Countering the threat of terrorism: a descriptive case study of the strategic security plan used in the 1996 Atlanta Summer Olympic Games

James E. Usanga
Clark Atlanta University

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.auctr.edu/dissertations
Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
COUNTERING THE THREAT OF TERRORISM: A DESCRIPTIVE CASE STUDY OF THE STRATEGIC SECURITY PLAN USED IN THE 1996 ATLANTA SUMMER OLYMPIC GAMES

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF CLARK ATLANTA UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY
JAMES E. USANGA

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
ATLANTA, GEORGIA
DECEMBER 2001
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my deepest appreciation to our Holy Father, Leader Olumba Olumba Obu, for His spiritual upliftment and guidance throughout the trial times of my endeavors. My initiative and efforts in this research were encouraged by my mentor, Chief John Gordon, of the Atlanta Police Department, who guided and gave freely his time, expertise and granted interviews and access to judicial documents and records. His counsel and advice led to the more illuminating tract in this work. I am especially grateful to my dissertation committee chairman, Dr. Johnny L. Wilson, for his patience, advice, and criticism of the final phase of this research. In particular, I owe special thanks to Dr. Hashim Gibrill, chairman of the Political Science Department, and Dr. K. S. Murty, chairman of the Criminal Justice Department. Both have provided me with inspiration and stimulated my work during my years in graduate school at Clark Atlanta University. Their review and constructive comments of earlier drafts of this manuscript have greatly contributed to this study in its final form. My deepest love to my wonderful wife, sister, friend and companion, Ukeme, for her understanding and support. During the phases of the research and writing, she kept me on a steady course with encouragement, suggestions, and spiritual support. Without her undivided advocacy, and editorial skills this research would never have been completed. I apologize to anyone whom I may have overlooked. This has been the most complex, breathtaking, and rewarding project I have ever undertaken and I am grateful for its happy ending. I pray that this dissertation will, even in a small way, contribute to the prevention of another terrorist incident in future Olympic Games. Finally, in memory of my dear father, Chief E. A. Usanga, the Okuku of Afaha Itam, a man with a vision who did not live to see his dreams come to fruition, I dedicate this dissertation.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................. ii  
Table of Contents .................................................................................................................. iii  
List of Figures ....................................................................................................................... x  
List of Tables ......................................................................................................................... xi  

## CHAPTER I:  
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 1  
  
  Statement of the Research Problem ................................................................................... 4  
  Purpose of the Study ........................................................................................................... 8  
  Significance of the Study .................................................................................................... 9  
  What Is Terrorism? ............................................................................................................ 10  
  Research Questions ......................................................................................................... 16  
  Research Methodology .................................................................................................... 17  
  Source of Information and Data on Terrorism .............................................................. 18  
  Limitation of the Study .................................................................................................... 23  
  Scope and Organization of the Study .............................................................................. 24  
  Endnotes ............................................................................................................................ 27  

## CHAPTER II:  
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE .......................................................................................... 30  
  
  Special Event Management ............................................................................................ 30  
  Terrorism in General ......................................................................................................... 34  
  Domestic Terrorism .......................................................................................................... 41
CHAPTER III: THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF COUNTERTERRORISM PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES

Historical Development ......................................................... 95

Restructuring of the Antiterrorist Bureaucracy in 1977 .......... 98

The Lead Agency Concept .................................................... 101

The Antiterrorism Planning, Coordination, and Policy Formulation Organization ........................................... 101

Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) .............................. 102
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Government Departments and Agencies with Antiterrorism Programs</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of State (DOS) Structure and Organization</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration And Naturalization Service (INS)</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Treasury and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF)</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Transportation (DOT) and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of Explosive Detection Equipment</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAA's Cooperation with other Federal Departments</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Intelligence Community</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Department of Defense (DOD)</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endnotes</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CHAPTER IV:
U.S. INTER-AGENCY SECURITY COORDINATION FOR MAJOR EVENTS IN 1986 AND 1994 179

I. The 1986 Statue of Liberty Centennial Celebration in New York 179

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsection</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Historical Perspective</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Planning</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Threats</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Planning Implementation</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Georgia Regional Map</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Olympic Ring</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>The Atlanta Olympic Model Planning Structure</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Agency Command Center (ACC) Chain of Command</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Olympic Security Operational Structure</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>The Accreditation Badge</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>The Joint Coordination Center (JCC) Information Flow</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>The Atlanta Police Department (APD) Information Flow</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Incident Command Post Structure</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Terrorist Incidents in 1994 by Region</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

On July 19, 1996 the eyes of the world shifted to the historic city of the south, Atlanta, Georgia, for the Centennial Olympic Games. The Games which closed on August 2, 1996, were followed in August by the X Paralympic (Special Olympics) Games. While many Americans looked at the 1996 Games as the Atlanta Olympics, international visitors more than likely saw them as "America's Games," and any problems encountered were a reflection of the country as much as of the city. The security and protection of citizens and property, without mentioning, are integral parts of the success of such special events as this would necessitate that law enforcement agencies predetermine a plan of action to prevent, contain and investigate any form of threat. The Atlanta Police Department (APD), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and a number of different local, state and federal law enforcement agencies, private security guards and Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games (ACOG) volunteers, shared the responsibility for providing Olympic security services during the Games.

As the 1996 Summer Olympic Games was an event of international importance, the United States was concerned not only with the right-wing extremist groups, but with the threat of terrorism. It should be remembered that during the 1972 Olympic Games, the Black September Palestinian Group took eleven Israeli
athletes hostage and in a subsequent rescue attempt by the West German Police, seventeen people were killed.\textsuperscript{1} The international coverage of this event shocked the world, and brought worldwide focus to the issue of terrorism and its use of the media for making political and ideological statements, often at the expense of innocent civilians. Since this incident, elaborate security measures have become an integral part of the preparations for any scheduled special event. The United States citizens and the international Olympic family and those who attended the Games demanded a high level of security and made their displeasure known when it was not apparent. These needs placed major responsibilities on the FBI, the leading federal agency, and other auxiliary agencies.

During the Olympics, specific details concerning uniformed officers' responsibilities as well as prosecutorial responsibilities must be clearly defined. Contingency plans for emergency operations may place SWAT personnel, helicopter service or other specialized units on standby. Substantive planning requires a thorough comprehension of available resources and how they can best be allocated to fulfill most (if not all) identified needs.

It is essential for containment and investigation of terrorism, since interagency cooperation is important in the prevention of terrorist activity. There must be prompt assessment of the actors and their intentions, if possible. This requires immediate access to all possible sources of information, dedication of necessary resources, and careful coordination and planning by public services, medical facilities, highway departments, fire, rescue and emergency services.
Security for the 1996 Games was a major concern, with as many as 400,000
to 500,000 visitors a day in the downtown area, with more than 11,000 athletes from
nearly 200 nations competing. Most of the activities were at the center of the
central Atlanta business district called the "Olympic Ring." Within the three-mile (5-
kilometer) Olympic Ring were eleven competition venues and a variety of other
Olympic-related activities including the Athletes' Villages, the International Olympic
Committee Hotel, the main Olympic Stadium and Centennial Olympic Park. Other
venues stretched from Miami to Washington, D.C. and from Birmingham to the
Atlantic Ocean. All competed for security resources.

Satisfying the exceptional security load posed a major challenge to the law
enforcement officials. Law enforcement leadership needed to share resources and
professional knowledge; focusing this cooperative force to shape events and
motivate the community to support public safety goals, since terrorist
assassinations, bombings and hostage-takings undermine public confidence in a
target government's ability to provide basic security. Such terrorist depredations
erode national resolve and faith in a country's leadership. When a nation is a target
of such actions, terrorism must be measured not only in loss of life or destruction of
property, but in less tangible terms: loss of government credibility and a diminished
capacity to influence domestic and international events and to promote the national
interest. The dramatic July 27, 1996 Centennial Park bombing during the Games
was a forceful reminder that, despite notable successes, the war against
international or domestic terrorism has not yet been won.
The provision of public safety services at the 1996 Olympic Games was a task shared among over fifty local, state and federal law enforcement agencies and ACOG security. The role and responsibilities carried out by these entities were predicated on close coordination and cooperation in both planning and operations. Although the relationship between the law enforcement agencies and ACOG was an interdependent one, the role of each was distinct and it is clear that law enforcement agencies were ultimately in charge in the case of any emergency.

Statement of the Research Problem

When the XXth Olympiad Games held in Munich, West Germany in 1972 were marred by terrorist tragedy, the law enforcement community began to weigh the Olympic Games with greater care and caution directed at security considerations and heightened countermeasures. The 1972 tragic incident, demonstrated the unparalleled opportunity that a massive congregation of world-renowned athletes offered to terrorists interested in commanding the attention of the world with a single, violent terror attack.

Not until the Munich tragedy did Olympic officials come to the realization that the Games were not immune from terrorism. In his statement on the Olympics, Dave Maples holds that:

The United States is perceived as a more violent society than other societies, therefore, law enforcement agencies must allay those fears in their security planning, because Munich has forever changed the way not only the host country thinks about security, but the way people attending the Games think about it.\(^2\)

Numerous threats of terrorism and searing memories of the massacre of
Israeli athletes ensured that security was an overriding concern during the 1996 Atlanta Summer Games.

ACOG security and law enforcement officials were faced with a "daunting task," that is, to be aware of dozens of domestic and international terrorist groups of every political persuasion; while exploring ways to protect athletes, officials, and over 1.5 million visitors during the greatest sporting event in history. Assurances by officials of strong security measures did little to relieve public concern of possible terrorist threats or attacks at the Atlanta Games. An Atlanta Journal-Constitution poll of downtown Atlanta workers in early 1996 showed 71 percent were concerned about terrorism while in a national poll, 61 percent of Americans expressed concern about the Games being a target for terrorists.³

History shows that terrorism has been used effectively since ancient times to achieve often-dramatic success in realizing political or religious goals. Although terrorism is not a new phenomenon, modern society and advanced technology have provided small group of terrorists with the ability to influence world events. The provision and assurance of public safety and security at major international events have become an increasingly major issue over the past twenty to twenty-five years. From the United States' perspective, the major change in international terrorism in the 1990s has been that terrorists can strike on its soil as compared to the 1980s, where few international terrorist actions were aimed at foreigners in the United States. Although US citizens were often victims of terrorism, that primarily was a result of attacks abroad. The February, 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in
New York City killed six people, injured over one thousand. Other examples of the spread of international terrorism in the United States, (US) including the 1994 conviction of Abu Nidal supporters for a Saint Louis murder, and the 1993 arrests for the plot to bomb several New York buildings, further demonstrated increased terrorist capabilities.

The Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games (ACOG) security officials and law enforcement agencies, in the wake of the devastating truck bomb in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995 killing at least 110 people, were forced to reassess the groups that might pose threats to the 1996 Atlanta Centennial Olympic Games. It should be noted that many security and terrorism experts had all but dismissed the right-wing extremists within the United States as a physical threat to the Olympics. The primary threats were considered to be religious fundamentalist groups, particularly those based in the Middle East. With the April 19th blast, and the July 27, 1996 Centennial Olympic Park bombing, it became apparent that domestic terrorism poses a serious threat to security agencies and law enforcement officials.

Although the ACOG security officials were reluctant to link the Oklahoma City bombing with preparations to protect the Games, they conceded that the incident especially in such a high-profile event as the Centennial Olympics Games, warranted a thorough investigation and close monitoring in order to learn anything that could affect their security plans. Other security officials agreed that the bombing had an effect on the federal government's allocation of resources for the Olympics, including full intelligence efforts of the FBI and the CIA and other
agencies to ensure that the United States would not be embarrassed.

The Uniform Crime Report (UCR) in 1993, rated Atlanta as the per capita violent crime capital of the country though the crime rate dropped by ten percent in 1994; with the number of homicides at the lowest level since 1986. The Atlanta Police Chief Beverly Harvard's primary goal is to involve the community in helping to reduce crime. In addition to curbing crime, Harvard was required to organize strong security for the 1996 Olympic Games.

Law enforcement and security agencies were also concerned with the epidemic increase in gang-related crimes in the city of Atlanta. Their concern stemmed from the geographical locations of strategic planning boundaries for the Games which had spread within and outside what was called, the "Olympic Ring." For example, the Olympic Village site in Southwest Metropolitan Atlanta was at the Techwood Housing Community, and the Centennial Park at the Downtown area, were not far from Underground Atlanta where major gang activities had occurred. With projected crime statistics for the years 1992 through 1996 linked with the additional traffic and ancillary problems proposed by the influx of Olympic visitors and dignitaries, policing problems were astronomical at best.

Although terrorists have not attacked the Olympics since Munich in 1972, the unique challenges presented by the return of the Olympic Games to the United States for the second time in just over a decade, reinforced law enforcement's constant vigilance against those who conspired to execute a terrorist attack to garner international attention. Therefore, the magnitude of the Olympics and the
international participation that characterizes this event heightened such concerns.

**Purpose of the Study**

This study focuses on the planning and coordinating strategies by multiple agencies, including the Atlanta Police Department (APD), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of Defense (DOD), the Georgia Bureau of Investigations (GBI), the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department of State (DOS), the Department of Transportation (DOT), and other auxiliary agencies in providing security during specific scheduled major events that have taken place within the last fifteen years.

The purpose is to examine the law enforcement and security planning data to the extent available on three prior Olympic Games (the 1972 Munich Games, 1984 Los Angeles Games, 1992 Barcelona Games) to assess the factors leading to the 1996 Atlanta Centennial Olympic Park bombing. In dealing with terrorism, the United States and security agencies must, constantly evaluate the nature of the threat which changes markedly over time. As the law enforcement community takes steps to reduce the country's vulnerability to terrorist attack, terrorists continue to find new "weak links" in the security chain which they can exploit.

Finally, this study attempts to capture important Olympic knowledge gleaned through security operations' management and preserve for the safeguarding and protection of personnel and assets for future Olympic Games and special event security planners.
Significance of the Study

This study is significant in that the perception that the United States is immune to terrorist attacks has been shattered. International terrorists have demonstrated they can strike within, as was the case in the World Trade Center bombing of 1993. And domestic terrorists have shown they can cause more damage, as in the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma.

These deadly acts of terrorism punctuated the importance of security issues connected to international special events such as the Olympic Games. The gathering of sports heroes and other dignitaries under international scrutiny, in a spirit of friendly competition, created extraordinary and unique security standards. A “complete success” in Atlanta was achieved through a planned, coordinated and cooperative response from the local, state and federal law enforcement community.

Reviewing the lessons learned by the law enforcement communities who had already experienced similar challenges proved to be invaluable to the Atlanta Police Department (APD) and others. The professional knowledge passed on by these law enforcement communities significantly contributed to the development of both interagency and individual agency Olympic security plans and provided a blueprint for security operations during the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta.

With the passing of time, it will not be remembered that twenty-two people died at the XXth Olympiad in Munich. It will be historically remembered, however, as the beginning of "Olympic Terrorist Activity" on major events. The major disruptions and disasters that terrorists visited on the Great Metropolitan Atlanta
Centennial Park has again, changed the course of history. Those same Olympic Games, which had been held sacred by all participants, people of the world, and governments, had been reduced to a visual media event, a "killing field," a statement by terrorists and a tragedy in Olympic history which will never be forgotten. Coping effectively with such acts of terrorism in future Olympics is a pursuit of cardinal significance. This study seeks to make a contribution to that pursuit.

What is Terrorism?

The term terrorism did not come into popular usage until the 1790s when it was employed to describe Jacobin excesses in revolutionary France. Based on the Latin verbs terrere, to tremble or cause to tremble, and detertere, meaning to frighten from, the word terrorism has come to mean acts of violence designed to influence political behavior through a process of intimidation.6

Since the late 1960s, there has been a vast proliferation in the usage of the term terrorism. This term often has been confused with other forms of low-intensity conflict, which at times is also called sub-state violence.7 Usually, perpetrators of violent deeds prefer to call themselves something other than terrorists. Hence, we become familiarized with the current saying, "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." Probably, the semantic confusion over the definition of "terrorism" is the most fundamental obstacle in the efforts to establish a coherent theory of terrorism.

Many writers, scholars, government agencies, etc. use the word "terrorism"
loosely, or at least without defining it with any degree of precision. Formidable
problems are encountered in formulating a reasonably precise and objective
definition of the word.

As noted by Motley, "Terrorism is a phenomenon that is easier to describe
than to define." Walter Laqueur, says that it is too readily used as a substitute for
rebellion, street battle, insurrection and guerrilla warfare which so often leads to
inflation of statistical data by the media.

Alex Schmid defines "terrorism" by listing its common denominators. In over
100 definitions by well-known authors in the field, twenty-two elements emerged as
components of terrorism. Among those, violence, force, politics, fear and terror
were seen as the primary "attributes" of terrorism. Still, lengthy definitions,
attempted by the State Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
scholars, have met with little universal acceptance. Despite the lack of consensus,
terrorism today generally describes the destructive acts of disenfranchised people
which are designed to gain attention, or in some other way further political causes.

Despite these difficulties, core elements of a meaning seem clearly to include
the use or threat of violence: political motivation, and the creation of psychological
pressure for some specific or generalized purpose. The Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) defines "terrorism" as:

The threat or use of violence for political purposes by individuals or
groups, whether acting for, or in opposition to, established govern-
mental authority when such actions are intended to shock/ intimi-
date a target group wider than the immediate victims.
A broad legal definition is found in the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, which defines “terrorist threat” as follows:

A person is guilty of a felony if he threatens to commit any crime of violence with purpose to terrorize another or to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly, or facility of public transportation, or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror or inconvenience.12

Applied to the political arena, terrorism has been defined simply as "motivated violence for political ends."13 The Task Force on Disorder and Terrorism of the National Advisory Committee On Criminal Justice Standards defined “terrorism” as "a tactic or technique by means of which a violent act or the threat thereof is used for the prime purpose of creating overwhelming fear for coercive purposes."14

For the purpose of this study, “terrorism” is defined as violent, criminal behavior designed primarily to generate fear in the community, or in a substantial segment of the community, for political purposes. When such behavior impinges on the consciousness and concerns of the entire nation, then the nation becomes the community in the definition. Domestic terrorism is such behavior carried out by indigenous population elements. International terrorism is such behavior carried out in the United States by foreign groups or abroad by the indigenous population. In the context of this study, international terrorism is terrorism designed to affect unfavorably the security interests of the United States. Criminal acts so orchestrated as to threaten the stability of the 1996 Olympic Games and the safety of allies of the United States, thereby affecting adversely the security interest of the
United States, are classified as terrorism.

Definition of Concepts:

Included in the definition of terms are those general terms specifically related to the study. These definitions are to prevent any confusion relating to the use or meaning of the terms within the confines of the study, and to aid in the comprehension of the structure and scope of the paper.

Civil Disorder- "A form of collective violence interfering with the peace, security and normal functioning of the community."  

Coordinating- "The task of interrelating the numerous component units within the organization to ensure goal accomplishment."  

Deterrence- "Protection and security efforts of the public and private sector to discourage terrorist acts. It is especially target hardening."  

Hooligans- "Career criminals who come to soccer games primarily to conduct criminal behavior such as assault, robbery and rape."  

International Radical Terrorist (IRT)- "Any extremist movement or group, which is international in nature and conducts acts of crime or terrorism under the banner of personal beliefs in furtherance of political, social, economic, or other objectives."  

Investigations- "Inquiries concerning suspected criminal behavior for the purpose of identifying offenders or gathering further evidence to assist the prosecution of apprehended offenders."  

Jurisdiction- "The lawful right to exercise official authority, whether executive, judicial, or legislative; the territory within which such power may be exercised. For
Law enforcement officials; it refers to the geographical boundaries of power; for the courts, it refers to the power to hear and decide cases."\(^{21}\)

**Law Enforcement** - "Those groups of sworn local, state, or federal personnel who by definition or charter are trusted with the keeping of the peace, and the protection of life and property."\(^{22}\)

**Management** - "The process administrators used to give an organization direction and to influence people to work towards organizational objectives. It consists of those activities which are designed to include cooperation and facilitate work."\(^{23}\)

**Military Assistance** - "The authorization of federal military personnel to be utilized under the Executive Branch's authority with the support of the Legislative Branch."\(^{24}\)

**Nonpolitical Terrorism** - Terrorism that is not aimed at political purposes but exhibits "conscious design to create and maintain a high degree of fear for coercive purposes, but the end is individual or collective gain rather than the achievement of a political objective."\(^{25}\)

**Planning** - "Roughly, is deciding what the law enforcement agencies should be doing. It is the linking of current activities to future conditions. It is decision-making regarding operational activities based on anticipated contingencies."\(^{26}\)

**Physical Deterrent** - "Those deterrents which are structural or physical in nature, such as alarms, fences, lighting, etc., humans such as guards, animals such as K-9 dogs or procedural such as policies and procedures."\(^{27}\)

**Political Terrorism** - "Violent criminal behavior designed primarily to generate fear in the community, or a substantial segment of it, for political purposes."\(^{28}\)
Prevention- "International initiatives and diplomacy to discourage state support of terrorism and to build a broad consensus that terrorist acts are inadmissible under international law, irrespective of the cause in which they are used." ²⁹

Protection- "Shelter from danger or harassment." ³⁰

Quasi-terrorism- "Those activities incidental to the commission of crimes of violence that are similar in form and method to true terrorism but which nevertheless lack its essential ingredient." It is not the main purpose of the quasi-terrorists "to induce terror in the instant victim," as in the case of true terrorism. Typically, the fleeing felon who takes a hostage is a quasi-terrorist, whose methods are similar to those of the true terrorist but whose purposes are quite different. ³¹

Official or state terrorism- "Nations whose rule is based upon fear and oppression that reach terrorist proportions." ³²

Right-Wing Terrorism- Generally, domestic terrorist groups categorized as "right-wing" are defined as "being racist, anti-black, and anti-Semitic and are for the advancement of the white race." ³³ These groups also have engaged in acts of provocation and assault against federal and state law enforcement officials.

Security- "Privately employed persons whose purpose is the protection of property and personnel of the company or employer." ³⁴

Security-In-Depth- "A means of planning a series of controls so that each will delay an intruder as much as possible, thus discouraging an attempted penetration or assist in controlling it." ³⁵

Site (location) Survey- "Site or location survey, is a review of a specific location or
site as to vulnerability as a target, its physical structure, as well as a review of employees, visitors, and guests' backgrounds.  

Special Event- (varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction according to the responsibilities and venue of agencies involved. Preparation and resource allocation also vary according to need.) In the FBI 1989 publication, Terrorism in the United States, John Fraser describes special events to be a) "of such national or international significance that they are attractive targets for terrorists;" b) "intelligence indicates that a credible terrorist threat exists;" c) "of such a nature that the potential for collection of significant, classified intelligence by hostile governments exists;" or d) "of such national or international importance that an FBI presence would logically be warranted to fulfill its investigative responsibilities." Strategic Planning- "Is programmatic and deals with determining how agencies should achieve policy goals and objectives. It involves the department's administration, planning unit, and division commanders." 

Research Questions

This study attempts to find tentative answers to the following questions:

1. Would historic, political, long-standing ethnic rivalries (if existed) among the fans, athletes, or officials of competing countries give way to any kind of disruptive or terrorist acts of violence in 1996; i.e. can the Olympic Games be kept free of nationalistic and political pressures?

2. Does anti-government rhetoric encourage domestic terrorists?

3. Is the loss of civil liberties too high a price to pay for stronger anti-terrorist laws?

4. Will the rising availability of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the
black market enhance future terrorist capability?

5. What physical, procedural, and aesthetic security was incorporated to insure the safety of the Olympic athletes, officials, visiting dignitaries, and observers from terrorist activities at the Atlanta 1996 Centennial Summer Olympics?

6. What kind of adverse impact did terrorists want to make by bombing the Centennial Olympic Park on July 27, 1996?

7. Did previous Games' security guards' criminal behaviors or "heroism" help make Richard Jewell the FBI's initial prime suspect?

8. How do we prevent the tragedy of September 5, 1972 and July 27, 1996 from reoccurring in future Olympic Games? That is, what improvements in the security response structure, through lessons learned, can be suggested for the Olympic Security Committee to adopt in future events?

Research Methodology

This is a descriptive case study analysis of the city of Atlanta and how the Olympic Security Support Group (OSSG) worked together to develop strategies to prevent violence and harm to the Olympic athletes and participants. In addition to examining the different roles played by law enforcement agencies in selected major events including previous Olympic Games, an evaluation of threat potential of terrorist groups will be made to assess the applicability and success of the precautions suggested.

This study reviews other local, state and federal law enforcement agencies' security planning and coordinating strategies used at selected major events. Examples are; the 1972 Munich, West Germany Summer Olympic Games, the 1984 Summer Olympic Games in Los Angeles, the 1986 Centennial Statue of Liberty celebration, the 1994 World Cup Soccer Championship, and the 1992 Summer
Olympic Games in Barcelona, Spain. Utilizing these data, this study will assess the breakdown of the safety and security planning of the respective government agencies resulting in the bombing of the Centennial Park during the 1996 Centennial Summer Olympic Games in Atlanta, Georgia. This assessment will be made in relation to the numerous bomb threats to the Olympic Security Committee by terrorist groups at the international and domestic level.

This study combines an historical evaluation of agencies’ security roles and security precautions used in prior Olympic Games to reduce the terrorist threat to property and life, and the success or failure of these precautions, as well as of security precautions suggested as effective for the 1996 Centennial Olympic Games in Atlanta. Since the historical data evaluated are not statistical in nature, and the projective survey for future security is subjective, and does not lend itself to formulae and statistical review, a means of measuring threat level or potential in relation to terrorist groups had to be developed, and is theoretical in nature.

Sources of Information and Data on Terrorism

Data sources for this study included: books, journals, newspapers, Congressional meeting reports and committee reports dealing with terrorism or Olympics over the last 15 years. Additional information was procured from previous research projects, state and federal documents including reports by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Defense (DOD, the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department of State (DOS), the Department of Transportation
(DOT), television documentaries/news stories on terrorism and personal interviews with selected officials dealing with terrorism, security planning and the Olympics.

The method used in this study was a survey, analysis, and synthesis of the relevant literature. The literature, which is voluminous, can be categorized on the basis of whether its source is governmental or non-governmental.

Governmental Sources:

Previously, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) published analyses of various problems and events for the benefit of the general public. These analyses represented attempts to delete all classified materials from official reports in order to provide academicians, journalists, businessmen, and other interested citizens with information that would be essentially correct without the wealth of supporting detail from classified sources found in original reports. Several of these analyses were used in this study.

The CIA has long discontinued the practice of preparing such analyses. According to Dale Peterson, then CIA spokesman:

It took manpower to start with a classified report and try to produce something meaningful in an unclassified fashion.... Our primary responsibility is to provide US government policy-makers with the best intelligence product we are capable of producing. We saw that a lot of analysts' time was spent preparing these unclassified analytical pieces.39

Scholars will, therefore, have to do without CIA materials in the immediate future. It is worth noting that CIA analysts classify terrorist acts according to whether they were carried out by basically autonomous non-state actors or by
individuals and groups controlled by some sovereign state. This classification, however, creates so many problems that the CIA's public analyses of terrorism have been less useful than they would probably have been if a less subjective method of classification had been adopted.

The State Department is one of the leading agencies in the fight against terrorism. All of the information that the department wishes the public to have is published in the Department of State Bulletin. This monthly publication includes speeches and policy statements, and is available from the US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, on a subscription basis. This information source is important for the study because it provided the definitive United States government position with respect to major events and terrorism.

The primary "lead agency" for dealing with domestic terrorism is the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Materials dealing with terrorism are sometimes found in the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, available from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, US Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., 20535. This bulletin is also available on microfiche from the National Criminal Justice Reference Service.

The National Criminal Justice Reference Service has available, also on microfiche, a variety of materials from foreign police sources. The file of Police Chief, the periodical of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, is also on microfiche. Police Chief, published at Gaithersburg, Maryland, is an important source of information on the views of state and local law enforcement authorities.
Enforcement and Criminal Justice also publish periodical supplements of annotated bibliographies dealing with terrorism.

Among the most useful sources available for the study were the published accounts of the many congressional hearings held on the subject of terrorism during the past decade. The great advantage of a congressional hearing is that its witnesses are not limited to reading a prepared statement. The witnesses must also answer questions put to them by legislators from both ends of the political spectrum. Such questioning elicits more detail that would be provided if the witnesses were limited to prepared statements.

The Library of Congress issues Subject Catalogs four times a year, listing new acquisitions that have been processed and are available for reading. Many of these acquisitions have been prepared by organizations and writers outside the United States. Journals published by branches of the American armed forces also include articles and data on terrorism. One example of these is the Air University Review.

One problem with almost all of the professional sources just enumerated is that the views represented are almost exclusively those of the federal government. An exception is the congressional hearings, where a variety of views is expressed. In general, however, to obtain access to something other than the "party line," it is necessary to consult other types of sources.

Non-Governmental Sources:

Virtually all significant terrorist acts are reported by those American news-
papers normally covering important world news. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution was the most often used for the study. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution coverage was as complete as seemed possible, and was consulted primarily for its interpretative coverage of the Atlanta scene. Many other newspapers could, however, have been used extensively, and some were referred to occasionally.

After a terrorist incident has been reported in the daily press, many national periodicals also cover it. Publications such as Time, Newsweek, Sports Illustrated, U.S. News & World Report, USA Today, and others present usually condensed versions of the incidents, with the benefit of somewhat more time in which to research and write their accounts. The Economist of London also provides reasonably complete coverage of world terrorism. Many other periodicals offer in-depth analyses. One of the periodicals that appeared to have covered the subject thoroughly was the New York Times Magazine, but many others - Harper's National Review, and Security World -- included articles of interest. For skyjacking and countermeasures, Aviation Week and Space Technology is one of the best sources, and has featured articles dealing with new technology as it impinges on the terrorist threat.

Of the various specialized journals, Terrorism: An International Journal, edited by Yonah Alexander, was the one most relevant to the study. It began publication in 1978, and has devoted entire issues to a particular country or problem. Much of the work it publishes is highly theoretical and deficient in factual content. Security World frequently includes articles dealing with antiterrorism
measures and equipment. Internet carries a great deal of information regarding how lethal weapons can be constructed in one's home workshop; the information gives individuals and groups coping with terrorism some idea of what they are facing.

The Library of Congress collection is much larger, since it includes foreign books and those now out of print. Scores of books dealing with terrorism are published every year. However, relatively few of these concern Strategic Events Planning by the listed agencies and departments to stop terrorist attacks.

**Limitation of the Study**

This study may be subjected to the following limitations: first, numerous secondary documents---books, articles, and official reports on terrorism may render conflicting versions of certain facts (numbers of terrorists involved, casualties, and the like). In such cases, the version by recognized source has been used for its face value. Secondly, a large portion of the critical information is not available, not only in the public domain, but is hard to access even to those inside the federal government. Should this information be available, the study would have further benefited. Thirdly, constraints placed on domestic intelligence activities by the FBI and other law enforcement agencies have limited the amount of information available to the bureau, other law enforcement agencies, and scholars. Similar constraints placed on the CIA have limited the quality and quantity of information available regarding international terrorist activities.

Finally, only selected scheduled major events, for example, the 1986 Statue
of Liberty Centennial Celebration and the 1994 World Cup Soccer Championship were used for comparative study. These specific events are selected for direct comparison with the Atlanta Summer Olympic Games planning because they were staged in the United States, with the same restrictions and cooperation being exhibited by the local, state and federal government's agencies. These same restrictions and cooperation also influence the planning and coordination of law enforcement, security and counte-terrorist personnel. In addition to inter-agency cooperation, the basic technological abilities and the political environment is also of a like type.

**Scope and Organization of the Study**

This study is organized in an eight-chapter format. The introductory first chapter presented the background of the study, the problems, its purpose and the significance of this study. The chapter explained the methodology used to evaluate the information gained through research and its limitations. Also, the source and methods for gathering the data and the scope and organization of the study were outlined.

Chapter II examines pertinent literature on major special events management, terrorism in general and terrorist groups, theories on causes of terrorism and the terrorist personalities. It also reviews specific Olympics, their findings and conclusions as applicable to this study.

Chapter III contains descriptions of countermeasures generally available to policymakers facing the problem of terrorism. It describes the structure, functions,
basic principles, and security roles of selected US departments and agencies assigned with counterterrorism responsibilities. It includes a review of modern terrorists; i.e., their involvement with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and attempts to explain why biological agents are likely to appeal to terrorist groups.

Chapter IV includes two case studies and examines past contingency planning and security coordination during: I. The 1986 Statue of Liberty Centennial Celebration event, and II. The 1994 World Cup Soccer Championship events in nine cities throughout the United States. The review first considers the events' historical and regional perspective. This is followed by an evaluation of the security process, while exploring the posed potential threats. The chapter concludes with assessment of the overall planning strategy including the development and coordination of an effective communications networking among agencies.

While chapter V is devoted to the actual application of the data within the confines of the study, details on the historical perspective, regional study, and the three phases model of 1996 Olympic security preparations and implementation by the different departments and agencies providing security during the 1996 Centennial Games are discussed. This chapter will be evaluated in terms of the interagency preparation and cooperation including, threat assessment and the Olympic security safeguards throughout centers of the events. For example, functions of the Joint Command Center (JCC) and the Olympic Security Support Group (OSSG), in protecting the Olympic Torch, the Olympic Village, the event venues, transportation system and others.
Chapter VI outlined the critical steps in preparing for and hosting the 1996 Olympic Games. It described the extraordinary measures undertaken by more than fifty local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies responsible for the provision of a safe and secure environment for the Centennial Games. This chapter addresses each phase and levels of the security process. For example, the Developmental Phase deals with the Strategic Planning process while the Experimental Phase identified the different level of training requirements for a smooth transition into the Operational Phase, which covers the implementation and management process. These three phases show how effective cooperation and coordination between law enforcement and ACOG security promotes better understanding of each mission and led to a successful security operation during the Games in Atlanta.

Chapter VII: Discussion/Assessment of Success, closely examines the perceived emergency response structure incorporated in the planning, and illustrates conditions under which such measures have failed or have been successful. Here, Munich and Atlanta's terrorist Olympic incidents are compared.

Chapter VIII the final chapter, considers other analyses, evaluation and conclusions drawn from the review of related Olympic Games and other scheduled major events. In addition, recommendations will be made to the IOC security personnel dealing with preventing acts of terrorism in future events.

2Dave Maples, a Nashville native is the FBI's point man on the Olympics, has followed the Summer Olympics trail from Los Angeles to Seoul to Barcelona, with short stops at every Winter Games in between, and in Atlanta preparing for the 1996 Games, was one of the speakers who covered the Olympics security, during the 10th Annual International symposium on Criminal Justice Issues at the Chicago Circle of the University of Illinois at Chicago July 31 - August 3, 1995, the symposium speakers believed the world is threatened by new forms of terrorist violence directed against a broader range of targets from business and governmental organizations to civic and religious leaders. They saw the need for redefining the options and strategies necessary to protect society. New models for international cooperation were also discussed.


7Various phases of low intensity conflict include insurgency, guerilla, military operations (commando raids, retaliation activities) revolution. A “war of national liberation” is a term that can be applied to any low intensity conflict since it fits into almost any category of the spectrum of conflict and is a constant element of the early phase of political subversion furthering a climate of discontent. (U.S. Senate, 1985: XIII).


10Alex P. Schmid, Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts,


12Model Penal Code, Section 211.3.


18Neil J. Gallagher, is the Chief of the Counterterrorism Section, with the FBI. He categorized Hooligans as adolescents or young adults who typically come from a working-class background, and are usually unemployed and unskilled. Envisioned themselves as an extension of the team, and their behavior has been compared to the actions of individuals under a drug-induced “high.” The Police Chief (March 1994): 39.


23Gaines, Southerland and Angell, Police Administration, 367.


25Reid, Crime and Criminology, 435.

26Gaines, Southerland and Angell, Police Administration, 367.


28Reid, Crime and Criminology, 434.

29U.S. Government Anti-Terrorism Program, 2.


31Reid, Crime and Criminology, 435.

32Ibid.


34Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Domestic Terrorism,” 8.


36Brian M. Jenkins, Rand’s Research on Terrorism (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, 1977), 12.

37Excerpt from Colonel John Fraser, A special Advisor to the Law Enforcement Training Center, Glynco, Georgia during his presentation at the 1991 IACP Terrorism Symposium held April 11 - 12, 1991, in Vienna, Virginia.

38Gaines, Southerland and Angell, Police Administration, 375.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

This chapter focuses on the research and theoretical accounts on and about terrorism that shed light on the guidelines for this Atlanta Summer Olympic study.

Special Event Management

The FBI publication, Terrorism in the United States 1994, shows how the changing world conditions have affected terrorism not only at the global level, but at the domestic level as well. During 1990 through 1994, for example, such events as the ongoing Middle East peace process, the provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) cease-fire agreement with the British government and the fall of the Soviet Union have each had a profound effect on terrorism.¹

Fraser 1991 accepted the FBI 1989 definition of special events. In his special event management study 1991, he included the Olympic Games, the World's Fair, the Statue of Liberty centennial celebration, the Economic Summit of Industrialized Nations and the United States presidential inauguration. His study focused on the organizational structure, analysis, strategic and operational planning, training, logistical support, coordination centers, crisis management and emergency response capabilities as key elements needed during special events. He noted that law enforcement agencies have had some difficulty in the strategic
planning area especially when asked to plan for a future event with significant unknowns and "what if's." He concluded that this is not a problem unique to law enforcement, but that many corporations face similar challenges by police departments.

Morrone 1994 assessed the definition of special events and concluded that definitions vary according to the responsibilities and venue of the particular police department in question. A special event in a rural setting according to his examples, may be a "4-H show or country fair," while a special event for a large city may be the "1996 Olympics," that preparations and resources allocation will vary according to availability and needs. For instance, a department's available resources will dictate the response level to a terrorist act; limitations on available special units do not preclude the need thereof. Local police departments or state police agencies with limited resources will have to contact other agencies for assistance and the chief as first responder, must quickly assess and evaluate the situation in terms of needs and his resources. Morrone's model of special events management is based on a three-phase model: 1) initial planning, 2) substantive planning and 3) post-event review.²

Morrone stated that the recent international political events, such as the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the dismantling of the Soviet Union, provided an opportunity to expand law enforcement cooperation worldwide. The 1988 New Jersey state trooper arrest of Yu Kikumura,³ and subsequent investigation of the Japanese Red Army was a shining example of interagency cooperation among
Gallagher's 1994 description of special events is in agreement with both Fraser and Morrone's definition. In his view, whether it is a major international sporting event such as the Olympic Games or a local festivity, every law enforcement agency has faced the challenge of setting up a security plan to accommodate the activities surrounding a special event. These events may range from hosting a local celebration to undertaking massive security arrangements. Gallagher noted while evaluating the threat during the 1994 World Cup Soccer Championship that, as with any special event, the primary jurisdiction for venue site security rests with local law enforcement authorities. By the sheer scope of the competition, that is, since fifty-two matches were scheduled across the United States during a one-month period, security challenges faced not only the local jurisdictions surrounding the venue sites, but adjacent jurisdictions and other sites where national teams may be in residence for the matches.

Atlanta Olympic security officials stated prior to the Games that, "Atlanta will be the safest place in the world during the Summer Games." These officials believed if they said it often enough it would come true. Security Chief Rathburn, Atlanta Mayor Campbell, Police Chief Harvard and virtually all law enforcement officials assigned to the Olympic stated it as a "mantra," but experts cautioned that "mantra" sounded, at times, like a challenge to every militant and terrorist group seeking an international stage for murder and mayhem to advance a cause. Experts claimed, and the planners knew, that no city in America is immune from
terrorism. A well-placed explosive, chemical bomb, or deadly virus at the Olympics could be more devastating with more long-term repercussions than Oklahoma City, the World Trade Center and the nerve gas incident on the Tokyo subway combined. According to Brian Jenkins before the Games, "For someone with a cause, (the Olympics) is a ready-made stage." Some security experts believed that terrorists would stay away from the Olympics after the 1972 Munich Games terrorist attack, because, instead of recognition, the slaying of Israeli athletes brought only international condemnation for the Palestine Liberation Organization faction of "Black September." Others, including Robert Heibel, argued to the contrary. He believed increased security deterred Olympic terrorism, not a lack of trying on the part of terrorists. Heibel stated:

I think when you put on a united front and you see people are well organized and look trained and efficient and you put out information that indicates you are prepared, it acts as a deterrent for the amateurs, but maybe not the professionals.

Schwartz 1991 asserted that, "our law enforcement agencies are as good as or better than any in the world, because United States law enforcement at the local, state and federal levels is superbly staffed, equipped and trained." He believed that these agencies, have met the difficult challenge of policing in a free society, balancing their precious individual freedoms with the nation's need for order and security. Although the demands of due process and a Constitution that, by design, requires the state to honor and respect the rights of its citizens, they have sometimes made law enforcement difficult. They have also made law
enforcement highly professional. He also admitted that law enforcement agencies, without doubt, have also been fortunate as well. He cautioned these agencies to continue to view any threat seriously, resisting complacency and a false sense of security. Preparing for the worst may be one of the only ways to avoid terrorism in the future.

**Terrorism In General**

The lack of conceptual precision and clarity concerning the scholarly analysis of terrorism as could be seen in Crenshaw, 1981; Wardlaw, 1982; Wilkinson, 1987 is well recognized. Typically, the issue raises the following questions: How broad or narrow should a definition of terrorism be? What elements should be included, or excluded? And, given a particular definition of terrorism, what is the appropriate or most effective strategy for developing a theory? Recently, these problems have been addressed by Schmid and Jongman et al. in their second edition of *Political Terrorism* 1988, a guide to research in the field, and by Jack Gibbs in a paper titled "Conceptualization of Terrorism" 1989.

Terrorism is by no means a new form of warfare. Paul Wilkinson 1987 noted that it has been witnessed in nearly every conflict of ideas, wills, and national groups in history. The Old Testament contains many references to behavior that, for all intents and purposes, can only be described as terrorism. In the first century A.D., Jewish nationalists known as the Zealots conducted a fierce and unrelenting terror campaign against the Roman occupiers of the eastern Mediterranean. The radical Islamic sect known as the Assassins, which appeared nearly a millennium
later, he added, was "perhaps the first organized group systematically employing murder for a cause it believed to be righteous." Inspired by the teachings of Hassan Sibai, the Assassins resisted, for nearly two centuries, efforts to suppress their heretical religious beliefs through a combination of merciless terrorism and fanatical faith in their own certitude and, in so doing, created a murder cult not witnessed before or since. It is somewhat ironic that the word "terror" according to Stohl 1988, originated in the aftermath of the French revolution and was associated with the extreme violence of the Jacobin and Thermidorian regimes.

Herman 1982 and Chomsky 1986 described the term "terrorism" as having wide disparate meanings depending on who is using it. The United States government under both Reagan and Bush (in the 1980s) and Clinton and Gore (through the 1990s to the present) routinely identified the violent actions of their adversaries (e.g., Libya, Iran, Iraq) as terrorism while at the same time ignoring similar activities of their client states. Similarly, during the Oklahoma crisis of the 1990s, according to York and Pindera 1991, a Liberal member of the Quebec National Assembly referred to the Mohawk Warriors as "terrorists." Picard 1990, stated that supporters of the Mohawks, on the other hand, complained that the actions of the state (represented by the Surete du Quebec) amounted to terrorism. Given the subjective quality of the term, how is it possible to engage in a coherent, meaningful study of the phenomenon?

A common problem in conceptual analysis concerns the scope of the definition. As Hospers 1965 asserts, the definition should be "neither too broad
nor too narrow." For example, to define "terrorism" as "action intended to induce sharp fear and through that agency to effect a desired outcome in a conflict situation" would be far too broad as it would include a wide range of activities - including domestic violence, and routine actions of police forces. Clearly, more defining characteristics are required.

An example of a definition that is too narrow is provided by the United States Department of Defense as:

...the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a revolutionary organization against individuals or property with the intention of coercing or intimidating governments or societies, often for political or ideological purposes.

This definition is inadequate in that it ignores actions of the state that can appropriately be labeled terrorism.

A number of authors including Franck 1978, Laquer 1979, and others, argued that terrorism has extensive historical precedents for the use of violence to coerce an enemy rather than to weaken or destroy his military capability. Walter Laquer argues that terrorist tactics can be found in ancient Greek and Roman history and in the Middle Ages. Terrorism has been waged by national and religious groups, by the left and by the right, by nationalist as well as internationalist movements. It has been state-sponsored terrorist movements that have frequently consisted of members of the educated middle-class, but there has also been agrarian terrorism, terror by the uprooted and the rejected, and trade union and working-class terror. Terror has been directed against autocratic regimes as well
as democracies. National liberation movements and social revolutions (or reactions) have turned to terrorism after political action has failed. Elsewhere, and at other times, terrorism has not been the consequence of political failure, but has been chosen by militant groups even before other options were tried.

Two factors may account for terrorism being misconceived as a new phenomenon. The post-industrial societies of North America and Western Europe are highly vulnerable to attack because of concentration and accessibility of transportation, communications, and power resources. The easy movement of people, goods, and information within and across national boundaries is an integral part of the economies of these countries. These conditions facilitate terrorist activities and provide abundant targets for them. The jet airplane has radically altered travel, and as a result shrunk the late-twentieth century world. Terrorists can travel more rapidly from a safe haven to staging area to point of attack and back to a safe-haven. The same vehicles contribute substantially to the susceptibility of attack and to the vulnerability of modern society to terrorism.14

Terrorism is now one of the paradoxes of our time. Its threat is as pervasive as nuclear war, but its victims are relatively few in number. Nonetheless, its consequences are publicized widely in excruciating detail. Terrorism affects individuals, societies, governments, and interstate relations. Terrorism, moreover, has been employed successfully to embarrass governments and to compel them to grant concessions and pay ransoms used to underwrite new revolutionary activities. It is both deadly and frightening.
Reid 1994 described terrorist attacks as not new to this or other countries although today they involve larger numbers of victims; but it was not until 1981 that the U.S. government perceived the threat of terrorism "to be serious enough to warrant classification as a major component of American foreign policy." That after a year of study by a joint team from the Army and Air Force, a late 1986 report indicated that the United States still did not have an effective plan for coping with terrorist attacks. The team insisted that a comprehensive civil-military strategy to defend our interests at home and abroad from terrorist attacks should be developed. Kidnapping and hostage taking are other forms of terrorism that characterized the 1980s. In mid-1985 William Buckley, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) station chief in Beirut, Lebanon, was forced from his car and kidnapped by pro-Iranian gunmen. He died in December in a makeshift dungeon where he was held in chains.16

According to Bakhash 1987, terrorist incidents at home and abroad as well as an excessive amount of commentary by journalists, authors, academicians, sociologists, politicians and psychologists, have left unclear terrorist trends. Probst 1989 agreed that terrorist attacks are also increasing in their sophistication and casualties throughout the world. As the public becomes inured to particular terrorists' operations, terrorists find the need to increase their operations and the carnage and bloodshed associated with them in order to maintain public interest and reaction.

Americans, among other Westerners, have become prime targets for terrorist
activity. The United States' policy along with that of many other countries, is committed to the maintenance of political stability and to orderly, legal, constructive change. This policy seeks to diffuse tension by urging national governments to institute reforms leading to stable governments that will obviate the need and excuses for illegal terrorist activity. Terrorism is an ongoing threat and the West in particular continues to oppose it vigorously because of the violence involved and the threat of economic and political destabilization. Legitimate governments must understand the nature of terrorism in order to check or prevent it.

American intelligence agencies are reportedly predicting that international terrorism will gradually change its strategy, perpetrating terrorist acts within the United States itself instead of virtually limiting itself to attacking American personnel and facilities abroad. This expectation is based on the growing number of individuals in the United States potentially or actually sympathetic to terrorist groups. A handful of terrorists can inflict great damage on a society, provided that they have a reasonable base of support in the community, supplying them with safe houses, forged papers, weapons, and explosives. The money needed can be obtained through ordinary criminal acts or from abroad. Terrorist groups in the United States include the Puerto Rican and Croatian nationalists who have already committed terrorist acts and Cubans, Iranians, Palestinians, and others with sympathizers in the United States who have heretofore been relatively inactive until recently. The expectation of intensified domestic terrorism is also based on the improved capabilities of terrorists themselves.
The Department of State 1994, describes "terrorism" as:

Pre-meditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 'noncombatant' targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. The term 'noncombatant' is interpreted to include, in addition to civilians, military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed and/or not on duty.\textsuperscript{18}

Examples listed as terrorist incidents were the murder of the following US military personnel: Col. James Rowe, killed in Manila in April, 1989; Capt. William Nordeen, United States defense attache killed in Athens in June, 1988; the two servicemen killed in the La Belle disco bombing in West Berlin in April, 1986; and the four off-duty United States Embassy Marine guards killed in a café in El Salvador in June 1985. The department also considers as acts of terrorism, attacks on military installations or on armed military personnel when a state of military hostilities does not exist at the site, such as bombings against United States bases in Europe, the Philippines, or elsewhere. In reviewing the year, 1994, the State Department noted that there were 321 international terrorist attacks during that period; a 25-percent decrease from the 431 recorded the previous year and the lowest annual total in 23 years. Sixty-six were anti-US attacks, down from 88 in 1993.\textsuperscript{19}

Merari 1978 reviewed terrorists' objectives, strategies, and tactics. He described the primary objectives of terrorists are to instill fear, to terrorize, and to create violence for the sake of effect. That is, the particular victims may not be important to the cause other than to create the fear toward which the violence is aimed. Instilling fear is not the only objective of terrorists. In addition, they seek to
destroy the confidence people have in their government. He categorized terrorist groups as "xenofighters," those who fight foreigners or "homofighters" those who fight their own people. Often xenofighters are seeking removal of a foreign power or the changing of political boundaries regarding a foreign power, with such goals as 1) to attract international attention, 2) to harm the relations of the target country with other nations, 3) to cause insecurity and to damage the economy and public order in the target country, 4) to build feelings of distrust and hostility toward the government among the target country's population, and 5) to cause actual damage to civilians, security forces, and property in the target country. While homofighters strategies are: 1) undermining internal security, public order, and the economy in order to create distrust of the government's ability to maintain control, 2) acquiring popular sympathy and support by positive action, 3) generating popular repulsion from extreme counter-terrorist repressive measures, 4) damaging hated foreign interests, 5) harming the international position of the existing regime and 6) causing physical damage and harassing persons and institutions that represent the ruling regime.

