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An analysis of the role of the organization of African unity in settlement of intra-regional conflict: the case of the Republic of Chad

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The purpose of this study is to critically analyze the role of the Organization of African Unity in finding a peaceful settlement for intra-regional conflict using the Republic of Chad as a case study. It is a truism that since the Republic of Chad gained independence from France in 1960, the Chadians have not witnessed any political stability.

This study is premised on the assumption that the root cause of the conflict in Chad is due to French colonialism and neo-colonialism that have continued to impinge upon the Chadians even after political independence had been achieved; that the inability of the OAU to find a solution to the conflict is due to foreign intervention. Moreover, different political ideologies that have divided the Organization of African Unity into three groups, namely, the Monrovia, the Casablanca and the Brazzaville Twelve have been an impediment to the OAU in its efforts in effecting a peaceful settlement.
for intra-regional conflict such as the Chadian conflict. The two methodologies employed in this research are descriptive and historical analyses.

The study maintains that it is because of the historical subjugation and subordination of the Chadian socio-economic formation by the French imperialists, that the Republic of Chad has been made to serve the French interests instead of serving the interests of the Chadians.

The study suggests that if the Republic of Chad is to be successful in achieving political and economic independence, it must wage war against neo-colonialism and petty-bourgeois elements who are aligning themselves with the imperialists to destabilize the political economy of the country.

Our analysis of the OAU's role in Chad shows that no stone was left unturned to bring a lasting solution to the Chadian conflict; but the noble efforts of the OAU could not possibly bear fruit because the OAU has so far not had much success in implementing its policy of resisting foreign intervention in essentially African conflicts.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN
UNITY IN SETTLEMENT OF INTRA-REGIONAL CONFLICT
THE CASE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHAD

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF ATLANTA UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY
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I should perhaps conclude by noting that none of the individuals acknowledged above—either directly or indirectly endorsed the views expressed in this study. I am the only one responsible.
DEDICATION

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

War, poverty, disease, hunger, ignorance, inadequate education, premature death, racism and genocide which we are now witnessing in Africa and Third World countries in general have been both cause and effect of European capitalism. That is to say, the penetration of capitalist mode of production into these countries has indeed brought untold hardships and conflicts to the Africans.

However, not everybody agrees that "the history of Africa's relations with the West has been a history of robbery." The most sophisticated of those theorists who stress the "positive contributions" of colonialism agree that the mother countries might have benefited from "an unusually high" rate of profit, particularly from colonies with easily extracted mineral wealth. One of such writers argue, nevertheless, that European colonialism did not impoverish the colonies in any fundamental way.¹ Whatever their contention is, the truth remains that political independence clearly did not mean total independence for

the new African states. These countries still depend on
the colonizers, both for development funds and for the
technology necessary to achieve a higher standard of living
for their peoples. This means that the conditions of
exploitation remain. Moreover, Africans who had intensive
contact with the colonial political system shared experience
of humiliation, manipulation, and exploitation.

When the great scramble for Africa began, colonies
had become a necessary appendage for European capitalism,
which had by then reached the stage of industrial and
financial monopoly that needed territorial expansion to
provide spheres for capital investment, sources of raw
materials, markets and strategic points of imperial
defense. Thus all imperialists, without exception, evolved
the means, their colonial policies, to satisfy the ends,
the exploitation of the subject territories for the
aggrandizement of the metropolitan countries. They were
all rapacious; they all subserved the needs of the subject
lands to their own demands; they all circumscribed human
rights and liberties; they all repressed and despoiled,
degraded and oppressed. They took African lands, lives,
resources, and dignity.\(^2\)

It is a truism that for most of the period from 1885

to 1960, seven European countries - Great Britain, France, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Germany and Italy made a concerted effort to conquer, administer, and hold on to Africa. For about twenty-five years, from the end of World War I to the end of World War II, it seemed they would be quite successful. These countries claimed sovereignty, or uninhibited control over all African territory. Indeed, the Europeans extended their grip on the whole of Africa in order to ensure full exploitation of African resources - both natural and human. Territories by outright war and military action, sometimes in the ill-disguised form of "treaties" imposed on local rulers by a combination of force and plain deceit as it was in the case of Chad which we will elaborate after the following chapter.

To maintain their domination over their newly seized territories and to ensure their utmost exploitation, the imperialists established full state power over them. The political essence of capitalism which is imperialism is the direct and overall subordination of one country to another on the basis of state power being in the hands of the dominating foreign power. The overall political power was directed to two main objectives - to keep the colonial people in political subjection; and to make possible the

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maximum exploitation of the people and the country's resources. 4

We can safely argue by summarizing here that colonialism enabled the imperialists to rob the African peoples in a variety of ways. They were able to secure cheap land, cheap labor, and cheap resources. They were also free to impose a system of low-priced payments to peasant producers of export crops to establish a monopoly-controlled market for the import of the manufactured goods of the colony-owning power, and secure a source of extra profit through investment. The results on the economy of the colonial territories were almost catastrophic. The African countries inherit economies which are not merely underdeveloped but distorted. 5

French colonialism in Chad was one of such situations in which the colonialists codified administrative rules and set up judicial systems; they collected taxes and maintained a minimal order for a time; they established new political frontiers that determined the limits of contemporary states; and also established a new economic sector, orienting it toward their own. All this was done primarily to serve French interests.


The civil war in Chad which has attracted worldwide attention as a result of the massive intervention of some foreign governments is a product of French colonialism or imperialism which has created internal contradictions not only in Chad but also in other African countries that went through the process of colonization.

As the Europeans divided and colonized Africa, they imposed their own Western capitalist system on African economies. The various conflicts that are manifesting themselves in Africa do not mean that Africans are wild dogs that should be fighting one another; or because Africans are inferior as the Europeans labeled us; but these conflicts arise as a result of the capitalist mode of production imposed on the African economy by the Europeans.6

Statement of the Problem

Since the Republic of Chad gained independence from France in 1960, there has been a continuous conflict which has created political instability and brought total economic chaos to the Chadian people. Many people such as Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff7 have linked the root cause of the ongoing conflict in Chad to ethnicity; Harold D.


Nelson et al. believe that it is a result of religion - Muslims versus Christians; some people such as Rene Lemarchand also believe that it is a result of certain class of people in Chad struggling to gain power.

This study is premised on the assumption that the root cause of the conflict in Chad is the result of the impact of French colonialism and neo-colonialism that has continued to impinge upon the Chadian people even after political independence has been achieved. The second assumption is that the inability of the OAU to find a diplomatic solution to the Chadian conflict is due to foreign intervention. Of course, the study does not dismiss totally such variables as religion, ethnicity, and class struggle as secondary contradictions in the Chadian conflict. This is because the Chadian ruling elites who are more or less, allies of French imperialism do not hesitate to use religion and ethnicity to attain and promote their goals. But our main concern in this study is the phenomena of French imperialism and neo-colonialism in Chad. Our contention is that, it is because of the historical subjugation and subordination of Chadian socio-economic formation by the French imperialists, the Republic of Chad has been made to serve the French

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interests instead of serving the interest of the Chadian people. The collision between pre-colonial social formations in Chad with the advanced capitalist social formation of France resulted in the intensification of exploitation and the forcible subordination of the country's socio-economic and political structures and practices.  

In order to maintain the profitable system of colonialism, the colonial power prevented industrialization in the Republic of Chad; and they had no interest in creating modern industry in Chad since it was their aim to utilize the resources - raw materials and cheap labor to feed their own industrial machines in France. At a glance, it could be seen that Chad is a chronic case of underdevelopment.

Indeed, there is no doubt that France has remained one of the major actors on the political scene of Chad. Through the so-called aid, trade, and military support, France has kept intact its domination over a large number of Francophone states, including Chad. As a matter of fact, French policy vis-a-vis Chad aims primarily at maintaining the 'dominant-dependent' relations between the two countries, that is, France and Chad.

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11 Ibid., p. 136.

In order to achieve its goal, France has never hesitated to intervene in Chad so as to protect its clients. For instance, the liberation struggle launched in 1978 by Chadian nationalists led France to intervene militarily in order to protect its puppet regime of Felix Malloum in power.  

Furthermore, as we examine closely, we have seen that the subjugation and integration of Chadian economy with that of France, allowed the French people to instill their norms and values to the Chadians, making it even more difficult for the Chadians to see themselves as people of one country. Our analysis of the Chadian conflict and the role of the OAU reveals the contradictions resulting from the continuing process of economic domination and subjugation by French imperialism in Chad.

French interest in Chad is motivated by economic, strategic and military objectives. Economically, it can be observed that even after Chad had gained independence from France, the Chadian economy continues to be heavily dependent upon that of France. For instance, Chad's imports since independence come from France; giving France the first place among exporters to Chad. Moreover, foreign investment in Chad is dominated by France.  


The strategic location of Chad is important to France in that the military bases in Chad are viably keyed to interventionary activities to support pro-French regimes in west and central Africa. During the colonial rule, the Chadian people were a major source of military recruits for France in Africa. Chadian forces in the French army were noted for their contributions to the victory of free France armies against the Axis powers when an attack was made on Italian armies at Mourzouk, Libya from a base in Chad.

The OAU interest in Chad is to seek a peaceful settlement to the Chadian conflict without external intervention. However, given the desperate maintenance of neo-colonialism in the Third World, particularly in Africa, the OAU was by-passed by these external powers in order to promote their strategic interests in Chad as opposed to African national interests.

The right of the OAU to intervene in the Chadian conflict comes from the Charter of the OAU, Article XIX in which the Heads of States and Governments declared that

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they:

Pledge to settle all disputes among themselves by peaceful means and to this end, decided to establish a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. The composition of which and condition of service shall be defined by a separate Protocol to be approved by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.18

Indeed, foreign intervention has internationalized the Chadian conflict beyond the OAU framework as a regional organization under the Charter of the United Nations to deal with African regional problems through peaceful settlement of disputes.19

In advancing reasons for foreign intervention in African conflict, it would be worth mentioning that an interventionist power acts for or against any regime for its own interest, and not for the purpose of benefiting the regime. Legum identifies three situational crises as reasons for foreign interventions on the African continent: (1) Inter-Africa Disputes. Legum sees this as a recurring element which generates from the will of various regimes to strengthen their economic, political, military, and diplomatic clout by enlisting the support of appropriate powers. Thus Somalia's alliance with the Soviet Union in the 1960s, according to Legum, was due to the desire of


the Somalian regime to consolidate and increase its power, vis-a-vis Haile Selassie's Ethiopia, in border disputes. Therefore, Somalia invited the Soviet Union to participate in the crisis of the Horn of Africa. Other cases Legum mentioned were the Angola/Soviet-Cuba alliances during the civil war; the call of Joseph Mobutu of Zaire for an alliance with France, Belgium, China and the U.S. during the Shaba attack in 1977; Egyptian-Libyan conflicts which produced a multi-billion dollar arms deal between the Soviets and Libya, and others. (2) Armed liberation struggles in Southern Africa and the Horn of Africa. Since liberation movements are faced with strong adversaries according to Legum, they are forced to seek aid, mainly from outside powers, to assist them in their struggles. The aid was said to have come exclusively from the Soviet bloc: Cuba, Yugoslavia, and China. (3) "Insecurely-based, often unpopular regimes struggle to maintain themselves in power." They stretch their hands for alliances to foreign powers who are prepared to supply military and economic aid. Joseph Mobutu's and Idi Amin's regimes exemplified this category. These three situational variable crises Legum identifies as "a useful way of examining the role of foreign powers in Africa...which have most commonly resulted in increased foreign intervention." 

It is a fact that the intervenors are interested in a regime only to the extent that such a regime is willing to foster, protect, promote and carry out the program of defined objectives of intervenor. In a crisis situation in a target area, the first task of an interventionist power is to decide whether to (a) retain the ruling regime, (b) replace it by a new regime, and/or (c) reinstate an old regime. An indication of this was the unceremonious dumping of Bokassa of the former Central African Empire from power by France. Following the deterioration of relations between France and Bokassa, climaxed by the killing of school children in Bangui, France invited Bokassa to Gabon and told him to abdicate. As French local and international media pounded thunderously on his case over the Bangui massacre, Bokassa caused more embarrassment to France. After his overthrow by the French army, and despite his French citizenship (which he acquired by virtue of assimilation) his effort to secure permanent asylum in France was denied and he was whisked off overnight to Abidjan, in Ivory Coast. Commenting on Bokassa's fall from power, a strong anti-communist journal, *The Economist* wrote that, "Last week's neat and bloodless coup against

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Emperor Bokassa bore a plain made-in-France stamp. Having maintained Bokassa, France unmade him."\textsuperscript{22}

An unparalleled, racialist anti-Idi Amin campaign was mounted by the Western powers when they considered him to be against Western interests. The Western powers helped Amin to usurp power from the elected government of Milton Obote immediately after independence.

Joseph Mobutu was imposed on the Zairean people by the Western powers not because of their fondness of him, but because there was no qualified substitute to carry out the defined objectives of the Western capitalist nations. According to a key European diplomat analyzing the Western role during the Shaba II assault, "there is no alternative to the regime of Joseph Mobutu, so we have to support him in hopes of reforming him."\textsuperscript{23}

Legum also asserts that the Western interest in Africa is basically "economic and strategic." He notes that the loss of direct colonial control over the resources and markets of former colonies, especially France, Britain, and Belgium, brought about the problem of how to maintain their access to these resources and markets of the continent.

\textsuperscript{22}The Economist (29 September - 5 October, 1979), p. 8.

\textsuperscript{23}An anonymous quotation by The Washington Post (June 7, 1978), P. 12A.
Theoretical Frame of Reference

Since the phenomenon of imperialism is important for our analysis, it is necessary to review some of the theories of imperialism. Although a large number of theoreticians, such as Hans Morgenthau, use a political frame of reference in order to define imperialism, V. I. Lenin's approach is economic. To Lenin, imperialism is both a process of political subjugation that follows from needs for economic exploitation, and a situation whereby the world becomes territorially sub-divided into politically controlled economic spheres of influence.\footnote{Donald J. Puchala, \textit{International Politics Today} (New York: McMillan Publishers Inc., 1977), p. 76.}

Michael Barratt Brown defines imperialism as economic control and exploitation of foreign lands arising from the necessity for countering the impediments to the accumulation of capital engendered by the internal contradictions of the domestic capitalist economy.\footnote{Michael Barratt Brown, \textit{The Economics of Imperialism} (New York: Merlin Press, 1970), p. 22.}

To put it another way, it is the outward drive of certain people to build empires - both formal colonies and privileged positions in markets, protected sources of materials and extended opportunities for profitable employment of labor.

Marx's treatment of capitalism contains an explicit theory of imperialism which is very important to our analysis.
This theory says essentially that imperialism is a necessary outcome of capitalism. Marx, of course, throws light on imperialism in his analysis of the process by which surplus value is converted into capital, process called accumulation. Surplus value according to Marx is value of the product of the workers less what the capitalist pays him. Marx maintained that the process of using surplus value to engineer more surplus's value is the capitalization of surplus value. If surplus value is to be used to generate more wealth, it has to be converted into means of production as well as means of subsistence for workers. The capitalist, Marx contended, cannot survive and remain competitive without progressive accumulation or the continuous reproduction of his capital on a continuously expanding scale. This in itself, suggests a relationship between capitalism and imperialism. Interestingly enough, Marx shed a lot of light on imperialism, and its relations to capitalism.\(^\text{26}\) He shows that capitalism is inherently expansionary and the contradictions of capitalist accumulation will tend to transport capitalism to economically backward countries.

V. I. Lenin holds that imperialism grows out of the logic of the capitalist system. But Lenin goes somewhat beyond Marx in asserting that imperialism symbolizes a particular stage in the development of capitalism. It

reflects a transitional stage of capitalism to a higher economic order, a transitional stage characterized by the displacement of capitalist free competition by capitalist monopoly. According to Lenin,

> Imperialism is capital in that stage of development in which the dominance of monopolies and finance capital has established itself; in which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance; in which division of the world among the international trusts has begun, in which the division of all territories of the globe among the biggest capitalist powers has been completed.\(^27\)

Lenin contended that, although the economic foundation of imperialism is monopoly, this monopoly which grew out of capitalism exists in the general environment of capitalism, commodity production and competition, in permanent and insoluble contradiction to this general environment. The monopoly stage of capitalism is, not surprisingly, also a state in which the accumulation of capital exists side by side with the poverty and starvation of the masses. Indeed the superabundance of capital and mass impoverishment are two sides of the same coin. According to Lenin, this is so because uneven development and a semi-starvation level of existence of the masses are fundamental and inevitable conditions and premises of this mode of production. As long as capitalism remains what it is, surplus capital

will be utilized not for the purpose of raising the standard of living of the masses in a given society, for this would mean a decline in profits for the capitalists, but for the purpose of increasing profits by exporting capital abroad to the backward countries. This is one aspect of the relationship.

Another aspect emerges from the tendency of monopoly to engender stagnation and decay or loss of dynamism. Because the monopolist can, up to a point, fix prices at least temporarily, his incentive continuously to revolutionize his means of production is greatly reduced. Lenin cites the example of a machine invented by a certain Owens which revolutionized the manufacture of bottles. Lenin sees all this as being indicative of the fact that capital has become overripe and cannot find avenues of profitable investment, a situation which compels the export of capital.

Hobson considers some of the psychological motives which have been put forward as an explanation of imperialism such as national pride, quest for glory, and bellicosity. While admitting that these factors might be relevant to the explanation of imperialism, he dismisses them as not constituting a major cause. He asserts that the dominant motive for imperialism was the quest for markets as well as opportunities for higher returns on investments. According to Hobson, the need for this quest arises partly because as a result of the development of capitalism in
in the West, industry was more productive and needed greater imports of raw materials, more food for the urban population growing in response to industrialization, and products to meet the rising demand for luxury goods created by a rising standard of living. Hobson maintains that a more important cause of imperialism was the tendency for production to outgrow consumption.²⁸

Hobson concludes that imperialism is really the vehicle of the growing cosmopolitanism of capital. He rejects the explanation of imperialism as an inevitable and integral aspect of industrial progress. To do this, he raised the question as to why there should be underconsumption or why there should be more saving than could be profitably and usefully employed? He answers that if the economy was such that consumption power of incomes were distributed according to needs there would be no underconsumption; that since human needs are not finite, consumption would rise with productivity and there would be no excess saving. He then goes on to point out that it is quite otherwise in an economy where income distribution bears no relation to need and some people have far more income than they could possibly consume. In that kind of economy, according to Hobson, there is bound to be underconsumption. In so far as this type of distribution and underconsumption are

²⁸J. A. Hobson, A Study of Imperialism (London: Dennis Dobson, 1954), pp. 82-84
necessary attributes of capitalism, Hobson maintains that imperialism is a logical outcome of capitalism.

Another theory that we would consider is that of Kautsky.

Kautsky explanation of imperialism is more complex and sophisticated, for it is couched in Marxist rather than in liberal terminology. He utilized some of Hobson's lines of thinking, however, especially the emphasis on imperialism as a manifestation of protectionism and militarism.  

Kautsky envisioned an imperialism in which there might be collective exploitation of the world by international finance. The interests of the capitalist class as a whole conflicted with those of capital - a majority of powerful capitalists who relied on military means to support their expansionist efforts. An internationally united finance capital thus might lead to a peaceful resolution of real and potential conflict generated by the rivalry of national finance capital.

Rosa Luxemburg also saw imperialism as the conversion of surplus into capital which finds itself everywhere in the world economy and does not limit its accumulation to an isolated capitalist society. The drive of capital to expand is the outstanding feature of modern development, and in its final phase capitalism has adopted such

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an unbridle character that it puts the whole civilization of mankind in question. Indeed, this untamable drive of capital to expand has gradually constructed a world market, connected the modern economy and laid the basis for socialism. 30

Another theory of imperialism that we need to consider is that of Johan Galtung. Galtung understood imperialism as a structural relationship between collectivities.

Imperialism is a system that splits up collectivities and relates some of the parts to each other in relations of harmony of interest, and other parts in relations of disharmony of interests, or conflict of interest. Collectivities may be nations of center and the periphery, and each nation in turn may have its own center and periphery. Imperialism is defined in terms of a number of relationships between the center and the periphery. 31

We have seen that imperialism is a necessary outcome of capitalism. It is important to bear this in mind not only because it helps us to cut through the confusion over the motives of Western colonization in Africa but also to shed light on the colonial experience in Africa and its effects on Africa's development particularly in the Chadian case.


Indeed, European capitalism and French colonialism in Chad served to ensure its dependence upon capitalist relations of production. Through forced labor, taxation and rents, the peasantry was compelled to engage in production for exchange and to cultivate the cash crops (cotton and groundnuts) necessary for the development of French industry. Village chieftaincies became one of the levels of metropolitan administration, for chiefs being made responsible for designating the 'volunteers' for public works and stimulating the cultivation of cash crops in order that taxes be paid.\(^{32}\)

The capitalist penetration of Chadian economy created some fundamental affinities between the Chadian economy and that of France. The controlled development of the Chadian economy in the interest of the metropole, which went along with the expansion of colonial trade, meant structural links and structural interdependence, for instance in the division of labor between primary production and manufacture, and in the dependence of economic growth in colony on the metropole's demand for colonial imports.\(^{33}\)

Nevertheless it is correct to say that capitalism is a necessary outcome of imperialism. This is true because in the Republic of Chad as it was in all cases in Africa, "the monetary system was invariably an extension of that of France. In other words, the control of Chad's reserves

\(^{32}\) J. Suret-Canale, French Colonialism in Tropical Africa, pp. 130-137.

and of the issue of currency rested in France."\textsuperscript{34} Such control was justified by arguing that it gave the colony monetary stability and international status and helped its trade.\textsuperscript{35} However, monetary dependence was essentially a means of exploitation.

**Significance of the Study**

This study will contribute to the available literature more information concerning the Chadian conflict and the role of the Organization of African Unity in finding a peaceful settlement to this conflict which started immediately after her independence. Whereas a great deal of information has been accumulated on such conflicts as the Ethiopian-Somalian boundary disputes, the Somali-Kenyan conflict, the Nigerian-Biafran conflict; little is known about the Chadian conflict and the role of the OAU in its efforts to find a peaceful settlement to the conflict. The Republic of Chad also represents a unique case of imperialist strategy to continue with its exploitation after formal political independence has been gained by the former colony. It is unique in that since independence, the Chadian people have not witnessed any political stability.


\textsuperscript{35} J. Suret-Canale, *French Colonialism in Tropical Africa*, pp. 73-80.
and the Republic of Chad has not been able to harness her economic resources for the benefit of the Chadians. Moreover, the study will help to develop a framework for analyzing the major conflicts confronting the African nations in their search for nation-building. The Chadian case is of particular interest because it typifies the kind of conflicts found throughout Africa in particular and the Third World in general.

**Review of Literature**

There have not been many writings concerning the Chadian conflict since independence. Reasons why the Chadian conflict has been ignored by many writers cannot be explained in this study. Nevertheless, there are few articles and books that deal with the conflict which we are going to review.

Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff in their book, *Conflict in Chad*, maintained that of all the African countries that won independence from France in 1960, Chad has encountered the most serious obstacles to achieving nationhood. Among the most formidable of its internal handicaps have been its landlocked situation; frequent changes in its political frontiers; vast desert areas; a small, unevenly distributed population of diverse origins, religions, and ways of life; strong and often conflicting tribal and regional loyalties; traditional chieftaincies of widely varying scope and authority; and an almost total lack of
internal communication. Since independence, according to Thompson and Adloff, these impediments to national unity have been compounded by an unrepresentative, often repressive government and a plethoric, inefficient, and sometimes corrupt bureaucracy. 36

According to the authors, France's aim in conquering the territory that became Chad was to unite its northern with its central and west African empires. The authors maintained that because the area was amorphous in both natural and human terms, only internationally recognized frontiers could give it a framework and only a strong government could maintain internal order.

It is the authors' belief that the French conquerors found no coherent political institutions in either the northern or southern regions of Chad, and that they devised similar types of government for these areas, based in large part on the manner of response of the local populations to France's efforts to mold their development.

The authors maintained that the present conflict in Chad is caused by tribalism, regionalism and ethnicity. Overall, tribalism, according to the authors was little affected by French rule, and regionalism, for different reasons, survived most strongly in Tibesti and Ouaddai—the two poorest regions in Chad.

36 Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, Conflict in Chad, pp. 23-29.
Thompson and Adloff conclude that France's overall impact on the Chadian economy - as on its political development - was spotty, due in part to natural conditions and demographic differences in Chad.

It is indeed disheartening in that Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff have distorted the truth about French rule and continuous French interventions in Chad after political independence. Are these authors making us to believe that French rule in Chad was to unify the country? Colonialism did not call for any unification of the colonized people. Indeed, it divided and ruled the colonized people - making it difficult for them to develop their own economic and political ideologies. French colonialism in Chad was no exception as it was obviously in the interest of the colonial power to maintain order in the country and to make Chad to contribute to France's economy. For instance, monopolies for the sale, transport and export of cotton were manned by French companies, and there was total absence of indigenous companies. French rule divided the country into regions making it easier for France to control it administratively and politically. French colonial power enacted a policy of forced cotton cultivation which was exported to France without any monetary returns to Chadians.

It is surprising that Thompson and Adloff are dwelling so much on the climatic, environmental, social and economic factors as the causes of underdevelopment and present
conflict in Chad without mentioning anything about French imperialism that has in fact exploited the country for so many years. If the contention by Aristotle "that man is a political animal by nature"\(^{37}\) is correct, then this negates the contention maintained by Thompson and Adloff that the French conquerors found no coherent political institutions in Chad.

