Ethiopia? While recognizing its friendly and internationalist overtures, we would entertain the following points: the Soviet Union was fully aware of Somalia's longstanding desire to unite all territories in which ethnic Somalis live under one flag by any means; it was also aware of the fact that Somalia was building and preparing its army for its expansionist purpose; it was also aware of the fact that socialism in Somalia was a farce and a misnomer; we are convinced that the relation of the Soviet Union with

91 Brian Crozer, quoted Ottaway, Soviet and American Influence in the Horn of Africa, p. 78.

Somalia was based solely on political expediency - provide arms and training and acquire access to Somalia's port (Berbera) and air base in return - and not on ideological grounds; the Soviet Union knew that, although it has a Treaty of Friendship with Somalia, the latter is also a member of the Arab League to which its allegiance is greater; the Soviet Union was also aware of the fact that these Arab countries had been courting Somalia for some time in an effort to persuade it to break with the Soviet Union; the Soviet Union, cognizant of the inevitability of the loss of its naval and air base in Somalia wanted to make sure that its new partnership with Ethiopia, which had just broken military relations with the United States under pressure, would be founded on a more advantageous ground for itself; hence the hiding of the intelligence from the Ethiopians and, worst of all, the encouragement to switch its attention northwards can only be explained by analyzing the motives of the Soviet Union as they relate to its "middle range" objectives of the third category.

It would be very easy to draw historical parallels. In the 1967 Arab-Israeli War - popularly known as the Six Day War - the Soviet Union was reported to have given wrong intelligence information to Nasser on Israeli troop movements on their border with Syria. Safran, giving the "view from Cairo," wrote:
Nasser has indicated on several occasions that the Russians had informed him on May 13, 1967, that the Israelis were planning to attack Syria on May 17 and that they had concentrated on the Syrian front 11 to 13 brigades for this purpose...It happens, however, that the alleged Israeli troop concentration did not take place. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, which had many times in the past checked similar allegations and submitted reports that obtained the credence of Israelis, Arabs, and United Nations Organs, explicitly reported this time it had failed to detect any Israeli troop concentration.93

A close examination of the motives of the Soviet Union in both instances - Ethiopia and Egypt-Syria - reveals its national interest. With respect to Ethiopia the motive was to further the deterioration of relations between Ethiopia and the United States beyond repair thus paving the way for a better strategic position for itself than it had in Somalia where its influence was on the decline. This could only materialize when Ethiopia was engaged in a fierce war to defend its territorial integrity.

With respect to the Six-Day War, the motive was to consolidate its precarious influence in Syria which was slipping away due to the unpopularity of the government resulting from communist participation. Hence, the Soviet Union reasoned that the only way it could maintain its influence in Syria was by encouraging that government to

take a militant position vis-a-vis Israel and the United States, thus demanding patriotism and vigilance from its people. Moreover, convinced that even a small scale action from Israel could topple the Syrian government, the Soviet Union could only persuade Nasser to assist Syria when it brought to Nasser's attention Israel's preparation for an all out war against Syria.\(^9\) The result has been that the Soviet Union has been well entrenched in Syria protecting its interest ever since.

Cuba and the Somali-Ethiopian War

There are those who consider Cuba's role in the Angolan civil war and the Somali-Ethiopian war as that of "surrogate"* and "mercenary"** doing the dirty job of its patron the Soviet Union!

David Newsom, U.S. Undersecretary for Political Affairs, made a distinction between the motives and roles of the Cubans and the Soviet Union:

Soviet and Cuban objectives in Africa are harmonious, but not necessarily synonymous...Castro, emphasizing the African element in the Cuban population sees a special mission...Soviet motivations are probably a mixture of geopolitical,

\(^9\)Ibid., pp. 276-277.

*Kissinger denounced Cuba as a surrogate in 1975; for more see Gavshon, Crisis in Africa, p. 107.

**The Chinese use this term to explain Cuba's role in Africa.
strategic, and ideological.  

This distinction must have been drawn after President Castro told a rally of 1.2 million Cubans "we are a Latin-African nation... African blood flows freely through our veins."  

Although there are those who are inclined to tarnish Cuba's reputation, its role in easing the predicament many African and other nations find themselves in, since its socialist revolution, has earned praise and respect. In the words of Arthur Gavshon:

While the Russians, for instance, were distributing armaments to handpicked customers...the Cubans were telling Asians how to breed bulls. Long before fighting wars in Black Africa, Castro was sending out builders' brigades... Cuban engineers helped needy clients in three continents to build roads and dams. Cuban teachers taught African children to read and write.  

Cuba has been discharging its internationalist duties and responsibilities of the highest degree. Its role in the Angolan civil war can be explained within this ideological context. So also is its participation with Ethiopia against chauvinism and reaction. Explaining his position with respect to the Somalia-Ethiopian conflict -

---


97 Gavshon, p. 108.
right after his failure to form a confederation between Ethiopia, Somalia, and south Yemen - Castro said "the Mexicans have more right to Arizona than Somalia has to the Ogaden."  

The participation of Cuban forces in the war between Ethiopia and Somalia was a justified one. Ethiopia defended its invitation of Cuban forces by calling world attention to Chapter VII, Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations where the "inherent right of individual or collective self defense" is not infringed upon "until the Security Council has taken necessary measures to maintain international peace and security." It was also in accordance with the OAU resolution of 1964 where it declared "that all member states pledged themselves to respect the borders existing in their achievement of national independence."

It was at the request of the government of Ethiopia to assist it in repulsing the expansionist invaders that the Cubans were brought into the war. However, this does not hide the fact that the Cubans had been in Somalia long before that, extending their solidarity both in economic development and military training. But after Somalia exhibited its true color and motives, Cuba switched sides at the request of the Ethiopian government. While

---

98 Castro quoted in Gavshon, p. 112.
it can be argued that Cuba does not have the capabilities—especially economic and military—to compete with both the Soviet Union and the United States for influence in the region, its commitment to Marxist-Leninist ideology and its anti-imperialist stand have forged a foreign policy which is compatible with that of the Soviet Union.

President Nyerere elaborated on the justified role played by the Soviet Union and Cuba and explained the position of most members of the Organization of African Unity, when he said:

Cuban and Soviet forces are...in Ethiopia, at the request of the Ethiopian government. The reasons for their presence are well known. They have helped the Ethiopians to defend their country against external aggression. They have not—not has the Ethiopian government—engaged in any fighting outside Ethiopian borders.  

The Peoples Republic of China and Israel in the Somalia-Ethiopian War

International politics has become so complex and intricate that even the practitioners would have had a hard time, unless in retrospect, picturing the Peoples Republic of China siding with the United States and the neighboring reactionary Arab states on the one hand, and Israel siding with the Soviet Union and Cuba in the war between Somalia and Ethiopia, on the other hand.

The relation between Ethiopia and Israel was founded on their mutual distrust for neighboring Arab states of the region. Ethiopia, as the host country of the Organization of African Unity, had played a very constructive and significant role furthering Israel's African policies. Haile Selassie's favorable predisposition towards Israel had enabled Ethiopia to become Israel's largest economic aid recipient in Africa. It is common knowledge that Ethiopia had benefitted from Israel's expertise in police and counter-insurgency group training. However, due to Israel's occupation of Arab territories, the OAU in 1973 adopted an extreme position vis-a-vis Israel, i.e. severing diplomatic relations until Israel returned all occupied territories. Ethiopia abided by the resolution not because it was convinced that it was a rational option, but because it wanted to appease certain Arab countries which were extending their support to the Eritrean Liberation Front and to Somalia.

Be that as it may, the fundamental concern of both countries, Arab reaction and Arab chauvinism, had still bound them together. This was to manifest itself when Somalia invaded Ethiopia and Israel came to Ethiopia's side. The London Times observed that, "paradoxically in

---

100 Halliday, The Ethiopian Revolution, p. 232.
Ethiopia, the Cubans are partnered by the Israelis, who have given the tottering Ethiopian forces incalculable help in keeping American logistical equipment going.\textsuperscript{101} I.M. Lewis hit the nail on the head when he said:

\begin{quote}
Israel's willingness to supply napalm and military technicians was readily intelligible in terms of her interest in sustaining a powerful Christian presence in the Red Sea as a counterpose to Arab influence.\textsuperscript{102}
\end{quote}

Although both the United States and Israel have a common interest in keeping open the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea and the Bab el Mandeb, their approaches to attaining this goal have been very antagonistic. It seems that the U.S. feels safer with the area dominated by Arab states while Israel prefers a strong Ethiopia, despite the presence of the Soviet Union.

China, on the other hand, seems to chart its foreign policy with the intention of challenging the "Soviet social-imperialists" and "hegemonists." China assumes that the Soviet Union is the primary enemy and confronting it is its paramount interest. It was this misguided assumption that led it to stand shoulder to shoulder with the United States and apartheid South Africa against liberation movements in Angola. And again it was this

\begin{footnotes}
\end{footnotes}
assumption that led it to adopt a pro-Somali stance in the Horn of Africa. By so doing, it once again stood with the United States and the reactionary Arab regimes of the region.

The New China News Agency, commenting on the problem between Somalia and Ethiopia said:

While knowing quite well that the territorial issue between Somalia and Ethiopia was a hangover from old colonialism, the Soviet Union has meddled in the affair and aggravated it and, with an ulterior motive, peddled its sinister 'confederation staff.'

Following that ambiguous assessment of the problem between Somalia and Ethiopia, Ping-nan, a member of the delegation of the Chinese Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, on September 11, 1977 reaffirmed his government's position by saying China "totally supports the Somali people's just struggle for independence and national sovereignty."

China is a nation with its own national interest. Although lack of economic and military capability has hindered its competition with the United States and the USSR for influence in the Third World, it has exhibited several paths to attaining its goals. Analyzing and


synthesizing the foreign policy objectives and ambitions of the Peoples Republic of China, Arthur Gavshon has the following to say:

Politically, the Chinese aim was to foil what was portrayed as the Soviet Union's pursuit of world hegemony. For sometime the United States, as the only other superpower, was also accused of seeking the same objective. But as the struggle evolved Peking, in special situations, lined up with the Americans or their friends in opposition to the Russians. China's leaders themselves disavowed any hegemonistic pretensions but did not conceal an ambition to lead the Third World. Strategically, the Chinese strove to circumscribe superpower aspirations by mobilizing the Third World to play a balancing almost a controlling role.  

Hence, China is not and cannot be immune from what guides and dictates foreign policies of all nations. Although it may be concealed, disguised with and/or rationalized by ideological explanations, the crux of the matter, however, is that real politique, the pursuit of the pragmatism dictated by national interest remains the motivating force and this in turn explains the pragmatism which directs nation-states' foreign policies.

Antagonistic Foreign Policies and the Creation of Displaced People in the Horn

How do we substantiate our thesis that in fact antagonistic foreign policies and not drought/famine or

the drive for economic benefit are the culprits? This is a legitimate question, especially in light of the current African economic catastrophe and the prevalent drought.

Since the displacement of Ethiopians had taken place from both the Ogaden and Eritrea regions into Somalia and Sudan respectively, discussion of the whys and the hows is in order.

In Somalia

Both Gavshon\textsuperscript{106} and the Africa Research Bulletin\textsuperscript{107} estimate that 600,000 Ethiopians had been displaced as a result of the war. Africa Report quoting United Nations officials hastened to add that "only nine percent of the refugees are over 15."\textsuperscript{108} UNHCR Fact Sheet: Somalia, declared the magnitude as follows:

UNHCR assists some 70,000 Ethiopian refugees located in 35 camps in the region of Hiran, Gedo, the North West and Lower Shebelle. Most arrived in Somalia following the events in the Horn of Africa in 1977-78. Almost 80 percent of the refugees are women and children.\textsuperscript{109}

Anthony J. Hughes in his article "Policy Options in the Horn," said, "Somalia is burden with more than one

\textsuperscript{106}Ibid., p. 270.
\textsuperscript{109}UNHCR Fact Sheet: Somalia 7 (February 1984), p. 1.
million refugees from the Ogaden." Stressing the fact that it is the conflict of the two countries that is the culprit, Africa Report wrote on the displaced people in Djibouti by saying, "like the refugees in Somalia, the Djibouti refugees fled Ethiopia in 1977 to escape the Ogaden War."