**Domestic Terrorism:**

The features of this type of terrorism are that all offensive operations are conducted by anti-government elements and carried out within the primary targeted state (most often the country of origin of the group). Hence, the nationality of the perpetrators is the same as that of their victims. The sphere of operations is limited to a single state/country, their home territory. They are able to survive in that
geographical location seemingly because they enjoy the support of their sympathizers within their own country, except in the case of the Oklahoma bombing.

Successful domestic terrorism often gains momentum and grows in size until it develops into a popular national movement. An example of which would be the Pedro Albizu Campos Revolutionary Forces (PACRF). This group is a violent Puerto Rican separatist terrorist group dedicated to achieving total Puerto Rican independence from the United States. Also, the "right-wing " groups such as the Aryan Nations, the Order, the American Front Skinheads and Posse Comitatus fall into this category. According to the FBI definition:

Domestic terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence, committed by a group(s) or two or more individuals, against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.22

In order to put the domestic threats in perspective, it may be helpful to briefly reconstruct some of the major concerns and describe the most prominent form of terrorism conducted in the United States. In 1970, the late Richard M. Nixon expressed Presidential concern that he or members of his Cabinet would be victims of terrorist attacks. When the Secret Service was asked by Nixon to develop intelligence on terrorist groups, the agency refused, stating it would duplicate the duties of other agencies.23 Two years later, as part of a national security hunt for suspected terrorist bombers, the FBI—according to two former high level officials—conducted illegal break-ins at private dwellings to investigate terrorism. These specific actions were taken during black bag jobs, surreptitious entries, when
the FBI was searching for fugitive members of the militant Weather Underground.24

Clarence M. Kelley, a former Director of the FBI, alerted the law enforcement community that from 1973 to 1976 terrorist-related crimes within the United States had increased three-fold. Past senior US officials who have conveyed a variety of concerns regarding terrorism include: former President Carter who promised that the United States will not give into terrorism, regardless of its form or wherever it occurs and former Secretary of State Vance who described terrorism as one of the most inhumane phenomena of our time. The former Director of the State Department's Office for Combating Terrorism, Ambassador Quainton, predicted higher levels of terrorist violence during the 1980s. Another former Director of the FBI, Judge William H. Webster, has suggested that it is the nature of terrorist groups to mount increasingly more spectacular attacks in order to capture attention and to maintain credibility among their constituencies. Former Secretary of State Haig has added that it is time for terrorism to be addressed with greater clarity and effectiveness by all nations, including the United States.25

A handful of terrorist organizations account for most bombings and other terrorist actions in the United States. The Pedro Albizu Campos Revolutionary Forces (PACRF) is a domestic terrorist group which directs its terrorist activities at the United States and receives no foreign direction or financial assistance. This is the most active of the many Puerto Rican independence groups known as the Armed Forces of Puerto Rican National Independence, FALN. Since 1974, the FALN has been responsible for causing five deaths, 84 injuries, and over $3.5
million in property damages.\textsuperscript{26} The number of incidents committed by Puerto Rican terrorist groups during the last five years, has steadily declined. In 1990, five terrorist acts were committed by these groups in the US and Puerto Rico; in 1991, the number of incidents decreased to four, and in 1992, the number of incidents decreased yet again to one act of terrorism. During 1993 and 1994, no acts of terrorism were committed by Puerto Rican terrorist groups.\textsuperscript{27} The apparent decrease may be due, in part, to the November 1993, political plebiscite held in Puerto Rico in which a plurality of Puerto Ricans voted to maintain their commonwealth status. The results of this plebiscite appear to have deflated the independence movement of Puerto Rican nationalists, of whom only a very small, but militant faction, condone the use of terrorism as the primary method of operation.

Jewish extremist organizations, such as the Jewish Defense League, also have accounted for a large share of domestic terrorist incidents. This organization bombed the residences of three United Nations employees and an Egyptian Tourist Office. The Jewish Committee of Concern and the Jewish Armed Resistance have also been active in firebombing incidents.\textsuperscript{28} In 1980, the FBI regarded "Omega 7," anti-Castro Cubans, as the most dangerous terrorist group in the United States. To a certain extent, there has been a changing of the guard of terror groups operating in the United States. In addition, the New World Liberation Front which had been active, claimed responsibility for only one bombing during 1978. Since that time, little has been heard from this organization.\textsuperscript{29}
Special interest terrorist groups also remain a potential threat to US interests. Special interest groups are characterized by their focus on a specific cause or issue. Examples include groups who espouse the use of terrorism in order to advocate environmental issues or animal rights. In recent years, many criminal acts have been perpetrated against providers of abortion services. These include arson, extortion, bombing, stalking, and harassment. The Attorney General Guidelines (AGG) states that a domestic security/terrorism investigation may be initiated when facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that two or more persons are engaged in an enterprise for the purpose of furthering political or social goals wholly or in part through activities that involve force or violence and a violation of the criminal laws of the United States.\textsuperscript{30}

In Reid's 1994 account, there are other types of domestic terrorism that have caused greater concern in the United States and for which no adequate explanation has been articulated. For example, tampering with domestic products, and deaths resulting from consumption of cyanide-tainted aspirin and cyanide-laced soup in 1986. He also reminded Americans that although earlier deaths from cyanide-laced Tylenol capsules, resulted in new legislation for tamper-proof containers, this did not eliminate the possibility of becoming a victim of any kind of terrorist attack. In the fall of 1992, while driving on I-295 near Jacksonville, in North Florida, a woman was randomly shot in the head, receiving severe injuries that left her disabled. Other violent acts led to the American Automobile Association (AAA) to recommend to tourists that they avoid traveling through that area. These terrorist acts, had a
significant negative impact on the tourist trade in the state of Florida.\textsuperscript{31}

According to the FBI publication, \textit{Terrorism in the United States 1995}, there were 83 attacks by domestic terrorists in the United States from 1985-95, including fire bombings of fur stores and abortion clinics by the Animal Liberation Front and Anti-Abortion Groups, the February 26\textsuperscript{th} World Trade Center and the April 19\textsuperscript{th} Federal Building bombing. There were no terrorist acts on US soil in 1994 as shown in table 1 below. The FBI says tightened security measures rather than a downward trend explain the absence of terrorism in the US in 1994.\textsuperscript{32}

\begin{table}[H]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{ll}
\hline
Year & Number of Attacks \\
\hline
1985 & 7 \\
1986 & 25 \\
1987 & 9 \\
1988 & 9 \\
1989 & 4 \\
1990 & 7 \\
1991 & 5 \\
1992 & 4 \\
1993 & 12 \\
1994 & 0 \\
1995 & 1 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Terrorist Incidents in the United States: 1985-95.}
\end{table}

These show that many violent acts are random in nature, placing society under the threat of terroristic attacks, and illustrate the fact that terrorism victims are not limited to specific individuals.

The literature supporting domestic causes notably, Bassiouni 1975, and Gurr (1970), emphasizes governmental oppression and poor living conditions. Structural conditions incite terrorism. The key difference between international terrorism and domestic terrorism is the inclusion of a second international party as the scene, the target, or the origin. This key difference would mean that the second international party involved had something to do with the domestic structural determinants causing terrorism. This link is particularly difficult to make. Even if this link could be made, however, the relative deprivation hypothesis is a tricky one to measure and test.

Deterrence theory for domestic terrorism is mainly directed to physical security, as was seen during the 1996 Centennial Olympic Games here in Atlanta. In the future, greater efforts must be expended towards analyzing relationships between terrorist, terrorist groups, and terrorist operations, terrorist motives and intentions; why terrorists select particular targets. The terrorist problem is a real one. However, the voluminous literature on terrorist activity has largely focused on what terrorism is, and why democratic societies should be concerned about this particular form of violence. It is time to seriously deal with how the United States and the Olympic Committee can better develop its capabilities to avoid and, if required, manage domestic/international terrorist-induced crises.
International Terrorism

International terrorism consists of violent attacks by groups against more than one primary country, target or nationality. The attacks are directed against foreign targets as well, within or outside their own national borders. The victims of international terrorist attacks many times bear no relation to the prime target of the perpetrators. In these incidents the target may be of symbolic value to the assailants. Even though the terrorists may have large groups of sympathizers among the population in whose name they act, they choose to operate on foreign soil. The choice of operating abroad could be attributed to stiff security measures, to the inability to find safe bases in their home territory, the government’s control of the media, harsh punishments, travel restrictions and a variety of other reasons.


The apparent agreement on the issue of international terrorism at the United Nations (UN) began to disintegrate in 1972, when the United States introduced a Draft Convention for the Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism following the massacre at the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich, Germany. The
devastating reality created an atmosphere of awareness of the threat posed by political terrorism in the international arena. The former UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim raised the issue of terrorism in the General Assembly, prior to the introduction of the United States Draft Convention for the Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism in 1972. The failure of the efforts made by the Secretary General and the US delegation revealed a deep split in the United Nations opinion, centering around the distinction between "national wars of liberation" and "terrorism." The split is visible in the title of the first major investigation into terrorism by the UN resolution which led to:

measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms, and study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance, and despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical change.34

This resolution led to the creation of three committees to: 1) define terrorism, 2) examine the causes of terrorism, and 3) propose measures to prevent terrorism. The disagreement on the definition of terrorism split the UN into two groups - the US and the Arab and African states. The General Assembly saw no further progress on this issue until 1979, when the United States Embassy in Tehran, Iran, was occupied in November and American personnel were held hostage. The General Assembly passed two resolutions on 1) the Convention against the taking of Hostages and 2) the following year it adopted a Resolution on Measures to Enhance the Protection, Security, and Safety of Diplomatic and Consular Missions
and Representatives. Both resolutions require the extradition or prosecution of persons alleged to have hostages, and no "political offense exception" is allowed. Ratification of these measures has been spotty, indicating that although the General Assembly appreciates the importance of diplomatic inviolability, it cannot agree on how to compel states to provide adequate protection to diplomats. Because of the symbolic value attached to diplomatic missions and personnel, and the inability of the United Nations to enforce the host state's obligation to protect them, individual states have assumed the responsibility of protecting their diplomats and facilities overseas. The US government, for example, appropriated over $1 billion in 1984 to improve the physical security of its embassies and train staff to avoid terrorist attacks abroad.35

International terrorism as defined by the US Department of Justice is:

the unlawful use of force or violence, committed by a group(s) or individual(s), who is foreign based and/or directed by countries or groups outside the United States or whose activities transcend national boundaries, against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.36

The department maintained that, several international terrorist groups continue to maintain or increase their presence in the United States. These groups continue to infiltrate its members into the country by both legal and illegal means despite their pronounced hatred for the United States and its policies, because they perceived it as a rich environment for fundraising, recruitment, and proselytizing. A prime example of such a group which has been active in the United States is an Iranian terrorist group known as the "Mujahedin-E-Khalq" (MEK). This group is
foreign-based and its activities transcend national boundaries.\(^{37}\)

Laqueur 1977 viewed terrorism in terms of bombing, assassination, hijacking, and kidnapping. From these acts terrorism has become, he states, the most publicized form of political violence of our time. He documented this by examining political terrorism through the beginning of the anarchists of the 1880s, the left-wing clashes of the 1900s, the actions of Carlos, Black September, the Baader-Meinhof Gang, as well as the Molly Maguires. He then went on to discuss the sociology of terrorism: intelligence gathering, funding, weapons, tactics, counterterrorism methods, and the role of the media. Also included in the discussion were the actions/behaviors of terrorists. Laqueur, concluded that the democracies need to wait for public opinion to change before they can act decisively against terrorism.

William M. Landes 1978 analyzed the impact that metal detectors and sky marshals had on the level of international skyjackings. His basic findings were that aircraft hijackings dropped significantly after the implementation of the two intervention strategies named. Landes looked at skyjackings from 1961 to 1976 and found through the use of ordinary least squares regression that while skyjackings were the typical form of terrorism throughout the 1960s, their numbers dropped off significantly after 1973.\(^{38}\) In essence, aircraft hijackings are thought to have been virtually eliminated by metal detectors in airports and sky marshals on airplanes.

Landes' work stood alone for nearly ten years as the only systematic, statistical impact analysis on the impact of metal detectors, and expanding this type of work to include two other interventions aimed at thwarting terrorism. They also
added an analysis of terrorist substitution effects which had been initiated by research efforts by Sandler, Tschirtart and Cauley 1983, and Sandler and Scott 1987. The inclusion of substitution effects was important, for it sought to explain the inability of intervention measures to reduce the overall level of international terrorism.

Cauley and Im 1988, used Autoregressive and Moving Average (ARIMA) model and intervention analysis as described by McCleary and Hay 1980, to evaluate three specific anti-terrorist policies and the substitution phenomenon associated with these policies: (1) increased airport security screening, (2) increased security at US embassies and other diplomatic missions, (3) the institution of the UN convention on preventing crimes against diplomatic personnel, and (4) the substitution phenomenon that indicates that terrorists will substitute out of one mode of attack into another when government authorities crackdown on a particular mode.

Their findings can be summarized as follows. First, the metal detector intervention led to a permanent reduction in the number of hijackings, as found earlier by Landes. However, this reduction in hijackings was countered by an increase in other types of terrorist events. Therefore, the overall effectiveness of the imposition of hijackings is less clear, for it is not certain whether we are better or worse off with more non-hijacking attacks and fewer (but still some) hijackings.

The technological intervention of metal detectors, however effective, was the most effective of any of the measures tested. The imposition of tighter security
around US installations led to an immediate reduction in attacks which was not substituted for, but this reduction was merely temporary, that is, it had no long term effect. As for the 1977 UN convention, no significant effects were found on the level of terrorist attacks. Overall, anti-terrorist policies were not found to have much of a significant direct impact on the level of terrorism, nor did they have much of a deterrent effect on future levels of terrorism.

Enders, Sandler and Cauley 1990, entered the fray again to test for the effects of some of the same and some additional anti-terrorist interventions. Enders, Sandler and Cauley again used ARIMA modeling by McCleary and Hay 1980, to assess the immediate and long-run impact of (1) metal detectors, (2) a host of United Nations conventions and resolutions involving terrorist events (that is, crimes against protected persons including diplomatic agents, hostage taking and aerial hijackings), and (3) the United States bombing raid against Libya in 1986, on the level of international terrorism by specific category and for substitution effects.

Overall, their findings are similar to the earlier two works on intervention policies. Their results regarding the first two interventions are the same. The installation of metal detectors reduced all types of aerial hijackings. This impact was immediate and permanent, and terrorists appear to have substituted other kinds of hostage taking events for skyjackings in response to the metal detectors. They could also find no significant immediate or long-term impact derived from the seven UN conventions and resolutions regarding international terrorism that were tested. However, the unique contribution of the paper lies in its test of the US raid on
Libya—a test that had not been done before, and one that might shed an interesting, new set of lights on the debate between those who argue for military retaliation against terrorists and those who do not.

The findings on the raid on Libya are as follows. The retaliatory attack against Libya increased terrorist acts against the US and the UK in the short run. No long-term impact was found. Here the findings are both similar and contradictory to the findings on other policy interventions. They are similar in that the impact of the intervention was temporary, as was the case with the imposition of increased security measures around US missions. They are also similar in that there was no long-term impact as was the case with the US security measures and all of the UN resolutions. Yet the finding that the intervention policy led to an increase in international terrorism flies in the face of any and all intentions the policymakers had for the retaliation. This article then took the analysis of policy intervention to a new level by including offensive rather than just defensive measures, and showed that not only can policy be ineffective, but it can also be counterproductive.

This idea is tied to the fact that terrorism is a persistent local problem that needs attention, and that terrorist events tend to bring out strong emotional responses in people. These responses emanate not only from immediate victims, but targeted third party victims and beyond. In fact, a number of analysts represent this highly charged, emotional, negative reaction to terrorism. Wilkinson 1990, provides a colorful example:

Let us strip away the masks of terrorist illusions and expose the death-head of murder beneath. Terrorists are fond of using
romantic euphemisms for their murderous crimes. They claim to be revolutionary heroes yet that commit cowardly acts and lack the heroic qualities of humanity and magnanimity.\textsuperscript{40}

These analysts forward the notion that terrorism cannot be explained because explanation equals justification, and terrorism certainly could never be justified.\textsuperscript{41} This points out the fact that terrorism is often only viewed from one perspective, a perspective which allows for no explanation. If we are not to try to explain terrorism, but only to eradicate it, then there is little need for in-depth analysis.

Schreiber's 1978, views below are in agreement with the above statement. He maintained that terrorism is a politically motivated violence against the innocent, and is used as a weapon against the state. He worked to delineate between the political terrorist, the professional criminal and the fanatically insane. His examples of terrorism do not glamorize the cause, however, but show how it is inhuman, political and military in nature. He explored government fears and reactions to violence, the psychology of the terrorism and how the innocent victims react. He also discussed how they can become converted by their captors and grow to trust them and believe in them. Finally, Schreiber discussed issues that have hindered international control of terrorism: tighter security measures, failure to negotiate, media publicity, and the appropriate means to deal with the convicted terrorists. He concluded with the need to keep negotiations open with the terrorist as a means of dealing with the situation and to be hard on capture and punishment of the terrorist.
Clark 1980 analyzed the growth of terrorism and viewed the fact that American society is unable to defend itself in the event of terrorism. He explained this by evaluating what he called our extreme vulnerability in modern technology in the areas of nuclear power plants, water systems, liquefied natural gas, and computers. This was accomplished by evaluating terrorist attacks against these systems both in the United States and the world. Clark feels that these previous attacks were "trial runs" for greater and more devastating attacks in the future. This view is contrary to the opinion of many other authorities on terrorism, who believe the terrorist groups do not have the weapons or expertise to use them. Clark has shown how, through theft of weapons from facilities that are poorly guarded, these members can launch sophisticated terrorist attacks. Clark concluded with precedents of actions that our government has used in the past, and how these same actions can be employed with no danger to our fundamental rights.

In the State Department publication, Patterns of Global Terrorism - 1993, it considered the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York City as an act of international terrorism because of the political motivations that spurred the attack and because most of the suspects who have been arrested are foreign nationals, even though the FBI has no evidence that a foreign government was responsible for the bombing.42

The data on international terrorism show no clear trend up or down from 1988 through 1993, despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, which is now known to have provided more aid for terrorists than was hitherto recognized. Statistics for
1994 indicate a decline in the number of international terrorism, the lowest point in two decades. Most of the 321 documented terrorist incidents reported in six regions, were in the Middle East and Western Europe. Specific breakdown by region is as shown in table 2. The highest (115 incidents) were recorded in the Middle East, while the least (12 incidents) occurred in Eurasia indicating less tension in that region.

**Table 2**
Incidents in 1994 by Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Number of Incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eurasia</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In evaluating the types of incidents reported, it is noted that bombings and armed attacks were the most prevalent methods utilized. Not every incident reported was documented as to which group was involved.
State-Sponsored Terrorism

One of the most dangerous forms of terrorism is state-supported terrorism. In 1986, as indicated by Bremer 1989, the US State Department stated that Libya, Syria, and Iran were the most active practitioners of state-supported terrorism. Libya led the list by being involved in at least nineteen international terrorist attacks. The 1986 air strike on Libya's terrorist camps (which was Qadhafi's home) was the watershed event in the world's fight against terrorist-supported states. Qadhafi learned that his support for international terrorism would not be cost free, and he changed his behavior, which after all, was the objective of the US attack. Libya's involvement in terrorism, according to statistics, declined from nineteen incidents in 1986 to six in 1987 and another six in 1988.43

International terrorism would not have flourished as it has during the past few decades without the funding, training, safe-haven, weapons, and logistic support provided to terrorists by sovereign states. For this reason, the primary aim of the US counterterrorism policy has been to apply pressure to such states to cease and desist in that support and make them pay the cost if they persist. This is done publicly by identifying state sponsors and by imposing economic, diplomatic, and sometimes military sanctions. An important tool in this effort is the list of state sponsors of terrorism that developed from the counterterrorism provisions of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as revised by the Anti-terrorism and Arms Export Control Act of 1989. Here, seven nations are designated as states that sponsor international terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.44
The Department of Defense publication, *Strategic Assessment 1995*, summarized that cases of state sponsorship can be demonstrated, the US and the international community tend to respond vigorously against the offending government. It cited an example following a determination that the Iraqi government was responsible for an April 1993 plot to kill former President Bush during his visit to Kuwait, the US launched cruise missiles against the headquarters of the Iraqi intelligence service. In November 1993, in response to Tripoli's refusal to extradite suspects in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 and UTA Flight 772, the UN Security Council toughened the sanctions imposed on Libya in March 1992. The publication concluded that, terrorists who lack state sponsorship increasingly use criminal activities to finance their movements. For example, documents captured and defectors suggest that "Peru's Shining Path" collected tens of millions of dollars from the cocaine traffickers.45

According to Pope 1993, in the *Department's Efforts to Combat International Terrorism* publication, the basis of the US policy is to reduce and eventually eliminate the support which states provide to terrorist groups. Of the current state sponsors, Iran is seen as the major problem that faces the US because Iran's support for terrorism includes the threat to murder British author Salman Rushdie, its continued campaign to assassinate Iranian dissidents overseas, and its support for groups which seek to use violence against the Middle East peace process. He concluded with international collaborations in which governments have increasingly been willing to join in steps against state sponsors and the groups they support.
Some of his examples were 1). Operation Desert Storm when many countries joined in expelling or keeping under close security suspected Iraqi agents and imposing other security measures to thwart Iraqi's terrorist efforts, and 2). Most recently, the Italian extradition of Khalid Mohammed El-Jassem, a Palestinian terrorist, to the US to stand trial for offenses committed 20 years ago while a member of the notorious Black September Organization and his attempt to kill then Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and for planting an explosive at New York's JFK Airport.46

A review by Trager 1986 indicates that President Reagan signed a new policy directive authorizing a government-wide effort to combat international terrorism. The new policy was set forth in a document officially designated National Security Decision Directive 138. Designed to give the government an offensive instead of a purely defensive stance, the policy would enable the United States to launch preventive and retaliatory strides against terrorists abroad. Special emphasis was to be placed on improvement of intelligence operations and international cooperation to stop terrorists before they act. Legislation was being drafted by the Administration to implement the new policy.

Secretary of State George Schultz warned in a speech to the Trilateral Commission in Washington, D.C. April 3 that a "purely passive strategy" was no longer adequate in coping with the problem of international terrorism. It was time, he said, "that the nations of the West face up to the need for active defense against terrorism."47
The United States claims to repudiate international terrorism. This policy has been graphically demonstrated by the retaliatory 1986 air strike on Libya and the 1993 missiles launching on Iraq. The United States has also led in the support of political, economic and diplomatic sanctions imposed on states, that according to them, support terrorism. On the other hand, some argue that if the events of the US Iran-Contra scandal had happened in any other country, it would have been regarded as terrorism, and that the Gulf War was nothing but international terrorism on Iraq. In an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council in 1993 to expose what President Clinton called "Iraq's crime," he stressed that 1. "a firm and commensurate response was essential to protect the US sovereignty; to send a message to those engaged in state-sponsored terrorism." 2. to deter further violence against the US citizens and 3. "to affirm the expectation of civilized behavior among nations."48

In one of the arguments, Draper 1987, stated that the Iran-Contra affairs was a plot worked out by practiced conspirators who set up a shadow government within the Executive Branch of the US government; that is, to covertly and illegally exercise a governmental policy which negated the legitimate powers of Congress and violated the US Constitution. Many legal scholars agreed with him and define US-Junta operations as illegal-state terrorism. The Boland Amendment in October 1984 outlawed the CIA or any other agency or entity of the United States from providing any type of military support to the Nicaraguan contras (called "freedom fighters" by President Reagan).
Draper's article, "Rewriting the Iran-Contra Story," claims that top officials of the Executive branch of the US government conspired to overthrow an established constitutional rule of law with the help of former President Ronald Reagan. This intervention, according to him, was not only illegal but constituted terrorism.49

Typology on Causes of Terrorism

The classification of terrorist groups is an ominous task, tantamount in many respects to the elusive undertaking of defining terrorism. In the field of terrorism research, the most common typologies according to Schmid and Jongman et al., 1988, focus on the characteristics of either the actors or perpetrators. Some common theories regarding the cause of terrorism as examined by terrorist experts are on ideology of violence, some pursue mainly psychological motives, and others, political, and sociological motives.

The importance of Max Weber 1949, notion of "ideal-type" construct cannot be overstated. As a method of inquiry, developing ideal-types (organized into typologies) makes objective and replicable analysis possible. Although social reality involves a complex interaction of forces, and thus defies easy categorization, a coherent typology can form the basis for model and theory development.

Ideology of Violence and Historical Terrorism

An ideology to justify political violence (terrorism) emerged when Marx and Lenin saw revolutions as an inevitable consequence of social unrest. Marxist theory considered terrorism as suicidal, but regarded terrorist acts as acceptable parts of the final mass attack on the old structure. Lenin combated the influence of
anarchists and terrorists before the Russian Revolution. However, some ideas about anarchists and terrorism have reemerged since the 1960s. The National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice holds that revolutionary theory is based upon dissatisfaction with social and political life and a passionate belief that change can and should be effected.

Revolution, in a political sense, implies a forcible transfer of power from one social group to another. It is based on the premise that no class surrenders power to another without violence. Terrorism per se has no ideology for reference or rationalization. Where and when destructive and barbaric acts of terrorism are perpetuated with little prospect of military gain and with the likelihood of negative political results, it is proper to suspect psychopathology.

The "ideological" category is widely used in the field of terrorism research. The objective of groups that employ this form of terrorism is to radically transform the established institutions of a given society or country. To date, most of the terrorist typologies that emphasize political motivations of terrorist groups tend to focus on secular ideologies. Typically, many of them include categories of "left" oriented ideology. Many others, in addition to distinguishing among left-oriented groups, include categories of "right-wing" terrorism. Unfortunately, very few theorists have developed typologies that recognize the importance of religious motivation and ethnic-nationalist motivation as an explicit category of ideological terrorism. It is important to emphasize religious, secular and ethnic-nationalist ideologies as powerful motivators.
Non-state terrorism inspired by secular ideologies, particularly those that can be categorized as left-oriented (e.g., Marxist-Leninism and anarchism), has diminished significantly since the 1970s. In the United States, for example, there has been a decline from 129 incidents in 1975 to 17 in 1986.51 Similar trends can be found in many other parts of the world. This form of ideological terrorism is often associated with the student rebellions that occurred in the US and Western Europe during the 1960s and 1970s. The political objectives of these groups as stated by Burton 1976, were strongly influenced by radical theorists such as Marx and Bakunin, as well as more contemporary theorists such as Franz Fanon, Mao Tse Tung, Che Guevara, Marighella, Fidel Castro, and Herbert Marcuse.

Religious terrorism occurs when religious scripture or doctrine can be identified as the fundamental motivating and unifying factor. In Said's 1988, analysis of the preceding twelve years, religious violence in the Middle East has gained an enormous amount of media attention. Unfortunately, much of the commentary reflects a Western ideological bias.52 More sophisticated analysis focusing on the social and cultural norms and traditions is rare - even among researchers of terrorism. In this respect, Martin 1987 highlights the importance of ritual, symbol, and myth as pretexts for religious violence. Martin argues that the Muslim doctrine of Jihad is central to any explanation of Islamic terrorism. He pointed out that the concept of jihad invokes a broad semantic field that can provide a rationale for "holy war." As an Arabic verb, the term (specifically, jihad) denotes "striving in the path of God"; however, as a verbal noun it has two generally
accepted meanings: the lesser jihad (striving through warfare), and the greater jihad (striving through peaceful means). It is the notion of the lesser jihad that is used to justify armed struggle and terrorist violence.

When this doctrine is viewed within the context of structural and historical antecedents the phenomenon of Islamic terrorism becomes more comprehensible. Many Islamic fundamentalists consider the influence of Western culture to be a serious threat to the survival of their religious traditions and values. More specifically, European colonialism and its legacy of cultural and ideological hegemony have led to widespread bitterness and resentment among Muslims. For many fundamentalists the only alternative is to invoke a holy war. Although these elements alone are usually not sufficient conditions to precipitate a violent jihad. A thorough understanding of Salmon Rushdie’s controversial novel *Satanic Verses* published in 1988 will show that historically specific events, as well as political manipulation, can be a decisive factor. Rushdie’s satirical depiction of the Koranic text infuriated many Muslims as it was perceived as outrageously blasphemous.\(^{53}\)

A type of terrorism often associated with ethnic-based secessionist movements is defined as ethnic nationalist terrorism.\(^{54}\) Discriminatory practices directed at an identifiable ethnic group can produce the bitterness and frustration that leads to political violence. These practices can involve religious freedom, educational policy, resources allocations, and political opportunities. First, as explained by Crenshaw 1981, there is a perception within the minority group that specific social, political or economic injustices exist. This is followed by a sense of
frustration over the inability to resolve those grievances through conventional non-violent means. Samuel P. Huntington views the process of modernization as a means of ending the isolation of various ethnic groups. While the breakdown of the polarization of a society along ethnic lines may be beneficial to social stability, the breakdown of the ethnic borders may also lead to some serious negative effects.

As noted by Kirk 1983, all of these approaches concentrate on the terrorist as a purely ideological creature: fighting repression, fighting the West, fighting (however subjectively perceived) injustice. The idea that terrorism is a political tool that can be used in a rational context is simply avoided.

Political Objectives

At the heart of terrorism is the notion of political violence. Terrorism falls within a gray area -- an area within which political violence is in some cases justified, and in other cases not justified. Mention the word “terrorism” or “terrorist” to almost any individual, and a set of images or concepts fills that person’s thoughts. Terrorism strikes not only the immediate victim of the act, and not only the potential third party involved (that is, the party the terrorist is trying to influence); terrorism touches almost everyone’s life in the sense that the notions of terrorism and the imagery of terrorists can easily be brought to the fore in people’s minds. This fact stands out in typical knowledge about politics in the general public. A variety of surveys show how little factual knowledge Americans have about their political system, yet they can easily conjure up ideas and pictures of terrorists.

The baseline premises of political violence theories of terrorism’s cause are
viewed as rational actors who use terrorist means in response to objective political economic and/or social conditions existing at the level of the nation, state or the global power structure. This, of course, is the orientation toward the topic that terrorists themselves clearly favor, terrorists almost invariably citing "objective" political conditions as their reason for engaging in terrorist acts. This rationalist viewpoint depicts terrorism "as politics pursued by other means," rather than conventional and/or legitimate struggle or social protest.

Frantz Fanon's 1963 work, *The Wretched of the Earth*, is considered by some as the most powerful and influential piece of literature written in the past years supporting the use of violence for political purposes. As stated by Earnest Evans: "Clearly Fanon has had a major impact on contemporary revolutionary ideology. His writing has increased the acceptability of the strategy of terrorism." Fanon's work provided the most explicit rationale for terrorist violence, arguing that violence against the colonizer binds colonized peoples together as a group and has a cleansing effect on the individual - "it frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect." Fanon believed violence has these beneficial effects even if it is only symbolic; that is, even if it is not required in the political and military conflict for de-colonization. Jean-Paul Satre 1963 endorsed this view in his preface to Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth*:

...the rebel's weapon is the proof of his humanity. For in the days of the revolt you must kill: to shoot down a European is to kill two birds with one stone, to destroy an oppressor and the man he oppresses at the same time."
Terrorists tend to generalize this attitude to all political contexts, claiming that they are justified in resorting to terroristic violence because states are guilty of using these tactics. Like Sature, terrorists do not distinguish between security forces and the citizenry as targets for violence. There are no innocents. The writing of individuals like Fanon has acted as a guide and source of inspiration for those seeking to change their position through the use of violence.

Eddie 1986 explained that political scientists have great concern over political violence which they define as terrorism. The basic models utilized in studying terrorist groups support the theory that violence has been resorted to by both men and women of various social backgrounds and motivations. Political goals of terrorist groups may range from independence from certain geographical areas to worldwide revolution. Many groups seek to overthrow governments and replace them. Terrorists seek to overthrow these governments by terrorizing the populace through repeated acts of violence to demonstrate their governments' inability to protect citizens.

The terrorists' political scenario contends that the citizens will pressure the government to restore order; and the government, fearing for its continued existence, will overreact, suspending many basic rights and freedoms and oppressing the people. The people will then begin to adopt the terrorists' view that the government is corrupt, repressive and impotent.

The resort to terrorism is a calculated choice by the terrorists who find other forms of political activity to be either unavailable or ineffective.61
Psychological Theories

The research concentrating on psychology notably Crenshaw 1988 and Wilkinson 1990, stems from the notion that terrorism is completely abnormal behavior and must, therefore, be the result of disturbed minds. Terrorists cannot perceive reality and they cannot understand that their acts achieve little. They act because they delude themselves into thinking that their violence is justified. Meaning that, we would not be confronted with terrorism if these kinds of people did not exist. Within the relevant body of literature there is a discovery of a likely candidate in the work of other psychologists and psychiatrists who place their analytical focus upon the individual motivations of terrorists whom they characterize as a set of persons suffering from one or more psychological disorders.

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the widely-respected criminologist, Cesare Lombroso, developed theories that saw all forms of criminal behavior including terrorism, as the natural consequence of psychological factors. Lombroso's initial work concentrated upon the influence of genetic inheritances and to the assertion that some individuals are born criminals. In her review of the literature in 1983, Dr. Anne Romano pointed out that "the concepts of the Lombrosian School were later disapproved by Goring. However the conviction that criminals have biological defects has continued on." Introducing his readers to psychological theories of the causes of terrorism, Schmid contends:

If it is assumed that nonviolent behavior in society is normal, those who engage in violence, criminal or other, are necessarily
'abnormal' deviating from the rules of society. An outflow of this assumption are the many theories which regard the terrorist as a peculiar personality with clear identifiable character traits.\(^{64}\)

This assumption frequently takes the form of a contention that many, if not all, terrorists are subject to psychopathologies of various kinds, that they are in colloquial terms, "crazy." Directly countering Sterling's view, psychoanalyst Abraham Kaplan has opined, "an international network of terror is less an organizational reality than the pervasiveness of a psychopathology."\(^{65}\) Referring to elaborate initiation rites common to Western-based terrorist groups and their satanic symbolism, Kaplan continues along these lines to assert that "the Baader-Meinhof group is not very different in the causes and consequences of their actions whether their reasons, from the Manson family."\(^{66}\)

On the contrary, Hacker 1980, and other writers point out that some terrorists believe that society is sick and does not recognize the gravity or nature of its illness. The terrorists, accordingly, are also convinced that they can affect the cure. Psychological theories that perceive terrorist groups as motivated by psychological influences include: rebelling against authority (adult frustration), guilt feelings (conscious formation), the heartfelt need to change existing systems (frustration), that the behavior patterns of these reformers include aggression and violence. The research on the media and liberal, democratic societies as causes of terrorism builds on the psychological causes according to Alali and Eke 1991, Martin 1990, and Schaffert 1992. This research sees terrorists as purely publicity seekers. The
media plays into terrorists' wants by covering terrorist events. Liberal, democratic societies further play into terrorists' desires by being easily accessible along with having a basically uncontrolled media. Media cause terrorism because they indirectly give terrorists what they want, and democracies cause terrorism because they do not have enough control over the various segments of society.

**Sociological Theories**

Many of the same causes covered under the heading of political violence have similar sociological and psychological explanations of why terrorism occurs. Sociological approaches to the causes of terrorism can be roughly distinguished from those of other social sciences in that they focus upon the perceptions of groups or collectives of persons prone to violent behavior when viewing the objective conditions of the world they inhabit. The sociological approaches also provide a bridge for the interactions that take place within these groups and between them, on the one hand, and their perceived external environment, on the other. In this sense sociological approaches draw from a political conflict model and psychological interpretations while adding key bridging concepts such as group perceptions and interactions, as well as such concepts as culture, institutions and social structure.

When Irving Horowitz says that, "terrorism is primarily a sociological phenomenon," one cannot help but think that his experience as a sociologist has predisposed Horowitz toward this conclusion. Demographically, according to Russell and Miller 1977, the typical urban terrorist is young, normally falling in the
age group of twenty-two and twenty-four years old. Terrorism is in their words, a predominantly male phenomenon since almost all significant terrorist operations (well over 80 percent) were directed, led and executed by males. Although, women are prominent in certain West German and Japanese groups; on the whole the typical terrorist organization is led by males, females accounting for less than twenty percent of its body and being largely limited to support/ancillary roles such as maintenance of safe houses. This pattern is far more pronounced in right-wing terrorist organizations and Latin American-based groups than in left-wing, West European outfits. For both men and women alike, marital status is single. As Russell and Miller explain:

   The unmarried terrorist is still the rule rather than the exception. Requirements for mobility, flexibility, initiative, security and total dedication to a revolutionary cause all preclude encumbering family responsibilities and normally dictate single status for virtually all operational terrorist cadres. Statistics regarding arrested or identified terrorists in Latin America, Europe, the Middle East and Asia reflect over 75-80 percent of the individuals involved were single.

In terms of their vital statistics then, terrorists are generally young adult, unmarried males. In conjunction with their finding that the vast majority of urban terrorists come from metropolitan areas and normally operate within the cities of which they are long-term residents, Russell and Miller summarized that many terrorist cadres and leaders are of "middle-class or even upper-class background."

The Terrorist Personality

Parry 1976 cites what Dr. Lawrence Freeman called the likely characteristics of the typical terrorist personality:
(a) First, many cases of abnormality can be traced to unhappy child-hoods, the effects of illegitimacy or broken homes. Other instances of what appears to be comfortable and placid child-hood and adolescence, upon close examination reveal the protest against real or perceived domination or inadequacy of the parents.

(b) Second, the terrorist has a desire to submerge his individuality into a group. The group is a refuge for the individual’s impotence and irresponsibility.

(c) Third, the terrorist seeks an ambivalent closeness to his victim. The terrorist is recognized and even the most powerful figures must reason with him.

(d) Finally, there is a kind of terrorist sacrament. The terrorist obliterates an image of himself when he strikes out at his victim. Parry stated that terrorists are motivated by their desire to reaffirm their masculinity and self-image. In most cases, terrorists are a result of an unhappy or broken home. Emma Goldman described terrorists as psychopaths who derived from a society that has been cruel, relentless, and inhuman.

But Walter Laquer is extremely skeptical about any one comprehensive explanation of the cause of terrorism; or that a scientific socio-political theory is even in reach; or that it is possible for scholars to agree on a definition of “terrorism.”

Terrorist ideology and psychology suggest that certain characteristics emerge in the typical terrorist. Without a surprise, these characteristics are often attributed to adolescence. According to Kidder 1987, the typical terrorist displays the following characteristics: 1. Frustration: Pent up concerns about an individual’s ability to change society. Terrorists have no patience and are totally absorbed in
their cause. **II. Oversimplification of Issues:** Terrorists often reduce complex issues to "black and white." The terrorist live out a "fantasy war," convinced that he has broad support from numerous like-minded followers; **III. Utopianism:** Many terrorists seem to believe that a near perfect future lies ahead, once the present order is destroyed; **IV. Social Isolation:** Terrorists are often lonely and the terrorist group is often the first family they have ever known; **V. Willingness to Kill:** (The cold-bloodedness of some terrorists is startling). The last characteristic is indicative of a harsh oversimplification that allows killers to see victims simply as objects - a state of mind observed from Nazi killers during the massacre of Jews in World War II. Researchers have noticed, however, that captors who hold hostages for protracted periods tend to develop a kind of bond with them that makes cold-blooded murder less likely.72

In light of all this, it is apparent that attempts to pinpoint the causes of terrorism and to develop a theory of terrorism from them have not yet yielded conclusive results.

**Olympic Games Historical Overview**

The Olympic Games were established in the spring of 1896, mostly through the efforts of a French sportsman - Baron Pierre de Coubertin. They have continued every four years from that time, but not without political contentions. In the 1936 Games held in Berlin, Germany, Adolph Hitler refused to recognize Black American Jesse Owens, who won four gold medals. The 1972 Games held in Munich, West Germany were marred by the murder of the eleven Israeli athletes
and West German policemen who were killed by members of an Arab guerilla organization. In 1976, the Games were held in Montreal, Quebec, Canada. The host Canadian government refused to allow the Taiwanese team to carry its flag or have its national anthems played, whereupon, the Taiwanese promptly withdrew. In 1980, the United States refused to participate in the Games held in Moscow, Russia to protest the invasion of Afghanistan and in 1984, the Russians refused to participate in the Los Angeles, California Games, allegedly for lack of security.

The security measures in operation during the past three Summer Olympic events (Munich, West Germany; Los Angeles, California and Barcelona, Spain Games) serve as a backdrop to the 1996 Atlanta, Georgia Centennial Summer Olympic Games.

**Munich, West Germany**

The Germans had a basic event management plan prior to the Munich Summer Games, but no detailed counterterrorism measures in place. Furthermore, they lacked special trained hostage negotiation teams. Additionally, security personnel had been employed without proper screening measures.

Explaining the events resulting in the death of the Israeli hostages at the Munich Airport, Binder 1972, in his article, reported that the athletes were killed in a shoot out between the Arab gunmen, policemen and soldiers. The article explained how, in the final moments, an Arab terrorist threw a grenade into a helicopter in which the athletes were bound hand and foot, making escape impossible for any of the hostages. Binder's account went on to explain that at least one of the guerrillas
was an employee of the Olympic village, possibly more, therefore allowing the terrorists access to and knowledge of the compound.73 In his second article titled: "German Term Action Necessary," Binder discussed how the German police defended their action to open fire on the Arab terrorists, thus leading to the eventual death of the Israeli athletes. The police, according to the article, claimed that there were only five terrorists, and that they believed they could control the situation by attempting to kill the terrorists and free the hostages. They had already decided against storming the Olympic Village, and attempting to isolate the guerrillas was too risky. The article concluded with a brief description of the events leading up to the tragedy.74

Other articles for example, "Guerrillas in Cairo" claimed that the Black September Organization took responsibility for the attack on the Israeli athletes and that they were prepared to kill themselves rather than be taken captive if their demands were not met.75 "Horror and Death," another article, discussed the deaths of the Olympic athletes in Munich. It explained how a feeling of euphoria had spread during the early part of the Olympics because everything was going so well. The only problem was from the media that complained about the absence of press security at the Olympic Village. Due to those complaints, the security around the village was reduced to accommodate the press, thus opening the way for the terrorists. The ironic note was that the Israelis had requested and been assured that special security from the West Germans was going to be in force. The article also discussed how the terrorists took the hostages, the negotiations and the
subsequent deaths of the hostages. It concluded by explaining how the German plan to rescue the hostages from the terrorists failed.\textsuperscript{76}

In yet another article, Schrieber 1972, in detailing the activities in the Israeli compound at the Olympic Games, explained that the security measures of the 1936 Games were relaxed in order to provide a friendlier atmosphere for the guests and dignitaries since the previous hosting of the Games had been in 1936, during severe political times. The report stated that higher security and increased security personnel should have been provided for the Israeli athletes. The report concluded with the confused negotiations with the terrorists involved at the airport which failed. Why the attempted rescue failed was not explained.\textsuperscript{77}

In an attempt to completely describe how the Black September members got past the compound guards at the Olympic Village and burst into the rooms of the Israelis, taking nine hostages and killing two, the "Terror at the Olympics" article\textsuperscript{78} described the negotiations with the terrorists; their move to the airport, and the subsequent shoot-out.

It was initially reported to Israel that the hostages were safe when, in fact, they had already been killed. The German rescue plan, approved by Israel, was inept and doomed from the start because of the inadequate manpower, but no suggestions were made on how the plan could have been improved.

In the "Terrorist International" article, it shows that evidence of growing terrorist activity prior to the Munich raid was presented. Links between groups such as the PFLP, the United Red Army, and others had been noted in increasing
numbers in months prior to the Games. The article discussed how the mobility of the terrorists was possible through foreign embassies, underground, and sympathetics to the cause.  

O'Ballance 1979 in a report on terrorism in the Middle East, explained how the terrorists who captured and killed the Israeli athletes were able to escape detection; how they obtained false documents such as passports and identification; how they managed to go through security scanners with grenades hidden on their bodies; and where they got their equipment and money.

The Munich Olympics, according to Edgar Best, left some legacies. Edgar Best, the director of security for the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee (LAOOC) and former special agent who ran the FBI's Los Angeles office, concluded that one legacy is that security planning will never be the same for the Olympic Games. He noted that the police in Munich did not have the ability to deal with that kind of a confrontation. Another legacy he added, is that since that time, Western countries have developed crack anti-terrorist forces to address such problems.

Los Angeles, California Olympics

Before 1984 the Olympics were last held in Los Angeles back in the Great Depression Summer of 1932, and nowhere in the final report on those Games was the word "security" mentioned. But months before the 1984 Summer Games, the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee (LAOOC) headquarters focused a greater part of their planning on security. Johnston (1984) described the serious attitude taken towards security. The reason for such an approach is traceable to
the 1972 Olympic tragedy in Munich, West Germany.

Ostler 1981 claims the 1984 Olympics faced not only terrorism, but racial and possible "other" problems because: (1) the United States supported the South African apartheid policy by letting its teams participate in sports; (2) the black business community in Los Angeles was not included in the Olympics' "business area"; (3) South Central Los Angeles, where the Coliseum is located, was weaker in socioeconomic conditions than it was during the 1965 Watts Riots; and (4) many foreign governments, including Russia, called for a location change for the 1984 Olympics because South Africa was allowed to play there. The article concluded that more than 50 Third World countries were concerned with the foregoing issues.81

Reich 1981, in his article "Politics Again to Dominate Olympics," revealed that during the 11th Olympic Congress, the Soviets did not appear to have "forgiven and forgotten" the United States' boycott of the 1980 Olympics in Moscow. They had lodged protests as to the housing arrangements at the University of California at Los Angeles, and they requested changes in site due to the South African rugby team's appearance in the United States. In his article, "African Threat to Olympics," Reich reiterated the concerns of the 11th Olympic Committee that Russia would cause disruptions in the planning of the 1984 Los Angeles Games. However, some Committee members, he reported, warned that further problems could develop later, depending on how the Reagan Administration handled the South Africans in the future.82
Another study in "Protesters Greet Springboks in New York" 1981, found that 50 protestors chanted as the South African rugby team arrived in the United States. Several cities cancelled scheduled games and New York Mayor Erastus Dornin, II, was asked to cancel a match for fear it would spark a boycott by black nations of the 1984 Games. 83

**Barcelona, Spain Olympics**

By way of background factors pertaining to security measures taken at the Barcelona Olympic Games, the writer will begin with a brief summary of political events precluding the games. Shively 1993 discussed the changes in Spain's government from a fascist to a democratic state. In 1976, King Juan Carlos and his conservative Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez put a democratic constitution before the people of Spain in a referendum. The referendum was important because it added the legitimacy of popular approval to the democracy. She noted that the new democracy was plagued by disorganized party conflict in the parliament, together with a rising campaign of terrorism by Basque nationalists. The terrorists' targets were primarily the officers of the police and the army, which added to the tension because those institutions were potentially dangerous if they became disenchanted with the new system. In 1982, a moderate socialist, Felipe Gonzalez, became Prime Minister. His long, not very radical rule, helped to calm fears of the "Reds" and laid the civil war to rest. Considerable power of self-government was developed by the regions. Spain became a member of the European Community in 1986, integrating it into a democratic organization of democratic states. Spain now
appears to have successfully established a stable base for democracy.  

Revell 1992, in his article "Security Planning for the 1992 Olympics" reviewed security measures taken to protect the 1992 Summer Olympic Games. He discussed the threat of terrorism during the Barcelona Games as emanating from two distinct levels with the most likely scenario involving existing terrorist organizations that had been active within the Iberian Peninsula over the past decade. Such domestic threats which caused Spanish authorities greatest concern were from the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) and a somewhat smaller group, the October First Anti-Fascist Resistance Group (GRAPO), and two other terrorist organizations - Catalonia Separatist Group known as Terra, Lliure and the Guerrilla Army of the Free Galician People. In his outline of the planning and organizational structure of the Games, the operational organization, Olympic facts and figures, security arrangements and the general coordination of the security program as a whole, Revell concluded that the urgency and the importance of the security planning process was made abundantly clear to the IACP delegation, that is, when two terrorist incidents were carried out during the Olympic delegation's visit - the first was a car bomb detonated by the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) group, killing two Barcelonian police officers, a tow truck driver and wounding a number of bystanders.

The second incident was the bombing of public buildings by the October First Anti-Fascists Resistance Group (GRAPO). Although there were no injuries, property damage was substantial. These two incidents caused the Spanish police to go an
extraordinary length to ensure that the Barcelona Olympics were safe and secure because the authorities were very anxious for all guests at the Olympics to feel safe, secure and confident to move about without fear.86

According to Martz 1996, "The traditional answer to the question of Olympic Security has been low-tech," concluding that, the 1972 Olympics in Munich, Germany, the 1988 Seoul Games, Barcelona in 1992, demonstrated that security measures planning should not place too much emphasis on uniform security, but rather on electronic security measures. He proposed such actions to the Atlanta Olympic Security Planning Committee. Finally, he pointed out that too much security in the form of uniform personnel during previous Games would detract from the freedom, spirit and enjoyment of the athletics events.87

Summary

The literature review demonstrated that violence has always been commonplace in politics and international relations. Terrorism is a pejorative term. As so often occurs with terms that become routinized with overuse, the concept of terrorism, while widely understood, seems to evade a universally accepted definition. If one side in a dispute succeeds in attaching the terrorist label to its adversary, it gains an important psychological, political and material advantage.

Certain states have utilized the definition and nature of terrorism as part of their own political and psychological campaigns against political opposition. Some countries label those who engage in violent acts against the regime as terrorists. For instance, Britain applies the term to the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and Israel
regard all Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) acts as terroristic. The Jews in
Palestine during and after World War II utilized terroristic attacks against the Arabs
and the English in establishing the state of Israel. Every sovereign state reserves
to itself the political and legal authority to determine what is and what is not
terrorism in the context of its domestic and foreign affairs.