Another author; Samuel Decalo in an article maintains that the problem facing Chad does not only stem from the intractability of inter-ethnic animosities, the incompatibility of existing sub-nationalism, the absence of representative structures, and the destabilizing effects of acute dependency relationships. Decalo believes that the core of the conflict\(^{38}\) concerns the social and administrative dimensions of Chad itself: always extremely rudimentary even in the populated south, the state apparatus simply has never extended over much of the periphery. And even where its presence is felt, according to Decalo, it is not always been accepted.

It is the author's contention that control over the human and material resources encompassed within the territorial boundaries of Chad has often been intermittent and weak. He believes that what Chad faces today, as at


independence, are the twin tasks of building a nation and a state. Though not unique to Chad, the dimensions of these problems certainly appear monumental in this former French colony.

Samuel Decalo stated explicitly that sixty years of colonial rule did not effect any major changes in Chad. Though the French fought hard to conquer the territory, once it was theirs it was grossly neglected. In no sector, according to Decalo was this neglect more evident than in education. For instance, there was only one school in Fort Lamy (Ndamena), with barely fifty pupils; that there were still only eighteen qualified teachers in the entire colony in 1933.

The author maintains that it was French colonial rule that created underdevelopment in the country. Raw materials which were greatly needed for French industries were taken away by the imperialists to develop their own metropolitan without any consideration to the colonized people.

The present conflict which has claimed many lives in Chad, according to the author, is a product of French imperialism and neo-colonialism.

Indeed, Samuel Decalo's analysis of the conflict in Chad has a lot to offer to anyone who wants an understanding of the present conflict which has its roots from French imperialism and neo-colonialism in Chad. Colonial rule was not a blessing for the Chadians and Africans as a whole;
for it meant extreme poverty, ill-health, bad housing, illiteracy, political tyranny and chronic hunger for the masses. According to Decalo, French rule has brought about the present conflict, and has divided and kept the Chadians in a state of passive inertness, and acceptance of prevailing rules. The playing off of one tribe or religion against another, became an essential characteristic of colonialism in Chad.

Decalo's analysis of the Chadian conflict is relevant to our study because we are looking at the impact of French imperialism and neo-colonialism in Chad.

Rene Lemarchand in his article maintains that the root cause of the conflict in Chad is due to ethnicity and factionalism which he believes is as old as the segmentary lineage systems around which revolves much of the socio-political life of African societies.

In such systems, he contends, power is widely diffused. Clan, subclan and kinship groups are the principal units around which individual solidarities crystallized, but never long enough to coalesce into a durable nucleus of power.\(^\text{39}\)

The author stated that the sheer diversity of cultural entities within Chad's boundaries were long concealed by the simplicity of the north-south dialectic in the early phase of the civil war. For almost a decade, roughly from

\(^{39}\)Rene Lemarchand, "Chad: The Road to Partition," pp. 118-120.
1969 to 1978, civil violence pitted the predominantly Sara, Christianized south against the Islamicized 'rebel' north. With little attention paid to the existence of minorities on each side of the north-south cleavage, it was generally assumed that all northerners were Arabs and all southerners, Sara.

Lemarchand in analyzing the Chadian conflict also believes that the conflict is due to Libyan annexation of part of the country by Gaddafy. Although, the author maintains that the aim of annexation was to work for the realization of a complete unity between the two countries, the projected union was shelved when it became known that Gaddafy was promoting his selfishness through the annexation.

The author concluded that the Chadian conflict is a conflict that involves different ethnic groups in Chad, and that the OAU cannot do anything in terms of finding a peaceful settlement to the conflict since different factions involved are not willing to negotiate for peaceful settlement.

Far from being the root cause of the conflict in Chad, the Libyan intervention could be seen as an intervention to protect his fellow Muslims from being dominated by the southern Christians. We totally disagree with Lemarchand for dwelling so much in ethnicity and Libyan annexation as the causes of the conflict.
Methodology

The two principal methodological approaches utilized in this study are descriptive analysis and historical analysis.

Descriptive Analysis

Descriptive analysis is a technique used in social science research in describing a given social phenomenon. This technique is utilized in order that events are described and critically analyzed. Since Chad was controlled and ruled by France for so many years, this method enables us to describe the specific historical periods, the events, the various political actors in Chad before and after independence from France. It also allows us to describe analogous events or conflicts in Africa particularly and the Third World in general.

Historical Analysis

In order that this study will not be a mere narrative statement of facts, events are described and critically analyzed. This is important in the light of numerous efforts by the OAU to find a peaceful settlement to the Chadian conflict. Since the Chadian conflict evolved immediately after independence, this approach will allow us to describe and analyze the historical period which the

Republic of Chad was controlled by the French, and also after the neo-colonialists have taken over power from the colonialists.

Aristotle in studying the various Greek city-states used historical analysis and the law of similar causes in order to explain how political institutions and governments of Ancient Greece evolved. 41

It is in the same vein, that we will examine and analyze the ongoing conflict in Chad and the role of OAU as a product of history. My emphasis of the historical approach derives from my own conviction that one cannot understand the dynamics and logic of contemporary social phenomena without knowing how the phenomenon came about.

This approach is useful in that it could also allow us to describe and analyze analogous conflicts in Africa such as the Congo crisis of the early 1960s, the Nigerian-Biafran War and even those so-called border conflicts, such as Ethiopia versus Somalia.

Sources of Data

An exhaustive use of historical materials, books, magazine reports, newspapers, scholarly journals, government statistics, United Nations publications on Africa, and other works that are of relevance to our study will be

This bulk of the data for this study will be seriously scrutinized and a serious effort will be made to decipher the information at hand.

It should be clear that this study does not pretend to present a definitive [analysis and] solution to the civil war in Chad instead, we are concerned with sketching the broad outlines so that the more recent events can be properly understood.

The study shows that French rule and continuous French intervention in Chad has resulted in a chronic case of underdevelopment in that country. It attempts to understand the Chadian conflict and the role of the OAU as a product of history. In this case, the history of Chad under French rule and the history of African people as a whole trying to free themselves from vestiges of imperialism.

Chapter One of the study deals with the statement of the problem, theoretical frame of reference, the significance of the study, data collection and analysis, and the methodology. Chapter Two begins with a brief examination of the ideological differences in the formation of different political blocs in Africa. It proceeds with an examination of Nkrumah, Tafawa Balewa, and Emperor Haile Selassie's conception of African unity.

Chapter Three of the study analyzes the Republic of Chad under French rule, and the root cause of the Chadian
conflict; the economic fabric of Chad, major factions and ideological differences among the different factions are analyzed.

Chapter Four of the study critically examines the various countries that have intervened directly or indirectly in the Chadian conflict which makes it very problematic for the OAU to find a peaceful settlement to the conflict. Such countries as France, the United States, Libya, Nigeria, Egypt, Sudan and Zaire are discussed.

Chapter Five assesses the role of the OAU in its efforts to effect a diplomatic solution to the Chadian conflict. Here, we are assessing the efforts made directly by the OAU or indirectly by African countries on behalf of the OAU.

Before examining the OAU efforts, a brief history behind the formation of the OAU and how it is set up to settle conflicts among member states is presented.

The study concludes by suggesting that if the Republic of Chad is to be successful in achieving political and economic independence, it must wage war against neocolonialists and petty-bourgeois elements who are aligning themselves with the imperialists to destabilize the political economy of the country. It is only by winning this war, that we believe, the Republic of Chad and other African countries would be able to utilize their resources for the development of Africa and not for the development of imperialists countries.
The study recommends that since the Republic of Chad has been incorporated into the capitalist system for so many years, and it has not been able to overcome the problem of dependent capitalist development, she must denounce and cut off all ties with capitalism which is an exploitative system, and commit itself to a socialist system in which equality and tranquility will prevail. The planned economy that we are suggesting will, however, have to be fought for by people who are committed to a change that will alleviate the sufferings of the masses in Chad.

Our analysis of the OAU's role in Chad shows that no stone was left unturned to bring a lasting solution to the Chadian conflict. But the noble efforts of the OAU could not possibly bear fruit because the OAU has so far not had much success in implementing its policy of resisting foreign intervention in essentially African conflicts. Moreso, the OAU lacks the resources and authority to enforce its diplomatic initiatives among member states.

The study concludes that as long as African countries cannot mobilize their resources and be able to develop a monolithic ideology in fighting imperialism and neo-colonialism, Africa will continue to remain an arena of foreign intervention in its internal conflicts, such as the Chadian conflict.
CHAPTER II

IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES IN THE FORMATION
OF DIFFERENT POLITICAL BLOCS

In this chapter, we will examine and analyze the ideological differences in the formation of different political blocs in Africa which eventually helped in the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). We will look at how Nkrumah, Tafawa Balewa, and Emperor Haile Selassie who were the leading pioneers of African unity perceived African unity. This will help us to understand the reasons why African countries are unable to develop a monolithic ideology to fight against imperialism and neocolonialism in order to liberate Africa of dependent capitalist development.

According to C. Wright Mills,

ideologies are intellectual and moral creations; they contain high ideals, easy slogans, dubious facts and sophisticated theories. Ideology is a social reality in terms of which certain institutions and practices are justified and others attacked; it provides the phrases in which demands are raised, criticisms made, exhortations delivered, proclamations formulated and, at times policies determined. Political ideology designates agencies of action, of the means of reform, revolution, or conservation. It contains
strategies and programs that embody both ends and means.\textsuperscript{1}

Ideology plays an extremely important role in the political life of many African countries. Interestingly enough, it serves to legitimize the rule of politicians and military men who may have led their countries' independence movements or have attained power by coup d'etat, but who are unable to lead their countries quickly into the promised land of economic development. In the confusion resulting from the modernization process, ideology may serve as a guide to action and as a kind of social cement. As projected on the international scene, ideology enables a government to assume the desired image for the benefit of its domestic constituency.\textsuperscript{2}

In Africa, different political ideologies have been propounded by different political actors in their search for African unity. These different ideologies have indeed helped in the formation of the Organization of African Unity which, of course, was founded at a time when African leaders were experiencing their taste of independence and were anxious to consolidate their leadership. Across the continent, they however, saw the danger posed by the divisions of language, culture and religion, by the economic inequalities, by the


controversies over boundaries arbitrarily drawn by the colonial powers. It quickly became clear that a high degree of cooperation was necessary among the fledging African states, if the continent was to survive as a viable economic and political entity. It was to achieve this cooperation that led to the formation of the OAU.  

There were considerable differences of opinion as to how African unity could best be attained. The signing of the charter establishing the OAU was quite an achievement especially at a time when Africa was sharply divided into three rival blocs - the Casablanca group, the Monrovia group and the Brazzaville Twelve. The Casablanca group (led by Ghana) stood for a radical, militant, and left-oriented approach to African unity. The central thesis of the Casablanca group was a "Union Government of African States." This thesis rejected totally any kind of partitioning of Africa. In the words of Ghana's Foreign Minister Ako Adeji,

To us in Ghana, the concept of African unity is an article of faith. It is a cardinal objective in our policy. We sincerely believe that the independent African states can, and may some day, form a real political union -

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4 The Casablanca group was used to describe the participants at a conference at Casablanca convened on 3 January 1961 by King Mohammed V of Morocco and attended by representatives from Egypt, Libya, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco and the Algerian Provisional Government. See Jon Woronoff, Organizing African Unity (Methchen, N.J.: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1970), pp. 31-76.
the Union of African States...it does not matter whether you start with an association of African states or whether you start with economic or cultural cooperation, we must start from somewhere, but certainly the union can be achieved in the end.  

Firstly, Africa should have an overall economic planning on a continental basis that would increase the industrial and economic power of Africa. Secondly, Africa should aim at the establishment of a unified economic planning organization and a unified military and defense strategy are set up, it would be necessary to adopt a unified foreign policy and diplomacy to give political direction to our joint efforts for the protection and economic development of Africa.

The underlying factor behind the formation of the Casablanca group was the fight against imperialism and neocolonialism. Led by the first President of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, the group believed that the balkanization of Africa into series of small states is leaving some African countries with neither the resources nor the manpower to provide for their own integrity and viability. Without the means to establish their own economic growth, they are compelled to continue within the old colonial trading framework. Hence, they are seeking alliances in Europe and elsewhere,

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which deprive them of an independent foreign policy and perpetuate their economic dependency.

The Casablanca group recognized the dangers of neo-colonialism, and summed it up as follows:

Imperialism is still a most powerful force to be reckoned with in Africa. It controls our economies. It operates on a worldwide scale in combinations of many different kinds; economic, political, cultural, educational, military, and through intelligence and information services. In the context of the new independence mounting in Africa, it has begun and will continue to assume new forms and subtle disguises. It is already making use, and will continue to make use of different cultural and economic associations which colonialism has forced between erstwhile European masters and African subjects. It is creating client status, which it manipulates from the distance. It will distort and play upon, as it is already doing, the latent fears of burgeoning nationalism and independence. It will, as it is already doing, fan the fires of sectional interests, of personal greed and ambition among leaders and others will be the devious ways of neo-colonialism by which their stranglehold on Africa's resources for their own continued enrichment.  

The Casablanca group was more vocal concerning a Union Government of Africa because they realized that any form of economic union negotiated singly between the fully industrialized countries of Europe and newly emergent countries of Africa is bound to retard the industrialization, and therefore, the prosperity and the general economic and

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7 Leslie Rubin and Brian Weinstein, Introduction to African Politics: A Continental Approach, p. 266.
therefore, the prosperity and the general economic and cultural development of African countries. Of course, the Casablanca states, though sympathetic to Dr. Nkrumah's approach in general terms, none of its leaders committed himself to implement the call for a union government. 8

The Monrovia group was the largest gathering of African states at that time, and this group believed in the maintenance of each African state as a sovereign nation. The group stood for a conservative, and Western-oriented approach to African unity. The participants in this group agreed on the following five principles:

absolute equality and sovereignty of African states; each African state to have the right to exist and no state to try to annex another; voluntary union of one state with another; non-interference in the affairs of other African states; no dissident elements from one state to be harbored by another state.

The Monrovia Conference was followed by a conference in Lagos in January 1962. The conference reaffirmed the principles set out at the Monrovia Conference. 10 It is really surprising to see how many countries wanted to

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8 See Zdenek Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the OAU, p.22.
9 Ibid.
10 The Monrovia group owes its name to the Monrovia Conference held during 9-12 May 1961 and attended by delegations from twenty African states. The states represented were: Chad, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey (Benin), Ethiopia, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Malagasy Republic, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, Tunisia and Upper Volta. Ibid, pp. 8-43.
maintain the status quo by joining the Monrovia group. This in fact, demonstrates that after the achievement of political independence, the majority of elites who took over power from the colonial masters were not interested in African unity as a whole but they were interested in becoming leaders of their different countries in order to satisfy their selfish ambitions by cooperating with he imperialists to exploit and drain the resources of Africa. They have continued to play a role that makes Africans hewers of wood and drawers of water. It is the same group of people who have concluded that Africa cannot survive without aid and loans from the imperialist countries.

The Brazzaville Twelve group as its name implies was the group that held its meeting in Brazzaville which was attended by twelve Heads of State. Its aims were "organizing cooperation between its members in all fields of external policy in order to reinforce their solidarity, ensure their collective security and their development, and maintain peace in Africa, Madagascar, and the world." This group shared a desire to remain on the best of terms with France. They strongly opposed any kind of communist

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11 The Brazzaville Twelve was formed in October 1960 at Abidjan, Ivory Coast at a meeting of Heads of State of former French colonies. See Leslie Rubin and Brian Weinstein, Introduction to African Politics: A Continental Approach, PP. 225-265.

12 Ibid.
presence in Africa, and they sided with France in the Franco-Algerian conflict. They also agreed to become a permanent association (Union Africaine et Malgache), the charter of which was subsequently signed in Malagasy on 12 September 1961.

The contradictions which this group of African political leaders have created by opting to remain puppet regimes for France suggest that African countries cannot determine and control their own political and economic affairs. Above all, it also suggest that as long as there are many political actors in Africa who do not see the danger posed by imperialism and neo-colonialism, it would be difficult to achieve a revolution on a continental basis. But revolutions that will cater for the welfare of the masses can occur in those countries that are committed to the welfare of the masses of people in those areas.

Nkrumah's Conception of African Unity

Kwame Nkrumah was viewed by many as the man who ignited the flame of African emancipation. Kwesi Armah, a one time minister in Nkrumah's government, described Nkrumah in the following words:

Certainly, Dr. Nkrumah is a man in a million. He is a man who was bitten once by an idea, and has since then devoted his whole energy and life to a cause - the cause of the African and the idea of a regenerated, prosperous, happy and effective African society. Dr. Nkrumah is also a man of millions. Millions all over Africa and the
world admire his striking achievements in diverse fields, his achievement in the field of letters, thought, and political strategy and action.13

According to Samuel G. Ikoku:

Kwame Nkrumah has been correctly christened to the genius of the African Revolution. This is amply proved by a review of his performance from the end of the second World War till his death...here indeed was a unique African.14

In his article, R. 'A. Akindele also asserts:

Nkrumah's credentials as a leader of the African Revolution look impressive. Indeed, it is not preposterous to assert that radical African nationalism has largely been a Nkrumahist phenomenon.15

Nkrumah's approach to the task of African unity up till 1966 was grandiose, institutional and diplomatic. For almost a decade, his scheme for African unity revolved around the possibility of a union of the sovereign states. At the Cairo Summit Conference of the OAU in July 1964, Nkrumah warned his fellow Heads of State about the problems which can only be solved through the force of a Union Government of Africa. He went on,


by this I do not mean the abrogation of any sovereignty. I seek no regional unions as a basis for unity. Indeed, the more independent states there are within our union government, the stronger will be our unity, and the freer will be each sovereign state within the union to attend to its specific and exclusive problems.\textsuperscript{16}

In the specific field of common action, Nkrumah put forward "defense, foreign policy and economic development, including a common currency for Africa. He then proposed that the Union Government shall consist of an assembly of Heads of State and Government of the independent African States."\textsuperscript{17}

Of course, the idea of unity, (based on the whims of Heads of State), has been widely held by past and present African leaders. While Nkrumah pleaded for a "one swoop" political approach, a great number of other leaders were in favor of a "step by step" regional or bilateral approach. However, what many leaders ignored is the dynamics of capitalist development, and the consequence of nationalism. As we can see, most African countries are developing capitalist countries (fundamentally different from developing socialist countries like China, Albania, Vietnam, North Korea, etc.) thus they are plagued with internal contradictions, which are only curable by means of a thorough social revolution. Externally, they are satellite countries to the Euro-American-Japanese

\textsuperscript{16} Kwame Nkrumah, \textit{Africa Must Unite}, pp. 132-149. See also Zdenek Cervenka, \textit{The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the OAU}, pp. 1-4.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
powers a greater stranglehold on the countries involved. Both the British and the French, at one time or another, plotted to form some sort of Federation of Africa. The EEC countries certainly want a combination of African countries, especially of those that have something useful to offer, to be tied to the Community.

Lamenting on the development of the past decade, Nkrumah observed that:

> the number of rash military coups in Africa reveals the lack of Socialist revolutionary organization, the need for the founding of an all-African vanguard working class party, for the creation of an all-African people's army and militia.¹⁸

He continued, "Socialist revolutionary struggle, whether in the form of political, economic, or military action, can only be ultimately effective it is organized, and it has its roots in the class struggle of workers and peasants."¹⁹ And under the present circumstances when imperialists dominate the entire continent through indigenous bourgeoisie and puppet governments, teleguided and marionetted by neo-colonialist, the need for armed struggle has arisen.

For the unification of Africa cannot be achieved by consent, by moral precept or moral conquest. It is only through the resort to arms, that Africa can rid itself once and for all of all the remaining vestiges of colonialism, of imperialism,


¹⁹Ibid., pp. 54-88.
and neo-colonialism; and a socialist society be established in a free and united continent. 20

As a matter of fact, Kwame Nkrumah was one of the architects of Pan-Africanism - a movement that sought unity for Africa as a whole. The essence of Nkrumah's approach was that it also called for a partial surrender of national sovereignty to the "Union Government of Africa." 21 The view for a Union Government of Africa by Nkrumah was based on the belief that political unity should precede economic cooperation and that only a continental union could be an effective instrument against colonialism and neo-colonialism. Nkrumah's conception of African unity is stated as follows:

We cannot allow ourselves to be so disorganized and divided. The fact that I speak English does not make me an Englishman. Similarly, the fact that some of us speak French or Portuguese. We are Africans first and last, and as Africans our best interests can only be served by uniting within an African community. Neither the Commonwealth nor a Franco-African Community can be a substitute. . . . The survival of free Africa, the extending independence of this continent, and the development towards that bright future on which our hopes and endeavors are pinned, depend upon political unity. . . .

Proof is therefore positive that the continental union of Africa is an inescapable desideratum if we are determined to move forward to a realization of our hopes and plans for creating a modern society which will give our peoples the opportunity to enjoy a full and satisfying life. 22

20 Ibid., p. 87.

21 Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, pp. 132-149. See also Leslie Rubin and Brian Weinstein, Introduction to African Politics: A Continental Approach, p. 239.

22 Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, pp. 217-221.
Nkrumah was convinced that if African countries developed their potentialities in human and natural resources in separate isolated groups, their energies would soon be dissipated in the struggle to outbid one another; and economic frictions among Africans would certainly lead to bitter political rivalry. However, Nkrumah's approach to African unity was rejected in favor of the idea of a functional combination of sovereign states cooperating in the achievement of common goals.

Tafawa Balewa's Conception of African Unity

Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the first Nigerian Prime Minister at that time, assumed the role of a spokesman for the 'moderates', and represented what emerged as the majority of the opinion during the Addis Ababa conference at which he represented the Monrovia group. His conception of African unity and his speech during the conference was a clear-cut reply to the main points of Nkrumah's proposal. He rejected the idea of surrendering part of each state's sovereignty for the benefit of the Union Government of African States by saying:

Nigeria's stand is that, if we want unity in Africa, we must first agree to certain essential things. The first is that African States must respect one another. There must be acceptance of equality by all the States. No matter whether they are big or small, they are all sovereign and their sovereignty is sovereignty.23

Tafawa Balewa continued with the remark that "We cannot achieve this African unity as long as some African countries continue to carry on subversive activities in other African countries." He maintained that African unity could only be achieved by taking practical steps in economic, educational, scientific, and cultural cooperation and by trying first to get the Africans to understand themselves before embarking on the more complicated and more difficult arrangement of union as proposed by Nkrumah. Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa went on as follows:

Some of us have suggested that African unity should be achieved by political fusion of the different states in Africa; some of us feel that African unity could be achieved by taking practical steps in economic, educational, scientific and cultural cooperation. My country stands for the practical approach to the unity of the African continent.

He reiterated his earlier position that Nigeria should do her best to bring about closer understanding, and more exchange of visits and ideas between all the countries of Africa. The greatest problem facing the new African leaders, observed Balewa, was how to keep their continent out of Cold War conflicts. Toward that end, his government was prepared to work closely with other African countries and "to draw up

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24 Ibid.

25 Zdenek Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the OAU, pp. 6-7. See also Leslie Rubin and Brian Weinstein, Introduction to African Politics: A Continental Approach, p. 239.
Despite the Balewa government's deep interests in African affairs - "we belong to Africa and Africa must claim first attention in our external affairs" - and despite his strong feelings about colonialism, racism and the need to regulate the access of outside powers to the African continent, Nigeria's African policy did not seem likely either to inspire national pride or to satisfy the psychological needs of the various populations. "A policy which advocates functional cooperation instead of organic (political) union of Africa," declared an opposition spokesman on foreign affairs, "cannot inspire anybody." Unlike the radical African states which had insisted on a supranational political unity in Africa and were quite willing to use all means at their disposal to achieve it, the Balewa government not only treated Pan-African union as a long term evolutionary process which might ultimately grow out of prolonged contacts among the various African states, but also insisted on inviolability of national boundaries and legal equality of all states. These principles place a high value on national independence and territorial

26 Ibid.


integrity, and emphasize the use of a functional rather than a political or revisionist approach to Nigeria's involvement in intra-African politics. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Abubakar maintained that economic and cultural cooperation was not only a necessary step to African unity but was to be placed ahead of political union. Even the government's support at that time for nationalist and liberation movements in Africa was too hedged and sporadic to be taken seriously by anyone.\(^2^9\)

However, it could be seen that Sir Abubakar's cautious approach towards African unity won the support not only of the Monrovia group but significantly, also of the Casablanca group.

**Emperor Haile Selassie's Conception of African Unity**

Emperor Haile Selassie, the Ethiopian Head of State, known also at that time as the elder statesman, stated as follows:

What we require is a single African organization through which Africa's single voice may be heard and within which Africa's problems may be studied and resolved. We need an organization which will facilitate acceptable solutions to disputes among Africans and promote the study and adoption of measures for common defense and programs of cooperation in the economic and social fields...let us, at this time, create a

single institution to which we will all belong, based on principles to which we all subscribe, confident that in its councils our voices will carry their proper weight, secure in the knowledge that the decisions there will be dictated by Africans and only by Africans and that they will take full account of all Africa's vital considerations.³⁰

Haile Selassie's conception of African unity, of course, is based on the gradual approach which rejected the idea of surrendering part of each state's sovereignty for Union Government of African States.

We have seen that almost all African government recognize African unity as an ultimate goal but because of colonialism which has drawn artificial boundaries and partitioned Africa for Europeans' interest, African political actors continue to base their programs and politics on national needs rather than on the interest of independent Africa as a whole.