The Sudan

David R. Smock argues that Ethiopians displaced from both the Ogaden and Eritrea constitute the largest numbers of refugees in the continent. And on giving the reason for the Eritreans to flee Ethiopia he said, "the Eritreans have fled their homes to escape the prolonged warfare between the Ethiopian forces and the Eritrean liberation movements, a conflict which dates back to 1962." Smock does not stop there. He implicated the Government of Sudan for its intervention in the internal affairs of Ethiopia. He said:

Sudanese sympathy for Eritrean refugees is reinforced by their support for the liberation efforts. Although the Fronts have not organized military camps inside the Sudan, the EPLF and ELF did have offices

113 Ibid.
there and virtually all Eritrean supplies
for the war coming from various Arab
states pass through Sudanese ports.\textsuperscript{114}

Of the many policies which Ethiopia pursued vis-a-vis
the Sudan, bombing the Sudanese territories was one which
was acknowledged and disclosed by the Sudanese government.\textsuperscript{115}

\textbf{Africa Confidential} writing on why Ethiopia bombed the
Sudanese territory said:

\begin{quote}
The Ethiopia plan is seen as designed to put
pressure on the Sudanese authorities in order
to stop them from giving assistance to
Eritrean refugees and cut the supply route
over their territory which reaches Eritrean
guerrilla forces through port Sudan and
Kassala.\textsuperscript{116}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{116} \textbf{Africa Confidential} 17:6 (March 19, 1976), p. 4.

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.

UNHCR Fact Sheet: Sudan giving the number of refugees
reported, "The Sudan is host to an estimated 665,000
refugees...the majority (some 460,000) are from Ethiopia
and have taken refuge in the eastern region of the
country."\textsuperscript{117}

Our contention that these people are only displaced
people and not refugees is corroborated by Smock's
finding. Smock interviewed displaced people in two
settlement schemes - at Umbrush and at Awad-el-Sid in
September 1980. His finding at Umbrush was that,

\textsuperscript{117} \textbf{UNHCR Fact Sheet: Sudan} 9 (February 1984), p. 1.

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., p. 455.

\textsuperscript{116} \textbf{Africa Confidential} 17:6 (March 19, 1976), p. 4.

\textsuperscript{117} \textbf{UNHCR Fact Sheet: Sudan} 9 (February 1984), p. 1.
None of those interviewed had any intention of remaining permanently in the Sudan. Their attachment to Eritrea is deep, and they fully intend to return as soon as the liberation struggle is successful or a negotiated settlement brings an end to the fighting.  

The same is true for the displaced people at Awad-el-Sid.  

Could economic benefit be the motive for those fleeing into Sudan and Somalia. The answer must be a negative one. According to the United Nations, all three countries, Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia are among the twenty-five least developed countries in the world.  

Africa Emergency Map (see Annex V) points out that Ethiopia and Sudan are among the most critically drought affected countries while Somalia is described as "critically affected."  

Colin Legum et al. describing Sudan's economy said, "the disastrous state of the economy continued to deteriorate and, by the end of 1981, the country was virtually bankrupt."  

Legum, et al. have the following to say about Somalia's economy. "In tackling the acute

---

119 Ibid., p. 460.
economic problems facing the country, the Government has moved further away from the "scientific socialism" which it had espoused over 1969-1979. Smock hit the nail on the head when he said that most Eritreans were far better off economically in Ethiopia than in the Sudan, they fled for survival. By the same token, the famine/drought factors are not and cannot be the causes for displacing Ethiopians into Sudan and Somalia for all three countries do form part of the Sahel and hence are hit hard by the drought. This is why we argue that antagonistic foreign policies are responsible for creating displaced people in the region. In other words, the climate for war is primarily responsible for the displacement of these people and it is agreed by most students of African politics that these wars are either caused or sustained by foreign intervention.

123 Ibid., p. B269.
CHAPTER IV

THE RELATION BETWEEN FOREIGN POLICIES AND DISPLACED PEOPLE IN CENTRAL AND SOUTHWESTERN AFRICA

The problems that engendered the conflictual relationship between Zaire and Angola and the resultant foreign power interference may be different in terms of form from those of Somalia and Ethiopia. In essence and content, however, they are very much alike. How are they similar and different?

In the former, foreign interference was carried under the pretext of giving all liberation movements (FNLA, UNITA and MPLA) a fair and equal chance to form a representative national government where no group dominates one or the other two. This was the line advanced by Zaire, the United States, China, South Africa, Zambia, and a few other African countries. Opposing that contention and interfering on the side of the government established by the MPLA were the Soviet Union, Cuba, East Germany and most African countries.

In the case of the Horn of Africa, however, foreign interference was manifested by supporting Somalia's expansionist foreign policy (USA and most Arab countries) perpetrated against the territorial integrity and national unity.
of Ethiopia which called for interference on the side of the aggressed by countries like the Soviet Union, Cuba, Libya, etc.

In both regions, however, the overriding motive, i.e. the raison d'ètre for interference is the same: national interest viewed in terms of economic, geopolitical and strategic interests.

To concretize our assertion, it is of paramount importance that we entertain the following points: What were the motives of Zaire in Angola? Were the motives of the United States similar with those of Zaire or did the United States have its own motives? What about the objectives of Apartheid South Africa? Were there similarities in foreign policy objectives between the United States and South Africa? Did the United States influence South Africa to intervene in the Angolan civil war? What about the objectives of the Peoples Republic of China? Were the convergence of the foreign policies of the United States and China by design or the result of coincidence? Was the foreign policy of the Soviet Union motivated by the principle of assistance to and unity with the workers of Angola and the vanguard party of the MPLA? What were the objectives of Cuba's involvement on the side of the MPLA? Was Cuba's foreign policy induced by the Soviet Union or could they be regarded as coincidentally complimentary to one another? What role did mercenaries play in the whole scenario in the region? Can one make a principled
and hence a legitimate distinction between Cuba's participation in the war on the side of MPLA and that of the mercenaries on the side of FNLA, UNITA, and South Africa? Finally, we would ask, how did all these interventions contribute to the creation of displaced people in Angola and Zaire?

It is clear that the points raised above call for a systematic analysis of the objectives of the foreign policies of each individual country vis-a-vis Angola in particular and the region in general.

Before embarking on this project, it is appropriate to give a synopsis of the intricate and protracted development of the liberation process in Angola, it being the source of the conflict.

The Liberation of Angola and the Jockeying for Strategic Position by the Superpowers

The independence of Angola and its sister countries, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands, countries which experienced Portuguese colonialism for over four centuries, caught not only the West but also the East and the African countries off-guard and by surprise. My contention is shared by Arthur Gavshon. Equating the coup in Portugal with the liberation and independence of the colonies he said:

The swiftness of the Lisbon coup caught Washington and Moscow by surprise. The failure of the CIA to anticipate and to alert the administration to the uprising
called for the scorn of the House Select Committee on Intelligence in January 1976. Kremlin reactions to the parallel performance of the KGB did not, apparently, become a subject for investigative reporting by Soviet journalists.

The Western countries, led by the United States, had romanticized over the notion that the liberation movements in southern Africa, namely FRELIMO of Mozambique, ZAPU and ZANU of Zimbabwe, ANC of South Africa, SWAPO of Namibia and MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA of Angola, did not possess the military, political and diplomatic capabilities to triumph over their oppressors and colonizers. Hence independence and freedom were only wishful thinking. Arthur Gavshon put it thus:

In Washington, the administration was still captive of a four-year-old appraisal that Portugal's wars in Africa would go on indefinitely. (Then quotes NSSM 39) 'The rebels cannot oust the Portuguese and the Portuguese can contain but not eliminate the rebels.'

Hence it goes without saying that the West formulated and pursued its foreign policy as dictated by National Security Study Memorandum 38* which assumed that the White man's rule in southern Africa was there to stay indefinitely.

---


2 Ibid.

*National Security Study Memorandum 39 is a study done during the early part of Nixon's administration with the intention of formulating U.S. policies in Southern Africa.
The Soviet Union must have shared the same opinion. And it could be one of the reasons why the "Russians in 1973 switched their support from Neto (of MPLA) to Daniel Chipenda (the leader of a splinter group)."³

African countries, which had stood behind the liberation movements and contributed their dues to the OAU Liberation Committee, started taking different and at times antagonistic positions especially on the question of the formation of a government in Angola. Of the three different liberation movements, two, FNLA and UNITA, espoused a diametrically opposed socioeconomic and political view from that of MPLA. The emergency summit conference of the Heads of State and Government held in Addis Ababa from January 10-12, 1976, and the split that followed is a strong testimony to the divergence of national interests and socioeconomic and political views they pursue and variable proclivities of their foreign policies.

The independence of Angola and its sister countries would not have caught these countries by surprise if they had been doing their homework. It is beyond doubt that independence was not handed to these countries on a silver platter. They bled and died for it! Writing on the change of attitudes and what provoked the coup in Portugal, Arthur Gavshon said:

³Ibid., p. 241.
Portugal's 'group of captains' who led the Armed Forces Movement against the dictatorship of Prime Minister Marcelo Caetano on 25 April 1974 did not cause Lisbon's decision hurriedly to dismantle the 500 year old Lusitanian Empire in Africa. They prompted recognition that the long, grinding wars of independence, waged by the people of Mozambique, Angola, Portuguese Guinea, the Cape Verde Islands and Sao Tome and Principe, could not be won. To most Portuguese those wars had begun to seem endless. Nearly 12,000 had died, more than 40,000 had been wounded...ordinary Portuguese folk were more than ready for change. 4

Although Portugal is a country located in Europe, its socioeconomic development is pathetically backward. It is a country which subsists on the perennial rent it obtains from the United States for its use of the Azores military base. The country is so poor that the problem of unemployment, underemployment, and flight of skilled labor power to the other European countries makes it more like a Third World country than a colonial power. The war it was waging against the liberation movements in its African colonies was financially covered by NATO countries. To understand the qualitative changes that took place in Portugal, one has to look at this internal contradiction from a materialistic perspective. As Mao observed:

Changes in society are due chiefly to the development of the internal contradiction in society, the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production; the contradiction between classes and the contradiction between the

4Ibid., p. 233.
old and the new... Does materialist dialectics exclude external causes? Not at all, it holds that external causes are the condition of change and internal causes are the basis of change, and the external causes become operative through internal causes.\(^5\)

The wars in the colonies were the external causes for the changes in Portugal. Thus these countries would not have been caught by surprise if they had paid attention to the role and place of the liberation movement in Portugal's domestic affairs.

The independence of Mozambique, Guinea Bissau and Angola, and the civil war in Angola led the superpowers to jockey for strategic positions. The Soviet Union had to attain parity not only in amassing the instruments of war but also in obtaining military strategic positions. The United States, having lost the war in Vietnam felt threatened and perturbed. The establishment of progressive and socialist oriented governments in Mozambique, Guinea Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands not only changed the alliance of forces in favor of socialism but also brought the revival of the "Zero-sum game" and "domino" theories. The loss of a country or a region to the enemy camp, in this case the communist camp, was considered to be minus for the capitalist camp. And the loss of a country like Angola, rich in natural resources, located in a strategic position

(Southwest Africa and Atlantic Ocean) and bordered by Namibia, Zambia and Zaire, all capitalist oriented countries dominated directly or indirectly by South Africa, was seen as the start of a chain reaction leading to diminished U.S. influence. Hence subverting the revolution and overthrowing of the government of MPLA under the pretext of "equal share for all liberation movements" became U.S. political strategy.