For the purpose of this study, "terrorism" is defined as violent, criminal
behavior designed primarily to generate fear in the community, or in a substantial
segment of the community, for political purposes. When such behavior impinges on
the consciousness and concerns of the entire nation, then the nation becomes the
community in the definition. Domestic terrorism is such behavior carried out by
indigenous population elements. International terrorism is such behavior carried out
in the United States by foreign groups or abroad by indigenous population
elements. In the context of this study, international terrorism is terrorism designed
to affect unfavorably the security interests of the United States. Criminal acts so
orchestrated as to threaten the stability of the 1996 Olympic Games and the safety
of allies of the United States, thereby affecting adversely the security interest of the
United States, are classified as terrorism.

In this chapter, the selected review of the pertinent literature analyzes and
compares other studies as they are related to the roles of the various agencies in
the management of major scheduled events such as the Olympic Games. Also,
literature concerning terrorism and the Olympic Games at Munich, in 1972, Los
Angeles in 1984, and Barcelona in 1992, were noted. Little information was found
concerning the security precautions and actions taken in case of terrorism against
members of the athletic teams and the diplomats at the Games. Christopher
Caldwell, summarized the 1996 Olympic Games as annoying because the entire
presentation has been to turn an event that is nationalistic, competitive and cruel
into an event that is egalitarian, sweet and easygoing. That commercialism, "has
fostered the most extreme anti-competitive squeamishness at the Olympic
Games."\textsuperscript{88}

In general, the current literature reflects wide disagreement among scholars
on the proper definition of "terrorism." Various interpretations and governments'
perspectives have generated numerous definitions reflecting their perceptions and
political stances. Clearly, the lack of consensus among governments, as well as
different non-governmental entities, indicates that the heart of the problem in
defining "terrorism" is not value free. The confusion in interpreting the phenomenon
is increased by numerous variables incorporated with violence. Physical violence is
only one of the modes creating terrorism.

The destructive effects of all forms of terrorist actions such as threat,
bombing, kidnapping, assassination, coercion and repression are damaging to
social stability. Variables like political aims, strategy, motivation, criminal acts,
intent and victimization also contribute to disrupt civil order. Psychological
destabilization caused by fear, anxiety, mental distress and psychological
manipulation bring social, economic and political pressures.

Moreover, some analysts of terrorism do not believe in a "causal" theory of
terrorism; terrorism is an unstoppable, random blight on both domestic and international society that simply must be dealt with. Again, these theories tend to be very general in nature, and also very vague. They are not derived in any formal manner and do not get to the level of being able to describe the variance of group behavior within any given system. The literature, generally, is quite diverse and contradictory. Overall, one can see how these various theoretical approaches hold a kernel of truth. Yet none of these approaches lead to the kind of overreaching theory that can tie various acts of terrorism as caused by A, B, and C, but we cannot tell you when and where or how often terrorists will strike; we only know terrorism appears to exist for these reasons.

In brief, any non-governmental entity (individual or group) who applies violent means such as physical or psychological, directed beyond the immediate target, is considered a terrorist and will be addressed as such in this study.

This literature review serves as a guide in the analysis of the Atlanta Olympic Games as an example of major scheduled event planning; that is, the strength and weaknesses of this Games' planning. Chapter III will include the structure and functions of selected United States government agencies, security protection units and antiterrorism programs; examples are the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department of State (DOS) and other auxiliary agencies. It will also discuss their strengths and weaknesses in their role-play.
Endnotes:


2Lieutenant colonel F.V. Morrone is a retired Executive with the New Jersey State Police, Director of Investigation, Gramma International, Ltd., West Atlantic City, New Jersey. He sees joint investigations as centering on the global problem of terrorism.

3Explosives were found in Kikumura’s vehicle and he was later identified as a member of the Japanese Red Army, which has been credited with numerous bombings and acts of terrorism throughout the world. Other suspected intended targets were military recruiting offices and New York City business centers. New Jersey residents were shocked to learn that acts of terrorism could occur on American soil.


6Ibid.

7Brian Jenkins, a security analyst for Kroll Associates, an international investigative and consulting firm, refuted what experts said concerning “mantra.” He argued that both experts and planners know, that no city in America is immune from terrorism, and that, the threat today is higher than it has ever been.

8Robert Heibel a former deputy chief of counter-terrorism for the FBI, helped to coordinate security for the FBI at the 1988 Games in Seoul. He compared the security measures during the Los Angeles Games in 1984, that the security organizers were concerned about domestic terrorist groups advocating independence for Puerto Rico. But that the international terrorists and right-wing militias did not show up on the security organizers radar screens as a major threat.


19 Ibid., 4.


21 Ibid., 339.


24. J. Wallace LaPrade, former head of the FBI’s New York Office, testimony as a defense witness at the trial of former FBI officials, W. Mark Felt and Edward S. Miller, the bureau’s number 2 and 3 men respectively, October 21, 1980. For further details see “Trial of Ex-FBI Men Told Break-Ins Were Approved.” The Washington Post, 22 October, 1980, sec. A, p. 15.


27. Ibid., 10.

28. The Jewish Committee of Concern claimed responsibility for arson or fire bombing attacks on the residence of five Egyptian nationals. The Jewish Armed Resistance, which was active in the New York City area, claimed credit for five bombings or fire bombings in 1978. Webster, Second International Symposium in 1978, op. Cit., 5.

29. Intersearch, 3, no. 5, 17 March 1980, 1. Also, in 1978, anti-Castro Cuban accounted for the second largest number of terrorist incidents in the United States. Two of their more prominent Omega 7 acts included the October 1978 bombing of a sporting goods store across from Madison Square Garden in protest of the appearance of the Cuban boxing team, the December 1978 bombing of the Cuban Mission and the Lincoln Center Concert Hall, both in New York. The latter incident was in protest to a performance of Cuban musicians. In March 1979, this organization planted a bomb in a TWA baggage terminal. Webster, Second International Symposium in 1978, op. cit., 5.


In contrast with the failure of the General Assembly to deal effectively with the general question of international terrorism at its 27th session, it did succeed at its 28th session in adopting a Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents (Resolution 3034 [XXVIII] of November 2, 1972 and (Resolution 3166 [XXVIII] of December 14, 1973. The adoption in both the Sixth Committee and the Assembly was by consensus.

In his thesis "International Terrorism: Rationalization, Retaliation, and the Reagan Shift," explained that the only reason he can imagine that the finding might shock policy makers, or seem counter intuitive to them, is their willingness to conceptualize the possible tit-for-tat behavior of a non-state actor. He sees violence leading to more violence as completely logical; in that, this logic is more believable than the punishment-leads-to-less-terrorism logic, which is why he theorized about state violence being the taste cue for non-state actor violence.


Paul L. Bremer III, Ambassador at Large for Counter-terrorism, statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 9, 1989, addressed a
variety of topics. Some of these, including the "U.S. Policy: How Is It Working?"
For a clear and comprehensive counter-terrorist policy and how it is working see the
Department of State Bulletin (May 1989), 75-76.


46 Laurence Pope, "Department's Efforts to Combat International Terrorism,"
Dispatch, April 26 (1993), 299-301.

47 Oliver Trager, "Fighting Terrorism: Negotiation or Retaliation" (New York:

48 President Clinton address to the nation on "US Response to Attack by Iraqi
Government." The background statement on Iraq/Bush plot was released by the
White House. Office of the Press Secretary (Washington, D.C. June 26, 1993),
see the State Department Dispatch, 473-474.

49 Theodore Draper, "Rewriting the Iran-Contra Story." His article claims that
top officials of the Executive Branch of the US Government conspired to overthrow
an established constitutional rule of law with the help of former President Ronald

50 For example, Milbank (1976) distinguishes between anarchist and other
"Marxist-based" groups.

51 Ted Gurr, "Political Terrorism in the United States." In The Politics of

52 Edward Said, "Identity, Negation and Violence." New Left Review, 179
(October, 198), 46-60.

53 Andrew Phillips, "The Satanic Furor," Maclean's, 102 (February, 1989),
16-19.

54 Ethnicity refers to any distinctive cultural attribute, such as race, religion,
language, and custom.

55 Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism." Comparative Politics, 13
(July, 1988), 379-396.


65 Abraham Kaplan, "The Psychodynamics of Terrorism," Terrorism, 1, no. 3-4 (1978), 244.

66 Ibid., 252.


69 Ibid., 21-23.

70 Ibid., 25.


73 D. Binder, A 23-hour drama: 2 others are slain in their quarters in guerrilla raid. New York Times, 6 September, 1972, Part 1, 12.


76 Horror and Death at the Olympics." Time, 18 September, 1972, 22-30.


78 "Terror at the Olympics." Newsweek, 18 September, 1972, 24-32.

79 The Terrorist International." Newsweek, 18 September, 1972, 3-4.


85 Oliver B. Revell, the FBI Special Agent in Charge in Dallas, Texas was the Barcelona Olympic Games Terrorism Committee Chairman visited Barcelona on September 15-18, 1991, with other delegates to review and provide insights on security preparations being made by Spanish authorities and others for the 1992
Olympic Games.


CHAPTER III
THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE COUNTERTERRORISM PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES

A number of plane crashes and terrorist acts a few months prior to the 1996 Centennial Olympic Games in Atlanta (during an election year) paraded counterterrorism legislation: example, the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building in spring 1995. Any such legislation would require citizens to yield some of their constitutional rights of privacy and freedom of movement, especially at the airport.

A Congressional conference report on the House and Senate antiterrorism measures bill (S735 - H Rept 104-518) which resulted, is designed to give federal law enforcement agencies significant new tools to battle domestic and international terrorism, including expanded jurisdiction over crimes linked to terrorism and an increased power to keep foreign terrorists from entering, or raising funds in the United States. The designed new tools are to prevent, prosecute and punish domestic and international terrorism, as well as restrict death row appeals.\(^1\) House and Senate negotiators settled on the final terms of the bill on April 15, 1996. The Senate adopted the conference report, 91-8 and the House followed suit on April 18, 1996, 293-133 clearing the bill for signing by the President.\(^2\)
The United States has over thirty agencies, departments and offices involved in executing some form of security program, related to terrorism. It is beyond the scope of this paper to outline the structure, functions and duties of all of these institutions. Organizations having major impact on United States' security policy, as utilized during the 1996 Centennial Olympics in Atlanta in preventing terrorist acts are discussed.

For the past two decades, antiterrorism efforts of the United States government have focused primarily on international terrorism. Even though this study deals with security during the 1996 Atlanta Summer Olympic Games, a brief description of how the United States manages international and domestic terrorist threats in general is necessary to provide a perspective of the United States antiterrorist programs.

This chapter deals with essential background information pertinent to two key presidential decisions that gave impetus to the United States antiterrorist program; describes the existing program and its organizational structure; discusses jurisdictional responsibilities; and outlines the role of supporting agencies.

**Historical Developments**

In the early 1970s, the tragedies at the Munich Olympic, the epidemic of kidnappings in Latin America, and the murder of two US diplomats in the Sudan, underscored the harsh reality of modern-day terrorist violence for the United States. The above incidents radically altered the United States' attitude and response toward terrorist acts. Thus, in September 25, 1972, late President Richard M. Nixon
acting on the recommendations of the two study committees headed by Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco and Deputy Secretary of State William Macomber, signed a Presidential Memorandum establishing a Cabinet Committee and Working Group to Combat Terrorism. According to Nixon, this was to consider "the most effective means to prevent terrorism here and abroad."\(^3\)

The established Cabinet Committee was chaired by the Secretary of State William Rogers, whose full membership included Secretaries of the Departments of Defense, Treasury, and Transportation, the Attorney General, the US Ambassador to the United Nations, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Assistant to the President for National Security and Domestic Affairs Advisors. During the Cabinet Committee's first and only meeting on October 2, 1972, it was decided that the Committee would perform the following functions: 1. "coordinate among government agencies, ongoing activity for the prevention of terrorism," 2. "evaluate all such programs and activities and where necessary, recommend methods for their effective implementation," 3. "devise procedures for reacting swiftly and effectively to acts of terrorism that occur," 4. "make recommendations to the director of the office of Management and Budget concerning proposed funding for antiterrorist programs." Lastly, the Committee was to "report to the President, from time to time, on the status of American effort to combat terrorism."\(^4\) A Working Group, composed of senior members of the Cabinet Committee, was subsequently established. In the words of the first chairman of the Working Group, Lewis Hoffacker, the United States'
approach to counterterrorism "is based on the principle derived from our liberal heritage, as well as from the UN Declaration of Human Rights, which affirms that every human being has a right to life, liberty, and security of person. Yet the violence of international terrorism violates that principle."\(^5\)

Initially, the Working Group was made up of the same departments and agencies as the Cabinet Committee. However, by 1974, eleven more agencies and departments were added to the Cabinet Committee and the working group. They were - the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Energy Research and Development Administration, the Federal Protective Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Law Enforcement Administration, the Washington D.C. Metropolitan Police Department, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the National Security Agency, the Office of Management and Budget, the United States Information Agency, and the Secret Service.\(^6\) These new agencies and departments increased the antiterrorist bureaucracy to twenty-one actors. Towards the latter part of 1977, marking five years of the existence of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, the actual work of this committee was done by its Working Group, chaired by the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Combating Terrorism. Issues arising within the Working Group were handled on an ad hoc basis. There were three outstanding factors that affected the quality of the Working Group's endeavors: firstly, the lack of exchange of needed information among agencies and departments members within the Working Group. Secondly, the sheer huge size of the working group itself hindered coordination within the group,
and thirdly, the loss of interest among members within the group itself. These problems prompted the establishment of an executive committee in 1974 consisting of those agencies and departments with jurisdictional functions in dealing with terrorism to respond to these problems.

Findings from the study of the American Society of International Law (ASIL) during their research project on international terrorism for the Department of State concluded that the cabinet committee and its Working Group, were a first step toward coordinating the United States policy response. The project’s final draft report in the early part of 1977 recommended that “somebody must be clearly assigned authority to respond to a crisis situation and that a centralized data base on terrorist activities be created." In Brian M. Jenkins' testimony before the Senate's Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance on September 14, 1977, he stated that the individuals in the Working Group were dedicated and capable but lacked formal authority and sufficient rank to impose their will on officials in other departments. Jenkins concluded that the "Working Group was primarily a bureaucratic coordinating body, not a command organization because so many bureaucratic jurisdictions will make governmental coordination difficult."

Restructuring of the Antiterrorist Bureaucracy in 1977

Following the election and shortly after former President Carter's inauguration, a major review and restructuring of the antiterrorist bureaucracy was triggered resulting in a comprehensive review of the entire antiterrorist organization entitled Presidential Review Memorandum on Terrorism No. 30. The memorandum
ordered the National Security Council to initiate a detailed study to assess the United States' abilities to both develop consistent policies for dealing with terrorism and for handling specific terrorist incidents, to study the structural problems of the Cabinet Committee system, and to make recommendations on a possible course of action. On June 2, 1977, after concluding its foreign policy review process, the administration addressed the issue of international terrorism and the structural weaknesses of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, and approved Presidential Review Memorandum on Terrorism No. 30. According to the former Deputy Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti, the "study confirmed the need for an extremely flexible, antiterrorism program at the federal level that would take into account the changeable nature of the contemporary terrorist threat and the wide range of resources that would have to be marshaled to meet all likely contingencies." 

**The Establishment of the Special Coordination Committee**

By the authority of a Presidential Directive (PD) in September 1977, the Cabinet Committee was dismantled and transferred to the Special Coordination Committee of the National Security Council with its role as the central coordinating body for the United States' antiterrorist program. The Special Coordination Committee's membership consisted of the National Security Advisor as chairman, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Three primary functions in the area of terrorism were invested on the Special
100

Coordination Committee (SCC):

1. to supervise the senior-level interagency group to ensure coordination among the agencies dealing with terrorism.

2. to resolve any jurisdictional problems that might have arisen during a terrorist situation. During a crisis situation, the SCC was to convene immediately and

3. to ensure that all necessary decisions concerning terrorism were made at the highest levels of government.\textsuperscript{15}

Two newly created organizations assumed the dismantled Cabinet Committee’s responsibilities and were directly responsible to the SCC. The Organization for the Response to Terrorist Incidents took over the management of terrorist crisis situations and the Organization for Antiterrorism Planning, Coordination and Policy Formulation assumed the task of planning, coordinating and formulating governmental policy towards domestic and international terrorism.\textsuperscript{16}

The United States’ policy of prevention, deterrence, reaction and prediction towards terrorism was reaffirmed by the Carter administration and was known as the four basic program components at the operational level.\textsuperscript{17} The prevention component focuses on international initiatives and diplomacy to discourage foreign states’ support of terrorism. This program further attempts to build a broad consensus that terrorist acts are inadmissible under international law, irrespective of the motivating cause. The second component, deterrence, emphasizes protection and security efforts, essentially target hardening in both the public and private sector, in order to discourage terrorist acts. The third basic program component, reaction, consists of operations in response to specific major acts of terrorism.
Finally, prediction includes intelligence and counterintelligence efforts in continuous support of the three previously mentioned program components. The administration also embraced the concept of lead agency management of terrorist incidents.

The Lead Agency Concept

The “Lead Agency” concept was supported in order to minimize the impact of bureaucratic politics. This concept operates on the principle that if an incident falls within one agency's jurisdiction, that agency coordinates the United States' response towards the incident. The Organization for Response to Terrorist Incidents deals with terrorist incidents by use of the lead agency concept. There are only three agencies within the United States government that have jurisdiction over terrorist incidents: the Department of State, the Justice Department/Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Transportation Department/Federal Aviation Administration. Their exact structures and functions will be outlined in this paper.

The Antiterrorism Planning, Coordination, and Policy Formulation Organization

This body is made up of two interagency groups and constitutes the upper two levels—the Executive Committee on Terrorism and the Working Group on Terrorism—coordinating the various components of the program and providing overall guidance for planning, coordination, and policy development.

The senior level interagency Executive Committee on Terrorism (ECT), responsive to the SCC, is especially concerned with the response to major terrorist incidents and related issues, including periodic testing and evaluation of response
capabilities. A June 1979 report by the Executive Committee done for the SCC, also outlined the committee's duties as including "long-range antiterrorism program planning and analysis." The Working Group on Terrorism (WGT) assigned responsibilities including information exchange, resolution of jurisdiction issues, and the coordination of the general antiterrorism activities of the various agencies chaired by the representative from the Department of State. The Department of Justice representative serves as the deputy chairman. The full committee membership periodically meets in plenary session; the participants also belong to committees that deal with specific problems and issues, international initiatives, security policy, contingency planning and crisis management committees address and, as required, the prevention, deterrence, and reaction components of the United States government's antiterrorism program. The intelligence component (prediction) is continuously addressed by a special intelligence community that coordinates with both the Working Group and the Executive Committee.

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)

To facilitate the management of terrorist incidents, delineate operational jurisdiction and provide for the exchange of information between agencies, federal departments concluded a number of Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), which includes agreements between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on domestic aircraft hijackings, the FAA and the Department of Defense (DOD) on aircraft hijackings on US military bases, the
The Carter administration suffered the adverse consequences of international terrorism largely because of the economy and the Iranian issue, like any other program. The administration's antiterrorism program was criticized by many as lacking a real command structure. That is, individual departments and agencies failed to coordinate their decision-making.

The United States' response to terrorism from the early 1970s to the early 1980s was an approach based on a passive-reactive defense. However, the signing of the National Security Decision Directives 138 by President Reagan on April 3, 1984, represented a change in the American approach towards terrorism and this is confirmed in the words of Noel C. Koch (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense) "from the reactive approach to recognition that pro-active steps are needed." Although the process appeared to be a constantly swinging pendulum where extremes dominate, Presidents are not always able to adopt a course of action they consider ideal because public opinion has swung to one extreme or another as a result of previous mistakes or disasters.

The push for antiterrorism legislation in President Clinton's era had an air of familiarity. The terrorism bill passed in April 1996 grew out of similar circumstances - public outcry after the Oklahoma City federal building disaster. In February,
Clinton submitted his Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995, which stemmed from recommendations growing out of the World Trade Center bombing and focused on the threat of international terrorism. After the Oklahoma attack, President Clinton and congressional leaders quickly pledged swift and bipartisan cooperation on a set of initiatives aimed at both international and domestic terrorism. Clinton began the week with a lengthy list of new provisions he was seeking to help prevent acts of terrorism and to identify perpetrators. At the top of his list were the following: 1. Giving federal agents expanded wiretap authority and 2. Requiring the use of chemical identifiers known as "taggants" in black powder and smokeless powder, the two principal categories of gun-powder.

At a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing April 27, 1995, administration officials and lawmakers generally agreed on the need to clarify and broaden federal jurisdiction and powers regarding crimes related to terrorism. During the hearing, FBI Director Louis J. Freeh told the committee his agency could and did investigate extremist groups that posed a threat of violence, but said he needed additional funds and legal powers to keep pace with the threat. The administration, for example, wanted increased access to telephone and other consumer records in terrorism probes. Freeh said, "gathering information about potential terrorism was the best hope of preventing it," and assured senators the government would stay within constitutional bounds.

Some lawmakers including then Senate majority Leader Bob Dole, R-Kansas, Senator Arlen Specter, R-Pennsylvania, Joseph I. Lieberman,
D-Connecticut, the Deputy Director for the Center for National Security Studies James X. Dempsey, and civil liberties advocates were already concerned about broadening government powers. They protested the administration's initial antiterrorism bill, such as plans allowing military involvement in law enforcement efforts regarding biological and chemical weapons, the idea of broadening federal wiretap authority to eavesdrop from one phone to another without obtaining a new warrant, and the issue of special deportation procedures for suspected alien terrorists and prohibitions on fundraising for terrorist groups respectively. Senator Lieberman stated that the United States would have to re-think its traditional balance of government power versus individual freedom in light of the Oklahoma bombing, "without order in our society," he added, "there is no liberty."28

In sum, the Carter administration brought about the restructuring of the antiterrorist bureaucracy. His successors - Reagan, Bush and Clinton have attempted to alter the structural complexion of the organization for antiterrorism planning, coordination, and policy formulation. While none of the administrations has radically altered either the government's antiterrorist policy or bureaucracy, the focus of the American response to international and domestic terrorism has been redirected.

**U.S. Government Departments and Agencies with Antiterrorism Programs**

The mission of antiterrorism programs is to detect, prevent, and/or react to unlawful, violent activities of individuals or groups whose intent is to 1. overthrow the government; 2. interfere with the activities of foreign governments in the United
States; 3. impair the functioning of the federal government, a state government, or interstate commerce; or 4. deprive Americans of their civil rights as guaranteed by the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.29

There are over thirty departments and agencies responsible for the implementation of the United States antiterrorism programs. These institutions and personnel responsible for the management of terrorist incidents are so divided among local governments, state and federal governments that it is frequently difficult to know who is in charge. This section will briefly outline institutions invested with the United States antiterrorist bureaucracy, such as: the Department of State; the Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Department of the Treasury/ Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; the Department of Defense; the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Transportation.

Department of State (DOS) Structure and Organization

The Department of State is the designated lead agency for the United States policy on international terrorism, and the most important organizational actor in the United States' response to both domestic and international terrorism. It advances the United States' objectives and interests in shaping a more free, more secure, and more prosperous world through formulating, representing, and implementing the President's foreign policies. In addition to representing the United States' policy and interests, the department is the primary provider of foreign affairs information used by the United States government in policy formulation.

The Secretary of State, the ranking member of the Cabinet and fourth in line
of presidential succession, is the President's principal advisor on foreign policy and
the person chiefly responsible for the United States representation abroad.30

This department has jurisdictional authority over international terrorist
incidents involving American citizens and property overseas and does so through
an interagency coordination mechanism. The chief organizational actors within the
State Department tackling the issue of international terrorism are the Office for
Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning, the Office of Security and the
Operational Center. The Office for Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning
formally created on February 9, 1984,31 represents the heart of the department's
antiterrorism efforts. This office has been reconstituted and re-designated from the
office for Combating Terrorism. The Office for Combating Terrorism was formally
established during 1976.32 Its primary function, which has been retained by the
office for Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning, was to "develop and refine the
policy and operational guidelines for dealing with terrorist threats to American
citizens and interests abroad."33 Another group, the Policy Coordinating Committee
on Terrorism (PCCT) chaired by the Department of State, is responsible for the
development of overall US policy regarding international terrorism.

Goals of the Antiterrorism Assistance Program

In November 1983, in response to the alarming increase in international
terrorist activity, the United States Congress authorized that an Antiterrorism
Assistance (ATA) Program be established within the Department of State. The
program is designed "to help friendly governments counterterrorism by training
foreign delegations at United States facilities in antiterrorist policy, crisis
management, hostage negotiations, airport security measures, explosive detection
and disposal methods. For the past decade, approximately seventy-five
countries and over fourteen thousand international government officials have
participated in the ATA program.

The program is specifically directed toward enhancing the antiterrorist
operating skills of participating countries and increasing respect for human rights by
sharing modern, humane and effective antiterrorism techniques with international
civil authorities. While promoting these major objectives, the ATA program also
enhances the protection provided overseas to American personnel and facilities,
and increases cooperation between the United States government and international
security and law enforcement communities. This program has become a major
element in the United States government's continuing effort to combat international
terrorism.

The Antiterrorism Assistance Program idea gained acceptance by the United
States Congress, but Democrats from the House of Representatives expressed
concern that such a program could result in the United States helping authoritarian
regimes clamp down on political dissidents rather than real terrorists. The
Director of the Office of Combating Terrorism was assigned responsibility for
administering the Antiterrorism Assistance Program on February 4, 1984. Five
days later, the Under Secretary for Management increased the office's
responsibilities by assigning it emergency planning functions. These new
responsibilities, in addition to those outlined above, expanded the number of duties of the Office for Combating Terrorism beyond its capacities. In response, the Office for Combating Terrorism was reconstituted and re-designated the Office of Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning.\textsuperscript{38}

One year after the World Trade Center bombing, Washington was embroiled in a fierce bureaucratic battle over control of United States counterterrorism policy. Secretary of State Warren Christopher called for the folding of the counterterrorism department's office into a larger bureau for narcotics, terrorism and crime. But opponents in Congress worried that downgrading the office could lessen the United States' clout in dealing with terrorists abroad. The House passed legislation blocking the reorganization and was followed suit by the Senate. White House officials drafted a secret presidential directive aimed at returning control of counterterrorism operations to the National Security Council; after the Iran-contra scandal (when counterterrorism policy was ousted from the NSC by Oliver North), the Reagan administration gave the Department of State the job of coordinating Washington's response to terrorism abroad. The Department of State, Pentagon and FBI officials, fought the White House plan, fearing it could breed the kind of off-the-books operations that embarrassed Reagan.\textsuperscript{39}

Counterterrorism experts in and out of government worried that the bureaucratic wrangling was already hampering the United States response to terrorist threats. Critics charged the administration had been slow to respond to the kidnapping of two United States missionaries by Colombian terrorists. But aides to
the Secretary of State insisted the infighting has had no impact on the department's ability to combat terrorism.40

Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning

The Office for Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning is divided into three sections. The first is the Counterterrorism Policy Section, which is headed by a Senior Deputy Director. The next two sections are headed by Deputy Directors. One section deals with emergency planning and the other with the administration of Counterterrorism Programs, such as the Antiterrorism Assistance Program.41

The Office of Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning has responsibility for the execution of the Department of State's jurisdictional authority over international terrorist incidents involving American citizens and property. Through the Operational Center, personnel from the office handle the American response to a terrorist incident by formulating a task force physically located in the center and which is headed by a representative of the counterterrorism office. The task force will remain on duty 24 hours a day until the crisis has been resolved.42 It must be pointed out, however, that during major incidents, such as the Pan-Am airline and the World Trade Center bombings, the President and other senior members of the National Security Council will oversee all important policy issues and even some tactical moves.

The Director of the office for Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning is the United States chief antiterrorist official. The position of Director carries the rank of ambassador with the administrative authority of an assistant secretary.43 The
Director of the office for Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning is the chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism and through this position oversees both the United States response to domestic and international terrorism.44

Within the State Department the Director heads up the department's policy group on security policies and programs and contingency planning.45 Finally, the Director reviews all intelligence material on terrorism. He sees that all relevant information is distributed, coordinated and incorporated into the United States antiterrorist program.46

In the summer of 1984, former Secretary of State George Shultz named a special panel to sort out what could be done to fight terrorism. He wanted ideas for reducing the risk of terrorist attacks against overseas missions. The Advisory Panel on Overseas Security, headed by retired Admiral Bobby Inman, suggested a monumental buildup of security with a new organizational entity to manage it. On November 4, 1985, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (BDS) was created as an independent bureau.47 As an organization, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's responsibilities are diverse and encompass many areas. Its primary function "is to provide protective security for the personnel and facilities of the agency and the Foreign Services in the United States and abroad, and for the protection of certain high level foreign dignitaries."48 Because security matters such as terrorism and espionage are State Department concerns, Diplomatic Security agents are trained to handle high-level assignments, especially during the past Olympic Games.
Foreign Operation Division

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security fulfills its overseas duties through special agents who work as Assistant Regional Security Officers or Regional Security Officers. Responsible for protecting American personnel, property, and information abroad, Assistant and Regional Security Officer serve as principal security advisors to the U.S. on security concerns as overseas ambassadors. They manage programs at each post for dealing with threats posed by criminals, terrorists, and hostile intelligence services. The Regional Security Officer is also the American liaison with host country law enforcement agencies, sponsoring activities such as an antiterrorism training assistance program for foreign civilian security personnel.49

These officers are also responsible for commanding, under the authority of the Ambassador, those Marine Security Detachments assigned to embassy duty.50 The Marine Security Detachments are the office of Security's chief operational unit. The Marines, working with Technical Services Division, provide protection of personnel, property and classified material. The Technical Services Division provides the Marines with the means of protecting the embassy from electronic penetration, surreptitious entry and terrorist attacks.51

Both the Office of Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning and the Office of Security report to the Under Secretary for Management. The Office of the Under Secretary for Management is responsible for seeing "that planning and policy, as reflected in the counterterrorism office, and the resources for the response to threats represented in the security office will both be under single jurisdiction."52
The Deputy Secretary of State is the department's senior most official concerned with the issue of international terrorism and represents the department and chairs the Senior Interdepartmental Group on terrorism.53

**State Department Operational Center**

The United States' mission to the United Nations is concerned with the coordination of the United Nations' efforts in dealing with international terrorism. The United States strongly believes that the only long-term means of preventing and deterring international terrorism is through international cooperation. The State Department's Operational Center, outside the White House's Situation Room, is the United States' chief crisis management institution. Once an international terrorist incident involving American citizen and/or property begins, the Operational Center takes over operational control of the American response. This official's main task is to remind the foreign government(s) handling the incidents of the different international conventions and agreements it is party to, and its obligations in enforcing them. The American policy goal is to have the terrorist(s) punished either by the United States through the extradition of the terrorist(s) to the US or by the foreign government using its domestic laws dealing with criminal behavior.54

Besides physically strengthening walls and installing antiterrorist equipment, the United States has developed a policy of non-concessions. The policy of non-concessions basically states that the United States will not accede to terrorist demands. No ransom will be paid, no convicted terrorist will be pardoned, and no country will be pressured to give in to terrorist demands. In other words, the US will
make no deals. This policy has been a constant feature of the United States’ antiterrorist policy since the late 1960s. However, there were members of the Reagan administration who believed that the Carter administration gave into Iranian demands for the release of the hostages.\textsuperscript{55} In reaction, the Reagan administration strongly restated U.S. support for the non-concession policy, so as to make it clear to terrorists that his administration would not bend to their demands. The non-concession element of the US policy was damaged by Iran-Contra affairs. Since then, the US has made crystal-clear the government’s steadfast commitment to the "no deals" principle.

**Antiterrorist Controversy**

One of the most controversial aspects of any nation's antiterrorist program is the use of self-help measures. Self-help measures can be divided into two categories. The first involves the use of force such as the execution of hostage-rescue operations, counterintelligence operations and covert actions. The second category of self-help measures consists of economic sanctions, international claims, diplomatic protests and quiet diplomacy.\textsuperscript{56} Three of four of these measures are the direct responsibility of the State Department: international claims, diplomatic protests and quiet diplomacy.

International claims are designed to use the law of state responsibility in incidents where there is evidence that a state failed "to prevent injuries caused by terrorism or {failed} to apprehend, punish or extradite terrorists."\textsuperscript{57} Unfortunately, the ambiguous nature of the law of state responsibility and the likelihood that a
state would not accept responsibility for a terrorist act undermines the effectiveness of this measure. John Murphy, however, states:

> the bringing of international claims might serve a useful function in that they would focus attention on the illegal acts of the respondent state and raise the consciousness of the world community as though the legal principles involved and the respondent state's violation of them.58

The second self-help measure is diplomatic protest. Diplomatic protests, whether in response to a nation's failure to protect Americans or other nationals or in response to a nation's aiding and/or abetting international terrorism, represent a worthy avenue of recourse. Diplomatic protests, first, state publicly the United States' belief that international terrorism and state behavior associated with it is illegitimate. Secondly, in John Murphy's words, "the possible benefits of diplomatic protests outweigh the possible costs."59

Because of the nature of international politics, the United States may choose not to use an international claim or diplomatic protest. As an alternative, the United States can engage in quiet diplomacy. Through the use of quiet diplomacy the United States can still express its displeasure with a nation's behavior without the risks of both diplomatic protests and international claims. Quiet diplomacy also makes possible the formulation of agreements, such as the United States-Cuban memorandum of understanding concerning aircraft hijackings, which would not have been possible through more public forms of diplomacy.

One of the most debatable self-help measures is economic sanctions and export controls. The aim of the use of economic sanctions and export controls is to
cut off military and economic support to those nations determined to have aided and/or abetted international terrorists by the granting of safe havens and other assistance. The State Department views the use of economic sanctions and export controls against governments aiding and/or abetting international terrorism as vital in the prevention and deterrence of terrorist behavior. However, economic sanctions and export controls are not viewed by all sections of the US government as vital weapons in combating terrorism. The Treasury Department, as pointed out by William Regis Farrell, "does not view terrorism from an economic perspective."

The Treasury and State Departments have traditionally disagreed over the use of sanctions. It is the view of this author that the damage to the US economy and the international economic order caused by economic sanctions exceed any benefit gained by the imposition, because other allies and non-allies will eventually ignore such sanctions and continue trading with the targeted nations either overtly or covertly. The nation imposing sanctions in the long run is injured more than the target nation, witness the Carter administration's grain embargo of the Soviet Union following the latter's invasion of Afghanistan.

The State Department does not have exclusive power to impose either economic sanctions or export controls. This department must work with the Departments of Commerce, Treasury, Defense and Transportation in imposing sanctions. There are an estimated twelve or more legislative acts granting the President the authority to impose economic sanctions on nations determined to have aided and/or abetted international terrorism.
With recent domestic terrorist activities, the Congress in 1996 passed a broad counterterrorism bill concerning fundraising, and exclusion/deportation which allowed the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General and Treasury Secretary, to designate certain foreign groups as terrorist and block these groups from fundraising in the United States. The Treasury Secretary would be authorized to freeze the US assets of such groups and allow the federal government to deny visas to foreigners who belong to groups designated as terrorists. The legislation would also establish a special deportation court for aliens suspected of terrorism where the government would be able to shield sensitive evidence from suspects.\textsuperscript{63}

The Department of State is the United States' chief antiterrorist organization. The department employs a vast array of tools in its fight against international terrorism. A major problem the State Department and other agencies and departments are faced with in implementing the United States antiterrorism program is the attitude of those officials implementing policy. A problem closely associated with the lack of awareness on the part of some government officials is the argument that the problem of international terrorism is an issue best handled by specialists and not generalists.\textsuperscript{64}

A major difficulty in the State Department's handling of the problem of terrorism -- and that of other departments and agencies -- is that key officials learn mainly on the job, but often before they can use the knowledge they have gained, they are transferred to another post.
The Department of State represents the United States' commitment to combat international terrorism. No matter how effective other agencies and departments are in fulfilling their antiterrorist responsibilities, without an effective response from the Department of State, the American response to terrorism will be lacking.

Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

The Department of Justice (DOJ), was established by the act of June 22, 1870 (28 U.S.C. 501, 503) with the Attorney General as its head. The Attorney General directs the affairs and activities of the department, and is responsible for managing the federal response to acts of terrorism conducted in the United States. This function, in turn, is delegated to the Associate Attorney General who makes major policy and legal decisions during any terrorism crisis.

Guidelines and Statutory Authority On Counterterrorism Investigation

Counterterrorism investigations are based on the fundamental duty of government to protect the public against terrorism and criminal violence intended to destroy or manipulate our constitutional system. It is the responsibility of the Attorney General to ensure that every effort is made to protect US citizens and property, also, to protect their individual rights. To accomplish this with the department's thousands of lawyers, investigators and agents who play significant roles in protecting citizens through effective law enforcement, crime prevention, and prosecution, the Attorney General issues the following investigative guidelines:

1) the domestic terrorism investigations which are conducted
in accordance with the "Attorney General Guidelines for General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprises, and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigation" and

2) the international terrorism investigations are conducted in accordance with the "Attorney General Guidelines for FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counter-intelligence Investigations." 

These guidelines, which are subject to continual review and revision, establish a consistent policy concerning when an investigation may be initiated and what techniques may be employed while conducting the investigation.

The Office of the Associate Attorney General supervises the overall coordination of all agencies within the Justice Department dealing with terrorism. Under the Associate Attorney General's authority, are the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Criminal Division. The Associate Attorney General is the deputy chairman of the Inter-departmental Group on Terrorism.

Title 28, of the US Code, Section 533, authorizes the Attorney General to "appoint officials to detect crimes against the United States," and other federal statutes. The Attorney General has designated the Federal Bureau of Investigation, (FBI), to be the lead federal law enforcement agency in the United States government fight against terrorism. The FBI is responsible for investigating the activities of terrorist groups within the United States and for the investigation of terrorist acts against US citizens abroad. At present, the FBI has investigative jurisdiction for more than two hundred fifty statutes that categorize violation of federal laws. Information obtained through an FBI investigator is presented to the
appropriate US Attorneys or DOJ officials who decide if prosecution or other actions are warranted.\textsuperscript{70}

**FBI Mission and Organizational Structure**

The FBI mission is two-fold: first, to prevent terrorist acts before they occur, and second, to launch an immediate and effective investigative response, should an act of terrorism occur. In the course of conducting investigations, the FBI collects information regarding group membership, associations, movements, support structures, and funding. This information serves not only as a basis for prosecution, but builds an intelligence database, making possible the prevention of terrorist acts. The reactive phase, on the other hand, consists of an effective and timely response to a terrorist incident through crisis management and conventional investigative techniques.\textsuperscript{71} Efforts to coordinate investigations into terrorist incidents were put to the test following the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York City.

The FBI assumed responsibility for the crime scene and assigned three hundred agents to carry out forensic examinations. Joined by personnel from the New York City Police Department (NYPD), the Secret Service, INS, Customs, ATF, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and other law enforcement agencies, were able to complete their investigation within a month after the bombing, allowing for the swift prosecution and later conviction of four suspects in the incident.\textsuperscript{72}
Organizational Structure

The FBI is headed by a Director, who is supported by a Deputy Director. An Assistant Director heads each of the nine Headquarters divisions. The Counterterrorism Section (CTS) at FBI headquarters provides program direction and management to all FBI counterterrorism investigations. Overall program policy and investigative procedures are set and monitored by program managers in the CTS. Because most terrorist activities involve broad geographic areas in the United States, which transcend FBI field division boundaries, it is necessary for headquarters to coordinate investigative activity. The CTS is a component of the Criminal Investigative Division, which coordinates all criminal investigative programs. The CTS is further organized into several units that manage investigative matters, planning matters, research/analysis projects, training, staffing, and program funding responsibilities.\(^73\)

The FBI is a field-oriented organization. Its field offices are located in fifty-six major cities. Of those, fifty-five are in the United States, and one is in Puerto Rico. The locations have been selected in accordance with crime trends, the need for regional geographic centralization, and the need to efficiently manage resources. Within each FBI field office, there exist units that conduct counterterrorism investigation, provide program direction and support services to these field offices, from approximately 400 satellite offices known as resident agencies.\(^74\)

Each FBI field office is overseen by a Special-Agent-in-Charge (SAC). The
New York City and Washington, D.C. offices are each managed by an Assistant Director in Charge (ADIC) due to their large size. The ADICs are assisted by Deputy Assistant Directors (DADs), and by Special-Agent-In-Charge (SACs) responsible for various programs. The SACs in all field offices, including those in New York City and Washington, D.C., are aided by one or more managers called Assistant-Special-Agents-In-Charge (ASACs). The initial, tactical response to a terrorist incident is made by the FBI Special-Agent-In-Charge (SAC) at the scene. He is under the supervision of the Director of FBI who retains the responsibility for containing and resolving the crisis.

**Specific Capabilities**

The FBI has a number of specific responsibilities in combating terrorism. Each office and headquarters has a contingency plan that go into effect when a terrorist incident occurs. They include, for example, the chain of command, communications both within and outside the FBI, and the availability of specialized equipment and personnel. The knowledge and experience gained by such teams are shared with local law enforcement agencies through training sessions at the FBI Academy, Quantico, Virginia and throughout the nation.

Another asset that allows the FBI to respond to terrorist acts is the Special Operations and Research Unit (SOAR). The function of SOAR is to accumulate and analyze facts about terrorist incidents and through papers, articles, seminars, and training sessions to present ways of dealing with terrorism. Members of SOAR are also available for on-site consultations and are well-versed in the practical
SWAT and HTR Program

Two additional FBI units are Special Weapons and Tactics Squads (SWAT) team and Hostage Rescue Team (HRT). It is believed that confronting a criminal or terrorist element with a clearly superior force, such as a Special Weapons and Tactics Squads (SWAT) team will serve to diminish any willful inclination toward violent resistance. SWAT was designed to equip the FBI with a flexible and effective response to unconventional and high-risk law enforcement situations arising from jurisdictional responsibilities. Each of the fifty-six FBI field divisions maintains a SWAT capability that is utilized to respond to, contain, and terminate terrorist activity in progress. It is intended that the SWAT concept should be employed in any situation involving what is, in the judgment of the SAC, a higher-than-normal risk or requiring the special skills unique to SWAT operational capacity. Examples of these situations are: sniping; barricaded subjects; terrorist activities; high-risk raids and arrests; skyjackings; rescues coincidental to FBI jurisdiction; operations requiring airborne insertion or extraction capability; security and protective functions.

If one or more teams are combined to form a larger organization, the senior team leader on the scene exercises direct tactical command. This in no way alters the overall command responsibility and authority of the SAC within his field office because all authority for employment of SWAT teams is derived from SAC.

The desirable relationship between the team leader and the SAC in any
given operation is seen in the following chain-of-command; i.e., at the top is SAC (or his delegated representative), followed by the SWAT Leader and the SWAT Team. Specifically, the team leader is responsible for: 1. ensuring that he and his team obtain necessary training; 2. scheduling team activities; and 3. conducting contingency planning relative to potential problems within his field office. At the scene of an incident, the controlling team's personnel, formulates a tactical plan, makes recommendations to the SAC, briefs the team on mission procedures, and equipment concerning execution of the tactical plan; and directs the execution of the tactical plan. 81

This delineation of responsibilities relieves the SAC of much of the detail involved in SWAT planning, giving him time to devote overall problem perspective; while at the same time it fully exploits the tactical expertise of the SWAT team.

Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) Program

In response to "the growing threat of terrorism" and the perception that there was a "void in US ability to handle large scale terrorist situations," 82 the FBI originally in 1983 formatted a fifty-agent Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) to provide the President and the Attorney General with a civilian law enforcement alternative to the use of military force. Today the team is part of the Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG) stationed at the FBI Academy and its authorized 91 Special Agents, which includes an ASAC, eight SSA's, twelve agent staff positions, and seventy agent operators. The operators are assigned either to an Assault/Entry Section or a Sniper/Observer Section. The HRT is structured to deploy with part or all of its
personnel and resources, depending upon the magnitude of a crisis and can do so within four hours of the request.\textsuperscript{83}

The HRT is prepared to provide FBI field offices a variety of assistance for resolving high-risk crises involving hostage/barricade, raid, arrest, or other tactical situations. Further, the team is specifically trained to do so in stronghold, aircraft, vehicle, rural, or maritime environments. The Team conducts a great deal of research and development with respect to explosive breaching, weapons, tactics, and equipment that might enhance tactical capabilities. It also maintains liaison with other domestic and foreign counterterrorist teams, whenever possible exchanging ideas, policy, training methods, and operational experiences.\textsuperscript{84}

In addition the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 addressed the FBI’s role in responding to hostage taking. A group of highly experienced and expertly trained hostage negotiators formed the core of the FBI’s Critical Incident Negotiation Team (CINT).\textsuperscript{85} Since it was created in 1985, CINT members regularly intervene in various hostage-taking incidents as they occur nationwide. Trained in all aspects of crisis negotiation including preparation for overseas negotiations, and international assistance functions, the team has been called on to perform over twenty-two overseas operations since its inception.\textsuperscript{86}

Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)

Increased counterterrorism cooperative efforts between the FBI and various law enforcement agencies have resulted in the formation of the Joint Terrorism Task Forces, composed of Federal, state and local law enforcement officers. These
units are staffed and supervised by police officers, detectives, state troopers, and FBI agents. The purpose of these task forces is to maximize interagency coordination and cooperation in the formulation and implementation of investigations strategies while taking advantage of a wide range of law enforcement resources. The pooling of personnel and resources among United States agencies alone is not enough to successfully counter the global nature of the terrorist threats. International cooperation and information sharing were necessary to enhance the United States counterterrorism effort and promote continued success in the future.

**Extraterritorial Investigative Jurisdiction**

The FBI's extraterritorial jurisdiction in international terrorism is obtained from numerous US statutes. While previous statutes enabled the FBI to investigate acts of terrorism inside the United States, Congress, in response to the threat posed by terrorists against United States citizens and their interests abroad, passed two laws, in 1984 and 1986 expanding FBI jurisdiction to include investigation of terrorist acts abroad. Of particular importance, however, is the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, which created a new section in the United States criminal code for Hostage Taking and the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, which established a new statute and expanded the FBI's jurisdiction pertaining to terrorist acts directed against United States nationals and/or interest overseas.

The FBI, with the permission of the host foreign government, and close procedural coordination with the United States Department of State, can conduct
extraterritorial investigations by interviewing victims, collecting forensic evidence and apprehending terrorist fugitives for eventual prosecution in a U.S. court. The ability to conduct an on-site crime scene investigation greatly enhances the likelihood of a successful conclusion to the investigation. This development greatly benefits the fight against terrorism, including enhanced coordination and cooperation, as well as increased intelligence and information sharing among those agencies and departments tasked with counterterrorism responsibilities. One example of a successful effort by the FBI in providing extensive investigative assistance to many foreign countries, is the FBI's assistance to the government of Kuwait following the arrest and conviction of sixteen subjects by the government of Kuwait for their plot to assassinate former President George Bush in 1993. The above cited example and other past successes in the United States government's fight against terrorists are attributable in large part to this coordinated counterterrorism effort.

The chief tools available to the FBI in combating terrorism are counterintelligence operations. In July 1995, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directives 39, entitled US Policy on Counterterrorism. These directives further articulated and defined the roles of members of the United States Counterterrorism Community, including the FBI. The counterterrorism funds in 1996 were increased to $1 billion over four years to help federal law enforcement officials fight terrorism. Because of the major concern of terrorism, the FBI would receive the largest share, $468 million.
The FBI has jurisdiction over domestic counterintelligence operations designed to be preventive and reactive in nature in dealing with terrorism.\textsuperscript{92} During the past years, the FBI has expanded its Counterterrorism Branches at FBI Headquarters. Counterterrorism officers and analysts from several U.S. Government agencies were also invited to work at the FBI. The goal is to improve the U.S.' ability to combat terrorism and maintain a robust infrastructure protection and countermeasure capability for the United States. All FBI counterintelligence operations must follow "the Attorney General's foreign counterintelligence guidelines against the foreign inspired terrorists or foreign-based terrorists."\textsuperscript{93} Finally, the FBI participates in numerous interagency working groups that deal with terrorism issues. One example is the Protective Security Working Group (PSWG) chaired by the FBI. PSWG ensures that federal agencies tasked with protective responsibilities for facilities and individuals are kept abreast of all aspects of the terrorist threat. Its International Terrorist Unit examines trends in international terrorism which have a possible impact on US domestic terrorist activity.

\textbf{Immigration And Naturalization Service (INS)}

The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Inspection Division is another important agency within the Department of Justice (DOJ), assigned an antiterrorist role. The INS headed by a commissioner was moved from the Department of Labor to the Department of Justice through the President's Reorganization Plan Number V 1940.\textsuperscript{94} The INS established the Restructuring Office within the Commissioner's Office to direct the second phase of planning for
the agency’s restructuring effort. The agency has moved with the administrator’s decision to separate enforcement and immigration function within one agency.95

The agency’s primary responsibility is to administer immigration and nationality laws, with respect to the inspection in determining the admissibility of all persons attempting entry into the fifty states, Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands and Guam.96 Since maintaining the intensity of all US borders is this country’s first line of defense against terrorist incursions, the INS inspectors, in conjunction with officers of the US Customs Service, implement at all ports of entry, special screening procedures to ensure that known terrorists and illegal weapons, explosives, and equipment are not admitted to the United States.

The Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182)97 specified various classes of aliens who are excludable from the United States. That is "a person seeking to enter the US with a criminal act for a political purpose" thereby endangering the security of the United States.98 Through the normal course of their duties, INS officers encounter millions of foreign-born persons every year throughout the 250 ports of entry in the United States. These include land, air, and sea locations along the Canadian borders, as well as the Gulf Coast; thereby giving the agency a prominent role in the national counterterrorism effort.

Although no specific organizational component within INS is dedicated exclusively to terrorist activities, the Intelligence Program, a unit within the Enforcement Division, is the focal point for the collection of information relating to terrorism. The INS primary role in the antiterrorist structure revolves around its
involvement in the "Lookout System." Both the Manual Service Lookout Books (MSLB) and the National Automated Immigration Lookout System (NAILS) containing thousands of records grouped by phonetic coding, enabling similar-sounding names to be grouped together for references despite dissimilarities in spelling. The systems are constantly upgraded with the list of lost or stolen documents that could be used by terrorists or other criminals attempting entry into the United States. Findings by the Forensic Document Laboratory (FDL) confirm strong ties between terrorism and the use of fraudulent identity documents.