Kwame Nkrumah's call for a continental unity was brushed aside, and the African leaders settled for a superficial unity which brought together African Heads of State but not African peoples. This arrangement, of course, suited the so-called 'moderate' governments in countries such as Ethiopia (as it was then under Emperor Haile Selassie), Nigeria under Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa, Liberia under President Tubman, and Libya under King Idris. They

³⁰See Volume I of the Proceedings of the Summit Conference of the Head of State and Government held in Addis Ababa in May 1963 published by the Provisional Secretariat at Addis Ababa. See also Zdenek Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the OAU, pp. 5-6.
commanded a majority in the organization, and they made sure that none of the OAU decisions would conflict with their interests. The willingness, on the other hand, of the 'radicals' – such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Ben Bella of Algeria, Modibo Keita of Mali, Sekou Toure of Guinea, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Milton Obote of Uganda – to join the OAU was based on their hope that they would gradually be able to convince the others to come their way and shift the organization to a unity of greater depth and close cooperation.

Indeed, why African countries have not been able to make a headway towards a continental unity is because most of the leaders in Africa, who we may describe as petty bourgeois are actually reactionaries. We are saying that the majority of the states in Africa are controlled by reactionaries who align themselves with the capitalist-imperialist countries to exploit and perpetuate under-development in these countries. These African leaders are incapable of transcending the territorial boundaries of the colonial administrations. Above all, imperialism defined the context in which constitutional power was to be handed over, so as to guard against the transfer of economic power or genuine political power. The African petty

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bourgeoisie accepted this, with only a small amount of dissent and disquiet being manifested by the progressive elements such as Nkrumah, and Sekou Toure.\(^{32}\) Whereas the colonialists had maintained unity for exploitation, the African petty bourgeoisie lacked the capacity to demand both unity and freedom. So they accepted the balkanization which led to the fragmentation of Africa into smaller units called states.\(^{33}\)

It is a fact that the bourgeoisies have been for national unity in the areas in which capitalism was first engendered. They sought political unity to guarantee the integration of production and distribution, giving rise to what were then relatively large nation states in Britain, France and Germany as compared to the numerous feudal fiefs which previously existed. The failure of the African ruling class to effect meaningful unity boils down to the fact that they fear that larger territorial units might have negated their narrow class interests in their respective states as we mentioned earlier. It could be seen, therefore, that throughout the continent, none of the successful independence movements denies the basic validity of the boundaries created by imperialism.\(^{34}\) Of course, to have


\[^{33}\text{Ibid., p. 12.}\]

\[^{34}\text{Ibid.}\]
done so would have been to issue a challenge so profound as to rule out the preservation of petty bourgeois interests in a compromise independence worked out in conjunction with international capital. They maintain themselves as a class by fomenting internal divisions and by dependence on external capitalist powers. All across the continent, it could be seen that most African mini-states, if you will, are engaged in consolidating their territorial frontiers, in preserving the social relations prevailing inside these frontiers, and in protecting imperialism in the form of the monopolies and their respective states. The capitalist superpowers, directly and indirectly, individually and collectively, guarantee the existence of the African petty bourgeoisie as a ruling class and use them to penetrate and manipulate African political economy. This has been done so crudely and openly that one does not have to be specially informed or specially aware in order to perceive what has been going on.

In Africa today, all the activities or international capital are aimed at perpetuating the division of the continent which they initiated at the time of the partition. The petty bourgeoisie is showing that it seeks to maintain

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35 Ibid., pp. 10-16.

the division of the African masses, since the anti-colonial alliance with all other classes has gained its objective of formal independence. Pan-Africanism which calls for political unity of all African states with a total disregard to the artificial boundaries drawn by the colonialists has been so flouted by the present African regimes that the concept of African unity is dead for all practical purposes. In many respects, African countries have been further shut off from one another during the present neo-colonial phase than what it was during raw colonialism. Even within the context of the existing African nation-states, the African ruling class has seldom sought to build anything than tribal power bases, which means that, they seek division and not unity at all levels of political activity, be it national, continental, or international.

"The dominant mode of thinking in Africa today is inherited from the colonial masters and is given currency by the state apparatus." African leaders fight the bogey of communist threat rather than the reality of capitalist-imperialist oppression. Even the more progressive of this ruling class harbor and protect local reactionaries while neutralizing or eliminating socialist approaches to solving their problems.

37 Ibid.
In twelve, fifteen, or twenty years of constitutional independence, the various parts of Africa have scored no victories in ending exploitation and inequality. On the contrary, social differences have increased rapidly and the same applies to the amount of surplus extracted by foreign monopoly capital. In the spheres of production and technology, the so-called development decade of the sixties offers the spectacle of decreasing agricultural production, a declining share of world trade, and the proliferation of dependency structures because of the further penetration of multinational corporations. 39

It would be correct to say that the transformation of the African environment, of social and production relations, the break away with imperialism and the forging of African political and economic unity are all interrelated and important phenomena which Africans must fight for if their political independence is to be meaningful.

The arguments that we may advance in favor of African unity can be roughly divided into two categories: economic and political. Although the relative importance attached to each of these categories varies from one African country to another and from one era to the next, each of them deserves to be more fully elucidated.

In dealing with the economic arguments for Pan-Africanism, 39

Ibid
colonialism, has not only created micro-states in Africa and established rigid patterns of import-export economies, but the artificial and arbitrary colonial boundaries have created obstacles to the normal flow of economic activities. The independent African states are also too small, weak and poor to be able to develop individually. The neo-colonialist forces control their economies and make a mockery of their economic policies. To solve some of these economic problems and create favorable conditions for the promotion of African economic development, it is a must that the African states form a political union. Such a political union will (i) enable African countries with small internal markets to achieve economies of scale from larger industrial units producing for the amalgamated market; (ii) further specialization between individual members, in some cases exploiting different natural resources and other advantages of the federal units; (iii) increase Africa's bargaining power. The amalgamated market would also be more diversified in structure and therefore less vulnerable to external

40 Of the twenty-two independent states in West, Central and East Africa, four have less than one million inhabitants, three between one and two million, and nine between two and four million.

41 The underdeveloped and insignificant nature of inter-African trade is indicated by the fact that in 1962 it counted for 2.5 percent of Africa's overall foreign trade. Partly because the exports of most African states consist mostly of raw material and partly because the African states themselves belong to different currency and preferential zones, the bulk of Africa's trade is still primarily oriented towards the markets of the industrialized Western countries.
fluctuations.  

The political arguments for unification are equally important and compelling. Apart from keeping Africa out of Cold War conflicts, continental political unification would save the continent from all dangers and threats of imperialism and neo-colonialism. It would also rid the continent of all vestiges of racism and white domination. It will also enable Africans to take their own political destiny in their own hands. Only with unity can Africans really govern Africa, and their resources will be used for the benefit of Africa.

May we say that it is because of the unwillingness of the majority of African leaders to agree on a continental unity that Africa has become a dumping ground for the imperialist markets. The heavy dependence on the outside markets means that the life of a number of African countries hangs on the whims of outsiders. African export commodities have their prices determined by non-African buyers rather than by African producers. This is, of course, a simplification of a complex problem, but it illustrates the

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economic difficulties of the continent which, despite its wealth in oil, diamonds, gold and other precious metals and minerals, and indeed its potential for a "green revolution" in agriculture, has not yet evolved a mechanism capable of dove-tailing the economic needs and activities of the various countries in a way that would benefit Africa in general. 45

The OAU since its inception has faced several ideological and political tendencies and these tendencies continue to exist up until today, hence the difficulty for the OAU to come to a general agreement on conflict management. Indeed, the ideological divisions and differences have characterized the history of the OAU as evidence in the formation of the Monrovia, Casablanca and the Brazzaville Twelve as we mentioned earlier. 46 Besides, conflicting national attitudes towards economic development and political set-up, multi-national corporations, the questions of Black African trade and "dialogue" with South Africa, support for liberation movements, etc., have influenced the OAU. 47

On the "dialogue" issue, until about 1970, most members agreed that South Africa was impervious to peaceful negotia-

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45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

tions and must be challenged by supporting guerrilla action against it. There were few lonely voices of dissent, by such leaders as Malawi's Banda and Lesotho's Chief Jonathan.\footnote{Michael Wolfers, \textit{Politics in the Organization of African Unity} (London: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 1-36.} However, in 1970, the Ivory Coast made a major diplomatic thrust in favor of opening a "dialogue" with South Africa and as many as seventeen OAU members support the idea.\footnote{Yash Tandon, "South Africa and the OAU: The Dialogue on the Dialogue Issue," \textit{Mawazo} 3:2 (December 1971), pp. 3-15.} Though the dialogue strategists could not push their diplomatic initiative to full advantage at the critical OAU Summit at Addis Ababa in 1971, the diplomatic battle at the summit clearly reflected the basic division among members of the OAU.

To further support our contention that ideological divisions and differences have great impact on the OAU's ability in conflict management, let us take the case of Angola. At the first extraordinary summit of the OAU ON Angola during 10-16 January 1976, the OAU members were equally divided on the question of recognition of the MPLA government there.\footnote{Yash Tandon, "The OAU and the Principles of Universality of Membership," \textit{African Review} 1:4 (April 1972), pp. 52-61.} Again, at the 13th Summit meeting, the OAU assembly found itself in the throws of a severe internal crisis on the Polisario issue. In this case, both Morocco and Mauritania...
warned that they would disaffiliate themselves from the OAU entirely if the summit approved a pro-Western Sahara (Polisario Front) resolution tabled by Benin.  

The differing political and ideological attitudes and practices of the African states, which facilitates the unscrupulous intrusion of cold war and superpower rivalry in the continent, are fundamental and all pervasive. On the question of attitudes towards erstwhile colonial powers, the practice of African states is fundamentally divergent. The conclusion in February 1975 of the Lome Convention by a group of African states is clear illustration of the point.  

In the field of decolonization of Africa, though the "emancipation of all dependent territories" was listed as an aim of the OAU, and in spite of the many declarations of intent in that respect, it does not seem there was a clearly worked out plan as to how that aim should be realized. In fact, there was no agreement as to the extent and scope within which the OAU should embark on its policy of liberation. It is not surprising, therefore, that the OAU Liberation Committee suffered from lack of cooperation from the very beginning.  

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51 See Keesings Comtemporary Archives 1976, pp. 27595-27661.  


A study of liberation movements in Africa shows that the OAU backing for the liberation movements has not been uniform so to speak. For example, while the exile government of Angola (GRAE) headed by Holden Roberto, who was also the President of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) was supported by the moderate member states of the OAU, the radical MPLA, headed by Augustino Neto was backed by the radical group of African states. This split was evident even after Angola's independence on November 11, 1975. As pointed out earlier, in the first OAU Special Summit on the question of Angola, held between January 10-16, 1976 at Addis Ababa, the forty-six OAU members remained divided on the question of the recognition of the MPLA government.

Another case that may be worth mentioning is ending the illegal white minority regime in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). The Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by the white minority regime in Rhodesia had posed a major problem to the OAU. And yet, the OAU assembly on October 22, 1966 adopted the mildest possible resolution in that the OAU placed the main responsibility on the shoulders of Great Britain.

54 Ibid., pp. 48-53.
55 Ibid.
and the United Nations, simply urging the former to use force to prevent the UDI. Even the proposal for economic sanctions against Rhodesia was defeated as unrealistic. On November 11, 1965, Rhodesia proclaimed UDI. The African states could not push the Security Council to invoke in this case the mandatory enforcement action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. On its part, the OAU Council met at its sixth extraordinary session at Addis Ababa on December 3, 1965, and merely adopted the strongest possible resolution the OAU had ever passed. The resolution stated:

If the United Kingdom does not crush the rebellion and restore law and order, and thereby prepare the way for majority rule in Southern Rhodesia by December 15, 1965, the Member States of the OAU shall sever diplomatic relations on that date with the United Kingdom.

However, translating this threat into reality was not easy. On nine out of the then thirty-six member states of the OAU complied with the resolution. The annoyance of the nine with those who did not make the break rankled for a long time. President Nyerere of Tanzania described the refusal of some states to implement the resolution as having "dealt a death blow to the OAU."

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57 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
With these cases, we have seen that ideological differences that exist in the OAU made it very difficult for the organization to be effective in settlement of intra-regional conflict and/or any other issue affecting Africa as a whole.

We will now proceed to the next chapter to present a background of the Republic of Chad and the root cause of the Chadian conflict.
CHAPTER III

THE REPUBLIC OF CHAD AND THE ROOT CAUSE
OF THE CHADIAN CONFLICT

Our main concern in this chapter is to examine the root cause of the Chadian conflict; but before we do so, a brief historical background of Chad becomes necessary.

The Republic of Chad is a landlocked country in north central African bounded by Nigeria, Niger, Libya, Sudan, Central African Republic, and the Cameroun. It is about two and one half times the size of France, but with a sparse population of four and one half million which includes eleven main ethnic groups and 192 smaller ones. According to Samuel Decalo, the population can roughly be divided into fifty percent Muslims, forty-three percent followers of traditional religions, and about seven percent Christians. Most of the Muslim population resides in the north and share a common historical and cultural background. By the same token, most of the followers of traditional African religions and the Christians reside in the south and have a common heritage with Africa south of the Sahara. This is not to

suggest that the two broad groupings outlined above are monolithic; on the contrary, within both groups there is wide ethnic diversity and rivalry. Table 1 shows a general ethnic composition of the Chadian population. The two broad divisions mentioned above do capture a significant division of the population based on common work, culture and history.

The advance of Europeans into the Chadian region represented an expansion of French interests in Africa. The International Congress of Berlin in 1884, initially called to settle conflicting European claims in Africa, settled little in regard to separate national claims but served instead to accentuate the rivalry and to establish the ground rules for a new wave of competition. Zones of influence based on military and economic presence supplanted the former policy of free trade. 3

We find it necessary to give a quick idea of class structure in Chad. We consider that the ruling class, that is those who are directing the affairs of the state, the Emirs or what may be called Chiefs form one group; followed by the ruling class; after them come the artisans and the Fulani - traders, and then after that come the peasants properly speaking.

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TABLE 1

ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF CHAD 1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Southern Sedentary Groups</td>
<td>1,139,000</td>
<td>34.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sara</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mboum, Laka</td>
<td>112,000</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moundang</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toubouri</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massa (Banana)</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Semi-Sedentary &amp; Seminomadic Groups of the Sahel</td>
<td>902,000</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maba</td>
<td>170,000</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulala, Kuka</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haddad</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dadjo</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massalit</td>
<td>48,000</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moubi</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaghawa, Bideyat</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadjeray</td>
<td>87,000</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenembe</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budouma</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kotoko</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barma</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massalat</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>142,000</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Nomadic Groups</td>
<td>613,650</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toubou</td>
<td>121,650</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabs</td>
<td>460,000</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulani</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Other Groups</td>
<td>645,350</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,300,000</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ruling class who occupy a position of power with all privileges use their positions to manipulate and exploit all other groups in order to promote and attain their goals. For example, before Felix Malloum became the President through a coup d'état in 1975, he instigated the northerners to revolt against what he termed "the southern domination." The exploitation continues regime after regime. For instance, Hissene Habre and Goukouni Oueddei have their own standing army through conscription using religion and ethnicity as a means to divide each of these groups, even to the extent of making them to fight among themselves, and making it more difficult for these group of people to recognize who their real enemy is.

The village in Chad, like any other village in African country's was founded and organized by several extended families, which have their own network of relationships. Although certain traditions concerning collective ownership of the land have been preserved, the Chiefs or Emirs and their entourages have retained considerable privileges as regards ownership of land and the utilization of other people's labor; this means that the peasants who depend on the Emirs are obliged to work for a certain period each year for their existence.

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At the present neo-colonial dependent period, the Republic of Chad being a neo-colonial dependent state is ruled internally by the petty bourgeoisie or what may be called comprador-capitalists and externally tied to the former colonizer - France. To support this contention, we are making a particular reference to both the economic and political structures, set up by both governments - when Goukouni was President, and now that Hissene Habre is in charge. When Goukouni was the President, he appointed people from the upper echelon of the society as members of his cabinet. Hissene Habre followed the same trend when he became the President in 1982 by setting up a government which is also dominated by the ruling class. For empirical observation, politics in the Republic of Chad is structurally dominated by the petty bourgeoisie with little or no participation on the part of the masses as it can be seen in Table 2 that follows. Moreover, as the table indicates, the economic structure of Chad had remained the same, that is, essentially a colonial capitalist structure.

The petty bourgeoisie succeeded in assuming the leadership role in Chad after independence, and thus to supersede

6 Europa, Africa South of the Sahara, pp. 302-306.
7 Ibid., p. 308.
TABLE 2
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
(May 1983)

Heads of Government

President: Hissene Habre (took office 21 October 1982)

Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development - Djidingar Dono Ngardoum

Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation - Idriss Miskine

Minister of Internal Affairs and Security - Tahar Guinassou

Minister of Defense and Veterans - Routouang Yoma

Minister of Justice - Oudalbaye Naham

Minister of Economy and Trade - Ali Djalbord Diar

Minister for the Control of Natural Disasters - Taher Abdeldjelil

Minister for Livestock and Water Resources - Adoum Moussa Seil

Minister of Finance and Equipment - Elie Romba

Minister of Planning and Reconstruction - Joseph Yodeyman

Minister of Public Works, Mining and Petroleum - Hassan Djamous

Minister of Transport - Loi Mohamad Shawa

Minister at the President's Office for Information - Soumila Mahamat

Minister of Posts and Telecommunications - Assileck Halata

Minister of Education, Youth and Sports - Abba Sidick

Minister of Further Education and Research - Gouara Lassou

Minister of State Enterprises - Ngartokete Tatola

Minister of Labor and Women's Promotion - Doubangar Doregim

Minister of Health and Social Affairs - Koibla Djimasta

Minister of Tourism, Crafts, Forests and Natural Reserves - Kolbassia Vouna

the traditional rulers, because it was the only class that was politically and intellectually capable of representing its own class interests as though they were the general interests of the colonized society as a whole. The petty bourgeoisie on assuming power in Chad, has reduced considerably the power granted to Chiefs or Emirs by the colonial masters. The role of the State in Chad today, "is to take charge of the political interests of the bourgeoisie and to realize the function of political hegemony which the bourgeoisie is unable to achieve on its own." When this role is fulfilled at a moment of a severe political crisis, the result is likely to be an extreme inflation of executive power and exploitation of the masses. This seems to be the case in Chad.

Having conquered Chad, France did not apply a unified administrative policy to local chiefs and sultans until after 1920. The policy implemented was partly a function of the willingness and ability of the local chiefs to control the people under them and partly a function of their proximity to French administrative centers. Although French colonial policy in general favored the reduction of power of local authorities, in Chad greater reliance was placed on tradi-

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9 Ibid.

tional administrative structures and officials. This was particularly true in the northern areas which were largely populated by nomads and which was a considerable distance from the French administrative centers in the south.\textsuperscript{11}

The civil service during the colonial era was composed almost entirely of Europeans; Chadians were not offered the opportunity to train for administrative positions until the late 1950s.\textsuperscript{12} French colonial rule did not bring about any socio-economic advances in Chad. Indeed, Chad was very much neglected once it was finally conquered, especially since administrative appointments the AEF (French Equatorial Africa) in general (and Chad in particular) were the least attractive and/or desirable postings that were frequently assigned either to novice colonial administrators or to derelict officials as a sign of demotion and/or punishment. Most of those posted to the AEF were the dregs of the French colonial civil service.\textsuperscript{13} The development of local representative institutions was largely a post-World War II phenomenon. Under the administration of Governor General Francios-Joseph Reste, some experimentation in cooperatives


and local councils occurred before the war, but these efforts offered little permanent basis for future political development after the war and again reflected the French tendency to transfer to French Equatorial Africa (Afrique Equatoriale Francaise - AEF), institutions that had developed elsewhere, with little regard for the local setting and the state of political maturity.  

Initial economic exploitation of the territories of AEF was carried out through the use of concessionary companies, whose brutality, mismanagement, and corrupt activities provided material for the journals of political opposition parties in Paris. The fall of several French governments and the rapid exhaustion of resources eventually brought about the elimination of company concessions. Chad was generally spared this technique, except in the introduction of cotton production, because of its general lack of readily exploitable resources.  

The French colonial government in Chad used its controls over imports and import licenses and government supply and transport contracts not only as a means of revenue but also to keep economic activities under French control; moreover, French policy did not encourage African enterprise in Chad.

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as was the case also in other states in French Equatorial Africa. Because of Chad's geographic position and special ties with France, the French have long regarded the young Republic as an area of importance to the maintenance of France's presence in Africa. During the colonial era and up to the present, the bulk of armed resistance and rebellion has come from the Muslims particularly from the Bokou-Enedi-Tibesti (B.E.T.) region. Some observers suggest that the southern elites were more amenable to colonial domination hence the French recruited most of its officials from the south. French colonial policy did give more autonomy to the north mainly because of the inhospitable terrain (mountains and desert) while in the south a more structured bureaucracy evolved in the urban centers, particularly Ndjamena, the capital. The most modern city in Chad is the capital, Ndjamena, which was founded by Muslim pilgrims from West Africa. Figure 1 is a map of Chad showing prefectures and towns. The city is separated from Cameroun by the River Chari that has no bridge, so people cross the river in dugout canoes. Table 3 shows area and population prefectures.

In the Republic of Chad there are no railways and hardly any paved roads; during the rainy season, the poor tracks

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FIGURE 1

CHAD--1976, Showing Prefectures and Towns

Source: Samuel Decalo, Historical Dictionary of Chad.
### TABLE 3

**AREA AND POPULATION PREFECTURES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prefecture</th>
<th>Area (sq km)</th>
<th>Population (1979)</th>
<th>Density (per sq km)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Batha</td>
<td>88,800</td>
<td>354,000</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biltine</td>
<td>46,850</td>
<td>175,000</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti (BET)</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>88,000</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chari-Baguirmi</td>
<td>82,910</td>
<td>676,000</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guera</td>
<td>58,950</td>
<td>207,000</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanem</td>
<td>114,520</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lac</td>
<td>22,320</td>
<td>135,000</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logone Occidental</td>
<td>8,695</td>
<td>295,000</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logone Oriental</td>
<td>28,035</td>
<td>307,000</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayo-Kebbi</td>
<td>30,105</td>
<td>684,000</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moyen-Chari</td>
<td>45,180</td>
<td>524,000</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouadai</td>
<td>76,240</td>
<td>347,000</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salamat</td>
<td>63,000</td>
<td>107,000</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tandjile</td>
<td>18,045</td>
<td>302,000</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,284,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,405,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: UN Statistical Yearbook, 1979*

Connecting the urban centers are transformed into impassable swamps. With Ndjamen some 700 miles from the coast, most imports have travelled up to 1,800 miles to reach Chad.

The poor communications act as a major developmental constraint and inhibit national unification. Intense socio-economic differences sharply separate various population groups, reflecting fundamental diverging patterns of social
organization and lifestyles, and deeply entrenched inter-ethnic animosities. These cleavages in general parallel the country's internal historic tug-of-war, though other divisions are often of equal intensity. While the locus of authority since independence has been N'djamena, the modern capital, this power stems from the economic viability, cultural unity, and numerical strength of the Sara south, with a 'reactionary' Muslim counter-pull exerted by Abeche, the imperial capital of Ouadai, an anarchic element as from pre-colonial days, represented by the Toubou of Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti (BET).

In the far north of the country reside the semi-nomadic, highly independent, and taciturn Toubou who have formed the backbone of the rebellions against N'djamena since 1966. Pacified since 1920s - having previously contested the French entry under the banners of both Turkey and the Sanusiya - the Toubou were eventually pushed into rebellion by President Tombalbaye's inept rule in 1966.

Unlike elsewhere in francophone Africa, eighty years of colonial rule did not effect any major changes in Chad.

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Though the French fought hard to conquer the territory, once it was theirs it was grossly neglected. This is one of the reasons they refused to build such infrastructures as railroads, and pave roads because they were not interested in the development of the area but were interested in siphoning off the raw materials which they needed in developing their own country - France.

In no sector was neglect more evident than in education. In 1921, for example, there was only one school in Fort Lamy (Ndjamena), with barely fifty pupils; in 1933 there were still only eighteen qualified teachers in the entire colony, and the largest school had just three grades and 135 pupils, mainly children of the Senegalese tirailleurs that the French had brought with them. The first secondary school was not established until after World War II, and as late as 1958 there were only three in the entire country. While the pace of education greatly escalated after independence, the overall rates of scholarization still lagged behind those other least developed countries in the former Federation d'Afrique Equatoriale Francaise.

In 1971 the country had no institutions of higher learning. Students who wished to further their education

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21It was only in 1962 that the first two Chadian doctors - Bajoglo Baroun and Outel Bono, both later to play a prominent role in politics - grated and returned from Paris. See Harold Nelson, et al., Area Handbook for Chad, pp. 150-154.

22Ibid., pp. 154-156.
beyond the secondary level were required to enroll in colleges and universities abroad. Of the eighty-three students enrolled in such institutions in 1966-67, all were male; thirty percent were studying in France, and the remainder in Belgium, the People's Republic of the Congo, and Senegal.23 The first European explorers arrived in Chad, part of several early African empires, in the 1800s. The country became a French protected state around the turn of the century. It became part of French Equatorial Africa in 1910 and gained its independence in 1960.24

French colonialism, of course, had a collective impact on the area that was twofold: (1) the arbitrary drawing of territorial boundaries and the implementation of divide and rule tactics resulted in the exacerbation of long standing class, ethnic and religious cleavages, and (2) colonial domination resulted in the chronic 'underdevelopment' of the country. In other words, the collision between pre-colonial social formations in the area with the capitalist social formation of France resulted in the intensification of exploitation and forcible subordination of the country's socio-economic and political structures and practices.

