Imperialism or realism: United States and West Africa

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IMPERIALISM OR REALISM: UNITED STATES AND WEST AFRICA

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF ATLANTA UNIVERSITY
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DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

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The purpose of the thesis is to utilize the realist-neorealist paradigm to analyze the United States policy objectives in West Africa, comparably to other African regions. The basic premise of the realist paradigm purports that states are unitary actors and they act to protect their national interest.

Through a critical analysis of secondary data, my findings clearly point to the fact that the former colonial powers, Britain and France are the major actors in West Africa not the United States. The United States policy strategy centers solely on the crisis areas of other regions, the Horn, Central Africa and Southern Africa. This is because of the power struggle between the superpowers and because these areas are endowed with vast mineral resources. The Nigerian oil and Chadian conflict
with Libya are the only two areas of U.S. interest in West Africa.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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My ultimate gratitude is to my parents Mr. and Mrs. A. O. Umerah for their prayers and encouragements. Mom, I finally made it! And to my husband, Dr. Ifeanyi Udezulu and Ifeoma and Ifeanyi, Junior for their constant love and support during the tedious period of writing the thesis.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgement ................................................. ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of Contents ................................................ iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables ........................................................ iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedication ........................................................... v</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Chapter

I. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE OF STUDY ............ 1

- Statement of Purpose
- Historical Background
- Hypothesis and Research Questions
- Theoretical Basis
- Research Method
- Literature Review

II. EUROPEAN COLONIZATION AND DE-COLONIZATION OF WEST AFRICA ..................... 20

- British Colonization of West Africa
- French Occupation
- British Decolonization
- French Decolonization
- Consequences of Colonial Rule

III. U.S. POLICY STRATEGIES IN AFRICA ................. 35

- Energy Policy
- Food for Peace Program
- Commitments for Economic Assistance
- U.S. Security Interests: An Exploration
- Trade Issues

IV. THE U.S. PRAGMATIC NEO-REALISM AND WEST AFRICA: A CONCLUSION .................. 71

BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................... 88
LIST OF TABLES

2.1 West African States - Independence.............. 31
3.1 U.S. Sales and Donations Under Food for Peace (Public Law 480) Programs 1975 to 1983........ 42
3.2 U.S. Government Foreign Grants and Credits by Type and Country 1945-1985............... 48
3.3 Commitment for Economic Assistance 1982-1985.. 51
3.4 U.S. Military Sales and Military Assistance 1950-1985........................................ 59
3.5 Value of Arms Transfers by Major Suppliers and Recipient Country 1981-1985.............. 60
3.6 U.S. Exports and Imports by Country 1975-1985.. 68
3.7 Merchandise Trade Balance....................... 70
4.1 South Africa as Mineral Supplier to U.S. 1981-1984........................................... 83
4.2 Reward and Punishment Model.................... 86
DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my mom Linda Umerah, to my children, Ifeoma, and Ifeanyi, Junior and to my brother Chukwuma.
Chapter I

Introduction and Purpose of Study

Statement of Purpose

Modern students of world politics have sought to explain the contents and dynamics of interstate relations through two competing paradigms, the classical tradition and Marxism. The most influential Western efforts have converged in what K. J. Holsti calls the "Classical tradition" encompassing both Liberalism and Realism.

But for over a century a contending paradigm based on Marxism has challenged the assumptions of the classical tradition. For Marxist scholars class conflict is basic in the explication of competing interests of sovereign states: for capitalism creates both exploitation and interstate conflict, particularly in the form of imperialism.

The present effort seeks to propose a "middle range" approach that can be applied in the analysis of U.S. policy objectives in the West African region. The middle-range approach derived its theory from a synthesis of both Realism and Neorealism.

The thesis aims to demonstrate by using the middle range approach rather than Marxism, how the United States
sets its policy strategies. Both Realism and Neorealism purport that states act to protect their national interest. And due to the super power struggle for influence in the crisis areas of African regions, West Africa is relatively unimportant to U.S. policy calculations. The U.S. allies, Britain and France who were the former colonial powers, not the U.S. remain the pre-eminent threat to regional stability in West Africa.

**Historical Background**

The European Convention of 1885 marked the staking out of official claims in Africa by the various European powers. Britain, France and Portugal (to a lesser extent) asserted their influences in West Africa. The United States however, maintains a relationship with Liberia which continued after the country's independence in 1847. Thus, America's official interest in Africa before World War I centered largely on Liberia. Diplomatic relation of Liberia with the United States was complicated by the fact that the very existence of an independent black republic negated for many European colonialists, the kind of legitimacy that the colonial powers accorded each other.

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Liberia, yet they supported the country in such a manner, The Americans avoided taking direct responsibility for Liberia, yet they supported the country in such a manner, as to preserve Liberia's independence, while at the same time, salving the exaggerated pride that then was widely the characteristics of the Great power in the attitude toward small and weak states. Undoubtedly, it was America's influence that prevented Liberia from being absorbed by one or another of the major colonial empires.

After World War II, America established a decisive interest in Africa. President Franklin Roosevelt insisted on decolonization of European colonies in the Third World in general and especially in Africa. Following the struggles for independence (see chapter two), the European countries finally granted the majority of the African states their semi-sovereignty, for the former European power continued to sway their former colonies. I used the term semi-sovereignty here because some scholars still argue that neo-colonialism still persists in Third World. Therefore, these nations are not totally independent so to speak.

The research problem is whether or not the West African region is vital to the U.S. policy measures. Or,

\[3\]

Ibid. p. 206.
whether the U.S. neglect of this region is due to the
established presence of U.S. allies (European powers).

The Hypothesis:

The United States minimal engagement in West Africa
is due to the lack of super power tension in that area.
Compared to the Horn, Northern Africa and Southern African
regions, West Africa is not a strategic location to U.S.
policy objectives.

Research Questions:

- Is there a correlation between U.S. interest in vital
  Africa mineral resources and policy calculations?

- Whether or not there is a relationship between super
  power zero-sum game and policy objectives.

- Does the U.S. as a rational actor act to protect its
  self interest?

- To what extent is West Africa vital to U.S.?

Theoretical Basis

Since the birth of the modern nation-state in
Western Europe, a single paradigm has held sway over
efforts to theorize about global politics. Variously
called "power politics," the "billiard ball model,
"political realism" and the "state centric model," this
paradigm assumes global politics to be a contest for power

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among sovereign nation-states in an anarchic environment. Its key tenets have been passed down from generation to generation by historian and political theorists as varied as Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Ranke. In the United States, its basic ideas were reinforced and systematized during and after World War II by a group of scholars including Nicholas Spykman, E. H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, and Robert Osgood. They were reacting to what they saw as "errors made by advocates of idealism with their emphasis on national self determination, international law, political community, and morality during the interwar period."

The peace of Westphalia of 1648, which brought to an end the religious wars of Europe must be regarded as the crucial historical step in the evolution and acceptance of a paradigm of global politics, which features "power" and "state" as core concepts. Westphalia is said to have "legislated into existence" the system of states that has provided a focus for much of the discipline. It signified

4  "Sub-Saharan African and U.S. Policy"  
the victory of secular princes over the imperial pretensions of feudal barons and provided the basis for the growth of a detailed system of international law that "legitimized the authority of these monarchs personal property into the legal fiction of the sovereign state with the ascribed legal characteristics corollary of non-intervention in the internal affairs of such sovereign kingdoms."  

Hans Morgenthau summarized the impact of that age—the appearance of a central political power that exercised its lawmaking and law-enforcing authority for the single stake of power. Understanding how and why that struggle for influence occurs and suggesting ways for regulating it, is the purpose of the study of world politics.

The key insight underlying these assumptions relates to the realist understanding of power. Nation states are seen as the critical actors, because they alone are sovereign and can marshal the necessary resources to wield power. For Morgenthau, they are the "ultimate point of reference of contemporary foreign policy."  

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politics a single actor, the government has sufficient power to regulate the activities of all other entities in society, producing a certain measure of order and tranquility; in the international arena, there is no such leviathan. Therefore, in such an "anarchic" environment, each nation state must struggle to maintain, if not to increase its power; otherwise it will be crushed. These assumptions of struggle for influence or control have influenced "world politics that has been within a certain parameter as elevating these political facts into a legal theory, and giving them, both moral approbation and appearance of legal necessity."

While there has been little research of a systematic sort on the role of paradigms in international relations inquiry, a belief that the power politics approach has been the guiding intellectual force in the modern period is widely accepted.

The realist paradigm can be said to consist of three fundamental assumptions:

-Nation-states and/or decision makers are the most important set of actors to examine in order to account for behavior in international politics.

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10 Mansbach and Vasquez, p. 5.
Political life is bifurcated into "domestic" and "international" spheres, each subject to its own characteristic traits, and laws of behavior.

International relations is the struggle for power and peace.

This struggle for power and peace constitutes a single issue occurring in a single system and entails a ceaseless repetitive competition for this single state of power. Understanding how and why that struggle occurs and suggesting ways for regulating it, is the purpose of the disciple. These assumptions have provided a core belief about world politics that have been shared by scholars as diverse as A. F. K. Organski, Thomas Schelling, David J. Singer, Inis Claude, Karl Deustch, E. H. Carr and R. J. Rummel. Our main concern here is to explain U.S. minimal engagement in West Africa within the Realist/Neo-realist context. Other leading neo-realist scholars include Kenneth Waltz, Robert Keohane, Richard Rosecrance and Robert Tucker (see Chapter Four for full discussion of neorealism).