It is estimated that over twenty major ports of entry are now connected to the FDL through Photophone, a tele-imagery system that provides a real-time capability to transmit and receive visual images. This equipment is capable of transmitting a "high-resolution image by phone throughout the globe in approximately twenty seconds." INS also uses a hand scanner for frequent travelers at Kennedy and Newark Airports. Known as INS Passenger Accelerated Service System (INSPASS), the hand scanners allowed frequent travelers to be processed quickly through long lines as Immigration into Customs. According to James Achterberg, INSPASS project director, INS was able to use the scanner for over 36,000 times before deciding whether to employ the system as another part of entry.

One of the best means to fight terrorism is through an effective liaison effort. INS works closely with other federal, state and local law enforcement agencies, including the Department of State, FBI, CIA, and others, through information
sharing about known or suspected terrorists. A number of interagency committees and working groups have been established to ensure that information can be processed quickly among people and agencies with key roles in the national counterterrorism effort.

All INS officers are subjected to the following type of training - "basic intelligence training for trainee officers; more advanced intelligence training for intelligence officers; specialized training for Terrorism, Drug and Fraud (TDF) task force members at ports of entry; and fraudulent document detection training." Finally, INS, by virtue of its character to enforce and administer US laws relating to the immigration of aliens, is in a unique position to gather a variety of intelligence information on a first-hand basis. Any efficient campaign against terrorism has to start with information on the many international and domestic groups that have conducted or threatened to carry out terrorist acts in the past. A key source of this information is generated through "TECSII data base," managed jointly by the Custom Service and the INS, to identify individuals who have raised the suspicions of agents at ports of entry into the US because of their involvement with contraband as well as suspicious travel patterns revealed on their passports.

These Intelligence Collection Requirements mandate field-level officers to communicate immediately any information developed on terrorism to the INS headquarters for appropriate dissemination. It should be noted that only a small fraction of the hundreds of millions of aliens to whom INS comes in contact have terrorist ties. The INS, in recognition of the seriousness of a single terrorist attack
on US soil, has implemented a number of pro-active and effective counterterrorism measures through its mandated role in coordinating a federal response to terrorism.

**Department of the Treasury (DOTT) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF)**

The Department of the Treasury is headed by a Secretary and deals with terrorism mainly from a law enforcement perspective. The department has both a law enforcement function and the authority to utilize economic levers in combating terrorism. The Treasury offices are composed of divisions headed by Assistant Secretaries and are primarily responsible for policy formulation and overall management of the Treasury Department. The Assistant Secretary for Enforcement and Operation coordinates all of the Department of Treasury's antiterrorism law enforcement activities.

President Clinton's Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995 required making plastic explosives for easier detection by law enforcement. The bill also mandates a study and recommendations by the Department of Treasury as to whether tracing agents should be added to explosive material - excluding black and smokeless powder, "If warranted by the study findings, the Treasury Secretary could require such taggants." The departments under the Assistant Secretary jurisdiction are the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), the Custom Service and the Secret Service. Only the functions of the ATF antiterrorism under the Department of the Treasury will be discussed.

**ATF Organizational Structure and Functions**

In July 1, 1972, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms was
established by the US Department of the Treasury Order No. 120-1 (originally No. 221), as a law enforcement organization within the Department of the Treasury. The order transferred the functions, powers and duties arising under laws relating to alcohol, tobacco, firearms, and explosives, from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to the ATF. Title XI of the Organized Crime Control Act in 1970, formalized the ATF Division as having explosive expertise. In the Anti-Arson Act of 1982, Congress amended the Title XI definition of explosive to include arson as a federal crime thus, expanding ATF's responsibility for investigating commercial arson nationwide.

The Director who is appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury, is the head of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and reports to the Assistant Secretary (Enforcement). ATF represents the Department of the Treasury in terrorist incidents involving the use of firearms and explosives. With its headquarters in Washington D.C. Most of the Bureau’s personnel and operations are decentralized throughout the United States, with a few stations overseas. ATF agents, inspectors and support staff enforce the federal laws and regulations relating to alcohol, tobacco products, firearms, explosives and arson by working directly and in cooperation with other local, state, federal and international law enforcement agencies.

The Department of the Treasury formulated a memorandum of understanding with the FBI addressing issues involving the use of explosives. During an investigation of an incident involving explosives, the ATF handles technical matters
while the FBI acts in the role of supervisor. To investigate explosives incidents and arson, ATF uses National Response Teams (NRTs) and International Response Teams (IRT) and Arson Task Forces consisting of ATF special agents, auditors, technicians, laboratory personnel, and canines. The Bureau's four NRTs can respond within twenty-four hours to suspected bombing and arson scenes in the US. At arson scenes, ATF also deploys cause and origin specialists, specially trained canines and auditors, while the IRTs formed as a result of an agreement with the State Department, are deployed outside the US. ATF had initiated steps to ensure law enforcement's continued effective investigation of a crime scene. This cooperation, training and intelligence sharing continue to be a vital element in counterterrorism. A good example is the ATF joining forces with the FBI, the New York Police Department and Port Authority Police Department to investigate the bombing of the World Trade Center to bring those responsible to justice. As stated by Steven H. Harris:

...terrorists certainly, do not confine their activities to one country or region, therefore international cooperation, training and intelligence sharing has been illustrated in numerous international terrorism investigations in recent years, such as the successful investigation into the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland.

Two major incidents in the 1990s have drawn criticism from the Executive Branch, Congress, the media and the general public over the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms' law enforcement functions. 1. The ATF role following the "Ruby Ridge Shootout" in August 1992, which resulted in the deaths of a federal marshal and two civilians and 2. the Waco, Texas raid of the Branch Davidian
compound on February 1993 that left over eighty dead including four ATF agents. Both incidents prompted a number of investigations and hearings such as President Clinton's mandate to the Department of the Treasury and the Department of Justice, which are responsible for the ATF and FBI, to conduct "vigorous and thorough" investigations of the events leading to the loss of law enforcement and civilian lives, and hearings by the members of the Senate Judiciary's Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Government Information and the Government Reforms and Oversight Subcommittee on Criminal Justice.

Robert M. Wells described both incidents as "examples of excessive force and abuse of power by law enforcement officials."115

Department of Transportation (DOT) and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

The Department of Transportation (DOT) is headed by a Secretary. The office of Inspector General under the DOT Director remains committed to aviation security. The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Aviation and International Affairs carries a broad portfolio of responsibilities covering domestic and international aviation, international trade, and a range of other international cooperation and facilitation issues.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is one of the DOT's administrative organizations concerned with the issue of terrorism. Other DOT functions in combating terrorism are the representation at meetings of International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and to monitor nations' compliance in maintaining airport security standards required by the ICAO. The ICAO is the acknowledged
body responsible for setting standards in the field of civil aviation.116

By virtue of the Anti-hijacking Act of 1974, the DOT Secretary has the authority to suspend American Civil aviation traffic with any nation that aids and/or abets international terrorism.117 The Secretary can also, by virtue of Section 1115(b) of the Anti-hijacking Act, suspend American Civil Aviation traffic with any nation that does not maintain the minimum airport security measures mandated by the Hague Convention of 1970118 and the Omnibus Counter terrorism Act of 1995.119 Such actions could be implemented by the DOT Secretary with the approval of the Secretary of State. One of the Department of Transportation's strategic goals in counter terrorism relates to transportation security, as will be discussed below.

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) aviation security mission is to protect the users of commercial air transportation against terrorism and other criminal acts. The FAA's mission also includes the prevention of passengers or cargo shippers transporting hazardous materials or other dangerous goods in a manner that could jeopardize flight safety.120 In brief, the "FAA is to prevent or deter the introduction of weapons and explosives aboard commercial passenger-carrying aircraft." To achieve this goal, the FAA has established a number of focus areas, one of which is to maximize the performance capability of people working in security for air carriers, for airport operators and at FAA facilities; including but not limited to "training of inspectors, rule making and intelligence analyses, among others."121

The Office of the Director of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is
responsible for the handling of hijacking and the oversight of civil aviation security programs. The FAA's Office for Aviation Security is responsible for the supervising of the security and safety regulations dealing with all aspects of civil aviation mandated by the Air Transportation Security Act of 1974.

The 1970s and the 1980s brought about a rise in group-sponsored or organizational terrorism against aviation. Crimes against international civil aviation involving US Aviation interest along with the capabilities of the criminals during the 1980s were at its peak. For example, FAA security in 1985 witnessed the "hijacking of TWA Flight 847, the attacks on the Rome and Vienna Airport and the bombing of TWA Flight 840 on departure from Athens." The aforementioned incidents resulted in tightened security and inspection procedures, the Foreign Airport Security Act of 1985, and the swift action of the ICAO. In 1986, the ICAO adopted improvements to its Security Standards and Recommended Practices; as a result, there was a significant drop in the number of hijackings, a total of three worldwide between 1986 and 1987. The bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 which killed all 259 people on board and eleven on the ground over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988 emphasized the continuous need for prompt action to strengthen further aviation security measures. The above action prompted the Presidential Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism and the passage of the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990. Both demonstrated the President's, Congress and the determination of the United States citizens to have the FAA adopt - and the aviation industry to implement more reliable methods to prevent an act of terrorism against
Another tragedy, the crash of TWA Flight 800 in July 1996, proved to be the catalyst for taking important steps in aviation security. Although the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) ruled out terrorist involvement as a potential cause of the crash, the crash prompted the creation of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security (WHCASS) in August 1996, known as the Core Commission. The WHCASS reports in "September 1996 and February 1997 addressed safety, security, and air traffic control modernization." The Core Commission made recommendations to 1. "implement a comprehensive plan to prevent inclusions of explosives and other threats objects in cargo, 2. conduct airport vulnerability assessments 3. deploy new explosives detection equipment, and 4. implement automated passenger profiling." 

**Development of Explosive Detection Equipment**

Much of the FAA's effort to develop effective countermeasures focuses on research and development for explosive detection equipment, concourse security and system development and integration. In the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Congress allotted $198 million for aviation security initiatives, including $144.2 million for the deployment of advanced security technologies, $18 million to hire 300 additional FAA personnel, $8.9 million for additional canine teams, $5.5 million for airport vulnerability assessments, and $21 million for aviation security research and operational testing. The FAA has
awarded contracts to purchase up to 100 FAA-certified explosive detection machines and 489 trace detection devices.\textsuperscript{133}

The FAA's security program consists of the use of random hundred percent baggage searches, the use of X-ray equipment and the use of sky marshals on airline routes likely to be hijacked. The new technology weapons detection equipment "(infrared, ultrasound and millimeter wave),"\textsuperscript{134} automated weapon recognition by X-ray and explosive vapor detection of persons and carry-on luggage have been purchased and installed by the Security Equipment Integrated Product Team (SEIPT).\textsuperscript{135} SEIPT was formed by the FAA and is composed of FAA, airline, and airport representatives. The Security Equipment Integrated Product Team (SEIPT), is responsible for (1) developing acquisition plans, (2) determining the type and number of explosive detection equipment to purchase, (3) selecting the airlines and airport sites to receive the equipment, and (4) overseeing the installation and integration of equipment into airports' existing security system.

Working with the aviation industry, FAA has completed and implemented the automated passenger profiling, and has deployed explosives detection equipment to airports nationwide. Presently, FAA has installed new security technologies, including seventy-two FAA-certified explosives detection machines, and 345 trace detection devices, at US airports.\textsuperscript{136} The CTX 5000 SP's (and its upgraded version, the 5000DS), at a cost of about $1 million per machine, is currently the only FAA-certified bulk explosive detection system deployed.\textsuperscript{137} In addition, FAA has developed a new computer-based operator training system called the "Screener
Proficiency Evaluation and Reporting System" (SPEARS), a computerized training and testing system to help train airline screeners and maintain their skills.

FAA's Cooperation with Other Federal Departments

Adopting new and effective measures to counter the threat against civil aviation requires a cooperative team effort. As earlier mentioned in this chapter, the FAA's main responsibility outside of its supervision of civilian airlines security program, is the handling of crisis situations involving US civilian aircrafts. Its mandated authority covers the "hijacking of aircraft in flight or on the ground with its doors closed." Because hijacking incidents invade the jurisdictional realms of other federal departments, the FAA has formulated memoranda of understanding with the FBI and with the State and Defense Departments. The memoranda of understanding with the FBI deal with domestic hijackings. The memoranda of understanding with the DOD deal with hijackings occurring or involving US military bases, while the memoranda of understanding with the DOS cover overseas hijacking incidents involving American airlines.

The Antiterrorist Assistance Program (ATA) is another vital element in the US response to the threat posed by international terrorism. ATA since its inception in 1984, has helped train over 650 students from twenty-eight nations in advanced civil aviation security or airport police management at the FAA's Transportation Safety Institute in Oklahoma City. The ATA program also works with the FAA's assessment of airports as provided under the Foreign Airport Security Act.

The Department of State and the FAA cooperate closely in this FAA airport
assessment program and in areas such as research and development, to identify and develop new technology to apply to the process of examining baggage so that materials such as plastic explosives can be more consistently detected. For example, the "thermal neutron analyzer" developed as a means of ensuring that plastic explosives cannot evade detection, has offered real promise for the FAA and its aviation industry. As part of a comprehensive effort to detect plastic explosives, ATA trained bomb-detector dogs already hold a critical role in aviation security.

FAA faces significant challenges in providing effective security oversight over the US aviation industry. The US air transport system is the most complex aviation system in the world with approximately six hundred million passenger implements and more than twenty-six billion cargo ton miles per year. Domestically, over 450 airports are required to have FAA-approved security programs. The responsibility for aviation security is shared between FAA, the airlines, and airport. The FAA sets guidelines, establishes procedures, and relies on the intelligence community for information on threats to aviation and makes judgment on how to meet these threats.

To meet current and future threats to aviation security, FAA needs an integrated strategic plan to guide its efforts and prioritize funding needs. The planning efforts of the Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security and Research and Acquisitions, including the Technical center, must be integrated towards common goals, objectives, and milestones.
Although the FAA is not an intelligence-gathering organization, the agency's direct ties and counterterrorism effort to those agencies that are, has increased the FAA's effectiveness in deterring any terrorist or criminal act. Because aviation is an attractive target for terrorists, the FAA and the U.S. aviation community remained alert and continued to improve and enhance the safety and security of the traveling public.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Intelligence Community

The most important aspect of any nation's fight against domestic and international terrorism is current and accurate intelligence. As stated by Robert H. Kupperman, "Intelligence is the first line of defense." The Intelligence Community refers in aggregate to these: "Executive Branch agencies and organizations that conduct the variety of intelligence activities which comprise the total United States national intelligence efforts."

The community is divided into three categories known as 'elements.' 1. The Department of Defense Element; 2. The Department of Intelligence Element (other than DOD); and 3. The Independent Agency Element. These three elements formed over twelve organizational units of the Intelligence Community are authorized to conduct intelligence functions outside and within the United States. The community includes the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); the National Security Agency (NSA); the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); the office within the Department of Defense (DOD) for collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs; the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research of the Department of State (DOS); Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence; the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI); the Department of the Treasury (DOT); and the Department of Energy. Currently, all counterintelligence activities occurring outside the US are conducted by the CIA. All counterintelligence activities occurring within the U.S. are conducted by the FBI and are executed according to the Attorney General's Guidelines (AGG) for Domestic Security Investigation as was discussed under DOT/FBI.

Members of the Intelligence Community advise the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) who heads both the Intelligence Community and the CIA, through their representation on a number of specialized committees, namely, the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB), and the Intelligence Community Executive Committee (ICEC), both are chaired by the Director Of Central Intelligence (DCI). The DCI also served as the President's principal adviser on foreign intelligence matters. Both the Director and Deputy Director of the CIA are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.

The CIA was established under the National Security Council (NSC) by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S.C. 401 et. seq.). It now functions under that statute, Executive Order 12333 signed by President Reagan on December 4, 1981, which revoked Executive Order 12036 of President Carter's Administration thus, altering the functions of the Intelligence Community. Executive Order 12333 states the intelligence community's antiterrorist task as the:

Collection of information concerning, and the conduct of activities to protect against international terrorism and other hostile activities
directed against the United States by foreign powers, organ-
izations, persons and their agents.\textsuperscript{156}

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is the only independent agency. Through the office of the Deputy Director for Operations' Counter-terrorist Center, the CIA plays a key role within the United States' antiterrorist intelligence component.\textsuperscript{157} However, the CIA is purely a foreign intelligence organization and has little or no domestic security law enforcement duties. The nature of intelligence operations performed by the CIA requires them to maintain secrecy, therefore, the details surrounding their involvement in counterterrorism remain classified and excludes the possibility of any type of academic in-depth examination in their utility in combating terrorism.

The CIA's work is classified into three general categories: intelligence gathering and analysis; counterintelligence and political intervention in other countries. In combating international terrorism, the CIA supports the overall US Government effort by collecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence on foreign terrorist groups and individuals. It conducts liaisons with the intelligence and security services of friendly governments, shares counterterrorism intelligence information with and, on request, provides advice and training to these services.\textsuperscript{158}

Intelligence gathering is a critical process, which can serve as an essential tool for combating terrorism and provide an invaluable contribution to U.S. policymakers and law enforcement authorities. Intelligence is designed to guide and shape law enforcement policy and strategy through continuous questioning, probing, assessing, reassessing, and evaluating raw data.\textsuperscript{159} Intelligence data
provide the basis for systematic management by identifying potential terrorist
groups, their membership, plans and capabilities.

Political terrorists do not generally possess the strength to launch a direct
attack on their adversary. They thus rely on anonymity, surprise, and guerrilla
tactics to obtain their specific goals. Because terrorist organizations operate
covely, similar methods of investigation and intelligence gathering are necessary
to combat and obstruct their plan. Such methods, according to Siljander, may
include "the use of electronics surveillance techniques, physical surveillance
techniques, physical surveillance of suspects, infiltration of suspect groups by
undercover agents, development of a network of paid informants, and establishment
of computerized dossier systems of suspect and known terrorists."160

No matter what intelligence strategy is utilized in combating terrorism, the
collection, analysis and dissemination of covert and overt information and
intelligence are vital to the success of the United States' antiterrorist efforts. A
possible alternative to the public and bureaucratic constraint placed on the use of
overt operations is the use of secret operatives to carry out actions against
terrorists. Only the President through the recommendation of the National Security
Council (NSC) can authorize the CIA to execute covert operations. Covert actions
are considered when the United States foreign policy objectives may not be fully
realized by normal diplomatic means and when military actions are deemed too
extreme an operation.161 These "covert operations" according to Celmer, were not
formulated until the National Security Council (NSC) established the Office of
Special Projects (OSP) in June 18, 1948. The OSP was directed "to plan and conduct covert operations."\textsuperscript{162} The Office of Special Projects (OSP) which represents the intelligence community's chief operational asset in combating international terrorism, has evolved into the present "Directorate of Operations."\textsuperscript{163}

Covert actions or operations entail such activities as collecting intelligence information, and protecting against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organization, persons, or international terrorists activities.\textsuperscript{164} Since terrorists learn from varied and shared experience and take great precautions to prevent detection or penetration, the CIA's counter terrorism specialists participate actively in developing strategies aimed at combating terrorism through covert operations.

There are several advantages associated with using covert resources to implement foreign policy objectives.

First, it gives the administration wide leverage in dealing with foreign persons and governments without the fear of reprisals from world opinion.

Second, it serves to shield the intelligence establishment from congressional, media and public inquiries.\textsuperscript{165} CIA covert collection of information must use all legal means available, including human resource penetration and physical surveillance, and emphasize linkages between regular criminal investigation and terrorist operations.

Covert military operations launched during the Reagan administration known as Iran-Contra, were a violation of United States law and helped point out flaws in
the system of check and balances. In the Iran-Contra affairs, the agency was implicated in the illegal diversion of money from arms sales to Iran to fund the Reagan Administration’s covert work against Nicaragua. What was most troubling to policymakers and many CIA officials was that the former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), William J. Casey and his covert operators, violated the law and avoided congressional oversight. These revelations and other exposures have caused public outrage and a change of attitude towards the agency’s covert operations. A former CIA member acknowledged that the agency has "lost its credibility." Other critics concluded that the CIA’s directorate of operations which runs covert actions, is becoming less relevant.

Analyzing the CIA’s role during the Cold War and other intelligence inadequacies gave critics more reasons to question the agency’s effectiveness. First, the CIA has been faulted for failing to "foresee the demise of communism" despite years of devotion to assess the military capabilities of the former Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact nations. Second, the agency failed to give sufficient warning to trapped American civilians in Kuwait City of the imminent invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein’s troop.

Third, Griffin stated:

The ongoing revelations about Iran-Contra and the CIA’s dealing with the Luxembourg - based Bank of Credit and Commerce International, which has been linked to drug traffickers and Arab terrorists, have put the agency on the defensive.

He concluded that, "the agency’s overall analysis in recent years has been" according to Allan Goodman "[between abysmal and mediocre]" with the
permeated state of the world, Goodman argued, "[Covert action should be used as an instrument of absolute last resort, rather than one of the early options considered.]"172

The intelligence challenges further raised questions as to if the intelligence community is relying too heavily on satellite and electronics surveillance at the expense of human intelligence collected in the field. The former director for CIA planning and coordination Gary Foster noted: "though the agency possesses extraordinarily sophisticated machines, --the data-collecting ability of this spy technology, far outstrips the capacity of humans to analyze it intelligently." In the Gulf War, Foster emphasized: "the real issue was not if we had the intelligence, but whether we had the capability to use it all."173

The CIA's cold war infrastructure, combined with challenges of the new world order, raises other new questions. At issue is the fundamental question of what a post-Cold War intelligence community should resemble, and what the present role of the nation's spies and analysts should be. Under the CIA's restructuring plan, Senator Daniel P. Moynihan, D-N.Y., while serving as vice-chairman for the Senate Intelligence Committee, advocated abolishing of the CIA.174 In support of the idea, the former head of the CIA's counterterrorism operations Vincent Cannistraro, stated:

Academia and think tanks have at least an equal record in forecasting significant trends and development in the Soviet Union. Some have done better, despite the lack of access to sensitive intelligence data.175

He further suggested the control of political and economic data collection by the
Department of State while the military intelligence and counterterrorism responsibilities be assigned to the Pentagon.\textsuperscript{176}

One of the major legislative initiatives to restructure the intelligence community, introduced by some lawmakers was that of Senator David L. Boren, D-Oklahoma, chairman of the Senate Selected Committee on Intelligence and House Rep. Dave McCurdy, D- Oklahoma. The measures suggested to Congress such changes as:

- A new director of national intelligence to oversee all intelligence operations. With broad statutory powers, and a voice on the National Security Council and authority over spending.

- A new National Intelligence center to take over the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence as well as manage the intelligence analysts now working at the Pentagon, the State Department and other government departments.

- A smaller CIA to restrict the agency to clandestine operations.

- Consolidation of satellite intelligence-collection efforts by the rest of the intelligence community under a deputy director with authority over military and civilian agencies. The deputy's responsibility to include control over the new National Imagery Agency, responsible for all satellite and airborne photographs and the National Security Agency, which intercepts communications around the world.\textsuperscript{177}

Boren argued that ["the DCI has become a captive of the CIA, as opposed to being a coordinator of intelligence from all the community."]\textsuperscript{178}

While others agreed that some intelligence-gathering capability is necessary, critics suggest that the CIA is "ill-equipped for the tasks of the 1990s"\textsuperscript{179} and beyond. Angelo Cordevilla, and other officials in the intelligence field agreed for openness within the intelligence community. The CIA should "operate openly in a
democratic society," and no longer "hide behind the veil of secrecy," and autonomy.
The agency "must function more like a private company and be accountable for its mistakes," experts charged.180

There is a consensus even within the CIA that the intelligence community must cut back on certain intelligence operations. Former President Bush National Security Directive No. 29, in 1991, ordered for a total reevaluation of the mission, role and priorities of the intelligence community, and over twenty departments and agencies projection of their intelligence requirements until the year 2005.181 To meet this order, Robert M. Gates former DCI, implemented the following changes:-

1) Reduce staff in foreign affair and weapons-analysis by over 30-40 percent.

2) Improve coordination between bureaucracies, to reduce duplication of effort, and enhance independence of analysis and to strengthen accountability and

3) Declassify a large number of CIA files, make CIA officials available to Congress, the media and publish more of the agency's assessments.182

Similarly, in an effort to revamp the nation's intelligence community, the House National Security Committee (HNSC), approved the intelligence reorganization bill (HR 3237), on July 17, 1997 after adopting a substitute amendment that eliminated nearly all provisions to increase the authority of the director of the CIA over military-related intelligence.183

The CIA's past challenges were far different than those it must encounter now: for example focusing on small states armed with weapons of mass destruction, virulent local conflicts over ethnic and nationalistic rivalries, drug trafficking and
terrorism, even economic competition from longstanding allies. Goodman, agreed that the agency "should focus on areas where it has a comparative intelligence advantage such as terrorism, nuclear-arms control and narcotics trafficking." 184 For all the fault its critics cite, most experts believe the CIA still serves a valuable function.

Intelligence when used properly, can facilitate a more thorough understanding of the complex phenomena of terrorism and increase the likelihood that appropriate policies and strategies can develop to combat and deter acts of political terror. Without such understanding, insight, and capabilities, however, policymakers and law enforcement authorities must operate in a vacuum, responding to crisis situations in an ad hoc, and unorganized manner. While satellite photographs and other technical data can reveal military movements before attacks, they cannot provide early warning of an enemy's intentions. Therefore, the new intelligence community's top priority should place emphasis on human-source intelligence.

The Department of Defense (DOD)

A number of terrorist incidents have influenced the development of the United States' policy toward domestic and international terrorism. With few exceptions, the US policy to counterterrorism has involved nonviolent pressure tactics designed to persuade countries to desist from supporting terrorist groups. It was not until early 1978 that the Department of Defense (DOD) responded with a determined and coordinated antiterrorist program. 185
The department deals with international terrorism within the context of its approach toward special operations. The two chief civilian offices concerned with special operations in general and international terrorism in particular are the Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs (OASIS) and the Office of the Under Secretary for Policy. The OASIS, through the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (PDAS), "is the office of the Secretary of Defense's focal point for special operations matters" in general and is charged with planning, coordinating and overseeing the Pentagon's antiterrorist program.

In 1978, the Secretary of Defense established a Counterterrorism Steering Committee (CTSC) consisting of the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs as chairman and representatives from the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The committee was designed "to better focus on the problem of international terrorism and to make recommendations to the secretary on policies and procedures to counter the terrorist threat." The committee was also charged with the task of identifying and addressing problems of the overall United States antiterrorist program and, as stated by William Farrell, ensuring that the Department's "interests were adequately represented in the inter-agency arena."

It should be noted that all US military operations are designed for dealing with terrorists outside the United States. All paramilitary operations inside the US fall under the FBI jurisdiction. The Armed Services are prohibited by law from engaging in domestic paramilitary operations. However, should situations occur
requiring the use of armed service personnel, the President in consultation with Congress has the authority to waive statutory restrictions on such operations.¹⁹¹

The DOD military response to international terrorism is under the direction of the Joint Special Operations Agency (JSOA). The main components of the Armed Services' antiterrorist program consist of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Joint Special Operations Agency (JSOA), the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), the Service Intelligence Units (SIU) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).¹⁹² The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have overall jurisdiction for all aspects of the military's response to international terrorism. The JSOC represents the United States' chief antiterrorist operational component and is made up of "thirty special operations units maintained by the military services."¹⁹³ The central component of this vast array of units is the Delta Force, supported by the 160th Aviation Battalion ('Night Stalkers') and the Navy SEAL units.¹⁹⁴ The JSOC's primary function is that of a coordinating body, designed to unify and coordinate the training of the different services' antiterrorist units.¹⁹⁵

The onslaught of terrorist attacks, paralyzing world attention with fear of uncontrolled violence, has caused a public outcry for use of force or military retaliation against terrorists. One of the most important tools a nation can employ in dealing with terrorism is an effective antiterrorist military capability. Military forces can be applied within an overall counterterrorist strategy in the form of retaliation or intervention. The United States can use retaliation to "punish" the perpetrators of terrorist acts, after an incident. The purpose of this action is intended to send a
message to terrorists that there are consequences for their action.

There are two uses of military forces according to Richard H. Shultz, Jr., first, "to rescue US citizens caught up in another nation's civil strife." The second is in "antiterrorist operations to rescue hostages, preempt the destruction of important facilities or resources or retake them from the terrorist."

Former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, in his presentation at the DOD-sponsored 1987 International Terrorism Conference (ITC), articulated the criteria for consideration of military action against states that engage in terrorism. He stated:

Political and economic actions are all the more effective when the terrorist state understands clearly that behind these other measures stands effective military power capable of an appropriate and timely response -- before we commit to military action, there are several key questions we must answer. Primary among them are:

- What are the objectives of such action?

- What are the likely short- and long-term consequences of retaliation not only with regard to the immediate terrorist problem but to larger US interest?

- What are the consequences of failure?

- Are there alternative actions that have not been tried or considered?

- What are the likely consequences of failing to act?

Developing a strategy that includes offensive action requires planning which is selective and procedures which are flexible. Warlaw believes that a policy is
necessary and should allow for finite discrimination between terrorists and responses. He contends, that while terrorists are a menace to an ordered society, a greater danger lies in allowing the fear of terrorist activity to force policy changes by states. Warlaw concluded, "states must be committed to the policy which is the real target of a terrorist attack if they are to provide any true deterrents to future international terrorism."  

Unfortunately, the United States' record in executing commando style raids similar to Israel's Entebbe raid in Uganda has been disappointing. Two early examples could explain the American disappointments. First, the tragic ending of the Iranian hostage rescue mission of April 16-24, 1980 by the Operation Eagle Claw during President Carter's administration. Second, the October 23, 1983 terrorist bombing of the US Marines Barracks in Beirut killing 241 Marines during President Reagan's administration. These incidents and others raised doubts about the US Armed Forces' preparedness to deal with terrorism and the Department of Defense's general understanding of international terrorism.

Congress in 1986 passed the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. It requires the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCOS) "to periodically recommend such changes in the assignment of functions or roles as the chairman considers necessary to achieve maximum effectiveness of the armed forces." After a year of study by a joint team from the Army and Air Force, a late 1986 report indicated that the United States still did not have an effective plan for coping with terrorist attacks. The team insisted that a comprehensive
civil-military strategy to defend U.S. interests at home and abroad from terrorist attacks be developed.

Besides rescue operations and military interventions, the military also performed a number of other important antiterrorist functions. Among them are the execution of counterintelligence operations; issues related to nuclear terrorism and psychological operations.

**Execution of Counterintelligence Operations**

The importance of accurate and current intelligence to units engaging in antiterrorist operations cannot be over emphasized. Counterintelligence (Cl) is perhaps the least understood component of intelligence. Yet, counterintelligence is a prerequisite for an effective intelligence capability. Cl is both information gathered and activities conducted to protect against terrorist activities. Following the conclusion of the Iranian hostage operation, the need for current and accurate intelligence became clear if the military were to deal effectively with international terrorism. In response, the DOD mainly the Army, reviewed and constructed a counterintelligence and counterterrorism program.\(^{202}\)

The success of accurate and cooperative intelligence was well demonstrated by the retaliatory action of the 1986 Libyan raid, and the August 1993 military action on Baghdad, after the Kuwaiti court finding of Iraqi involvement in the assassination attempt on former President Bush. Finally, the Persian Gulf war, also illustrated an unprecedented cooperation among allied intelligence and security services which disrupted much of the international terrorist support structures.\(^{203}\)
Despite steps taken to implement lessons learned during operation Desert Storm and centralized management functions, the existing intelligence structure still largely reflects its Cold War origins. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) continues to assess resources with a few toward providing joint task force commanders with fully operational intelligence support organizations. The agency is also examining the consolidation of some service-level intelligence production responsibilities.

**Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and or Bio-Terrorism**

Another vital function of the Armed Services in dealing with terrorism is related to chemical and biological weapons threat by terrorists. Yonah Alexander noted that today's terrorists are "better organized, more professional and better-equipped than those in the 1970's." He concluded that, "a few sophisticated terrorist groups could use higher leverage tactics to achieve mass disruption or political turmoil." 

Studies by experts in the field also show that terrorists evidently have considered resorting to biological terrorism and are likely to take greater operational risks in the next millennium. As stated by Michael L. Moodie, "the Odds are Increasing," although how much is hard to quantify. Joan Stephenson noted, "there are groups today that are willing to use weapons of mass destruction, including biological agents." Examples cited, are the June 1994 attack by the Aum Shinrikyo in Matsumoto, Japan that killed seven and injured 500. And also the Tokyo Subway killing of twelve with over 5,500 injuries. Although, these were the first instances of large-scale terrorist use of chemical agents, a variety of
incidents and reports for the past two years indicated a growing terrorist interest in Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).\textsuperscript{210}

Terrorist interests in chemical and biological weapons (CBW), as further stated by Yonah Alexander, is not surprising given the relative ease with which some of these weapons can be produced in simple laboratories, than nuclear explosives. He argued that open sources literature and formulas to produce chemical and biological agents can be found at libraries, including access to the internet which provides instructions on how to produce some chemical agents. Once in possession of such information, "a terrorist with some technical know-how, could synthesize toxic chemical agents from raw materials or intermediates."\textsuperscript{211}

In support of Alexander's findings, Oehler stated, "although popular fictions and national attention have focused on terrorist use of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons are a more likely choice for terrorist groups."\textsuperscript{212} Oehler explained terrorist choices in three ways:

1. In contrast to the fabrication of nuclear weapons, the production of biological weapons requires only a small quantity of equipment.

2. Even very small amounts of biological and chemical weapons can cause massive casualties. The fact that only twelve Japanese died in the Tokyo Subway attack de-emphasizes the significance of the 5,500 people who required treatment in hospital emergency rooms. Such a massive influx of injured -- many critically -- has the potential to overwhelm emergency medical facilities even in large metropolitan areas.

3. Terrorist use of these weapons also makes them "weapons of mass disruption" because, of the necessity to decontaminate affected areas before the public will be able to begin feeling safe.\textsuperscript{213}
Both Alexander's and Oehler's findings demonstrated two advantages that biological and chemical weapons have for terrorists. First, is the low cost, ease and speed of production and the fact that they can be developed by individuals with limited education, and second, the reliability and availability of such weapons, which are easier to "disguise and transport than conventional arms." 214

The DOD through the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security Policy, is responsible for protecting the United States' nuclear weapons from terrorist attack. 215 The Armed Services represents the DOD's operational arm in this area. However, the services' role is a supportive one in relation to those of other agencies dealing with nuclear terrorism. 216

The main national security worry associated with international crime has been that "plutonium or highly-enriched uranium" could be stolen from the former Soviet Union and sold internationally in the black market. Several seizures in Germany in 1994 raised concern that such diversions may have already taken place. 217 These concerns and others have resulted in fundamental changes within the organization of the US nuclear forces. Following the presidential nuclear initiatives developed under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Secretary of Defense, the Army and Marine Corps no longer have nuclear weapons, a function for which both have had during the Cold War era. 218

Finally, organizing an aggressive response against unconventional adversaries like terrorists will require further restructuring of the military power to address the threat. However, to achieve this required strategic planning which
includes possible retaliatory strikes and the political will to execute them. It should be noted that many experts disagreed on the application of military force when countering terrorism. Richard Shultz suggested that while the United States recognizes the need to use military force in defense of national interest, there also exists a moral desire to find alternative means to settle differences. Shultz called this the "peaceful application of military force" and, as such, sees great potential in a deterrence strategy.  

Summary

The United States Counterterrorism programs revolved around cooperative efforts between local, state and federal law enforcement agencies and deploy a massive array of tools in attempting to deal with domestic and international terrorism. All the departments and agencies outlined in this chapter represent the core of the US institutional response to terrorism. For example, the Department of State's (DOS) antiterrorist program has the lead role in dealing with international terrorism abroad and does so through an interagency coordination mechanism, while the Department of Justice (DOJ) with its agencies, has a similar lead role in terrorism issues occurring within the United States. Depending on the source of an attack, as many as twenty-five or more U.S. agencies may be involved in investigating and prosecuting suspected terrorists, as was the case in the investigation of the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 and the Oklahoma City federal building in 1995.

Targeting, collecting, analyzing and disseminating form the four distinct
phases of intelligence production for both domestic and international terrorism. The civilian US intelligence community has had some setbacks, including public interagency disputes that many experts worry could affect cooperation between the CIA, which has lead responsibility abroad but is not allowed to collect intelligence domestically, and the FBI, which has lead responsibility domestically and is expanding its efforts abroad. This bureaucratic division of responsibility of counterintelligence between the CIA for foreign matters, and FBI for domestic matters was once a convenient and flexible division of labor. However, no counterintelligence case is wholly foreign or domestic. Presently, no agency in the United States government has total responsibility for most counterintelligence cases. In addition to jurisdictional problems, the intelligence community also has a problem in deciding which counterintelligence organizational structure, staff or centralized line unit, is the most effective. This problem was well documented in the House National Security Committee Intelligence reorganization bill (HR 3237) on July 17, 1996, to expand the power of the director of the CIA at the expense of the Secretary of Defense. The Spencer-Dellums amendment of the bill stripped from the bill the provision to shift the Department of Defense's human intelligence-gathering to the CIA. It reinforced the Secretary of Defense's control over the budget and personnel of military-related spy agencies. The amendment also authorized the "creation of a new agency in the DOD to oversee the government's high-tech imagery and mapping activities, which are now carried out by several agencies, including the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) and the
Pentagon's Central Imagery Office (PCIO). The US intelligence community, however, suffers a number of impediments in responding to terrorism. For example, the surveillance of individuals is seen as infringing upon their basic rights and freedom as was argued by the civil liberties advocates in protest of the antiterrorist bill (S 735) by the Senate and (HR 729) by the House following the World Trade Center bombing. Joseph I. Lieberman, D-Connecticut, stated; "the United States would have to rethink its traditional balance of government power versus individual freedom in light of the Oklahoma bombing," that "without order in our society, there is no liberty." To date, the need for domestic intelligence to curb terrorist activities versus the question of invasion of the constitutional protected rights of American citizens continues to receive cursory examination.

Nuclear weapons are generally deemed the most frightening of the three types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Within the United States, there are three organizations assigned to deal with the technical aspects involved in this threat. The Department of Defense (DOD) has jurisdiction over technical matters involving nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has authority over technical problems involved with a terrorist incident in which nuclear material is used for civilian purposes. The Department of Energy (DOE), is responsible for incidents involving material used for military purposes, but not in the form of a weapon. Finally, the FBI has responsibility for overseeing all domestic terrorist incidents involving nuclear weapons and materials. Criminal diversion of
these nuclear materials into terrorists hands, might well be the single most worrisome proliferation problem. A primary purpose of the Clinton administration's agreement to help Russia dismantle and dispose of the former USSR's nuclear arsenal was to prevent these weapons from reaching terrorists and governments that support them. Unless the United States learns about the diversion of nuclear material, Washington would have more difficulty detecting such a nuclear weapon program since it will not require the large facilities and expense involved in producing missile material.226

There are many obstacles faced by the United States in the formulation of an effective counterterrorism program. With so many law enforcement agencies assigned counterterrorism responsibilities, it is not surprising that agency rivalry has long plagued counterterrorism efforts. For example, because of rivalries between the FBI and ATF at crime scenes where both agencies are present, officers have been known to engage in a {"battle of the field jacket."}227 In the FAA and Custom Service turf rivalry, the FAA is responsible for maintaining security at US airports and requires that personnel with direct access to aircraft and other protected areas wear identification badges to help police keep unauthorized people away. The refusal of Custom officials to wear airport badges, has led to confrontations between custom agents and local policemen.228

Although "turf" consciousness is not the only problem, experts believed that a lack of effective communication between agencies can often mean that agencies on the scene may not know that others are conducting similar investigations. To
eliminate such conflict, the DOS's Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) meets regularly with the Policy Coordinating Committee on Terrorism (PCCT), an interagency group. Since 1990 when the TSWG began coordinating research and development program among all counterterrorism agencies, it has reduced the duplication of efforts. The group has, for example, pooled several projects, once conducted independently by different agencies to develop high-energy gamma ray equipment used in detecting explosive weapons, in cargo containers.\textsuperscript{229}

In sum, by carefully weighing the potential threat, analyzing the nature of the problem and determining the resources available, effective policies can be fashioned within the limits of the law to detect and prevent terrorist activities at home and abroad. From the perspective of intelligence, there are unanswered questions worth debating and more congressional and departmental reforms worth considering. The challenge, however, is to find ways to prevent terrorists from carrying out their plans. This will require that the United States government with its departments and agencies, including the military, assigned counterterrorism responsibilities and continue to devote substantial efforts to prevent terrorist attacks, particularly, at major events such as the 1996 Summer Olympic Games in Atlanta as detailed in Chapter V.
Endnotes:


2. Ibid.

3. U.S. Department of State, President Nixon Establishes Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, Department of State Bulletin (23 October, 1972), 475-480.

4. Ibid., 475-476.


10. Information regarding this concept was documented in The United States Government Antiterrorism Program. An Unclassified Summary Report, prepared by the Executive Committee on Terrorism for the Special Coordination Committee, National Security Council, June 1979, 2-4,7.


19Ibid.


21Ibid., 8 - 9.

22This is an excerpt from the Hearings before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, on Federal Capabilities in Crisis Management and Terrorism. The Statement of Ambassador Anthony Quainton, former Director, Office for Combating Terrorism, 15 August, 1978, 57.


24In the wake of the World Trade Center bombing, President Clinton submitted his Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995 in February and focused on the threat of international terrorism. Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1995, 6-18.


26An excerpt from the FBI Director Louis J. Freeh statement during his testimony before a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on April 27, 1995, Antiterrorism Bill. The Director requested for additional funds and legal powers to
keep pace with terroristic threat. The bill proposed to authorize $2.1 billion over five years for additional investigators and equipments. The largest share, $1.2 billion, was for the FBI, with the rest to be divided among other federal agencies. Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1995, 6-19.

27Ibid.

28Ibid.


33U.S. Senate, International Terrorism, 30.

34U.S. Department of State, International Terrorism, Department GISI, September 1984.

35Laurence Pope, Department Effort to Combat International Terrorism, State Department Dispatch, 26 April, 1993, 299-301.


40Ibid.


45Ibid., 2.


48Ibid.


50Ibid.

51Ibid.

52U.S. Senate, International Terrorism: Hearing on S. 873, 35.


55Ibid., 75.


57Ibid., 567.

58Ibid., 568.

59Ibid., 569.


Farrell, The US Government Response to Terrorism, 93.


This information was documented in "FBI Facts and Figures: A Compendium of General Information about the FBI." Published by the US Department of Justice Office of Public and Congressional Affairs, March 1996, 1-2.

Ibid.


FBI Facts and Figures," Published by the US Department of Justice, March 1996, 5-6.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Revell, "Structure of Counterterrorism Planning and Operation in the United States," 143-144.
78 Ibid.
79 Statement of the FBI, submitted by Larry A. Potts to the Subcommittee on International Affairs and Criminal Justice of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight and the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary, United State's House of Representatives, July 26, 1995.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Revell, "Structure of Counterterrorism Planning and Operation in the United States," 143-144.
89 Ibid.


96 Ibid.

97 Ibid.


100 Ibid.

101 Ibid., 51-52.

102 Ibid., 52.


107 Ibid.


111Ibid.


114Robert P. Cesca, Deputy Inspector General’s Memorandum to Secretary Bentsen, Subject: Department of Treasury’s Waco Administrative Review.


118Ibid.


121Ibid.


123Ibid., 48.


125Ibid., 43-44.


127Ibid., 76.

FAA’s standards for certifying explosive detection systems for screening checked baggage are classified. The certification standard sets criteria for detection, false alarm, and throughput.

Trace devices attempt to detect minute explosive quantities inside luggage or articles due either to contamination or vapors emanating from an explosive.

In Vision’s Technologies, Inc., CTX 5000 series is the only FAA-certified explosives detection system.


Robert Kupperman, is a senior advisor to the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Dr. Kupperman had served as Chief Scientist of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). Special Feature: “Terrorism: A Dangerous Future,” Harvard International Review, 17, no. 3 Summer 1995, 46-47.

Central Intelligence Agency, Factbook on Intelligence, June 1995, 17.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., 11-13.

“Genesis of the CIA,” Factbook on Intelligence, March 1993, 4-5.

Executive Order 12333, 1348. Also see CIA Factbook... 1995, 11.

Executive Order 12333, 1338.


Ibid., 1084-1085.


CIA, Factbook on Intelligence, 35.


Ibid.

Brian Jenkins, “The U.S. Response to Terrorism: A Policy Dilemma,” 5


167 Ibid.


169 Ibid.

170 Ibid.

171 Allan Goodman is the Dean of Georgetown University, School of Foreign Affairs. Quoted in Congressional Quarterly, 11 December 1995, 1075-1076.

172 Ibid.

173 Gary Foster, served as Deputy Director for CIA Planning and Coordination, L.A. Times, 28 May, 1991.

174 Senator Daniel P. Moynihan former Vice Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee was a strong advocate for the abolition of the CIA. National Journal, 21 September, 1991, 2271.


176 Ibid.


178 Ibid., 51. Also see USA Today, 30 October, 1992.

179 Stansfield Turner, “Intelligence for the New World Order,” Foreign Affairs (Fall 1991), 152.


182 Ibid., Also see speech before the Dallas World Affairs Council, 10 November, 1992.


194 Ibid.

195 Ibid.


197 Ibid.


201 Ibid.

202 U.S. Department of the Army, Intelligence: Its Role in Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence Production Division, US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, October 1983, III.


205 Ibid.

206 U.S. Senate, The Chemical and Biological Weapon Threat, statement for the Record by Gordon C. Oehler Director, Non-proliferation Center to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Affairs. 1 November, 1995, 6-8.

207 Michael L. Moodie is the President of the Chemical and Biological Arm Control Institute, a non-profit policy research organization in Alexandria, Virginia.


209 Ibid.

210 Gordon C. Oehler, The Chemical . . . 6-8.


212 Ibid, See U.S. Senate, The Chemical and Biological Weapon Threat, 6-8.

213 U.S. Senate, The Chemical and Biological Weapon Threat, 6.


Ibid.


House National Security Committee approved HR 3237 by voice vote on July, 1996. The US, Senate version of that legislation backed the DOD establishment of the "Mapping Agency" and included other intelligence issues. See Weekly Report, 1884.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid., p. 640.


Ibid.
CHAPTER IV
US INTERAGENCY SECURITY COORDINATION
FOR MAJOR EVENTS IN 1986 AND 1994

This chapter, organized in two parts, examines two past contingency planning and security coordination during: I. The 1986 Statue of Liberty Celebration in New York City, and II. The 1994 US World Cup Soccer Championship in nine cities throughout the United States. The experience gained from these two scheduled major events by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the host cities Police Department, other state and local law enforcement agencies in 1986 and 1994 was worthy of consideration in security planning for other major events, including the 1996 Summer Olympic Games in Atlanta.

I. The 1986 Statue of Liberty Centennial Celebration in New York

Historical Perspective

The Statue of Liberty has become a global symbol of freedom that makes the United States so unique and special. This giant sculpture was given to the United States by the people of France as a gift of friendship in 1886 to honor the idea of liberty. The Lady Liberty is located on Liberty Island, (originally called Bedloe's Island). It is over twenty-five stories tall, and currently, considered the tallest statue in the world. It is composed of one hundred tons of copper, one hundred twenty-
five tons of iron and steel for a total weight of two hundred and twenty-five tons.¹

In 1986, the people of New York State, the United States of America and the world joined to stage a ninety-six hour long centennial birthday party for the Lady Liberty. Approximately, twelve million spectators filled New York's harbor, park and the street to participate in scores of diverse events that accompanied the centennial celebration. Furthermore, millions within and outside the US watched the great event on television. Activities such as the twenty-three square-rigged ships, thirty-three naval vessels from home and abroad, apart from international modern warships paraded the harbor paying tribute to the statue. An estimated 800,000 visitors flocked into Central Park to attend the New York Philharmonic Orchestra concert. The lighting of the statue by former President Reagan, the fantastic firework displays, small water-craft flotillas, crewing competitions and other festivities were among various attractions that provided national and international audience with an unforgettable experience. The "unqualified and all-round success" acclaimed by New York City Police Department, would not have been so successful, without effective inter-agency coordination and implementation of the overall planning strategy.²

Security Planning

The NYPD planning started a year prior to the scheduled date for the event. The department analysts solicited and gained support from an array of law enforcement agencies---NYPD Intelligence Division, the New York Terrorist Task Force, Secret Service, Customs Bureau, Federal Bureau of Investigations, Naval
Investigative Service, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Newark Terrorist Task Force and the Port Authority Police. The New York City Police Chief, Robert J. Johnston, Jr., was given the responsibility of "guiding the project" by Police Commissioner Benjamin Ward. Over sixty law enforcement agencies, the military, public service agencies, utilities and private sectors were represented in approximately 200 conferences to address issues involving division of responsibilities to ensure an uninterrupted celebration.

The issue of terrorism was justifiably given the highest priority. The NYPD Intelligence Division took the lead role in this area. The operational issues resolved during the department and inter-agency meetings were:

1. Allocation of adequate police manpower to fill details at the many separate events that were scheduled to take place;

2. Acquisition of numerous specialized vehicles, aircraft and power boats to assist in the operation;

3. Acquiring portable buildings and vans to serve as temporary headquarters at the twenty two separate locations in the city where activities were scheduled;

4. Developing an effective communications system;

5. Computerization of information and

6. Co-ordination of police and non-police activities.

Once the primary security and inter-agency assignments were made, a preliminary plan of action with all training requirements, responsibilities, timeliness, as well as an operational organization chart was prepared. Specific responsibilities
were assigned to each particular participating group. The NYPD Chief Johnston and his designees were in control of the two thousand square-foot command center. Their function was to facilitate control of field events to ensure that problems were corrected quickly by agencies assigned. In addition to police personnel, the center was staffed with nearly forty non-police high-ranking and well-trained officials from the emergency services organizations, the military service, federal government agencies and public utilities to respond to any conceivable emergency that might arise. For example, the department wanted Con Edison's representative on board, because he could expedite needed services from his company in the event of a power failure. Every representative in the command center could perform similar services within his own areas of responsibilities.