After the military conquest of Chad carried out between 1916,
the country was ruthlessly exploited. 25

The development of politics of Chad was dominated from the initial years after World War II by political forces and considerations originating in France. Local elections were won largely by members of the European dominated Chadian Democratic Union (UDT), associated with the metropolitan Assembly of French People (Rassemblement du Peuple Francais - RPF). The UDT ruled with rigid administrative policy, and government administration members who became identified with the opposition Chadian Progressive Party or the Independent Socialist Party of Chad (Parti Socialiste Independance du Tchad - PSIT) were subject to dismissal or transfer to distant posts. 26 The number of Chadians engaged in party politics by Europeans who were more interested in the struggle between the (Rassemblement du Peuple Francais - RPF), and French Socialist Party, and the French Communist Party was made possible by encouraging internal divisions in Chad.

It comes as no surprise that today Chad is one of the poorest and least developed countries in the world. The legacy of colonial and neo-colonial exploitation can be illustrated graphically by a glance at the socio-economic data for the country. Chad has a per capita income of only

25 See Samuel Decalo, Historical Dictionary of Chad, p. 70.

eighty dollars ($80.00) per year, a GNP of $290 million and a national budget of $100 million. These figures should be contrasted with Chad's foreign debt of over $18.5 million. These figures indicate that the economy is distorted and incapable of producing a good standard of living for the overwhelming majority of the population. Table 4 shows a general budget of Chad from 1976 to 1978. The civil war and Sahel droughts have only added to the problems of survival for the peoples of Chad. Other data that should be considered here include: an illiteracy rate of ninety-three percent, male life expectancy of twenty-nine years, female life expectancy of thirty-five years and an infant mortality rate of 200 per 1,000 live births.

In summary, it can be safely argued that Chad is a chronic case of underdevelopment. The objective conditions described above provide the basis for the present conflict. Armed with this brief characterization of the country's background, we can now proceed to look at some of the root causes of the Chadian conflict.

Chad, a vast landlocked country in central Africa has had an unhappy history since independence in 1960, and has been riven by armed rebellion since 1965. Figure 2 shows a


28 These statistics reflect only estimates made in 1976. The present situation can only be presented to be much worse. See Europa, Africa South of the Sahara 1983-84, pp. 209-301.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>1978</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Revenue</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct taxation</td>
<td>3,331</td>
<td>3,356</td>
<td>3,661</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local taxation</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poll tax</td>
<td>1,350</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company taxation</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect taxation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs receipts</td>
<td>9,025</td>
<td>8,774</td>
<td>9,551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production and consumption taxes</td>
<td>7,675</td>
<td>7,489</td>
<td>8,024</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other revenue</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posts and telecommunications</td>
<td>1,061</td>
<td>1,042</td>
<td>1,232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>1,406</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>358</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>137</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraordinary revenue</td>
<td>2,023</td>
<td>2,240</td>
<td>3,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>15,785</td>
<td>16,182</td>
<td>17,084</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Expenditure</strong></th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>1978</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public debt interest</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>12,261</td>
<td>13,717</td>
<td>14,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>4,261</td>
<td>5,254</td>
<td>6,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1,751</td>
<td>1,896</td>
<td>1,978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1,395</td>
<td>1,213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public health</td>
<td>1,150</td>
<td>1,241</td>
<td>1,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Projects</td>
<td>1,752</td>
<td>1,022</td>
<td>1,618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State intervention</td>
<td>1,564</td>
<td>1,311</td>
<td>1,086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>15,785</td>
<td>16,182</td>
<td>17,084</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE 2
POLITICAL MAP OF CHAD - SHOWING MAJOR CITIES

NIGER
LIBYA
EGYPT
CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE

Chad

Lake Chad

N'Djamena
Fort Foureau

Zouar

Moundou

Logone

Chari

Bahr Serra

Bahr Aouk

Bahr Salamat

SCALE 1:10,000,000
1" = 160 miles
political map of Chad with major cities. Independence mainly meant a simple changing of the guard and the manifold problems inherited from the colonial era were not approached from the standpoint of seeking fundamental solutions.

During Tombalbaye's rule, the conflict was largely between the indigenous African people of the south and Saharan Arab Muslims of the north. The indigenous African people of the south, as we mentioned earlier, were relatively receptive to French assimilationism, which gave them an upper hand over the Saharan Arab Muslims of the north in bureaucracy, colonial politics and position of privileges. When formal independence came, the northerners mounted resistance to the authority of the southern dominated government and bureaucracy. This was exacerbated by the introduction of the one-party system by Tombalbaye's regime. When Ngarta Tombalbaye became the nation's first president at independence, he effected a gradual concentration of administrative, political and military powers in his own hands. At the outset, French administrators were replaced at regional governmental levels in the Arabized areas by southerners who were from the President's ethnic group. The serious administrative inefficiencies that occurred created great animosity toward the government.²⁹

²⁹Samuel Decalo, Regionalism, Political Decay and Civil Strife in Chad," pp. 24-50.
The Arabized people deeply resent what they regard as political domination by the southern elements. They object to the obligation to pay taxes on livestock, which the central government has imposed as a primary source of income, as well as the civic taxes that must be produced from meager incomes. They also feel that their part of the country has been comparatively neglected in the government's programs aimed at national development.30

Resentment heightened with the 1962 ban on all political parties except the southern based Progressive Party of Chad (Parti Progressiste Tchadien - PPT), and the adoption of a new constitution in 1963 advocating a strong presidential form of government. Tombalbaye's purge of Muslim politicians from his cabinet in 1963 and the dissolution of the National Assembly drew Arab opposition.31 Tax riots in the Sahel in 1965 also grew into banditry, violent defiance of the central government and, finally, organized guerrilla resistance.

In September 1963 there were demonstrations and riots at Fort Lamy, resulting in heavy casualties and numerous arrests. There was even greater violence in central Chad two years later, heralding the beginning of Chad's long drawn out rebellion, which Tombalbaye at first denounced as a plot to exploit ethnic and religious antipathies by northern Muslims.

30 Ibid., p. 56.

31 Etienne Mallard, "No Alternative to Tombalbaye?" Combat (October 20, 1969), pp. 8-9.
having close ties with fellow Arabs in Sudan and Egypt.\(^{32}\)

It should be noted that Tombalbaye's use of the term "northern Muslim" did not apply to the BET alone, but to all Muslims, both black and Arab, living outside the five southern prefectures. Because educated Sara tribesmen formed the backbone of the civil service, they were inevitably posted throughout Chad, and in regions other than the south they had little contact with the indigenous population, which they tended to rule with a heavy hand.\(^{33}\)

In foreign affairs, Tombalbaye's views were colored by the French administration's early hostility toward him as a militant PPT campaigner, and also by a parochialism born of personal experience that was limited to French Equatorial Africa.\(^{34}\)

Just as in his social and political contracts Tombalbaye became mistrustful and withdrew more and more into himself, so in foreign policy he grew increasingly isolationist. Gradually he severed the ties that Lisette had formed with the RDA and had perpetuated with the FEA countries of the UDEAC.\(^{35}\)


\(^{34}\)Ibid., p. 27.

\(^{35}\)Samuel Decalo, *Historical Dictionary of Chad*, pp. 43-47.
Chad's attainment of sovereign status enabled Tombalbaye to establish diplomatic relations with and seek aid from a wide range of countries with a view to making Chad less dependent on France. His diplomacy had no ideological orientation, but was based on realpolitik. Soon little was left of his inheritance from Lisette other than such measures and policies as would be of use in reaching his primary goal of governing Chad with a wholly free hand. To achieve this, he first had to dispose of his internal opponents, and to eliminate them Tombalbaye was not above enlisting help of any external forces that promised their cooperation.

Tombalbaye's tightening of his control over the bureaucracy and the chiefs met with great opposition. By 1963, however, when the repression that followed the outbreaks in September clearly indicated that his major targets had become "northerners" and Muslims, opposition among those two elements of the population began to crystallize, leading eventually to the armed revolt against Tombalbaye's rule.

The regime of Tombalbaye was thoroughly corrupt and

36 Ibid., p. 49.


managed to stay in power mainly through French military and economic support. When France realized that Tombalbaye could no longer represent their interest, they organized a coup d'etat on April, 1975 which killed him. The proclamation issued by the authors of the coup accused the President of having despised the armed forces of having cast a slur on national unity and of pursuing disastrous economic policies.

The French troops stationed at N'djamena did not intervene. General Felix Malloum who had earlier been implicated in President Pompidou's alleged plan to overthrow Tombalbaye in 1973, was installed as the new President on April 1975. The coup came at a time when success of the liberation movements could no longer be considered negligible.

May 13, 1975 saw the formation of the Supreme Military Council (CSM) headed by General Felix Malloum. The new leaders promptly endorsed Chad's existing international commitments, dissolved the National Assembly and political parties, disbanded the general paraphernalia of government, released some political prisoners, and promised Chadians a

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41 Ibid., pp. 1103-1105.
43 See Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, Conflict in Chad, pp. 64-66.
new constitution and democratic elections. Moreover, no spectacular vendettas were undertaken against members of Tombalbaye's government, and only a few of the most oppressive and venal of them were arrested. In mid-May, 1975, the CSM sent out three teams to "explain" the coup and its aims to Chadians throughout the country.

In the provisional government of May 13, 1975 (confirmed on August 16), eight of the nine ministers were members of the CSM. Furthermore, although four civilian technocrats were appointed to rehabilitate the economy, the key portfolios remained in the hands of the military. To be sure, more posts were given to Muslims than in the previous regime, but there was no corresponding improvement in the ethnic and regional imbalance. Late in 1975, the authority of the central government and its head was strengthened by the banning of all political demonstrations and the replacement of elected municipal councils by prefects appointed by the N'djamena authorities. Already in May, the office of paramount chief had been abolished (although the current incumbents were reprieved by lifetime tenure), and within three months, eight of Chad's fourteen prefectures were headed by newly appointed prefects. On November 21, strikes, of which there

44 Ibid., p. 67.
45 Samuel Decalo, "Regionalism, Political Decay and Civil Strife in Chad," p. 100.
46 Ibid., pp. 100-104.
have been, fifteen since the coup d'etat, were forbidden. Thus labor grievances were added to the other causes of the unrest and impatience felt by many Chadians.  

On the credit side of the ledger, Malloum's accomplishments were not widely appreciated, perhaps because they were to some degree negative, in that they put an end to certain abuses. Thus arbitrary arrests, a fairly common practice in Tombalbaye's time, virtually ceased, and some government measures contributed to reviving the country's economy. Taxes were reduced, as were increased; imports of essential consumer goods were encouraged; and a lid was placed on some soaring prices.  

As regards foreign relations, goodwill missions were sent to Arab governments, but no progress was made in including Libya to abandon the Aozou Strip. With the failure of efforts by various leaders in Africa and Europe to liberate Madame Claustre, Franco-Chadian relations worsened, and this overshadowed all other external issues. Incensed by the direct dealing by Paris (and Bonn) with Habre, which entailed the payment of ransom money and furnish-


48 Alex Rondos, "What Hope for Chad?" West Africa (May 5, 1976), p. 6.


ing of non-military supplies, Malloum demanded on September 27 that France withdraw its troops from Chad. Malloum may have gained some popularity by issuing that ultimatum, but Chad's economy suffered in terms of the compensation France has been paying for the use of military bases and the blow to local trade that resulted from the departure of its free spending Legionnaires.

Realizing that he had yet to win the hearts and minds of his compatriots, Malloum called a halt to military operations against the FAN and courageously toured the rebel areas in the winter of 1975-76. Preaching national unity and reconciliation, he frequently proclaimed his willingness to negotiate with any and all rebels, and even voiced praise of Habre as a patriot.

On the first anniversary of the April 13, 1975, coup d'etat, Malloum was the target of an unsuccessful assassination attempt in which reportedly four Chadian were killed and seventy-two wounded. Concurrently, Chadian students in Paris occupied their country's embassy in protest against Malloum's suppression of dissident trade unionists and youth groups as well as the non-payment of their scholarships.

52 Ibid., pp. 141-147.
53 See Samuel Decalo, Historical Dictionary of Chad, pp. 61-70.
These disappointing reactions to his campaign of conciliation persuaded Malloum that he must tighten his grip on the country, and in the late spring of 1976 he reorganized the armed forces and then reshuffled his government.  

Generally speaking, the military junta that replaced the first government did not bring any significant change in the composition of leadership or administration of the country.

Like his predecessor, Felix Malloum continued to fight the northern rebels with French troops. The problem of nationalist struggles for power increased tremendously under the rule of General Felix Malloum. In January 1978, an agreement was signed in Khartoum by President Malloum and Habre in the hope of securing a cease-fire and forming a government, to include FROLINAT, which commanded nationwide support. At the same time, however, FROLINAT settled its internal differences and unified its command under a Revolution Council led by Goukouni Oueddei. The various factions or movements that were fighting against the central government included Forces Armees Populaires (FAP). The name of Forces Armees Populaires, given originally to the combined armies of Goukouni and Acyle in March 1978, was retained by Goukouni for his own Toubou forces, after the alliance of

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54 Ibid., pp. 68-73.
55 Ibid., pp. 73-78.
56 See Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, Conflict in Chad, pp. 148-151.
the two leaders collapsed into mutual hostility in July and August of that year. Another faction was Forces Armees du Nord (FAN). The FAN was composed of Toubous of the mountains and plains of the BET who had rebelled against the Tombalbaye regime beginning in 1965. In the early 1970s, Goukouni Oueddi, son of the Derde of Tibesti, yielded his command to the Second Liberation Army to Hissene Habre, and the army became known as the FAN.

Another faction that was fighting against the central government was the "Volcan" armies. The original "Volcan" army was the heir to the First Liberation Army, founded by Ibrahim Abatcha in 1966 and taken over by El-Baghalani four years later. It may be there were other factions fighting against the central government but current data concerning these factions or movements are lacking.

In September 1978, the FROLINAT launched a general offensive inflicting crushing defeats on the Chad National Army, and captured Fada and the northern capital of Faya-Largeau. Felix Malloum was forced to appeal to Libya and France to arrest the progress of the victorious rebels. A cease-fire was concluded after conferences at Sebha and

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57 Ibid., pp. 149-152.
60 Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, Conflict in Chad, pp. 122-130.
Benghazi which amounted to a de facto division of the country between FROLINAT and Malloum's government. The hope that this agreement would be the basis for a unified government including Malloum, Goukouni and Habre floundered on Malloum's refusal to agree to Goukouni's demand that all French troops in Chad be withdrawn. Goukouni's forces inflicting heavy defeats on Malloum's government forces, led to his resignation as the President of Chad on March 23, 1979.

The Economic Fabric of Chad

As we mentioned earlier, Chad is one of the world's poorest countries, even inside the category of the twenty-five classified by the United Nations as "least developed," while the ravages of Sahel drought have further injured the economy.

The country's immense dimensions - 1,000 miles from north to south, and 500 miles in width - coupled with an extremely rudimentary internal communications network, further limits prospects for economic development or the elimination of regional disparities. The distance from the

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61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 See Samuel Decalo, Historical Dictionary of Chad, pp. 31-38.
coast multiplies the costs for every commodity, raising the prices of imports, and driving down local producers' prices so that they may remain competitive in world markets. Table 5 shows the principal commodity exports in Chad from 1961-1974.

**TABLE 5**

**PRINCIPAL COMMODITY EXPORTS, 1961 - 1974**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>Cotton Value in m. CFA</th>
<th>% of total Exports</th>
<th>Cattle and Animal Products Value in m. CFA</th>
<th>% of total Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>4229</td>
<td>79.9</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>2820</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>4313</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>5173</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>5207</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>817</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>4509</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>909</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>5504</td>
<td>83</td>
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<td>1968</td>
<td>5778</td>
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<td>1969</td>
<td>6586</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>10.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>5910</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>1762</td>
<td>22.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>5257</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>2004</td>
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<td>1972</td>
<td>6096</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>1546</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>5380</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>1471</td>
<td>17.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>6040</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>1105</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Crop farming and nomadic cattle-raising occupy most of the population and accounts for nearly one-half of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Other principal crops grown in Chad are millet, sorghum, manioc, rice and wheat. Cotton is indigenous to Chad. Table 6 shows other principal crops in Chad. The purchase, ginning, and marketing of cotton in Chad are undertaken by a single company, Societe Cotonniere.
TABLE 6

OTHER PRINCIPAL CROPS IN CHAD
('000 metric tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>1979</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1981</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice (paddy)</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millet and sorghum</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweet potatoes and yams</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cassava (manioc)</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulses</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundnuts (in shell)</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sesame seed</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cottonseed</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton (lint)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dates</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


du Tchad (COTONCHAD), which purchases the entire output.\textsuperscript{65}

The cultivation of cotton was imposed upon the southern populations (so that they might pay the poll-tax and that the colony might start paying its keep). Despite the centrality of cotton to the economy and its role as the principal economic occupation of the majority of the population, its cultivation is neither favorably regarded nor is its expansion for increased exports assured.\textsuperscript{66}

It could be seen that the incessant factional fighting in Chad, that plagued the country since independence had

\textsuperscript{65}Kessing's Contemporary Archives (September 18-22, 1978), p. 1064.

\textsuperscript{66}Harold D. Nelson, et al., Area Handbook for Chad, pp. 84-89.
slowed down exploration of minerals. The current oil finds, first discovered late in 1975, are expected to climb enormously as additional thorough exploration occurs whenever it is possible. Frond has been the principal mineral export but deposits of iron, tin, tungsten, kaolin and bentonite have also been found. Other minerals like uranium, copper, nickel, assisterite, and gold have been discovered as prospects for the nation's economic strength whenever the war allowed this to happen.

Chad has a chronic trade deficit. In 1974 the deficit was 11,803 million francs CFA as shown in Table 7. Table 8 shows principal trading partners with Chad. Nevertheless, Chad continues to import most of its needs from France, hence France remains Chad's principal trading partner for many years. Foreign investment is dominated by France, with the U.S. participation in some of the investments. France continues to enjoy surpluses in trade with Chad. The following Table 9 shows the pattern of trade between Chad and France year-in and year-out.

In 1970, the French trade surplus was 31.8 million francs. Eight years later it increased to 256 million francs, representing an enormous increase of seven hundred and five

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### TABLE 7

**FOREIGN TRADE, 1960-1974**
*(figures in millions of CFA francs)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Deficit</th>
<th>Exports as % of Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>6235</td>
<td>3271</td>
<td>2964</td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>6253</td>
<td>5293</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>84.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>7472</td>
<td>4084</td>
<td>3388</td>
<td>56.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>7185</td>
<td>5604</td>
<td>1581</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>8537</td>
<td>6544</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>76.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>7705</td>
<td>8722</td>
<td>983</td>
<td>87.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>7962</td>
<td>5848</td>
<td>2114</td>
<td>73.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>9901</td>
<td>6635</td>
<td>3266</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>9494</td>
<td>6824</td>
<td>2670</td>
<td>71.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>13900</td>
<td>8026</td>
<td>5874</td>
<td>57.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>17216</td>
<td>8205</td>
<td>9011</td>
<td>47.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>17220</td>
<td>7787</td>
<td>9433</td>
<td>45.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>15476</td>
<td>9028</td>
<td>6448</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>18213</td>
<td>8483</td>
<td>9730</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>20859</td>
<td>9056</td>
<td>11803</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE 8

**PRINCIPAL TRADING PARTNERS**
*(million francs CFA)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>1973</th>
<th>1974</th>
<th>1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium/Luxembourg</td>
<td>592.9</td>
<td>762.6</td>
<td>208.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>725.7</td>
<td>932.8</td>
<td>1,364.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>232.6</td>
<td>285.1</td>
<td>245.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China, People's Republic</td>
<td>254.8</td>
<td>218.7</td>
<td>289.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>774.5</td>
<td>474.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>7,728.8</td>
<td>7,642.6</td>
<td>10,597.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>489.4</td>
<td>229.4</td>
<td>392.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, Fed. Republic</td>
<td>410.9</td>
<td>651.0</td>
<td>714.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>224.7</td>
<td>386.0</td>
<td>1,107.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>232.9</td>
<td>827.9</td>
<td>2,116.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>2,194.3</td>
<td>2,562.4</td>
<td>2,805.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>616.0</td>
<td>669.0</td>
<td>594.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>418.7</td>
<td>281.6</td>
<td>412.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>255.4</td>
<td>373.4</td>
<td>1,542.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>720.8</td>
<td>2,025.1</td>
<td>1,786.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 8 - continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>1973</th>
<th>1974</th>
<th>1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>197.1</td>
<td>128.2</td>
<td>251.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>208.4</td>
<td>180.4</td>
<td>174.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>397.9</td>
<td>316.9</td>
<td>492.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>215.0</td>
<td>297.6</td>
<td>683.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>54.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, Fed. Republic</td>
<td>92.1</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>129.3</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>538.9</td>
<td>387.8</td>
<td>1,976.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>37.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>121.9</td>
<td>496.5</td>
<td>152.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE 9

CHAD IMPORTS AND EXPORTS WITH FRANCE  
(in millions of French francs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imports from France</td>
<td>100.8</td>
<td>159.9</td>
<td>261.3</td>
<td>306.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports to France</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>50.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


percent. The French own most of Chad's industry including the major industries in Chad. The currency, the CFA franc, is issued by the Bank of the Central African States (BEAC) and tied to the French franc. This indeed demonstrates that Chad's economy is heavily dependent on the French economy. Chad's imports from the UDEAC (Central African Economic and
Customs Unions) countries fell after her withdrawal from UDEAC from 3,500m. francs CFA in 1975.\textsuperscript{69} Substantial deficits with her former UDEAC partners continue to be recorded (exports to UDEAC amounted to 402m. francs CFA in 1975).

Since independence in 1960 Chad has continued to be heavily dependent upon foreign financial assistance. France continued to be the principal supplier of foreign aid including direct budgetary assistance which amounted to about 2,500m. francs CFA in 1976.\textsuperscript{70} In that year approximately half of the aid disbursed (26,000m. francs CFA) was of French origin and rather more than half of that was for technical assistance in agriculture, education, and health. Of course, none of these aids are given without strings attached. The heavy dependence on French aid for economic and other so-called support, are the causes of underdevelopment in Chad.

In 1980, the Transitional Government of National Unity inherited an internal public debt of about 10,000m. francs CFA, while the state's external balance was aggravated by a massive outflow of currency (the CFA franc, linked to the French franc, remains fully convertible) caused by


\textsuperscript{70} See Europa, \textit{Africa South of the Sahara}, p. 316.
departing businessmen. Table 10 shows the balance of payments from 1975 to 1977.

**TABLE 10**

**BALANCE OF PAYMENTS**

(US $ million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1977</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Merchandise exports f.o.b.</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>100.8</td>
<td>106.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchandise imports f.o.b.</td>
<td>-126.2</td>
<td>-115.3</td>
<td>-142.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade balance</td>
<td>-68.3</td>
<td>-14.5</td>
<td>-35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports of services</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports of services</td>
<td>-103.8</td>
<td>-99.9</td>
<td>-107.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance on goods and services</td>
<td>-125.6</td>
<td>-86.6</td>
<td>-117.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private unrequited transfers (net)</td>
<td>-8.1</td>
<td>-4.2</td>
<td>-14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government unrequited transfers (net)</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>85.5</td>
<td>102.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Balance</td>
<td>-60.4</td>
<td>-5.3</td>
<td>-28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct capital investment (net)</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other long-term capital (net)</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-term capital (net)</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>-7.0</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net errors and omissions</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>-6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (net monetary movements)</td>
<td>-22.7</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>-3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valuation changes (net)</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official financial (net)</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>-9.2</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in reserves</td>
<td>-11.9</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Since 1971 development expenditures through the budget have become negligible. Expenditures on defense and internal security continue to dominate the budget and accounted in 1973 for more than one quarter of total expenditure.

Hissene Habre's government introduced a new budget for 1983, with allocations totalling 36,000m. francs CFA. On

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71 Ibid., p. 318.
the revenue side, however, only 8,000m. francs CFA were expected to be raised from total taxation, with the balance to be financed out of foreign aid. Almost one half of public expenditure (17,000m. francs CFA) is allocated to defense and security, leaving little for development spending. This is because the government is maintaining a 35,000 man strong national army and faces continuing security problems, particularly in the north. The economic problems of the country have been exacerbated in recent years by the disappointing progress of agriculture, by the disastrous drought conditions and, above all, by the protracted civil war.

Major Factions in the Chadian Conflict

One of the most significant developments in the country's post-independence era was the formation of the Front for the Liberation of Chad (FROLINAT) in 1966. After 1966 the armed rebellion against the neo-colonial regime became more systematic and attracted significant backing from a variety of sources. Although FROLINAT has been racked with factional strife since its beginnings, it

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73 Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, Conflict in Chad, pp. 20-23.

was able to secure control of the northern half of the country by 1977-1978. The success of FROLINAT's military strategy, moreover, prompted the Supreme Military Council's (CSM) government of Felix Malloum to officially recognize the movement and seek national reconciliation. In fact, if it were not for the presence of French troops Malloum's government would have been toppled by the guerrilla offensive of 1977 and 1978.

Malloum at the urging of France sought to break the momentum of guerrilla struggle by forming a new government with former guerrilla leader Hissene Habre. This agreement was signed January 1978, in Khartoum, Sudan, and elevated Hissene Habre to Prime Minister. Political observers, however, said that the signature on January 25 of a "basic charter" was not in itself a spectacular political event. It simply confirmed the two parties' will, expressed in an earlier Khartoum statement, to lay the foundations for Chadian national unity. The original Khartoum agreement called for the formation of a provisional government of national union which would help bring about reconciliation among all forces in the country.

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75 Ibid., p. 5907.


It was believed that the basic charter would provide the "institutional framework for the Republic of Chad until the adoption of a constitution and the establishment of the organs stemming from it."