According to John Spanier, the basic purpose of American foreign policy, after all is the protection of a democratic social ordel in a hostile world. It is

11 Ibid.
America's counter balancing power that has protected democratic values; without that power, Soviet power and Soviets social values and order would have prevailed. Freedom in the world, in short, is ultimately tied to American power. As Kissinger (while Secretary of State) expressed it, "if we do not lead, no other nations that stand for what we believe in, can take our place."

The Horn of Africa, North Africa, and Southern Africa are areas of strategic American policy designs in Africa, because of the East-West tension. Therefore, America is protecting its national interest by establishing its presence in those areas. Specifically put, the U.S. involvement is related to America's geo-political needs in terms of configuration of power.

Research Method

The conclusion reached within this study will be based on critical analysis of secondary data. This method facilitates comparative analysis of U.S. policy patterns in various African regions. Also invasion of privacy diminishes through this method as opposed to the use of primary sources.

The data sources are from key documents that describe U.S. policy objectives and program in various African regions, as well as those that illuminate trends in communication context by important U.S. foreign policy actors, will be audited against objective standards. Some of these are U.S. government documents and published by the U.S. Department of Commerce—International Trade administrations; U.S. House Commission on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa, the U.S. Senate Commission on Foreign Relations; the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Historian; the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census; U.S. the Agency for International Development, Bureau of External Affairs; the U.S. Department of Defense; and United Nation Chronicle. Other sources will be obtained from leading journals and texts.

These official documents will be analyzed to determine:

- Comparative mineral contribution of the West African region into the so-called strategic minerals.
- Pattern of trade between the U.S. and the region.
- Comparative U.S. military presence in the region.
- U.S. foreign aids
- U.S. interest and West African geo-politics

The method of analysis is derived from a basic premise that:
States are the unit level of analysis. They are rational egoists.

The U.S. foreign policy is inextricably linked to the following:

- Advancement of U.S. military machines
- Dependable source of raw materials throughout the world
- And maintenance of a high standard of living rather than issues of morality.14

These assumptions were re-echoed in a March 1986 speech by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker. In the speech, Mr. Crocker confirms that U.S. African interest is based on these broad categories: developmental issues, strategic, political and economic concerns. This is an indication of U.S. awareness that Africa is part of a broader global system.

Literature Review:

Major literatures on U.S. relations in Africa are generally deficient on the West African region. The focus is invariably on the continent in general or, on specific crisis areas in the various regions.

Mark Delancey identifies three major areas of orthodox study: First, major African problem (e. g. 

Southern Africa, the Horn and boundaries). Second, African foreign policies (including case and comparative studies and international organizations both African and EuroAfrica). Third, the African policies of major (and minor) states with the great power.

Michael Radu's essay on "Ideology, Parties, and African Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa," asserts that there is a dramatic upsurge in the number of Sub-Saharan states claiming allegiance to Marxist-Leninist and/or revolutionary socialism during the 1970s. He argues that ideology may in the long run affect their economic development. Radu in effect, analyzes the importance, trends, and implications of Marxist ideology (in its various forms) for the internal political and economic development of African states, for their foreign policy, and for Western interest in Africa.

Internal disputes and U.S. policy options in Africa is also a major area of study. Ogene F. Chidozie writes on U.S. policymaking during the Congo crisis 1960-64; the Nigerian civil war 1967-70; the importation of Rhodesian

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The progressive American economist Stewart Smith has examined America's economic, political, cultural and military policy in Africa. He explains the continent-wide picture of U.S. corporate profiteering and expansion in Africa with necessary details for each major country and area.\(^{18}\) Smith illuminates the flexible political strategy of U.S. imperialism, its reliance everywhere on reactionary exploitive class. According to the economist, the upper class suppresses the masses and barters national sovereignty to the interests of imperialism in general and U.S. imperialism in specific, be it the fascist racist regime of South Africa, or the bureaucratic capitalist ones in the same newly independent countries. Furthermore, he Pentagon: suppression of the liberation movements within the continent and the use of African bases and resources as a cistern of growing importance in the global configuration with communism.

As African states probe for a political identity, distinct from the colonial past, the super powers jostle

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\(^{19}\) Ibid.
for influence. For the U.S. and its allies, the aim is to preserve political, economic and strategic dominance over much of a continent known to possess immense mineral resources and other riches on which many key Western industries rely. For the Soviet Union, and its friends, the stake is to challenge that dominance by planting seeds of socialism in the African soil or by seeking to deny the West access to Africa's economic resources and strategic facilities. Arthur Gavshon graphically details this state of affairs in his Crisis in Africa.

Frederick S. Arkhurst in his collection of essays follows similar trend of thought in his U.S. Policy Towards Africa (New York, Praeger 1975). This collection reviews U.S. African relation: from historical developmental perspective (Immanuel Wallerstein) through contemporary policy in specific regions (Herbert J. Spiro) to South Africa and the entire issues of politico economic calculations.

The global balance of power, involving nuclear stalemate and mutual deterrence, tends to make a conflict between the main industrial powers improbable. Tensions in the Third World often result in warfare and inevitably engage the partisan interest of Soviet Union and the U.S.

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They may become deeply committed to their embattled clients, as in the Horn, or seek to enhance their own influence. Africa is most of the time influenced by asserts that national interest are subjective determinations formulated with reference to the shared American perception and misperceptions of Soviet intension and capabilities. This critique is documented by Gerald J. Bender and his co-editors. The crisis areas are Southern Africa, the Horn, Zaire and Northern Africa. The editor contends that perceptions and misperceptions of a nation's capabilities in the system affects the values of a national entity.

Robert M. Price also writes on these vital issues of U.S. national interest and global strategy in Africa. He lays strong emphasis on the zero-sum game between the super powers. But he clearly pointed out that Soviets' influence in the crisis areas does not threaten the American status-quo. The American perception in this instance is largely illusory. As for U.S. economic interest in Africa, Robert Price affirms that based on statistics, Africa is of no significance to America. For only three percent of U.S.

direct investments abroad is found in Africa. This claim is, to say the least, very questionable to this writer. America, in my opinion, cannot afford to lose its grip on the huge African mineral deposit.

The heavy reliance by the U.S. and other industrial democracies on minerals imported from the region south of Sahara (Zaire for instance) raises policy problems and choices in the 1980s. Concern about continued access focuses particularly on South Africa, which dominates world export of four minerals (chromium, manganese, vanadium, and platinum), that have both industrial and military significance. The fact that the Soviet Union is the principal alternative source of gold, vanadium, platinum and manganese, called for U.S. policy stance in that area.

A study published in 1983 on the economic and political implications of sudden oil wealth in a range of African countries makes the same basic point, on Africa's economic significance to the U.S. Oil resources are located in some West African countries (Nigeria, Cameroon, and Ivory Coast ranked top with their oil reserves). In

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1980, oil export accounts for 90 percent of Nigeria's foreign exchange. Nigeria is now the second largest oil supplier (following Saudi Arabia) to U.S. Nigeria's leaders have threatened to use their oil weapon as a last resort if they felt the Reagan administration tilted too far toward South Africa.25

The basic U.S. interest in West Africa apart from oil is the spread of radical Arab influence in West Africa (containment of Quaddafi). Donald Rothchild and John Ravenhill posit that this is the U.S. objective in West Africa.26 Chad is under seige from Libya, whose forces occupy the northern third of the country. The U.S. bilateral support for Chad, demonstrates its resolve to help African nations counter aggression.27

African debt problems also received scholarly scrutiny. During the 1960s, African governments benefited from high commodity prices and generous foreign aid. Government revenue was supplemented by borrowing from private commercial banks. With the onset of world

24 Ibid. p. 43.
recession in the 1970s, however, the prices of Africa exports plummeted while the cost of imports remained high. Trade imbalance was the outcome. Nigeria is one West African nation with the foreign debt amounting up to $12 billion. The Nigerian debt service, rescheduling, and re-borrowing from the International Monetary Fund, received major literary attention. My research will show that the U.S. as a rational actor, does not consider West Africa as an area of high stakes compared to U.S. policy interests in the crisis African areas.

The study is in four chapters: the first is a general introduction and review of literature on the U.S. African relation and analysis of theoretical basis of the study realism and neorealism.

Chapter Two examines the historical, political, and developmental setting of West African states. Because Western powers (Britain, and France in particular) colonized the area of Africa, their presence clearly limits the Soviets influence in the region.

Chapter three presents data on U.S. interest in Africa as a whole. This states in detail the U.S. energy policy, U.S. sales and donations under Food for Peace,

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U. S. foreign aid, particularly economic, U.S. security interest and trade issues.

The final chapter analyzes the data in Chapter III, within the context of the realist-neorealist paradigm. It concludes with a prognostication of the future of West Africa in super power contest for the African countries.
CHAPTER II

EUROPEAN COLONIZATION AND DE-COLONIZATION OF WEST AFRICA

One thing has checked the development these rich regions—native misrule.

The West African region was colonized mainly by two European powers, Britain and France. This attempt was a direct consequence of the European scramble and partition of Africa, in extension of their quest for imperial domination of the most of the area contemporarily known as the Third World. In West Africa, "native misrule" was the rationale for imposition of control by these powers. Accumulation of resources superceded thereafter. From the last quarter of the nineteenth century to the early third quarter of the 20th century, most of West Africa experienced colonization. This area even after European domination inherited the colonial legacy that still tied them politically and economically to the former colonial powers.