A complete jurisdictional chart to identify agencies with their primary responsibilities to handle terrorist and other incidents in various areas of the harbor was constructed. For example, Liberty Island, Ellis Island and Governor's Island were all federal preserves that were not under the NYPD jurisdiction. Secondly, a portion of the New York harbor is shared between New York City and New Jersey. Thirdly, most of the participating ships under foreign flags were not technically subject to local jurisdiction. However, a Memorandum of Agreement (MAA) was drawn between the police department, the FBI, Coast Guard, Naval Investigative Service, the National Park Service and other governmental agencies which ascertained that necessary actions would be taken regardless of jurisdictional authority. All the planning for the celebration was completed a week prior to the
major events. But, as Chief Johnston expressed, the question was, "would it work?"\textsuperscript{6}

**Potential Threats**

While the planning, training and manpower acquisition phase was taking place, agencies responsible for intelligence made a concerted effort in intelligence gathering, analysis and dissemination protocol. These multi-agency task forces included members of the NYPD's Intelligence Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Secret Service (SS), Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), Naval Investigative Service (NIS), Custom Bureau, Newark Terrorist Task Force (NTTF) and the Port Authority Police (PAP).\textsuperscript{7} These agencies were concerned with which groups pose potential threats of violence, who would be potential targets of violence, what type of weapons would likely be used and what would be the extent of damage to human life and property.

Among the groups that were under close surveillance were: the Libyans, the Chileans and numerous other groups that could utilize violent attention-getting political statements, thereby using the Statue of Liberty celebration to gain attention.\textsuperscript{8} The Libyan threat was the highest on the list, because, the analysts predicted a possible motive or retaliation on their part to earlier US attack in Tripoli.

Should this theory be valid, the next question was, what would the target be? The statue itself? The naval ships? The spectators? The subway system? Then, what means would be used? A portable guided missile launched a mile or more from its target? A "Kamikaze-type" attack from an explosive-laden aircraft? Time bombs left in public places? Perhaps an automatic rifle assault on the public similar
to the disastrous one in the Rome airport several years ago? Libya was certainly a question mark, but it was an obvious one, and to that degree, the threat it posed could at least in same measure be evaluated. Other threats such as an anti-government faction of Chileans, saw the participation of the nation's thirty-seven foot-long barkentine, the "Esmeralda" in the tall ships parade as a symbol of oppression. They claimed that political prisoners aboard the vessel were subjected to torture.9

Another threat posed was within New York where the actual event was staged. One of the warships in the naval review, Iowa, was in the midst of controversy. The ship drew protest from anti-nuclear groups who opposed the Navy announcement to make New York the new home port for the warship. The group claimed that the ship as reported, was armed with nuclear weapons. That report, sparked instant opposition from anti-nuclear groups.10 That opposition alerted the planners of the Iowa's vulnerability to attack. Finally, some twenty-two dignitaries of the one hundred public officials that planned to attend the celebration, including the US President Reagan and the First Lady, the French President Mitterand and the First lady, the US Secretary of State Schultz and former Chief Justice Berger),11 were identified as being at significant risk.

Security Planning Implementation

The Command and Control Center, located in the heart of the NYPD headquarters communication base, was controlled by the Chief of Department who assembled all the complex organizational plans so as to work upon implementation.
This center contained sophisticated communications network, five closed-circuit video feeds mounted on bridges and building tops in and around the harbor. The feeds were also mounted on always-moving police helicopters. The video cameras mounted were constantly scanning the crowd at harbor side and the ships on the waterways, while the specially designed fabricated digital board traced ship movements. Both the cameras and the digital display board, projected images on large monitors inside the command center.12

After one year of intensive planning, in order to convey all theories into practice, over forty agency representatives, together with the NYPD police personnel in the Command and Control Center, conducted a rigorous thirty scenarios command post exercise. These exercises required reactions to all kinds of emergencies—ship collisions, bomb discovery, subway derailment, fires and medical related incidents. It kept the participating members on the alert and made them familiar with one another's operations in order to eliminate confusion about individual and unit roles.13

Operational strategies were: first, the Intelligence Center in conjunction with the New York Terrorist Task Force maintained complete secured communications links to the Interagency Threat Assessment Group (ITAG) within the FBI's New York City headquarters. ITAG responsibility was to analyze all data related to terrorist threats and work closely with the Intelligence Center. It was also responsible for conducting criminal activity investigations and providing an armed tactical response team to challenge terrorists on federal property. Intelligence gathered by member
agencies were analyzed in the center and, if significant, were given to the Chief commanding the center. His job was to assess the immediate threat potential and issue appropriate commands to counter an immediate danger to the public. Meanwhile, backup investigators from the agencies would act on the data and attempt to apprehend persons engaged in criminal activity.\textsuperscript{14}

The second line was providing protective services to event dignitaries, monitoring of high-risk areas and properties. The dignitaries who were at significant risk were assigned individual security details which included, performing bomb sweeps at their hotels and residences. This line was also responsible for continuous operation of numerous motorcades and constant coordination of security details which was aided by computerization of their schedules.\textsuperscript{15}

To secure harbor-based events from interruption, the entire harbor shoreline including piers, parks, and private properties within twenty-five miles, was scrutinized. Extensive aerial and waterside photo surveys were conducted. Isolated and vulnerable locations where terrorist or extremists groups could launch attacks were identified by field commanders and sealed with fencing, others had officers posted or dismantled to prevent access. Naval Investigative Service and police officers were stationed aboard ships. To exercise control of thousands of press reporters and vendors accessing sensitive locations, more than thirteen thousand security clearances were performed by the police department and the Joint Terrorist Task Force. Access to the Command and Control center were restricted to identify special participants through designated elevator. Alternative
security plans were in place to keep a continuous flow of communication, should disaster strike the main center.\textsuperscript{16}

In sum, the NYPD was determined to take every precaution against terrorist attacks. The event concluded with no acts of terrorism or diversion of public attention from Lady Liberty and the symbol of freedom that she represents. The Department took pride in its success and attributed it to their hard work in security planning which made all the preparation worthwhile.

II. The 1994 U.S. World Cup Soccer Championship

Historical Perspective

Starting from June 17 through July 17, 1994, the United States, for the first time, hosted the prestigious World Cup Soccer Championship. From 1930 to the present, the World Cup Soccer games have grown into the world's largest single-sporting event.\textsuperscript{17}

World Cup Soccer is unique due to the global popularity. Nearly one half the world's population, almost two billion people watched the games in stadiums and on television worldwide. The sport holds such importance that some countries have declared national holidays to watch and give support to their team.\textsuperscript{18} Over 141 nations with more than 150 million registered athletes started the elimination rounds in December 1991 to qualify for the 52 match tournaments,\textsuperscript{19} to be played in the United States.

Nine major cities and venues across the United States,\textsuperscript{20} were selected to host the 52 tournaments. The event was officially opened in Soldiers' Field,
Chicago, Illinois on June 17, 1994 and rounded up by the Cup’s final championship game at the Rose Bowl in Pasadena, California. During the month-long event, an estimated 3.5 million people of which 1.5 million accounted for visitors from other nations were in attendance.21

The mere fact that this particular event received international attention, brought concerns among law-enforcement communities as to how the host country - the United States - would prepare to handle this World Cup Championship for the first time. They took into account the extreme intensity of the competition; the number of games within such a short span of time; the diversity and geographic location of the venue sites; and the potential symbolic appeal of the competition to any terrorist group, anti-government factions or individual zealots who would view the events as an excellent opportunity in which to execute a terrorist act in furtherance of a political agenda or national cause, or even to embarrass the host country.

Sport violence is as old as sport itself (Simons and Taylor, 1992). The first documented incident could be dated back to 532 B.C. in Constantinople during a chariot race. Riot fans seized the stadium resulting in a clash between fans and the Roman soldiers and the killing of an estimated thirty thousand people.22

The number of cases of sport-related violence has been increasing since the middle of the eighteenth century. Most of these incidents were directly related to a specific sporting event and took place in or around the arena. However, in some instances, the sporting event was only a trigger that set off a long-standing tension.
For example, in 1910, black boxer Jack Johnson defeated White James Jeffries, which caused an outbreak of racial violence that spread throughout the United States, causing several deaths and many injuries. In a massive riot following a soccer match between Peru and Argentina on May 24, 1964, the modern era witnessed the deadliest of all incidences of fan violence. Over three hundred eighteen people died and about five hundred or more were injured.

The sport of soccer has long been plagued by a history of spontaneous violence and organized rioting instigated by "hooligans" which have been prevalent at almost every large competition in recent history. Within the past twenty-five years, a great number of European countries have experienced major problems in connection with soccer matches and tournaments. Most of these acts of soccer-related violence, have long been associated with "hooliganism." Hooligans are career criminals who envision themselves as an extension of the team. Their primary purpose in soccer matches or tournaments is to conduct criminal behaviors, such as assaults, robbery, rape, public drunkenness, public disorder and police interference.

In a report by Lord Justice Peter Taylor to the British Parliament on the 1989 Hillsborough Stadium disaster, in which 95 people were crushed and trampled to death and more than 400 injuries during the Cup final between Liverpool and Nottingham, Forest noted:

During the 1970s, hooligan behavior became a Scourge at and around football (soccer) grounds. Rival fans abused and fought with each other on the terraces. The pitch was invaded, sometimes to facilitate the fighting, sometimes in an attempt to abort a match.
by whose team was losing, and on occasions to display anger and seek to assault a referee or player who had incurred displeasure. Throwing missiles, either at a player or a policeman or at a rival fan, became another violent feature. When the police responded by searching fans for missiles on entry, the practice grew of throwing coins (which could not be confiscated). Sometimes the coins were sharpened in advance to make them more damaging.26

Of course, the police in Europe have in different ways tried to manage the crowd control problems endemic to soccer matches. At the same time, some groups have done their best to outwit the police and circumvent the security measures undertaken to return soccer to its position as a spectator sport followed for entertainment and pleasure, rather than an opportunity for violence. All the mentioned catastrophes and other somber lessons had a great impact on the European soccer championships held in Germany in 1988 and the World Soccer Championships in Italy in 1990 and the 1994 World Cup Championships was not an exception.

The phenomenon of soccer "hooliganism," other soccer-related violence, including an attempt by terrorist groups to disrupt the events, presented numerous challenges to the FBI and other law-enforcement agencies.

Security Planning

The FBI began preparations more than two years prior to the event, in order to address the special security concerns inherent with hosting such a major international sporting event in the United States. The FBI worked closely with other law-enforcement counterparts and local officials to coordinate the planning for
policing the 1994 World Cup tournaments at each of nine venue sites, in an effort to identify key areas of potential concern and implement effective security counter-measures. During the two year preparation, the planners covered such topics as strategic international police cooperation, intelligence gathering, tactical concepts, cooperation with the Union of European Football Association (UEFA) and the different local organizers, arena security and match liaison.27

Since European police agencies have dealt with soccer and its associated problems for many years, it was important that the US law enforcement agencies learn from their experience. Representatives of the state and local law enforcement agencies associated with the nine venue sites, as well as FBI field offices, received briefing and lectures from recognized European experts in soccer-related violence. For example, additional physical security measures not generally employed in the United States were studied for their applicability during the 1994 World Cup. Of course, application of innovative security techniques was also tempered by American sensibilities. Alan Rothenberg, chairman of World Cup USA '94 declared, "This is America. This is not a police state, and we are not going to turn it into one" because of the problems associated with soccer.28

Extensive coordination efforts within and among each of the nine venue sites such as the host cities and other law enforcement agencies responsibilities were put in place. This included a close working relationship with the World Cup USA '94 Coordination Committee, as well as with key European police agencies. Addressing the FBI conference at the FBI Academy in 1992, Chief Lars Nylen of
...from our own experience, we also knew that suddenly the host nation could get infected with... Hooligan fever-a virus spread by published stories and rumors and encouraged by the reality that threats and riots do happen now and then...a fever that makes even the most disciplined police force ready to respond with violence or sheer frustration if goaded beyond a certain point by assault, stone throwing, and obscene abuse. To the ordinary police officer without any experience of soccer problems, it can be hard to understand the difference in criminal supporter behavior and the behavior of terrorists or professional rioters. To avoid...police actions that produce more disorder than [they] prevent, we had to make sure that the police did not fall ill with Hooligan fever. Our medicine was good, timely and accurate information, education and training.29

That became the basis for the establishment of an effective intelligence base to identify potential acts of violence.

In January and April 1993, the FBI hosted two additional conferences with other US federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Assisted by the World Cup USA Committee, the FBI was able to address the unique security considerations of World Cup soccer. For example, issues concerning disorderly and criminal behavior are predictable. In such situations, there is always a build-up period. The police, especially the tactical commander, must be able to "read the crowd," identify early warning signals and pinpoint those actions that incite reaction.30 It was also noted that, good planning, trained and experienced law enforcement personnel, good observation skills, proper tactical interventions and good police management will make it possible to counteract an extremely negative and difficult-to-handle situation.
Even more importantly, it was the beginning of a coordinated US federal government approach to support local law enforcement for the 1994 World Cup. One key facet of federal support for World Cup efforts was the provision of assistance by the Defense Department's Office of Special Events. To ensure that major special events are conducted in a safe and secure manner, the US Congress empowered the Office of Special Events to assist local law enforcement agencies in security preparations.\(^{31}\)

The integration of military personnel into soccer security operation required extensive planning. Local and military planners were to work together to resolve staffing challenges regarding availability of military personnel and their respective support roles. This assistance ranged from providing advice on security planning issues to actually loaning security-related equipment and assets. The DOD was to assign hundreds of soldiers mostly state-activated National Guardsmen, to support the host city police departments.\(^{32}\)

Through the final game of the World Cup Soccer Championships, the FBI closely coordinated assistance to local law enforcement with the Office of Special Events thus meeting all the security planning needs.

Potential Threats

As the 1994 World Cup was an event of international importance, the United States was concerned not only with Hooliganism but with the threat of terrorism. Since the Munich, West Germany tragedy, elaborate security measures have become an integral part of the preparations for a special event. With the rapidly
changing world situation, as well as the fact that the United States did not know which countries would qualify to participate in the World Cup until December 1993, it was difficult to assess the terrorism threat level during the planning period. As such the threat assessment process was set to evolve throughout the matches. The assessment process includes developing an understanding of the problem, maintaining effective coordination and establishing the necessary intelligence base.

Although, there had not been a terrorist attack at an international sporting event since the killing of Israeli athletes by Arab terrorists at the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich, Germany, the potential did exist for this event, perhaps, at a lower probability than that of Olympics. The absence of a terrorist attack in the past might be due to the global popularity of the sport. The fear of jeopardizing their current immigration status; fundraising capabilities, recruitment opportunities, propaganda activities to support their cause and freedom of assembly within the United States. Second, in 1994, United States law enforcement successfully apprehended and convicted several fugitives wanted for their involvement in terrorist activities. For example, on March 4, 1994, four of the six defendants indicted were convicted on all thirty-eight counts against them, including conspiracy to bomb targets in the United States, the bombing of the World Trade Center and the use of explosive devices,\(^{33}\) including the arrest and conviction of members of Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) in the United States.

The domestic terrorist groups that were struggling for Puerto Rico's independence from the United States were under scrutiny. These groups have been
responsible for the majority of terrorist incidents perpetrated by domestic terrorism groups within the United States. But during 1993 and 1994, no acts of terrorism were committed by these groups as compared to five terrorist acts in 1990, decreasing to four in 1991 and again, only one act of terrorism in 1992. This apparent decrease may be due, in part, to the November 1993 political plebiscite held in Puerto Rico in which a plurality of Puerto Ricans voted to maintain their commonwealth status. The election result appeared to have deflated the independence movement of Puerto Rican nationalists, minimizing terrorist threats from these groups.

Additional areas of concern stemmed from intense soccer rivalries between country teams, who could spawn the types of violence commonly seen at soccer games throughout the world. Existing ethnic rivalries, territorial disputes, or historical differences between countries could also be fueled by their participation in the 1994 World Cup Soccer Championship. Physical security concerns within the venue and event sites, encompassing areas of potential vulnerability to terrorist threats, or acts of random violence, were carefully weighed. The unique challenges presented by World Cup Soccer resulted in a coordinated law enforcement effort directed at countering any potential threat designed to disrupt the event. In the capacity as lead agency in combating terrorism in the United States, the FBI sought to assess the potential threat that the 1994 World Cup Soccer could pose. In addition, the massive media coverage afforded by this event could have been viewed by international or domestic terrorist groups as an excellent forum to stage
In analyzing the potential for soccer-related violence during a 1992 FBI conference at the FBI Academy, the phenomenon of soccer hooliganism presented numerous concerns to the FBI and US law enforcement officials. One consideration by experts was that the sheer cost and the great distances involved may preclude travel by violence-prone individuals (hooligans). In one of the many sessions, Adrian Appleby noted "There is no doubt about whether they will come. They are planning to come now!" He explained that the hooligans traveled further, at greater expense, during the 1992 European Soccer Championships in Sweden. In addition, promotional packages and travel incentives already in existence may further facilitate the travel of fans, including the hooligan element to the nine venue sites for the World Cup.  

These hard-core English hooligans are considered to prepare to attack the police in the absence of other targets, but even they are more opportunists than terrorists. Experience shows that, at heart, the troublemakers are cowards who give up when faced by professional police intervention. They start something only when they believe that have a chance to succeed.  

The lack of violent terrorist activity in the United States in 1994 was more an outcome of increased awareness and security countermeasures than decreasing threat. The February 1993 bombing attack on the World Trade Center in New York clearly showed that the threat of terrorism in the United States is real and potentially lethal.
Security Planning Implementation

The primary jurisdiction for venues site security rests with local law enforcement authorities, in all the nine venue sites. While the Europeans have had tremendous success in quelling violence within soccer arenas, in many cases the violence has left the stadium and moved into the surrounding neighborhoods. This is further aggravated by the sheer scope of the competition - fifty-two matches scheduled across the United States during a one-month period. As such, security challenges were faced by not only the local jurisdictions surrounding venue sites, but adjacent jurisdictions and other sites where national teams were residing for the matches.38

The establishment of a low threshold for intervention in the form of selected arrests; extracting leaders, agitators, and violent persons from the crowd served to defuse any form of aggression and deter further violence. This was accomplished through the designation of a special arrest team, which worked in close cooperation with undercover officers, documentation teams, and international liaisons. Due to the cooperative efforts of the FBI and US law enforcement, no dramatic incident of soccer-related "hooliganism" or terrorist acts of violence dampened the event.39

Although Americans are often passionate supporters of their favorite football, basketball and baseball teams, the United States has never experienced the level of emotional involvement in athletic competition that is associated with the World Cup. Currently, with the 15.9 million participants in the United States, soccer has become the second most popular sport among young people in America.40
An unfortunate by-product of the enthusiasm and favor associated with soccer is the phenomenon of soccer-related violence. Although most of the violence associated with soccer is minor, there is some directly related organized criminal activity, which has come to be known as "hooliganism." The soccer match and hooligans' role as spectators are secondary to the violence. It is not uncommon for a core group of fifteen to twenty hooligans to incite a large crowd of a hundred or more to riot.41

After-event reports concerning the security arrangements and World Cup Soccer incidents, however, regard problematic any World Cup Soccer championship in recent history, despite the tremendous attendance and support from the American people, competition from major league baseball and little tradition among Americans for the game soccer.

**Summary**

By reviewing and evaluating past contingency planning and security coordination, the knowledge gained from the successful conduct of scheduled major events in 1986 and 1994 by the FBI, the host city police department and other law enforcement agencies were accumulated and shared among counterpart agencies charged with similar security planning during the 1996 Summer Olympic Games in Atlanta.

Although the two major events were scheduled in ten US cities, the security planning and coordination strategies were similar in nature. As lead agency for counterterrorism in the United States, the FBI played a key role in all of the security
planning for the two special events, which received a high degree of visibility both
domestically and internationally.

The FBI, in coordination with its law enforcement counterparts and local
security officials, successfully implemented effective security countermeasures
designed to counter any potential threat devised to disrupt the (1986 Statue of
Liberty Celebration and the 1994 World Cup Soccer Championship) events,
including international and domestic terrorist or soccer-related violence.

Chapter V will include assessment of the security arrangements and
implementation of the 1996 Centennial Olympic Games in Atlanta, its security
problems resulting in the bombing of the Centennial Park on July 29, 1996, and a
proposal to reduce the probability of future Olympic tragedy.

Endnotes:

1 It will take a total number of 250 cars (each weighing 2,000 pounds), piled
on top of one another to equal the weight of the Statue of Liberty. Cited from World

2 J. Johnson, Jr., “Security Arrangements of the Statue of Liberty

3 Ibid., 33-34.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid., 34.

6 Ibid., 37.

7 Ibid., 34.


The host cities were, Boston at Foxboro Stadium, Chicago at Soldiers' Field, Dallas at the Cotton Bowl, Detroit at the Silverdome, East Rutherford at Giant Stadium, Orlando at the Citrus Bowl, Pasadena at the Rose Bowl, San Francisco at Sanford Stadium, and Washington D.C. at R.F. Kennedy Stadium.


Nylen, “Policing Major Soccer Events,” 42.


Chief Lars Nylen of Polisen Uppsala, Sweden, one of the European experts in soccer related violence. Nylen addressed the FBI conference at the FBI Academy in 1992. Sweden was the last site of the European Soccer Championship (Euro 92). As the central institution for Swedish law enforcement, the Swedish National Police Board coordinated the planning for policing Euro 92.

Ibid.

Gallagher, “Preparing for the 1994 World Cup Soccer Championship.” 41.

Ibid.

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Terrorism in the United States,” 3.

Ibid., 10.

Ibid., p. 17.

Ibid., 16.

A statement by Adrian Appleby the Chief of the National Football Intelligence Unit in London during the 1992 conference at the FBI Academy, cited in Gallagher, “Preparing for the 1994 world Cup Soccer Championship,” The Police Chief (March 1994): 39-44.

Nylen, “Policing Major Soccer Events,” 41.

Gallagher, “Preparing for the 1994 World Cup Soccer...,” 39.


CHAPTER V

ATLANTA, GEORGIA: THE SITE OF THE 1996 OLYMPIC GAMES

In Atlanta Georgia, substantial contingency planning and security coordination was undertaken prior to the 100th Anniversary of the Summer Olympic Games beginning July 20th through August 4th, 1996. The Atlanta Olympic security success was then dependent upon creative planning, cooperation and extremely close coordination among the dozens of community agencies.

This chapter reviews the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games organization, security planning and coordination by the Atlanta Police Department (APD) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in conjunction with other US law enforcement agencies charged with similar responsibilities during the Games. Security organization for the Games is represented in three phases: The Developmental Phase, the Experimental Phase, and the Operational Phase. These plans served as a blueprint for security operations during the 1996 Centennial Games in Atlanta.

Detailed narratives as to the organization, the security planning and coordination by law enforcement agencies for this event, begins with a historical perspective of how Atlanta bid for and won the hosting of the 1996 Games.

Historical Perspective

Atlanta, Georgia (Appendix A), was one of the fourteen US cities lobbying for the right to merely bid for the Games of the XXVIth Olympiad. This great historic
event was very significant to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the athletes because 1996 marked the 100-year anniversary of the modern Olympics. Conventional wisdom held that the centennial event would surely be awarded to Athens, Greece, site of the 1896 Games to commemorate its anniversary. It was after all, ancient Greece where the first recorded Games occurred in 776 B.C. and it was in Athens where the Games were reborn, through the efforts of a young Frenchman, Baron Pierre de Coubertin, in 1896.¹ Based on the aforementioned reasons, most insiders assumed naturally that Athens, Greece, the Olympic birthplace and sentimental favorite, would be awarded the Centennial Olympics' hosting in 1996. As summarized by Bill Payne, "in many ways, history and sentiment were against us."²

Certain considerations such as, a strong backing for a candidate city by all the levels of its government, and the demonstration of thorough arrangements to cover any eventual loss, increases the chances for selection as host city for the Games by the International Olympic Committee's (IOC). In addition, the city's organizing abilities, coupled with existing sports facilities, hotel capacity and a reliable transportation system were cited as prerequisites for endorsement and nomination by the United States Olympic Committee (USOC).³

In February 1987, an Atlanta attorney William Porter (Billy) Payne, approached the then Mayor Andrew Young about the possibility of the city bidding to host the 1996 Summer Olympics. Three years later, Bill Payne emerged as President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Atlanta Committee for the
Olympic Games (ACOG) in 1990. Through his leadership and the cooperation of three African-American Atlanta Mayors (former Mayor Andrew Young, Mayor Maynard Jackson and then incumbent, Mayor Bill Campbell) who strived to represent the continuity in the growth process of Atlanta, the dream of hosting the 1996 Olympics in Atlanta became a reality.

Although, Atlanta had never bid for an Olympics before, and no city in the last fifty years had won the right to stage this great event in its first attempt, Payne was optimistic that he would somehow bring Atlanta and the rest of the world the best Olympics of all times. Chaired by Payne and co-chaired by Andrew Young, ACOG became a private, not-for-profit corporation that was expected to deliver not only the Olympic Games, but everything related to it including building new facilities, communications, corporate services, Games' services, host broadcasting, licensing, marketing Olympic programs and operations and most of all, providing security for the Games. Among the fourteen of the US bidding cities, Atlanta, Georgia and Minneapolis, St. Paul, were the only semi-finalists selected by the United States Olympic Committee (USOC). The USOC which is responsible for promoting and encouraging the Olympic movement within the country in Spring 1988, officially nominated Atlanta to bid for the Games citing, the city's organizing track records and the existing infrastructures.

Starting September 12 through 21, 1990, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) - the nonprofit Organization entrusted with the control and development of the Olympic Games, with its eighty-seven members met in Prince
Tokyo's Takanawa Hotels to select one city from among six (Athens, Greece; Atlanta, Georgia; Belgrade, Yugoslavia; Manchester, England; Melbourne, Australia and Toronto, Canada), to stage the 100th-anniversary celebration of the modern Olympic Games in the Summer of 1996.

On September 18, 1990, with a vote of fifty-one to thirty-five on its fifth ballot, the IOC selected Atlanta over Athens and the Games of the XXVIth Olympiad, the Centennial Games was awarded to "the City of Atlanta." This award returned the Summer Olympic Games to the United States for the second time in just over a decade, after being host on three previous occasions: 1904 in St. Louis, 1932 in Los Angeles (LA), and 1984 again in LA, since the Modern Games began in 1896.

The state of Georgia with 7,055,000 people, ranks tenth among the fifty states of the United States in population. It is the largest state east of the Mississippi, and is larger than any other state in the southeastern region of the United States. Georgia has a 59.441-square mile area, with a 109-square mile population density. The state is 320 miles furthest North to furthest South and 410 miles furthest East to furthest West, stretching from the picturesque foothills of the Appalachian Mountains to the golden beaches of the Atlantic Ocean. It is boarded by South Carolina, Florida, Alabama and Tennessee.

The state of Georgia is grouped into four special geographic areas: Georgia's Mountains in the extreme north of the state, Georgia's Metropolitan Atlanta in the upper middle, Georgia's Historic South in the central to lower middle and Georgia's Beaches on the seaboard in the lower southeast of the state. Within
these areas, the state is divided into nine travel regions as shown in figure 1 above: Historic High County Region, Northeast Georgia Mountains Region, Atlanta Metro Region, Presidential Parkways Region, Historic Heartland Region, Classic South Region, Magnolia Midlands Region, Plantation Trace Region and Colonial Magnolia Midlands Region, Plantation Trace Region and Colonial

Figure 1. Georgia Regional Map

Courtesy of Carl Vinson Institute of Government. The University of Georgia.
Coast Region. Georgia is known as the "Peach State," (named for King George II of England), and nicknamed "The Empire State of the South." The gold dome on the Capitol was mined from Dahlonega, Georgia, the site of the first gold rush in North America. Georgia is the home of two former U.S. Presidents - Jimmy Carter and the late Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

The first ever held Summer Games on the East Coast, was the largest peacetime gathering organized, including 16,000 athletes from over 197 countries around the world, 17,000 press, 8.5 million ticketed spectators, and infusion of an estimated 400-500 thousand daily visitors to the Metropolitan Atlanta area.

During the two-week period, the athletes were involved in two hundred fifty-four competitions in over twenty-eight sporting events. An astounding 3.5 billion, (more than half the world's population), watched the biggest-ever Olympic extravaganza through television transmission, radio broadcasts, and newspaper coverage. This is the only such event that had the entire world's attention. The event hosting was very significant to Atlanta as noted by John A. Lucas (1992), "the summer of 1996, marked exactly 132 years after General Sherman's army burned Atlanta to the ground," during the Civil War.

Regional Review

Atlanta is the largest city in the state of Georgia, with a population of 2.9 million. The Olympic Games of 1996 held in Atlanta, Georgia according to reports, were equal to "twenty Super Bowls occurring simultaneously." Although, the city has a track record for accepting tough challenges and prevailing by sheer
enthusiasm, the vast number of participants, spectators along with the resident Olympic spectators, experienced one of the most complex, geographically dispersed Olympic Games sites in Olympic history. A record number of visitors descended upon the city to test Georgia's legendary southern hospitality. Atlanta would not be all it is today without the contribution by prominent Atlantans and corporations such as: its home grown corporate giant; the Coca-Cola company, the creator of the Cable News Network (CNN), ("the high-tech, fast-paced, state-of-the-art international news broadcasting"), and owner of two professional sports teams - Ted Turner; its first black Georgian elected to Congress since the Civil War, Mayor of Atlanta, 1981-1989 and a key member of the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games (ACOG)-Andrew Young; the famous author of the book, "Gone with the Wind" - late Margaret Mitchell and with its reputation as "the putative capital of the American civil-rights movement" accredited to the world renowned civil rights leader, Martin Luther King Jr.16

The twenty-six Olympic Games venues were concentrated in the heart of the city of Atlanta. Some venues were located in other Georgia counties as well as three other states and the District of Columbia.

Within the Atlanta area in Figure 2, a three mile (5 kilometer) imaginary circle with the central Atlanta business district at its center, called the "Olympic Ring." The ring covered the Georgia World Congress Center, the Olympic Stadium, the Atlanta Fulton County Stadium, the Olympic Family Hotel, the Olympic Village, the Olympic Center (including the International Broadcast Center, Georgia Dome,
Georgia World Congress Center and the Omni), the Centennial Olympic Park and the Atlanta University Center.

Other Georgia venues outside of Atlanta were: Stone Mountain Park, located

Figure 2. The Olympic Ring

Courtesy of the Atlanta Police Department (APD)
16 miles (25.6 kilometer) east of Atlanta, hosting tennis, archery and cycling competitions; while beach volleyball was held at Atlanta Beach in Clayton County located south of Atlanta. Soccer semifinals and finals, preliminary rounds of volleyball and rhythmic gymnastics were held in historic Sanford Stadium on the campus of the University of Georgia in Athens, located fifty miles (85 kilometers) northeast of Atlanta. Exciting equestrian and mountain biking competition were held at the Georgia International Horse Park - Conyers, located thirty-three miles (53 kilometers) east of Atlanta. Women's softball was held on the banks of the Chattahoochee River, Golden Park in Columbus, Georgia, located one hundred-five miles (168 kilometers) southwest of Atlanta. The scenic Lake Lanier located near Gainesville, Georgia, fifty miles (88 kilometers) southeast of Atlanta, was the site for rowing and sprint canoe/kayaking. The historic Wassaw Sound in Savannah located two hundred forty-eight miles (398 kilometers) southeast of Atlanta along the coast of Georgia featured Olympic yachting.

Out of state venues were: white-water slalom canoe/kayaking at Polk County, Tennessee located one hundred-thirty miles (209 kilometers) on the Ocoee River, northwest of Atlanta. Preliminary and quarter-final soccer matches were hosted in other cities around the United States: at Legion Field - Birmingham, Alabama located one hundred forty-six miles (235 kilometers) west of Atlanta; the Orange Bowl - Miami, Florida, located six hundred seventy miles (1072 kilometers) south of Atlanta; Citrus Bowl - Orlando, Florida, located four hundred forty-seven miles (715 kilometers) south of Atlanta and RFK Stadium - Washington, D.C. located six
hundred forty-two miles (1027 kilometers) northeast of Atlanta. The four Olympic Villages within the state of Georgia were divided between Atlanta, Athens, Columbus, and Savannah. The main village was the biggest and best ever. The eight building complex built within the five kilometer radius of the Olympic Ring located at the Georgia Institute of Technology in Atlanta, with more than 5,400 beds, housed the majority of the 16,000 athletes, coaches, and other officials. In addition to the four primary Olympic Villages were other satellite sites outside the state of Georgia to house competitors in venues such as Birmingham, Miami, Orlando, and Washington D.C. Due to the vast area of the Olympic Games sites, planners were faced with an enormous task of providing security.

**Socioeconomic and Racial Issues**

Some of the problems which confronted ACOG and the Olympic planners within the region were politically driven. For example, many of the major Game sites, as well as the Olympic Village, were located in economically depressed racial areas. With the problem of unemployment and high crime rates ever present in the Metropolitan Atlanta areas, Olympic organizers were forced to address those issues. The announcement by Billy Payne that monies realized will only be spent on Olympic Games preparation and not on urban development, drew fierce opposition from the black community in Summer Hill.

To address the issue of financial support for poor communities, the National Association of Black Journalists in its panel discussion on "African-Americans and the Olympic Movement," stressed the lack of support from ACOG since most of the
Olympic venues were being built in African-American neighborhoods. For example, the main Olympic Village, where most of the athletes, coaches and officials were housed during the Games, was in the Techwood area at Georgia Tech.\textsuperscript{18} Atlanta activists charged that thousands of poor people were being displaced from their Techwood/Clark Howell homes, while the homeless were subjected to repressive measures in violation of their civil rights as the city prepared for the Games. Activists Ed Loring explained that the Atlanta Housing Authority deliberately allowed the Techwood homes to deteriorate to fulfill what Coca-cola and Georgia Tech's dreamed about -- "getting rid of the poor."\textsuperscript{19} Another very sensitive issue was that of the two stadiums where "neighborhood residents had substantial input."\textsuperscript{20} The Fulton County stadium, according to complaints, helped to bring the neighborhoods down rather than improve them as was intended. The new Olympic stadium which was to be razed after conversion, was to fit better into its surrounding.

The selection of Atlanta as an Olympic city created the right political climate to justify the demolition of the project. Although refuted by the city officials and members of the Atlanta Committee for the Games, the ACLU of Georgia filed a suit challenging the constitutionality of Atlanta's parking lot, city nuisance ordinances passed after it was awarded the Olympics in 1990. The new laws prohibit people from occupying vacant buildings, or "sleeping in parks, on the grass or on benches."\textsuperscript{21}

Another controversial issue during the preparation period was the Georgia state confederate flag which blacks claimed invoked memories of slavery. A bill by
Governor Miller before the Senate legislature to have the flag changed before the Games failed. These socioeconomic and racial issues, heightened the security concern for the Olympic planners.

Organizational Structure for the Games

The establishment of an Olympic Organizing Committee prior to planning for the Games, was to meet the requirements set forth in the Olympic Charter - the document that establishes the main requirements for the organization of the Olympic Games.\(^\text{22}\) Immediately following the selection of the city of Atlanta, by the IOC in September 1990, the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games (ACOG) was incorporated in 1991 to plan and stage the Games.\(^\text{23}\) The delegation of its responsibilities under the Olympic Charter to ACOG by the City of Atlanta and the entrustment of its responsibilities to organize the Games to ACOG by the United States Olympic Committee (USOC), empowered ACOG to plan and stage the Games on behalf of the City of Atlanta and the USOC.

Security provision for the Games was organized into two primary bodies, one existing under the auspices of the Olympic Organizing Committee, and the other comprised of the participating law enforcement leaders from the local, state, and federal departments and agencies. These two security organizations have separate but overlapping functions. The Olympic Organizing Committee's private security was responsible for its assets and the Olympic family; enforcement of the rules, regulations and procedures necessary for the safe presentation of the Games; and coordination of certain security-related efforts of other groups. To accomplish their
functions, ACOG security functions were satisfied by two groups - private security and volunteers.

Once ACOG's private security role was defined, a written commitment was drafted to acknowledge the assignment and organization of its security services. If for any reason the organizing committee fails to meet its security commitments, the law enforcement community will then inherit the shortfalls. The local, state, and federal law enforcement contingent was responsible for public safety and the general well-being of people and property during the Games. It was specifically responsible for responding to threats or acts that may affect persons or property in any aspect of the Olympic Games.

In Atlanta, the interagency planning structure, figure 3, was known as the Olympic Security and Support Group (OSSG), which comprised of over forty agencies. OSSG was organized based on the "Olympic Model."24 The Olympic Model is based on an interagency committee process. The OSSG mission was to develop a "master security plan" that would serve as a blueprint for agencies providing Olympic security services.25 At the top of the figure, the Atlanta Police Chief Beverly Harvard and the Georgia Commissioner of Public Safety Colonel Sid Miles jointly chaired the OSSG. The Olympic Security Planning and Coordination Committee (OSPCC), was organized from the OSSG and was responsible for the day-to-day management of the OSSG planning process. This included overseeing work performed by the nineteen subcommittees and the staff support arm, referred to as the Integrated Planning Group (IPG). The most important structure, was the
OLYMPIC SECURITY SUPPORT GROUP
Co-Chair
Colonel Miles, GSP  Chief Harvard, APD

OLYMPIC SECURITY PLANNING COORDINATION COMMITTEE
Major Jon Gordon, APD

INTEGRATED PLANNING GROUP

Agency Planning Office
Venue Planning

Accreditation  Aviation  Community Relations
Communication  Criminal Justice  Dignitary Protection
EOD  Fire & EMS  Infrastructure
Intelligence  International Entry  Intransit
Site Survey  Media  Public Safety
Tactical  Traffic  Training
Village

Figure 3. Olympic Security Planning Structure

Courtesy of the Atlanta Police Department
establishment of the Atlanta Police Olympic Agency Planning Office (APO), by a written special order signed by the Atlanta Police Chief Harvard in June 1993. The mission of the APO was to manage and coordinate all agency preparations for the 1996 Olympic Games including performing its normal police services as well. The APO was organized to also work closely with Olympic Planners - ACOG, OSSG, OSPCC, IPG and other law enforcement agencies in providing Olympic security services. In short, the Atlanta Police APO was the primary organizing unit responsible for developing and implementing approved plans supporting the 1996 Olympic Games. The APO was the accountability center that managed all of the tasks required to be completed in preparation for providing Olympic security services. In this capacity, it served as a clearinghouse as well as an Olympic resource center for the rest of the department.

During the 1996 Games, the Operational Phase was set in motion approximately two weeks prior to the 1996 Olympic Games opening ceremonies, with the exception of the Olympic intelligence functions which were initiated months earlier in order to monitor national and international events with potential bearing on security preparations. Although the Developmental and Experimental Phases often overlapped, all three phases were closely linked and inter-related. Finally, the organization of the Games into these three phases was critical to the city of Atlanta law enforcement agencies and their counterparts since it generally follows the sequence of events regarding Olympic security preparations and implementation.
Security Threat Assessment for the Games

Threat is a measure of how likely a subject is to succeed in carrying out some activity that may cause harm. Threat is based on an assessment of the subject's intent and capability. Threat assessment then, is the collection and collation of all available intelligence, both classified and unclassified concerning the subject. To Olympic security planners, the threat posed by terrorism is transforming and can, at times intensify in direct relation to changes in political, social and economic situations occurring around the world. In essence, the terrorist threat is ever present.

The threat of terrorism during the Games in Atlanta was grouped into three distinct categories: the international terrorist organizations that have demonstrated their capabilities to function within the United States, the domestic groups that have been active over the past decade, and the racially-oriented/radical groups depending upon their motivation.

Security considerations for the Olympic Games have evolved over the years, but a philosophy for Olympic security emerged nearly a quarter of century ago following the Munich "black hooded assassin" at the Olympic village. This tragedy and recent terrorist attacks demonstrated not only the increased threat but also the changing nature of terrorism. According to Brian Jenkins, "there is an identifiable and fairly high level of anxiety" about terrorism among the general public, that "the threat assessment is close to an all-time high." Jenkins and ACOG continued to debate whether foreign or domestic terrorism posed the greater risk.
Security officials with ACOG, according to Ron Martz, were "reluctant to
discuss security preparation, --- and they wouldn't point out specific groups that
might target the Games." But terrorist experts meeting in Chicago to explore
trends in international and domestic terrorism agreed that the militant Middle
Eastern groups, particularly radical Muslim fundamentalists opposed to the peace
process between the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel's recent
agreement, are likely to pose the biggest threat.

Although intelligence officials contend that no threat to the Olympic Games
was detected, experts were concerned that areas such as hotels, utilities, and the
park may be vulnerable to attack. To alleviate such concern, potential terrorist
targets like the Georgia Institute of Technology's nuclear research reactor, a few
blocks from the Olympic Village would be closed and its nuclear fuel shipped to
Savannah for storage. But some security analysts agreed that state-sponsored
terrorism is less likely at the Games because even those countries that featured in
the DOS' annual report on terrorism - Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and the Sudan's
teams and officials will be represented during the Games. Contrary to the security
analysts' beliefs, Robert Heibel argued that the Islamic fundamentalist, not really
owing support to any particular state, could attempt to disrupt the Games.

The FBI begun its preparation for the Games early in order to address "the
special security concerns generated by this international event." The formation of a
counter terrorism network by the FBI in close coordination with Olympic security
officials and other local, state and federal law enforcement agencies, was to
neutralize any potential terrorist threats and concerns.\textsuperscript{30}

**International Terrorist Groups**

The international terrorist groups most likely to execute a terrorist act during the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta, include: Abu Nidal, based in Libya, was responsible for the 1972 Munich Olympic massacre; and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), due to their past affiliation with the Black September Organization. The PLO is currently committed to the return of occupied territories to Palestinians and the creation of an independent homeland; the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), a radical faction led by Abu Abbas, who masterminded the October 1985 attack on the Achille Lauro ship, in which one US citizen was killed; Al-Fatah, a Palestinian group believed to have stopped terrorist acts since Arafat signed a peace agreement with Israel in 1993; Eyal, an Israeli right-wing group believed responsible for the 1995 assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin; the Provisional Irish Republican Army, known as the (PIRA), an armed wing of Sinn Fein, the political party seeking removal of British forces from Northern Ireland; the PIRA has actively carried out various criminal activities in the United States in support of its terrorist operations.

Supporters of formalized terrorist groups such as the Egyptian Al-Gama'at Al-Islamiyya, responsible for a machine-gun attack on Greek tourists at a Cairo hotel in April 1996 that killed eighteen and wounded more than twenty; the HAMAS and Hezbollah, responsible for the bombing of the US Embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut in 1993, hijacking of TWA Flight 847 in 1985 and kidnapping of
many American hostages. These groups continued to view the United States as an attractive refuge and staging area. Some supporters in the US are believed to be conducting criminal activities to include military-style training in support of terrorist groups’ objectives.

International terrorist group considered as loosely-affiliated extremists which continued to view the US as both a staging area and a target, may seek the assistance of selected domestic terrorist groups to aid them in their intelligence, site fundraising supplying equipments as well as protection prior to and after the terrorist act. The most prominent has been the emergence of the International Radical Terrorism (IRT), responsible for the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and has also been charged with the 1993 aborted plot to bomb several sites in New York City, including the United Nations. The FBI believes that, along with continuing state sponsorship of international terrorism, the IRT poses a significant threat to US national security.31

**Domestic Terrorist Groups**

Over the past years, terrorism in the United States has continued in a general trend in which fewer attacks are occurring, but individual attacks are becoming more deadly.

The rise of militia movements in the United States now confronts federal authorities with plausible risks of terrorism from within. The American "ultra-right" from the FBI's perspective, has widely adopted the "leaderless resistance" concept, meaning adherently organizing themselves into tiny cells that are extremely difficult
to detect or infiltrate. One example, is the "Unorganized Militia of the United States," founded by Indianapolis attorney and former Marietta resident Linda Thompson. This group actively promotes the formation of militia groups throughout the US. Militia members were charged with the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City that killed over 168 people in April 1995. Within the same month, militia groups were arrested in central Georgia and accused of conspiring to stockpile bombs for a "war" with the government. Although initial reports of a plot to disrupt the Olympics were discounted, the raid illustrated that such elements lurked not far from the Games' center.

The Pedro Albizu Campos Revolutionary Forces (PACRF), a domestic terrorist group which directs its terrorist activities at the US, receives no foreign direction or financial assistance, is dedicated to achieving total Puerto Rican independence from the United States. The Al-Fuqra, a secretive US-based militant black Muslim sect not aligned with the Nation of Islam, continued to pose a threat.

The recognition of the Palestinian team for the 1996 Games by the International Olympic Committee (IOC), and the four suicide bombings by Palestinians in late February and early March 1996 claiming sixty two Israeli lives within nine days, shook the foundations of the peace process. It was apparent that the Jewish Defense League (JDL), would definitely involve itself with the protection of Jewish citizens within the Olympic arena. Its involvement raised concern among Olympic security planners, that is, the possibility for the JDL to utilize the Olympic Games for the purpose of retribution for past acts against Israel.
Racially Oriented and Radical Groups

In the Olympic security radar were the racially oriented groups which could mobilize to cause a vast amount of disruption during the 1996 Games. Groups categorized as "right-wing" were defined as being racist, anti-black, anti-Semitic and for the advancement of the white race. In addition to advocating white supremacy and the hatred of non-white races, these groups have also engaged in acts of provocation and assault against federal and state law enforcement officials.

Groups such as the Aryan Nations based in Hayden Lake, Idaho, the Order and Posse Comitatus, all fall into the "right-wing" category. For example, in 1995 two members of a Minnesota "patriot" group were convicted of plotting to use ricin to kill US Marshall and Internal Revenue Service agents.\textsuperscript{32} Another radical white supremacist group called the White Aryan Resistance, based in California, is reported to be recruiting neo-Nazis and teenage skinheads.

The most significant instance of "right-wing" terrorism occurred in July 1993, when members of the American Front Skinheads attempted to bomb the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) headquarters in Tacoma, Washington. Finally, extremists in the United States continued to demonstrate their interest and experimentation with unconventional weapons. The World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombing show that almost anyone can make fertilizer bombs; and the Tokyo subway disaster confirmed that any good chemist can make nerve gas. This is supported by the manufacturing of the "biological agent ricin from castor beans by the Patriot's Council in Minnesota in
CHAPTER VI
THE 1996 ATLANTA OLYMPIC GAMES
ORGANIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION

The 1996 Atlanta Summer Olympic Games were organized in three phases: the Developmental Phase, the Experimental Phase, and the Operational Phase and are examined separately in this chapter. First, the Developmental Phase involved extensive research, written plans, identification of needed resources, establishing of training requirements and identification of agency roles and responsibilities. Second, the Experimental Phase addressed the testing of the plans through a series of training exercises that simulated real-life Olympic Security incidents. Plans and preparations were either validated or revised as needed, during this phase. Third, the Operational Phase was about actual implementation and execution of those security plans.

I. Developmental Phase

The first step in the process was to lay out the hierarchy of command to have a clear understanding of participating agencies' respective roles and inherent responsibilities. This “Atlanta’s Version of the Olympic Model,” was called the Olympic Security Support Group (OSSG). The OSSG was a quasi-official organization of local, state, and federal law enforcement officials and ACOG
security personnel involved in planning the Games. Figure 4 illustrates the "Atlanta Olympic Model" Planning Structure, which was an interagency planning process.

Figure 4. The Atlanta Olympic Model Planning Structure.

Courtesy of the Atlanta Police Department.

At the top of the planning structure is the OSSG established on September 11, 1991. The OSSG, comprised of over forty agency members, from the local,
state, and federal law enforcement, was jointly chaired by both the Georgia Commissioner of Public Safety, Colonel Sid Miles, and the Chief of the Atlanta Police Department, Beverly Harvard.¹ The OSSG’s “ultimate responsibility” was for the development and implementation of the public safety master security plan to serve as a blueprint for agencies providing security services and for securing the 1996 Games by creating a safe and secure environment.

Other responsibilities were to:

- Manage the Olympic Security Planning Coordination Committee (OSPCC). This includes appointing agencies, reviewing, and approving all works of the OSPCC.

- Insure coordinated efforts with the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games (ACOG) on all public safety related security issues as it pertained to the development of a comprehensive security plan for the 1996 Games.

- Authorize the formation of all subcommittee membership and chairpersons.

- Establish a process of interaction with the media.

- Develop policies for resolving conflicts among the components of the planning organization. The OSSG co-chairs were to set an agenda for OSSG business and approve all requests for outside support and services as they relate to the development of the master plan.

Due to the OSSG’s large membership and the need for effective decision-making and conflict resolution, a smaller executive committee evolved, the Olympic Security Planning Coordination Committee (OSPCC). The OSPCC was an interagency group led by Major Jon Gordon of the Atlanta Police Department.
Major Gordon was in charge of Olympic Security Planning for the department. The OSPCC managing board comprised of upper and middle managers from participating public safety agencies.

The following responsibilities were assigned to the OSPCC. First, to implement policy and assume responsibilities as directed by the OSSG. Second, to manage the development of the public safety master plan subject to OSSG oversight and third, to be responsible for managing the day-to-day security planning for the 1996 Olympic Games. This included overseeing the work performed by the nineteen subcommittees and the staff support arms referred to as the Integrated Planning Group (IPG). Another responsibility included managing the conflict resolution mechanism between venues, subcommittees, and the IPG. Developing memos of understanding (MOU) with appropriate agencies, subject to approval by the OSSG. The IPG is a multi-agency planning group with representatives from several agencies involved in the Olympic Security Plan Development Process. The IPG provided essential planning and research support to the entire Olympic Security Planning Structure. It served as the integrating mechanism for the Olympic Security Plan Development process. In accordance with policy set by the OSSG, the OSPCC was to manage the Olympic Security Plan Development process. The IPG operated as the staff-arm of the OSPCC and in accordance with the directives of the OSPCC in providing all necessary staff support to the Olympic Security Plan Development process.
Subcommittees

A subcommittee was assigned to each of the nineteen identified key responsibilities that law enforcement faced in planning security for the Olympics. A subcommittee is a group of public safety planners from participating agencies that were responsible for developing strategic and/or operational plans and procedures for their respective areas of support and special operations. They also identified resources required to support their plan.