What Were the Objectives of Zaire's Foreign Policy in the Angolan Civil War

Zaire's involvement could have been precipitated by many factors. In this context different writers have given it varied interpretation. Nzongola Ntalaja views it as a combination of both class interest and national interest. Expounding on the class interest factor, he said:

Zaire's intervention in the Angolan civil war, far from being a simple execution of American directives by the government of President Mobutu Sese Seko, was primarily related to the latter's struggle for survival...That is to say that the Mobutu regime intervened in Angola to defend its own class interest.6

With regard to the national interest factor, he notes:

Zaire does have an important economic and strategic stake in Angola. It consists in maintaining access to the ports of Lobito in Angola and Matadi in Zaire. Of the four exit routes for Zairean copper exports, the

---

Benguela railway from the Southeastern frontier with Angola to Lobito on the Atlantic Ocean is still the quickest and the best.\(^7\)

The national interest scenario could be expanded by including Mobutu's longstanding interest in incorporating Cabinda into Zaire's territory. Blinded by national interest to historical reality the Mobutu regime had continued, even after the defeat of Portuguese colonialism to argue that Cabinda was a separate entity and that referendum should decide its future.\(^8\) This cynicism was exposed by Ernest Harsh and Tony Thomas when they unravelled the motives behind it all. They wrote, "Despite official denial Mobutu appeared to covet the oil fields of Cabinda, as well as its ports which could have given Zaire improved access to the ocean."\(^9\)

Cabinda, according to *Africa Research Bulletin*, is a small enclave found between Zaire and the Congo Peoples Republic. The territory is known for its extensive deposits of oil with official reserves set at 300 million tons.\(^10\) Its geographical proximity had also attracted the attention

\(^7\)Ibid., p. 159.


of the Congo Peoples Republic which had a short history of supporting secessionists in the territory. The Foreign Minister of the Republic is quoted as having said: "Cabinda exists as a reality and is historically and geographically different from Angola and that a referendum should be held."\textsuperscript{11}

Mobutu's unremitting interest in the territory has persuaded him to make a political arrangement with Holden Roberto, leader of FNLA, who desperately needed the diplomatic, political and military support that Mobutu could give him in his bid for power in Angola. \textit{Africa Confidential} described it as follows:

Suspicion has been raised in the last few weeks that President Mobutu has in fact come to an arrangement with Holden Roberto, the FNLA leader, that, in return for independence in Cabinda, he will make sure that Roberto and FNLA get control in Angola.\textsuperscript{12}

The inclination of Zaire towards FNLA did not arise with the coming of Mobutu to power. A chronological study of the development of the liberation movements in Angola along with the chronological study of the change of power and leadership in Zaire (then Congo-Leopoldville) since its independence shows that starting from the government of Cyrille Adoula in 1963 to that of Mobutu in 1965, and until 1974-75, Roberto was Zaire's darling. The

\textsuperscript{11}Ibid.

end result was that while FNLA had been allowed to operate in Zaire, MPLA was excommunicated and its leaders detained or killed.\textsuperscript{13}

Mobutu made his regime's interest clear on May 20, 1975 when he told AZAP in Kinshasa that "Cabinda is not Angola, it is separated by Zaire...and its people should be allowed to decide freely through a referendum what future they sought for themselves."\textsuperscript{14}

The second theory is the one propounded by Kissinger and was really, a pretext for U.S. intervention. Kissinger argued that Zaire's involvement in the civil war was provoked by the potential threat posed to its territorial integrity and security. Posing the concern of Zaire as a common problem shared by Zambia, he said:

By mid-July the military situation radically favored the MPLA. Zaire and Zambia became more and more concerned about the implications for their own security and turned to the United States for assistance in preventing the Soviet Union and Cuba from imposing a solution in Angola, becoming a dominant influence in South-Central Africa and threatening the stability of the region.\textsuperscript{15}

It seems that Kissinger's contention must have


originated with President Kaunda of Zambia's visit to the United States which took place early in April 1975 to assess the ramifications of the coming of MPLA to power. However, we are convinced that the conclusion must have been drawn by the Ford Administration with the intention of getting the support of Congress, which opposed the participation of the U.S. in a civil war in Angola. It was clear from the outset that the United States did not want to see "the MPLA lead the nation-building process in Angola fearing a socialist style regime with close ties with the Soviet bloc." Hence we could say that the "security theory" expounded by Secretary Kissinger was only a pretext for U.S. involvement. Angola, a country which had just won its independence and was engaged in a devastating civil war instigated by the same countries, could not have been a threat to the security of Zaire and Zambia. The core interest, of the first type, of this desperate country was the establishment of a viable government, the maintenance of its independence and territorial integrity, and the establishment of cordial relations with its neighbors. However this aspiration was to be shattered by Zaire whose core interest, of the second


type was the expansion of its territory and the subversion, and overthrow of the government of MPLA. Zaire became an accessory to foreign interference, an action which did not give an iota of respect to the principles of the Charters of the United Nations and those of the Organization of African Unity. Arthur Klinghoffer hit the nail on the head when he said, "Zaire also colluded with the United States, China, France, Belgium, South Africa, UNITA and of course, FNLA to escalate the war."\footnote{Klinghoffer, The Angolan War, p. 47.}

There is a one argument which gives some credence to the "security theory" of Henry Kissinger. Mobutu's motive for his participation in the civil war has been made evident above. However, in hindsight it could be also argued that although territorial expansion was his immediate motive, his long term objective may have been to wipe out his opponents, the one time followers of Tshombe. This group of Katangan rebels have now made Angola their home and, after twenty years still harbor animosity for Mobutu's government.

As if his effort to topple the MPLA and destabilize Angola was not enough, Mobutu refused to honor the agreement signed with President Neto at the end of the civil war and not show any inclination to disarm the remnants of the FNLA saboteurs who resided in Zaire. Thus it is believed that Neto lost his trust for Mobutu and encouraged
The invasion of Shaba province and the near success of the effort of the invaders to topple Mobutu was a result of many intrinsic problems pertaining to the neo-colonial economy of the country. "The fall in the price of copper, the collapse of agriculture and the corruption and inefficiency of the administration" had alienated not only the populace but also the military who had lost confidence in the government and the zeal to fight. Hence one can say it was an opportune time for the Katangans to invade. The reason why it did not succeed, however, is because of the subjective condition, i.e. the organizational ability of the National Liberation Front of the Congo (FNLC) was not equal to its objectives. The objective condition, however, was ripe. Another factor for the failure of the effort of FNLC was the intervention of Morocco, France, the U.S., China, Belgium, etc. on the side of Mobutu.

Blaming Cuba and the Soviet Union for the incident, Mobutu broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba on April 4, 1978, and recalled his Ambassadors to the Soviet Union.


Algeria and Libya thereafter. Responding to Mobutu's accusation, Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez of Cuba told the United Nations General Assembly on May 30, 1978 that "Cuba has not participated directly or indirectly in the events in Shaba...and did not supply the arms for that purpose nor did it train those who attacked." The Angolan government, on the other hand, while not denying its role on the invasion said:

The Angolan government had condemned reports of Moroccan troops and Chinese military supplies being sent to Zaire...in Shaba and other Zairian provinces the people want change and that any foreign attempts to retard this change are bound to fail.

While the invasion is considered as "separatism" by Zaire and its friends, Angola, the London Times and the leaders of the FNLC viewed it from a different light. The London Times' report reads as follows:

The invaders are not secessionists invoking Tshombe's shade. They are calling on Zaireans to rise against a discreeted autocrat. They are in contact with rebels in Kivu, the surviving remnants of the Gizengist and Mulele faction.

And an FNLC spokesman said in Rome:

---

23 Ibid.
24 Ibid. 4400.
The FNLC forces, together with the insurgent population opposed to the Mobutu dictatorship will do everything possible to protect the foreign citizens in Kolowezi...The insurgent Congolese population seeks only one object – to topple Mobutu's dictatorial and anti-popular regime.26

This is why we argued that the "security theory" even following the line of argument delineated here is far-fetched. Simply put, it is not clear cut and not convincing enough.

This leads us to the next theory: Zaire intervened in the Angolan civil war to "oppose communism." We had asked earlier if the motives of Zaire were similar to those of the United States in their Angolan adventure in particular and in the Third World in general. Who can answer this paramount question to our satisfaction better than the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs? He said:

Despite temporary aberration (Mobutu) has been a good friend to the United States...We do have a warm spot in our hearts for President Mobutu...There is a basic commonality of attitude and policies in foreign affairs between our two countries.27

Stephen Weissman, writing on Kissinger's obsession with the danger of communism and Zaire's usefulness in


frustrating or subverting socialist revolution said:

Given such outstanding reliability (of Mobutu) Secretary of State Kissinger was reportedly "banking" on Mobutu to 'oppose Moscow's interests' in Africa generally and to further Washington's interests in various international forums'...since Zaire was to bear much of the burden of anti-communism in Africa and modernization in the Third World, a high State Department official noted a thrust in Washington to bolster the country 'in the hope that it could extend its hegemony throughout the continent,' in the same vein CIA Director William Colby designated Zaire 'a future regional power'.

It would be a truism to state that Zaire, as a member of the international system advances its national interest. However, the group in power [the petit bourgeoisie and the comprador bourgeoisie] has class interests which are linked to those of the bourgeoisie in the metropole. Hence, it is only logical, for the class in power to make the country an appendage of these countries and play reactionary roles in the system. This role works on reciprocity. Aluko said:

The Western powers intervened in 1977 and again in 1978 in Zaire to prevent the country from going...'the way of Marxist Angola.' The direct or indirect involvement of the Soviet Union and Cuba in the Shaba invasion of 1977 and 1978, could not be totally divorced from [a] desire to promote or export revolutions from Angola to Zaire.

---

28 Ibid., p. 395.

This case study once again reminds us of the existence of the loose bipolar world discussed in Chapter Two. As outlined above, the function and role of developing nations within this system, far from being independent, has been subordinated to the whim of one or the other superpower. We would like to close this subheading by pointing out that Brucan's theory in this regard, would have to be supplemented by the ideological and political concerns of President Mobutu who did not disguise them nor hesitate to act and translate them into reality.

What Were the Reasons for the U.S. to Intervene Directly or Indirectly in Angola's Civil War?

As many writers have pointed out, the motives for the U.S. intervention were economic, political and military-strategic interests.

However, before going into the analysis of these factors, we would like to point out that the United States had taken a politically motivated position vis-a-vis the three liberation movements as early as 1962. It is common knowledge that Holden Robert, leader of FNLA, had been the "Moses" of Angola, chosen by the United States to lead Angola to independence. Gavshon observed:

In 1962 the CIA selected Roberto as a moderate worth cultivating for his chances of heading the future government of an independent Angola. For the next seven years Roberto was on the CIA payroll, with a personal stipend worth about $10,000 a year mainly for keeping the Americans
informed about what was going on in the Angolan resistance movements.30

The United States' all out support for Roberto's movement was obstructed by the NATO doctrine which limited U.S. support of decolonization in Africa. This doctrine has two purposes. Its first purpose is a required abstention of member countries from extending support to the liberation movements to undermine the colonizers. Its second purpose is to provide support for the effort of the colonizers, in this case Portugal, France, Britain and Belgium, financially, materially and politically.31

Thus, until the coup in Portugal and the civil war in Angola (1974-75) the U.S. was committed to maintaining the status quo. To the surprise of many, Portuguese colonies were included in the security of the North Atlantic Alliance Organization thereby expanding the concern and influence of NATO the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean. Christopher Coker put it thus:

In December 1974 the State Department admitted that Portuguese Africa had been included in NATO contingency planning, an admission which went far beyond the NATO secretariats earlier declaration that only the security of areas in its immediate defense perimeter had even been discussed.32

30 Gavshon, Crisis in Africa, p. 236.
31 Ibid., p. 227.
Although the NATO doctrine limited and contained America's sole desire to control the economic riches of the country, this was to explode in 1974-75 when Portugal left the country and America and its NATO allies provoked the civil war.

What made Angola different? Why was MPLA less acceptable to Portugal and its NATO backers than FRELIMO or PAIGC? All three movements stood for the same principles, non-alignment, no foreign military bases on their soil, social justice, an end to unbridled exploitation by foreign monopolies, and the building of a socialist economy as the only way to bring peace and prosperity to all their people. There was nothing to choose between the three. Yet Angola was different from either Mozambique or Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde. It was an immensely wealthy country, with huge off-shore oil reserves which by 1975 earned it a mention on CIA world oil reserve charts, even though production was still very low by world standards. Enough foreign mining surveys had been undertaken to prove that Angola was a promising source of a range of strategic minerals as comprehensive as those in South Africa: uranium, cobalt, chrome, fusing-quarte, and many others. Neither Mozambique nor Guinea Bissau and the Cape Verde archipelago could compete.33

Africa Confidential points out that the country is the second largest coffee producer in Africa, next to the Ivory Coast. Its oil and coffee account for fifty-seven percent of the nation's export. Diamond and iron-ore account for ten and six percent, respectively.

---

The large iron-ore deposits have attracted the investment of West Germany, France, South Africa, Japan, etc. Other minerals worth mentioning include manganese, phosphates, copper, granite, marble, asphalt, rock and gypsum.34

Nzongola Ntalaja looked at the U.S. intervention in Angola holistically. That is, instead of isolating U.S. interests from those of the rest of the capitalist countries, he prefers to maintain the dialectical complimentarity between U.S. interests and those of others. He said:

An adequate interpretation of American intervention in Angola becomes possible, therefore, when viewed from this more general framework of neocolonialism. The interests to be protected are neither singularly American nor exclusively economic. They comprise all those interests necessary to the preservation of the world capitalist system...they include the interests of the international bourgeoisie as well as those of the state bourgeoisie of post colonial countries still subjected to imperialist exploitation.35

Before going to the next sub-topic - political interest - we would like to quote the late President of Angola, Agostino Neto, who lamented over the economic sabotage and boycott perpetrated by the United States and the multi-national corporations:

The United States and other imperialist nations have begun to organize a boycott against us. Some of our overseas bank

accounts have been frozen. Certain aircrafts which we paid for have not been delivered. Some American companies, Gulf Oil in particular, have begun to sabotage our oil economy.36

Neto's disclosure corroborates and strengthens Nzongola's thesis that the interest of U.S. imperialism in Angola and the world over for that matter, is tied to the interest of world imperialism.