European Colonization of West Africa: British

In West Africa, colonial build-up occurred in areas where commercial relation with Europe were most developed.
For instance on the Gold Coast, the forts controlled by the Dutch and the British were rationalized geographically by agreement in 1867. This introduced a period of uncertainty as old alliances, commercial and political, were called into question.

By 1871, the Dutch were bought off the western forts and Asante had threatened to restore its old hegemony over most of the coast. Britain was not ready to tolerate such development. It, therefore, organized an invasion. As a result, Asante state was destabilized. Alliances were made with various former sub-ordinate rulers who now refused to support the Asante Hene. The Crown shortly annexed the coastal territories, Gold Coast colony. By 1896, the British found excuse for war and Asante was conquered. The Gold Coast now was annexed as a suitable hinterland. As it went, the rest of the West African area was partitioned by Britain and France.

The Niger delta, the heartland of the palm oil trade, was one of the great regions of commercial interest to Europe in West Africa. The delta area experienced an

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1 The European colonization of this region did not necessarily mean first appearance of Europeans to the scene. Slavery existed on this area. After abolition of slave trade, there were other established commercial ties.

intense version of the pressures caused by "profit squeeze" and new technological development in Europe. George Goldie, a British entrepreneur succeeded in amalgamating firms and eliminating rivals in order to create the United Africa Company in 1879. By 1884, Goldie had completely monopolized the delta trade. Goldie's company received a royal charter and proclaimed a protectorate over much of the Niger delta.

Jaja, a former Brass slave who created his own state in Opobo, made attempts to organize palm oil shipment directly to Europe, in coalition with some of the Royal Niger Company's rival. Jaja was accused of treachery and was deported in 1887. The company made arrangement that warranted its penetration within the Sokoto caliphate. And the French agreed to accept a demarcation line which granted Northern Nigeria to Britain.

Commercial interest was a determinant factor in establishing a viable economic hinterland for the British coastal port of Lagos. To achieve this urge, Britain engaged in a coastal race for the Niger in order to push

3 Arrival of steamboat caused new firms to penetrate into delta area. They bought cargo space and this in turn threatened the old order and trade share agreements.

4 Freund, p. 93.

5 There were over-lapping of boundaries with the French presence in areas surrounding Nigeria. Dahomey and Niger for instance.
back the French and preserve most of the Yoruba states as a British sphere of influence. War imminently resulted as the Lagos regime provoked the most commercially effective Yoruba middlemen state Ijebu. These men's power were crushed though. Thus, the British were able to secure as a colony, the most populous area of West Africa, Nigeria.

Sierra Leone was like Liberia, a settlement for free slaves. Britain administered the territory as a protectorate after 1896. The English language was imposed as the Lingua Franca. The Anglo-phone colonies were Ghana, Gambia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone.

French Occupation:

In 1876, Colonel Pierre de L'Isle arrived in Senegal as governor of the French colony. This marked a radical new advance movement where French commerce predominated. The French gradually developed a policy of transport and communication deployment. They constructed a railway from St. Louis to the new port of Daker through Cayor. A Telegraph line was constructed too, to Futa Toro, in the

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7 Liberia was established by America at the end of slavery. Later it was accorded a Republic and remained so.

8 This railway network was vital in order to expedite the production and export of groundnuts.
interior valley of the Senegal and Upper Niger. The French hence, moved into the interior following the great trade routes along which slave caravans had once trodden.

African rulers were perceived by Brier, as setbacks to the extension of a commercially viable French empire. These rulers imposed taxes and they hindered the realization of a great potential surplus production from the peasants and their rule stood in the way of the establishment of necessary transport network. For instance, Lat Dyor, who was Damel of Cayor, opposed construction of this rail network and harrassed the French forces with guerrila warfare that represented a major phase of wars of conquest of Senegal in 1880s. This extended French expansion into the interiors.

In 1883, the French military began to annex Bamako on the Niger. They proceeded to launch major attack on Tukulor Empire founded by Al haji Umar. This area in question covers the western half of contemporary Mali. This successive attempt gave rise to French expansion into Chad, linking the Sahara with French Algeria.

The French conquered most of the territory of West Africa. They established control over the interior of the

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10 Ibid, p.33.
Savanna, the Sahara and three new coastal colonies: Guinea, Ivory Coast and Dahomey (Republic of Benin).

Decolonization of West Africa **British:**

After the second World War, pressure for self government began to mount. The Ghanaian example set precedence. The Convention People's Party (CPP) was formed in 1949. The year 1950 marked the climax of militancy against the colonial regime. The CPP was an ideal pressure point. Nkrumah, the leader of this party, and his closest associates paid the price for this militancy, even though they did not instigate any riot nor strike. The British used them as scape-goats.

In 1951, a new constitution proposed direct elections for the entire territory and ministerial responsibility was given to the successful party. The CPP gained substantial seats and Nkrumah agreed to call off Positive Action and serve as the Leader of Government Business.

In 1954, Nkrumah won a second electorial victory. But hostility against him increased even spreading to cocoa growing region of Asante. By 1956, Britain obliged him to call a final election, before proceeding to grant independence. The anti-Nkrumah forces did succeed in

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11 Freund, p. 212.
weakening the CPP in Asante, but their alliance on a national scale was remote. It could not offer a viable strategy to unseat the CPP. Consequently, the CPP won the 1956 election and Nkrumah led the Gold Coast to independence, as the new state of Ghana in 1957.

The absence of overt challenges to the interest of Western security or business interests, was one of the most significant aspect of Ghana's experience in the transition years. The commodity boom was still in its apogee and this generated optimism that the economic outlays were strong enough to withstand political readjustment.

Decolonization in Nigeria displayed a similar pattern to that of Ghana. The labor movement exercised dissatisfaction and there was intensive politicization, despite British measures to impose a business union system.

The first major post-war political party, the National Congress of Nigeria and the Cameroon (NCNC), bore a strong similarity to the CPP. Its leader, Nnamdi Azikiwe, was a journalist who, like Nkrumah, had receieved much of

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13 Freund, p. 213.

14 Onimade, p. 128.
Azikiwe inherited the banner of the more populist stand of pre-war Lagos politics by establishing ties with the labor movement, which shunned off popular agitation (at least initially).

In the west, most of the Yoruba elites rejected the NCNC and established the rival Action Group whose leader, Obafemi Awolowo, called for decolonization towards a rather weak federal Nigeria. Other Yoruba personalities continued to function within the NCNC. As a result, control of the west was hotly contested throughout the 1950s.

Two major parties developed in the north, the Northern Peoples Congress and the Northern Elements Progressive Union. The NPC was monopolized by the strong men of the emirates. Ahmadu Bello headed the most radical party, NEPU. In 1959 NPC finally agreed to independence based on a strongly federal constitution. The coalition between the NCNC and NPC was the first government formed in 1960 as Britain accorded Nigeria its self-rule. The

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15 Onimode, Ibid.
premier was Tafawa Belewa. And Nigeria formed economic and military alliance with Britain.

The peasant revolts in the mid 1950s in Sierra Leone were the most dramatic social conflicts. They were aimed at the authoritarian and "venal chiefs." These eventually reasserted themselves under the patronage of Sierra Leone's People's Party led by Milton Margai. In 1956, the first colony-wide election was held. And Margai's diplomacy brought Sierra Leone to independence, while his opponent Siaka Stevens lost in 1961. By early 1960 Britain made up its mind to give up its administrative position in Africa. Consequently, Gambia received its independence in 1965.

**The French Decolonization**

Demand for full independence outside the French colonial practice of assimilation was regarded as treason. Therefore necessary action would be taken to restore control. Cameroon's (that is the UPC) demand for independence was totally unacceptable.

Senghor and the Ivory Coast unlike other French West African colonies entertained viable mass parties. Leopold Senghor founded the Bloc Democratique Senegalais, upstaged the older generation of politicians from the four

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16 Bill Freund, p. 223.
communities through alliances with the Shaykhs of the Islamic orders. By August of 1960, Senghor led his country to independence.

A more radical upheaval occurred in the Ivory Coast. The League of Africans who represented the most progressive wing of the new politicians in French speaking Africa, the Rassemblement Democratique Africaine, established an effective branch, the Parti Democratique du Cote d'Ivoire. The PDCI won adherence of a significant group of prosperous, labor employing cocoa planters. Felix Houphet-Boigny, the leader of PDCI became the Ivorian president when independence was granted on August 6, 1960.

Sekou Toure, the leader of Parti Democratique du Guinee (PDG) the Guinean section of RDA, came from the trade union movement. These are ranks of manual workers. The PDG struggle was anti-old aristocracy of the impoverished Futa Djallon. This party like others demanded self-rule. Sekou Toure was not prepared to accept the humiliating demand of rejecting independence option. Guinea was the only French African country to vote "non" in

\[17\]
Ibid. P. 224.
1958. By 1960, Charles De Gaulle in a reversal of policy, announced plans to grant independence to its African colonies. French decolonization, was not a genuine retreat from Africa, compared to its British equivalent. It was instead a change of sovereignty that did not affect the basic French interest. On achieving independence the new nations signed agreements with France on foreign aid and defence pact that reinforced French cultural and economic predominance. Adding to these, France would leave its army as a guarantor of the new regime. Africanization of the state services was a slower process and less offensive than in former British Africa.