The nineteen subcommittees were: Accreditation, Aviation, Communication, Community Relation, Criminal Justice, Dignitary Protection, EOD/Bomb, Infrastructure, Intelligence/Terrorism, International Entry, Intransit Security, Media, Public Safety, Site Survey, Tactical, Traffic Control, Training, and Olympic Village. Each of the nineteen subcommittees was responsible for developing a plan to satisfy a particular critical function as indicated by the names of the subcommittees.

Once the subcommittee planning was completed; it was the responsibility of the OSPCC, along with the IPG, to compile a comprehensive Master Security Plan.

Olympic Security Master Plan

The Master Security Plan served as a blueprint or guide on how the law enforcement agencies were to provide a safe and secure environment for the 1996 Olympic Games. Its objective was to manage the design, development, coordination, and implementation of the security system for the Games.
Planners designed this blueprint by applying lessons learned from previous Olympic Games to improve methods and operations for the 1996 event. The Master Plan utilized a wealth of knowledge and experience from the FBI, USSS, and the Department of Defense Office of Special Events who were willing to share its professional knowledge.

The Master Plan identified approximately eighty (80) sports, function, and training venues where the presence of law enforcement personnel were required during the Games. It was anticipated that in some cases, agencies with primary operational responsibilities would have to augment their existing personnel through Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) or Manual Aid Agreements (MAA) with secondary agencies in order to provide an adequate number of law enforcement personnel to perform Olympic security functions. Additional personnel would be derived from local law enforcement agencies around the state and as a last resort, the US DOD.

Olympic venues requiring law enforcement assignments were assigned to lead agencies on the basis of jurisdiction. These assigned agencies had jurisdiction over the resolution of any public safety incidents that occurred therein except such venue responsibility was delegated to another law enforcement agency; for example, in an emergency response incident involving the Olympic family, the FBI might assume jurisdiction.

The Master Plan outlined the role of ACOG and public agencies. On specific Olympic Security functions, public agencies were to cooperate closely with ACOG.
in the delivery of public safety services. Besides being responsible for traditional law enforcement duties which included but were not limited to; arrest situations, emergency responses, criminal investigations, traffic control and others, there were a number of additional significant functions that the agencies were to perform throughout the Games. These functions were planned through OSSG Security Planning Subcommittees. The functions were organized into two categories: those conducted in preparation for the Olympic Games, and those conducted during the Olympic Games.


ACOG Security Role

The Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games (ACOG) was included in the planning structure because of its Olympic Security role. Although ACOG’s role is different from that of law enforcement, the need to coordinate and cooperate at all phases of preparation and operations were essential. Besides, the organizing committee was the source of much information by the law enforcement community to facilitate its own preparations.
At ACOG, the president, also serving as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), has two senior executive assistants and six vice-presidents. In addition, the Chief Operations Officer (COO) reports to the CEO. Under the COO there are two assistants, one deputy and seven officers in charge of administration, operations, broadcasting, Games' services, management, sports, international organizations, and others. The officer in charge of operations oversees Olympic Security. However, the security function under operations is included along with other functions such as operation management, Games support (accreditation, logistics, medical, press operations and transportation) as well as technology, venue-based planning, the Para-Olympic Games, and airport operations. The six major security program components developed by ACOG consist of:

1. Resource Management
2. Command and Control
3. Access Control
4. Interagency Coordination
5. Crowd Control
6. Athlete Delegation Security

**Resource Management**

Resource Management is the development and acquisition of all equipment and services as well as personnel required to secure the Olympic Games. Equipment and services include the Department of Defense (DOD) support,
sponsorships such as "the Sensormatic Electronics Corporation" consortium, and other sources for equipment and resources.

The Sensormatic Electronics corporation was to provide a high-tech but low-key electronic device to enable security officials to monitor every venue from a central command post. The system was to be built into all Olympic Games accreditation badges. In addition, the device provided closed-circuit cameras, program management, infrastructure support, biometric access control at all athlete villages, vehicle sanitization equipment and software for the ACOG Security Command and Control Center.

ACOG included in their planning a provision for the DOD Office of Special Events, (OSE), to provide, install, maintain, and remove linear fencing, fence-based intrusion detection alarm systems for all athletes' villages, surveillance devices, communications equipments, access control turnstiles, crowd control/vehicle crash barriers, x-ray machines, DOD equipment and portable secondary power sources.

Security personnel were to be drawn from the law enforcement community outside the state of Georgia, ACOG staff and volunteers, contracted private security, and as a last resort, military personnel from the United States Department of Defense. James Christie stated, "The federal government has allocated $35 million to the DOD to assist in security. By US law, the military cannot be involved in law enforcement, but it can carry out services such as bomb detection, inspection of vehicles, and surveillance of venues." While normal policing was conducted by
the over fifty local, state and federal law enforcement agencies, volunteers performed less critical duties.\textsuperscript{5}

As part of the planning ACOG officials confirmed the Pentagon’s plan to commit over 10,000 troops in security related positions during the Games. Assigned to a special unit base at Fort McPherson and headed by Brigadier General Robert Hicks Jr., the Olympic Joint Task Force coordinated all non-emergency military support for the Games and planning for events that might have military personnel.\textsuperscript{6}

**Command and Control**

ACOG anticipated this model center to be the primary vehicle used for testing all systems and equipment before and during the Olympic Games beginning mid-1994 through August 1996. The main ACOG Security Command Center was to be located at ACOG Headquarters. All law enforcement and ACOG venue Security Command Centers were co-located at each of the venues, to allow direct links to the sophisticated communications network between venue command posts and the ACOG Security Command Center. Also included was a direct link between the ACOG Security Command Center and the law enforcement Joint Coordination Center (JCC).

**Access Control**

Several levels of access control were planned to be used during the Games, with the highest level being deployed at the Atlanta Athletes’ Village. All other sports and function venues’ level of control were to be equipped with proven access control systems and procedures to create a secure Olympic Games environment.
Some of these systems and procedures include: magnetometer and x-ray screening, contraband searches, limited entry turnstiles, fence-based intrusion detection system with CCTV monitoring, biometric technology and vehicle sanitization equipment.

Interagency Coordination

The planning allowed ACOG security staff to provide coordination and cooperation through membership on the OSSG and OSPCC who in turn provided oversight to the IPG and the various law enforcement subcommittees. In addition, ACOG security staff was to notify the IPG of all ACOG inter-organizational venue planning meetings to facilitate attendance by law enforcement planners and venue commanders. During the Olympic Games period, coordination was to be facilitated by the co-location of law enforcement and security personnel within venue command posts and the presence of ACOG security personnel at the law enforcement JCC and law enforcement personnel at the ACOG Security Command and Control Center.

Crowd Control

ACOG security staff was to assume responsibility for enforcement of all "house rules" within the venues and the general marshaling of crowds. This control was to be accomplished through a well coordinated usher, security, and law enforcement team at each venue. ACOG planned to use between 6-8,000 private security officers at a 3:1000 ratio security guard to spectators; 2,000 Security Team Program (STP) Volunteers and 5-6,000 regular security volunteers. Approximately
33% of the ushers were to be volunteers and about 67% to be paid ACOG staff, utilizing a 4:1000 usher to spectator ratio.  

**Athlete Delegation Security**

The importance of the athletes' security in the overall success of the Olympic Games, since the Munich Olympic Games in 1972, cannot be overemphasized. ACOG Security Program planned to divide athlete security into five basic components: Threat Assessment, In-transit Security, Athletes' Villages, Sports Venues, and Training Venues.

The Intelligence Specialized Management Center (ISMC) was to develop Threat Assessment and disseminate as necessary. Intransit Security was to be provided by ACOG security personnel equipped with two-way radios aboard each bus transporting Olympic athletes and with the assistance of the Intransit Security SMC, provide police escort for the buses to travel between sports and training venues and the athletes' village. As reported in Ebony magazine, "perhaps the most comprehensive security apparatus has been devised, consisting of 22,000 security personnel, made up of Local, State and Federal Law Enforcement agencies, including the FBI, the CIA, the SS, and units of the US military, to provide "around" the clock surveillance and armed security patrols to be deployed to secure the Olympic Village, athletes' residents, and other critical sites."  

The Olympic Village was the focal point for the entire 1996 Olympic Games. Accordingly, its vulnerability and protection was a major concern. The Village Subcommittee's primary responsibility was to develop (in close coordination with
ACOG), a comprehensive public safety/security plan relative to the operation of the primary Olympic Village at Georgia Institute of Technology. The Village Subcommittee would not be operational during the Games, however, Village Subcommittee personnel were to be available for consultation on Village topics.

Coordination of planning for the Village was to be conducted by the state of Georgia, through Georgia Tech and the Georgia State Patrol. The Olympic Village Subcommittee's four general operation concepts included:

1. The development of a comprehensive public safety/security plan for the Olympic Village in close coordination with ACOG.
2. Identification of the necessary security related resources to support the Village operation plan.
3. Identification of all tasks necessary to implement the plan.
4. Assigning tasks to individual representative agencies, monitoring progress, assessing, and coordinating the developed plans with the Village Commanders.

Agency Planning Office

The third organization included in the planning structure was the Agency Planning Office (APO). According to the Olympic Master Security Plan, this office could only be established at the discretion of an agency's Chief Executive Officer. The APO was established for the Atlanta Police Department, the State of Georgia with fourteen different agencies led by the Georgia Department of Public Safety, the Chatham County Police Department, the Clayton County Police Department and Sheriff's Office, the Columbus Police Department, the Conyers Police Department, the Dekalb County Police Department and Sheriff's Office, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Fulton County Police Department and Sheriff’s Office, the Hall County Sheriff’s Office, the Muscogee County Sheriff’s Office, the Savannah Police Department, the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the United States Coast Guard, and the United States Secret Services. As an interagency group, their duties were to coordinate Olympic planning and operational activities. In addition, they were to have direct input into the planning process as to the other agency’s role in Olympic Public Safety Operations. The primary work period for APO was scheduled between mid 1994 to mid 1996. The first major document jointly produced by OSSG and APO planners was the Olympic Master Security Plan.

**Atlanta Police Department (APD)**

The Atlanta Police APO was the primary organizational unit responsible for developing and implementing approval plans supporting the 1996 Olympic Games. Establishing an APO, outlining its role and directing its normal duties, were critical first steps in preparing for the Olympic Games.

The Atlanta Police Olympic agency Planning Office although informally functioning since September 1992, was officially established in June 1993 by a written special order signed by Beverly Harvard, the Atlanta Police Chief. Under the command of a deputy chief, the planning staff consisted of one major, one lieutenant, two sergeants, eleven officers and an administrative assistant. The APD’s APO staff acquired most of their knowledge through consultations with
professionals from previous special events. For example, the FBI, U.S. Secret Service and the Department of Defense Office of Special Events (OSE) provided an after-action report and other planning documents, and shared their expertise about both cooperation and coordination as well as inter-agency planning.

It should be noted that police planners from New South Wales, Australia were actually assigned to the Atlanta Police APO in the months preceding the Olympic Games. Additionally, officials of the APD prior to and during the Olympic Games included planners from Nagano, Japan, host city for the 1988 Winter Olympic Games and members from the Salt Lake City law enforcement community, host of the 2002 Winter Olympic Games. Their contribution and feedback were part of the learning process.

Extensive research of past Olympic Games and major international special events were conducted by APD planners. The Olympic venue security model is a good example of material synthesized from previous special events and modified to satisfy the 1996 Games' requirements. The model also provided a generic outline for developing operational plans as it relates to the Agency Command Center (ACC) and the Joint Coordination Center (JCC).

Basically, as a host city, the APD would be responsible for all Olympic sports and functions venues within Atlanta City limits. Most of these were located within the Olympic Ring which is an imaginary circle with 1.5 miles radius (figure 2, page 209) extending from the Georgia World Congress Center (GWCC) through the heart of the city. The APD's plan was to coordinate the Traffic Specialized
Management Center (TSMC), the EOD Specialized Management Center, and the Joint Coordination Center (JCC). The department also intended to provide personnel to all other SMCs in addition to overseeing the numerous sports, training and function venues for which it was primarily responsible.

The State of Georgia plan was to coordinate activities outside the city of Atlanta such as the Aviation and Intransit Security Specialized Management Centers. The state would also provide personnel to all other SMCs in addition to overseeing the numerous sports, training, and function venues for which it was primarily responsible.

Because the venues were spread out geographically around the southeastern states, where jurisdictional responsibilities overlapped, joint working groups from both teams were to be formed. For example, a number of venues located inside the city of Atlanta were actually on the state of Georgia property. Consequently, these venues were the responsibility of the state’s law enforcement. The FBI was the lead agency for tactical situations related to terrorism since they have primary jurisdiction over terrorist acts.

**Establishment of Agency Command Center**

With over forty other agencies involved with providing Olympic security services at the local, state, and federal levels, planners needed an understanding of how the APD would integrate its operations with the rest of security providers.

The necessary support mechanisms could not be planned for, tested, and implemented without a firm understanding of the APD’s Olympic “chain of
command," its security roles and responsibilities. The mechanism for initiating the APD's Olympic security operation was its Agency Command Center (ACC). It served two purposes; 1.) to facilitate the management and coordination of all the APD's Olympic security operations and 2.) to serve as the focal point of the APD's Olympic central repository of operation information during the Games.

Figure 5. APD Agency Command Center (ACC) Chain Of Command

The ACC figure 5, comprised of three groups: The Olympic Command Staff, the Operations Group and the ACC Support Group. The Command Staff and
Operations Group, were responsible for deployment, operations and recovery of the Olympic Discretionary Forces (ODF) and Olympic resources. The Operations Group consisted primarily of Logistics, Communications, Venues, and Special Management Centers (SMCs), Traffic Management, Public Safety, Media, Protocol and Employee Transportation. The Support Group was responsible for providing administrative support to the Operations Group. The ACC was managed and operated by the administrative arm of the Operations Group and the Support Group under a commander responsible for managing ACC support operations allowing the Command Staff and Operations Group to focus on Olympic Security Field Operations. Included were the following functions: Information Management, Manpower Scheduling, Equipment Support, Records, Time Keeping, Liaison to Joint Coordination Center (JCC) and Liaison to Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games (ACOG).

The ACC staff handled all Olympic related functions, events, incidents, and administrative paperwork. Therefore, to understand the type of Olympic Security functions to be performed by the ODF was critical at the planning phase.

ACC Operations relied on computer technology to support internal staff functions as well as external security operations. The Atlanta Police Department intended to use three specialized computer applications during the planning and operational phases of the Games. The three applications were an Auto-Cad Mapping System, a Command and Control System, and an Incident Tracking System.
Auto-Cad Mapping System

This system produces venue drawings and site plans to enable Olympic competition and cultural event tracking, event simulations, assignment locations and traffic management plans. This data was vital to law enforcement venue planners as well as for any special law enforcement teams that would be operating in the venues. The venue and map files created by this system, provided valuable support to law enforcement, traffic management and ACOG transportation planners.

An in-house mapping developed by planners enabled the APO to receive regular updates of ACOG's computerized venue drawings and maps. These mapping section was created to support the ADP's map-based Police Command and Control System (PCCS). It allows APD's venue planners and commanders to plot large scale venue drawings, which graphically displayed how ACOG was organizing a venue site.

Police Command and Control System (PCCS)

The PCCS was developed as a tool to assist the APD's commanders in managing the department's resources in order to provide a normal level of police services, while accomplishing its Olympic mission during the 1996 Games. The PCCS consisted of two components: the Central Manager, and the Field Manager. The Central Manager was located in the ACC and used for situation display, incident management, scheduling and timekeeping. The Field Manager was used to support field level operations through scheduling, time-keeping, and resource management.
Incident Tracking System

The need to share pertinent information across agency lines among the numerous participating law enforcement agencies providing Olympic security services was paramount. This was to be accomplished through an incident tracking system. It was the one common thread that linked the Olympic law enforcement operation center together. This system allowed law enforcement agencies to access the information by connecting the system's terminal to a network modem, and staffing a position in the JCC.

The APD's Agency Command Center was to provide technical support of the Incident Tracking System for APD users, while the DOD Office of Special Events (OSE) were to provide technical support for use of the system at the JCC.

To identify personnel requirements for providing normal police services during the Games, the APO prepared a comprehensive assessment of existing personnel allocations in the department. Alternative staffing strategies were then mapped to support executive level decisions regarding staffing for normal public safety mission as against Olympic security mission.

To evaluate work loads based on calls for services and investigative case loads, all officers were required to work a minimum of six days per week, twelve hours a day. The APD recognized that employees to be assigned to specialized functions needed additional training or equipment. This was especially true for the tactical, bombs/EOD, aviation and motorcycle functions. The FBI, United States Secret Service, ATF, and the Department of Defense provided local law
enforcement agencies with many specialized training opportunities. These included practical exercises, classroom instruction, and the preparation of training video's as will be discussed in the Experimental Phase.

II. EXPERIMENTAL PHASE

The reliability of the Developmental Phase outcome was dependent upon the identification of important training requirements at the Experimental Phase. The training function is primarily concerned with the identification and documentation of training peculiarities to the 1996 Olympic Games, and the facilitation of the scheduling and delivery of training necessary to meet those needs in a timely manner. These training requirements received attention during the transitional period.

The Olympic Security Support Group (OSSG) Training Subcommittee was responsible for identifying Olympic related training requirements for all aspects of Olympic Security Operations. The Training Subcommittee Membership included subject matters and training experts from participating public safety agencies. The helpful work product of the Training Subcommittee was the Master Training Calendar. The Calendar listed all scheduled public safety training courses at the local, state, and federal level that were available to participating public safety agencies. In addition, the Training Subcommittee developed ten Olympic lesson plans and fifteen Olympic training videos for use by OSSG agencies.

A law enforcement agency may choose from the following venue training topics, to train their personnel; Law Enforcement Section Commanders were to take
an assessment of their training and communicate their training needs to their agency. Their agency then coordinated with the Training Subcommittee.

The listed training topics and training exercise were consistent with the recommendations of the Training Subcommittee.

**Training Topics**

| - Accreditation                | - Diplomatic Immunity               |
| - Armed Person at venues      | - Enforcement Policies & Procedures |
| - Barricaded Gunman           | - FAA Briefing (Security Badges)    |
| - Bomb Sweeps/Sanitization    | - First Aid / CPR                   |
| - Bomb Threats                | - Hazardous Material Incidents      |
| - Courtesy / Professionalism  | - Helicopter Land Procedures        |
| - Crowd Control / Mass Arrest | - Hostage Situations                |
| - Cultural Awareness          | - Laws and Ordinances: Federal, State, County and City |
| - Lost and Missing Persons    | - OlympicSecurity Organization Structure: Agency Chain of Command |
| - Media Police                | - Role of ACOG Security             |
| - Peaceful Demonstrations     | - Political Asylum/Defection        |
| - Radio Communications        | - Screening Procedure               |
| - Role of Law Enforcement Security | - Traffic Control                   |
| - Sniper/Terrorist Attack     |                                         |
Venue Training Exercises

- Table Top Exercises
- Command Post Exercises
- Field Test Exercises
- Seminars

Two training packages were designed at both the agency and interagency levels, although the subject matters were the same. Coordination of the training function was provided by the Atlanta Police Department. The training general operational concepts were as follows:

- Research training programs and packages from previous international special events.
- Meet with individuals who previously coordinated international special events training activities.
- Conduct an assessment of training requirements across agencies and functions.
- Conduct an assessment of training market resources.
- Develop a training plan and translate it into a planned curriculum.
- Identify and acquire necessary resources to accomplish a training plan.
- Identify and train instructors to teach courses in their functional area.
- Develop and produce training material to support training activities.
- Coordinate, facilitate, and conduct training whenever appropriate.
- Maintain a comprehensive log for all Olympic-related training activities completed by participating agencies.
- Develop a handbook for public safety security personnel assigned to the 1996 Olympic Games.
The three key useful training exercises conducted during the Experimental Phase were:

1. Table Top
2. Command Post
3. Field exercise

**Table Top Exercise**

The purpose of the Table Top Exercise was for participants to evaluate plans, policies, procedures, resolve questions of coordination, and assignment of responsibilities.

Table Top Exercises were conducted by representatives from the Department of Defense Office of Special Events (OSE). It was a structured dialogue designed to clarify what was known and/or unknown about the topic of discussion. Key planners and operations personnel were presented with situations and scenarios that were designed to clarify Olympic policies, procedures and responsibilities. The key point was that responses must be based on what was written in the plans.

**Command Post Exercise**

These exercises involved testing Olympic security preparations at the system level. For example, OSE professionals such as Dr. Bellavita, conducted virtually all of the Table Top and Command Post Exercises for the Olympic law enforcement community. Command Post Exercises (CPE) were designed to conduct scenario driven exercises to identify possible problems with policies and procedures used to
coordinate an agency(s) action during operations. It involved commanders and mid-level personnel. Messages are directed specifically by radio, telephone, or computer to individuals or agencies who are then responsible for coordinating their responses with other participants. Command Post exercises were conducted for participating agencies in the area of traffic control and command center operations. The Nuclear Defense Agency also conducted a two-day Command Post exercise that focused on the law enforcement community's response to a radiological incident.

Douglas Pasternak and Jennifer Seter, noted that "US Counter-terrorism Specialists were involved in two training exercises: the first exercise presented law enforcement agents with a terrorist scenario that included the discovery of a radiological explosive device at the Georgia Dome, and the detonation of a second bomb at Stone Mountain Park, 16 miles east of Atlanta."9 The second exercise "code named Olympic Charlie, presented a scenario that involved the release of lethal VX nerve gas during the Olympics."10

Over twenty-five rigorous Command Post exercises required reactions to all kinds of emergencies including; a bomb discovery, defection, food poisoning, fire, and a radical fundamentalist group demanding the release of six prisoners in Israel, just to mention a few. These simulated exercises were an attempt to put theory into practice thus enabling participants to be familiar with other agencies' operations. It also helped eliminate confusion about roles and clarified the different areas of responsibility.
Field Training Exercises

These exercises were intended to evaluate the actual operational capability of organizations' Olympic plans in an interactive manner. It provided an opportunity to integrate Olympic plans, personnel, and equipment.

The 1996 Olympic Games Field Training exercises were conducted by representatives from the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). It involved close coordination with the organizing committees who were testing their own preparation as well. A Field Training exercise tested an actual field response to a scenario deploying personnel and equipment in real time. Two Field Training exercises were conducted by the FBI. One involved the Olympic Stadium, the MARTA rail line, and a city water station. The other exercise involved the airport, the Athletes’ Village, and satellite sports venues. According to Ron Martz, "rather than showcase their forces with extensive exercises, Atlanta officials kept most of their exercises under tight wraps." Melinda Liu et al., states:

With the Olympics only three months away, federal authorities are building what may well be the biggest counter-terrorist screen in history. The force includes the FBI, the CIA, the Secret Service, Local and State Police, and US Military Units. A training exercise two weeks ago forced field commanders to reach a nerve-gas attack and a plane hijacking simultaneously; another test simulated the detonation of a small nuclear device.

Other training methods involved seminars. These training methods were given by outside agencies to provide information on dignitary protection (US Secret Services), tactical response and incident command (FBI), diplomatic immunity and
asylum (DOS), and venue operations (ACOG). Those involved in this training were Olympic Commanders and Olympic planners.

Ron Martz alleged that Olympic Village staffers were introduced to "the harsh and often frightening realities of chemical agents and other hazardous materials during a closed-door seminar conducted by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)." The seminar included topics such as basic introduction to chemical agent and other hazardous materials, characteristics of hazardous materials, signs and symptoms of exposure, short and long-term effect of exposure and treatment.

On the agency level, each law enforcement agency was responsible for the Olympic training of its agency personnel. In the case of the APD, the Training Academy and APO coordinated the preparation and conducting of Olympic training.

The Atlanta Police Department

The department began conducting Olympic training with the department's personnel two years prior to the opening of the Games. There were different training methods, and numerous training aids used with the staffs of the Training Academy and the Agency Planning Office (APO).

To cover the unique duties and responsibilities associated with Olympic security operation, the APD first introduced Olympic-related topics, into the in-service training cycle as parts of its yearly mandated curriculum. In addition to formal classes, including Table Top, Command Post, Field Exercises and Seminars (earlier covered), the APD made use of home study materials, roll call videos, and
the Law Enforcement Handbook (LEH). The LEH, which reinforced the training, was provided to all APD sworn officers for quick reference to operational and other Olympic related information that they might need during Olympic operations.

Subjects included in the curriculum were; Asylum/Defection, Diplomatic Immunity, Language Services, Media Relations, Intelligence, Bombs/EOD, Lost/Missing persons, Dignitary Protection, and Accreditation. These areas were included in the department’s annual training to ensure department-wide awareness of the unique nature of hosting a major international special event.

Annual training is mandated training that all law enforcement officers must attend each year in orders to be certified as Peace Officers in the State. It was developed primarily for the first line supervisors, officers, and investigators. At the APD’s Training Academy, the staff of the APO in 1995 annual training classes presented an overview of the 1996 Olympic Games and its impact on the personal and professional lives of its employees. A total of twenty hours of Olympic-related subjects were taught during annual training in 1996.

APD personnel also took advantage of a number of outside training opportunities prior to the Games. The ATF, the FBI and the US Secret Service also provided substantial training opportunities for local law enforcement officers.

More than 4,500 local, state, and federal officers assigned to Olympic venues under State Law Enforcement Control took a week-long crash course in Georgia law concerning guarding the Games at the State Public Safety Training Center in Forsyth County.
Study shows that the officers were being trained at a rate of "500 per week" at a total cost of "$600,000 to the state." Among that group were 700 officers from eleven different agencies, authorized by Vice President Al Gore, after Olympic organizers and state officials expressed concerns about the assigned number of security personnel. All 700 were sworn in as Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) Agents, giving them dual state and federal authority. Over one hundred were assigned to the APD and received additional training there.

The study concluded that many of the plain clothes Federal agents were to team up with state and city officers to form two person ID teams, circulated in and around the venues to help spot potential problems and defuse them before they escalated. Due to the different jurisdictions of the agencies involved, Major Mile and Police Chief Harvard coordinated through a cooperative effort an additional training classes before the Games, to help their officers spot situations that could lead to terrorist incidents. "They will have to learn that a strong briefcase or equipment bag could contain plastic explosives, that an illegally parked car could contain a bomb, and that the well-dressed but unusually nervous visitor could be an international terrorist."

State law enforcement officials also conducted extensive helicopter exercises around Olympic venues to familiarize air crews with sites they may have to fly into during the Games. The venues included those in Downtown Atlanta, as well as Wolf Creek in South Fulton County, Atlanta Beach in Clayton County, Stone Mountain, the International Horse Park in Conyers, Lake Lanier and the University
of Georgia. Involved in the exercises were helicopters from the military as well as local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. Announcement of the exercises was made by State Officials to warn the public of the noise especially at night, explained Gary McConnel.17

Over 45,000 ACOG volunteers studied their Games' time operational materials, assigned uniforms and underwent an extensive training process. The Olympic Security Volunteers were to serve basically as "the eyes and ears for the police during the Olympics."18 Instead of having multiple firms supplying up to 8,000 guards, as in Los Angeles, ACOG proposed a single major firm that would supply fewer but better-trained and qualified guards. They were to be supplemented by 2,000 volunteer international police officers and up to 6,000 other volunteers at a lower security level.19

According to Bill Rathburn, "You get better quality using volunteers, than poorly paid security guards who may not report for work because they have no long-term investment in the job."20

The volunteers were screened and interviewed before undergoing strenuous sessions of general training to graduate to specific venue training, according to the venue, they were to be assigned. They were to work under direct supervision of their venue commanders or supervisors. Mock exercise training of investigators, protective personnel, and volunteers ranged from a mini-library on terrorism maintained by the OIC to orientation video packages providing checkpoint staff with training in questioning techniques, identification alteration clues, smuggling tricks
and personality profiles of typical terrorists. More detailed training at the end allowed volunteers to become familiar with the venue management team, venue locations and procedures, and job specific instructions. Venue specific information package accompanied the venue tours and volunteers were equipped with venue pocket guides to use as quick reference during the Games.

The developmental and experimental phases were put to test when Olympic sponsor-United Parcel Services (UPS), conducted a security test on July 19th in which a fake bomb was delivered to the Georgia World Congress Center (GWCC), the site of six Olympic sports, without ACOG notification. The package, which contained a wired device, was detected by Olympic guards after passing through the UPS checkpoint. Part of the building was evacuated. According to reports, the incidents infuriated ACOG officials.21 “It caused a lot of unnecessary anxiety,” as was confirmed by ACOG spokeswoman Lyn May.

III. OPERATIONAL PHASE

The 1996 Centennial Olympic Games security planning was operational on July 5, 1996 immediately following the opening of the Olympic Village and the arrival of athletes in Atlanta. The pulse of Olympic Security at the Operational Phase adds to the excitement and anticipation of what planners had worked towards for more than five years.

Security provision at the Operational Phase was based on an interagency Operations-Conceptual Model as illustrated in the “Olympic Security Operational Structure.” Figure 6 shows how the many different agencies at the local, state, and
federal levels worked together to provide security services for the 1996 Olympic Games.

Figure 6. Olympic Security Operational Structure

Courtesy of Atlanta Police Department
In the United States there is a very definite division of federal, local, and military law enforcement responsibilities. These divisions are outlined in the Constitution of the United States as well as the constitutions of the individual states. Under the Constitution and laws of the United States, the protection of life and property and the maintenance of public order are primarily the responsibility of the state and local government. Essentially, the security structure reflected a confederation of organizations committed by statute and charter to satisfy Olympic public safety tasks. Jurisdiction was the first criteria in determining lead agency status over a venue or appropriate agency to provide Olympic Security Services.

**Operational Components**

One of the structural components that went into action during the 1996 Olympic Games was the Agency Command Centers (ACC). The ACC was the heart of the Command and Control of the over forty public safety and security agencies. All Olympic-related functions, incidents, events, and administrative paper work were handled by ACC staff. Olympic Village Operations and Venue Command Posts were all located within ACOG security. These functions were all within the jurisdiction of their respective agency. The Joint Coordination Center (JCC) received and disseminated information to and from all public safety security agencies. The JCC was not a command center. Its purpose was to maximize the direct and immediate access to pertinent information in order to facilitate the highest degree of coordination between participating law enforcement agencies. The Hartsfield Coordination Center (HCC), dealt with the safety and security of athletes
and dignitaries in and out of Hartsfield airport. Since no one agency single-handedly managed multiple operational functions, the Specialized Management Centers (SMC) were created to combine agency resources thus addressing such crucial areas as: Air Support; Traffic; In-Transit Security; Dignitary Protection; Bomb Technicians and Olympic Intelligence Center.

Air Support was managed from the Aviation Management Center (AMC). The AMC was responsible for surveillance and related tasks such as traffic and in-transit security between the airport, Olympic Village, training and competition sites and the transporting of bomb and tactical personnel when needed. It was also responsible for the management of Dignitary Protection. Because of the unique overlapping of responsibilities, dignitary protection, in-transit security and traffic functions were co-located. However, the operations of these areas were from strategic off-site locations. Bomb technicians employed sophisticated equipment on the leading edge of technology such as; explosive Total Contaminant Vessels (TCV's), Golden X-Ray Machines, Post-Blast, Investigation Equipment, complete demolition systems for electric firing and many others. These groups were based throughout the security network and were directed by the Bomb Management Center (BMC). The Olympic Intelligence Center (OIC) was processed in a multi-agency center. It received real-time classified intelligence from around the world as well as direct leads from the more than 120 undercover investigators throughout the state of Georgia.

The IOC had professional liaison officers from state and federal agencies
along with a selected team of analytical experts who were responsible for the daily-unclassified threat bulletins for each command center. Another indispensable component to the entire structure was Tactical Operations. Joint exercises featured a variety of situations that could be faced. These efforts allowed managers from different agencies to perfect coordination of resources to confront the demands of each crisis. There also were the Satellite Joint Operation Centers (SJOC), at each of the nine locations outside of the Atlanta region that hosted Olympic events - Gainesville, Savannah, Columbus, and Athens, in Georgia; Miami and Orlando, in Florida, Birmingham, in Alabama, Washington, D.C. and the Ocoee River in Cleveland, Tennessee. Detailed operational functions of these components will be covered as it is applicable in this chapter.

Within the "Olympic Ring" inside the city of Atlanta, were eleven competition venues and a variety of other Olympic-related activities including the Athletes' Village, the IOC Hotel, and Centennial Olympic Park. However, the APD shared responsibility for providing Olympic security services with a number of different law enforcement agencies. For example, the Athletes' Village, Olympic Center, Georgia State University and Centennial Olympic Park were inside the Olympic Ring but on state property. Consequently, the State Olympic Law Enforcement Command (SOLEC) had primary responsibility for venue security at these locations, similarly, the Atlanta University Center, which was originally the responsibility of the Atlanta Police Department. The three venues were delegated to the Fulton County Sheriff's Office as was the IOC Hotel. The Atlanta PD was the lead agency for traffic
management on the surface street inside the Olympic Ring but not for the interstate
highways or the MARTA rapid rail system.

Law Enforcement Versus ACOG Security Role

The two entities responsible for operating the venue sites were the
organizing committee (ACOG) and the law enforcement agencies. The relationship
between the two was much the same as was between other private security
providers and public law enforcement agencies. The relationship was an
interdependent one, but the role of each was distinct. Effective cooperation and
coordination between law enforcement and ACOG Security was predicated on a
clear delineation of roles and responsibilities as illustrated in Appendix B. This
delineation can be summarized as “inside and outside” venue roles.

ACOG Security Roles

During the venue’s security operational period, the law enforcement agency
with security jurisdiction within an Olympic venue was responsible for traditional law
enforcement duties including, but not limited to, all arrest situations, criminal
investigations, crowd/demonstration control, emergency public safety response,
bombs/EOD, dignitary protection, air support, tactical response, traffic control on
public streets and general assistance to private security providers.

The Law Enforcement Venue Commanders were primarily responsible in the
case of any public emergency or public safety incident that occurred at a venue
site, this included any incident that threatened the safety, order, and/or security of a
venue site.
The lighting of the Olympic flame, in any host city, marks the official commencement of the Olympic Games. According to Hill (1996), "The Olympic torch is a modern invention, dating only from 1936." Study shows that in ancient Greece, a sacred truce was called to enable athletes to compete peacefully at the Olympic Games. Before the Games, runners-called "heralds of peace," traveled to Greece proclaiming the beginning of the truce and issuing the clarion call to the Games. Following the symbolism of a torch lit in Olympia, Greece by the rays of the sun, the torch relay has preceded every Olympic Games since the custom was revived in 1936.

The security of the Olympic Torch Relay began in April 27, 1996 when the Olympic Torch arrived in Los Angeles from Greece- where the flame is historically ignited at Mt. Olympia. At the L.A. Coliseum, thousands of spectators watched as ACOG President and CEO Billy Payne received the flame from the Greek high priestess and lit a special cauldron to launch the US portion of the relay. The flame traveled through forty-two states and Washington, D.C., in 15,000 circuitous miles. It covered counties, major cities and state capitals of America. The eighty-four day relay, culminating July 19, 1996 at the opening ceremonies in Atlanta involved more than 10,000 torchbearers which included 5,500 individuals selected through a program developed by the Coca-Cola Company, the official sponsor of the Torch Relay, 2,000 Olympians and others selected by ACOG and the United States Olympic Committee (USOC).
The logistics for the relay were intimidating. Crowd, traffic, and possible sabotage were the primary concerns. ACOG, Coca-Cola and the State of Georgia Olympic Law Enforcement Command were jointly responsible for ensuring that the torch arrived on schedule for the lighting of the Centennial Olympic Cauldron. The general route of the caravan was determined by ACOG, and Coca-Cola who plotted the detailed route which included traveling on horseback, canoe, steamboat and sailboat.

Most of traffic and crowd control coordination with local communities began a week to ten days prior to the torch arrival in Metropolitan Atlanta. In the early days of the Torch Relay, some of the law enforcement officials, most of whom were state troopers, were spread all across the country to assist in coordinating the Torch Relay with local law enforcement jurisdictions.

In preparation for the challenge as the Olympic torch moved through Metro Atlanta on its final two days en route to the Olympic Stadium, the entire contingency of forty-six state law enforcement personnel assigned to protect the flame during its cross-country relay, were made available to run with the torchbearers thus preventing photographers and enthusiastic spectators from stepping into the torchbearer’s path.

Rafer Johnson, a 1964 gold medallist became the first US runner among the 10,000 Olympic Torch Relay team members who were designated to carry the flame from L.A. to Atlanta for the “Opening Ceremony.”25 The bearer of the final Olympic torch as reported by Steve Wulf, was a “closely guarded secret.”26 The climax of
the torch lighting came when the torch was handed over to Muhammad Ali, who was described as “the surprise and inspired choice to light the Olympic Cauldron.”

Ali, a world renowned and famous athlete who had won the light-heavyweight boxing gold medal in Rome, bravely with his trembling arm, ignited the wick, leaving the over eighty-three thousand crowd from around the world with great joy and emotions.

The successful Olympic Torch Relay from the Los Angeles Coliseum, to the lighting of the cauldron at Atlanta Olympic Stadium July 19, 1996, was due in-part to advanced work coordination of the 46 officers assigned to the relay security by the State Olympic Law Enforcement Command (SOLEC), headed by Gary McConnell. It was also through joint cooperative efforts by all the local law enforcement personnel throughout thousands of the police jurisdictions. According to McConnell, there were no “threats or any real serious criminal activity toward the torch or the torch relay group.”

**Accreditation and Access Control**

Part of the security efforts to deter or prevent terrorism, sabotage or random violence during the 1996 Olympic Games, was through strict access control of all venues and Olympic facilities. As a result, over 40,000 Olympic staff and volunteers, 10,000 athletes, 15,000 media representatives, including Olympic families, contractors and providers went through background screening in order to be issued an accreditation card. The development of this credential system by the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games (ACOG), was for the purpose of 1.)
Identification, 2.) Controlling access of authorized persons into ACOG controlled facilities, and 3.) Limiting access to restricted areas within ACOG controlled facilities. The process of obtaining such a credential was called accreditation.

Accreditation was essentially the process of determining whether an individual was qualified to have full or partial access to Olympic-related venues and properties. Although managed by ACOG, government law enforcement agencies played an important support role in the accreditation process by accessing exclusive information—criminal history, intelligence etc. and contributing it in a sanitized form to assist ACOG in making accreditation decisions. The State of Georgia through the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) and the Georgia Crime Information Center (GCIC), managed the input of law enforcement information into the accreditation process.

All persons working within an ACOG-controlled facility were required to have in their possession the proper ACOG issued credential. This included all law enforcement personnel assigned to work inside an ACOG controlled facility. It should be noted that all law enforcement personnel were exempted from a background check since a background check was a condition of employment in their respective agencies.

The Accreditation Badge, an ACOG issued credential figure 7, consisted of a category code which identified, for example, APD personnel as law enforcement, a venue code which identified the venue(s) they were allowed to access, the zones within a venue for which entry had been pre-approved, the credential holder’s
name, a photograph, and their agency. In addition to a photograph, the accreditation card had several words or numbers to further identify the bearer. This included large color-coded letters that automatically identified the person by category, such as athlete, VIP, or staff.

![Figure 7. The Accrediation Badge.](image)

The Olympic ID card or accreditation card, according to Martz, "in what Atlanta Olympic Security Chief Bill Rathburn says "[was the most sophisticated electronic security technology in the history of the Olympic Games." Known as
the “ID3D Handkey Hand Identify Verifier,” or hand scanner. This device was used to control access to high security areas such as the athletes’ village and the command center for the ACOG.

The new high-security tempering and counterfeiting device, is part of an emerging system of automated identification technologies known as “biometrics.” Developed by the “Recognition Systems of Campbell, California,” this device “was shown in a 1991 test by Scondi National Laboratories” to be the fastest and a 99.9 percent or better accuracy rate. These high-tech systems were tested extensively in the laboratory as well as during a live audition at the Atlanta Sports ’95 competition according to Paul Tarricone.

Biometrics, according to officials of the Security Industry Association, “uses unique individual physiological or behavioral characteristics to verify identity.” Among the “physical characteristics that can be used to accurately identify an individual because they remain relatively stable and are unique are fingerprints, voice prints, palm prints, hand geometry and retinal blood vessel patterns.”

Bill Wilson described the scanner as capable of taking a three-dimensional reading of an individual’s hand, and then compares it to a master measurement stored in an individual machine, a master computer, or in a microchip on an ID card. For the Olympics, the master measurement was retained in a microchip in individual identification cards. In the process of accessing the venues, if the hand in the machine failed to match the measurement in the microchip, access was denied.
Due to the scope of the accreditation process and the time constraints, four accreditation centers were activated to facilitate the accreditation application process. The four centers were: 1) The Main Accreditation Center, 2) The Athletes' Accreditation Center, 3) The IOC Accreditation Center, and 4.) The Savannah Accreditation Center. As a single-use facility, the Main Accreditation Center (MAC) was located in Downtown Atlanta on Peachtree Street. It functioned as the primary accreditation center for volunteers, vendors, staff and others associated with the Olympic Games. The Athletes' Accreditation Center (AAC), located at the eastern hangar of Atlanta Hartsfield International Airport, functioned as the primary accreditation center for athletes, trainers, coaches, and others associated with the athletes. The IOC accreditation Center (IOCAC) located within the Atlanta Marriott Marquis, the Olympic Family hotel, functioned as the primary accreditation center for the Olympic Family. While the Savannah Accreditation Center (SAC) and Ocoee Accreditation Center (OAC) located at the Savannah Airport, and Tennessee respectively, functioned as the primary accreditation center for all Olympic Games accreditation in Savannah, Georgia, and Ocoee, Tennessee.

Access Control and Screening Point Security

The purpose of access control was to establish guidelines for managing access into and within ACOG's operated facilities during the exclusive use period. Access and Screening point security involved spectator access points, other access points including athletes, VIP's, media etcetera and deliveries which included equipment, vendor goods and mail. Only ticketed spectators and or accredited
individuals were allowed entry into venues or other access controlled areas. Access controllers manually search hand-carried items and utilized "magnetometers and handwands" to screen spectators and accredited individuals for prohibited items prior to entry being allowed. Access control officers were assigned to monitor magnetometer alarm signals, while the access control supervisors were positioned in close proximity to respond to problems or to assist as required.

Law enforcement personnel assigned to venue access control points were to provide assistance to ACOG personnel, upon request, with any accreditation matters that may involve a violation of a criminal statute. Law enforcement interest in access control within a ACOG venue as stated in their handbook, was from a "public safety" standpoint to insure only authorized persons were in an ACOG venue. All persons without a ticket accessing an ACOG facility or restricted area were required to wear and properly display an ACOG issued credential. The credential was subject to examination by law enforcement personnel and authorized security personnel on demand.

In some instances, "day passes" were issued to those individuals who arrived at the venue without a credential. Those individuals must have been pre-approved or otherwise accredited. Day passes were coded to indicate the date for which the day pass was to be valid, and were venue and date specific with the bearer's name visible. Day passes were to be requested through the Venue Manager and distributed at the venue's Accreditation Help Desk. The Venue Security Manager was to aware of the valid code for the day pass for each day.
Information received by law enforcement personnel regarding lost, misplaced, stolen, or confiscated ACOG issued credentials were to be reported to an ACOG security supervisor through the officer's chain of command for action to prevent its unauthorized use in the future. The credential could be invalidated by ACOG only. Should individuals attempt to gain access using an altered or counterfeit credential, the matter was to be referred to a Law Enforcement Venue Commander. This commander must insure that a thorough follow-up investigation is completed to determine the suspect's identity and any applicable criminal violation(s).

Olympic Villages and Athletes Security

The primary concern of any Olympic Organizing Committee since the aftermath of the 1972 Olympic Village terroristic tragedy is the safety of the athletes and Game sites. Study shows that primary threats in the past have been directed against the athletes housed at the Olympic Villages with secondary considerations for the Game sites themselves. Although the threat of terrorism remains, ACOG officials promised a safe and secure village for athletes.38

All aspects of the 1996 Olympic Village Security were planned by the Village Sub-Committee and coordinated as needed with all other planning groups having peripheral Olympic Village Security responsibilities. The Village Subcommittee roles and responsibilities were the determination of the level of security required for the village. This included physical security devices, access control systems, and security staffing requirements for the village.
Of the four Athletes' Villages in Georgia Tech, Savannah, Lee College in Tennessee and Columbus, particular attention was paid to the main Olympic Village at Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech). Described as “A city within a city,” the Village was home to approximately 15,000 athletes and Olympic officials. The Village was self-contained and provided medical, dental, dining, recreational postal services, a shopping complex with banks and other services. The DOD/OSE provided, installed and maintained approximately 580,000 feet of linear fencing, fence-based intrusion detection alarm systems for all athletes' villages, surveillance devices, communications equipment, access control turnstiles, crowd control, vehicle crash barriers, x-ray machines, EOD equipment and portable secondary power sources.

The 1996 Olympic Village relied more on technology than in past Games. The Village was the site of most of the technology driven systems. On this note, Rathburn stated, “we will have the most sophisticated security that has never been achieved before in the Village.” Unlike the Barcelona Village, which used electrified fencing, Atlanta Villages opted for a “stress sensitive” fence. The ten foot-high chain-link fence which surrounded the village as described by Kim, employed “cutting edge surveillance cameras called “Speed Domes.” The “Speed Domes pan,” a small Panasonic camera in a rotating mount could “tilt, to provide a 360-degree field vision.” The device which focuses faster than the human eye was backed by a network of several hundred fixed video cameras. Employment of the “smart” identification cards with computer chips embedded in them, with a high tech
close-circuit TV System, electronic anti-theft devices on equipment and software package called "Visual Reality Security (VRS) 2000," linked it all together. This high-tech system, was manufactured by Sensormatic Electronics Corporation (SEC).

The SEC provided integrated access control, alarm monitoring, and closed-circuit video, surveillance systems throughout the Olympic Village and at each of more than forty venues in and around Atlanta. Key elements of the system explained Chiera included:

1. A hand free access control technology using a chip embedded in the accreditation badge.
2. Hundreds of compact, high-speed, dome-type surveillance cameras, and
3. Hand geometry readers. These palm devices were installed at the entrance of high-security areas. A "map" of the user's hand was recorded and stored inside the radio frequency chip embedded in the badge. In this two-pronged system, the information contained in the badge and user's hand geometry must match in order for the person to gain access.

The Athletes' Village at Georgia Tech with "about 14,000 residents and 10,000 staffers," was sanitized prior to July 6, 1996 actual residential occupation. As the single largest consumer of law enforcement manpower resources, security operation on the perimeter was supported by ACOG Security Department. Because of the heavy concentration of athletes within the Village, security was extremely tight and only those accredited persons with access privileges to the villages were allowed to enter. Serviced by a large transportation mall that functioned as a bus pickup and drop-off point, access to the village was through two entrances, one for
foot and the second for vehicle traffic. Both entrances were manned on a 24-hour a day basis. Law enforcement provided perimeter access control and general augmentation to the private security component.

The fenced perimeter was broken by several white-tented entry stations. To access the village, residences and staffers must pass through sensormatic door frames similar to the airport metal detector. Access control supervisors were positioned in close proximity to respond to problems or assist as required. Upon arrival at a village, athletes were screened by means of their issued radio frequency badges and hand geometry at the residential access control points or by visual verification of their accreditation badge. Access controllers were assigned to monitor alarm conditions at each RF postal, the access controller visually inspected the badge to ensure the bearer's picture matched the badge. If the badge caused the RF sensor panel light indicators to change from amber to green, access was allowed into Olympic Village by an electronically controlled turnstile. If upon reading the badge, the sensor panel alarm indicator light changed from amber to blue and an alarm sounded, this indicated a lost, stolen or canceled badge. Similarly, if the sensor panel alarm indicator light remained amber, indicating either a valid but defective badge or an invalid, counterfeit badge, access was denied. Further, the access controller would confiscate the badge and the "Chief de Mission" assumed control of the situation.

Individuals who left the secured environment had to repeat all steps of the screening process. Those athletes within the secured umbrella would gain access
through the RF/hand geometry at the Village. Athletes within the Olympic Village who left the residential zone and returned were required to submit to the RF and hand geometry screening process before re-entering the residential zone. Athletes within the Olympic Village who left the international zone were required to submit to the RF and hand geometry screening process upon entering what was described as the “zone 2 Boundaries.”

While Olympic officials had concentrated on controlling access into the village, they also gave careful thought to minimizing potential problems within the fence. Athletes from risk-prone nations were closely monitored. A top secret “antipathy matrix” was used to map out where teams from countries known to be in conflict politically or militarily were to be housed. For example, the Israeli and the Palestinian teams due to the Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation, the Kuwaiti and Iraqi teams due to the Gulf War, and likewise teams from Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), since China failed to recognize Taiwan’s independence. The above teams and others were separated and housed as far apart as possible within the Village.

Olympic Sports and Function Venues Security

Protection of the venues and visitors during the Games was another major challenge to security officials. Unlike the Munich Olympic Games, where the entire Olympic site was located within one city and under the control of the West Germany Federal Police and the Munich Municipal Police, or the 1992 Barcelona Summer Games in Spain where one person was responsible for all security, “including
Olympic, non-Olympic and infrastructure sites," the Atlanta Olympic Centennial Games sites were located in at least fifteen separate law enforcement jurisdictions. Included were Municipal/County Police agencies, County Sheriffs and University Campus police.47

Another concern as stated by Pasternak and Seter was that, "the crazy-quilt security arrangements with more than 35 federal, state, and local agencies at forty Olympic Venues (Appendix C) could cause confusion."48 While agencies will be providing security on Olympic sites, some experts were worried that "other areas like hotels, businesses, and utilities, may be vulnerable to attack."49

In the Atlanta Games, venue-specific operational plans that were to maximize public safety and security within the operational boundaries of their venue site were developed by the law enforcement venue commanders, in conjunction with their agency planning office. Each venue command post operation had a venue commander, assistant venue commander(s), administrative and clerical support and radio operator(s).

Atlanta Committee for Olympic Games (ACOG)

The Joint Coordination Center’s main function was to handle and facilitate information dissemination, information display, live video feed, information management, ACOG information links, and information intelligence retrieval. Information was passed to and from the JCC from agency command centers and the specialized management centers. As was anticipated, an excess of fifty (50) public safety agencies with direct Olympic Games responsibilities staffed the JCC
with at least one (1) agency personnel on a 24-hour basis. The JCC also maximized multiple liaison assignments for agency representatives by providing a centralized location. The primary agency assigned the responsibility of the JCC was the APD, with shared assistance from the State of Georgia Law Enforcement Personnel staffing was determined on a venue-by-venue basis.