Under the Khartoum Accord, a new provisional government would have the task of implementing a detailed political program according to a precise timetable. It would lead to general elections for a constituent assembly, which would result in political institutions. However, while there was no official word on the contents of the "basic charter, it was believed to provide for a "security and defense commission" incorporating leaders of General Felix Malloum and Hissene Habre. It was also thought to provide for a 'consultative council' with both of these new bodies supervising strict application of the Khartoum Accord. That would involve progressive dissolution of Malloum's ruling Higher Military Council (CSM) and the designation of a president of the Republic and a prime minister responsible for forming a new government. It was through this agreement that General Felix Malloum had become the president of the Republic of Chad, with Hissene Habre nominated as the Prime Minister. For President Malloum

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his new appointment at that time could be presented as a
success for his policy of national reconciliation. Super-
ficially, it was the first tangible result since the policy
was announced when he came to power in April, 1975 after the
assassination of President Tombalbaye.

The new government of President Malloum and Prime
Minister Habre proved to be unworkable and by February,
1979, fierce fighting broke out in the capital city. One
reason that may be advanced for the failure of this agree-
ment was that General Malloum did not include the most
hardline armed opposition to his regime: 80 the Libyan
backed faction of FROLINAT (Chad National Liberation Front)
which is now known as GUNT (Transnational Government of
National Unity). The Prime Minister Hissene Habre broke
away from FROLINAT because of alleged Libyan involvement
in the conflict. As Habre backed out of the Union govern-
ment, he went back to organize his armed forces to launch
a new attack on the government of Felix Malloum. The new
offensive by Habre's armed forces sent Felix Malloum into
exile. 81

Once again, November 10, 1979, saw the formation of a
Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT) which was

80 See Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, Conflict
in Chad, pp. 46-49.

81 See Harold D. Nelson, et al., Area Handbook for Chad,
p. 86.
agreed upon in Lagos. The accord was set up with Goukouni as President, Kamougue as Vice-President, and Hissene Habre as the Defense Minister.

The creation of the Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT) under the leadership of Goukouni Oueddei was however greeted with a sigh of relief and a measure of guarded optimism. It was maintained that the composition of the GUNT regime in Chad, and especially the enhanced role of the defeated Sara South within it, might possibly stabilize a situation still exceedingly volatile and inherently unstable. Yet, as West Africa cautioned, "Twenty years of government by a group unrepresentative of the country, pretending to fill the vacuum at the center of power and doing so with conspicuous ineffectiveness, cannot be easily erased." Even given the sincerity and goodwill of eleven factions in the GUNT power hierarchy - which is far from assured, because every conceivable opportunistic faction has been included was an attempt to bring unity, peace and stability to Chadians who have never experienced any of these since independence.

84 Samuel Decalo, Historical Dictionary of Chad, p. 31.
Having assumed power as the President, Goukouni Oueddei's Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT) never showed itself able to administer the sprawling nation, wracked by war and recurrent poverty. Forged at a peace conference in August, 1979, GUNT encompasses eleven Chadian political and military factions representing various regional, ethnic and political tendencies, and the differences among them were simply never overcome. As leader of a shakey coalition, Goukouni began a balancing act between Libya and French pressures. Conscious of Gaddafi's territorial ambitions on Chad, he had at one time threatened to fight what he called "Libyan imperialism." But eventually, he accepted Libyan assistance to neutralize Habre, his Defense Minister who was seeking to gain total control in the civil war stemming from deep distrust between themselves.

The Transitional Government of National Unity led by Goukouni did not function, so to speak, and President Goukouni felt betrayed when the OAU troops refused to side with him and to engage in the fighting against Habre's army. In mid 1982, Habre returned with an armed force to take control of the government; and Goukouni fled to Cameroun.

85 "Chad: Habre's Turn," Africa News 12 (June 14, 1982), pp. 5-6.

It could be observed that the current fighting is mainly between Goukouni of GUNT, who is being aided by Libya, and President Habre, who is receiving assistance from France and the United States. A brief breakdown of major contending forces in the Chadian conflict would include the following:

1. Peoples Armed Forces (F.A.P.) led by Goukouni Oueddei. This is now called Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT).

2. Northern Army Forces (FAN) led by Hissene Habre.

3. Force Armee de l'Occident (F.O.A.) led by Moussa Modela. This force was created out of remains of the 3rd Army of FROLINAT and is loyal to the F.A.P.


5. Front d'Action Commune Provisoire (F.A.C.P.) led by Mahamat Abba Seid.

6. Conseil Democratique de la Revolution (C.P.R.) led by Acyl Ahmat and allied with (F.A.C.P.).

7. FROLINAT First Army or Volcan Force led by Abdoulaye Adoum Dana.

8. FROLINAT Original led by Abba Siddik based in Algiers.

9. FROLINAT Fondamental led by Hadjaro Senoussi.

10. FROLINAT Third Army or Mouvement pour la Liberation du Tchad (MPLT) led by Aboubakar Abdellrahaman. These forces were almost wiped out by Goukouni.

11. Union National Democratique (U.N.D.) led by Facho Balam and supported mainly by southern professionals.

It should be clear that these eleven factions do not at all have the same political and military power.

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Actually, the most powerful groups in the conflict seem to be Goukouni's GUNT and Habre's FAN. But since 1979 all eleven factions have been involved in both political and military actions.\textsuperscript{88} The question that may be asked here is, "What is the motive behind so many factions struggling for power in Chad?" The fundamental reason for this, is that when France colonized the area, they imposed their advanced capitalist system on the Chadians. We are all familiar that this system calls for accumulation of wealth and exploitation by few ruling elites at the expense of the majority of the people. It is to grasp the center of power which is equated with wealth that gives rise to so many competing factions in the Chadian conflict; for they feel that if they can gain power, they will be able to enrich themselves and enjoy those privileges which were enjoyed by the colonialists. It is our contention that none of these factions is really committed to a change in political, economic, and social conditions of the people in Chad. For instance, after his forces first conquered the northern government stronghold of Faya-Largeau in June, 1983, Goukouni stated categorically that, "He had no ambition to become President again;" according to him, "All I want is to destroy Habre."\textsuperscript{89}

\textsuperscript{88}"Chad: The A to Z of Factionalism," \textit{Africa Confidential} 20:23 (November 14, 1979), p. 4.

\textsuperscript{89}"Habre's Chad: One Year and War Rages On," \textit{Africa News} 20:21 (May 23, 1983), p. 3.
It should be spelt out here that Goukouni's rise to power on 23 March 1979 did not usher in peace and stability but merely reversed the role of the former combatants. With N'djamena in Muslim hands, the Sara South - the stubborn periphery - became the center of resistance. The bloody confrontations between elements of the victorious liberation forces during Goukouni's regime underscored the utter lack of unity and discipline of the condition that had emerged victorious, providing a dramatic contrast with the calm and remarkable cohesiveness of the defeated south.

**Ideological Differences Among the Different Factions in the Conflict**

Habre and Goukouni are Moslems from the north and former allies in the long civil war against rule by non-Moslems from the southern part of Chad, but they are now fighting each other in a bitter civil war. This is one of the reasons we said earlier that religion, ethnicity, and factionalism are not the root causes of the Chadian conflict.

Habre and Goukouni are fighting in order to maintain the status quo - the present capitalist system in which few people dominate, manipulate and exploit the masses. Their ideology therefore, is capitalist ideology that calls for accumulation of wealth of the society by a few.

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individuals at the expense of the total population in a given society. Their ideology is not an ideology which is committed to a change in social, political and economic institutions in Chad which will alleviate the sufferings of the masses of people in the country.

Even though at present, Goukouni Oueddei is receiving military and economic support from Libya, this does not mean that Goukouni is really committed to a change in Chad. We mean a commitment to a revolution that will alleviate the sufferings of Chadian people, and set the Chadian economy free from French imperialism and neocolonialism. To support this contention, in 1980 Libya was supporting Goukouni when the survival of his government was threatened by Habre. Gaddafi's troops occupied the country from December 1980 until November 1981, keeping Habre's forces out of N'djamena. But Goukouni remained suspicious of Gaddafi, and he turned to France for military and economic assistance in 1981. The French readily agreed to help Goukouni, on the sole condition that he ask the Libyans to leave Chad. With the promise of French aid behind him, Goukouni asked Gaddafi to coordinate the Libyan withdrawal with the arrival of an OAU peace-keeping force. This suggests that Goukouni has no intention of turning his regime to the left.

91 Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, Conflict in Chad, p. 31.
Habre on the other hand, is receiving military and economic assistance from France and the United States. The implications for this is well known, for if Habre succeeds, the Chadian economy will be tied to that of the center – France and remains a puppet regime to the United States. This, of course, means a continuous exploitation, subjugation, and subordination of the Chadian economy.

Presently, the seat of government in Chad is occupied by Hissene Habre who formed the government on September 29, 1982.

It is, our belief, therefore that a people's revolution has never occurred in Chad; it may be in the future, but not in the era of Goukouni or Habre who are fighting to maintain the neo-colonial dependent state in Chad in order to continue with the pattern of colonial and neo-colonial exploitation. In other words, their ideology is capitalist ideology which neglects the interests of the masses to cater for the interests of the ruling class.

Let us proceed to discuss foreign intervention in the Chadian conflict.

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CHAPTER IV
FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN THE CONFLICT

In this chapter, we will analyze some of the objectives that motivate foreign countries to intervene in the internal affairs of African nations particularly in the Chadian conflict. We will examine French intervention, Nigerian intervention, Egyptian intervention, Sudanese intervention and Zairean intervention in the Republic of Chad.

The contemporary world system is characterized by superordinate/subordinate interdependency of nations which gives rise to inequity and crisis. Consequently, interventionism has become the principal instrument for maintaining the system by those who profit from it, while those who are subordinate to it make efforts simultaneously to create a more equitable system.\(^1\)

Recognizing the impact of interventionism on this socio-economic and political conditions of the target areas, the General Assembly of the United Nations in its December 21, 1965, adoption of a "Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and Protection

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of the Independence and Sovereignty," which stipulated that:

(i) No State has the right to intervene
directly or indirectly for any reason
whatever, in the internal or external
affairs of any State. Consequently, armed
intervention or other forms of interference
or attempted threats against the personality
of the State or against its political,
economic, and cultural elements, are
condemned; and

(ii) No State may use or encourage the use of
economic, political, or any other type of
measures to coerce another State in order
obtain subordination of the exercise of
its Sovereign rights or to secure from it
advantages of any kind. Also, no State
shall organize, assist, forment, finance,
incite, or tolerate subversive, terrorist
or armed activities directed towards the
violent overthrow of the regime of another
State.2

Despite the stipulation by the General Assembly of the
United Nations, the United States, between 1945 to the present
intervened 230 times in the internal and external affairs of
several nations, virtually all interventions were in the
southern areas of the world.3 France also intervened eighty
times in Africa from 1954 to 1983; presently, France has
18,255 troops distributed over twenty-four countries in
Africa and another 35,200 in metropolitan France.4

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2Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, December 21,

3Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without

4Colin Legum, "Foreign Intervention in Africa," The
Yearbook of World Affairs 1980 (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1980); and Colin Legum, "Communal Conflict and International
Intervention in Africa," in Colin Legum, et al., Africa in the
In a somewhat theoretically refined account confined to African and foreign interventionism, Legum seeks to explain the causes of external intervention in Africa. He identified three major parties as being involved in the foreign intervention in Africa: (a) African nations, (b) foreign powers, and (c) the OAU. He attributes foreign intervention in Africa to the dynamics of internal structure and the situations in that region as a whole. He perceives the African continent as being made up of "fifty odd African countries" with each being dispossessed of homogeneity that would facilitate conflict free national integration; therefore virtually no nation-states yet exist in Africa. Legum regards Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and Somalia as the African countries having the requirements of nation-state because these countries are homogeneous culturally.

Legum proceeds to argue that foreign intervention in Africa is determined by African internal conditions. He examines the OAU, and some responses of African leaders.

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1979). Both works are complementary to one another. The last citation was devoted virtually to politics of irredentism and border disputes largely discussed in the light of OAU's response from the perspective of its Charter on border disputes as well as the organization's weaknesses. We review both simultaneously with appropriate footnote citations as to which one is referred to.


The participation of the OAU in African conflicts and in prevention of foreign intervention in Africa were described as powerless due to the lack of central authority, which is characteristic of all international organizations. Consequently, it became impossible to muster a strong majority that would take an interventionary action on behalf of any member against "foreign meddling." It seems that the penetration of the organization by former colonial powers through client-state members and the manipulative tendencies of the Western powers are the central problem rather than Legum's diagnosis of the problem. Secondly, Legum argues that OAU's principles of "non-interference" in each other's domestic affairs, and the automatic recognition of colonial borders at independence, deprived the organization of any effective role as mediator. As a result, the exiting governments are supported against secessionist politics of irredentism, "expansionist nationalism" and the like.

The responses from African leaders are of two groups. The first group, represented by President Nyerere, holds that there is a tendency for an African nation to call in foreign troops when its sovereignty is threatened. But foreign response is determined by what the interventionist powers perceived to be gained. Moreover, the intervenors are prepared to exacerbate conflicts beyond initial and normal proportions if only by doing so their interests could be served. Nyerere sees contemporary intervention as a
great danger to African freedom from the Euro-American world, which still regards Africa as its sphere of influence and acts accordingly. Nyerere concludes:

We reject the right of Western European countries to dominate Africa, just as much as we would reject attempts by Eastern bloc countries to dominate Africa. In particular, we want to be clear that Tanzania resents the arrogance and the contempt of those who purport to set up a Pan-African Security Force, or an African Peace Force, on behalf of Africa (in apparent reference to French proposals for an inter-African force). Either Africa will do that for itself, or there will be no Pan-African Force defending the freedom of Africa, only something calling itself by foreign domination of this continent.  

The second group is represented by the former Senegalese President, Leopold Sedar Senghor. Senghor regarded intervention in the continent as a product of communist expansionism which aids local rebellions and insurgents. He sought a solution by calling on the Western bloc to adequately arm African nations if they did not want to see the continent fall to communist domination.  

French Intervention in Chad

According to the French Constitution of 1793, Article 119, the French people "do not interfere in the domestic affairs of other nations and will not tolerate interference..."

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by other nations in their affairs." Yet, history has recorded nearly six centuries of French intervention in Africa. It was first an intervention to obtain slaves, followed by formal colonialism, and at present institutionalized with the establishment of force d'intervention for the continent.

In the Chadian case, three objective determinants of intervention could be put forward: economic, strategic, and diplomatic/psychological objectives of stabilizing power in Africa are met through France being the decisive force in directing and determining the outcome of situations in Chad. There are French missionaries, technicians, teachers, and troops supposedly performing duties of the "civilizing mission" which fulfills the psychosis of being a better people, which cements the French national image. A French official communique on the situation in Chad shows the diplomatic component of its relation with Chad. It said in part, "Our view is that we give Chad its independence in 1962 and we did everything we could to preserve the country's territorial unity and integrity within the principle of national sovereignty." 10

The economic component is also significant in that, as we mentioned in Chapter Three, Chad continues to import

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9 Hans J. Morgenthau, "To Intervene or Not to Intervene," p. 61.

most of its need from France. Thirty-nine percent of its total imports in 1979 came from France, giving France the first place among exporters to Chad. Foreign investment in Chad is dominated by France.  

The strategic interventionary objective is also significant in relation to interventionary bases in West and Central African nations and important in the event of another attack from her European counterparts as was the case in World War II. The combined army base and air base outside Ndjamena has served as France's major military installation in Central Africa. The bases in Chad are viably keyed to interventionary activities to support pro-French regimes in West and Central Africa. Viewing the continued crises in Chad, French strategists perceive it "an affront on an African scale" with all the strategic repercussions that this might have in Niger, Mali, Togo, and Senegal, to name only these countries.

The major French acquisitive intervention in Chad took place in 1981 by military attack mainly on the northern part of the country and France thereafter established its rule. However, it was the war of April 22, 1900, that finally

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13 Ibid., pp. 227-230.
brought the entire country under the French rule. In area and population, 4,960 square miles and four million persons respectively, Chad is the largest country of former French Equatorial Africa.14

Chad presents a case of prolonged French interventions in Africa. Since independence Chad has been racked with unprecedented internal struggles for political power by various nationalist groups and made indecisive by equally numerous French and other interventions. Because of the economic, strategic, and diplomatic objectives of France in Chad, French interventions were carried out to restore order in such a way that those objectives are not jeopardized by supporting the faction prone to serving the French interests. Between 1960 and 1983, France intervened thirteen times in major crises.15 These thirteen cases are the ones in which direct intervention of France was thought to be necessary notwithstanding the routine stationing of French troops in Chad to bolster the prestige and control of the favored regime. Despite the incessant eruption of crises, French troops have been maintained one way or the other and bases have been maintained. However, numbers of troops are withdrawn, increased or reduced according to crisis demand.


15 Ibid., p. 64.
Let us now proceed with a discussion of the process and detail of interventions. At independence in 1960, Tombalbaye became the first pro-French Chadian president and remained so until his death following the military coup d'etat of April 1975. During Tombalbaye's rule, French interventions were decisive in saving Tombalbaye's regime. Between 1960-67, a number of rebellions against Tombalbaye's government was registered. They were decisively crushed with French interventionary forces. In 1968, rebellions in various locations in the northern side of the country broke out but were brought under control by the use of French troops. The situation worsened in 1969 when armed rebellions erupted in the east-central part of the country with Toubon nomads getting out of control. Tombalbaye called in an estimated 1,600 French troops, who subsequently crushed the rebellion. French troops continued to fight rebels in northern Chad for most part of 1970. The rebels, numbering 2,000 when they regrouped in June, 1970, were equipped with modern weapons. The most serious of the numerous clashes between Toubon rebels and French troops took place near Largeau on October 11, 1970. In an ambush by Toubon rebels, eleven French 

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parachutists were killed and ten others wounded. A week later Tombalbaye announced on Chad radio that 2,000 rebels equipped with modern weapons had been located in northern Chad and went on to say, "thanks to foreign intervention,"\footnote{\textit{Keesing's Contemporary Archives} (June 19-26, 1971), p. 24672.} in an apparent reference to French forces.

Franco-Tombalbaye relations began to sour when Tombalbaye, influenced by Joseph Mobutu of Zaire, took initiatives that were inimical to French objectives. First, was the policy of "Cultural Africanization," or "Authenticity," which was nothing more than symbolic, but nevertheless African in origin.\footnote{\textit{Europa, Africa South of the Sahara} (London: Europa Publications, Ltd., 1981), p. 287 and \textit{Keesing's Contemporary Archives} (April 8-14, 1974), p. 26254.} Furthermore, it was a challenge that shook the whole fabric of the French cultural control mechanism in Chad, and called into question the validity of the civilizing mission. The "Cultural Africanization" aimed at living in accordance with the African cultural heritage. In Chad, it became official with the formation of \textit{Mouvement Nationale pour la Revolution Culturelle et Societe} (MNRCS), which superseded the ruling government party, \textit{Parti Progressise Tchadien} (PPT). Tombalbaye changed his civilizing colonial name of Francois to Ngarta and ordered the renunciation of all Christian names throughout the country. African ritualism was reintroduced mainly in the south and among
the civil servants. Fort Lamy became Ndjamea, and streets with colonial names were changed to African names. A group of thirty American Baptist missionaries were expelled from the country on charges of opposition to and subversion of "Cultural Africanization" policy. As a result of cultural Africanization, the MNRCS executive did not allow Chad to be represented at the Paris Conference of French-speaking African countries, which took place on November 13, 1973.

The relations between the Chadian regime and France became increasingly strained as Tombalbaye repeatedly criticized the SDECE Chief, M. Jacques Foccart, also former French Secretary-General for African and Malagasy Affairs, and accused him of interference in Chadian domestic affairs. Specific charges were (a) an attempt by an agent of Foccart to gain the ear of General Felix Malloum, the former C-in-C of the army then under house arrest for subversive activities; (b) an accusation of Foccart of having been active for thirteen years in preparing "fourteen plots against the security and welfare of the people," and (c) on September 24, 1973, the Chad radio accused President Pompidou of allegedly planning an armed intervention in order to replace President Tombalbaye's government by one "entirely devoted to himself" (i.e. to the French President).

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20 Ibid.
are was confirmed two years later when Tombalbaye was replaced by Malloum following a military coup d'état.

While relations between Chad and France were strained, relations between Chad and Libya were bolstered by an exchange of visits to Tripoli in December 1972, he condemned "Zionist expansionism" and reaffirmed support for the rights of the Palestinian people. The Libyan government was said to have undertaken to contribute to the strengthening of the unity of Chad by denying a refuge place to FROLINAT rebels. A grant of 23,000 million francs in development credits was said to have been made to Chad. Gaddafi returned the visit to Chad on March 5-6, 1974, and reiterated "friendship which unites the Arab countries with the whole of Africa."

Tombalbaye also sought to diversify his country's dependence on foreign powers. Following the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China in November 1972, two technical aid agreements were signed in May 1973, providing for a Chinese loan of 11,250 million francs to Chad. The first group of ten Chinese rice growing experts also arrived in Chad in November 1973. Tombalbaye tried to remove Chad from the French monetary zone. He described OCAM and any form of cooperation with France as smacking

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21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
of colonialism and decided to leave the organization.  

In the face of these developments, France began to shop for a replacement. Internal and external developments combined to heighten France's concern. The Euro-American capitalist world press presented the policy of Cultural Africanization in a horrifying manner particularly through missionaries whose converts had been told to go back to their original practice of an African ritual called *udo*. This was seen as reintroduction of customary African practices to "frighten his potential opponents." Several summary executions were alleged to have been made of those who refused to take part in the rituals. Having mobilized world opinion against Tombalbaye's regime in this manner, a new pro-French regime led by General Felix Malloum, who had been earlier implicated in President Pompidou's alleged plan to overthrow Tombalbaye in 1973, was installed on April 13, 1975, after a bloody coup d'etat that claimed Tombalbaye's life. One notes that Euro-American capitalist world press opinion served to accelerate intervention to displace the undesirable African regimes. This point should not be overemphasized, but it exhibited the same pattern in the preliminary cases

23 Ibid., p. 26456.


of the overthrow of Idi Amin of Uganda and Bokassa of the Central African Republic.\textsuperscript{26}

The first major armed opposition during Tombalbaye's regime was FROLINAT,\textsuperscript{27} which sought the overthrow of the Tombalbaye regime. Abba Sidick, the first leader of FROLINAT, at its inception, said that his organization was not seeking secession from Chad but fighting to "give a content to Chad's independence" by establishing a government which could not "leave the real power to France."\textsuperscript{28}

By the time of Malloum's assumption of power, FROLINAT had broken into more than eight factions fighting one another or fighting the French-backed government of Felix Malloum. There are eleven major factions in Chad as we mentioned earlier fighting to gain the control of the government. The faction led by Hissene Habre is currently in control of the government.\textsuperscript{29}

Shortly after Malloum took office, two French archaeologists Mme. Claustre and her husband M. Pierre Claustre were captured by Habre's faction of FROLINAT. The French sought to deal directly with the rebels and pushed aside the

\textsuperscript{26}See "French Intervention in Central African Empire," \textit{Africa Confidential} 18 (October-December 1976), pp. 8-10.
\textsuperscript{27}Harold D. Nelson, \textit{Area Handbook for Chad}, p. 127.
\textsuperscript{28}Ibid., p. 68.
Malloum government. Malloum protested the move and asked for the withdrawal of French troops, which never materialized.\textsuperscript{30} In 1976, Malloum's regime signed a new military aid agreement with France to bolster his defense against the rebels. As the fight continued, France became more and more involved on the side of Malloum. In major fighting, French military intervention prevented the takeover of Quininang Kebir, a town of about 7,000 people, by the rebels in July, 1977. Late in January, 1978 Malloum's forces and French pilots engaged a FROLINAT offensive drive around Faya-Largeau. Three French pilots and two chad NCOs were killed when their DC-3 aircraft was shot down by FROLINAT rebels. In March, 1978, 1,000 French troops were airlifted to Chad, according to French radio, "to block the rebel drive on the capital." It was supplemented in April by another 150 extra soldiers to "ensure the safety of French nationals," but whose mission was to train the Chad army.\textsuperscript{31} On March 7, 1979, northern rebels launched an attack on Abeche but were repulsed by a joint Franco-FAN force. Another battle broke out on February 10, 1979, between Malloum and Habre supporters for a general strike. The government troops who intervened in the ensuing scuffle were attacked in turn by Habre's forces.

\textsuperscript{30}Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, \textit{Conflict in Chad}, p. 32.

\textsuperscript{31}Kessing's Contemporary Archives (May 12, 1978), p. 28977.
Earlier, disagreement over the release of FROLINAT rebels from prisons has strained the relationship between Malloum and Habre.

The presence of French troops, even though they did not take part in the fight, prevented taking over the government which Malloum temporarily abdicated to Lt. Col. Abdelkader Kamougue when the fight broke out while Malloum sought protection under French forces in their military bases in Chad.32

The protracted unrest in Chad became a concern for its neighboring countries, particularly the flow of refugees to those areas from Chad. It led to several unsuccessful attempts to unite various factions in Chad.33 On January 22, 1978, an agreement was signed between the Malloum government and FROLINAT in Khartoum, under the auspices of the Sudanese government, for the creation of a government of national union of Chad comprising all contending factions. This agreement also covered a cessation of hostilities, the establishment of a constitutional assembly and a general assembly for political detainees, mutineers, and Chadians in exile. On February 5, Malloum freed political prisoners and pardoned exiled Chadians on the condition that they return


33 For a brief discussion on various mediation parties and efforts, see Kessing's Contemporary Archives (February 1, 1980), pp. 30064-30067.
by April 5. The efforts failed. On February 15, 1978, FROLINAT factions reported their capture of Fada, and the fall of Faya-Largeau on February 18. Subsequent quadripartite efforts involving Libya, Sudan, Niger and Chad in another agreement of March 28, 1978, for cessation of hostilities also failed. The failure of these efforts led to another conference in Kano in March 11, 1979, in which some Chad factions signed a new agreement. The agreement was to take effect on March 23, 1979. Known as the First Kano Conference on National Reconciliation, the provision of the peace accord called for a general ceasefire, the establishment of a

transitional government of national union, 
demilitarization of Ndjamen to a radius of 100 kilometres, general amnesty for political prisoners, release of prisoners of war, dissolution of all political organizations and the gradual integration of all military factions into the National Army.