18 De Gaulle ordered withdrawal not only of French authority but technical personnel and moveable infrastructure because of Toure's initiative.
Table 2.1

West African States - Independence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>West African Country</th>
<th>Colonial Power</th>
<th>Year Of Independence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin Republic</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>August 1, 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkino Faso</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>August 5, 1960</td>
</tr>
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<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>April 10, 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>August 10, 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>February 8, 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Britain</td>
<td>March 6, 1957</td>
</tr>
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<td>Guinea</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>October 2, 1958</td>
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<td>French</td>
<td>August 7, 1960</td>
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<td>Senegal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>April 27, 1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>April 27, 1960</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Consequence of Colonial Rule

By the 1960s, the majority of the West African nations had managed to gain permission for their self-rule. But the colonial foot print would never be wiped out of the West African soil.

One of the consequences of European partition was that where the contemporary national boundaries were drawn did not take into consideration the political and socio-economic interests and preferences of these West African communities. Single sedentary communities have been forced to belong to two different countries and there has been
merging of very different cultural groups into one country. For example, the Nigerian - Benin (Dahomey) boundary placed one part of the Yorubas in Nigeria and the other in Benin. The Ewes of Togo have many of their people on the other side of the border in Ghana; the Hausas found themselves in Nigeria, Niger Republic and Benin.

Nigeria embraces over five large ethnic groups, the Hausas, Fulanis, Ibos, Yorubas, Efik-ibibio, and the Kanuris. Each of these could have made up its own political entity but instead became a part of the Nigerian territory that has over 250 different languages.²

The amalgamation of disparate ethnic groups into one politico-economic entity created a lot of problems after independence of West African countries. It was not easy to maintain political stability in areas as Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ghana and Sierra Leone. This also created economic disarticulation in that political discord always impeded economic progress in these states.

Another strong politico-economic effect of colonial legacy was the division of the region into two major linguistic monetary blocs, the Francophone established the

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20 Ibid.
franc zone, and the Anglophone the sterling zone. This linkage continued to the extent that twenty years after political independence, most of these countries are culturally and economically coupled to their former colonial "masters." Geographical contiguity was a major facilitator for the strong and direct political-economic coupling of Francophonic West Africa. The contiguity minimized physical distances, encouraged, transportation and communication link-ups of various territories, and eased commodity flow.

France's main interest in West Africa, like that of Britain, was exploitation of natural resources. The French corporate multinationals notably SCOA and CFAO were granted extensive trade monopolies over these natural resources.

The Communaute Franciere Africaine (CFA) linked all former French colonies currencies with French franc at a fixed exchange rate. These countries agreed to hold their reserves mainly in French francs. French assistance is received in the form of foreign aid like technical assistance, budget support, plus subsidies on commodity exports. What I am saying here is that, the political dimension of France's influence is not fully appreciated up
till now. For after independence most Franco-phonic states in West Africa still coordinate foreign policy initiatives and strategies with Paris. The European power still influences West African countries at large. That is why most scholars would prefer to state that West African nations have not totally achieved full sovereignty.
CHAPTER III
U.S. Policy Strategies

The U.S. national interest in a strong, sound, healthy relationship with Africa was underscored by Secretary Shultz's visit to six countries across west, central and east Africa in January 1987. Home to nearly half a billion people, Africa is an important part of the world community.

According to Chester A. Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs:

Africa's size and population makes it potentially one of the most important commercial and economic markets in the world. Africa is proximate to crucial shipping lanes between Europe, Middle East, South Asia and and the Far East. This guarantees a role in the access to and security of the northwest Indian Ocean, and the South Atlantic Ocean. Africa contains the vast majority of this planet's undiscovered mineral resources; it is virtually impossible to dig a hole anywhere on the continent without uncovering some marketable ore or other mineral commodity. Its current production of minerals is an important concern to U.S. industry and commerce.¹

Mr. Crocker further asserts that Africa is currently the only economically affordable source of many strategic minerals such as cobalt, chromium and the platinum group metals. He adds that Africa has vast unexploited and uncontemplated agricultural potential. And it's nearly 50 countries comprise almost one-third of the members of the United Nations, the most cohesive voting bloc in that forum. Africa is important to the U.S. in cultural and historical terms.

According to the Assistant Secretary of State nearly one American in eight, traces his or her ancestry back to Africa. African countries' struggle for independence took place at the time the U.S. was engaged in their civil rights movement in the 1960s. The U.S. has a strong humanitarian and national interest in helping Africa meet the basic human needs of its people and realize its full potential as a member of the democratic family of nations. So what does the U.S. seek is its relationship with Africa? Mr. Crocker responds that the U.S. seeks a vital healthy relationship with a continent which shares many of their fundamental values. For instance the U.S. commitment to human rights, the desire to defeat terrorism and prevent international aggression (containment of Quaddafi and the
removal from Africa of nearly 43,000 Cuban troops). The U.S. also needs Africa to enhance its national security needs for access and prepositioning of supplies to enable it to execute its southwest Asia strategy.

For this reason the Reagan administration seeks security assistance funding for Fiscal Year 1988: $98.0 million in Military Assistance Program (MAP), $5.0 million in FMS concession credit (Foreign Military Sales), $10.5 million in International Military Education and Training (IMET) and $100.0 million in Economic Support Fund (ESF). With these in mind, let us look back into the trend of U.S. foreign policy objectives in Africa with special emphasis in West Africa.

**U.S. Energy Policy**

A study published in 1983 on the economic and political implications of sudden oil wealth in a range of West African countries makes the basic point that Africa is endowed with vast mineral resources. In 1982, some West

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2 Ibid, p. 11.

3 Ibid.

4 Major David C. Underwood. *West African Oil: Will it Make a Difference?* Major Underwood's country-by-country study published in full under the aegis of the CSIS African Study Program in 1983. Meanwhile this is drawn from his Master's of Art thesis in National Security Affairs from the Naval Post Graduate School in Monterey, California (December 1982).
African countries have significantly proven reserves: Nigeria with 16.5 billion barrels was on the top list, followed by the Ivory Coast and Ghana. Exploration efforts underway in the region have indicated that by 1990, Benin and Equatorial Guinea could be producing between 15 and 360 thousand barrels a day. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development estimates that Africa's continental and off-shore petroleum reserves in the next 20 years are approximately 51.3 billion barrels, or 14 percent of total world discoveries. Other parts of Africa such as Angola in Southern Africa and Congo, Cameroon and Gabon in Central Africa, also account for the huge oil reserve.

The security of energy supplies has been a major factor in U.S. defense policy in recent years. This received heightened attention by President Carter in January 1980, and the succeeding Reagan Administration. Nearly 40 percent of the total oil utilized in the industrial western economy today, comes from the volatile Persian Gulf area which is subject to interruption through terrorism, accidents, warfare, or a variety of politically motivated factors.

5 Kitchen, p. 43.
Nigeria is the second largest oil exporter to the U.S. following Saudi Arabia. Due to instability in the Persian Gulf, West African oil producing states may become vital to U.S. security needs.

**Food For Peace Program**

Food in many respects, remains at the core of international development issues. It is also an area in which the U.S. has an opportunity to make a particularly significant and positive contribution. The United States is the largest producer of food exports, supplying about 45 percent of total exports of wheat and 64 percent of coarse grains in the 1978-1979 periods.

When John Block was nominated by President Reagan's choice as Secretary of Agriculture, he advocated a policy that links countries to the U.S. through their dependence on American food. He argued that such a dependence would make these countries more reluctant to oppose U.S. foreign policy efforts in the global system.

Historically, Public Law 480 (Food for Peace) has comprised about one third of U.S. bilateral development

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assistance. Title I of Public Law 480 provides for concessional sale of agricultural commodities to "friendly" countries. In order to get the assistantship, a country would approach the U.S. government to negotiate an agreement. Public Law 480 grains must of course come from the U.S. vessel. Title II authorizes donation of food on behalf of the people of the United States to meet famine or urgent relief or nutritional need.

Approximately $1 billion was allocated for food for peace credits in fiscal year 1981-1982. Former Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, in a presentation to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the fiscal year 1982 foreign assistance program said:

"in our budget submission to Congress, a $1.9 billion Agency for International Development program is required. Over 50 percent will be used to alleviate malnutrition and hunger."

With huge quantity of shipments to Egypt, the Public law 480 program is something of a reward for cooperative policies. At the same time, there is no denial of the genuine need of Egypt. In 1975, Egypt imported $104.5 million of food plus donations of $12.8 million for the U.S.

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9 U.S. Policy and Third World, p. 29.
10 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. Statement by Secretary of State Alexander Haig, 97th Congress, 1st Sess, March 1981.
government. In 1982, the sales were $262 million while donations were $31.9 million. In 1983, Egypt received $16.8 million in donations and $238.3 million from sales.

Morocco, Sudan and Somalia - all in Northern Africa, also purchased and as well received donations from the U.S.

In East Africa, Kenya and Zaire from 1975 to 1983 received $139.7 million under Public Law 480 (See Table 3.1). Ghana was the only West African country, recorded to have received $70.5 million U.S. sales and donation of this grant between 1975 and 1983.

In 1983-1984, Egypt, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan received a total of $681.3 millions under food sales and $239.7 from donations.