U.S. Political Interest

Although we are dealing with the economic, political and strategic interest of the United States in Angola, we would like to state that the dialectical and organic link between them is not forgotten.

Having said that, we would like to pursue the point by trying to straighten out one fact. There are those who consider the intervention of the Soviet Union on the side of Angola primarily as a challenge to the Chinese influence in the region. Colin Legum contends that the "Sino-Soviet rivalry was the principal one."37 Gerald Bender said: "When Kissinger took his first serious look at Angola in early 1975...he stumbled into a Sino-Soviet dispute."38 We feel that this diagnosis is erroneous and


is a result of the failure to understand the theoretical underpinning of what constitutes capabilities that contribute to being a superpower. As discussed in Chapter Two, the international system is a loose bipolar system where the dominant powers of the poles are the Soviet Union and the United States. The problems of today's world are the manifestation of the contradictions between the two. The Chinese theoreticians wrote: "Therefore the Angolan question, like many other questions in the world, reflects the fierce contention between the two superpowers."\(^{39}\)

Following the line pursued by the Chinese theoreticians, the Wall Street Journal on December 17, 1975 editorial noted:

Yet when all the economic, military and strategic considerations are set aside, the Soviet challenge in Angola is primarily directed at the U.S...clearly the Soviets are in Angola and elsewhere testing American resolve.\(^{40}\)

Despite all these, the Ford administration was very clear with the challenge and its repercussion on international stability. In his first testimony before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Africa on January 29, 1976,


\(^{40}\)Wall Street Journal quoted in Harsch and Thomas, p. 102.
Kissinger said:

The Soviet Union's massive and unprecedented intervention in the internal affairs of Africa - with nearly $200 million of arms, and its military technicians and advisors, with 11,000 Cuban combat troops and with substantial sea and airlift and naval cover in adjacent waters, is a matter directly affecting global stability.41

In his news conference after the North Council meeting, Secretary Kissinger warned that the military activity by the Soviet Union in areas thousands of miles away from its border, can affect the relations of the two superpowers.42

On discussing and analyzing this sub-topic from this perspective, one will not get the full picture of U.S. involvement in Angola. What it has done, so far, is that it had portrayed America's involvement in the war as a reaction to Soviet "expansionism." This is not the case! The truth of the matter, however, is that the United States had been involved in the war clandestinely long before 1976 through the CIA, neighboring countries and mercenaries. Arthur Gavshon points out that Kissinger failed to tell the Senate Subcommittee on Africa the fact that: "the CIA had resumed funding the FNLA in July of that

41Gavshon, Crisis in Africa, p. 223.
year (1974) without formal authority."  

Kissinger also purposely failed to tell the Subcommittee that, "the four member '40 Committee' on 22 January adopted a CIA plan to give the FNLA $300,000 for immediate political action... Kissinger and Colby were members of the '40 Committee'."  

Former Senator Dick Clark, then Chairman of the Subcommittee on African Affairs exposed the administration's so-called covert activities by saying:

> It is clear from what has appeared in the press that the Administration had already made a substantial commitment of American resources and prestige in Angola, and intends to increase that commitment in the near future. Yet the Administration has never come to Congress or the public to ask for authorization for its military assistance to factions in the Angolan civil war, to answer questions or to explain why it believes this involvement is worth the risk it is taking.

During the early months of the CIA involvement in the civil war, the Administration did not want American arms to be seen in Angola. Hence, it gave funds to Mobutu so that he would purchase arms for the FNLA and UNITA from the European market and possibly Belgium.  

---

43 Gavshon, Crisis in Africa, p. 228.

44 Ibid.


46 Harsch and Thomas, p. 98.
revolution and the overthrow of MPLA, it had done every
dirty thing, and tried every trick in the book including
"the recruitment of an undercover army composed of
American and European mercenaries to fight in Angola."\textsuperscript{47}

Most of the recruits that joined this adventure were active
members of the United States Army with combat experience.

Ernest Harsch and Tony Thomas revealed the following:

Citing high state department sources Sean
Gervasi, an adviser to the Center for
National Security studies revealed at a
December 19, 1976 Press Conference that
numbers of U.S. mercenaries have come
from regular units by volunteering and
that they leave behind them letters of
resignation from the regular forces in
case such letters should be needed. Regular
commissioned and non-commissioned officers
have been approaching enlisted men to ask
whether they might be interested in
volunteering.\textsuperscript{48}

Regreting the impossibility of carrying out direct
military confrontation, and recognizing the fact that
Angola is one of the "gray areas," Kissinger condoned the
involvement of mercenaries in the war for reasons of
leverage, without which, he contends, diplomacy is impotent.\textsuperscript{49}

Obviously, Secretary Kissinger was fully aware of the fact
that the United States has legislation forbidding the
recruitment of its nationals by the government or foreign

\textsuperscript{47}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{48}Ibid., pp. 99-100.

\textsuperscript{49}Henry Kissinger, "Implication of Angola for Future
U.S. Foreign Policy Statement Before the Subcommittee on
African Affairs,"\textit{Department of State Bulletin} 74:1912
(February 16, 1976), p. 181.
governments for the purpose of advancing one's foreign policy objectives. Ward Churchill, discussing that legislation says:

In a body of law generally referred to as "The Neutrality Act" there is a section (Title 8, U.S.C. Sect. 1481(a)(3) which reads in part "any citizen of the United States who enters the armed forces of a foreign state without the written authorization of the Secretaries of State and Defense, shall lose his citizenship."

In addition to this section of the "Neutrality Act," there is a provision which bans U.S. nationals from attempting to overthrow other governments. U.S. Code Title 18, Section 960 reads:

Whoever, within the United States, knowingly begins or sets on foot or provides or prepares a means for or furnishes the money for, or takes part in, any military or naval expedition or enterprise to be carried on from thence against the territory or dominion or any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people with whom the United States is at peace, shall be fined not more than $3,000 or imprisoned not more than three years or both.

The President's condemnation of the so-called "unjustified and unwarranted execution of Daniel Gerhart, [an American mercenary] by the government of Angola" testifies


51 Quoted in the Atlanta Journal, 11 September 1984, 14-A.

to the fact that the administration was fully aware of the heinous tactics perpetrated by the CIA against the territorial integrity of Angola. Speaking on the same issue, Secretary Kissinger showed his contempt for African intelligence when he declared that, "Furthermore, no evidence whatsoever was produced during the trial of Mr. Gerhart in Luanda that he had even fired a shot during the few days he was in Angola before his capture." (Emphasis mine).

Legally speaking, we feel that, neither the President nor the Secretary of State has whatsoever grounds to speak on the issue. And if there was one, it was against them! Politically speaking, mercenariat is not measured by the number of shots one fires but by the ideology he/she stands for and by his/her commitment to translate it into action, i.e. combat!

We would like to conclude this discussion - U.S. political interest - by quoting Kissinger who told the Senate Subcommitte on African Affairs that what is at hand is the reputation of America and its resolve in the face of Soviet "expansionism." He said:

But our deeper concern is for global stability. If the United States is seen to emasculate itself in the face of massive, unprecedented Soviet and Cuban intervention, what will be the perception of leaders around the world as they make

53Ibid., p. 163.
decisions concerning their future security.\textsuperscript{54}

**U.S. Military Strategic Interest**

The United States is cognizant of the fact that the Soviet Union is not only closing the gap in building strategic and conventional weapons, which some specialists in the field consider as parity has been reached,\textsuperscript{55} but also in jockeying for militarily strategic positions. The United States defeat in Vietnam and the subsequent breakdown of the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) have shaken its superiority in the Indian Ocean. Its recent successes in Mombasa (Kenya) and Berbera (Somalia) are equally matched by the Soviet Union's naval base in Aden (South Yemen) and access to military and naval facilities in Ethiopia and Mozambique. The South Atlantic would be exposed if Angola were to let in the Soviets for the Soviet Union already has access to military and naval facilities in the People's Republic of the Congo and Guinea. However, this assessment would only be of theoretical interest if it were not part of the strategically crucial Persian Gulf and its oil routes, via the Indian Ocean, the Cape Coast and the Atlantic Ocean, then to the U.S., Europe and Japan.


The United States depends for fifteen percent of its oil on the Gulf while the percentage for Europe and Japan is sixty and ninety, respectively. It goes without saying, then that the "raw material vulnerability"\textsuperscript{56} of the Western world has compounded its "strategic vulnerability."\textsuperscript{57}

Relating this to the strategic location of Angola, Gavshon said:

Self-evidently, a left leaning Angola could exercise a progressive influence on the affairs of southern and central Africa. In a regional sense, so long as Angola remained under threat of attack by its neighbors, the Russians or Cubans would be bound to maintain a strong military presence in the country... Soviet access to Angolan air and sea ports, in global strategic terms has extended the reach of Moscow's air and sea force to the South Atlantic. Already Soviet and East European countries were routinely flying and sailing to and from Angola, facilitating their watch on Western air and sea movements.\textsuperscript{58}

While we could speculate that this is the short-term concern of the United States, its long-term interest is the safety and security of the surrounding pro-Western countries, namely Zaire, Zambia, Namibia and South Africa, where the "domino theory" could become operative unless Soviet "expansionism" is checked. And since

Angola's economy is strong and completely independent of south Africa...'and with the potential of financing' other liberation

\textsuperscript{56}Ibid., p. 13.

\textsuperscript{57}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{58}Gavshon, \textit{Crisis in Africa}, p. 226.
movements fight apartheid, colonialism and Western exploitation.  

Direct military intervention was a necessity to topple the government of the late President Neto. For instance, the importance of Zaire to the U.S. could be explained as follows:

First let there be no mistake that our interests in Zaire are long-term in nature. Zaire's geopolitical and economic weight in African scales of power is significant. With its population of 27 million, it is the third largest sub-Saharan African state. In terms of land area, it ranks second in size and its borders on nine other states in central and southern Africa. It is a fact that Zaire's sheer size and economic potential make it critical to regional stability.

Richard Moose solidifies Walker's assessment by quantifying Zaire's importance. He said, "we must not forget Zaire is the world's leading producer of both cobalt and industrial diamonds, the world's seventh largest producer of copper and the world's 13th ranked producer of coffee." On South Africa's importance to the United States, Lawrence Litvak, et al. said:

United States banks and corporations rank high in terms of the foreign contribution to South Africa's economy. After Britain, America is the largest foreign investor in South Africa...American companies have

---


61 Richard Moose, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Statement Before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House
at least $1,665 billion of direct investments in South Africa, comprising 17% of all direct foreign investments there. In addition, U.S. banks have over $2 billion in outstanding loans to South Africa, accounting for 33% of all loan claims against the country.62

The logical conclusion is that the United States cannot afford to see Angola "export" its socialist revolution to country after country and jeopardize its economic, strategic and political interests in the region. This brings us to the next country - South Africa, and its reasons for intervening in Angola.

Why Did South Africa Intervene in Angola?

Apartheid South Africa and Namibia are the two countries in southern Africa where settler colonialism persists. Its persistence, however, cannot be understood without a simultaneous study of the interests of the NATO countries, particularly the United States, Britain, France and West Germany.

The liberation of Mozambique and Angola shook not only the politico-military security of NATO countries, but also the psychological foundation of Apartheid on which it is built. While South Africa's economy is tied to Mozambique

Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 5, 1979, Department of State Bulletin 79:2926 (May 1979), p. 42.

its fear of any threat coming from Mozambique is not seriously considered as compared to the Angolan front, a country which is rich in natural resources and whose economy is independent of South Africa. In short, whereas it had and has a leverage in Mozambique, it did not have any in Angola. The only way out of this predicament was to engage in subversive activities and direct military intervention to overthrow the government established by the MPLA.