**Agency Command Center (ACC)**

The Agency Command Center (ACC) function was to handle and facilitate dispatch links, emergency commands, logistical support, staffing and scheduling, information coordination, officer transportation, venue oversight, intelligence links, inventory control equipment, and SWAT. Their communications links were to the Agency's Regional Command Center, the JCC and venues manned by the agency.

The six types of ACC's as illustrated in the “Law Enforcement Agencies with Primary Operational Responsibilities” (Appendix D) were:

1. Agency Command with Regional Command Centers and Venues.
2. Agency Command Center with direct links to venues.
3. Collocated Venue and Agency Command Center.
4. Agency Command Center with no venue.
5. Agency Command Center with Assets.

**Agency Command with Regional Command Centers and Venues**

These centers were agencies responsible for multiple venue and functional
assignments from Regional Command Centers to facilitate the flow of information from the various venues, and function as information is channeled into the Agency Command Center (ACC). The Regional Command Center (RCC) was basically the same as the ACC, but functioned on a smaller scale.

**Agency Command Center with direct links to venues**

In this center information flows directly from the venues to the ACC. In the collocated venue and ACC, both the ACC and the Venue Command Post (VCP) were housed within the same location, most often, operating together as one entity. For instance, some agencies had a responsibility for one venue site. Instead of manning two separate locations (VCP and ACC), it was more feasible to operate at one location. One example was the Georgia International Horse Park at Conyers.

**Agency Command Center with no venue**

This type of command center had no specific venues assigned to its agency. It was necessary to establish this type of command center for logistical special support for participating public safety agencies during the Games.

**Agency Command Center with Assets**

There were no venues attached to this type of Command Center, instead assets from the agency were attached. This type of Agency Command was used most often by federal agencies. An example of the assets attached to this command center was a tactical emergency response team, hostage rescue, bomb technicians, robotics et cetera, and Joint Operations Center (JOC) - This type of center was typically found at satellite locations. All Olympic Command and Control
Centers (JCC, ACC and Venues), were collocated at a special location. Others included.

**Satellite Venue Operations (SVP)**

Satellite venues were generally venues located outside of the Olympic Ring. The satellite public safety operations structure for the 1996 Olympic Games was paralleled (but on a smaller scale) to that of the operational structure within the Olympic Ring. Most of the satellite operations were conducted out of a multi-agency Joint Operations Center (JOC).

Functions of the Satellite Joint Operations Center included coordinating and facilitating officers' scheduling and transportation, maintaining communications links to ACOG, SWAT, Specialized Management Centers, Venue Command, and to the Joint Coordination Center. Satellite JOCs had direct links to the Joint Coordination Center in Atlanta, the Specialized Management Centers ACOG, and venues.

**Specialized Management Centers (SMC)**

Specialized Management Centers contained trained units of personnel having expertise in specific areas. The units were capable of performing multi-agency functional tasks. Many of the specialized units were collocated to enhance and expedite the coordination of security operations.

The specialized management units that were identified were Air Support, Bomb/EOD, Dignitary Protection, Intelligence, In-transit, and Traffic. Their main function was to handle or facilitate communications, equipment, roll call, operations coordination, assignments, scheduling and information management.
There was a direct communications link from the Specialized Management Centers to other functions in the Olympic Security operation structure. The direct communications links were necessary in order to expedite the flow of information during crisis situations and potential crisis situations. For instance, an SMC was able to communicate directly with a venue, bypassing protocol (JCC and ACC) whenever a situation dictates.

The Hartsfield Airport Coordination Center (HACC)

The Hartsfield Airport Coordination Center provided information coordination for Hartsfield International Airport's public safety operations. Participating agencies reported directly to their respective agency command centers. The HACC's two primary responsibilities were airport operation and international entry.

The HACC coordinated and facilitated ACOG liaison, accreditation security, security operations, communications, information management, and interfaces with Agency Commands and Specialized Management Centers. Participating agencies represented were the Atlanta Police Department, private security companies, ACOG, US Customs, US Department of Agriculture, Federal Aviation Administration, and the Immigration and Naturalization Services.

The law enforcement duties at a venue site were the primary responsibility of a single law enforcement agency. Law enforcement personnel were responsible for traffic control on public roads, crowd control, security of venue operational boundaries, and emergency response to any public safety incidents at venue sites. ACOG security forces were responsible for access control, crowd management,
protection of ACOG property, venue perimeter and venue interior security at the venue site, and traffic control on venue property.

A law enforcement personnel member at a venue site was a separate operational component that supported ACOG's venue operations in coordinating venue operations with ACOG security. The law enforcement venue commander and law enforcement field supervisors were assigned to the same venue site to insure the highest degree of continuity at a venue site.

Law enforcement venue commanders reported directly to their ACC. Law enforcement personnel assigned to a venue had radio communications with each other at their venue site only. The venue command post was required to monitor radio traffic between law enforcement personnel assigned to their venue site and the talk group for their agency's command posts. Both law enforcement venue personnel, ACOG security at a venue, and the venue manager met on a daily basis to assess the previous day and prepare for the next day. Prior to the start of competition at a venue site, law enforcement venue personnel and ACOG security conducted a sanitization sweep at each venue site and activated a full venue site accreditation system. Partial deployment of personnel at each venue site was planned three days prior to competition. Although opening time varied at each venue, venues were opened to spectators between two hours range before the start of competition to allow a thorough screening.

Martz explained that ACOG's wish for the 1996 Games, was for "high-tech but low-key security." While there were still plenty of uniformed guards as many
as 22,000, including up to 10,000 military personnel and more than 5,000 private security guards, electronic security measures played a far greater role than in past Olympics. Technology such as the IBM computer-based system was used to monitor alarms and access-control points at all venues; a sensor ID: an identification system utilizing a computer chip embedded in an ID card that was read by electronic monitors at access control points, a hand geometry reader: a device that measured the topography of an individual’s hand, compressed such information into a digitized file that was stored on the main computer and in the computer chip in an individual’s credentials.

In order to gain access to high security areas such as the ACOG Command Center and Olympic Village, the information in the chip must match the user’s hand. Speedome: a programmable surveillance camera was integrated into the overall system but could also be manually operated. SensorLink: a system that compressed video transmissions from the speeddomes so they could be transmitted through telephone lines to the central command post et cetera. To maximize its potentials, it was important for agencies involved in the provision of public safety during the Games to understand technology and its applications.

The over “5,000 unarmed private security guards sponsored by the nation’s largest private security firm, Bong-Warner were used for a variety of functions at Olympic venues and athletes’ villages.” Their duties included monitoring security access points in person and by a complex CCTV network, taking tickets and ushering. The largest group of volunteers, at least 40,000 of all ages, was
assigned to sports and function venues to help during various events. One of the “high-ranking volunteers” was Douglas Green, a retired deputy police chief for Calgary, who headed Olympic security during the Canadian 1988 Winter Games.

The volunteer concept gained acceptance with the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). Kris Turnbow noted, “Whoever came up with this concept really hit the nail on the head because of the amount of training these officers will bring to the Games.”

Volunteer groups, according to Mariani, included “sports officials and judges who must be certified by the governing body of their sport.” Other volunteers were assigned to computers, copiers, and fax machines and administered local area networks. In the medical field, the ACOG enlisted doctors, paramedics, emergency medical technicians certified in CPR. About ten percent of the volunteers provided language services. Each National Olympic Committee (NOC) was provided with hosts who spoke its language and was familiar with Atlanta. Some served at information booths for Olympic spectators from around the globe, while others picked-up international VIP at the airport and performed other tasks.

Venue Procedures

Upon arrival at a specific venue, ticketed spectators formed into queuing lines at designated entrances. Queuing lines were configured in a fashion that only one ticketed spectator was allowed at a time to enter an access-controlled post. ACOG security personnel made sure that all spectators preparing to enter a venue perimeter possessed a valid ticket before they were screened. Spectators were
screened utilizing magnetometer operated by ACOG security personnel supported by law enforcement. Magnetometer portals and hand-held magnetometer wands were used for screening persons at all venues. X-ray devices were used for screening all hand carried items for contraband and weapons. If a prohibited item was discovered, the person was removed from the queue. If weapons and/or illegal items were discovered, the access controller would deny access to the venue and relinquished control of the situation to a law enforcement officer stationed at the access control point. Omni-directional Close Circuit TV (CCTV) cameras, sometimes referred to as “speed domes,” were used to monitor certain public and controlled access areas within each venue. The camera was programmed to “work a beat” or be controlled through a computer by an operator hundreds of miles away.

At an ACOG command center, one can monitor crowds, athletes or traffic at events ranging from canoeing on the Ocoee River in Tennessee to yachting in Savannah, Georgia. An undercarriage vehicle inspection system was used to check all vehicles entering into restricted areas.

APD Venue Operation

As the host city, the Atlanta Police Department (APD) was the lead law enforcement agency at site venues within the Olympic Ring. The three sports venues were the Olympic Stadium, the Omni Coliseum, and the Atlanta-Fulton County Stadium. The other three were function venues- the Main Accreditation Center, the Main Press Center, and the Airport Welcome Center. The entire venue planning initiative was coordinated through the Agency Planning Office (APO).
The APD had primary law enforcement jurisdiction as well as investigative jurisdiction at venues for which its agency had operational responsibility. For example, at the Olympic stadium, the APD was responsible for the development and execution of security operations plans, policies and procedures, and a system of administrative and operational support. The APD was expected to coordinate efforts with venue counterparts in ACOG security, and to enforce all state criminal and traffic laws. Security jurisdiction responsibilities of the APD covered all routine law enforcement services at the stadium except for the investigation of major criminal cases such as homicide and sexual assault. All non-major criminal cases which included but were not limited to traffic, fighting, criminal trespass, shoplifting, disorderly conduct, scalping, simple battery, simple assault, unauthorized sales, et cetera.

The APD, with its investigative jurisdiction at the stadium, was responsible for the investigation and prosecution of all major cases including homicide and sexual assault that occurred within the stadium. The operational boundaries of the stadium included north of the stadium to the Festival area, south of the stadium to Little Street, east of the stadium to Capitol Avenue, and west of the stadium to Interstate I-75/85.

Law enforcement personnel provided 24-hour presence in the Olympic Stadium during the security operational period, and to key venue operational areas such as accreditation, language services, logistics, medical, protocol, sports, transportation, technology and venue management. Its staff at the command post
were a venue commander, assistant venue commander, relief venue commander, field supervisor, field officer, administrative officer, liaison officer, information/reporting officer, radio dispatcher, messenger and clerical. The staff inside the Olympic stadium was to perform the following functions: fix venue posts, fixed perimeter posts, roving venue patrol, roving perimeter patrol, mobile perimeter unit, relief unit, plain clothes unit, fixed traffic post and mobile traffic post.

**Venue Commander**

The APD assigned Major L. J. Robinson as the Venue Commander for the Olympic Stadium. The Venue Commander had overall operational responsibility for the command of law enforcement personnel assigned to the venue. He also had authority over resources assigned to venue. It was his responsibility to inform and otherwise coordinate with the Agency Command Center all changes of status of venue security. He worked together with ACOG security to carry out the security mission.

**Assistant Venue Commander (AVC)**

Assistant Venue Commanders, Captain K. R. Boles and Lieutenant A. J. Biello, assumed overall operational responsibility in the absence of the Venue Commander. When both the Venue Commander and Assistant Venue Commander were present, the Assistant Venue Commander was subordinate to the Venue Commander, and assisted the Venue Commander with his duties. **Relief Venue Commander** The Relief Venue Commander assumed overall operational responsibility in the absence of the Venue and Assistant Venue Commanders.
Field Supervisor

The Field Supervisors were to ensure that law enforcement venue personnel were properly equipped and at their assigned posts. Field supervisors responded to the scene of disturbances at the venue and assisted officers in taking appropriate action. Field supervisors also ensured that law enforcement officers' basic human needs were met with no compromise in security coverage by coordinating relief personnel. Field Supervisors reported to and received direction from the on-site Venue Commander. Field Officer Law enforcement personnel were assigned to either a fixed or roving post at venues. Any incident, situation, or request that law enforcement venue personnel believed required immediate attention, was promptly forwarded to the Field Supervisor for resolution.

Administrative Officer

This was an officer who performed administrative duties as was required by the Agency Commander or Venue Commander. He or she handled messages and information flow within the venue, which was not to be broadcast over the various radio frequencies due to the sensitive nature of the information. This included information overheard by third parties adjacent to venue security officers or law enforcement officers equipped with radios. The Administrative Officer also transported necessary paperwork concerning arrests and disposition of property.

Liaison Officer

The Liaison Officer was a single officer assigned to venues in which the APD had investigative Jurisdiction but not Security Jurisdiction. The Liaison Officer was
the agency's point of contact at the venue. The Liaison Officer - 1. Established
direct communications with the Venue Commander. 2. Attended all meetings and
briefings at the venue. 3. Maintained communications with APD. 4. Coordinated
requests for assistance by the law enforcement agency with Security Jurisdiction
and his her own agency.

Information/Reporting Officer

An officer assigned to a fixed location within the venue. It was the officer's
duty to answer law enforcement and public safety questions, or make the
appropriate referral. He or she also completed a police incident report or an
Olympic incident report, whenever justified by circumstances.

Radio Dispatcher

The Radio Operator was responsible for maintaining communications with
the command center, specialized management centers, and other public safety
agencies as needed. The Radio Operator also maintained a communications log.

Federal Agents

Agents from numerous federal law enforcement agencies were sent to
support the Atlanta Police Department in the Stadium Complex. The agents were
sworn locally and performed law enforcement duties within the operational area of
the venues.

Mass Transit Security

Given the magnitude of the events and sport venues, the volume of ground
transportation, pedestrian traffic, coupled with the potential risk posed to athletes,
the safety and expeditious movement of the athletes, the IOC dignitaries, and the thousands of visitors between point of entry, housing and Games sites were necessary for orderly conduct of the Centennial Games in Atlanta. The major problem for the 1996 Games was the problem of transportation.

The traffic function was a fundamental and critical task within the overall security mission. The traffic function was primarily concerned with the management of routine predicted traffic flow problems as well as coordination of responses by the law enforcement emergency reaction teams to unanticipated traffic problems.

The Traffic Subcommittee which worked with ACOG transportation in planning for the overall routine traffic management, ultimately evolved in the traffic management operation unit. The group included: Atlanta Police Department (APD), Georgia State Patrol (GSP), Atlanta Fire Department (AFD), Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT), Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA), and ACOG. Because traffic was a multi-agency functional area, it required the establishment of a Specialized Management Center (SMC). It was collocated with Dignitary Protection and In transit, as well as ACOG Transportation during the Games.

The largest demand for transportation was for the athletes, who were to be transported each day from their quarters at the Olympic Village to the sport and function venues and returned to the Village after the competition. In transit security was primarily concerned with securing the routes of ground transportation that was used by Olympic athletes. Notably, different levels of security were required
depending on athletes and countries involved. For example, buses carrying high
risk athletes and their officials, such as the Israeli, Palestinian or the Taiwan teams,
were provided with extra security such as plain clothes SWAT personnel on the
buses, escort vehicles, and if possible armored buses.

Transportation to and from the venues was the responsibility of both ACOG,
the State of Georgia, and the City of Atlanta. While APD Chief Beverly Harvard and
the State Department of Public Safety (SDPS) Commissioner Sid Miles shared the
responsibility for spectators transportation to all sports venues, transportation for
the movements of IOC/NOC members, athletes, officials operating staff, media
personnel, and VIP guests was coordinated by ACOG.56

Traffic Management

The development or establishment of a Traffic Management Plan (TMP) was
designed to facilitate the most efficient movement possible for vehicular and
pedestrian traffic throughout the Olympic Ring. The APD was the lead agency
since it had primary traffic management jurisdiction inside the Olympic Ring.

Traffic management operations, as a joint effort, were coordinated through
one center called the “Atlanta Traffic Operation Center” (ATOC) and represented by
each agency. ATOC was located on the second floor of City Hall East, inside the
Atlanta Police Department’s Agency Command Center (ACC). During the
operational period from July 18th through August 4th, each of the agencies had a
specific operational role to perform as described below:

1. The Atlanta Police Department was responsible for traffic
direction, traffic enforcement, and its commanders were the
final arbiters of any legal changes in traffic control on city streets. Also, the APD was the lead agency responsible for the traffic plans for all eight Olympic road course events.

2. The Atlanta Bureau of Traffic and Transportation was responsible for the placement of traffic control signs and some informational signs, the regulation of all city traffic signals, and the placement of traffic barricades on all city streets.

3. The Atlanta Fire Department reviewed the Traffic Plan to insure that traffic lanes were designated for use by fire and medical emergency vehicles responding to a call within the Olympic Ring.

4. The Georgia Department of Transportation was responsible for all state roads and highways, as well as the four interstate highways passing through the city of Atlanta. They controlled the closing of exit ramps off the interstate highways. The GDOT was the lead agency and with its new Advance Traffic Management System, provided video feeds, through fiber optic cable, to the Bureau of Traffic and Transportation and the Atlanta Police Department’s Agency Command Center.

5. The Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) was responsible for the public transportation system that included buses, vans, and rapid lines. Their input was important to insure that street closures and restrictions did not adversely impact their bus and van routes, as well as their daily schedules.

6. The Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games was responsible for the movement of the Olympic Family which included IOC members, NOC members, athletes, sponsors, media, staff, and volunteers to and from all Olympic venues within the state of Georgia. ACOG’s transportation system was a private enterprise separate from the MARTA system.

During the Olympic operations, National Guard personnel supported the Atlanta Police Department at the implementation of the Traffic Management Plan. Two positions in the Atlanta Traffic Operations Center (ATOC), were staffed by
military supervisory personnel throughout Olympic Operations. Their personnel consisted mostly of military and security police. As part of their traffic management duties, military personnel supported five of the eight Olympic Road course events in the city of Atlanta. One of the examples was assisting police personnel in restricting public access to the road courses.

A number of Technical Supports were used to facilitate the Traffic Management Operations. These supports were provided by several computer systems by Olympic sponsors such as IBM. These included the “Advanced Transportation Management System (ATMS),” and “AutoCad Map System” and live video feeds from the APD airship.57

Automated Traffic Management System

The ATMS service area included more than sixty miles of freeway and twenty-five miles of HOV lanes, managing traffic flow in five counties and Metropolitan Atlanta. It consisted of over one hundred video cameras strategically placed along interstate highways located inside the Interstate 285 perimeter as well as major intersections of Atlanta’s city streets. Each video camera was capable of panning, stopping to hold one view, and refocusing the lens to the desired level of magnification. These functions were controlled by personnel at the State’s Traffic Management Center and the Atlanta Police Agency Command Center. In addition, electronic message signs were in place along the Interstate highways and were controlled from the State’s Traffic Management Center. These signs were used to relay up to date information regarding traffic conditions to the general public.
AutoCad

The AutoCad Map System sponsored by IBM included computer generated maps of the city of Atlanta. The computer program allowed traffic management planners to graphically display the traffic flow patterns, transportation routes, street closures, and street restrictions. Consequently, the maps generated by the AutoCad system graphically summarized the traffic plan. Planners could modify the Traffic Management Plan easily. Color coding information made the maps easy to understand. Copies of the Traffic Management Plan were widely disseminated throughout the Atlanta metropolitan areas, via the local newspaper, community meetings, and business associations.

The AutoCad Map System was complimented by a set of documents that listed all of the street closures and street restrictions within the Olympic Ring. The documents provided a greater level of detail than the information depicted on the AutoCad maps. Each traffic document included the name of the street, the section of the street with north/west and south/east boundaries, how the street was being used, and the effective date(s). Road closures were classified as full-time or part-time and no unauthorized vehicles were allowed.

Atlanta Police Airship

The Atlanta Police Department had operational control of the world's largest flying airship during Olympic operations. Its use was donated to the department by the Kroger Company. The airship was equipped with sophisticated video equipment loaned to the department by the British army, which flies a similar airship in the
United Kingdom. The airship provided a stable, long-term observation platform from which to monitor vehicular and pedestrian traffic flows. The airship broadcast directly to the Atlanta Police Agency Command Center. The video feed was also shared with the State of Georgia and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. During flight operations, there was always at least one Atlanta police officer on board to act as a spotter. The airship was airborne approximately twelve hours per day.  

Transportation Services  

At the request of the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), transit agencies from across the United States helped to provide transportation assistance to ACOG. Over 2,000 buses were loaned from various transit agencies across the nation to handle the transportation needs of attendees.

MARTA provided rail service, buses, and van shuttles to most venues. State officials supplemented MARTA’s 265-person police force with at least 200 federal agents who were sworn in as state officers. Gary McConnell stated “[MARTA's role in Olympic transportation was the reason the state decided to add it to its lists of responsibilities which included seven sports venues, the Athletes’ Village, Centennial Olympic Park and the Torch Relay.]” Although Marta Police Chief Gene Wilson served as venue commander, there were several state officers as assistant venue commanders.

Another form of transportation during the Games, was the use of a fleet of “up to 200 helicopters.” As visitor accommodations during the Games was at a premium in a 90-mile radius from Atlanta, the service allowed efficient
transportation of spectators from further outside the city.

As envisioned, some or all helicopters were equipped with supplemental "Global Positioning Systems, Navionic coupled with the Automatic Data Link system (ADS) provided emergency, security, VIP, personnel transport and news-gathering." Steven T. Fisher explained that non-critical helicopter routes, such as those for VIP and "rotary-wing" airline operations, were to access "multi-modal" transportation points such as subway stations, bus stops or points with walking distance of games avenues.

All air support were provided on a mission basis. It included, six observation helicopters, four transport (UH-1 or UH-60) helicopters, two MEDEVAC helicopters, one heavy lift helicopter and one light fixed wing transportation aircraft, all available on a 24-hour/day during the operational period. In short, no one aircraft was dedicated to any agency. All observation helicopters used for night time support were equipped with high intensity directional search light or "Forward Looking Infra Red" (FLIR). All DOD provided observation helicopters had a sworn law enforcement aerial observer as part of the crew. Only DOD personnel, sworn local, state, and federal law enforcement officers; FAA and public emergency services personnel performing Olympic security related duties were allowed to fly on DOD provided security aircraft.

Besides providing and controlling twenty-four hour aviation support to the law enforcement security forces in the immediate vicinity of Atlanta, Athens, and Lake Lanier, other aviation support mission included the following:
In-transit which had the need for observation helicopters to assist in route security and provided police observation of in-transit athletes’ buses.

Venue Commanders provided upon request in support of scheduled event. Air support covered traffic control, security over flights with night-time illumination, and limited command and control support.

Emergency Response Team (ERT) The primary use of helicopters was to transport ERT’s from their staging or assembly area to the desired “landing Zone (LZ) where they were to discharge the ERT. This service was for all participating local, state and federal teams, except FBI HRT.

FBI Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) Using the Army/National Guard UH-1H helicopters flown by FBI crews, provided 24-hour support to move the HRT to a designated venue. These helicopters were completely under the control of the FBI, but complied with all established air support procedures.

Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) Transport helicopter support was available on an immediate response basis of order to move an EOD team and equipment to a predetermined landing zone. Upon completion of delivery of personnel and equipment, the helicopter(s) returned to the FSA and reverted to “Standby Status.”

Dignitary Protection This service was available for federally recognized dignitaries VIP only if helicopter assistance was necessary. Air Security and Surveillance for the ground movement of a threatened dignitary and the possible movement of security forces involved in dignitary protection were the only
anticipated aviation support missions.

Traffic Law enforcement was in need of periodic use of observation helicopters to assist in traffic management. Traffic information obtained by air support was relayed to the In-Transit Committee representative at the JCC and appropriate venue commanders.

JCC Command and Control Support Observation helicopter support with a live day night video down link capability to the JCC was required. This afforded JCC the ability to have command and control support for any game related incident and at the same time have live video fed into the JCC to allow monitoring the incident in progress and to facilitate decision making.

Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) Support MEDEVAC support for the Olympics was not a security responsibility. However, since medical evacuation was a public safety issue and airspace at all venues was restricted, Air Support was involved in MEDEVAC planning and support. Primary MEDEVAC support came from civilian Emergency Medical Service (EMS). If a need occurred to augment the civilian EMS capability, DOD provided MEDEVAC helicopter support was made available at the FSA.

MEDEVAC helicopters were prepared to move patients from Olympic sites and activities to nearby medical trauma centers. Again, MEDEVAC support was provided by Air Support on a mission basis only, with two criteria: 1) competent medical authority requesting the MEDEVAC support, and 2) no civilian EMS was available to fly the mission.
Heavy Lift Helicopter Support

Heavy lift "(CH-47 or CH-53)" support was required to be available on a contingency basis. The mission of the heavy lift helicopter support was to assist in the expeditious re-establishment of municipal services and utilities placed out of service by natural or man-made catastrophes. Additionally, they were available to assist in any mass casualty situations.

Air Transportation to Off-Site Locations

Fixed wing transportation support was required to support contingency requirements to move key security personnel (no ACOG security personnel) from the FSA to any of the off-site Olympic cities, for example Media Village in Dekalb. With one hour's advance notification, fixed wing transportation support was available to move up to twelve personnel (with limited equipment). The fixed wing aircraft transported the personnel to pre-determined airports, where the requesting Olympic off-site law enforcement agency assumes transportation support for the transported personnel and equipment. The fixed wing aircraft returned to the FSA after discharging its cargo at the off-site airport.

VIP and athletes of high risk, that is, past Presidents, current government officials, foreign state executives, if necessary, were transported by armored limousines or by helicopters to Game site. While those of a lesser threat were transported in standard executive vehicles with a security team depending on the situation.

Despite the meticulous traffic planning by the Subcommittees and agencies, the deployment of the "Advanced Traffic Management System" by the GDOT to alert motorists to alternate routes, accidents, construction, and delays in traffic,
some commanders and Olympic bus drivers were furious about what were described as "embarrassing organizational glitches."\textsuperscript{65}

Complaints during the Games, ranged from MARTA’s lack of staffing to meet an Olympic level of crowds, to persistently late transportation to and from Game sites and the IBM coordinated computer system’s frequent technical troubles, and others. For example disoriented drivers caused athletes to be late for their scheduled events, and excessive crowds were misdirected into the wrong venues.

In an effort to re-organize the shaky shuttle bus system which was maligned for late arrivals, breakdowns and inexperienced drivers; Olympic organizers, top federal transportation and city officials decided to dump over twenty-five buses from the ACOG fleet, improve synchronization of traffic signals, and assign military drivers to some buses. "To cut down buses getting lost" according to Downey, drivers were consistently assigned "to routes rather than being switched around."\textsuperscript{66}

But despite all the transportation clutter, there was no major security threat en-routes to and from the Game sites.

**Emergency Response Elements**

In a given scheduled major event such as the Olympic Games, emergencies are always anticipated especially now that Olympics are vulnerable to terrorist attack. The two emergency response groups in operation during the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta were the Fire and Emergency Medical Services (Fire/EMS). Their respective roles and responses during the bombing of the Centennial Park are detailed in Chapter VII.
Fire/EMS Response

The Fire/EMS established guidelines were to ensure maximum coordination between Fire and Emergency Medical Services, Medical Services, and Law Enforcement Venue Commander. The ultimate goal was to provide the highest level of public safety and the expeditious delivery of emergency services at the Olympic sites.

The Fire and Rescue function under the Atlanta Fire Department, was primarily coordinating the public safety response to incidents involving fire of hazardous materials, while contracted with EMS personnel to ACOG to provide on site emergency medical services.

Both the Fire and EMS coordinated and implemented all firefighting, emergency medical, rescue, disaster, and mass casualty issues for the 1996 Games. Since EMS personnel in Georgia are regulated by the state public health agency, therefore, the state health agency established a formalized system known as the "Public Health Command Center" (PHCC), to ensure a rapid and coordinated response to all public health issues during the Games. This center was a physical location, staffed with public health professionals and a federal emergency response staff. "Its primary function was to coordinate response to all public health issues, including media, disease out breaks, food safety, and prevention services." Every county with an Olympic venue had its public health response team and were operational twenty-four hours per day.

One medical disaster, according to Meeham et al, the Georgia Division of
Public Health (GDPh) had "primary responsibility to coordinate a medical response in a disaster situation," for example, standard disaster measures such as evacuation, mass shelter, and transportation. However, during the 1996 Games, concern was centered more on the management of mass casualties that could occur from a terrorist incident. Others included the real possibility of a chemical or biological terrorist incident. To this effect, federal government resources within the GEMA, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), DOD, and mutual aid agencies were mobilized as needed.

Emergency Response Team (ERT)

Atlanta Emergency Response Team during the Olympics was at the direction of the FBI Operational Center (FBIOC). Its mission was to immediately respond to a potentially critical situation to evaluate the need for tactical deployment of SWAT teams. A memorandum of understanding (MOU) between agencies was instrumental in dictating responses to problems and resolutions for participating emergency response teams.

The Emergency Response Command Post (ERCP) located at City Hall East on Ponce De Leon Avenue, was manned on a twenty-four hours per day shift, on a rotational basis between representatives of the different agencies involved. For example, on July 8, 1996, the Atlanta SWAT team began Emergency Response standby duty with twelve members on a 6:00 am to 2:00 p.m. shift. A twelve person element of the Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) assumed duty from 2:00 p.m. until 10:00 p.m. While the Norfolk SWAT team stationed in the Naval Reserve Center
on the Georgia Tech Campus assumed duty inside the Olympic Village at 10:00 p.m. until 6:00 am completing the twelve-hour shift for that day. Each Command Post had secured communications and fax capabilities.

Members of the Assessment Team had seven persons on standby for each shift. This team consisted of a supervisor, the on duty SWAT team leader, a hostage negotiator, a technically trained agent, a radio technologist, an evidence response team person, and a HRT representative. A tactical operations center monitored intelligence for each ERT. Tactical personnel assigned to a particular shift was to report for duty forty-five minutes prior to their shift in order to receive the latest intelligence and tactical update. If a venue officer responded to a problem, and determines tactical assistance was necessary, the officer would:

7. Notify the immediate supervisor, and request assistance on the scene.

8. The supervisor after assessing the situation in turn forwarded the information through the chain of command to the Venue Command Post (VCP) who in turn notified the ACC, JCC or JOC.

9. A field supervisor in VCP also notified the primary ERT either by telephone (primary) or radio (secondary) requesting their assistance.

10. The primary ERT team if necessary responded with mutual assistance.

11. The FBI Emergency Response Team Commander was then dispatched to provide assistance and observe the situation, if FBI SWAT/HRT was not designated as the primary responder.

12. The primary ERT was responsible for resolving the crisis or (if federal jurisdiction) command of the situation was then transferred to the FBI.
13. A Mobile Command Post responded to every crisis situation to provide a Forward Technical Operation/Command Post. In handling major incidents or high-risk situations relating to the 1996 Olympic Games, such as the Centennial Park Bombing, ACOG security coordinated with and supported law enforcement in expediting the deployment of tactical response teams to the scene.

**Communication Network**

Another key element for the successful operation of the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta revolved around an effective communications system. Given the size and scope, the simultaneous scheduling of multiple events the geographic location of Olympic venues, the large number of public safety personnel and numerous law enforcement jurisdictions involved in securing the Games, the high volume of pedestrian and vehicular traffic, and the necessity for immediate decisions and response to remedy demanding situations, all combined to necessitate a communication capability dedicated to the 1996 Olympic public safety.

The purpose of was to establish a coordinated radio communications network between law enforcement's venue command post, ACCs, SMCs, the JCC, and Joint Operations Centers (JOC). This networking system was to facilitate the flow of information throughout the venues of Olympic public safety operations. The importance of a well coordinated communication networking was emphasized by Special Agent Juan Montes during the security planning for the Olympic Games. Montes stated "One of the major things that I saw that's going to be very important,
is communication between all those different agencies. If we can keep those communication avenues free, clear and open at all times, ... it will run much more smoothly."71

During the operational phase, communication across agency lines became critical. To facilitate the communication process the Federal Communication Commission (FCC), granted ACOG exclusive temporary rights to ninety public safety frequencies for the Games.72 All ACC, Specialized Management Center (SMC) and ACOG Security Command Center were responsible for forwarding all pertinent information to the Joint Coordination Center (JCC). Pertinent information as classified by law enforcement, are “all information with the potential of having an impact on another agency, a specialized law enforcement function, or the overall security operation of the 1996 Olympic Games”73

A combination of three types of radio communication systems were used during the Games. This included, the existing radio systems, the 800 MHZ tracking systems and the DOD/OSE radio system. For communication compatibility, both the APD and part of the state communication systems were upgraded. The resulting network was a collaboration between IBM, AT & T and Motorola which consisted of a three-tiered information tree designed to provide critical data to decision makers in a speedy manner. Mark Moron described the system as “the largest ever designed for a sporting event.”74

The first level of dissemination was through a group paging network which allowed for immediate notification of an incident to anyone on the network. The
second, was by voice mail boxes, allowing a more thorough understanding of the event. The final element of the network consisted of a comprehensive e-mail system connecting law enforcement, ACOG, and sponsored security and allowed detailed information, announcements and alerts to be distributed electronically.

**Information Flow Procedures**

The Joint Coordination Center (JCC) in figure 8 below, coordinated the timely and accurate flow of pertinent information, in order to facilitate the highest degree of coordination between participating agencies.

![Figure 8. Joint Coordination Center Information Flow](image-url)
Each participating agency in the JCC was responsible for accessing incoming information that was relevant to the respective agency.

All incoming information were forwarded directly to the Center Manager or designee. Information was transmitted into the JCC through radio transmission, telephone conversation, facsimile transmission, courier, live video, computer network, television network, or a JCC agency representative. All incoming information regardless of the service were recorded in an “Incident Record,” maintained on file by the Center Manager at the JCC. These information were reviewed and decisions regarding its distribution were made based on the Center Manager’s assessment of its significance.

In priority order, all pertinent incoming information were displayed to the entire JCC or disseminated specifically to the affected agency representative(s) with icons and number coding used to differentiate the types of information displayed to the entire JCC on the video screen or monitors. The Center Manager then documented all incoming information onto the automated “Incident Tracking System.” Copies of the preceding shift’s incident log were made available to all participating public safety agencies on a daily basis and saved for future reference.

The law enforcement venue personnel had no direct communication with the JCC, since all information that were to be relayed to the JCC from the venue level were channeled through the Law Enforcement Venue Commander, the ACC Commander, then to the JCC.
**Venue Officers**

Law Enforcement personnel assigned to an Olympic venue, depending on the agency with primary law enforcement jurisdiction at that venue, were assigned a DOD radio and were able to communicate only with other officers assigned to that venue, as well as the Venue Command Post. Law enforcement personnel had the option to carry their department issued radio in addition to the DOD radio.

Law enforcement personnel assigned to Public Safety and Traffic functions but not specifically to Olympic venue, were to communicate with their law enforcement agency through the agency’s normal communication device utilized for the operational period.

**Agency Command Centers (ACCs)**

These centers were made able to communicate with their Venue Command Post, all SMCs, other Agency Command or Coordination Centers and the JCC. Each ACC monitored the radio traffic from the venue command posts within their jurisdiction and the ACC talk groups.

An Atlanta talk group system was used by all ACCs for interagency radio communications with the Central Radio Center (CRC), enabling each ACC to talk with and monitor the activities of other ACC’s, as well as their venues. A “talk group” is a channel that was radio programmed in to allow communication between all parties that have the channel selected on their radios. Information to be relayed to the Central Radio Center from the venue command posts as shown in figure 9, were transmitted by a law enforcement venue supervisor by telephone.
Specialized Management Center (SMC)

Through the use of the DOD/OSE "state of the art" walkie-talkies and based systems to many venues in the SMCs, law enforcement personnel were able to communicate with all Agency Command and Coordination Centers, Venue Command Posts, other SMCs, and when necessary, with officers inside and outside Olympic venues. SMC communicated by radio with venues by switching to the "talk group" of the ACC with security jurisdiction at the venue. Venues were able to communicate with SMCs by telephone or by requesting that the SMC change to the
agency's talk group for radio communications.

**Joint Operation Center (JOC)**

No direct communication between the law enforcement venue personnel and the JOC was allowed. All information needed to be relayed to the JOC, from the venue level, were channeled through the Law Enforcement Venue Commander and subsequently to the JOC. The dissemination of such information was then executed by the commander of the JOC. In most circumstances, communication protocol requiring the transmission of sensitive tactical information was done through the use of "landline" telephone or digital voice privacy radio, to minimize the likelihood of being overheard by non-essential personnel.

**Summary**

The development of the Olympic Master Security Plan (OMSP) blueprint by the OSSG, and the inter-agency planning efforts conducted by OSPCC and IPG were necessary. The OMSP primarily served as a guide on how the different agencies would collectively provide for the safe and secure environment for the 1996 Olympic Games. It provided a conceptual picture describing Olympic security methods, and procedures. It described the coordination among Olympic security agencies, especially regarding level and types of services, that is, just what public safety and security agencies would do and in what time frame.

Because of the potential long-term consequences, the selection of agency planners and the establishment of an agency planning office (APO) arguably determined whether or not the agency's Planning, and ultimately, the Operational
Phase, would be successful. In this chapter, planning at the Developmental Phase has been covered. Section II reviews the effectiveness of the planning process through a series of testing at the Experimental Phase.

The most important aspect of the Experimental Phase was to validate Olympic security plans. As a result of the Table Top, Command Post and Field Exercises involving different scenarios, it was clear how all aspects of Olympic security services were to be supported and provided. These joint exercises allowed managers from different agencies to perfect coordination of resources to confront the demands of each crisis. The application of the Experimental Phase was to uncover shortcomings and deficiencies which are generally much easier to contact than during the Operations Phase. In Atlanta, the rigorous work of the security plans during the Experimental Phase greatly improved successful security operations.

This Phase of the Olympic security preparations also uncovered areas of weaknesses in the proposal plan. This was true on both the agency and interagency levels. The only way to identify and resolve the weakness of a plan was through testing which was provided by the Experimental Phase. The Training Subcommittee was not operational during the Games, however training personnel were available to advise on training issues. Section III of this chapter, focused on the implementation of what was planned at the Developmental Phase and tested during the Experimental Phase.

At the Operational level, ACOG Security staff provided coordination and
cooperation through membership on the OSSG and OSPCC committees who in turn provided oversight of the IPG and the various law enforcement subcommittees. Its security program divided the security of the athletes into five basic components: threat assessment, in-transit security, athletes' village, sports and training venues.

Threat assessment was developed by the Intelligence Specialized Management Center (ISMC) and disseminated to ACOG as necessary. In transit security was provided by private security officers or security volunteers equipped with two-way radios aboard each bus transporting Olympic athletes and with the guidance of the In transit Security SMC which provided police escorts and heavily patrolled transportation corridors for the buses to travel between sport and training venues and the athletes' village.

There were several levels of access control used during the Olympic Games. The most sophisticated of these security equipment were used in Downtown Atlanta where most of the events took place, with the highest level deployed at the Atlanta Athletes' Village. While other sports and function venues had somewhat lower levels of access control, all were equipped with proven access control systems and procedures in order to create a secure environment for the Olympic Games. Some of these systems and procedures included magnetometer and x-ray screening, contraband searches, limited entry turnstiles, fence-based intrusion detection systems with CCTV monitoring, radio frequency proximity and biometric technology and vehicle sanitization equipment. At highly secured areas, such as the Olympic Village, an elaborate clearance system was established that relied on a
"biometric" scanner to determine people's identity through an optical scan of their hands. In order to gain entry, a person's hand print must match digitized versions that were stored in computer chips embedded in identification badges.

The movement of people other than athletes was closely controlled and monitored. Each person had a security clearance level, giving some members of the staff access to some locations but not to others.

Application of these high-tech systems was "the most sophisticated electronic security in the history of the Olympic Games." It was not surprising that many security experts, including Louis Chiera called the 1996 Olympics "[the technology games]."

During the Olympic Games period, coordination was facilitated by the collocation of law enforcement and security personnel at the Law Enforcement Joint Coordination Center and law enforcement personnel at the ACOG Security Command and Central Center. Law enforcement and ACOG security collocated operations at all venues. These command posts had access to most technology including; live Atlanta Olympic Broadcast and NBC TV video feeds from helicopters and blimps, Closed Circuit TV (CCTV) monitors, Geographic Information System (GIS) database and a satellite-based global positioning system.

Coordination of communication functions was agency-based consistent with jurisdiction. However, assistance in coordinating the performance of the overall communication equipment was provided through the DOD/OSE, Georgia State Patrol, and the APD.
Unfortunately the 1996 Olympic Games were plagued with "a tardy transportation system," computer failures, and security breaches during the first week of the Operational Phase. Although off-stage transportation and technical troubles were quickly resolved with the help of top federal transportation and DOD/OSE officials. According to Andrew Young, the co-Chairman of ACOG "no one could run a transportation system as big as ACOG's without problems." 

To ease the security and traffic problems during the Games, efforts were made to generate public support for the Traffic Management Plan. Details of the Plan were widely disseminated to all facets of the affected public. Universities within the Olympic Ring did not hold summer schools during the Games. University employees were scheduled vacations during that time in an effort to solve parking problems. As a result of these public awareness and support, Olympic traffic conditions in Atlanta were much better than projected.

Finally the Atlanta Police Department's (APD's) Olympic security role was an integral part of an overall, comprehensive security operation carried out by all of the government and private security providers. Despite the bombing of the Centennial Park, there was a strong consensus that the law enforcement community succeeded in carrying out its Olympic security mission. Furthermore, plans developed during the Developmental Phase, tested during the Experimental Phase, supported successful security operations during the Operational Phase.
Endnotes


5 Ibid.


10 Ibid.


15 Ibid.


20 Bill Rathburn served as the director of security for ACOG. A former Dallas Police Chief, Rathburn was in-charge of Olympic Security for the Los Angeles Police Department at the 1984 Games, and he has been a consultant for several other Olympics, including 1988 in Calgary and Seoul and 1992 in Barcelona where terrorism was a threat.

21 Ron Martz, Rodney Ho, Michael Hiskey, Maria Saporta and Andy Miller, “Test Bomb” Resounds as dud among officials,” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution.


27 Ibid.

28 Gary McConnel was the Chief of Staff of the State Olympic Law Enforcement Command. McConnell stated that the biggest problem has been enthusiasm. "People like to be around the torch ... But there have been no threats."
29Ibid.

30Martz, "Want to get in? You will have to give them a hand," The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 7 September, 1994, sec. D, p. 6.

31Ibid.

32Ibid.

33Paul Tarricone, "Raising the Bar: Security for the Atlanta Games is an Olympian Task for Planners," Facilities Design and Management (July 1996): 24.

34Ibid.

35Ibid.

36Bill Wilson is the vice president for sales and marketing of Recognition System of Campbell, California. Recognition System is the only company in the U.S. that commercially produces hand scanners. More than 1,000 domestic and international businesses uses hand scanner to verify identities. For example, computer software giant Lotus Development Corporation, uses scanner at its day-care center to verify the identity of persons picking up children.

37Tarricone, "Raising the Bar..., 24.


40Kim, "Advancement help ACOG...," p. 15.

41Ibid.


43Louis Chiera is the director of Olympic Marketing for Sensormatic Electronic Corp., of Deerfield Beach, Florida, the first ever Olympic electronic security sponsor. The company supplied security equipment for the US Olympic Committee and ACOG headquarters, including, Lake Placid, New York, Colorado Springs, and San Diego, Olympic Training sites.

44Kim, "Advancements help ACOG," p. 15.
See the 1996 ACOG policies and procedures policy number 1, pp. 1-5.

Jeff Beatty is a former CIA and Army Delta Force Officer who served as a member of the FBI's hostage rescue team during the 1984 Olympic Games in L.A. Atlanta Games she said, lacked the "holistic approach" found in Barcelona.

Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid.

Tarricone, "Raising the Bar," 24.

Kris Turnbow is the Chief of the Raytown, MO., Police Department. Chief Turnbow offered six of his officers to the 1996 Games as volunteers.


Ibid.


Ibid.


" Helicopters at Olympic," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 13

62 Ibid.

63 Steven T. Fisher is the FAA vertical flight program officer. According to Fisher, the helicopter ingress and egress routers during the Olympic used airspace over highways to minimize aircraft noise. See Heli-Expo '95 Report in Aviation Week & Space Technology, 13 February, 1995, 48.

64 Schmitz, "IBM's Olympic Challenge," 42.


66 Mortimer Downey is the deputy secretary of the Department of Transportation. Downey spent one-full-day in Atlanta observing the troubled transportation network and foresaw a major transportation challenge during track and field events when the 83,500 seat Olympic Stadium is opened for competition.


68 Ibid., 1470.

59 Ibid.

70 See Law Enforcement Venue Operations Manual on Operations Support/Technical, Section VIII.

71 Juan Montes is an FBI special Agent in Atlanta. A production of the Instructional Technology Service Unit. FBI Academy Quantico, Virginia “In the Shadows of Glory” by Victoria Ray, narrator.


74 Mark Morton is the Motorola's director of systems technology for the Olympics. Motorola provided 10,000 mobile and portable radios, 6,000 pagers, 1,500 cellular phones and computer moderns. See The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 16 February, 1996, sec. C, p. 9.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid.

78. Tarricone, “Raising the Bar...,” 24.

79. Louis Chiera was the director of Olympic marketing for Sensormatic Electronics Corporation, in Deerfield Beach, Florida. Sensormatic Electronic Corporation was the first ever Olympic electronic security sponsor. See Tarricone, “Raising the Bar...,” 24.


CHAPTER VII
DISCUSSION AND ASSESSMENT OF SUCCESS

This chapter has a dual purpose. First, it reviews the coordination effort between the FBI and other ancillary agencies assigned with the responsibilities of investigating the Park bombing. Second, a brief comparative analysis between the 1972 Munich attack and the 1996 Atlanta bombing incident will be explored.

The General Security Concern

In the United States, substantial contingency planning and security coordination was undertaken prior to the 100th Anniversary of the Summer Olympic Games hosted by the City of Atlanta beginning July 20 through August 4, 1996. While terrorism was at the forefront of security planning for the Summer Games, providing such a security coverage is a top priority of every law enforcement agency involved in the organization, public safety, and security planning effort. Law enforcement officials ranging from police officers, military personnel, private security guards and others, were assigned the responsibility to thwart everything from mugging to terrorist bombing during the Games.

In a meeting with officials from ACOG security personnel, the APD, Games security sponsor Sensormatic and more than one hundred downtown businesses
leaders, Atlanta Police Major Jon Gordon allayed concerns about crimes in the Downtown area and the threat of terrorism. Gordon explained that while there is always a decrease in major crimes, “pick-pockets” increase in an Olympic city during the Games.

Similarly, two dozen corporate security directors were warned by four security advisors and specialists in terrorist activities during a one-day seminar on “improving corporate security and dealing with potential terrorist attacks.” According to Brent Brown, tight security at Olympic venues in Atlanta could make ill-prepared downtown buildings and businesses easy targets for terrorist attacks. In agreement Robert Fink stated that terrorists “are going to take a soft target over a hard target most of the time.” Fink added that good planning and continued training of employees helped raise awareness and turn a vulnerable business or facility into a hard target. The security director’s major concern was on the best way to convince business leaders that the threats from domestic and international terrorists were real.

Olympic Centennial Park

The Centennial Olympic Park, is located in the center of Atlanta’s downtown Olympic complex within the “Olympic Ring.” The Park was described as Bill Payne’s legacy to Atlanta, “one that would long outlive the Games.” The twenty-one acre enclave with a price tag of over $50 million, was to be a “low-security village square” for those with or without tickets to mix and taste the Summer Games unhindered by the metal detectors and bag searches required at every other
Olympic site. Price described the Centennial Park as by design, more of a "market place than a shrine to Olympic sportsmanship," and "a place to seize the main chance." He further stated that:

The park was surrounded by such highly secured Venues as

the Georgia World Congress Center, the Omni, the Georgia Dome, the Main Press Center and the hotel that housed the Dream Team and other prized athletes, ... Centennial Park was, in effect, the soft underbelly of an otherwise impregnable armor.

Before the Games, security experts were privately critical of ACOG's lack of "[thorough planning.]" To Jeff Beatty, the Centennial Park was wide open for terrorism. "In the venues they chose security as the most important thing; at Centennial Park, they chose access. Those two things are diametrically opposed - open access means poor security."

Park Jurisdiction

Although the Park is in the heart of downtown, it is actually on state property and thus the law enforcement responsibility of the State Olympic Law Enforcement Command (SOLEC) during the Games. The agency was also responsible for controlling traffic on streets around the park, even though they are within the city of Atlanta. A number of uniformed law enforcement officers were detailed to the area by state officials to police the park. Included were two-person undercover "ID teams" assigned to watch for suspicious activity, such as gangs, petty thefts, and pickpockets. The "ID teams" were to mingle freely in the crowds and alert uniformed officers of any potential problems or threats.
Bomb Threats

Prior to and following the pipe bombing of the Centennial Park on July 27, 1996, the White House was acutely aware that the Games were quite inviting as a target for terrorism due to the number of bomb threats posed. All established guidelines were to be followed in the event of a bomb-threat and disposing of suspicious packages. Policies were established to minimize the effects of a bomb threat or suspected explosive device on the normal development of events at an Olympic venue and to maximize public safety in the event an actual device was found.

On pre-threat precautions, a number of security measures were adopted to increase the difficulty of transporting an explosive device into a venue or function sites; for example, accreditation, established and implemented house rules, checking bags, utilizing magnetometers, daily sweeps etcetera.

When a bomb threat was received, the person receiving the call was to notify the Law Enforcement Venue Commander (LEVC) or designee using the proper code. The LEVC was to notify the on-site EOD Bomb Technician, the Bomb Management Center and the ACC, which in turn were to notify the JCC/JOC. Venue security and maintenance personnel were to conduct a search and investigate any suspicious items found, while overseen by the venue bomb technician. Using the provided Bomb Threat Checklist, they were required to obtain the exact word of the caller and exact location of the bomb.