Commitment for Economic Assistance

President Harry Truman's 1947 statement is worth recalling:

The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when hope of a people for better life has died.12

Table 3.1
U. S. Sales and Donations Under Food for Peace
(Public Law 480) Programs
1975 to 1983

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<td>-</td>
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<td>9.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
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<td>16.1</td>
<td>272.5</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>9.7</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>9.9</td>
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<td>Somalia</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>10.7</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>19.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Foreign aid appropriations have often received low priority treatment by U.S. Congress. For fiscal years 1980 and 1981, Congress failed to enact foreign aid appropriation bills. Secretary Haig lamented that "this has caused us substantial difficulties. We have been forced to neglect vital aspects of our assistance programs, U.S. foreign policy interests have been undermined." Chairman Charles Percy of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee pointed out that the foreign assistance portion of the federal budget had declined from around 7 percent during the Eisenhower years to about 1.4 percent proposed under President Reagan.

Starting with the post World War II Marshall Plan, the United States set the pattern and pace for foreign aid programs. The Marshall Plan focused primarily on Europe in order to facilitate the reconstruction of the war-torn Europe. The Mutual Security Act of 1951 marked the beginning of an economic aid program which in essence, has continued up to the present time. The budget category now known as the Economic Support Fund (ESF) began as "Economic Support for Defense" in the act. The program has

13 U.S. Policy and Third World, p. 41.
been called Defense Supporting Assistance or Security Assistance Act. The Economic Support Fund was authorized by the 1978 International Security Assistance Act. The ESF is supposed to be used only for economic assistance, rather than the broader military-related purposes of the earlier program. The 1978 amendments were intended to make ESF more clearly economic aid rather than previous combination of economic and military aid.

In the early 1960s the number of independent nations in the world significantly increased, and these nations were concerned with the quest for the economic and social progress. The U.S.S.R. was beginning to compete with the U.S. as an aid donor, especially in Egypt and India. This caused a shift in the rules of the game. Nations that had once allied with U.S. as a precondition of aid now had a choice and even enjoyed the luxury of playing one donor off against the other, without making political commitment. As a result of this U.S. - U.S.S.R. competition, aid became a tool with which to bid for favor of nations not yet committed. Therefore, aid became less effective as a method for the U.S. to achieve immediate foreign policy objectives.

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16 Ibid.
U.S. aid policies were then designed to provide economic growth and political stability to the emergent Third World nations while integrating them into a democratic and free-enterprise oriented world order. This transformation of one element of U.S. aid from a political instrument of the cold war to a development program was problematic.

One of the major impacts of this new development aid was diffusion of aid to a wide range of LDCs which resulted in the problem of formulating criteria to allocate aid to particular countries. This, in turn, meant that the management of aid policy became even more complex. The current relationship between the Third World and the U.S. is considerably different than when the U.S. aid program began. For instance, the Third World demands for a new international economic order and the efforts of Group of 77 to advocate the Third World view created a more complex international environment. Also, Congress has sharply criticized the aid program. This skepticism has included the confusion over the political impact of aid and the ambiguity of the state of economic development, in the Third World. The main reason for the congressional reluctance to

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David F. Gordon "United States Foreign Aid in Perspective," *Current History* 77 no. 448 (July - August 1979): p.3.
support foreign aid has been the "over-selling of aid by successive administrations as a means of assuring desired behavior by client government."  

A study by the Center of International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1957, established the intellectual foundations that served as the rationale for U.S. development assistance and is still in use today.

The report argued that:

A policy of deterrence against the Soviet military threat is not of itself adequate to achieve the kind of world environment favorable to the U.S. containment requires more than a sustained demonstration that the Western allies can and will prevent a Soviet take-over of border areas. A sustained program of U.S. economic assistance could help less developed countries create the conditions for self-sustaining economic growth and this would materially reduce the danger of future conflict by aggressive minor powers.

The use of economic support funds and security supporting assistance in recent years has been directed toward a few countries of extreme importance to the United States, especially Israel in the Middle East and Egypt in Africa.

According to a Library of Congress Congressional Research


19 The MIT report known as Milliken-Rostow Report was written by a team headed by Max F. Milliken. Other members were Walt W. Rostow, Charles Kindleberger, Everett E. Hagan and Lucian Pye.
Service Study, the actual impact of U.S. aid on the overall host country economy is low. This is clearly the case with the many small programmes that the U.S. has operated in Africa.

The U.S. government foreign grants and credits to Africa, from 1945-1985, totaled $17,091 million. The grant to Northern African countries amounted to $7,349 million. Algeria, $743 million; Ethiopia, $807 million; Mali, $263 million; Mauritania $182 million; Morocco, $1,837 million; Somalia, $670 million; Sudan, $1,496 million; and Tunisia, $1,347 million (see Table 3.2).

The Central African region received a total of $3,552 million in the same period. Cameroon, $216 million; Kenya, $658 million; Tanzania, $418 million; Togo, $87 million; Uganda, $85 million; Zaire, $1,538 and Zambia $375.

The Western African subregion was allocated the sum of $3,583 million. The Republic of Benin accounted for $63 million; Burkino Faso, $331; Chad, $168; Cape Verde, $69; Ghana, $419; Guinea, $200; Ivory Coast, $128; Liberia,

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20 For convenience, I included the countries of the Horn into Central and Northern Africa, as could be easily seen on the African Map. Burundi was granted $71 million and Rwanda $104 million.

21 See Table 3.2 for specific year and country by country.
<table>
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<td>667</td>
<td>(Z)</td>
<td>83</td>
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Table 3.2
U.S. Government Foreign Grants and Credits, by Type and Country 1945-1985
Table 3.2 continued

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<td>4</td>
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<td>139</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
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<td>51</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<td>86</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>72</td>
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<td>106</td>
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<td>80</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>75</td>
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<tr>
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<td>144  (Z)</td>
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<td>11</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Southern</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
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<td>Malawi</td>
</tr>
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<td>Mozambique</td>
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<td>Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other and Unspecified</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Represents zero \( Z \) less than $500,000


---

$707; Niger, $272; Nigeria, $638; Senegal, $425; and Sierra Leone, $144.

Southern African region received a total of $1,432 million excluding South African Republic. Angola's allocation totaled $121; Botswana, $204; Lesotho, $224; Madagascar, $107; Malawi, $92; Mozambique, $172; Swaziland, $66; and Zimbabwe, $271. (See Table 3.3).

U.S. Security Interest: An Exploration

In nearly four decades, since WWII, there has been little basic change in the U.S. military view of Africa as an appendage of U.S. security interests in Europe, Middle East, and Asia. Helen Kitchen contends that the intervention in Congo in the early 1960s and in Angola in the mid 1970s, was as well as the post-shah priority being to cultivating "proven friends" along the continents northern and eastern perimeters, fall into this contextual framework.

The origin of the current U.S. security assistance program are generally traced to the Greek--Turkish aid program launch by President Truman in 1947. Later, a substantial portion of U. S. security efforts was directed at Asia--first in Taiwan, next South Korea, and then Southeast Asia. The main focus was on support for regimes that were perceived as being under serious threats

---

Kitchen, p. 57.
Table 3.3

U.S. Foreign Aid: Commitments for Economic Assistance 1982-1985

(In millions of dollars. Falls under economic portion of the Foreign Assistance Act economic and technical assistance by AID)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<td>51</td>
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<td>125</td>
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<td><strong>Western Africa</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Burkino Faso</td>
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<td>(Z)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
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<td>Chad</td>
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<td>(Z)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>Liberia</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>45</td>
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<td>Niger</td>
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<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
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<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guines</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>40</td>
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<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>(Z)</td>
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<td>Uganda</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>Zaire</td>
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<td>Zambia</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>42</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Southern</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>Botswana</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional</strong></td>
<td>57</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>643</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
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</table>

-Represents zero, (Z) represents less $500,000

of either invasion or subversion by communist forces, and
on support for regimes seen as key elements in a strategy
of containment. During the 1950s, 80 percent of military
assistance grants to the Third World went to Asia, and 63
percent was provided to Taiwan, Indochina, and Korea.

Grant military assistance as a major element of U.S.
aid gradually declined in the late sixties and seventies,
with the foreign military sales (FMS) program becoming
increasingly important. Domestic budget constraints and
discontent with the result of some of the U.S. military
relationships and involvement in Vietnam and elsewhere
contributed to a changing view of security assistance.
Congress became increasingly opposed to the grants military
assistance program (MAP) and favored a total phase-out of
the program. However, Congress has recently shown some
willingness to continue MAP on a small scale. The
relatively small International Military Education and
Training (IMET) has continued as a program.

Since the beginning of the IMET program in 1950,
over 500,000 personnel from 85 countries have participated
in the training. A number of these trainees are now

23

24
Ibid. p. 205.
highly placed in their governments and armed forces. During the late 1970s, there was controversy over several IMET programs with regards to Latin American countries. Hence, Congress imposed restrictions on IMET grants because of human rights considerations. The IMET program provides valuable training for its participants and gives foreign military officials exposure to American institutions and ideals.

The Economic Support Fund is an important instrument of U.S. security policy and constitutes a major portion of U.S. assistance to the Third World. Egypt has been by far, the largest recipient of the ESF funds. Others are Sudan, Tunisia and Zimbabwe. Sudan and Tunisia are being given a higher security assistance priority in order to help them "withstand pressure from Libya." Secretary Haig calls this vital to their largest interest. He asserts that:

As the threat to these important states mounts, so too, indirectly does the pressure on Egypt, with all that means for the prospects for our own broader regional strategy.26

25 Ibid. p. 50.
Arms sales have become an increasingly important instrument of overall U.S. foreign policy. Third World countries have become major customers in the international arms marketing, purchasing arms, usually on very favorable terms, from the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., and other nations.