Arthur Gavshon contends that South Africa's intervention was provoked by economic necessity and the determination to destroy SWAPO. Amplifying South Africa's reason, he said, "One stated purpose was to protect the Cunene Dam and power complex along the two sides of the Namibia frontier. Another purpose was to pursue and destroy SWAPO guerrillas in their Angolan sanctuaries." Tony Hodges views it strictly from a military context and national interest. In this case he suggests that the creation of a stalemate between the three liberation movements was the motive behind the intervention. He said:

Like the U.S. covert aid, the South African intervention was designed to engineer a military stalemate between the factions, thereby giving Pretoria powerful leverage with which to attempt to force concessions from them, particularly with regard to

---

63 Gavshon, Crisis in Africa, p. 244.
future Angolan policy towards definite in Southern Africa and Namibia.  

Another explanation is the theory of the prevention of the establishment of a radical regime that could jeopardize its colonial and economic interest in the region. The fourth explanation is the encouragement theory advanced by Klinghoffer. He argued that countries like Zaire, Zambia, Senegal and Ivory Coast, which have economic ties and which advocate detente with Apartheid South Africa are the ones behind its intervention. The fifth explanation is the theory of reaction where intervention by the Soviet Union and Cuba in Angola with the intention of creating "a string of Marxist states across Africa from Angola to Dar es Salaam" provoked the counter-intervention by South Africa to stifle and frustrate their motive.

Thus the motive for South Africa's intervention in Angola was to protect and advance its national interest. This case is no different from the previous one. The world has become one political stage where the national interests'
of some countries have no bound and limit. The expansion of their territories and/or the dismemberment of their neighboring territories has been the fulfillment of their national aspiration. That has been the case with Somalia and is now the case with South Africa.

The second part of this sub-topic is the one that deals with the relation between U.S. influence on South Africa and the latter's involvement in the civil war. Was South Africa's intervention instigated by the United States? Peter Botha clearly had unambiguously stated that South Africa was encouraged to take part in the civil war. Gavshon quoting Botha said:

The defense minister who in 1979 succeeded Vorster as prime minister, later told the Cape Town parliament with some bitterness that Washington, after encouraging South Africa to invade then, recklessly left us in the lurch.  

The then prime minister, Vorster was asked if it would be accurate to say that the United States solicited South Africa's help to turn the tide against Russians and Cubans in Angola last fall?, said in a diplomatic language:

I do not want to comment on that. The U.S. government can speak for itself. I am sure you will appreciate that I cannot violate the confidentiality of government-to-government communications. But if you are making the statement, I won't deny it.


\[69\] Quoted in ibid., p. 245.
John A. Marcum contends that Pretoria announced that its intervention was made on the basis that the United States would furnish it with the necessary supplies to offset the weapons superiority of the MPLA and Cuban forces. Arthur J. Klinghoffer disclosed that State Department Africanist, Edward Mulcahy, had admitted that the U.S. had regularly exchanged intelligence information with South Africa. John Stockwell is quoted as having said:

The CIA Station Chief in Pretoria frequently briefed BOSS (South African Bureau of State Security) on American operations in Angola and that BOSS director, Van Den Bergh went to Paris to meet the CIA Station Chief of that city. Van Den Bergh also went to Washington to meet the Chief of the African Division of the CIA.

In spite of all the facts presented above, Secretary of State Kissinger persisted in his denials of the collusion and/or having a fore knowledge of South Africa's intention. He said:

Some charge that we have acted in collusion with South Africa. This is untrue. We had no fore knowledge of South Africa's intention and in no way cooperated with it militarily. Nor do we view South African

---

72 Ibid.
intervention more benevolently than we do the intervention (of) other outside powers. 73

It would be ridiculous to expect the Secretary to admit the facts. Admission of the facts would have meant the loss of support of many African countries which were inclined to rally behind the United States' call for a representative government chosen from all three liberation movements.

In concluding this sub-topic we would like to point out that the national interest of the United States - its middle range interests of the third category - has been complimentarily linked with the national interest of South Africa i.e. core interest of the second type.

What Were the Objectives of China in the Angolan Civil War?

The political and ideological split between the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China which took place in the 1950s and early 1960s has been a disaster for the world socialist movement. Besides splitting the movement, it has retarded the pace of its development in countries with socialist potential. Their competition for influence in the Third World has contributed to the degeneration of Marxism-Leninism. The net result has been that the Peoples Republic of China, consciously or unconsciously, has allied itself with imperialism and against decolonization.

The manifestation of this volte face of policy and reactionary deeds by the Peoples Republic of China is

witnessed in Angola in 1974-75, when it was providing the FNLA with war materials to counter Soviet assistance for the MPLA. Colin Legum wrote that "China agreed to help UNITA in its revolutionary struggle against Soviet imperialism in Angola." (Emphasis mine). But China's contest of Soviet's assistance to MPLA was not limited to arming the other groups. It took matters a step further by entering into the politico-diplomatic debate. Commenting on the Organization of African Unity (OAU) extraordinary session on Angola, the New China News Agency said that the African countries had "witnessed an ugly performance of Soviet social imperialism, the ring leader who had provoked the civil war in that African country."

China's antagonism towards the Soviet Union reached its pinnacle when it wrote on the problem of reconciliation between the three factions and exposed its ahistorical and theoretically bankrupt positions. Writing on the day of Angolan independence, the Chinese government said:

> The Chinese Government and people extend their warm congratulations on the victory to the Angolan people and all the three Angolan liberation organizations. But it has not been possible to form a government of national unity...This is entirely the result of rivalry between the two super-powers and particularly the undisguised

---


expansion and crude interferences of the Soviet Union. Differences among the three Angolan liberation organizations were something normal and could have been reconciled by them through peaceful consultations...These actions of the Soviet leadership have fully revealed its true features as social imperialism.\textsuperscript{77}

We say it is ahistorical because the history of the October Revolution demonstrated that the contradictions between the Bolscheviks and the Mensheviks could not be reconciled by peaceful means. By the same token the history of the Chinese Revolution teaches us that the contradictions between the Communist Party of China and the Koumintang could not be reconciled by peaceful means. So, may we ask why and how it occurred to the Chinese theoreticians/historians that the contradictions between the MPLA on the one side and FNLA and UNITA on the other could be reconciled? The Chinese position is theoretically bankrupt for the simple reason that as a theory it fails to come to grips with the concrete reality of Angola which it attempted to explain. Here, the contradictions between MPLA and the other two parties were and still are antagonistic and hence irreconcilable. Understandably, the Chinese misreading of the situation is the direct result of the deductive reasoning of the "Theory of the Three Worlds" discussed in Chapter Two.

\textsuperscript{77}Quoted in Colin Legum, "Foreign Intervention in Angola," p. 22.
There are some suspicions that the meeting of the foreign policies of the United States and China on Angola was the result of concerted efforts by both. As Arthur Jay Klinghoffer put it:

Angolan policies were coordinated in Zaire as early as mid 1974 and were probably discussed when Kissinger visited China in November. Contacts continued in 1975, with American liaison officer, George Bush playing an important role in Peking. Kissinger was in China in October 19-23, 1975 just before Angolan independence and he was there again with President Ford in December 1-5, 1975.78

Although China finally decided to withdraw its support of the FNLA and UNITA, and retracted from its alliance with U.S. imperialism, Apartheid South Africa, Zaire, and others, it did so only after losing its credibility.

Reasons for Soviet Intervention in the Angolan Civil War

The question posed at the beginning of this chapter, "Was the foreign policy of the Soviet Union motivated by the principle of assistance to and unity with the workers of Angola and their vanguard party MPLA?", goes directly to the constitutional blueprint laid out by the CPSU. Article 28 of the 1977 Soviet constitution reads:

The USSR steadfastly pursues a Leninist policy of peace and stands for strengthening the security of nation's and broad international cooperation. The foreign policy of the USSR is aimed at ensuring international conditions favorable for building communism

78 Klinghoffer, The Angolan War, p. 104.
in the USSR, safeguarding the state interests of the Soviet Union, consolidating the positions of world socialism, supporting the struggle of people for national liberation and social progress, preventing wars of aggression, achieving universal and complete disarmament and consistently implementing the principle of the peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems.\(^7\)

The Article recognizes the dialectical relationship between the world political atmosphere and conditions with the building of communism in the USSR. That is, the more countries choose socialism for their socio-economic and political development, the more secure communism is in the Soviet Union. Conversely, the more subversive activities are perpetrated against these countries the more threatened communism would be in the Soviet Union. Hence the Soviets' commitment to support countries struggling to build socialism in their countries and those fighting for national liberation. By so doing the Soviet Union is advancing its national interest. In this case the **core interest** of the first type of the Soviet Union, i.e. maintaining its territorial integrity and its national identity is organically linked to the strength of socialism and communism the world over. Here we see the complimentarity of **core interest** and **middle range interest** of the third category of the Soviet Union's foreign policy! This is the case

\(^7\)Halliday, *Soviet Policy in the Arc of Crisis*, p. 27.
with the foreign policy of the United States as well.

However, this is not to deny the fact that Soviets' assistance is limited to countries which consider themselves "socialist" or which are labeled by Soviet theoreticians as "socialist oriented" (case amply discussed in Chapter Three). By the same token Soviet assistance to liberation movements like the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) led by Joshua Nkomo was not dictated by ideology but rather, was motivated by its contest with China and the West.

How is Angola different? There are many theories advanced for the Soviet Union's intervention in Angola on the side of the MPLA. The dominant ones, however, are the ones that argue that the Soviet Union intervened to challenge Chinese and U.S. influence. Africa Confidential argues that, "it saw an opportunity to counter U.S. and Chinese success elsewhere in Africa with the added possibility of advancing Moscow's ideological and probably military position in Africa." Arthur J. Klinghoffer contends that, "the Soviet Union's actions in Angola were responsive to China, which was undermining the MPLA by its support for breakaway factions of that movement and by its aid to FNLA and UNITA." 

81 Klinghoffer, The Angolan War, p. 102.
The same author in another chapter speculates on Soviet motives arguing that maybe, after all, the Soviet Union's involvement was to create "a string of Marxist states across South Central Africa and isolating the non-Marxist governments of Zaire and Zambia which had engaged in dialogue with South Africa." 82

In a commentary entitled "Angola, Its Friends and Enemies," Izvestia depicts the Soviets' assistance to the MPLA as dictated by the principle of internationalism, and also by the decisions of the United Nations and the request of the Organization of African Unity. 83 In response to Kissinger's accusation of sending immense quantities of arms and large expenditure forces to affect far-off events and dominate helpless people, 84 Brezhnev retorted:

We do not hide our views. In the developing countries, as everywhere, we are on the side of the forces of progress and democracy and national independence and we treat them as our friends and comrades in arms. 85

At another occasion, in response to Kissinger, who not only accused but also warned the Soviet Union and Cuba for "their wanton disregard for the interest of others and

82 Ibid.
84 Gavshon, Crisis in Africa, p. 223.
85 Ibid., pp. 223-224.
for the cause of world peace," Brezhnev replied:

Our party is rendering and will render support to peoples who are fighting for their freedom. We are acting as our revolutionary conscience and our communist convictions permit us.87

Leonid Brezhnev may say that. However, the experience of the MPLA with the Soviet Union disproves that assertion. It is a well known fact that Moscow had suspended its assistance to MPLA, between 1972-73, and switched to Daniel Chipenda, a leader of a splinter group of the MPLA who later joined the FNLA, for the simple reason that Neto, the leader of MPLA started manifesting nationalistic tendencies.88

The United States has made it a habit of drawing world public opinion to the principles and objectives of detente in its relation with the Soviet Union, especially when day to day developments in the world arena do not reflect and/or fall in line with its interests. Alleging that Soviet involvement in Angola is a threat to detente, Secretary Kissinger said:

The United States holds the view that the essence of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, if it is to proceed toward a genuine easing of tensions, is that neither side will seek to obtain unilateral advantage

---

86 Ibid., p. 224.
87 Ibid.
88 Colin Legum, "Foreign Intervention in Angola," p. 11.
vis-a-vis the other...the United States considers such action (Soviet intervention) incompatible with a genuine relaxation of tensions.89

Responding to Kissinger's allegation, the then leading theoretician of the CPSU, the late Michael Suslov, said:

No one seeks to deny that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries render moral and material assistance to the Angolan people and its vanguard, the MPLA. This assistance contributed to the success of the Angolan patriots in their armed struggle against colonial rule and now helps them defend the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of their country. As for the contention voiced from time to time, even by responsible Western government leaders, that this policy does not accord with the spirit of detente, it only testifies to a false understanding of the meaning of detente which never implied and cannot imply giving a free hand to aggression.90

The ideological explanation could only give a sneak preview of the intentions and motives of the Soviet Union. One should not lose sight of this country's national interest. As stated earlier, "the Soviet Union, just as all literal and hinterland countries, is interested in the safety of sea routes passing through the Indian Ocean." The safety of the sea routes can only be maintained through naval and military presence in the so-called allied or