We will elaborate more on the conferences in the next chapter.

Prior to his resignation on March 23, 1979, President Malloum announced the formation of a Provisional State Council and named Goukouni Oueddei its leader, who thereupon became de facto head of state. Like previous efforts,

it disintegrated but this time on the grounds that other rebels were not represented in the Kano after three months. On October 9, 1979, armies of the four rebel groups (FAT, FAN, FAP, and MPLT) made an orderly withdrawal from the capital but only to nearby villages in violation of the required 100 kilometres radius demilitarization of the capital. The Lagos agreement called for the withdrawal of French troops, having noted that "the continued presence of French soldiers is an impediment to a lasting solution of the problems in the country." The African peace-keeping force which was supposed to have been in Chad failed. In desperation, Goukouni Oueddei asked France to suspend the withdrawal of its troops until an African peace-keeping force arrived. Fighting has since continued largely between Goukouni Oueddei and Hissene Habre.

In the fighting which broke out after the Lagos Conference, Goukouni called in Libyan troops which decisively defeated the major rival force of Habre in December, 1980. Libya's influence and plan for a merger with Chad gave rise to condemnation by France and its allies and their demand for the expulsion of Libyan troops from Chad. The former

36 Kessing's Contemporary Archives (November 22, 1979), p. 26819.
38 Europa, Africa South of the Sahara, pp. 236-239.
French Prime Minister, Pierre Mesmer described the Libyan's influence in Chad as the "worst setback for France in Africa for twenty years." On taking over the French government in May 1981, Mitterrand took action to correct the "setback" by having Oueddei expel Libyan troops from Chad. This was accomplished by giving Goukouni Oueddei's forces logistical support, weapons, and functional bureaucratic economic assistance, and the mobilization of African countries in the deployment of interventionary forces in Chad.

Questions have been directed to the French government by newspapers and researchers as to the reasons for its intervention in Chad. There are two major answers given. First, they refer to the military agreements as the basis for intervention. According to a French official communique of January 8, 1981, these interventions were made at the request of the appropriate authorities for specific security objectives under the terms of agreements signed with the Chadian government. They also refer to a ceasefire agreement signed between the Malloum government and FROLINAT on March 27, 1978, as the basis for continuation of inter-


40 Ibid., p. 101.

vention in the face of the ceasefire agreement violation.\textsuperscript{42} This legalistic argument is to justify French intervention in pursuance of its vested interests in Chad. The second answer applicable to Africa as a whole is in conformity with the objective explanation we have been discussing. In line with some other official French statements, the former French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Louis de Guiringuad, said in answer to a televised interview that:

\begin{quote}
Africa's raw materials have to reach the world market, after all, and when tensions persist in a region, when there is insecurity, it is a fact that economic development is retarded. That, by the way, is the main reason we are critical of the attitude of the Soviet Union and Cuba.\textsuperscript{43}
\end{quote}

France's interests in Chad continue to be served in the chaotic situation by putting the faction prone to serving French interests in power; France has followed it up by efforts to restore a stable atmosphere conducive to the realization of those interests. The support faction is, however, retained or replaced according to performance in office in prompting French interests. The Tombalbaye regime was immediately faced with a removal threat when he started to kick against French ways. Likewise, Malloum's failure to


\textsuperscript{43}French Embassy, "French Policy in Africa," televised interview of Louis de Guiringuad, French Minister of Foreign Affairs with Christine Ockrent recorded on June 20, 1978, No. 78.70, p. 1.
enforce order led to a studied silence over his fall from power and his replacement by a new pro-French convert regime of Goukouni Oueddei who had his original support base in Libya.\textsuperscript{44}

The continued success of French interventions may be explained by wide inequality between the leaderships and the masses in the country and foreign backed repression. Most important, having no governing national ideology and philosophy based on their own historical experience, the leadership adopts a colonial agenda, an agenda under which the Chadian people have been exploited for centuries back. The leadership is concerned with entrenching itself in the positions of privilege rather than working for a change that will liberate the entire population from continued French intervention.

In the present fighting between Goukouni and Hissene Habre, France is intervening by supporting Hissene Habre with anti-aircraft weapons, crack French paratroops and other military weapons to defend Habre's regime which is a puppet regime of France.\textsuperscript{45} Apart from a continuing airlift of arms and other military equipment, the French government of July 8, dispatched up to one thousand troops to Chad which

\textsuperscript{44} Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, \textit{Conflict in Chad}, pp. 52056.

\textsuperscript{45} E.G.H. Joffe, "International Consequences of the Civil War in Chad," pp. 98-103.
helped President Habre's forces to recapture Faya-Largeau for Goukouni's rebel forces on July 30, 1983.  

On August 13, 1983, the French dispatched another unit of about 480 French paratroopers to be flown to the key town of Abeche which is further south. The total number of French troops in Chad at present is estimated to be 2,000. Some of these troops are marines who wear a badge describing themselves as instructors. However, like those at Abeche, they are frontline combat troops who are fighting side by side with the Chadian soldiers loyal to President Hissene Habre.

U.S. Intervention in Chad

Three main objective determinants of U.S. intervention in Chad could be put forward: containment of Colonel Gaddafy's regime, economic and strategic. The containment of Colonel Gaddafy's regime is the most important determinant of U.S. intervention in Chad. This is true because for most of the history of Chad, the U.S. attitude was "so what," said an American diplomat. "It's only when Gaddafy got more involved that we changed that attitude."  

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48 Robin Luckham, "French Militarism in Africa," p. 56.
Under the Carter Administration, the United States rejected the idea of directly supplying Chad with World War II bombers and made it known that American advisors would not be sent to Chad to train soldiers in any capacity.50

When the Reagan Administration took office in 1981, one of its earliest foreign policy decisions was to reverse the Carter Administration's policy of accommodation and dialogue with the Libyan leader. U.S. officials at that time described orders from the top to develop a broad strategy, including overt intelligence operations to contain Colonel Gaddafi militarily and isolate him politically. To the Reagan Administration, Colonel Gaddafi was, as one State Department official put it, "the most dangerous man in the world."51

The U.S. opposition to Libya's Muammar Gaddafi dates from his seizure of power in 1969 when Gaddafi proclaimed that Libya would become a socialist country. It should be noted, however, that the U.S. foreign policy since World War II has always aimed at destabilizing any of the Third World countries that have opted out of capitalist democracy to choose the socialist path to economic and political


development. Whenever any Third World country proclaimed a socialist path to development, the U.S. always intervenes by imposing sanctions, and even militarily, in order to install a puppet regime in that country that would represent the U.S. interests. The recent case of military intervention in Grenada demonstrates the U.S. stubbornness to impose its so-called democracy to the developing countries of the Third World. Of course, this points to the dangers of neo-colonialism and imperialism.

The United States has had one criterion of allegiance throughout the entire history of Chadian conflict. American support has gone to forces opposed to Libya. Although the Reagan Administration favored Habre, it resumed diplomatic relations with Goukouni immediately after he expelled the Libyans in late 1981. The Americans subsidized the OAU peace-keeping force, which replaced Gaddafi's troops.

American worries about Libyan subversion in Africa increased in October 1981, when Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was killed, and Sudan seemed on the verge of a Libyan backed coup. The U.S. initially focused its anti-Gaddafi effort on Sudan, providing a broad program of


54 Ibid., p. 436.
military, economic and intelligence assistance. It should be pointed out that the United States has no interests in Chad itself, but the Reagan Administration does fear that if Gaddafy installed a socialist regime in Chad, he would use the country as a springboard to destabilize America's regional allies, particularly Sudan and Egypt.  

The Reagan Administration has conceded that Chad is of little economic or geopolitical significance, and it is clear that the U.S. policy is directed against Gaddafy rather than toward Chad. At the onset, the Reagan Administration felt that France the former colonial power in Chad should play the most active role in preventing Habre from being overthrown. But when they realized that Libya was getting more involved in the conflict, the Reagan Administration changed its rules and intervened fully in the conflict. Ronald Reagan denounced Gaddafy's empire building and offered U.S. aid and intelligence to Chad. It condemned Libya on August 8, 1983, or "open aggression" in bombing the strategic town of Faya-Largeau. The State Department in an unusually strong statement, called for an immediate withdrawal of Libyan military forces from the former French colony.  

55 Ibid., p. 437.
56 "Widening Civil War in Chad," p. 2
To countervene the Libyan's intervention, the United States pledged $10 million in aid and supplies to Chad's government in its war against the rebels. The U.S. military transports were also dispatched to N'djamena with the first consignment of military aid to the Habre government in order to crush Libyan backed forces of Goukouni Oueddei. The U.S. airborne surveillance planes were also dispatched to Egypt, apparently to observe Libyan war plane activity. With Habre now facing a crushing defeat, the U.S. had decided to intervene by sending weapons and a handful of advisors to Chad and AWACs radar surveillance planes to neighboring Sudan in order for Sudan to help Habre in his struggle to maintain power in Chad.

To show annoyance over Libya's intervention in Chad, the Reagan Administration also sent Habre thirty heat-seeking, shoulder-fire Redeye anti-aircraft missiles for use against Libyan warplanes, as well as other emergency military equipment, such as jeeps and radios, for use against Libyan backed forces. Three U.S. Army Sargeants were also flown to Chad to show Habre's men how to use the Redeyes.

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The economic determinant of intervention is also significant in that American economic links have expanded in Chad through the presence of three oil companies: Exxon, Conoco, and Chevron, which laid out U.S. $25 million for exploration since Goukouni became the President, and it has continued under the present regime of Hissene Habre. The results of their exploration have been positive and in the near future Chad will apparently produce enough oil to become an exporter. In addition, uranium deposits are said to have been found in Chad: that will certainly fortify American interests in political stability under a pro-Western government. Moreover, in the present Chadian conflict, the U.S. is benefiting economically by selling her military weapons to Habre's government.

The strategic determinant is also important because the U.S. administration having identified Libya under Gaddafi as the major threat to the region's stability, saw Libyan intervention as evidence of a concerted Soviet inspired push into central Africa which would outflank strong U.S. friends there and destabilize the region. Libya's regime is considered to be a support of terrorism, with its support for the rejectionist front states in the Middle East, and apparent support for terrorist movements. It followed then, that the

61 "Chad: Great Power Rivalry," p. 5.

U.S. would inevitably support opponents of Libya such as Hissene Habre, even if this ran counter to the proclaimed policy of the OAU.

The Reagan Administration also fears that with Sadat, Sudan's self-proclaimed 'defender' gone, Libya which has not concealed its dislike of the government in Khartoum, partly because of its pro-U.S. stand, might feel free to do anything with President Nimeiri. The U.S. supported the creation of the African Peace Force because it thwarted Libya's design for a merger with Chad that would have provided Colonel Gaddafi with a base for wider African activities.63

Libyan Intervention in Chad

Any assessment of the impact of Libyan intervention in Chad must take into account the intangibility of Libya's objectives. Although King Idriss and Colonel Gaddafi differed as to the methods they used and the intensity with which they pursued their clearcut goals, both gave priority to the promotion of Arabism and Islam in Central Africa, and only second place to the acquisition of such mineral resources as might lie beneath the BET's rugged surface.64 Certainly Libya's help in financing the building of great mosques and institutions of Islamic learning in Chad promoted its


prime objectives, but in such construction Libya had to share the credit with other Arab contributors to the same ends, they included Saudi Arabia, and the conservative Gulf States.\textsuperscript{65}

In Gaddafi's view, it was essential to control northern Chad in order to protect its Muslim population from their continued domination by the southern Christians.\textsuperscript{66} Ready to hand was the FROLINAT which, when Gaddafi came to power in Tripoli, had been struggling for five years against the Tombalbaye regime and was eager for the help Gaddafi could and did readily give. Gaddafi's seems to be getting away with his clandestine takeover of the Aozou Strip until 1975, when the military coup d'etat at N'djamena required him to alter his strategy.\textsuperscript{67} Such a change had also been made essential by the military and propaganda successes being scored against Libya as well as CSM regime by the FAN Commander, Hissene Habre. Since that time, Gaddafi has been vainly searching for ideal Chadian Trojan horse that would hasten Chad's disintegration and facilitate the spread of Libyan influence throughout the whole country.\textsuperscript{68}

What role, if any, the Libyan colony in Chad plays in

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{65} Ibid., pp. 86-91.
  \item \textsuperscript{66} See Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, \textit{Conflict in Chad}, pp. 100-120.
  \item \textsuperscript{67} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{68} Rene Lemarchand, "Chad: The Roots of Chaos," p. 416.
\end{itemize}
Gaddafi's overall plan for penetrating Chad is not clear, for adequate current data are lacking.

Libya's interest and intervention in Chad has many historical roots, some of them going hundreds of years back into history of contact between Tripoli and the desert of deserts down south. 69

On June 15, 1980 a treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed in Tripoli between Libya and a representative of former President Goukouni, without the prior consent of the GUNT. Article 7 of the treaty permitted Libya to intervene should the internal security of Chad be threatened. 70 The FAN offensive of October 7, 1980 brought in its wake direct intervention on the part of Libya. During October, Libyan aircraft bombed Faya and N’djamena. Helicopters transported between 1,500 and 2,000 FAT troops into N’djamena, and tanks, guns, mortars, helicopters and aircraft were driven in large numbers across the desert. 71 Three Libyan regiments and an Islamic 4,500 to 5,000 men took part in the hostilities. On December 10 Ati was taken and the man N’djamena-Abeche road was cut off. On December 15, 1980 after an intensive five days of shelling, the FAN evacuated N’djamena. Some

71 Ibid.
of them took refuge in Cameroun; the veterans among them however, regained the eastern region around Biltine, where they reoccupied the Aramkole Massif which had been their stronghold in 1976-78. On December 21, 1980, Abeche was in turn evacuated. Habre had lost the battle and, in military terms, no longer constituted a threat to the GUNT even though both Sudan and Egypt had clearly demonstrated their intention to support him.

Following the fall of N'djamena, the atmosphere in the capital by then became increasingly relaxed despite frequent pillaging. On December 24, 1980, at an inter-African conference in Lagos, Nigeria proposed and accepted a motion in support of the GUNT and allowing for elections to take place in 1982.

The situation was again placed in the balance when Goukouni signed an agreement in Tripoli on January 6, 1981, paving the way for a gradual merger of Chad and Libya. Certain sections of the accord authorized the permanent intervention of Libya in Chadian affairs. The GUNT did, however, publish a statement on January 12, following a stormy ministerial meeting, according to which the Tripoli

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agreement constituted nothing more than a declaration of intent, and stating that no merger could take place without the formal consent of the two peoples.75 The consequences of the merger agreement were, however, crucial, both nationally and internationally.

Within Chad, President Goukouni's authority was jeopardized by his successive changes of policy. For no Chadian whether Muslim or otherwise, could consent to the absorption of his country by Libya, and the south, represented by the FAT, had not been consulted concerning the merger.76 The Libyans had under their direct command all of northern Chad, divided between the various FROLINAT factions. Libya's grip on the capital prevented the reopening of air, postal and radio communications with the outside world.77

Libyan intervention in Chad could be explained in terms of economics. Minerals, possibly uranium, in the Auzou Strip, annexed by Gaddafi, is an attraction. The possibility of access to Sudan's western flanks to undermine President Nimeiri's pro-Mubarak regime is another. The extension of a Pan-Islamic radical belt stretching from Chad to Port Sudan is the acme of Gaddafi's hopes.78

75 Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, Conflict in Chad, p. 31.
76 Ibid., p. 79.
77 Rene Lemarchand, "Chad: The Road to Partition," pp. 115, 132.
78 Ibid., p. 117.
Libyan intervention in Chad is interpreted by many African states as an attempt to spread socialism into Africa, hence such countries as Nigeria, Zaire and many others have openly condemned what they called Libya's imperialism in Chad; but they have ignored the U.S. and French imperialism which present a real threat to African development.  

Nigerian Intervention

The Nigerian intervention in Chadian affairs indeed has many historical roots. According to Anthony Hopkins, the majority of Nigerians who reside in Borno State migrated from Chad and settled in Nigeria. With Chadians have common or similar language, common culture and are of Muslim religion.

The position taken by the Nigerian government for intervening in Chadian conflict is to find a peaceful settlement of the civil war and to help in settling the Chadian refugees who fled N'djamena to Borno State in Nigeria since the out break of the civil war. When Obasanjo followed through on the ceasefire between the national army

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and Habre's FAN in March 1979 by proposing a conciliation conference at Kano, his offer was accepted. Public opinion in Chad and many African countries favored Nigeria over Libya as a mediator, for the Lagos government was a relative newcomer to the Chadian scene and had never tried to annex any part of the country.

The Nigerian government under the leadership of Obasanjo organized a conference in Kano. Obasanjo's invitation to five obscure Chadians to attend the Kano Conference as delegates was the rock on which that conference floundered, for his obvious intention was to infiltrate them into any governing body that might emerge from the previous meetings. Habre and Goukouni indignantly refused to sit at the same negotiating table with men who they claimed, represented no significant segment of the Chadian population and were merely the spokesmen for self-interested foreign governments.

The perservance shown by Nigerian leaders in exerting their influence on Chad's evolution is also to find a solution that would ward off intervention by France or by the Arab states.

In December 1980, an Emergency Summit Conference was also

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83 Ibid.
84 See Europa, Africa South of the Sahara, p. 416.
85 Ibid., pp. 416-420.
sponsored by Nigerian government. These conferences and summits will be thoroughly examined in the next chapter.

It is important to point out also that Nigeria was among the three African countries that sent troops for the OAU's peace-keeping forces. 86

Another reason that may be advanced for Nigerian intervention in Chad is the fears maintained by the Nigerian government that Colonel Gaddafy could possibly turn Chad into a socialist state through the annexation which could eventually spread to Nigeria being a neighboring country to Chad.

**Egyptian Intervention in Chad**

The Egyptian intervention in the Chadian Civil War is not because the Egyptian government wants to help Chad to settle their conflict amicably. The U.S. instigated Egypt to intervene by supplying AWAC aircrafts and other military weapons in order to contain Colonel Gaddafy's regime which the United States accuses of representing Soviet interests in Africa, aiding international terrorism and being a danger to the stability of the region. 87

In 1982, the U.S. organized 'Bright Star 82' in Egypt in which 4,000 U.S. troops took part in military manoeuvres with Egyptian, Sudanese, and Somali soldiers. This military

86 E.G.H. Joffe, "The International Consequences of the Civil War in Chad," p. 95.

exercise was, however, to pose a threat to Colonel Gaddafy's regime. Egypt being pro-U.S. is being as an ideal base from which the U.S. could launch a rearguard action against the Soviet Union or Colonel Gaddafy's regime in Libya. Egypt from Sadat to Mubarak has remained a puppet regime to the United States hence Egyptian intervention is also U.S. intervention.88

Sudanese Intervention in Chad

Sudan is one of the countries that shares a common border with Chad. The position maintained by the Sudanese government for intervening in Chadian conflict is to grant shelter to political refugees from Chad.89 Chadian rebels have used Sudan both as a place of refuge and as a base from which to attack their country's military strongholds in eastern Chad.90 The attitude of the strongly Islamic local officials in Darfur, where many Chadians lived, was markedly more favorable to the FROLINAT than was that of the central authorities. Relations between the government of Ndjamena and Khartoum improved in 1969 when Nimeiri came to power in Sudan, both because he persuaded Tombalbaye that he was not aiding the FROLINAT and because he came to terms with his

89Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, Conflict in Chad, p. 116.
90Ibid., pp. 116-118.
own rebels, who no longer tried to escape across the frontier into Chad. 91

For many years, Chadian immigrants have been attracted to the route to Mecca by way of Sudan, the Islamic schools of Cairo and Khartoum, and above all the cotton plantations of El Ghazera. 92

By 1977, Nimeiri was devoting most of his efforts concerning Chad toward strengthening the forces making for unity there, and in so doing he aligned his country with Egypt and France. 93 As President of the OAU in 1978, Nimeiri became more effective than before as a peacemaker at the conferences on Chadian national unity held at Sebha, Tripoli, and Benghazi, and at the same time at Khartoum he himself was slowly succeeding in bringing Malloum and Habre to an agreement. 94

The role that Sudan has played in the Chadian conflict is of course backed up by the United States. Sudan's call for arms has met with quick response from the United States. Equipment contracted and supplied includes jeeps, armoured personnel carriers and air defense guns. The U.S. has also


92 Europa, Africa South of the Sahara, p. 420.

93 "Chad's Civil War: International Involvement," pp. 6904-6908.

94 Ibid., pp. 6908-6910.
made available a $100 million package to Sudan for fiscal 1983. Other equipments include F-5e fighter jets and sophisticated M-60 tanks to enable Sudan to meet the Libyan threat to Chad and other pro-U.S. states in the region.

Since late in 1980 when Libyan troops intervened in Chad on Goukouni Oueddei's invitation and drove Hissene Habre into exile, Sudan has given shelter to Habre and allowed him to use its territory to wage war on the government in Ndjamena which was by then under Goukouni Oueddei as President. It was with the help of Sudanese troops and logistical support that enabled Hissene Habre to recapture the seat of government and become the current president of the Republic of Chad.

Zaire's Intervention in Chad

Mobutu's regime in Zaire which has remained a puppet regime of the United States intervened in the Chadina conflict in order to protect the interests of the U.S. Since the United States wants to confront Colonel Gaddafy in all fronts, the Reagan Administration has decided to use Mobutu, he being a faithful servant to the United States.

Since Mobutu has been maintained in power by the U.S.,

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95 Ibid.


97 "Chad's Civil War: International Involvement," pp. 6905-5908.
he has to obey orders from the Reagan Administration to intervene in the Chadian conflict, otherwise the U.S. may withdraw its constant support to Zaire's government.

Mobutu's reason for intervening in the Chadian conflict is to maintain law and order in Chad. Of course, Mobutu's role in Chad is also serving his own personal interests. For example, at the time Mobutu decided to get involved in the Chadian civil war, unemployment in Zaire was very high and by recruiting young boys to go to Chad, he was trying to solve the problem of unemployment. By also pretending that his army went to Chad to restore law and order, he was trying to restore the prestige of the army in his country. Besides that, Mobutu was paying back his Western master as we mentioned earlier. He saw an opportunity in the Chadian conflict to further his own interests in the sense that his economy was in trouble by the same West particularly, the U.S. were reluctant to lend Zaire any additional money, and any other form of aid from the West was not easy to come by. He used this opportunity to squeeze out as many concessions from the West.

It is worth mentioning also that Zaire already has three Mirage fighter jets in Chad. These are assigned to


99 Interview with Dr. Makidi-Ku-Ntima, Atlanta University, July 22, 1984.
defend the capital against attacks by the Libyan planes.
In June 1983, President Mobutu also dispatched 2,000 troops.
to Chad which helped Hissene Habre to recapture Faya-Largeau
from Goukouni's forces.  

With foreign intervention and neighboring meddling in
the conflict, the OAU is unable to find a peaceful settle-
ment to the Chadian conflict. We will now proceed to
examine the OAU initiatives and its limitations in settle-
ment of the Chadian conflict.

CHAPTER V

THE OAU INITIATIVES AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN SETTLEMENT OF THE CHADIAN CONFLICT

In this chapter we will examine and assess the role of the OAU and its limitations in finding a diplomatic solution to the Chadian conflict. Here, we are concerned with the major efforts made by the OAU or member countries on behalf of the OAU. Before we proceed to assess the role of the OAU in the Chadian conflict, let us briefly discuss the reason behind the formation of the OAU and how it is set up to settle conflicts among member States, for this will enable us to understand more fully why the OAU should intervene in internal affair of African countries and particularly in the Chadian conflict.

The African states having realized that gaining freedom was not the only thing, and that they were faced with another perilous confrontation, namely, the intrigues of imperialists to thwart their newly achieved freedom, met in Addis Ababa in May 1963 to form the OAU.¹ In other words, the African leaders discovered that while colonialism has been pushed out through the door, neo-colonialism, a much more dreadful

version of imperialism according to Nkrumah sneaked in through the back door.  

The Congo crisis of the early 1960s gave credence to the above realization. It provided a traumatic experience to the young African states; it laid bare the realization that the weaker and young African states were powerless in defending their rights against neo-colonialism and a new brand of imperialism. The crisis marked the official importation of the Cold War to the African soil, and provided a proxy-war-like situation between the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

To the United States, the leadership and economic policies of the duly elected Congolese Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, were inimical to its economic and other interests. Above all, the feeling that Lumumba was leaning towards the Soviet Union was taken to mean that he would make the Congo a communist state, and thereby, precluding the expansion of U.S. economic domination in Africa. Therefore, the U.S. policymakers declared that Lumumba must go; so he went, and the U.S. was implicated.  

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4 The CIA has been implicated in the deaths of Lumumba and subsequent overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah. Nkrumah maintained that Joseph Kasavubu and Moise Tshombe (who were implicated by U.N. Security Council Special Report on the death of Lumumba)
was handled by the big powers working under the cover of the United Nations convinced the African leaders of the necessity of setting up an indigenous African organization to cater for Africa's interests. This regional organization was to play a role similar to that of the Organization of American States (OAS) which serves the New World, or the Arab League which collectively serves the Arab world.  

When the independent states of Africa, meeting at Addis Ababa in May 1963, establishing the Organization of African Unity, they were of course, completing a process going back more than a half of a century. Before the formation of the OAU, there were numerous conferences aimed at bringing African nations together.  