There are conflicting data in various tallies of international weapon sales, but most tabulations indicate that the United States is the top arms exporter, with the Soviet Union ranking second. According to an analysis of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the Soviet Union exceeded the U.S. in arms export for 1978, ACDA reports that the U.S. exported $22.4 billion in arms to developing nations, and the U.S.S.R. $20.8 billion. Figures compiled by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, however, indicated that the combined total of weapons export of the U.S. and other Western nations have far exceeded those of the U.S.S.R. and other communist nations in most years. Furthermore, the Foreign Relations Committee reports that except for 1978, when Soviet sales were down considerably, the U.S.S.R. has trailed only slightly

28 Ibid.
behind the U. S. in arms sales in the Third World. For 1979, the U.S. sold $10 million and the U.S.S.R. $9.8 billion to the Third World.

Of the $90 billion in arms sales to Third World countries from 1974 to 1977, the U.S. accounted for about 43 percent, the U.S.S.R. 32 percent, and Western Europe more than 20 percent. The fact that some arms transfers are treated as classified information plus differences in accounting procedures contributes to the questionable accuracy of some figures.

President Carter, early in his administration, noting that the U.S. accounted for more than one-half of the total world arms sales, outlined a new arms sales policy. He stated that:

U.S. would begin to view arms transfers as an exceptional foreign policy instrument, to be used only in instances where it can be clearly demonstrated that the transfer contributes to our national security...The U. S. shall also assess the economic impact of arms transfers to those less


developed countries receiving U.S. economic assistance. 31

Some critics have charged that the actual policy was inconsistent with the rhetoric, while others argued that the policy was over-restrictive. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's June 1980 report concluded, that the Carter policy did not lead to arms sales becoming an exceptional foreign policy instrument. The community recommended that... U.S. should set a middle course... and the potential results should not be oversold.

The Reagan administration disavowed the Carter policy. Under Secretary Buckley condemned Carter's policy. He called for a new approach that will be based on the assumption that the strengthening of friendly nations is "an essential component of our total effort to restore effective deterrence to aggression... Arms transfer would be used to face up to the realities of Soviet aggrandizement."

32 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Arms Transfer, p. 84.
The Reagan foreign military sales financing programs is used to help countries, primarily in the Third World, acquire U.S. defense materiel and services. A substantial portion of these credits go to Egypt. Egypt is also the major recipient of U.S. weapons in Africa while Libya, Algeria and Ethiopia are listed as primary recipients of Soviet weapons. From 1962 to 1983 the following countries received $5,840 million of U.S. foreign military aid: Ethiopia, $224; Morocco, $475; Sudan, $211; Tunisia, $381; and Egypt $4,282. Kenya and Zaire were the only central African countries recorded to have received the sum of $171 and $185 respectively, in the same period. (See Table 3.4)

Between 1982-1985 the northern African countries to received military aid from U.S. numbered five; Morocco, $252 million; Somalia, $12; Sudan, $238; Tunisia, $377, and Djibouti, $7. In sum, this region received a total of $997 million. (See Table 3.5)

In the same period, Niger and Liberia were the two countries listed to have received $64 million while Niger Republic received $12 million.

Botswana was recorded as the only Southern African nation to have received $24 million of U.S. foreign

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Table 3.4

U.S. Military Sales Deliveries and Military Assistance Deliveries to African States 1950-1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Military Sales Deliveries</th>
<th>Military Assistance Deliveries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>657.5</td>
<td>973.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>86.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>7.8</td>
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</table>

1 -Represents zero, (Z) less than $50,000, includes military construction sales deliveries includes transactions for transition quarter July - September 1976.

Table 3.5

Value of Arms Transfers Cumulative 1981 - 1985, by Major Suppliers and Recipient Country

(Millions Current Dollars)

<table>
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<th>Suppliers</th>
<th>U.S.S.R.</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>3,200</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>4,600</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
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<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9,860</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Cameroon</td>
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<td>70</td>
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<td>Zaire</td>
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<td>West</td>
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<td>Benin</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Country</td>
<td>1986 Expenditure</td>
<td>1987 Expenditure</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>2,600</td>
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<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>775</td>
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</tr>
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<td>South Africa</td>
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<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,470</strong></td>
<td><strong>20</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
*World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers 1986.*
military aid, in that region. It was indicated that certain military aid and sales were classified information. If this is the case, no wonder Botswana is the only Southern African state listed to have received this assistance in this crisis area.

Central African sub-region accounted for $161 million of the total U.S. military aid to Africa in the above mentioned period. Cameroon was allocated $15 million, Gabon, $8; Kenya, $101 million and Zaire $37 million.

It must be made clear that African countries import arms from other suppliers such as France, United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, China, Italy, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and other countries. These countries export significant proportions of arms to Africa while Russia and America remain the major suppliers. As a matter of fact, Nigeria, Sudan, Togo, Zimbabwe to mention a few, import more arms from other nations than from U.S. and U.S.S.R.

But arms trade or transfer is considered one of the strategic policy options by policymakers. The very word "strategic" implies a tense, competitive, and unstable

situation. Concurring with U.S. Under Secretary for Defense, Buckley stated that "nothing worthwhile in the world community is possible—neither economic growth nor political or social reform—in an atmosphere of increasing instability." Therefore U.S. arm transfers (sales and aid) is perceived as policy instrument in the superpowers unfolding contest for influence in Africa. This position is further elaborated in subsequent section of this manuscript.

Trade Issues

The Trade Agreement Act of 1934 marked the beginning of a liberal foreign economic policy by the United States. The act was based on classic economic theories of international trade and tariff policy. The premise is that free trade would promote more trade, and partners treated equally would benefit all. Therefore, the reciprocal trade agreements were designed not just with laissez-faire philosophy in mind but as a response to the excessive protectionism of the Smooth-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. Tariff restrictions imposed under the Act led to prompt reciprocal tariffs by U.S. major trading partners. A reduction of trade barriers is expected to increase exports,

Buckley, p. 38.

U. S. Policy, p. 69.
generating economic growth.

In the years to follow, many changes occurred in the nature of world economic interaction. The Bretton Woods System, based on gold convertibility, changed to a new floating world monetary system. The relative economic strengths of the industrialized nations changed. For 30 years economic growth was remarkable. The emergence of developing nations as an economic force made for the call for a new international economic order (NIEO).

Trade issues had been the core of the North-South debate and have been a vital part of the South's call for NIEO. There has been undeniable growth and progress in world trade since that call and many developing nations benefited.

The United States relies on Third World countries as important markets for goods and services; as unique sources of imports; and as a focus of profitable private investments. In 1979, Third World nations bought U.S. merchandise worth $63 billion, or about 35 percent of total


U.S. exports, including 40 percent U.S. exports of manufactured goods. The Oil Producing and Exporting countries (OPEC) accounted for $15 billion of the purchases, non OPEC nation were responsible for $48 billion. Among the largest U.S. markets in the Third World are Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, South Korea, Brazil and Nigeria.

In 1979, the U.S. enjoyed $10.3 billion surplus on its service with LDCs. And these countries were the source of 34 percent of the earnings of U.S. private foreign direct investment. In the first quarter of 1981, the volume of U.S. exports increased by 7 percent, compared with a 4 percent decline in the fourth quarter of 1980. This reflected the stronger demand for U.S. exports in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, which resulted in an 11 percent increase in the volume of agricultural exports and a 6 percent increase in the volume of non-agricultural exports, according to the Department of Commerce. 42


The U.S.S.R. trade turnover with the Sub-Saharan region was only 0.8 percent of its total turnover with the outside world in 1978 and 1979. Soviet exports to the region was 0.8 and 0.6 percent of all its export in the same two years, while its import from there were 0.8 and 1.2 percent respectively.

In contrast, U.S. bilateral aid and trade overshadowed Soviet's bounds. What is lacking in the U.S. approach to aid and trade with Africa, is any evidence of a conceptual long term U.S. commitments to Africa's trade and development, a requirement that would allow the U.S. to be viewed as a serious and reliable partner. One major reason for this lack in long-term thrust is the constitutional requirement for the executive branch, annually to debate internally and then sell to Congress both the concept of aid and a country-by-country "justification for the year's package proposal, says Helen Kitchen. She added that the principle that applies to other areas of the world and other government programs also applies to Africa: the executive proposes and Congress disposes.

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43 David E. Allbright Sub-Saharan Africa and Soviet Foreign Policy in the 1980s, (London: Macmillan) p. 133.
44 Kitchen, p. 45.
The U.S. export and import of commodities to African countries from 1975 to 1985 remained very significant. Northern African region (Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia) imports in this period represented a total of $18,645 million worth of goods from these countries (see Table 3.6).

The Central African region (Cameroon, Gabon, Central African Republic, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire and Zambia) imported $5,386 million goods from the U.S. The U.S. general import from this area accounted for $7,717 million. The merchandise trade balance was minus $5,318 million.

Ghana, Ivory Coast and Nigeria were the only Western African countries to import from the U.S. The worth of this import was $4,708 and the U.S. imported from them, $25,973 millions. The trade deficit was $21,229 million.

Angola, Madagascar, Mozambique and South African Republic (Southern African region) accounted for $10,153 million export from U.S. While the U.S. imported merchandise that represented $15,431 millions. The trade balance, thus, was minus $5,229 million dollars.