90 Quoted in Gavshon, Crisis in Africa, p. 225.
friendly littoral countries, via, Libya, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola, the Congo Peoples Republic and Guinea. The competition for controlling the sea-lanes could not be looked at in isolation from the strategic mineral resources found within the parameter of these lanes. Although the Soviet Union is the largest oil producer in the world, it has found it more profitable to import from Iraq and Iran, as the location of the oil resources in these countries are much closer to the areas of their industries than their own.91

There may not be disagreement in the assertion that Soviet's presence in South Yemen, Ethiopia and Mozambique is motivated by its geopolitical concern. Its presence in Angola, however, is multi-purpose. National resources and strategic location are of paramount importance in Soviet thought and planning. Springing from Angola's experience and many other flashpoints where the contention for strategic materials is raging fiercely, Michale T. Klare said:

Not only must we (they) worry about conflict and instability in many key producing areas, but also about possible Soviet efforts to seize control of these supplies. Some observers, including Haig believe that the Soviets have a long-term plan to overwhelm the 'resource lines of the Western world.'92

91 Halliday, Soviet Policy in the Arc of Crisis, pp. 46-47.

Sub-Saharan Africa is a region where the contention between the two superpowers has become very obvious. Writing on the importance of the region and its resources to the West, Klare notes:

For those who fear a Soviet or insurgent threat to Western minerals supplies, no area is of greater concern than sub-Saharan Africa. This region, encompassing some of the most prolific concentrations of minerals in the world, now supplies much of the West’s cobalt, manganese, chromium and platinum. Long troubled by racial, political, and tribal unrest, the area is now expected to experience a fresh outbreak of insurgent conflict—accompanied, perhaps, by direct confrontation between the superpowers and their allies and proxies. And quoting Kissinger who said ‘should future trends... result in alignment with Moscow of this critical resource area, the USSR would control as much as 90 percent of several key minerals for which no substitutes have been developed and the loss of which could bring the severest consequences to the existing economic and security framework of the free world.’

Making use of our "logical propositions" and "psychological explanation" and deriving from Brucan’s theory of scarce resources as reasons of conflict, we would conclude that Soviet intervention in Angola was motivated by its desire to control the sea-lanes and strategic materials, which all contribute not only to its core interest but to its middle range interest of the third category as well. One can raise a somewhat logically sound question that since

---

93 Ibid., pp. 56-57.
the Soviet Union, the United States, China and the rest are endowed with scarce natural resources, could Brucan's theory be applicable to them? Libya and Chad could also be included in that concern. However, it should be indubitably clear that Brucan's theory springs from the dialectical assumption that all kinds of resources, be they scarce or otherwise, are depletable. Hence the logical need to reserve or save the local resources for all eventualities and scramble for the ones that are found in the developing world which are not exploited for local use and are sold at cheaper prices.

Gabriel Garcia contends that the first contact between Cuba and MPLA took place in 1965 when Che Guevara was [dispensing his selfless and principled internationalist duty] in the Congo (now Zaire) in August 1965.94 Ever since then Cuba's assistance to the MPLA has grown with the intensity and magnitude of the latter's struggle for liberation against Portuguese colonialism. Arthur Gavshon says that about "100 Cubans had been aiding the MPLA in Angola since the early 1960's, just as the others were helping FNLA and UNITA."95 With the transformation of the guerrilla war into a complex conventional war over the

95Gavshon, Crisis in Africa," p. 229.
establishment of the government of Angola, and where many countries, responding to their national interest, were escalating the war, the Cuban government found itself compelled to extend its assistance to its comrades-in-arms. President Castro is quoted as saying:

We simply could not sit back when the MPLA asked us for help. We gave MPLA the necessary assistance to prevent a people fighting for independence for almost 14 years from being crushed. It was our elementary duty, our revolutionary duty, our internationalist duty to give that assistance to MPLA regardless of the price.  

Depicting the reality of the intricate situation and the timing of Cuba's intervention, Gavshon said that "Soviet arms and Cuban troops began flooding into Angola after Zaire, China, South Africa, and the Americans became involved." There are those who try to point out a discrepancy between Cuba's economic and military capability and the "adventurist risks" it takes in far away places like Angola and Ethiopia. Hence they argue that the Cubans are only "surrogates" of the Soviet Union. The Chinese government is quoted as saying:

In four war operations - twice in Zaire and once each in Angola and the Horn of Africa - Cuba had played the role of 'hatchet man' in suppressing national liberation movements. It served as

96 Wolfers and Bergerol, Angola in the Frontline, p. 30.
97 Gavshon, Crisis in Africa, p. 227.
catspaw of Soviet social imperialism in (its) attempt to dominate the African continent and Soviet places of strategic importance.98

In Chapter Three, where we discussed Cuba's reasons for her participation in the war between Somalia and Ethiopia, it was pointed out that Cuba's and the Soviet Union's objectives may be "harmonious" but not "synonymous." Expressing the independent actions of his government with respect to its policies in Angola, President Castro declared:

The USSR is extraordinarily respectful and careful in its relations with Cuba. A decision of that nature could only be made by our own party...The decision to give military assistance to Angola was taken by Cuba completely independently. The Soviet Union never approached us with a request to send a single Cuban soldier.99

Strengthening Castro's declaration, William Minter said that Cuba's cooperation with the Soviet Union does not and cannot imply that it is acting on its behalf. The fact that it has been supporting liberation movements throughout the Third World attest to its commitment to internationalism.100

An example is the case when the Cubans and the Soviets

99 Klinghoffer, The Angolan War, p. 119.
took opposing stands in Zimbabwe, where Cuba was supporting ZANU and the Soviet Union supported ZAPU. Thus it can be argued that Cuba's actions in Angola were not dictated by the Soviet Union, but rather derived from its own solidarity with the Angolan revolutionary movement and, of course, its concern with U.S. imperialism. The latter confrontation will now be examined.

Cognizant of the economic, political and strategic interest of the United States, the Cuban Communist Party must have entertained the possibility of a confrontation between them. This presumably had been discussed by the Politbureau on the eve of its participation in the war. Writing on the meeting and analyzing the opinion of the politbureau members, Garcia wrote:

The U.S. had just freed itself from the morass of Vietnam and the Watergate scandal. It had a president no one had elected. The CIA was under fire in Congress and rated low in public opinion. The U.S. needed to avoid seeming - not only in the eyes of African countries but especially in the eyes of the American Blacks - to ally itself with racist South Africa. Besides all this was in the midst of an election campaign in its Bicentennial Year. Furthermore, Cuba was sure it could count on the solidarity and material aid of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries although it was also aware of the implications its actions might hold for the policy of peaceful co-existence and international detente. 101

101 Quoted in Gavshon, Crisis in Africa, p. 249.
It was a scientific analysis where all the objective factors were taken into consideration. The correctness of the diagnosis was witnessed in the absence of confrontation from the United States which could only verbally threaten it of potential reprisal. U.S. frustration was also witnessed in the U.N. Security Council when it repeatedly vetoed Angola's application for membership to the world body.

In closing, this sub-topic, we would like to answer the question raised at the outset of this chapter - could we equate Cuba's participation in the war with that of a mercenary? The answer is clearly no. There is a principled and hence a genuine distinction between Cuba's participation in the war from that of mercenary. While the Cubans believe they were sacrificing the blood and lives of their children for a just war and noble cause, the motto and motive of a mercenary is and always will be money!

Antagonistic Foreign Policies and Their Contribution to the Creation of Displaced People in Zaire and Angola

It is our hypothesis that antagonistic foreign policies are the causes for displacing Angolans into Zaire and Zaireans into Angola. Could this simply be an assertion? Could there be other factors like famine/drought and economic necessity that contributed to the displacement of the peoples in the region?

Since Angola is one of the most critically drought
affected countries (see Annex V) and Zaire is not, the concern is a justified one. However a chronological study of the situation would exonerate our contention.

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in its report to the United Nations said "a reassessment by the Government of Angola of Zairean refugees adjusted the total to 20,000 including some previously assisted by UNHCR."\textsuperscript{102} UNHCR Information: Zaire on giving the number of refugees in Zaire said, "The total number of refugees in Zaire is 305,000. The largest group (some 215,000) are from Angola and have taken refuge in Lower Zaire, Kinshasa, Bandundu and Shaba."\textsuperscript{103} And this is obvious that the Angolans fled to Zaire and vice versa between 1975-1976 when the civil war in Angola was at its height and that Zaire was participating in the war. We have to point out, however, that Zaireans have also been displaced in Angola as a result of the "pacification" measures taken by the Zairean army. Africa Research Bulletin illuminates our contention when it said that over 700,000 displaced Angolans in Zaire and 500,000 in Zaire could only exacerbate the tension between the two countries.\textsuperscript{104}

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{103}]UNHCR Information: Zaire 5 (February 1984), p. 1.
\end{itemize}
This was to manifest itself when a well-trained force of between 3,500 to 6,000 the Congolese National Liberation Front (FNLC) who were in exile in Angola, invaded the Shaba province of Zaire on two occasions. Christopher Stevens contends that Angola provided logistical support while the Soviets and the Cubans provided the arms and training respectively. Angola was only paying back in kind for Zaire's assistance to FNLA, UNITA and FLEC. Writing on what had been done to lessen tensions between the two countries, Africa Report said:

President Mobutu's reconciliation with Angola's late President Agostino Neto and the repatriation of approximately 150,000 Zaireans who had fled into Angola during the Shaba wars helped ease tension in Southern Shaba.

What we can deduce from this is 1) the unpatriated Zaireans who chose to remain in Angola are some of the political refugees, the Congolese National Liberation Front (FNLC) and their supporters and 2) the majority of the repatriated people - 150,000 are only displaced people and hence did not hesitate to go back to their country.

In answering the question could famine/drought

Contribute to the displacement of Angolans into Zaire, we would argue as follows: chronologically speaking famine/drought is a phenomena that hit Angola in the 1980s and the displacement of Angolans they were sacrificing the blood and and late 1970s.

Another reason why we argue in the negative is that like the Chadian drought victims who chose to relocate themselves within their own country, so also Angola's drought victims. African Emergency Facts: Angola said:

Some 500,000 people are estimated to be in critical need of assistance, mainly in the Northern, Central and Southern provinces. The 1984 drought caused massive displacement from agricultural areas to urban centers, roads and railway lines. 108

Hence, the fact that there is a chronological difference between the occurences of the civil war and drought, and also due to the fact that Angolans have preferred to displace or resettle within their own country strengthens our contention that antagonistic foreign policies and the ensuing war and civil war are the causes for the displacement of Angolans into Zaire and vice versa.

CHAPTER V

FOREIGN INTERFERENCE AND THE CREATION OF DISPLACED
PEOPLE IN CHAD

At the outset, we should note that the dearth of materials and information on the problem at hand has curtailed the scope and ambition of this study. However, it is safe to assert that it is one of the tension areas on the continent which has been neglected by scholars. The intricate and complex nature of Chadian national problems should have aroused their intellectual appetite. This did not occur. After all, we should not be surprised for most scholars of African politics are only journalists by another name whose scholarly zeal is either to romanticize and/or dramatize problem areas that only involve the superpowers directly.

One of the underlining reasons for the political problems in Chad is the unwarranted interference by Libya, France, Sudan, Egypt, the United States and others* in the internal affairs of that country, the raison d'etre being that their national interest, i.e. territorial security

*Countries like Nigeria, Zaire and others have also interfered in Chad.
economic, or geopolitical interests are threatened. Their utter disregard for the well-being of the Chadian people and most of all for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity - the sovereign equality of all Member States, non-interference in the internal affairs of states and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence - have contributed to the many thousands of lives lost and over 250,000 displaced people created.¹

An objective study of the case would require raising the following pertinent question: What are the reasons for Libya's interference in Chadian internal affairs? Are there discrepancies between government pronouncement and actual deeds? If so why? What are the reasons for France's interference in Chadian internal affairs? Are the threats allegedly posed by Libya detrimental to France's interests? If so, in what way? What are the reasons for Sudan's interference in the internal affairs of Chad? Does Libya's interference in Chad pose a potential threat to the territorial integrity of Sudan? What are the reasons for Egypt's interference in the internal affairs of Chad? Is there any relationship between its interference in Chad and

¹International Conference on Assistance to Refugees (ICARA) 9-10 April 1981.
its 1977 war with Libya? What were the reasons for the U.S. to interfere in Chadian politics? Are there any relations between its intervention in Chad and its politico-military activities in the region as a whole? It is assumed that to entertain these questions would give us a vivid picture of the motives and objectives behind their interference.