We will not dwell so much on these conferences since this is not our major emphasis in this study.

The Organization of African Unity was founded at a time when African leaders were experiencing their first taste of independence and were anxious to consolidate their leadership. Across the continent they saw the danger posed by the divisions

were members of Moral Rearmament (MRA), a U.S.A. based movement which supported and financed by the CIA. See Ray Schaap Meter and Wolf, eds., Dirty Work Two: The CIA In Africa (New York: Lyle Stuart, Inc., 1979), pp. 177-208.


of language, inequalities by the controversies over boundaries arbitrarily drawn by the colonial powers.\(^7\) It quickly became clear that a high degree of cooperation was necessary among the fledging African states, if the continent was to survive as a viable economic and political entity. The OAU, of course, represented a practical response to the balkanized condition of Africa at the end of its colonial experience, when the leaders of independent governments inherited many sensitive border problems caused by the artificially drawn frontiers imposed during the nineteenth century "scramble for Africa;" there was thus a real need for an organization capable of stabilizing the new continental political system.

The signing of the Charter establishing the OAU was quite an achievement at a time when Africa was sharply split into three rival blocs: the Casablanca group, the Monrovia group, and the Brazzaville Twelve which we have analyzed in the second chapter of this study.\(^8\)

The purposes of the OAU as stated in Article II (1) are as follows:

- to promote the unity and solidarity of Africa;
- to coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa;


- to defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence;
- to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa;
- to promote international cooperation, having due regard to the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  

The order of purpose has no bearing on the fact that the principal aim of the OAU was to free the African continent of colonialism, apartheid, and racial discrimination. This emerged from the debate on the OAU Charter at Addis Ababa in 1963 and was reaffirmed on many subsequent occasions.  

To achieve the purposes stated in Article II (I), the Member States pledged themselves to coordinate their policies especially in the areas of politics and diplomacy; economics, including transport and communications; education and culture; health, sanitation and nutrition; science and technology; defense and security.

Since the Organization of African Unity was created by a community of states extremely jealous of their sovereignty and attributes, it was therefore not surprising that the

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10 During 1971 the OAU Administrative Secretary-General Diallo Telli, in his message to mark the eight anniversary of the OAU recalled that "since it was established the OAU's prime and urgent objective has been the total liberation of our continent from all forms of foreign occupation, oppression and exploitation." See Yassin El-Ayouty, The OAU After Ten Years: Comparative Perspective (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), pp. 43-97.
Charter emphasized the powers of the States while restricting those of the organization. This, in fact, made the section on "rights and duties of member states" somewhat lopsided and left considerable doubt as to the actual extent to which the member states were bound to support the organization they created. The only commitment accepted by the members of the OAU was to observe scrupulously the principles of the Charter. These principles, however, created a somewhat unbalanced situation. Some of them merely confirmed the sovereignty of the member states and non-interference in their internal affairs. Others build upon this by prohibiting attacks against the members' territorial integrity and independence or more specifically, the use of subversion and assassination.\(^{11}\)

To make the OAU a purposeful tool, it was, nonetheless, necessary to have some obligation upon the members to pursue its aims. Article VIII of the OAU Charter which defined the powers of the assembly of Heads of State and governments, states that: "It is the responsibility of the Supreme Organ - the assembly of Heads and States and governments to discuss matters of common concern with view to coordinating and harmonizing the general policy of the organization."\(^{12}\)


The implication of this is that the member states coordinate their own policies while the assembly merely coordinates the policy of the organization but not policies of the member states. Sovereignty was used as an excuse for eliminating any aspect that could infringe on states competencies or even influence its action. The principle of non-interference, to us, was a handy means of rejecting any decision of the OAU that seemed to be directed against a member or merely restricted its freedom of action.¹³

Realistically speaking there is no provision in the Charter that makes the OAU's decisions binding on member states. In the absence of such provisions in the Charter, it follows that the OAU resolutions are merely recommendations. As such, they do not impose any legal obligations on the States which abstain, nor even on those which approve them.

To become a member of the OAU, Article IV of the Charter states that, "each independent sovereign African State shall be entitled to become a member-state of the Organization."¹⁴

The legal interpretation of this gives each independent African state a right to membership which it can claim, provided however, that it pledges to adhere to the principles enshrined in the OAU Charter and to work for the achievement


of the objectives therein. Let us take a few moments to examine the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration.

The desire to solve problems within an African framework has been connected with that mistrust of external influences which is common among African statesmen. But it also stems from deep reservations about the principles of international law in the Western world. With the creation of the OAU, African leaders hoped they would be able to set their own standards for the conduct of interstate relations, standards which would derive not from the customs and laws of the colonial powers but from the principles of the OAU. In this respect the OAU formulated general principles to be observed by the conflicting parties. It refrained from pronouncing judgements on specific issues or disputes because to do so would have implied that the OAU was acting as a supranational authority, a position the OAU has always declined to adopt. The principles of settling all inter-African disputes strictly within an African framework was first officially announced by Emperor Haile Selassie. It

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has since found expression in many OAU resolutions.\textsuperscript{18}

The first draft of the Protocol of the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration started at the First Council of Ministers in Dakar, Senegal in August 1963. At the Second Session in Lagos, Nigeria, the Council of Ministers appointed a committee of experts to do a thorough study of the basic draft which started in Dakar. The members of the committee included experts from Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, Tanzania and the United Arab Republic. Once more the Lagos draft expanded and published by experts that met in Cairo, where it was finally adopted.

The African leaders who were also meeting in Cairo, signed the Protocol on July 21, 1964 and it became an integral part of the OAU Charter.\textsuperscript{19} In October 1965, during the Accra OAU Summit, the Commission headed by Justice M.A. Odesanga of Nigeria was appointed, but it was not until 1967 that the first meeting of the Commission took place in Addis Ababa.\textsuperscript{20}

The Commission consisted of twenty-one members elected by the Assembly for a duration of five years, with a provision for reelection. It should be noted here that the Commission is viewed as an important organ of the OAU, hence

\textsuperscript{18}See Zdenek Cervenka, \textit{The Organization of African Unity}, p. 103.


\textsuperscript{20}Jon Woronoff, \textit{Organizing African Unity}, pp. 31-70.
it is the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government, and not the subordianate Council of Ministers or the Secretariat that must appoint members of this Commission. In electing officials, the basis for election allows the candidacy of no more than two representatives from a single state, but after the election, the final composition cannot have more than one official from each state. Having been elected, members cannot be removed from office, except by a vote of two-thirds majority of the total members of the Assembly. Here again, it should be noted how difficult it is to remove a member from the Commission. A consensus of two-thirds majority is not easy to be obtained in an Assembly where leaders have diversified political views and where more often than not, on certain issues, their only agreement is not to agree. To make a complicated removal procedure more complicated, before a member is replaced, it must be proved that he is either incompetent or that he is guilty of a certain misconduct. Members of the Commission are barred from receiving or seeking instructions from any member state and are also protected by the privileges and immunities.

The Commission is placed under a bureau composed of a president and two vice-presidents, who are elected by the

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21 Ibid.

Assembly from among the members of the Commission. The remaining eighteen members are called only when necessary. The seat of the Commission is in Addis Ababa. It is important and necessary to note that the Commission is not a permanent body but a panel of judges and other experts who are "activated when disputes are brought to it for settlement."

The parties involved in a dispute can select from among the twenty-two members those they wish to hear their case. Of course, the large number of Commission members makes it possible for several groups to be established simultaneously to deal with several disputes.

The Commission's area of operation is limited to conflicts between member states and has very little to do with a conflict between a state and the OAU. Notwithstanding the number of judges it is comprised of, the Commission cannot interpret the Charter of the OAU. That is the duty of the Assembly. Neither can it serve as an advisory body for the OAU: nor can it give its opinion on legal matters concerning the OAU.

For a dispute to be heard before the Commission, it must

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23 Yassin El-Ayouty, The OAU After Ten Years: Comparative Perspective, p. 97.
24 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
be put forward by one or more parties; by the Council of Ministers or even the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. Should one of the parties refuse to give in to the authority of the Commission, the Commission's Bureau may refer the matter to the Council of Ministers. However, should one of the parties continue to be adamant, arrogant and unyielding, there is nothing the Commission and the OAU can do, for when framing the Protocol of the Commission, it was agreed that the Commission's authority would be optional and not compulsory.

On the other hand when there is an agreement or when the parties consent to the authority of the Commission, the mode of settlement is next decided. The normal procedure is that the parties, together with the Commission choose the working method and rules of procedure. The members of the Commission, endowed with diplomatic privileges and immunities, have a free hand in conducting investigations and other findings to get the facts brought before it.

The President of the Commission, with the consent of the parties, together with one or more mediators chosen from the Commission could introduce the mediation. Article

XXI of the Protocol spells out clearly that:

The role of the mediator shall be confined to reconciling the views and claims of the parties. The mediator shall make written proposals to the parties as expeditiously as possible. If the means of reconciliation proposed by the mediator are accepted, they shall become the basis of a protocol of arrangement between the parties.\textsuperscript{30}

Therefore, the primary task of the mediator is to try to reconcile the various views and claims of both parties, mainly by way of giving confidential pieces of advice and recommendatons to the parties. No procedural rules are followed.

There is an upward trend in the use of mediators as the bese possible solution. The Africans are great respectors of elders as well as noble members in their communities. More often than not, in the event of a quarrel, an elder's judgment solves the problem. That is why on the state level too, the OAU has repeatedly made use of the services of the influential and often elder statesmen.\textsuperscript{31} Usually, these leaders are able moderates, who have over long years been drenched by torrents of political problems, but who stood the test of torture. However, the complexity of modern problems and foreign interventions, plus the fact that states


are beginning to feel secure, make it increasingly difficult for negotiators to produce tangible results.

Article XXII and XXIII of the Protocol describes the procedures, while Article XXIV explains the duty of the Commission of Conciliation. Under Article XXII the dispute to be settled could be submitted to the Commission through a petition forwarded to the President of the Board of Conciliation by one or more of the disputants.\textsuperscript{32} When the president receives the petition, after he has secured the agreement of the parties, he sets up a Board of Conciliators, of which he appoints three members while each party appoints one. The Chairman of the Board, who must be among the five board members, is chosen by the President. Article XXIII specifies that no two members from one country could sit on the Board.\textsuperscript{33}

The duty of the Commission of Conciliation, as succinctly explained in Article XXIV is to "clarify the issues in dispute and to endeavor to bring about an agreement between the parties upon mutually accepted terms."\textsuperscript{34} If there is no agreement between the parties, the Board is empowered to determine its own procedure. Article XXV makes it clear that the parties could be represented by agents to act as go betweens. They may also be assisted by counsels and

\textsuperscript{32} Zdenek Cervenka, The Organization of African Unity and Its Charter, pp. 43-60.

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., p. 88.

\textsuperscript{34} Jon Woronoff, Organizing African Unity, p. 87.
experts and other persons who may be of help. At the end of the hearings, the Board writes a report indicating the success or failures of its endeavor. The report is forwarded to the President of the Commission, with the approval of the parties it may be made public.

As elaborate as it is, the Commission of Conciliation is hardly used and has never settled a dispute. Essentially, the most distinguishable features of the Commission of Arbitration are: (1) it is a court which bases its ruling on international law, (2) the conclusions of the Arbitration Tribunal are binding. Article XXVII of the Protocol stipulates the establishment of the Arbitral Tribunal in the following manner:

1. The provision of arbitration by each party from the members of the Commission.
2. A third person chosen from the Commission, with the consent of the two arbitrators is made of the Chairman of the Tribunal.
3. Should the two arbitrators fail to agree on the choice of the person to chair the tribunal, the Bureau shall appoint one.

It is specifically stated that the arbitrators shall not be the nationals of the disputing parties, neither should they have lived in or been employed in those countries.

Having agreed on this selection procedure, and believing

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35 Ibid., p. 89.
36 Ibid., p. 91.
37 Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Early Years of the OAU: The Search for Organizational Preeminence," pp. 731-758.
that recourse to arbitration is a submission in good faith, the parties are bound to accept the outcome of the arbitration proceedings. This stand is made clear in Article XXIX which states that:

The parties shall in each case, conclude a compromise which shall specify (a) the undertaking of the parties to go to arbitration and to accept as legally binding, the decision of the Tribunal, (b) the subject matter of the controversy, and (c) the seat of the Tribunal.38

In any case, in the event that there is no compromise as stipulated by Article XXIX, Article XXX rules that Arbitral Tribunal shall decide the dispute according to treaties concluded between parties, international law, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity and Charter of the United Nations.39 Like the Commission of Conciliation, disputes are hardly referred to the Commission of Arbitration.

Though it was intended to create peace among member states, the non-interference clause in Article III of the OAU Charter has instead helped to create more problems at worst, or at best helped to hinder peace and goodwill. The concept of "non-interference" needed a clear and less ambiguous definition. It is true that the ideas and intentions expressed in its principle are good and sound. It was

39 Ibid., pp. 87-121.
intended to enhance mutual trust as well as healthy relations among members; it was inserted to make sure one country or those powerful African states should leave the less fortunate and weak ones alone, but as Vincent B. Thompson comments, "It inhibits states from pronouncing on actions by individual states which some members consider detrimental to the interest of the continent." The Charter, according to him failed to establish which issue might cease to be a domestic and which issue may necessitate Pan-African intervention.

Since its formation in May 1963, the OAU has witnessed many conflicts among member states and has intervened in most of these conflicts with a view of finding a peaceful settlement to these conflicts. In the Congo crisis of 1964-1965, the OAU intervened by setting up an ad hoc Commission to negotiate with the Stanleyville regime in order to bring reconciliation between Presidents Kasavubu and Tshombe. The background to the 1964-65 Congo crisis goes back to the colonial history of the Congo and the rule of Leopold II which had reduced the Congo to a reservoir of slave labor exploited with a ruthlessness which


crippled the country for several decades. The events following the declaration of independence on June 30, 1960 have been described in great detail in many writings, hence we will not go much into the detail of the conflict. However, the OAU did not and could not bring peace to the Congo and resolve its political problems. This was due above all to foreign intervention in the conflict. If the OAU Ad Hoc Commission on the Congo had been given more time, it might have succeeded in its primary objective, which was to forestall external intervention. The conclusion of African leaders was that the only safeguard against the occurrence of a similar situation was for them never to allow themselves to become involved in the confrontation between East and West.

The Congo crisis was the most important single event that led African states to establish a policy of non-alignment as the basis of their foreign policy.

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42 Under the rule of King Leopold II the Congo's population, more than that of any African country, was ravaged by the slave trade, and declined by three million. During the slave trade some fifteen million Congolese were shipped across the Atlantic, of whom ten million died en route from ill treatment. King Leopold did not suppress slavery but merely changed its nature. He made forced labor more profitable than the slave trade. See Earnest W. Lefever, Crisis in the Congo: A United Nations Force in Action (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1965), pp. 28-81.

43 Ibid., pp. 107-110.

44 Ibid.
Another important conflict in which the OAU intervened was the Nigerian Biafran Civil War in 1967-70 in which the Eastern region of Nigeria rebelled against the Federal Government of Nigeria and declared the region the "Republic of Biafra." The OAU did all it could to bring about a peaceful solution to the conflict, but all failed. This was partly because the Federal Government of Nigeria made it abundantly clear that the conflict was internal affairs of Nigeria. The Federal Government under General Gowon held very firmly to the view that any intervention, even in the form of a discussion at the OAU level, would be in violation of Article III (2) of the OAU Charter, which prohibits any interference in the internal affairs of States.\(^4\)

The OAU has also intervened in the Algeria-Morocco border conflict in which full scale hostilities had broken out between Algeria and Morocco along their common borders. The origin of the Algeria-Morocco border dispute lay, of course, in colonial history: its immediate cause, however, was a clash between the national interests of the two countries - on the one side, Moroccan irrendentism and, on the other, the attractions of the mineral resources in the disputed territory. Ideological differences between the two regimes compounded the problem.\(^5\) It was a classic example


of the danger which had haunted the drafters of the OAU Charter. A troublesome legacy from the colonial days, the border between Algeria and Morocco had never been clearly defined.

The dispute between Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya stems mainly from Somali irredentism. The Somali case was first brought to the OAU quite early in 1963. At the summit conference, in that year, the Somali delegate President Aden Abdullah Osman demanded the adjustment of the boundaries which he claimed divided the Somalis along the entire length of existing borders with Ethiopia and Kenya. He accused the Ethiopians of taking possession of a large portion of Somali territory without the consent and against the wishes of the inhabitants. Although through the efforts of the OAU a ceasefire between the parties was effected, the OAU was unable to effect a diplomatic solution to the Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya border conflict.47

Given the overview of these conflicts, we have seen that the OAU has intervened in almost all of the conflicts in Africa, be they border conflicts or conflicts that arise as a result of rebellion.

Throughout the civil war in Chad, attempts have been made by the OAU and individual African states on behalf of the OAU to mediate in the conflict. We would like to point

out that all of its diplomatic initiatives by the OAU eventually ended in failure. The OAU involvement in Chad is, of course, justified by the OAU Charter which specifically provides for peaceful negotiations to settle conflicts and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. The Charter also formally created the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration which is supposed to have the expressed function of solving disputes of conflicts. However, in general practice and in the Chadian situation in particular other means have been employed to solve the conflict. Cervenka elaborates on this peculiar development when he asserts:

Disputes among the OAU members have been settled through direct negotiations between states, good offices offered by third parties, and ad hoc committees composed of Heads of State, diplomatic negotiations conducted during sessions of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. A rather striking feature of the OAU's handling of disputes is that not one has ever dealt with by the organ created specifically for that purpose.

In other words, the Commission on Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration is mainly a nominal body which seldom if ever operates according to its original purpose. When we look at the OAU's initiatives in Chad, we are mainly concerned

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49 Ibid., p. 64.
with the successes or failures of various conferences, ad
hoc committees, summit conferences and actions of the third
parties on behalf of the OAU.

The OAU has in fact tried almost every conceivable
diplomatic initiative in Chad but anarchy and civil war
continue. Unfortunately, the Chadian conflict demonstrates
the dilemma historically faced by the OAU which is an
inability to enforce its diplomatic decisions. Let us
move to examine the OAU initiatives starting in with the Kano
National Reconciliation Conference.

The Kano National Reconciliation Conference, March-April, 1979

In March, April and May 1979, Nigeria, Libya, Sudan
Cameroon, Niger and four Chadian 'tendencies': FAT (Malloum),
FAP (Goukouni), FAN du Tchad (MPLT) or Third Army, a
splinter group from the Goukouni faction conducted a series
of meetings came to be called the "Kano National Reconcilia-
tion Conference" and provided the foundation for the more
comprehensive settlement that would come in August, 1979. 50

In spite of efforts by France, which proposed the
holding of a conference of reconciliation at Ndjamena,
Libya and Nigeria imposed their choice of Kano as the
conference location. The Kano Conference was held on
March 12-16, 1979, chaired by the Nigerian General, Shehu
Yar'Adua. Under the terms of Kano Agreements, a ceasefire

50 "Chad: Kano Peace Conference," Africa Research
was signed by the factions represented (FAP, FAN, MPLT, and Malloum's followers in FAT), and the following arrangements were made: the demilitarization of Ndjamena, the liberation of prisoners and hostages, the dissolution of existing government bodies, the formation of a Government d'Union National de Transition (GUNT), and the creation of an integrated army. Nigeria was to send a neutral force to maintain security in Ndjamena until a government could be set up. On March 23, 1979, Malloum and Habre tendered their resignations. A provisional state council of eight members (two from each faction) was constituted under the presidency of Goukouni Oueddei. When a transition government was set up in late April, 1979, its composition did not reflect the actual disposition of forces and therefore the new government could not get recognition from the OAU, nor from the countries on its borders.

A second conference was held at Kano on April 3-11, 1979 to constitute the GUNT. In addition to the signatories of Kano I, five new factions were presented, all claiming allegiance to FROLINAT: the Forces Populaires de Liberation led by Mahamat Abba; the Conseil Democratique

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Revolutionnaire led by Ahmet Acyle; the FROLINAT Original led by Abba Siddick; Volcan led by Abdoulaye Adam Dana, and FROLINAT Foundamental led by Hadjaro Senoussi. The conference was a failure. Nigeria and Libya exerted pressure to impose Mahamat Abba as president, but Goukouni and Habre refused to recognize the five new factions, and returned to Ndjamena. As Habre and Goukouni refused to cooperate, Nigeria slapped an oil boycott on the country and pulled its neutral troops out in order to force the parties back to the negotiation table. 54

Even before the ink was dry on the Kano Agreement, fighting broke out again. The failure of the Kano Agreement, however, does not mean that this series of meetings was without significance. The importance of the events in March, April, and May, 1979 was that power was transferred from the southern elites to northern Muslim elites.55 But the agreement was destined to fail because it did not include all of the major protagonists in the conflict and peace-keeping force which was to be set up by the OAU was not implemented.56 Thus, the stage was set for a new OAU initiative: the historic Lagos Accord process was set in


55John Howe, "Chad At War," Africa 97 (September 1979), p. 27.

The Lagos Accord, August 1979

The Lagos Accord was announced at the conclusion of a two day meeting on August 21, 1979. The main purpose of the agreement was to stop the armed fighting between the various factions and to create the conditions for a lasting solution to the crisis in Chad. Some of the most important provisions of the accord include:

- ceasefire and the demilitarization of the capital;
- establishment of an all African peace-keeping force composed of troops from countries without a border with Chad (Congo, Benin, and Guinea) and supervised by a commission under the Secretary-General of the OAU;
- the formation of a new government based on the parties involved;
- free elections within eighteen months;
- withdrawal of the remaining French troops.

It is important however, to note that the agreement specifically called for a peace-keeping force which did not include Chad's immediate neighbors particularly Nigeria and Libya. The inclusion of Nigerian and Libyan troops would have meant the immediate collapse of the agreement because of the very partisan role that both countries have played in Chad's civil war. The agreement was significant because it brought all of the conflicting factions together for the

first time and its provisions if implemented properly, contained the comprehensiveness necessary for a lasting peace. Also, it should be noted that despite the weaknesses of the OAU, the Lagos Accord was viewed by all the parties involved as the vehicle through which a lasting settlement could be worked out. According to Lagos Accords, the factions involved in the conflict would set up a Government of National Unity in Chad, or what has become known as the GUNT. The set up of the Government of National Unity was as follows:

1) President: Goukouni Oueddei representing the FAP forces at that time;
2) Vice-President: Lt. Col. Wadel Abdelkader Kamougue representing the Southern forces generally and the FAT in particular;
3) Defense Minister: Hissene Habre representing the FAN forces.58

The other factions in the conflict were all represented on the ministerial level.

It would seem at first glance that the OAU had in fact spearheaded a historic agreement that would end the long and bloody civil war in Chad. But less than six months after the signing of the Lagos Accord, new fighting broke out between FAP and FAN forces. So again, the main question is what went wrong? If we look at the Lagos Accord more closely, several major weaknesses become apparent. First of all, the

accord did not provide for the immediate arrival of the OAU's peace-keeping force. The first units of this force did not arrive in Chad until January, 1981, almost five months after the fact. By this time, the long standing tensions were already in place and ready to errupt again. Secondly, when the troops did arrive they failed to take decisive action to separate the combatants and enforce the ceasefire. Most importantly, although the agreement called for an end to outside intervention, neither the OAU nor the various forces in Chad had any practical means to enforce non-intervention. Also, the various factions themselves have continued to resort to military struggle to solve conflict over policy and power.

The Lagos agreements were not well received in the south. Firstly, southerners refused to allow the participation of Hissene Habre in the government; also, it was only following strong pressure exerted by France that they agree to take part in a provisional Administration Committee set up in Ndjamena. The south was afraid of being marginalized by the Lagos agreement. It held about seventy percent of administrative posts as well as the main agricultural (notably cotton) and industrial resources. In the south, under the direction of the permanent committee, order had been restored, economic life had returned to normal, administration was

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somehow functioning, and schools had been reopened. In the north by contrast, and particularly Ndjamena, there reigned anarchy and insecurity; the GUNT had been unable to set the administration in motion without the civil servants from the south who had not returned to the capital. Thus the south refused what they termed the 'inferior' role assigned to it and was demanding fair recognition.

The Sierra Leone Summit, July, 1980

The OAU also tried during its 17th Emergency Summit held in Freetown, Sierra Leone, in July, 1980, to resolve the crisis in Chad. This summit passed a resolution drafted by the Council of Ministers which states in part:

In the event of failure by the OAU to raise the necessary funds after a period of two months, the U.N. Security Council will be requested for assistance, particularly the necessary financial means to enable peace to be restored to Chad.

This resolution, of course, reveals the dilemma faced by the OAU, and exposes one of the main reasons behind the continued failure of the OAU peace efforts in Chad.

During this summit, there was considerable misunderstanding, or even disagreement between Sierra Leone and Nigeria. President Stevens endorsed the Libyan presence in Chad. President Shagari representing Nigeria wanted an immediate


withdrawal of Libyan troops in Chad.

Some of the terms of the Sierra Leone Summit were the reaffirmation of the following conditions already stated in the Lagos Accord of August 1979:

1) The immediate ceasefire among the contending factions,
2) Setting up of a mutual peace-keeping force by the OAU,
3) Inclusion of all the factions into Chadian integrated Armed Forces, and
4) Withdrawal of Libyan troops in Chad.62

Obviously, the OAU 17th Summit was unable to bring peace to Chad and its people. We can say here that while the OAU can provide the formal machinery and develop the plans necessary for the successful settlement of disputes, it does not have the resources nor the mandate to enforce its diplomatic initiatives. In the Chadian case, where the different factions themselves are not willing to negotiate, this dilemma has meant the continued suffering of the majority of the Chadian people. The OAU after almost three years involvement in the search for a diplomatic solution to the Chadian conflict, is eager to see an outcome in Chad that would reflect favorably on the organization.63 Past experience with Chad has proved a frustrating affair and the presence of Libyans in Chad was seen by many OAU members as a blow to


African countries particularly the reactionary countries such as Nigeria, Egypt, Sudan and Zaire. The problem during this summit was no longer the imposition of peace in Chad, but rather its maintenance - without the presence of Libyan troops.