It is very true that most African nations depend on foreign trade in terms of national income. Critical to this issue is the composition of exports and imports. Primary products, the traditional mainstay, remains the
Table 3.6

U. S. Exports and Imports by Country 1975 - 1985
($ million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>African</th>
<th>Export</th>
<th>Import</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>1874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunishia</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afr. Repbl.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>1150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Afr.</td>
<td>Repbl.</td>
<td>1302</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Z less than $500,000 - represents zero

Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census. Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States; Highlights of U. S. Export and Import Trade, FT990 monthly; and unpublished data.

68
predominant export. This is the reason for the weak export performance as opposed to U.S. which exports both manufacturers and agricultural products. Therefore, African nations are very vulnerable to price fluctuations because the total value of export earnings depends not only on the volume of exports sold abroad but also on the price paid for them. If export prices go down, greater volumes of exports will have to be sold to keep earnings constant. Total foreign exchange depends on both quantity and price of imports (see Table 3.7).

If the price of a country's export is falling relative to the price of the products it imports, it will have to sell much more of its exports and enlist more of its scarce productive resources merely to secure the same level of imported goods that it purchased in previous years. Due to unequal exchange, in terms of price differences between imported and exported goods, African countries are running deficit in trade with the U.S. This results in the huge debt problem facing most of countries today.
Table 3.7  
Merchandise Trade Balance  
(in $millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Northern</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>-727</td>
<td>-6035</td>
<td>-2957</td>
<td>-3118</td>
<td>-1903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>+655</td>
<td>+1335</td>
<td>+2510</td>
<td>+2534</td>
<td>+2244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>-21</td>
<td>-15</td>
<td>-44</td>
<td>+92</td>
<td>+160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>-813</td>
<td>-8046</td>
<td>+190</td>
<td>+191</td>
<td>+267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>+27</td>
<td>+8</td>
<td>+26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>+190</td>
<td>+309</td>
<td>+409</td>
<td>+492</td>
<td>+240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>+95</td>
<td>+125</td>
<td>+138</td>
<td>+116</td>
<td>+234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>+12</td>
<td>-512</td>
<td>-422</td>
<td>-651</td>
<td>-255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>-138</td>
<td>-295</td>
<td>-594</td>
<td>-644</td>
<td>-411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afr. Rpbl.</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>(Z)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>+13</td>
<td>+87</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>+10</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>+37</td>
<td>+30</td>
<td>+18</td>
<td>+32</td>
<td>+36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>-46</td>
<td>-114</td>
<td>-100</td>
<td>-90</td>
<td>-108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>+121</td>
<td>-263</td>
<td>-283</td>
<td>-420</td>
<td>-296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>+86</td>
<td>-102</td>
<td>-17</td>
<td>-33</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Western</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>+90</td>
<td>-51</td>
<td>-79</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>-79</td>
<td>-103</td>
<td>-282</td>
<td>-404</td>
<td>-455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>-2745</td>
<td>9955</td>
<td>-2872</td>
<td>-1931</td>
<td>-2326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Southern</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>-372</td>
<td>-631</td>
<td>-820</td>
<td>-907</td>
<td>-917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>-39</td>
<td>-84</td>
<td>-49</td>
<td>-32</td>
<td>-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>-18</td>
<td>-36</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>+40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Afr.</td>
<td>+462</td>
<td>-858</td>
<td>+102</td>
<td>-223</td>
<td>866</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

70
CHAPTER IV

THE U.S. PRAGMATIC NEO-REALISM AND WEST AFRICA: A CONCLUSION

Realism and Neorealism:

Realism is a major paradigmatic tool in the analysis of world politics. The United States as a rational actor clearly adopts this framework of analysis in calculating its policy objectives. Robert Keohane's *Neorealism and its Critics* is the pivotal source in explicating this rational actor model. For it documented a comprehensive account of the realist-neorealist perspectives.

I favor this framework of analysis because of its applicability to practical problems of international relations. This theory purports a readily comprehensible set of steps to be followed by U. S. policymakers in order to reduce potential national security threats.

Robert Keohane contends that an analyst working within the list tradition will proceed in the following ways:

- focus on states that could constitute effective threats, alone or in coalition with another, given the power at their disposal
-interpret the actions of those states not on the basis simply of their announced policies nor on the assumption that they will behave morally, but rather that they are seeking rationally to increase their power.

-will devise policies that protect society by amassing or maintaining sufficient power alone, or in coalitions, to maintain essential security interests.¹

Immediately after WW II, the realist school assumed a dominant pattern in analyzing why nations act. Scholars like John Herz, George F. Kennan, Walter Lippman, and Hans J. Morgenthau argued "political realism." They sought to redirect United States foreign policy such that it could respond to perceived Soviets aggression. Their theoretical percepts embraced by U.S. decision-makers who had formerly sought to "exercise isolationism, but then resorted to a permanent and global involvement in world affairs, and rational accumulation of power." Therefore, from 1945 onward, foreign policy articulations were carried in the language of "political realism". That is, the language of power and interest rather than ideals or norms. Kennan and Lippman favored this tendency because they were more interested in practice than in abstract theory.

Morgenthau on assessing U.S. actions viewed realism as an interpretative guide that would help people read,

² Ibid. p. 9.
understand and anticipate statesmen (actors). He asserted that international politics as a struggle for power could be understood by assuming that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined by power. He regards power as an end in itself, due to human nature.

Keohane, however, criticized Morgenthau for failing to differentiate between power as a resource and power as an ability to influence other's behavior. He posits that power is to be defined in terms of specific resources (e.g. behavioral influences), as this was a testable theory. Morgenthau also believes that when governments acts rationally, they have consistent, ordered preferences and they calculate the cost and benefit of all alternative choices. This would help to maximize the utility of those preferences. Morgenthau added that political realism sought to instruct leaders in order to help them act more rationally.

Morgenthau, according to Keohane was unable to create a "consistent and convincing theory because his definitions of balance of power and power were not coherent.

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3 Power as a profile includes tangible and intangible elements as described by Theodore Columbus and James Wolfe, Introduction to International Relations, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall 1986), p. 95.

4 See Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations.
Morton Kaplan, Stanley Hoffman and Richard Rosecrance used "systemic theory" to account for states behavior. Their main focus was on the competitive, anarchic nature of world politics as a whole. They attempted to explicate variations, that is, the alternations of war and peace, stability and instability.

Kenneth Waltz agreed with the premise of these writers. He believed that a good theory of international politics must be systemic, for organization of interstate transactions impacts government behaviors towards one another. Kenneth Waltz defines system as "a set of interacting units exhibiting behavioral regularities and having an identity over time."

... in order to turn a system approach into a theory, one has to move from the usual vague identification of systemic forces and effect, to their more precise specification, to say what units the system comprises, to indicate the comparative weights of systemic forces and to show how forces and effects change from one system to another, in order for theory to avoid the perils of reductionism (relying for explanation on unit-level rather than system-level attributes) or tautology.°

Waltz therefore criticized Hoffman, Kaplan and Roscerance for not having gone beyond the description of international system to identify their structures, defined

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6 Keohane, p. 15.
separately from the attributes and relations between the units.

He creates his own "positional picture" which he says:

emerges if we abstract from every attribute of states except their capabilities, the key changes in international relations are the ones in the distribution of capabilities across units.

'A good theory,' as Waltz puts it, 'will not merely point to importance of power and the balance of power as Morgenthau did, but will account for the recurrent formation of balances of power in world politics, tell us how changing power configuration affect patterns of alignments and conflict in world politics.'

Balances of power would emerge due to the anarchic nature of International system adding to the assumption that states "are unitary actors who at a minimum seek their own preservation and at a maximum, drive for universal domination."

As states compete with each other, they will imitate each other and become socialized in their system.8

Waltz applies his structural theory to issues of economic interdependence, military relationships, and what he calls the "management of international affairs." He exaggerated the extent to which great powers, including U.S. are dependent on others. He stated that:

-military power remains useful as ever--its usefulness has appreciated and military bipolarity is remarkably stable.

7 Ibid., p. 47 - 101.
8 Ibid., p. 129.
-the role of great powers is in maintaining order. . .
-the problem is in predicting how possibly the great powers would constructively manage international affairs, as the system changes.9

Most theorists of world politics agree with Waltzian analysis. Hence, he initiated a new line of theoretical inquiry while trying to systematize political realism into a rigorous, detective system theory of international politics. The Waltzian synthesis is known as Neorealism. The term neorealism is first used by Robert W. Cox from his discussion of "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relation Theory". Robert Keohane, and Robert G. Gilpin among others, are classified as major neo-realist scholars.

Waltz's contribution helps us think more clearly about the role of systemic theory, the explanatory power of structural models, and how to account deductively for the recurrent formation of balances of power. He shows that the international system shapes states behavior and vice versa.

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10Keohane, p. 15.
The insights of Realism are very enduring. They cross ideological lines. Contemporary realists like Waltz systematized the basic assumptions of classical Realism into what is called Structural Realism. Snyder and Diesing have employed this framework when discussing game theory, structure and bargaining. (Keohane, p. 175). And Gilpin used classical argument of Thucydides to explore problems of international change. The only difference (but not major difference) is that neorealists seek to apply social theory to understanding international affairs (p. 307).

For all these scholars, realism fruitfully focuses attention on fundamental issues of power, interests and rationality. And the majority of their views are adopted by the U.S. policymakers.