Having said that, we start by giving a short political history of Chad with the intention of exposing the root cause of the problems. Then we will try to answer the questions raised above.

Chad Under French Colonialism

Although a landlocked country, Chad is strategically located sharing borders with six countries. To the north it is bordered by Libya, to the east by Sudan, to the south by the Central African Republic, to the southwest by Cameroon, to the west by Nigeria and Niger. The mere fact that it shares borders with six countries and the fact that it had not had a stable socioeconomic and political system had been a nightmare to the advocates of the "domino-theory." The subversion of Chad or a revolution "exported" from Libya will only be a matter of time before it engulfs its neighbors. Writing from this vein, Africa magazine asserts that because of its "strategic position in the heart of Africa, Chad's internal problems take on a regional, even
Chad was a victim of French colonialism from 1900 to 1960 and a neo-colony since then. The dependent nature of this socioeconomic and political relation should be held responsible for its quagmire. However, Samuel Decalo makes only a passing remark to the problems generated by colonialism and emphasizes the artificiality of Chad's colonial boundaries, its immense size, its unfavorable geographical location and economic non-viability as the root cause for center-periphery strife. Although these are factors that have to be reckoned with, it is clear that French colonialism is responsible for the frame of Chad's boundaries and the anatomy of its constituent parts. In other words, today's Chad is a creation and a product of French colonialism. Hence the factors listed above are only manifestations of lingering neocolonialism.

The theory of dependency states that the problems of the Third World countries, be they economic, political, social, cultural, or otherwise are the product of the historical and structural linkage between their economies and those of the developed world countries. Paul Baran,

---


the harbinger of the theory argues that Western capitalism was responsible for destroying the socioeconomic institutions of what he refers to as the "backward areas." He contends that the lamentable situation that is prevalent in these areas resulted from this intrusion. In his words,

Western capitalism failed to improve materially the lot of the peoples inhabiting most backward areas, it accomplished something that profoundly affects the social and political conditions...it introduced there, with amazing rapidity, all the economic and social tensions inherent in the capitalist order.4

The other eminent scholar of this school of thought, Andre G. Frank, in his now classic article, "The Development of Underdevelopment," argues strongly that the underdevelopment of peripheral nations cannot be understood if divorced from the development of metropolitan/colonizing countries. He notes:

Yet historical research demonstrated that contemporary underdevelopment is in large part the historical product of past and continuing economic and other relations between the satellite underdeveloped and the now metropolitan countries. Furthermore, these relations are an essential part of the structure and development of the capitalist system on a world scale.5


Yet a third scholar, Keith Griffin writes:

It is our belief that underdeveloped countries as we observe them today are a product of historical forces, especially of those forces released by European expansion and world ascendancy. Thus, they are a relatively recent phenomenon. Europe did not 'discover' the underdeveloped countries, on the contrary she created them.6

What has been the consequence of this dependence on the economies of the African countries? As African countries had forfeited the autonomy of the development of their productive forces, their economies have been relegated to the role of subserviency. Such role is limited to providing the colonial countries with raw materials and a dumping ground (market) for the finished products of these countries. Lopsided and uneven development became the order of the day.

How do we relate this theory to the Chadian case? The colonizer preferring the economically most rewarding and profitable region established its politico-economic center in the south.7 The result was the dislocation of the national economy and disparity in the economic development of the regions. Worst of all, the country became a producer of cotton for export to the metropole, thereby becoming a one-crop economy. This point is stressed by Decalo when he says,

6Griffin, "Underdevelopment in History," in Ibid., p. 81.
7Decalo, "Chad: The Roots of Center-Periphery Strife," p. 492.
Classified by the United Nations as one of the world's twenty-five least developed countries...the country's main cash crop is cotton cultivated in the south accounting for up to eighty percent of Chad's exports.8

And writing on the uneven development of the regions he observed:

In the extremely sparsely-populated desert northern half of Chad reside the semi-nomadic and fiercely independent Toubou...strenuously resisting the French intrusion into the region...and they were not completely pacified until the 1920s. Totally outside the mainstream of political and economic life until their rebellion in the mid 1960s, the Toubou had been virtually left alone by the French.9

What about the politics of the country? Although many scholars tend to question the validity of the theory which argues that the superstructure of a country, i.e. the politics, culture, education, religion, philosophy, etc. is in most instances a reflection of the economic base of that country, the Chadian case indubitably confirms its applicability. Sixty years of French colonialism had not been able to create a government which could transcend parochialism and bring the ethnically, religiously and regionally polarized people together to forge unity and nation-building. In fact animosity, regionalism, ethnicity remained prevalent. Samuel Decalo declared,

---

8 Ibid., p. 496.
9 Ibid., pp. 493-494.
French rule did not, however, result in a strong centralizing administration that might have alleviated centre-periphery tensions and external counter pulls, and soothed regionalist sentiments and inter-ethnic animosities...the contending political poles and their ethnic bases remained virtually intact.10

What about the culture of the country? The motives of colonialism are not only the domination of the politics and economics of a country but also the disorientation and control of the mind and cultural aspect of the petty bourgeoisie leadership. It is believed that the control of the mind and culture of the people facilitates the creation of a "Frenchman," an "Englishman," or "Portugueseman" out of the African, the Asian and any other people that is a victim of colonialism. The purpose being that the victim robbed of his/her heritage and disarmed of his/her consciousness would become docile and subservient. John Daniel in his article, "The Culture of Dependency and Political Education in Africa," eloquently argued how colonialism managed to suppress and control the minds and culture of African people. He observed:

It must be remembered, however, that capitalism is not just a political and economic system. It is also a cultural system with a distinctive set of values whose absorption are no less essential to the effective functioning of the system...they are antithetical to the corporate and communal values of pre-capitalist or traditional Africa. Africa's penetration by capitalism therefore precipitated a large-scale cultural encounter between two sets of

10Ibid., p. 495.
contradictory value systems, and initiated a relentless and multifaceted assault upon Africa's non-capitalist values...their attack upon African culture was prompted by their ideological stance which regarded European culture 'as the ultimate refinement and repository of all human excellence, virtue and industry'...the primary actor in this assault was naturally the colonial regime operating in collusion with such auxiliaries and the missionary, the trader and the educator...the missionary, both in the role of the preacher and educator, attacked virtually every aspect of African culture: African religion was branded as barbaric, ancestral beliefs were condemned as witchcraft...however, it was a system that served two of the ends of colonial capitalism. First it separated the knowledge of his own history and culture, his legends and his customs. What it taught him alienated him from his community and transformed him into an individual in the mould of colonizer...second like the church, the school proclaimed capitalist values while also importing the basic literacy and simple technical skills required for the servicing of the lower echelons of the economy and administrative superstructure.11

Chad is a microcosm of this cultural colonialism which was the order of the day of Francophone colonial Africa. As we have pointed out above, French colonialism established its politico-economic center in the south where the "Sara clans" were found to be friendly and amenable to foreign culture and intrusion. Thus becoming the people upon whom was bestowed the responsibility of administering the country during the transition period from

colonialism to neo-colonialism. Decalo writing on this topic said:

Largely animist - though Christianity has made its deepest inroads among them during this century - the Sara were the main group that grasped with any avidity whatever meagre opportunities were presented them for upward mobility by the colonial power, to emerge eventually as the economic mainstay, and the political center of power of Chad, until the recent upheavals in N'djamena.¹²

In bringing this topic to a conclusion, we would like to affirm that it was French colonialism that is the culprit for the situation that Chad finds itself in. We would also like, however, to point out that the factors discussed by Decalo have aggravated the problem of nation-building.

In his own words, Decalo had said that the regime of President Tombalbaye had inherited a polarized and inherently unstable society with a weak administrative apparatus only to exacerbate the already tense inter-ethnic and regional frictions.¹³ It is hoped that this short colonial history of the country would assist us in understanding the subsequent civil strife which is the cause for continuing displaced people's problems in the region.

¹²Decalo, "Chad: The Roots of Center-Periphery Strife," p. 492.

¹³Ibid., p. 499.
Foreign Interference in Chad

As the above two chapters have indicated, interference in the internal affairs of another country presupposes the presence of an actual and/or potential political problem between the government and some dissident groups who are disenchanted with the way things are. The problems range from demanding autonomy for their regions, out-and-out secession, resisting unwarranted oppression, alienation, etc, thus making it easier for the interferers to take advantage of these problems. They do this, initially, by extending material and diplomatic support to the dissidents and finally, by taking active part in the war and exacerbating the situation.

This has been the experience of Chad where its northern neighbor interfered in its internal affairs claiming that the inter-ethnic strife that was going on in the country was pushing it to disintegration.

The problems that exploded in late 1960 were simmering during the colonial era. That abominable social system had degraded the people socially, exploited them economically, alienated them culturally and suppressed them politically. It was just a matter of time before it exploded. This it did during the neo-colonial status of the country when the petty bourgeois leadership, incompetent and filled with disdain for the people, continued from where the colonial administration left. Constituted mostly of the educated
Saran people, the government of President Tombalbaye aggravated the already tense and polarized society. Decalo, writing on Tombalbaye's government said:

In embarking upon a policy of wide-scale repression, constant purges, constitutional and electoral manipulations, and the centralization of all authority in his own hands. Tombalbaye confused, however, the substance and myths of state power, grossly overestimating his control of the former and underestimating the fragility of the ethnic and centre-periphery status-quo inherited at independence...Thus, though the regime certainly inherited a deeply splinterized and inherently unstable society and a weak administrative apparatus, the policies that emanated from N'djamena - practically from independence - exacerbated existing inter-ethnic and regional frictions and set the stage for the violence that was to erupt in full force in the mid-1960s.14

The political history of revolutions teaches us that wherever there is repression there is resistance. And it is only a matter of time before uprisings - spontaneous or otherwise - take place. So in 1975 a military coup took place claiming the life of the President. Apparently the military was convinced that the problems confronting Tombalbaye's government were overwhelming. They perceived a dangerously high number of dissident movements threatening the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. And these were the direct result of the inefficient and corrupt administration of the government. And thus it had

14Ibid., p. 492.
to go. Colin Legum et al. point out that there were

ten political and military movements in Chad:

- GUNT - Gouvernement d'Union Nationale Transitoire
- FAN - Forces Armees du Nord
- FAT - Forces Armees Tchadiennes
- FAP - Forces Armees Populaires
- CDR - Conseil Democratique Revolutionnaire
- FPL - Forces Populaires de Liberation
- ANI - Armee Nationale Integree
- MPN - Mouvement Patriotique National
- MPLT - Mouvement Populaire de Liberation du Tchad
- RNDP - National Democratic and People's Party

Unlike the cases with Ethiopia and Angola where the
number of dissident groups are fewer, the Chadian situation
depicts an alarming number of centrifugal forces who had
fallen prey to outside parties thereby facilitating inter-
erference in the internal affairs of their country.

**Libya in Chad**

Different theories have been expounded on why Libya
chose to intervene in the Chadian internal affairs. Two such
theories have been propounded by Colonel Gaddafi while a
third was advanced by *Africa* magazine.

Gaddafi, on January 29, 1981, advanced his first
theory when he told the Libyan Congress in Tripoli that his
policy of intervention in Chad was prompted by historical
links and concern for Libyan security.

---

15 Colin Legum, et al., "Chad: Libya Moves Out," *Africa*
Contemporary Record (New York: Africana Publishing Co.,
Libya had intervened militarily in Chad in response to Frolinat,* ending the war which lasted many years and resolving the conflict in Chad in the interest of the friendly forces and the people's forces represented by Frolinat which led the armed struggle for 20 years and defeated the racist and reactionary forces and imperialism backing them. For the secession led by Habre had behind it Sadat, his stooge, Nimeiri, and French agents in Africa... the war in Chad was against the Jamahiriya... we have crossed the border in self-defense when an act of force was used to impose a pro-imperialism regime hostile to the Chadian people. The complete mass unity between the two countries, based on people's power as stipulated in the joint Libyan-Chadian statement, is not like the familiar constitutional political unity. For there is a very historical and interaction between the Libyan and Chadian peoples, and between the Chadian people and the Arab nation, and the borders are open between the two countries. The Chadian people are similar to the Sudanese people in makeup. For there is a large proportion of Arabs among the Chadian people. Eastern and southeastern Chad is entirely Arab and a large section of the Chadian people are Arab by origin and race, while the overwhelming number are Muslim and Arab culture is the prevailing culture in Chad. The Chadian people have a specificity very different from all Black African people. A very large number of Libyans emigrated to Chad, settled there and became Chadians. Similarly a very large number of Chadian people are at present in Libya.15

Colonel Gaddafi has raised two very important points: the threat or potential threat to the security of Libya and

---


*Frolinat: Chad National Liberation Front is the umbrella of some of the military movements which forged unity: the leader then was Goukouni Oueddei.
the cultural-historical ties argument.