Colonel Gaddafi also argued that a precipitate withdrawal from Chad would jeopardize the peace that his soldiers had brought. Hence the failure of the Sierra Leone Summit. The OAU being so eager to see a peaceful settlement to the conflict, organized another Emergency Summit in Lagos in December 1980. Let us proceed to examine this summit in detail.

The Emergency Summit in Lagos, December 1980

In response to the changing situation in Chad the OAU held another Emergency Summit on December 23, 1980 in Lagos, Nigeria. Attending the summit were the Heads of State of eleven African countries and the Libyan Foreign Minister. The states represented included Libya, Nigeria, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Togo, Guinea, Benin, Congo, Sierra Leone, Ghana and Sudan. The Emergency Summit recognized the redistribution of power among the protagonists in Chad as a result of the recent fighting. Hissene Habre was urged to stay away from Lagos because the OAU felt that his

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forces no longer represented a military threat in Chad. OAU initiatives in the civil war therefore had been reduced to accommodating the strongest faction. The failure of the OAU to recognize and include Habre's faction in the summit resulted in a new phase of fighting between Habre's forces and Goukouni's GUNT forces.65

Shortly after the Lagos Emergency Summit, Libya in early January announced a proposed merger between Chad and Libya. Immediately, an informal meeting of African Heads of State was convened in Lome, Togo to officially condemn the proposed merger.66

Most of the African countries saw the proposed Libyan-Chad merger as an attempt by Colonel Gaddafi to 'spread his Islamic socialism to the Chadian people; some saw it as Colonel Gaddafi's imperialism and neo-colonialism.67

France immediately reacted strongly to the announcement of the merger agreement. On January 8, 1981 it stressed that the GUNT could not commit the people of Chad to such a course indefinitely, and French military personnel in the Central African Republic was reinforced.68 The result was an


68Europa, Africa South of the Sahara, p. 292.
animated series of exchanges with Libya. However, Libya retained its grip on northern and eastern Chad. President Goukouni also refused to discuss the possibility of Libyan withdrawal, while comites populaires established in the occupied zones reinforced Libyan influence. The refusal of President Goukouni to discuss the immediate withdrawal of Libyan troops was because of the fears he maintained that if Libyan troops are withdrawn, his regime, GUNT, which was set up by the OAU would face immediate collapse to Habre's forces. Of course, Goukouni has already condemned Habre and his close supporters to death in absentia.69

President Goukouni was pressurized by Nigeria, France, Zaire, and other African states to negotiate the Libyan withdrawal from Ndjamenina in a meeting in Lome, Togo.

The Chad Peace Conference in Lome, Togo, January 1981

In an effort to end the increasingly fierce fighting engendered by many years of civil war in Chad, an ad hoc subcommittee composed of Togo, Guinea, Congo and Benin was formed by the OAU to find a solution to the civil war in Chad. The committee's work led to a conference in Lome, Togo, on January 13, 1981. The OAU sponsored meeting became known as the "Chad Peace Conference" and brought together the two main factions, Goukouni's GUNT forces and Habre's FAN forces engaged in the fighting since the breakdown of

the Lagos Accord. The conference was attended by the OAU Secretary-General, Edem Kodjo, the OAU Chairman, President Siaka Stevens, President Kerekou of Benin, President Eyadema of Togo, and a high ranking official from the government of the Congo. The presence of so many Heads of State at the peace conference illustrates the role that personal diplomacy plays in the work of settling disputes among African states. Personal diplomacy is a frequently used tactic of the OAU, but it does not always end in success, so to speak.

Most of the provisions of the plan drawn up by the peace conference were elaborated in the Lagos Accord. However, at the conclusion of the conference, the two main protagonists could not reach agreement on the terms of ceasefire. At this point, the massive intervention of Libyan troops on the side of GUNT forces was the major area of contention. Hissene Habre could not agree to a ceasefire until Libyan troops were withdrawn. President Goukouni Oueddei, for his part, charged that the FAN was an illegal faction and, therefore, could not make demands on the so-called legal government of Chad.

On September 17, 1981, President Goukouni met with the French President, Francois Mitterrand in Paris. France

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71 Ibid, p. 5822.
affirmed its support for the GUNT, and a French initiative hastened the departure of the Libyan troops by urging the President of the OAU to send a peace-keeping force into Chad, as had been agreed upon during the Lagos Accord. France and the U.S.A. promised to support such a force militarily and financially.  

At the request of the Council of Ministers of the OAU, Libyan troops began to evacuate Ndjamena. It was agreed that the OAU peace-keeping force should be led by a Nigerian officer, Major-General Geoffrey Ejiga, and by mid-December 1981, there were 2,000 Nigerian troops, 2,000 Zairean and 800 Senegalese troops in Chad, Togo and Benin having withdrawn their offer to contribute troops.

Even before the arrival of the OAU peace-keeping force, controversy was raging as to the role it was to play. According to Goukouni, it was to help put down the rebellion of Habre, acting on orders from the GUNT. According to the OAU, however, the force was simply to maintain order and security without becoming embroiled in the civil war.

Profiting from their enemy's hesitation, the FAN led by Habre stepped up their offensive as soon as the Libyans had left. By mid-January 1982, Abeche, Oum-Hadjer and Faya-

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Largeau were captured by Habre's forces. It looked at this time as though the OAU peace-keeping force, with outposts at Ati and Mongo, was all that stood between Habre's forces and Ndjama. Hoping to isolate the FAN, Goukouni paid an official visit to Sudan in effort to establish good relations. On February 11, 1982, the OAU adopted a resolution calling for national reconciliation and fixing February 28, 1982 as a ceasefire date. Elections were to take place under the OAU supervision before June 30. This resolution, effectively a political victory for the FAN, was strongly condemned by Goukouni, who maintained that the only possible solution to the conflict was a military solution. Hostilities continued and the Chad Peace Conference did not bring any diplomatic solution to the Chadian conflict. The Lome Conference was not a total failure because it was the first time that the two protagonists - Goukouni Oueddei and Hissene Habre met face to face after many years of civil war.

The refusal of GUNT to negotiate with Habre, however, confirmed the leaders of the OAU peace-keeping force in their resolution to maintain a position of strict neutrality. Hissene Habre adroitly avoided confronting them head on,

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75 See Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, Conflict in Chad, p.93.

76 "Chad: OAU's Dilemma," p. 6303.
preferring to negotiate for the peaceful advance of his troops across their lines. Goukouni's forces were greatly depleted and after bitter fighting they retreated to bases in the south. This gave Habre a chance to capture the seat of government.

The OAU Peace-Keeper Force

The setting up of the African peace-keeping force in Chad was one of the resolutions reached during the Lagos Accord. The main reason that can be advanced regarding the setting up of the force was to replace the Libyan troops which a majority of African countries, France and the U.S.A. saw as an expansion of Colonel Gaddafy's empire. Another reason was with the formation of a peace-keeping force, the different factions in the conflict would be able to agree to a ceasefire and negotiate for a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

Early in December, 1981, saw the inter-African peace-keeping force in Chad taking shape. Countries that were willing to contribute troops included Nigeria, Zaire and Senegal. Troops from these countries arrived in Chad with assistance from the United States and France who promised to support the African peace force.

77 "OAU and Chad," p. 6335.
The question that could be put forward here, why did many countries who are members of the OAU refuse to contribute troops to a peace-keeping force in Chad? Many countries in Africa are not in a strong financial position to finance troops outside their countries.

The OAU peace-keeping force in Chad was the first time that the African countries had such a standing force for the maintenance of peace in any African country since the formation of the OAU in 1963.

In deployment of the OAU peace-keeping force in Chad, Nigerian troops were assigned to go to eastern Chad using Abeche which was controlled by Hissene Habre's rebel forces as the base; Zairean troops were assigned to the northern zone, with Faya-Largeau as the headquarters, and the Senegalese troops were to control the central zone based at Mongo.79

Initially, it had been intended that the first contingent of 400 Nigerian soldiers would fly directly to Ati, on the road in central Chad, to Abeche. However, conditions at the landing strip in Chad precluded a safe landing of the troops, hence the troops returned to Nigeria while a smaller contingent was left at N'Djamena. The remaining Nigerian troops were expected to be fully deployed by December 20, 1981. The Commanding Office of the force

79"OAU and Chad," pp. 6337-6338.
addressed a news conference on arrival in Chad, and stated that: "Nigerian forces were ready to come to Chad and that Cameroun Republic had granted permission for Nigerian troops and other vehicles to cross the Camerounian frontier on their way from Maiduguri to Ndjamena."  

However, there was a last minute revision in the composition of the OAU peace-keeping force. President Goukouni who was made the interim President by the OAU, said that he would prefer not to have Togolese troops in Chad, following President Eyadema's publically expressed sentiment that he would rather prefer a political solution than a military solution in the Chadian conflict.

In keeping with their promise of supporting the peace-keeping force, France did help in the transportation of Senegalese troops to Ndjamena; Britain offered financial assistance for logistical use to the Nigerian contingent; the United States also airlifted fifty-three tons of supplies to the Zaire contingent. Their aid of course, as we mentioned earlier, was not aimed at seeing a peaceful settlement of the Chadian conflict, but was aimed at seeing that Colonel Gaddafy's troops were replaced by an African peace-keeping force.

It was decided that the peace-keeping force should not
join in any fighting or try to regain the towns taken by Hissene Habre in the east. The fact that the peacekeeping force could not call for a ceasefire or prevent the two factions from fighting raised many questions as to the usefulness of maintaining such a costly force, estimated at $150 million a year by the United Nations.\textsuperscript{83}

The view that the OAU forces should help the Chadian government suppress\textquoteright{}dissidence was rejected outright by the Commanding Officer who acted on the instruction of the countries that contributed troops for the peace-keeping in Chad.\textsuperscript{84} The OAU representatives strongly maintained that in the event of fighting between factions comprising the present government there will be no question of \textquoteleft{}intervening on any side. But the OAU forces were to react if fired upon.

The arrival of the OAU peace-keeping force and the withdrawal of Libyan troops in Chad made it easier for Hissene Habre\textquotesingle{}s forces to advance further towards the west into the central province of Batha. There was little evidence of the OAU peace-keeping force being adequately deployed to contain a military problem that was beyond the control of the numbers of nominally neutral force. President Goukouni

\textsuperscript{82}Ibid., p. 6275.


\textsuperscript{84}Rene Lemarchand, \textquoteleft{}Chad: The Roots of Chaos,\textquoteright{} Current History 80:470 (December 1981), pp. 414-438.
continued to threaten that if the peace-keeping force did not fight the rebels, its presence in Chad was useless.

Four months after the arrival of the peace-keeping force, compounded with difficulties in its maintenance, President Goukouni was asked by the OAU to negotiate with the rebel leader Hissene Habre. If he did not, he would lose the support of the OAU. In effect, six Heads of State met in Nairobi and asked the parties concerned to make peace, and set a schedule which the two factions should follow. The OAU invited them to stop fighting, adopt a constitution and proceed to elections. 85

Limited Resources

During the OAU's occupation of Chad, more than one member state that contributed to the peace-keeping force in Chad encountered serious financial difficulties in maintaining the troops. The estimated cost of the OAU force until the June withdrawal was put at over $150 million which would mean that for a full year it could be up to $300 million. 86

It should be recalled that it was the OAU that formed the Government of National Unity (GUNT) and made Goukouni Oueddei an interim president. The decision by the OAU to

85 Ibid.
acknowledge the importance of the rebel leader Hissene Habre's position in the current phase of Chad's history at the expense of Goukouni - now seemingly considered little more than a faction leader, left in its wake a series of attendant ramifications. The OAU's change of tactic had clearly been dictated by the impossibility of maintaining the OAU international peace-keeping force in Chad since no one was willing to pay for it, and by the mounting evidence of an increasingly tense military situation. 87

The OAU peace-keeping force could not be maintained because the international backing and financial support for the operation was not fulfilled. One of the obstacles to getting any African-based intervention force off the ground since the formation of the OAU, was the inability of the OAU members themselves, and the unwillingness of outside interested parties, to raise the necessary finance. In short, the OAU decided to pull out its force in Chad because of the cost; moreover, the force was not given a mandate to act militarily in preventing the rebel forces from advancing towards N'djamena, the capital of Chad. The low level of resources available to the OAU has indeed limited its ability to become independent of the national leaders. In general the OAU has remained weak in terms of material resources. The organization controls few material resources, and unlike

such organizations as the OAS, NATO, and the Warsaw Pact, it has no member on which it can depend to supply such financial resources when necessary. The Chadian case has demonstrated the inability of the OAU to raise the necessary funds for the operation of its peace-keeping force. Important resources for an international organization such as the OAU, include expert knowledge of political and/or military affairs, and skills in bargaining diplomacy, and control of financial resources. The financial situation of the OAU has been notable for the limitations that is has imposed on the organization's operations. The OAU's budgets have varied from $2.5 to $4.5 million. Even these modest budgets are, however, deceptive, as many members have remained deliquent in meeting their fiscal responsibilities and there is no provision to bring strong pressure upon them to pay their arrears.

Neither appeals by the administrative Secretary-General no resolutions by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government have proven effective. As a result of these financial problems, in a conflict, such as the Chadian conflict the

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89 The 1973-74 budget was $4.5 million; this was an increase fo $0.7 million over the budget of the previous year. For purposes of comparison, the budget of the OAS is usually about $20 million.
OAU has not been able to support its force and find a peaceful solution to the conflict. Moreover, development planning has often been postponed, meetings of specialized commissions cancelled. Many member states do not meet their financial obligations because they feel that the organization has not been serving their interests.  

The lack of financial resources always forces the OAU to appeal to outside help in order to be able to meet the financial requirements for enforcing its agreements or decisions. When this happens, it defeats the purpose for which the organization was formed, for it will always have to compromise with the imperialist countries in order that the necessary finance might be granted. In the case of Chad, the OAU made a repeated appeal to the U.S., France and the U.N. for financial support for the peace-keeping force.

Limited Authority

Article XIX of the OAU Charter established the various commissions and makes explicit that intra-regional conflict management is considered as a major task for the organization:

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Member States pledge to settle all disputes among themselves by peaceful means and, to this end decide to establish a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, the composition of which and conditions of service shall be defined by a separate protocol.92

Similarly to the OAU Charter, this protocol demonstrates the extremely limited authority granted to the institutions not directly controlled by the Heads of State. Like the International Court of Justice, the Commission lacks the authority to require that conflicting parties or factions appear before it. It lacks the authority to interpret the OAU Charter, and there is no provision for the enforcement of its decisions.93

Although various organs have been added to or removed from the OAU since its inception, its essential nature, its authority and responsibilities, has not been greatly changed. It has remained a collegially governed, intergovernmental organization whose essential task has been to encourage, coordinate, and harmonize voluntary cooperation and compliance among its members.

The OAU, however, has suffered since its inception from the limitations inherent in all international organizations not dominated by a strong central power. They can be effective only when dealing with issues on which there is

92 See Jon Woronoff, Organizing African Unity, p. 176.
a general consensus. Attempts to impose the will of a simple majority would threaten the future of the organization, and since the preservation of unity itself is perceived as being vitally important, it follows that the OAU's ability and authority to intervene successfully in finding a peaceful settlement in conflicts among its own members, or within any one of its member states, is strictly limited. Members of the OAU are not bound to carry out decisions taken by its supreme body, the annual summit meeting of Heads of State. The decisions of this body have the status of recommendations. However, when a particular recommendation has the support of more than two-thirds of the OAU members, the dissenting minority finds itself under severe constraints not to act in open defiance of the great majority.

From the case study, and limitations suffered by the OAU since its inception, it becomes clear that the OAU has done tremendously well in trying to seek a peaceful settlement to the Chadian conflict. But one is therefore bound to wonder why it is that the conflict in Chad still continues in spite of all the efforts by the OAU. Perhaps anybody analyzing the situation in Chad could give different answers to this question depending on one's position on a number of issues. It appears that the inability of the OAU to achieve

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94 Ibid., pp. 347-348.
a substantial result in its efforts in Chad is because of foreign intervention, limited authority and lack of financial resources.

Although the OAU is firmly opposed to any external intervention in the continent's internal conflict, it has not much success in preventing "foreign meddling," For example, Ethiopia was unsuccessful in getting support to dissuade a number of Arab states as well as Soviet-bloc countries from openly supporting the Eritrean secessionist struggle. Since practically all the OAU members are opposed to secession of any kind, they had every reason for responding positively to the Ethiopians' appeal. 95 In the Chadian case, the OAU showed itself incapable of mobilizing its members to make a strong demarche against countries such as the U.S.A., France, Sudan, and Egypt which provided most of the economic and military aid to Chadian factions in order to sustain the civil war.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Our main objective at the beginning of this study was:
1) to critically examine the role of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)* in settlement of intra-regional conflict — using the Republic of Chad as a case study;
2) to establish that the root cause of the Chadian conflict is not ethnicity and religion as some social scientists would have us to believe, but French colonialism and neo-colonialism which has continued to impinge upon the Chadian people even after political independence has been achieved.

The study reveals that it is the arbitrary drawing of territorial boundaries and the implementation of divide and rule tactics that resulted in the exacerbation of long standing class, ethnic and religious cleavages in the Republic of Chad. Our conclusion is that because of the historical subjugation and subordination of Chadian socio-economic formation by France, the Republic of Chad has been made to serve the French interests instead of serving the interests of the Chadian people. As the study reveals, we have seen that the subjugation and integration of Chadian economy with that of France allowed the French people to institute their
norms and values to the Chadians, making it even more
difficult for the Chadians to see themselves as people of
one country. Our analysis of the Chadian conflict and the
inability of the OAU to find a diplomatic solution to this
conflict reveals the contradictions resulting from the
continuing process of economic domination and subjugation
by French imperialism.

The civil war in Chad is an unfortunate illustration of
both the strengths and weaknesses of the OAU. On the one
had, the OAU must be commended for its tireless efforts to
bring about a workable solution to the civil war in Chad
which is not its own making. On the other hand, the noble
efforts of the OAU could not possibly bear fruit for three
interrelated reasons; first of all, although the OAU is
firmly opposed to any external intervention in Africa's
internal conflict, it has not had much success in preventing
"foreign meddling."\(^1\)

Clearly, the OAU has so far not had much success in
implementing its policy of resisting foreign intervention in
essentially African disputes. There is no reason to think
that the OAU will be able to act more effectively in defense
of its principle of non-intervention by foreign powers in
the future. This is because the majority of the members of
the OAU are reactionary states that believe that the present

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\(^1\) Colin Legum, et al., "The Role of the OAU IN Dealing
With Violent Conflicts," *Africa in the 1980s: A Continent
status quo should be maintained. They believe that Africa should continue to rely and lean on the West for economic, political and cultural development.

Secondly, the OAU lacks the resources and authority to enforce its diplomatic initiatives among member states; and lastly, it is our contention that, unless the protagonists involved are committed to a peaceful settlement of the conflict, such a solution will not be possible. These three reasons explain fully the continued failure of the OAU diplomatic initiatives in Chad.

Despite the fact that President Habre who captured the seat of government a year and a half ago has done everything to suppress uprisings by other factions in the conflict, the current state of peace in Chad is only a temporary phenomenon. It has become clear that some elements are dissatisfied with the government set up by Hissene Habre. In other words, we can expect future collapse of Habre's government as fighting is going on between Goukouni's forces and government forces of Hissene Habre. The various factions that make up the present government have long standing divergent interests.

The study reveals that the various factions that are fighting in Chad are fighting for their selfish ambitions and not for the welfare of the Chadian people as a whole. None of these factions is committed to the welfare and a starvation of the people in Chad. They are all interested in
controlling the seat of government in order to promote their personal goals, and to carry on with the pattern of colonial and neo-colonial exploitation.

The study maintains that the civil war in Chad is a product of French colonialism or imperialism which has created internal contradictions not only in Chad but also in all African countries that went through the process of colonization. Indeed, there is no doubt that France has remained one of the major actors in the political scene of Chad. Through the so-called aid, trade, and military support, France has kept intact its domination over a large number of Francophone states, including Chad. French policy vis-a-vis aims primarily at maintaining the 'dominant-dependent' relations between the two countries.

The study maintains that the objective determinants of French intervention in Chad are: economic, strategic, and diplomatic/psychological. The objective of stabilizing power in Africa is met through France being the decisive force in directing and determining the outcome of situations in Chad.

The study suggests that as long as African countries cannot mobilize their resources and be able to develop a monolithic ideology in fighting imperialism and neo-colonialism, Africa will continue to remain an arena of foreign intervention in its internal conflict, such as the Chadian conflict. It is not enough to form an organization as the
OAU, for when action is needed, a majority of its members take a back seat. A more purposeful and pragmatic approach to the settlement of intra-regional conflict should be adopted by all members of the OAU.

Our analysis revealed that the civil war in Chad cannot be solved by foreign countries but by the Africans themselves, the Chadians and the OAU. The fight against imperialism and neo-colonialism in the African countries as a whole, and in the Republic of Chad in particular, must be conceptualized and carried out independently of the imperialist countries and institutions that brought about the conflict in Chad. This means that the fight must take place within African countries and must be directed, first and foremost against the internal class power structure. The fight must also focus on the liberation of the internal production structure and the radical transformation of the political, economic and cultural institutions created by "formal and informal" colonialism in Chad. This action, of course, will not automatically lead to the elimination of poverty and starvation which the Chadian people are going through. These are the necessary prerequisites needed for initiating the attack on imperialism which is the cause of underdevelopment and conflict in the Republic of Chad in particular, and Africa in general.

These actions will allow the shift of power from the dominant classes in Chad to the class that would shift the
development emphasis away from the present strategy of "catching up with the West" to a new development strategy geared toward the creation of an autonomous technological base, and to the reduction or elimination of inequality, absolute poverty, inadequate education, chronic under-development, starvation and hunger. It will also lead to the redirection of national cultural values in such a way that national culture becomes the means of improving and preserving individual and cultural self-esteem. In other words, a development is required in Chad that is genuinely national, self-reliant and geared towards the needs of all the members of the society, as opposed to development that is propelled from outside and geared towards the needs of outside interests and the few dominant classes in the Republic of Chad.

These are not easy solutions because there are no magic solutions with which to fight imperialism and neo-colonialism. Imperialism which is the cause of underdevelopment and conflict in Chad is a painful and severe burden, especially for the masses of the Chadians who are victimized by the ongoing conflict and the present economic and political system. The way out of the present conflict will also be painful, involving sacrifice, determination, and the will to pursue the available alternatives to solving these conflicts. In the words of Claude Ake, the choice
For the Chadian people is between socialism and capitalism. In other words, either the Chadian people pursue a socialist self-reliant policy that will lead to the socialization and liberation of the production structures, abolition of the existing class system, and the structural transformation of the political and socio-economic institutions; or it must bring about a capitalist revolution that may lead to accelerated economic stagnation and underdevelopment "by inhibiting the factors which alone can overcome" conflict which is the result of imperialism.

Unfortunately, the factors that can make capitalist revolution possible have been lost to imperialism. As Magdoff correctly pointed out:

The options that had been available to the successful capitalist countries in past centuries... options which helped pull them out of impending, recurrent periods of stagnation - are out of the question. Conquest of territory, providing new surges of investment, is impossible. Nor is there, as in the past, the opportunity to dispose, in new areas of settlement, of surplus populations generated by the agricultural and industrial revolutions. At the same time, the economic and financial structure shaped by a long and continuing history of dependence on the more advanced capitalism, imposes additional limits on the possibility of bootstrap-lifting via the route of profit-seeking capital investment. It is hard to avoid the

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conclusion that, more and more, the only real alternative facing these peoples is whether to accept their lot of misery and its accompanying wastage of human lives or to revolutionize their societies so that resources can be fully utilized to begin to meet real needs of the people.\footnote{Ibid., p. 91.}

Thus, the real choice beyond continuing conflict, hunger, and starvation "is not between capitalism and socialism after all, but between socialism and barbarism."\footnote{See Claude Ake, Revolutionary Pressures in Africa, pp. 107-203.}
APPENDIX A

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN CHAD

1. Chad's Independence.....................1960
5. Hissene Habre's Regime...................1982-Present
7. The Lagos Accord.........................August 1979
8. The Sierra Leone Summit..................July 1980
9. The Emergency Summit in Lagos............December 1980
10. The Chad Peace Conference in Lome, Togo....January 1981
11. The OAU Peace-Keeping Force.............December 1981
APPENDIX B

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

OAU - Organization of African Unity
EC - European Community
EEC - European Economic Community
AEF - French Equatorial Africa
BET - Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti
OAS - Organization of American States
UN - United Nations
UDT - European-dominated Chadian Democratic Union
RPF - Rassemblement du Peuple Francais
PSIT - Parti Socialiste pour l'Independance du Tchad
PPT - Parti Progressiste Tchadien
FLT - Front de Liberation Tchadienne
GDP - Gross Domestic Product
UDEAC - Central African Economic and Customs Union
BEAC - Bank of the Central African States
CSM - Supreme Military Council
FROLINAT - Front for the Liberation of Chad
GUNT - Transitional Government of National Unity
FAP - Peoples Armed Forces
FAN - Northern Armed Forces
UND - Union Nationale Democratique
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
MNRCS - Mouvement National Pour La Revolution Culturelle et Sociale
C-in-C - Commander in Chief
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