Keohane declares that "realism makes us aware of the odds against us."

"Realist" Analysis: U.S. in West Africa

I have stated above that there are three parameters of realist tradition that influence U.S. policy options.

12 Keohane contends that the Marxian scholars in discussing class struggle and uneven development contended that power is crucial, that world system are periodically dominated by hegemonic power wielding economic and military resources. Lenin discussed the influence of strength, and Wallerstein emphasises hegemony and the role of military forces, p. 182.
They are issues of power, interests and rationality. A review of U.S.-West African policy depicts an absence of key issues. Why? The answer emerges from the way the U.S. sets outs its objectives in other regions.

This issue of power is the foremost. One cannot cogently discuss this without mentioning the East-West Chessboard that extended itself into African territory. America, in order to deter or counter hegemonic intrusions by the Soviets or their surrogates into Africa, includes the issue of geopolitics as one of its priorities.

The Soviets presence in Ethiopia (the Horn of Africa) and Angola (in Southern Africa) clearly threatens the U.S. interest. Therefore since 1980, the U.S. has provided military help and 68 percent of the $568 million total is concentrated in such countries as Sudan, Somalia and Kenya. Seychelles and Djibouti have been included in areas of vital interest.

The purpose of the U.S. military and security aid is to apply American power internationally by:

(1) strengthening the defensive capabilities of the states in the American alliance structure; (2) helping friendly nations quell internal political or military disturbances; and (3) assisting friendly nations in buying breathing space and, with luck, in regaining or retaining stability. Security assistance may be used to buy friendship from governments where this is a commodity for sale.

The North African countries (see Chapter III) received valuable quantity of arms from the U.S. From
1981-1985 the amount totalled $990 million. Three Central African nations received $130 million (Table 3.5) excluding the special $560 million that had been allocated to the mentioned countries of vital strategic location. Four West African nations received $210 million. The figures speak for themselves. West Africa is not counted as area of crucial geopolitical interest to America, even though Chad currently receives Washington's attention because of Quaddafi's adventure in that country. Quaddafi was regarded as a Soviet satellite and his expansion attempts are perceived with contempt. Therefore, America and France try to counter Libyan threats by sending military aid to Chad.

The premise underlying security assistance is the extension of U.S. power in the world and realist scholars and neorealists, will perceive this as legitimate. The Soviet's established presence in these African regions threatens the American influence. Therefore, it is rational and in the interest of the U.S. to extend its global influence to the Horn, North Africa, Central Africa and Southern Africa.

Another parameter of the U.S. geopolitical interest is to cement special relationships with governments willing to provide access to ports and other facilities supportive of a global U.S. military outreach. The Horn and area down
to the coastal regions of Kenya, Tanzania to South Africa are very vital to the U.S. Military machine re-fueling. This area is also relevant in terms of strategic interests to the shipping lanes from the Middle-East, the security of the Indian Ocean and transit across the South Atlantic. The North African region, the Horn and Southern Africa are also close to the critically important southern flank of Europe and the vulnerable oil producing areas of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. Therefore, it is in the vital national interest of the United States to map out a favorable policy option in these regions. The U.S. in this regard uses the instrument of "foreign aid" as an incentive.

The U.S. foreign aid committed for economic assistance from 1982-1985 allotted $1,108 millions to the eight countries in North Africa; $179 million to twelve nations of the Western African area, $684 million to eleven nations in Central Africa, and $442 million to five nations in Southern Africa (see Table 3.3). Clearly, the West Africa region received the least amount of this economic aid allotment. The U.S. realistically contends that economics and politics are inseparable and the the U.S. and the West are uniquely qualified to responds to Africa's needs. The U.S. African goal of development depicts that Africa's security is vital to the U.S. national interest. The U.S. readily accept the fact that African economic
crisis threatens most of its policy goals in search for peace in Southern Africa (see Table 3.2 specific country and allocation of U.S. aid).

Under the Food for Peace program, Washington declares that the purpose is to alleviate the immediate needs of millions of starving people, at the same time promote long-term solutions to Africa's economic problems. The U.S. in this regard did not allow political differences, with any government in Africa, to weaken its determination to provide assistance. This claim is directed at Ethiopia whose government has been "hostile" to the U.S. since change of government in 1974. Since Haile Selassie's regime was replaced by Mengistu, Ethiopia has moved closer to communist bloc and this is a threat to American security interest. In achieving this objective the U.S. created funds to allow a flexible response to food emergencies. It financed transportation costs, created a government task force to provide better forecasts of food shortages and needs, and established an advisory group of business leaders to share information on Africa and the rest of the Third World hunger and food production. Although this is purely a humanitarian gesture on the part of the U.S., it also aims to use aid as incentives to those recipient governments to support U.S. policy goals in the areas towards them.
Ghana in West Africa was the only country listed to have received food donation and sales from 1975 to 1983. Egypt, Morocco, Somalia and Sudan were recipient nations in Northern Africa while Kenya and Zaire received the aid in Central Africa (see Table 3.1).

Chester A. Crocker when emphasizing the importance of Africa asserted that Africa offers a growing field for trade and economic cooperation with the United States. The United States needs to buy African raw materials. South Africa remains very vital to this issue.

The U.S. trade with South Africa includes a number of consumer goods: sugar, wool, gem diamonds, spun acrylic yarn, molasses, cotton shirts and trousers. South Africa has as a comparative advantage in mineral and mining processing.

The leading U.S. purchases from South Africa during 1985 were:

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13

### Table 4.1

**South Africa as Mineral Supplier to the U.S.**

**1981-1984**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mineral</th>
<th>U.S. Import Dependence</th>
<th>Percentage Supplied by South Africa</th>
<th>Other African Suppliers to U.S.</th>
<th>Other Reserves in Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chromium</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferro-chromium</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Diamond</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platinum Group Metals</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uranium</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>Gabon, Niger</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** *Legislative Options and U.S. Policy Towards Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, House of Representatives 99th Congress, 2nd Session, April-June, 1986.*
Platinums $584 million
Gem diamonds $286 million
Krugerrands $102 million
Ferrochromium $85 million
Uranium oxide $75 million
Uranium compounds $65 million
U.S. manufactured goods returned $47 million
Industrial diamond, natural $45 million
Coal $43 million
Ferromanganese $32 million

Purchase of these mineral resources from South Africa clearly depicts that it is in the interest to improve relations with South Africa rather than the other way around.

Nigeria is a major supplier of oil to U.S., second after Saudia Arabia. Nigeria had once threatened to use oil as a weapon against the U.S. This was aimed at influencing Washington to effect policy changes in South Africa. Ivory Coast, Cameroon and Gabon also are oil producers but the quantity is largely insignificant compared to the volume of Nigeria's export. Paradoxically the least policy choice area (West Africa) is the most indebted nation to America. This statistic largely points to Nigeria.

Looking at the parameters of U.S policy patterns in Africa, West Africa remains insignificant to the U.S. The first realm was that this area was largely colonized by the most close of U.S. Western allies Britain and France. These countries at the attainment of independence are still indirectly controlled by the West. The West still heavily
trades and invests in this region. Therefore this region is politically, and economically affiliated to the West. Thus, the relationship is safe to U.S. national interest.

The East-West Chessboard has not extended to the West African region. One may want to discuss the Chadian issue and containment of Quaddafi. The U.S. and France have started sending military assistance to Chad. But the Chadian issue is not comparable to the Angolan conflict. It is hoped that containment of Quaddafi would not escalate to other regions. Chadian neighbors, Nigeria in particular, are not ready for any political strife.

In terms of geopolitics or strategic locations, Liberia is the only country that has established U.S. military presence, in order to provide air facilities to the U.S. Similarly, the Soviet Union enjoys docking facilities in Guinea Bissau. In Central Africa, the established Soviet presence are at Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Congo and Zambia. In the South, those are in Angola, Mozambique and Madagascar. In Northern Africa are Libya and Ethiopia. America's military presence are noticeable at various areas of Somalia, Egypt, Sudan, Kenya, Zaire and Seychelles Islands. Many of the strategically located areas have deep-water ports, and good

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air fields. America counts on these areas for its oil tanker routes from Persian Gulf to Europe. With this in mind the rational actor has devised a model in order to guarantee safety of this area and continental policy.

Table 4.2

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<th>Reward and Punishment Model</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Punishment</td>
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<td>Inducement</td>
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<td>Reward</td>
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The aid flow to Egypt clearly depicts this nation's significances to the Gulf area. Aid allotment to Tunisia, Morocco and Sudan has been increased since Ethiopia has changed its political and economic structure, and with Quaddafi trying to expand Libya's borders. Somalia, Kenya and Zaire received significant proportions of U.S. aid. The U.S. in order to punish Libya has refused to deliver its 1975 military sales to the country (see Table 3.5). Aid to Ethiopia, except food aid, has been stopped since Mengistu assumed leadership. And the U.S. has used this instrument of tied aid in granting loans to African nations.

As long as the power structure remains the same the West African region will continue to be insignificant to the U.S. Should the structures change then the U.S.
policy patterns can take another course. West Africa does not need political instability in order to attract the super powers. The areas where the superpowers have established their presence are the crisis areas. It is preferably that the zero-sum game does not extend into the West African region. This region needs to be rational not to engage in wars and therefore stay out of the super power contest for influence. Britain and France will remain a viable influence in the region, at peace times.
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89