The purpose of these arguments, it would appear, was to appeal to the patriotism of the Libyan people and obtain their unconditional support for his military venture in Chad. A professor who had been in Libya during the height of the war told me that it had worked. He said that it had worked not only in involving and motivating the layman on the street but also university professors and teachers with whom he had a chance to discuss the situation. Thus giving Gaddafi the support he needed to pursue his military objectives in Chad. The fact that he had enemies in Sadat and Nimeiri, of Egypt and Sudan respectively, had easily penetrated the minds of the people with regard to the threat or potential threat to Libya's territorial integrity. The "historico-cultural ties" argument had easily mobilized the Libyan people. Gaddafi also said that he needed to protect those Libyans who had emigrated to Chad. A contemporary historical parallel would be that of the Reagan administration's argument that it intervened in Grenada because there was a threat to the "safety and security" of American students on the island. In both instances, i.e. Gaddafi and Reagan succeeded in obtaining the support of the majority of their people. However, this should not stop us from searching the actual underlying motive.

In defense of his second theory, Gaddafi insisted that
Libya's was invited by the "legitimate leader of Chad Goukouni Oueddei." Granted that the right to collective self-defense is protected by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, Libya's presence in Chad calls for further investigation and one should not take any official pronouncement at face value.

Africa magazine, advancing the "all inclusive" theory, said that "Gaddafi's foreign policy has three officially stated objectives...These are Arab unity, Islamic solidarity and a revolutionary Third World and African alliance." Assuming that Libya's involvement in Chad is explainable by any or all three objectives, the question that arises is whether the intended Islamic unity and/or solidarity is compatible with the unity of the Chadian people. In passing, it must be noted that there are Muslims, Christians and people of other creeds and religions.

What then are the motives of Gaddafi in Chad? Colin Legum writing about him said:

Not since the late Dr. Kwame Nkrumah's heyday in the early 1960s has an African leader embarked so openly on a campaign to subverting governments in the name of 'revolution and anti-imperialism' as has the Libyan leader; but, unlike Nkrumah, Gaddafi has immense riches to promote his aims and religious cause.

---

Can these allegations be substantiated? To do so, one must examine Colonel Gaddafi's record and its major foreign policy decisions as they relate to other African countries. His overt support for opposition elements in Senegal and Gambia and his training of a 5,000 man Islamic Legion to advance his foreign policy objectives provoked these countries to break diplomatic relations with Libya in 1980.²⁰ His distaste for Sadat, the late President of Egypt, and Nimieri of Sudan is an open secret. Nimieri, on many occasions, has accused Gaddafi of fomenting subversion and had implicated him in many of the aborted coups d'etat against him. The 1977 war between Egypt and Libya in which instance Sadat claimed to have taught Gaddafi "a lesson he will never forget,"²¹ should refresh our memory of Gaddafi's relation with Sadat. His relation with President Habib Bourgiba of Tunisia was not different. It was filled with friction and contempt. After the discovery of a Libyan arms cache in southern Tunisia in 1978, Bourgiba accused Gaddafi of trying to overthrow his regime.²²

²⁰Ibid., p. A37.


Gaddafi's objectives in Chad are not, in essence, very different from those of Somalia in Ethiopia and Zaire in Angola. It is his desire to incorporate the Aouzou strip of northern Chad, rich in natural resources, to his territory. And to that end, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Libya had produced a map, as early as 1976, showing the Aouzou strip being part and parcel of Libyan territory as set by the Mussolini-Laval agreement. Jingoist and expansionist as the policy was, the Chadian people felt that their patriotism was being tested. They expressed their commitment to the unity and territorial integrity of their country by holding a demonstration unparalleled in their recent history. In his address to the demonstrators, President Felix Malloum warned that "Libya's annexationist designs do not stop at Aouzou. Libya has also made violent attacks against Baradai, Zouar and Ouinanga in northern Chad."  

What we are witnessing, in this case, is not only the expressed intention of Libya's expansionist policy classified as core objective of the second type by K.J. Holsti, but also the Chadian wish to defend its territorial integrity by all means as expressed by President Malloum, his core interest and principal priority. In addition, we have


been able to ascertain Brucan's theory of scarce resources and the scramble for them as the main reason for conflicts between states.

Gaddafi has manifested his drive to incorporate the Aouzou strip in many and various ways. His intense desire and impulsive ambition to expand his domain and thereby enhance his reputation could be proven by recalling his failed policies of merger with Egypt, Syria and Tunisia. His move to Chad, therefore, while not a new policy was dictated by opportunism. It happened during the time when Chad was going through an internal crisis and was very weak to defend its territorial integrity. Political realism, as it is said, is the antithesis of idealism and that romanticism has no place. Somalia did it when Ethiopia was going through its internal turmoil and Zaire did it when the internecine war in Angola was at its height. So why should we expect Libya to do otherwise?

The only difference between the Libyan leader and the others is that, at times, he would manifest statesmanship and at other times, its opposite. Part of his statement quoted in Africa magazine reads:

Libya and Chad announced that they were going toward complete unity between the two countries, a unity of the masses in which the power, the wealth and the arms will be in the hands of the people and its instruments, the Congress and the people's committees.25

At other times he would simply say, short of unity, Libya would not settle unless, at least, it incorporates the Aouzou strip.\(^{26}\) His obsession with the Aouzou strip was so great that he is believed to have bought it from President Tombalbaye for 23,000 mCFA.\(^{27}\) In addition, Gaddafi is believed to have "supported a number of factions in past years in the hope that they would eventually acquiesce to the Libyan occupation of the reportedly uranium rich Aouzou strip."\(^{28}\)

It would be a justifiable question to ask why the acquisition of the Aouzou strip and other naturally rich regions become his paramount policy. What were the motives? He had made no secret about his drive to unite with or conquer states that have areas endowed with natural resources. His conflict with Tunisia over offshore oil rights in the Gulf of Ghabes is only one of its kind.\(^{29}\) His announced merger with and/or threat to annex northern Chad, the Aouzou strip, reputed for its oil and uranium is another. *Africa Confidential* reported that by 1978 Chad


\(^{28}\) "Libya Persistent Intervention," p. 6.

would produce enough oil to become an exporter, thus further enhancing Gaddafi's determination to annex the strip. Another country where Gaddafi's eyes are focused is Niger and its uranium rich region which he has displayed an unmitigated desire to conquer.  

Libya, a country with barely 4,000,000 people, lacks almost all the elements of power that we had outlined in Chapter Two. Gaddafi, however, seems to be oblivious of these facts. With the incessant accumulation of all kinds of arms from both the East and the West, he is playing senseless power politics. The danger, however, is that he will psyche himself to the point where he would provoke a war with a superpower like the United States as he once did or any of the middle powers and the consequence would be what he had never expected. It goes without saying that the security of the smaller countries around Libya is constantly threatened. Extending a helping hand to those who need it - as he once did to the former President of Uganda, Idi Amin - is part of his unrehearsed and spontaneous policy decisions.

What do we make out of all this? Well, it seems to us that there is a confusion between what the interest of the

---


31"Libya Persistent Intervention," p. 7.
Libyan people and those of the person Gaddafi. Which is paramount? We have no reason to doubt that he is doing all this with the intention of securing and advancing Libya's national interest. But since the outcome has been the alienation of Libya from the community of nations, a reappraisal and reevaluation of the priorities of the national interest of Libya is in order! Having done that, then Colonel Gaddafi can define his role to jibe with and advance that national interest of his fatherland. We earnestly believe that Gaddafi's incessant desire to be a member of the nuclear powers - for which purpose he wants to incorporate the uranium rich regions of Chad and then Niger - should not and is not the paramount priority of Libya.

France's Intervention in Chad's Political Crisis

The theory that has been propounded behind French intervention in Chad is comprehensive. It touches all its paramount concerns. Its historical responsibility, economic interest and the wish to preempt a Soviet military presence in the country have been noted by Colin Legum, et al. Added to this is its military treaty with its former colonies which gave it carte blanche to interfere in the internal affairs of Chad, by either taking active part in

the war supporting one faction against another and/or providing the instrument of war pouring fuel in the fire.

At the initial stage of Libya's interference in the Chadian crisis, France displayed ambiguity and lack of resolve to confront and drive out the invading army of Colonel Gaddafi. This put France in an awkward position. It either had to live up to the "defense agreements" it entered into when its colonies attained their independence or risk an erosion of its political and economic interest.

France's impotence in the face of Libyan aggression, and more so its plot to overthrow President Tombalbaye's government seemed to aggravate its precarious position in Chad and the rest of its neo-colonies. Colin Legum et al. reported that:

At the beginning of July, the Chad Press agency accused Jacques Focart, the French Secretary General at the Presidency with responsibility for African affairs, of plotting to overthrow the Tombalbaye government. It warned against the intervention of any French troops stationed in Chad against the existing regime.

The reason for the plot was France's disillusionment with the inept government of President Tombalbaye who continued his policies of alienating the various ethnic groups. We would like to point out, however, that the

---

33 "France's Military Intervention in Africa," Africa 77 (January 1978), p. 44.

policies of the president were only manifestations of the neo-colonial socioeconomic and political structure he inherited from France.

However, the disappointed Tombalbaye had no choice but to try to get out of that political dependency on France and chart his own policy. It was only a matter of common sense for him to reorient his foreign policy towards the Arab world for the rebels are Moslems and their spiritual and material support comes from that world. Declaring his intentions, Tombalbaye said "it may disturb certain people who have become used to regarding our republic...as a docile satellite" and reminded France that Chad "was the first African country to respond to General de Gaulle's appeal and sacrificed a number of its sons to liberate France from the Nazi Yoke." Tombalbaye continued to exacerbate Chad's relations with France by withdrawing from OCAM claiming that it was nothing but an "instrument of imperialism and neo-colonialism."36

However, his high expectations from the Arab countries could not reap him any benefit. Contrary to Tombalbaye's wish, the rebels' war, instead of abating, mounted. Clearly, this was the result of the assistance that the rebels were getting from the Arab countries. Tombalbaye expressed his

35Ibid.
36Ibid.
disappointment by saying "that there would be no rebellion in Chad if the rebels were not receiving outside help."\(^{37}\) That was definitely directed against Libya whose leader, time and again had said that his reason for intervention in Chad was the presence of imperialist forces there. Instead of making use of the opportunity and encouraging Tombalbaye to slowly but surely break away from French dependency, they drove him back to that dependent relation. Colin Legum et al. said:

> Relations with France had deteriorated sharply during 1973 when Chad began to forge closer ties with Arab countries, but in 1974 it soon became apparent that cooperation with the Arabs was giving disappointing results and that Tombalbaye was anxious to reestablish good relations with Paris. A meeting of the joint Franco-Chadian commission took place in Ndjamena at the end of January.\(^{38}\)

President Tombalbaye, innocent and novice to the intricate world of international relations, and more so to his actual power vis-a-vis a country as old and vicious in its dealings with its opponents as France discovered, it too late when his military overthrew him in 1975. Indeed the coup took place with the connivance of the French government.\(^{39}\) The mere fact that France by-passed President

---


\(^{38}\) Ibid., p. B567.

\(^{39}\) Ibid., p. B465.
Malloum's government to negotiate with the rebels led by the current President of Chad, Habre, for the release of Mme. Claustre, demonstrated not only its contempt but also its high-handedness. General Malloum responded by ordering the evacuation of French military bases and repudiating the bilateral cooperation agreements.41

One way of expressing one's dissatisfaction to the oppressor and indicating that you are ready to stop, if possible, or curtail that dominant-subordinate relationship is by making friends outside of the camp. And this is exactly what General Malloum did to demonstrate his government's frustration. Africa put it thus:

Meanwhile, Chad has shown that France is not its only contact...also in October, the Finance Minister, General Djago, returned from a series of visits to Belgium, Rumania, and USSR. At one point a Chadian delegation was in Peking at the same time as Major Kamouque, Foreign Minister was in Washington.42

Of all the colonial countries, France has earned the notoriety for jealousy over its neo-colonies. And this diplomatic flurry by the Malloum government threatened France's special relation not only with Chad but also with its other client states. Thus France rallied to improve

40 Ibid., p. B486.
41 Ibid.