The person receiving the call was to be thoroughly debriefed. Information
was to be forwarded to the BMC and the ACC as it was received. A Police Incident Report (PIR), or an Olympic Incident Report (OIR) was to be prepared by the investigating officer. In an "Open Records Act request by Mother Jones; the GBI in response reported that the FBI were jointly withholding incident reports on twenty one suspected packages discovered near Olympic venues by bomb squads. Seventeen of the twenty-one suspected packages were found on the day of the Centennial Park explosion."

The GBI and the APD claimed that only one bomb was found at the Games, but Olympic officials such as Larry Whitlock, informed Mother Jones that a number of other fully functional bombs were discovered near Olympic venues and deactivated. Whitlock’s claim was supported by Donna Burns, special projects director of the Georgia Emergency Management Agency (GEMA). Burns acknowledged that Olympic bomb squads “disrupted” sixteen packages using a water cannon or manual deactivation but would not confirm how many were fully functional.

During the last Summer Games held in the United States at Los Angeles 1984, a right-wing “Aryan” paramilitary group call the Order, made elaborate plans to bomb several Olympic sites. Upon arrest and detention of group members, several like-minded militias vowed to continue what they saw as the “Order’s unfinished business,” though no incidents related to that threat were reported during the Games. A similar occurrence was reported in April 1995 after federal agents acting on an informant’s tip arrested two members of the “112th Battalion of
the Militia-at-Large for the Republic of Georgia," near Macon, Georgia.\textsuperscript{13} The two men were charged with conspiracy and possession of unregistered explosives. It was widely reported by law enforcement officials at the time that the group had targeted Olympic venues, though authorities repeatedly denied there was any connection with the Summer Games in Atlanta.\textsuperscript{14}

Contrary to the 1984 Los Angeles threat, the Atlanta Games were disrupted by a deadly pipe bomb planted at the Centennial Park. It was a reality that tested the many years of planning and training. It also tested Bill Payne's rhetoric, which insisted that the Games "will be the best organized and most efficiently managed in the history of the Olympic movement."\textsuperscript{15}

\textbf{Incident Response Structure}

Much concern was devoted to the potential occurrence of major incidents, which could disrupt the 1996 Olympic Games. Accordingly, there was an extensive level of prior experience brought to the planning and execution of special functions such as intelligence, tactical, fire and rescue, to crime prevention and suppression technique as was covered in previous chapters. These additional training and extensive testing were to perfect capabilities.

The Incident Command Post comprised of sixteen personnel units. At the top of figure 9 is the venue commander who was responsible for all law enforcement incident activities, as well as normal operation within the venue. The Venue Commander was also responsible for the development and implementation of strategic decisions and the approving, ordering and distribution of resources.
within the venue. The Venue Commander (VC), regardless of range had complete
authority and responsibility for conducting the overall operations.
Other responsibilities included:

1. Assess the incident.
2. Establish a command post.
3. Notify the ACC.
5. Assign incident command staff.
6. Conduct initial briefing.
7. Make necessary coordination with other agencies.
8. Request additional resources as needed.

The Information Officer was directly under the Venue Commander. Its function was to develop accurate and complete information regarding incident cause, size, situation, resources, and other pertinent data. The Information Officer was also responsible for the documentation of said information on the incident form and forwarding the form to the Venue Commanders and aiding in the dissemination of the information. The Incident Operations Supervisor (IOS) was responsible for overseeing the incident from the incident location. The IOS was to implement the strategies and tactics under the direction of the Venue Commander. Other responsibilities included:

1. Continuous appraisal of the tactical situation.
2. Providing the command post with incident related information as it occurs.
3. Briefing the Venue Commander on deployments.
4. Planning and coordinating the use of tactical forces assigned to
Incident Reporting

The purpose of incident reporting was to establish guidelines for the gathering of information related to the law enforcement and security functions of the 1996 Olympic Games. However, the success of the 1996 Games was in large part, dependent upon the free flow of information between participating agencies. In order to encourage and speed that flow of information, temporary procedures were put in place for the duration of the Games. The method and procedures outlined below were to insure that information were collected and evaluated in the most efficient manner possible. It was anticipated that information will come to security officials from citizens, ticket holders, Olympic family members, intelligence services, police agencies and the media, in various forms and for various reasons. Little of that information required traditional crime reports, but its collection was to be no less critical.

The procedures that followed were to de-formalize the information gathering process as much as was possible while ensuring that all necessary information were gathered in a timely and complete manner. The two forms of reporting procedures were Olympic Incident Reports (OIR’s) and Police Incident Reports (PIR’s). The OIR’s was to be completed by any security official (ACOG or police) who felt they had information which should be transmitted to other security or law enforcement personnel. The six general categories of this information are:

1. General Information (Intelligence - This was information that may alert others to potential problems or crimes that could
occur during the Olympics. For instance, an Olympic athletes reporting that he or she overheard a group of foreigners talking about demonstrations should their team fail to win a medal.

2. Sick/Injured Persons

3. Damaged Property

4. Lost, Found or Mislaid Property

5. Stolen Property

6. Suspicious person, vehicles, and activities.

Police Incident Reports (PIRs)

While most information were transmitted with an OIR, there were cases that required official police reports. These incidents are handled by police officers as they normally would with two exceptions:

1. They were to request another officer to handle the report if they are on a fixed post with other duties.

2. If the report was of such a nature that it would normally be screened by department policy the reporting party was to be sent to the venue command post to make the report.

However, some discretional options were allowed in some circumstances.

1. OIRs were to be completed by law enforcement venue and security personnel at the time the information was received and turned into the venue command post immediately. If the reporting party was assigned to a fixed post, they were to radio the venue command post and advise that they had an OIR to be picked up.

2. Venue command post personnel was to be responsible for evaluating the information and distributing it to necessary personnel. At the very least, the information was to be faxed immediately to the Joint Coordination Center and the Agency Command Center.
3. The Joint Coordination Center was responsible for entering the event into Info 96 and assigning a log number. This was to make the event available to all Info 96 users. If the event was of such a sensitive nature that JCC personnel felt logging on Info 96 was inappropriate, they were to handle such distribution by FAX or other means to the Olympic Intelligence Center or other Agency Command Centers.

4. The Agency Command Center was to evaluate each incident to determine if it should be logged as an agency report or needed follow-up. If the report was to become an agency report, the ACC was to assign it a case number and insure its proper filing. If, in the opinion of ACC personnel the incident needed further follow-up, they were to insure that the request was made to the proper personnel.

5. The original copy of all OIR's was to remain at the venue command post throughout the Games at which time they were to be turned over to the Agency Command Center.

**Responding to the Bomb Scene**

Law Enforcement Officers responding to the bombing scene were to establish a command post and immediately deploy personnel for perimeter control, to secure the scene. No one was to be allowed in the area until the EOD technicians had arrived and cleared entry to the damaged area. This was to ensure that proper investigative procedures may be followed, evidence was to be protected from contamination, and danger from a secondary explosion was reduced.

Extreme caution was to be exercised in any rescue attempt by:

1. Requesting a bomb disposal unit, fire and rescue unit, and other emergency units and utility services if necessary.

2. Preservation of life and rescue of any victim as the first concern.

3. Estimating the size of the incident and the number of law
enforcement officers needed to set up a large enough perimeter to secure the scene. Contamination of evidence was of a concern since minute bomb fragments are essential evidence and may be destroyed by walking through the debris. Therefore, the scene was to be treated as though it was a homicide or other serious crime.

4. Attempting to locate witnesses to the incident and keeping them at the scene until the EOD investigator arrived.

In Atlanta, the nature of the incident at the Centennial Park determined the different unit and law enforcement support. For example, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) had on-call response teams available to respond and assist with major fires, thefts of explosives, post blast investigations, and processing of evidence as needed. ATF responses were to be coordinated through the Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) Bomb Management Center (BMC). The FBI response teams were to conduct investigations and post-blast investigations related to terrorist activities in areas covered under the federal jurisdictional guidelines.

**EOD Representative**

The purpose of the EOD Bomb Management Center was to provide coordination and direction for all Olympic EOD support in the event of an incident involving an explosive or related device. In addition, the Bomb Coordination Center (BCC) was an extension of the BMC. In conjunction with and under the direct auspices of the EOD BMC, the responsibilities of the EOD BCC was to stage EOD personnel and equipment for ground and possible helicopter response to any EOD-related incident inside and adjacent to the Olympic Ring on a 24-hour-a-day schedule.
In addition to military, federal, state and other local law enforcement EOD qualified personnel, the EOD BCC was manned by at least seven EOD qualified Bomb Technicians who were members of the Atlanta Police Bomb Squad (APBS) along with their equipment. The Bomb Technicians were supported with military EOD response equipment. If the device was authentic the LE Venue Commander was to notify the EOD Management Center and the ACC. An EOD team and K-9 team were to be immediately flown from Dobbins Air Force Base at Marietta to render the device safe or remove the explosive hazard. Once on the scene, the EOD team assumed control of the situation.

**Tactical/SWAT Representative**

At the Command and Control were three elements within the FBI Emergency Response Team. The first element was the Assessment Team, the second element was the Tactical Teams, and the third element was the Command element containing the Mobile Tactical Operations Center (MTOC), a Mobile Command Post and a communication vehicle. This group of thirty-two persons including TOC personnel were stationed at City Hall East. In support of this Emergency Response mission were two DEA helicopters at Peachtree/Dekalb airport, and two UHIB Huey helicopters at Dobbins Air Force Base.

In an incident such as the Park Bombing, the Assessment Team and an eight person Tactical Team were dispatched by the Special Agent In-Charge (SAC) in the FBI Operation Center (FBIOC) to respond directly to the scene of the incident where the Assessment Team supervisor was to meet with the ranking law
enforcement person at the site. The supervisor was to contact the Atlanta SAC to
brief him or her about the situation. The SAC in turn, was to decide whether or not
the Bureau was to assume command and control of the incident and if additional
assets should be committed to the resolution of the incident. The deployment of the
FBI tactical teams required that, the SAC and/or ASAC proceed to the incident
scene to assume command and control.

The second element dispatched through the on-duty SAC authorization were,
the two additional eight-person Tactical Teams. The team's movement was either
by ground vehicle or by helicopters. Deployment by helicopter was coordinated
with and approved by the on-duty SAC. It should be noted that the on-duty SAC
must approve utilization of helicopters to transport FBI resources. The Operations
Center coordinated in conjunction with the Olympic Law Enforcement Air Security
Operation Center and the agency responsible for the incident venue, were to
coordinate the deployment by helicopters.

The third element dispatched was the command element which included the
Mobile Command Operations Center (MCOC), the Mobile Command Post (MCP),
and the Communications vehicle. These vehicles were to proceed directly to the
scene of the incident and be directed in their deployment by the Assessment Team
Supervisor, the SWAT team leader, and the Crisis Management Coordinator.

During the process, the FBIOC remained in constant contact with the tactical
response elements in order to provide the latest intelligence updates on the
situation. The FBIOC was also responsible for alerting the tactical team on standby
to prepare and assume duty at the tactical CP at City Hall East. The US Marshall's Command Post, was used as a conference room by the SAC. The US Marshall's TOC was dispatched for the Assessment Team and the Emergency Response element. This vehicle was deployed to support tactical operations at the crisis site. The Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG) Commanded by the Special Agent In-Charge was deployed to assist the Atlanta SAC during the Olympic Games.

**Bombing Investigative Role**

The Centennial Olympic Park was closed to tens of thousands of visitors after a "crude homemade pipe bomb exploded at 1:21 a.m., Saturday morning, killing two and causing injuries to more than one hundred eleven people. The bombing was condemned by the Olympic officials, athletes, the State Department and throughout the world. President Clinton described the bombing as "an evil act of terror ... an act of cowardice that stands in sharp contrast to the courage of the Olympic athletes." He vowed to bring the perpetrators to justice.

The nature of the incident and where the property was located granted jurisdictional authority to both the federal and state agencies to investigate the bombing of Centennial Olympic Park. Since the bombing was investigated as a terrorist act, the lead responsibility of the probe shifted to the FBI. The FBI bomb experts' role in conjunction with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), was to identify the type of explosive device used. The two agencies were to determine from their files whether the bombing fits profiles of previous bombings, either in the method or the type of explosives used. During the criminal
investigation, state officials deployed a task force of over a hundred additional members of the Georgia National Guard to the downtown area. Additional “thousands of military personnel and security officers were deployed by Olympic officials to “re-sweep” all Olympic venues for explosive devices.”

The investigating officials were hesitant to “point a finger too quickly for fear of wrongly singling out one group” as being responsible for the bombing, as in the case of the Oklahoma City bombing. Analyzing the explosive device, security experts described them as “a nail-studded pipe bomb,” most often “the weapon of choice for domestic groups, particularly right-wing militias than international terrorist organizations.” Brian Levin who monitored hate crimes believed the pipe bomber could come from three profile groups: (a) an anti-government supremacist, or militia group, (b) a sociopath, or (c) someone with a personal vendetta. Levin pointed to the “random acts of terrorism” mantra that is a staple among anti-government terrorists who might view the Olympics as a movement toward a New World Order or government takeover. Such groups known as “leaderless resistance,” was coined by the White Supremacist, and has been co-opted in the extreme anti-government movement. Larry Preston Williams disagrees. He described the bombing as “the work of a loner,” that “the park was picked more for its accessibility and easy exit rather than some symbolic sponsor.” The FBI’s initial suspect was a private security guard Richard Jewell assigned to guard the AT & T pavilion, the area of the blast. Jewell was described by the FBI as one “who has a history of over-zealous policing in Habersham County.” FBI investigators
concluded that Jewell fit the profile of a lone bomber, who placed the 911 call. According to Scruggs and Martz, “this profile generally includes a frustrated white man who is a former police officer, member of the military or police “wanna be” who seeks to become a hero.” Jewell was later cleared of any role in the bombing but his investigation led to disciplinary actions against FBI agents and a probe by the Senate Judicial Subcommittee on terrorism into the release and publication of Jewell’s name by the media.

It should be noted that problems in Olympic Games, has been linked to private security guards in the past. For example, a private security guard who attempted to trade his badge for an Olympic pin at the 1980 Winter Games in Lake Placid, New York, was rejected because the pin owner already had a badge. Similarly, at the 1984 Summer Games in Los Angeles, one private security guard assigned to check buses for bombs, was caught smoking marijuana on the job. Another arrested for rape, one discovered with a concealed weapon in the athletes village and several busted after burglarizing athletes’ rooms. Others failed to report for duty after receiving their uniforms and badges.

In Atlanta during the Opening Ceremony, Roland Atkins, an unofficial security guard was arrested with a knife and a loaded handgun as he forged his way through security gates into the Olympic Stadium. “Atkins was charged with criminal trespass, carrying a pistol without license and theft of service.” The aforementioned past Olympic incidents could explain why FBI investigators were quick to name Richard Jewell as the park bombing prime suspect.
On December 9, 1996, after four months of unsuccessful internal investigation leading to the bombing of the Centennial Park, the FBI Director, Louis Freeh solicited for public help. He offered a "$500,000" reward for information leading to an arrest in the Olympic Park bombing. In July 1997, with the first anniversary of the Olympic Park bombing looming, the FBI again turned to the public for help by releasing a photo of a mystery man in shadow with a hooded sweat shirt sitting on the bench where the bomb was placed about twenty minutes before it went off. The federal investigators as a follow-up in November 1997 displayed several components similar to those used in the explosions. The investigators repeated the theory that the incidents may have been carried out by the same person or group. Among the key items displayed were:

1. Military style or backpack style olive green camera bags.
2. Steel plates of various thickness.
3. Flooring and masonry nails commonly used at construction sites.
4. No. 7 and No. 9 smokeless gunpowder.
5. Dynamite sticks and B batteries.
6. Alarm clocks 8 duct tape.
7. Twisted iron wire and 10 plastic storage containers.

There were a series of explosions proceeding the July 27, 1996 Olympic Park bombing. For example, in January 1997, two bombs exploded outside an Atlanta area women's clinic. Within the same year, another bomb detonated at an Atlanta night club with mostly lesbian clientele. The third bombing occurred January 29,
1998 in a Birmingham, Alabama women's clinic known to perform abortions.Investigators have hypothesized that a serial bomber could be responsible for all four attacks including the 1996 Park bombing. Eric Robert Rudolph was named as a suspect in the Birmingham bombing on February 14, 1998. Steel plates from the bomb that exploded in the Atlanta's Centennial Olympic Park were linked to Eric Robert Rudolph. FBI investigators also explained that nails used as shrapnel in that attack matched nails found in Rudolph's rented storage shed in North Carolina. Despite a massive search, federal agents have been unable to locate Rudolph and the Centennial Park bombing remains unresolved.

The 911 Call and ERT Alert

The unanswered question is whether the reduced staffing which created a shortfall in security personnel, played any part in the glitches to the 911 emergency system that resulted in the failure to inform state law enforcement officials that a threat had been called in about a bomb in Centennial Olympic Park?

The ACOG Security Chief, Bill Rathbun, in his defense of the charge by critics explained; though "security guards, military personnel and law enforcement officers on duty were stretched thin throughout the city and venues,"35 that the shortfall did not reduce staffing to a dangerous level. An examination of the joint communications network following the Centennial Park bombing reveals what may be described as an information breakdown. There is a disagreement as to the exact time the bomb threat was first received by the city's chaotic 911 emergency telephone operation. The 911 system documents suggest that approximately ten
minutes may have lapsed before Atlanta Police official took action.\textsuperscript{36}

Atlanta Police Chief Beverly Harvard at first denied any delay in responding to the bomb threat. She later acknowledged the "lag between the time a 911 call warned officials of a bomb at Centennial Olympic Park and police response to it."\textsuperscript{37}

The proper protocol as described earlier in this chapter, was that the bomb threat should have been relayed directly from 911 to the Atlanta Police Department's liaison in the Joint Command Center (JCC), City Hall East. The Police Department in turn should have immediately transmitted that information to the State Olympic Law Enforcement Command (SOLEC) liaison. The Bomb Management Center (BMC) should have been third in line to be notified of the potential of the deadly explosive. Contrary to the correct protocol, an Atlanta police officer was dispatched to the pay phone where the 911 threat originated, while another officer was sent to the park. The lapse in time due to improper notification of appropriate Agency Command (ACC), was seen by State officials as "a hindrance to the evacuation process."\textsuperscript{38}

\textbf{Munich and Atlanta Incidents Compared}

"The Games Must Go On" and "The Games Will Go On"

The above statements were made by two International Olympic Committee (IOC) officials in separate but similar circumstances within a twenty-four year period. The former was delivered by Avery Brundage, the IOC president after a twenty-four-hour postponement of the XXth Olympiad, following terrorist killing of Israeli athletes in the Olympic Village, September 5, 1972. The latter announcement
was by Francois Carrard, the director general of the IOC after a homemade pipe bomb exploded in Atlanta's Centennial Olympic Park during the XXVIth Olympiad, July 27, 1996. Those emphatic words "were an echo of the last time that violence devastated, but did not halt, the Olympic Games."³⁹

Terrorist Attack on Munich - 1972

The International Olympic Committee (IOC), experienced its bloodiest incident in Olympic history at Munich, West Germany. The Games were interrupted on September 5th when the first Olympic terrorist incident brought death in an event unprecedented in the history of the Games.

Members of Black September broke into the Israeli quarters at the Olympic Compound in Munich, initially killing two Israeli athletes and taking nine hostages. After tedious negotiations the incident was terminated in a shootout with the German police. Five of the Arab terrorists involved were subsequently shot dead in a gun battle at Furstenfeldbruck Airfield, some twenty miles from Munich, while a German police official was also killed by the terrorists. The total death toll in Munich was seventeen; that is, eleven Israeli athletes, five Arab terrorists and a German policeman. The three surviving terrorists, two of whom were wounded, were released following the hijacking of a Lufthansa jet the following month.⁴⁰

The Black September Organization is described as a radical left-wing, anti-Zionist group and takes its name from the month in 1970 in which the Palestinian guerrillas, formerly active in Jordan, were crushed by the Jordanian Army after a bitter nine-day "civil war."⁴¹
The Black September Organization has utilized the full spectrum of terrorist tactics, which have included kidnapping, hostage taking, bombing, armed ambush, hijacking, assassinations, and others. This is an organization that has extensive international terrorist connections, as well as support from many foreign nations including Libya and the former Soviet Union.42

Munich, the modern German city, with its friendly and hospitable people, planned the Olympics, not as an exhibition of national might, as was the Games of 1936, but as living proof that the strong, aggressive tensions of our world could be tamed and discharged in the Games. The Munich Games were planned and conducted with low security profile to further the Olympic creed: “Sound Mind in a Sound Body, that will promote friendship among nations.”43 The Olympic Committee decided to utilize a minimum number of uniform police and security personnel in keeping with a low security profile.

Security and law enforcement command and control was maintained through a centralized command post and communication center. A limited intelligence center was established as part of the command post to review all material collected on political as well as criminal subversives. The law enforcement planners conducted and reviewed a target assessment survey which included a review of all critical areas; including but not limited to, places of high spectator concentration, power plant locations, communication utility locations, VIP and others. In addition, those country delegates and athletes who might, because of political background, race or religion be identified as possible targets were reviewed. The Israeli
contingent was so identified. Meetings were conducted to determine the need for additional security precautions.

The two entrances leading to each Olympic Village compound was surrounded by a six-foot high block wall fence with barbed wire at the top. Each entrance was open from 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. and patrolled on a random basis by security personnel. After 11:00 p.m., these gates were located and patrolled by uniformed law enforcement personnel on a regular schedule. Access was controlled by a master personnel list between the 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. schedule. This control was considered as weak at best. No identification system had been established because it was felt by the Olympic Committee to be inconvenient to the participants, journalists, and support personnel. For all of these reasons, security was kept to a minimum.44

At 4:00 a.m. on September 5, 1972, the peace and tranquility of the XXth Olympiad was shattered by an attack by the Black September terrorist group on the Israeli Olympic athletes' apartment. This predawn attack was the beginning of the 24-hour reign of terror and death that brought shame on the German Republic and began an era of Olympic terrorism. In mid-afternoon after competition had continued as scheduled, the IOC decided to stop the Games and would not say when, or even whether, they would resume. That announcement created some uncertainty and a level of grief among the athletes.45

The four major actors in this short but complex incident during the negotiation process were the eight members of the Black September terrorist group,
the West German government, Israeli government, and heads of all Arab states and governments. There were two different levels of representation of the German government at the initial stage. One was the local government in Bavaria and the other was the federal government in Bonn. However, from the terrorists' behavior it is evident that the perpetrators intended to conduct negotiations at the federal level, with the government in Bonn, rather than the local government of Bavaria.

The Israeli government was represented by its ambassador to Bonn, Elyashiv Ben-Horin, who was communicating with Israeli Foreign Minister, Abba Eban in Jerusalem. The German authorities attempted to use the Arab government to mediate the release of the hostages but without success. For example, the Egyptians refused to take part or to help resolve the incident. The German authorities were entrusted with the handling of the situation by the Israeli government. This included their contact with the terrorists and doing all that was necessary to ensure the safety of the hostages.

The Black September key demand was the release of 200 Arab prisoners held in Israeli jails. On the list also were the names of Ulrike Meinhof and Andreas Baader, both leaders of a left-wing German terrorist group, and Kozo Okamoto, a Japanese terrorist who had taken part in the Lod Airport massacre. In addition, the group demanded a flight out of West Germany to an Arab nation. The authorities were given three hours to meet all of their demands. During a brief meeting at the police command post with police, diplomats, and other government authorities, including the Bavarian Minister of State, officials were briefed by the head of the
Munich Police. This official explained that he withheld any rescue attempts due to the possibility of explosives being present.46

At 9:00 p.m. when a final decision was taken, the negotiation had lasted for roughly fifteen hours. At that point a bus and two helicopters were provided by the government to transfer the hostages and their captors to Furstenfeldbruck Airfield. The crisis staff were to ambush the hostage takers at the airport, but the German official misjudged the number of terrorist and their capabilities. There were too few police marksmen at the airport. Police officers opened fire as terrorists jumped out of the helicopters taking several of the hostages with them to the commercial jet. The resulting fire from the terrorist lasted for more than fifteen minutes. A hand grenade was detonated by members of the Black September killing the hostages and some terrorists.

Finally, when the police firing ceased and the location was secured, the ending result was traumatic: eleven Israeli athletes, one police officer, five Black September terrorists were dead. Two police officers seriously wounded and three members of the terrorist group captured.47

**Terrorist Attack on Atlanta - 1996**

Security has evolved into a major production unto itself ever since the XXth Olympiad Games in Munich in 1972. The security for the 1996 Games was said to be “the tightest ever in history.”48

Twenty-four years after the Munich massacre, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) again, had relived their worst fear in Atlanta, Georgia. The July
27 bombing of the Centennial Olympic Park, which killed two and left over 111 people injured, marked the second Olympic terrorist incident in modern Olympic history.

It should be noted that ACOG was concerned about security as reflected in correspondence and memos. It also reinforced the organization’s political struggles, its overriding concern not to “blow its budget and its zealous promotion of the Games.”49 An early document on security, called for [“zero assassinations and zero terrorist attacks or bombings.”]50 Security vulnerabilities such as bomb threats and attempts to plant a bomb were listed. An assault on the Olympic image was considered a greater threat. But despite the massive $3.1 million security budget, with 30,000-strong security contingent51 who had rehearsed for threats up to and including a nuclear attack using stolen reactor fuel, it did not stop a terrorist attack on the XXVIth Olympiad.

On July 27, 1996 at 12:55 a.m., a security guard observed a suspicious package near the communication tower. He alerted a law enforcement personnel; an agent from the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) examined the parcel and called in a bomb-diagnosis team. At 1:06 a.m., David Johnson an FBI agent reported that a white male with no ‘discernible’ accent calls 911 and warns of impending explosion in Centennial Olympic Park within thirty minutes.52 The bomb ordinance squad, which included FBI agents, ATF agents and military personnel were joined by other officers to dispense the crowd. By 1:25 a.m., the crude pipe bomb exploded resulting in the death of a Georgian woman, Alice Hawthorne, a
Turkish TV Cameraman, Melih Uzunyol, and causing injuries to more than 111 people.\textsuperscript{53} It also marked the first terrorist attack at the Olympics since the 1972 Games in Munich.

The main key actors in the investigation of the bombing were: the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) at the federal level, the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) at the state level and the Atlanta Police Department, at the local level. Because the explosion was labeled as a terrorist act, the FBI automatically served as the lead agent in the investigation, with hundreds of other law enforcement officials under its direction.

In order to determine the source and those responsible for the bombing the following were studied by forensic experts: tapes from surveillance cameras in and around the park, the telephone from which the 911 call was made was traced; checking for fingerprints and footprints, and the remains of the bomb fragments were gathered from the scene. Others particles were removed from victims' bodies and flown to the FBI crime laboratory in Washington, D.C. for analysis.

An FBI explosive experts described the crude device as a three two-inch-by-ten-inch bomb made of screws and nails packed into a pipe and taped together.\textsuperscript{54} The use of a pipe bomb, augmented by screws and nails packed in plastic freezer container, could be attributed to homegrown terrorist groups. It is estimated that sixty percent of American bombings use black-powder or other homemade explosives packed in plumbing pipe. A federal investigator described it as “the American way of bombing.”\textsuperscript{55}
The Centennial Park episode was a reminder of the arrests of two Georgia militia members in April 1996, on charges of conspiracy and possession of unregistered explosive devices. Although the two men were still in jail during the bombing, Harry Brandon argued, that if there was a political agenda to the terrorist attack, one logical place to look was the militia movement.56

Brandon and Roy described the militia movement as rifed with paranoid fantasies about America's surrendering of its sovereignty to a New World Order. Both concluded that “the movement perceives the Olympics as a showcase for the New World Order.”57

Presently as I write, no one has claimed responsibility for the Olympic Park bombing, although investigators have named Eric Rudolph as a suspect to the bombing. Rudolph has also been linked to the Christian Identity Movement, according to Brian Levin.58

Munich versus Atlanta

Though all terrorist situations share common denominators, each case has a twist of uniqueness and dynamics of its own. There is a progressive evolution not only within each case of terrorist attacks but also from case to case. The learned experience has been demonstrated in the incidents that occurred in Atlanta Centennial Olympic Park. Lessons from Munich have been incorporated.

The Munich case occurred in a different continent, Europe. It was selected to analyze the methods and strategies applied over time. The current incident, the Park bombing represents the most experienced continent in acts of terrorism,
Western Europe. Both cases are compared because of the government policies that were applied and the ultimate conclusion of those particular incidents. These cases have captured a sample of policies and responses to acts of confrontational terrorism.

In Munich 1972, it was Black September’s awful masterpiece involving an established international terrorist group. By comparison, Atlanta is described as “amateur night” involving a domestic terrorist group. But Atlanta came in the immediate aftermath of TWA Flight 800 and closed enough in history to Oklahoma City. It also “leaves in Americans’ minds a conviction, that their nation is somewhat in the process of losing whatever may be left of its old immunity.”59

Atlanta was the reverse of Munich. While the Athletes’ Village was vulnerable in Munich, 1972 Games, at the 1996 Games, the safest and most secured place was the Olympic Village and venues.60

The security and law enforcement contingent in Munich consisted of a total of 4,905 personnel: 2,000 police officers, 973 criminologists planners and support personnel, a 347 man task force similar to a United States SWAT team, and 1,558 Olympic security personnel as well as other personnel.61 In Atlanta, over 30,000 law enforcement officers were deployed. In addition was 11,500 National Guard and active-duty military personnel, including more than 500 Delta Force and SEAL - Team Six commandos airmen from the Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regimen and specially-trained US Army Rangers to serve as part of a backup force for local police or the FBI’s Hostage Rescue Team.62 In the midst of what amounted
to "an armed camp," it was almost unimaginable that Atlanta would turn out to be like Munich.

One would anticipate canceling the Munich Games due to what many considered as "an unnecessary bloodbath on the tarmac." The public sentiment in the United States was almost hysterical in demanding that the Munich Games must be canceled. But in the midst of brutal human stress, ranging from denial to anger, to grief and to resolve, the IOC president Avery Brundage announced that the "Games must go on." To Israel, which had lost its sons, to call off the Olympics was conceding to terrorists demands.

Unlike the 1972 attack in Munich, the 1996 Olympic Park bombing felt almost routine. No one advocated for stopping the Atlanta Games. The IOC, ACOG, and President Clinton never seriously considered canceling the Games. The IOC director general, Francois Carrard had learned from the slow process in Munich following the massacre. Carrard and other Olympic officials showed no hesitation in affirming that the "Games will go on." 64

Munich’s situation - terrorism as theater is similar to that of Atlanta. One of the primary purposes of modern terrorism is the exploitation of the media to reach a broader audience. Criminal activities are generally linked to demands for media coverage of the event. The hostage taking at the Munich Games demonstrated the ability of terrorists to command media attention in a manner that instantaneously conveyed their demands, publicized their objectives to a previously uninformed public, and limited the policy options with which the West Germany government
could respond. Similarly, the Atlanta Olympic security hypes were suddenly overcome by the media’s counter-shadow of the Park explosion of July 27, 1996.

Summary

In the 1996 Summer Games, Centennial Park was added to the Atlanta plan by ACOG less than three years before Games opening ceremonies. The 21-acre park was to serve as “one of the most visible legacies of the 1996 Summer Games.” The Park was (1) intended to make people lose their fear of coming to downtown at night. (2) It was to represent the physical manifestation of the heart and soul of the people of the Atlanta community and the history of how “ACOG welcomed the world.” (3) it was the spiritual heart of the festival, where thousands of visitors could party without paying for tickets or pass through metal detectors.

Security at the Park was minimal as compared to the Olympic Village and venues. On the security spectrum, the athletes’ village was at the top end, and the park on the low end, simply because of the type of facility it was designed to be ... a place for people to mingle freely. Rathburn, as a concern, suggested fencing the park for crowd control, but Olympic organizers decided to forgo such security measures as bag searches and metal detectors. Again, despite the authorities’ worst fears, unprecedented precautions and a massive security effort, a crude pipe bomb exploded killing two, and injured more than 111 people.

Prior to the bomb explosion, there was mounting evidence that security forces may have been overwhelmed with bomb threats. For example, during the first full week of the Olympics, more than one hundred unattended bags and
packages were destroyed by security personnel, though none contained bombs. Over a dozen of bomb threats were also reported after the Centennial Park blast which resulted in the daily evacuations of malls and hotels.

The purpose of the tactical deployment of the Emergency Response Team (ERT) was to devise a strategy for ACOG security to coordinate with law enforcement to deploy special trained and equipped tactical personnel to major incidents or high risk situations related to the 1996 Olympic Games.

The Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG), commanded by a Special Agent In-charge (SAC) was deployed to Atlanta to assist the Atlanta SAC during the Olympic Games. Personnel from the SWAT Training Unit (STU) were assigned to the Assessment Teams. The Hostage Rescue Team (HRT), consisting of a seventy-two person Tactical Team, were staged at Dobbins Air Force Base within the Army Reserve Center. This element maintained a command center on a 24-hour a day basis and was available to respond to a potentially critical situation. The HRT was commanded by an ASAC and was subordinate to the SAC, CIRG, and to the Atlanta SAC, the on-scene commander. Since the bombing occurred within the Olympic Ring at 1:25 a.m., the Tactical Team at the Navy Reserve Center within the Olympic Village was dispatched by the FBIOC to the scene.

An investigation by state officials indicated a breakdown in the system designed to relay information from the emergency dispatchers to the appropriate law enforcement agency, for example, the Bomb Management Center (BMC). The 911 operators failed to alert the State Olympic Law Enforcement Command
(SOLEC) of the threat.

The 1972 Munich Games security was totally inadequate for the location and possible problems, which could have occurred. In addition, the police were unprepared for the possibility of terrorist activity, even though they were aware of the potential for disaster which existed in regards to the Isreali-Palestinian problem. The idea that all nations entering the competition would not regard possible political problems as appropriate within the period of the Games was not a possibility. The thoughts were admirable but not realistic in that particular period of time.

In the case of Atlanta, domestic terrorists' immediate objective may just as well be revenge, to punish the United States for a perceived grievance, as in the bombing of the federal building on Oklahoma City in April 29, 1995 and even the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City in 1993. The perpetrators are less interested in having their involvement advertised and are content to leave a narrow group of national security officials to understand who has struck and why.

The crude pipe bombing in Atlanta, though not quite so chilling as the images of the silhouetted gunmen of Munich in 1972, was not what Atlanta’s proud city fathers had anticipated during the glittering opening Ceremonies.

Finally, Atlanta Games will eventually be known in Olympic history, as the first fatal terrorist attack directed at civilians and, therefore, at the Olympics themselves, rather than the athletes of a particular country.
Endnotes:


Brent Brown is the president of Chesley Brown Consultants, an Atlanta security advisory firm. Among the business and facilities represented were the Georgia Dome, Galleria Mall, Peachtree Center and the 101 Marietta Tower, which housed a number of federal offices. In corroboration with the Georgia Crime Prevention Association, the Seminar was in response to many inquires from local businesses following the Oklahoma City bombing on April 19, 1995. See Martz, “Create Hand Targets to Deter Terrorists, Security Executives Trial,” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 4 May, 1995, sec. D, p. 4.

3Robert Fink is former head of the Atlanta office; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) and a specialist in terrorist groups and activities.


5Ibid.

6Ibid., 26-28.

7Ibid., 28.

8Jeff Beatty, a former officer in Delta Force, the elite Army anti-terrorist unit. Beatty trained the FBI in hostage negotiations for the 1984 Los Angeles Games and worked with several Atlanta corporate sponsors. He also advised ACOG on security for its own headquarters.


10Larry Whitlock, a senior bomb technician for the GBI and Chief of the Olympic bomb removal detail to Mojo Wire, charged that Whitlock failed to discuss the exact number of bomb threats. Jim Duff, who heads the GBI’s internal affairs department discounted statements made by Whitlock and other sources and claimed Mother Jones had circumvented appropriate information channels. The denial, Whitlock explained, stemmed from the reluctance of law enforcement agencies to divulge bomb detection capabilities during an ongoing investigation.


Ibid., Also see “Olympics Getting Extra Federal Officers for Security,” *USA Today*, 9 August, 1996.


Ibid., 27.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Brian Levin, a former Associate Director of Klan watch with Militia Task Force at the Southern Poverty Law Center. Now serve as a professor of Criminal Justice at Richard Stockton College in New Jersey.

Larry Preston Williams, is a New Orleans Security Consultant. Williams predicted that the chances of the bomber striking again increases with the reward of “seeing it go off.”


Ibid.


Martz, “Man Carry Knife, Gun Get Into Opening,” *The Atlanta Journal-


32Ibid.

33Ibid.


37Ibid.


42Ibid.


47Michael Krantz, “The Fire Last Time,” Time, 5 August, 1996 25. (Also see
Schreiber, 11 - 12


50 Ibid.


53 Patrick Rogers, Don Sider and Gail Cameron, "A Life Not In Vain," People Weekly, 12 August, 1996 40 - 42. Also see "Bomb Blast At Centennial Park Claims Black woman Among Two Deaths," Jet, 12 August, 1996.


56 Harry Brandon is a former top FBI official who had helped plan for security at the 1996 Games in Atlanta.

57 Joe Roy serves as a director of the Southern Poverty Law Center's Militia Task Force. In his findings, pipe bombs are consistent with militia involvement and that the Olympics are despised in right-wing hate circles.

58 Brian Levin of the Center of Hate and Extremism at Richard Stockton College described members of the Christian Identity movement as anti-gay, anti-Semitic and opposed to abortion and interracial marriage. This group is now linked to: January 1997 explosion outside a women's Clinic in Sandy Springs, Atlanta, the February bombing of an Atlanta nightclub with mostly lesbian clientele and, the January 1998 bombing of an Alabama Women's clinic that performs abortion in Birmingham.


71 Duffy, “Terror At The Olympics,” 36.
CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

The nature of this study is to examine a narrow aspect of a much larger topic. Therefore, it does not answer all questions pertaining to the subject of Olympic Security.

This study focuses on the XXVIth Olympiad security planning and coordination strategies by multiple law enforcement agencies at the local, state, and federal levels. Its objectives are to explore systematically how Atlanta’s interagency planning structure, called the Olympic Security Support Group (OSSG), was involved in the development of the security blueprint, and understand the compelling opportunity to focus their individual expertise at the developmental, experimental and operational phases and achieve success through teamwork.

Unlike other studies on the subject of the Olympic Games which focused on the nature of the phenomenon, its roots and trend over time, this researcher concentrated on the International Olympic Committee and the host government’s reaction to what they perceived as a security threat to the Games. The study sought to determine if a review of the 1972 XX Olympiad in Munich, West Germany could reveal strengths and weaknesses in the security precautions taken at the Games, and aid in recommending safety and security precautions for the 1996 Centennial Olympic Games in Atlanta, Georgia. The key security precaution was to avoid a
terrorist attack or disruption of any kind during the Games.

This research is descriptive in nature and is based on the best available empirical data among unclassified documents. Hence, it attempted to devise a form of comparison for the host governments. The analysis is conducted on two levels—aggregate and case studies from previous Games. The comparative case studies were utilized for illustrative purposes. Therefore, the case studies as illustrative tools, complement the aggregate data and fit into the holistic approach of this research, thereby enhancing the conclusions.

Elaborate security measures have become obligatory in major special events such as Olympic Games. One of the biggest challenges for Olympic host cities from a security viewpoint, is to avoid the repetition of the first Olympic terrorist incident during the 1972 Games in Munich.

This dissertation is subdivided into four groups: 1) to review other pertinent literature as it relates to major special events management in general and terrorism in particular. 2) to examine and evaluate selected US departments and agencies with anti-terrorism responsibilities, 3) to analyze the three-phase-model of the 1996 Olympic security measures undertaken by more than forty local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies responsible for the provision of a safe environment for the 1996 Games and 4) to determine whether the US counterterrorist procedures incorporated in the Olympic emergency response structure were adequate to meet domestic terrorist threats. Finally, to make recommendations based on study findings to determine if the groups projected as potential threats to the Centennial
Olympic Games succeeded in carrying out the park bombing. If so, lessons learned to prevent future Olympic terrorist actions will be discussed.

**Definition Flaws**

Over the past three decades, terrorism, be it domestic or international, has been widely written about. A large portion of these writings has been in the form of newspaper briefs or magazine articles describing some event or group. Other portions of the literature documented in the form of scholarly research are based on case studies. One can conclude that the majority of terrorism research is descriptive in nature. Yet a most persistent myth in the study of terrorism stresses the subjectivity that supposedly afflicts efforts to define the phenomenon. A single definition of terrorism acceptable by all is still unknown and the arguments regarding who is a terrorist and who is a freedom fighter are not yet resolved. The lack of any consensus on a definition of terrorism or a topology of its significant forms hardly bodes well for the explanation of its occurrence.

Some definitional flaws consist of the following: 1) failure to distinguish between presumed terrorist activities and other forms of coercive action not normally considered terrorist, 2) when terrorism, however characterized, is primarily associated with one side or the other in a political struggle. Usually, terrorism is often identified with revolutionary dissent given the nature of the dominant political agenda. For example, if one side of a dispute succeeds in attaching the terrorist label to its adversary, it has gained an important psychological advantage. In this regard, definitions should focus on the act and recognize that the issue of actors
and effects are areas for inquiry, not definitional attributes.

**Counterterrorism Coordination**

Examining the United States Counterterrorism programs, one can identify over thirty agencies, departments, and offices involved in executing some form of security services related to terrorism. However, there are three departments within the government with jurisdictional authority over terrorist incidents: 1) the Department of State (DOS), 2) The Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and 3) The Department of Transportation/Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The FBI serves as the lead agency responsible for combating terrorism within the United States and abroad. The lead agency concept operates on the principle that if an incident falls within one agency’s jurisdiction, that agency coordinates the United States’ response toward the incident, other agencies then provide support as required.

A number of terrorism task forces have been established to enhance coordination and cooperation, as well as increased intelligence and information sharing. Among those departments and agencies with counterterrorism responsibilities for example is the Vice President’s Task Force on Combating Terrorism. It serves as a catalyst for the emergence of an active and effective counterterrorism community. While the Joint Terrorism Task Forces, strengthened the FBI’s cooperative efforts with local and state law enforcement agencies.

Interagency policy coordination has been strengthened on the federal level through cooperative working relationship among the following agencies: the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), US Customs and US Secret Service (USSS). At the departmental level it includes: the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Energy (DOE), Department of State (DOS) and the Department of Transportation (DOT). These federal agencies and departments, work effectively where mutual jurisdictional interests are involved. The Policy coordinating Committee on Terrorism (PCCT) is responsible for the development of overall policy of the United States regarding international terrorism. This group is chaired by the Department of State. The US Counterterrorism program operates on a consistent, aggressive, and proactive approach to the problem of terrorism.

The United States' government counterterrorism initiatives have been guided by the US President’s Directives and Legislation. A Presidential Directive such as the 1982 Ronald Reagan National Security Decision Directive fosters the FBI’s responsibility of investigating terrorism in the United States. While the 1995 Clinton Presidential Decision Directives 39 further articulated and defined the roles of members of the United States counterterrorism community. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 and the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 clearly stated that any hostage taken or physical violence committed against a United States national abroad, during a terrorist act, gives the FBI the authority to conduct an investigation with the cooperation of the host country. The FBI’s objective is two-fold: first, to identify and prevent terrorist
acts before they occur; and second, to investigate, apprehend, convict and incarcerate those terrorists should an act of terrorism occur.

The Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) - the research and development (R & D) subcommittee of the Policy Coordination Committee on Terrorism (PCCT) serves as the only interagency coordinating group with a broad perspective on the full range of technology development for fighting terrorism. The broad agency participation is intended to maximize expertise and to assure that unnecessary duplication does not occur.

The Three-Phase Model

The size of the 1996 Summer Olympic Games by comparison to past Games was the largest in Olympic history. The vast size therefore required appropriate security strategies in preparation for a range of contingencies. These contingencies were required of the Atlanta Olympic security organizers in order to minimize risks and threats during the Games. The Centennial Games were organized in three phases; the Developmental, Experimental and Operational Phase. First, an analysis of the Olympic Security revealed that a Public Safety Planning Structure was necessary to facilitate the interagency planning process at the Developmental Phase. It also showed that the establishment of the Olympic Security Support Group (OSSG), composed of over forty agency members from local, state, and federal levels to plan for the Games, was based on the Atlanta’s version of the Olympic Model. While interagency planners, namely; the OSSG, Olympic security Planning Coordination Committee (OSPCC) and the Integrated Planning Group
(IPG), continued with the planning process to provide guidance and standards for the Games' safety. Significant responsibilities rested with individual agencies and the nineteen subcommittees.

The Atlanta Police Department (APD) created a separate division to coordinate and manage Olympic Security operations. APD participated at all level of the OSSG, served as the chair of OSPCC and planners participated in all of the subcommittees. The acquisition of resources was critical on several levels. At the planning level, the Department of Defense Office of Special Events (OSE), was to serve as the primary source of security materials and expertise by providing communications equipment, computers, furniture, security fencing, specialized security equipment, logistical support, and professional guidance. The Federal Government was to serve as a major supplier of security resources including the assignment of agents from a variety of federal law enforcement agencies to support the local and state law enforcement mission. In addition to providing extensive support in the areas of tactical response, bombs/EOD, intelligence and dignitary protection. The final strategy at this level, was to use the Department of Defense (DOD) military personnel consisting chiefly of military and security police to assist the APD with Olympic-related traffic management duties. Therefore, effective coordination and cooperation of the integration of the multi-agents from all levels of the government including military personnel into Olympic security operations required extensive planning at the Developmental Phase.

Second, training requirement received attention during the Experimental
Phase. The OSSG Training Subcommittee produced the Master Training Calendar which listed all scheduled public safety training courses at the agency and interagency level of participating public safety agencies. At the agency level, the APD's normal training cycle covered state-mandated, in-service training and included the unique duties and responsibilities associated with Olympic security operations. In addition to formal classes, seminars, home study materials, and roll call videos, the Law Enforcement Handbook was utilized. At the interagency level, outside training opportunities was provided by ATF, FBI and the United States Secret Services for local law enforcement officers.

The two training packages designed at both the agency and interagency levels were 1) training topics and 2) venue training exercises. Training topics ranges from accreditation, bomb threats, diplomatic immunity to terrorist attacks, while the venue training exercises included; Table Top, Field Test, Command Post and seminars. These simulated exercises were to eliminate confusion about roles and clarify the different areas of responsibility.

The important aspect of the Experimental Phase was to validate Olympic Security plan. The Table Top, Command Post and field exercises involving the different scenarios clearly showed how all aspects of Olympic security were to be supported and provided for. The application of the Experimental Phase uncovered shortcomings and deficiencies which are generally much easier to correct than during the Operational Phase.

Third, Olympic Security roles at the Operational Phase, were of two-fold: 1)
the government’s law enforcement role and 2) the Atlanta Committees for the Olympic Games’ (ACOG) private security role. Government law enforcement agencies provided a safe and secure environment for the Games while maintaining a normal level of public safety services in their respective jurisdiction. These agencies were responsible for traditional law enforcement duties including all arrest situations, emergency responses, criminal investigations, bomb/EOD, tactical responses, dignitary protection, air support, traffic control on public roadways and general assistance to private security providers. ACOG Security personnel were drawn from four primary sources; 1.) volunteers from out of state police departments, 2.) volunteers from other professions with authoritative responsibilities, 3.) security personnel from private security companies and 4.) military personnel from the Department of Defense (DOD). During this phase, more than twenty-five thousand American soldiers, private security guards, volunteers, and police officers from the United States and foreign law enforcement agencies screened visitors and vehicles, controlled crowds and checked bags for suspicious contents. US special forces teams were on alert throughout the Olympics as was four police SWAT teams, an FBI hostage-rescue team and several bomb-disposal teams. The White House also made available a new Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force (BIRF) to the Games.5

The primary role of ACOG private security personnel emphasized security functions inside of Olympic venues and Olympic Family transportation. ACOG Security personnel were responsible for access control, crowd management, and
ACOG asset protection at Olympic venues. Additional responsibilities included: magnetometer screening, contraband searches, accreditation badge checking, and general enforcement of all house rules. APD concept of operations was to provide centralized management over decentralized operations.

Coordination during the Olympic Games Operational Phase, was facilitated by the collocation of law enforcement and security personnel at the Joint Coordination Center (JCC) and law enforcement personnel at the ACOG security command and central center. JCC served as a channel to ensure the timely flow of vital information to over forty public safety agencies providing Olympic Security services; it was not a command center. Live video feeds from automated Traffic Management System (ATMS), Atlanta Olympic Broadcast Center (AOBC), the APD’s airship video cameras, close circuit cameras at the Olympic Village and others were accessed by law enforcement agencies from their respective Agency Command Center (ACC). This information from the JCC helped facilitate the highest degree of coordination between participating law enforcement agencies.

To keep the 1996 Games safe, was a mix of active Reserve and National Guards. Over 10,000 military personnel were assigned by Pentagon, but because federal law prohibits military personnel engagement in law enforcement duties, the state guards were responsible for coordinating the Games security mission through the Olympic Joint Task Force (OJTF). To this effect, the Georgia National Guard under the State control deployed over 4,500 of its troops from forty-seven states for Olympic duties, and about 4,000 were involved in security-related positions.6
Finally, it should be noted that the Developmental, Experimental, and Operational Phases were better focused and more successful when agency roles were defined and understood. Primary jurisdiction was generally the basis for an agency assignment to function at venue sites. The cooperative efforts that were emphasized from the very first day of the planning including the relationship between public and private elements such as the OSSG and OSPCC with the ACOG, played a pivotal role during the 1996 Centennial Olympic Games.

Olympic Games, by their very nature, according to the broad definition of major special events, have come to require elaborate security measures. During the Atlanta Games, prior to the Centennial Park bombing, threat assessment in areas of vulnerability were analyzed by security planners.

A terrorist attack against a specific athlete or group of athletes was the method used during the 1972 Munich Games. In Atlanta, an Olympic Intelligence Center (OIC) under the FBI command, with experts from other agencies including the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center was established to gather, coordinate, and disseminate criminal extremism and terrorism intelligence threat information. As a multi-agency center, the OIC coordinated the efforts of various local, state and federal intelligence and law enforcement organizations by having representatives from each agency work together in a centralized location and exchange information.

The FBI has successfully employed the newly developed “Domestic Threat Warning System” (DTWS) to transmit threat warning messages that have been thoroughly coordinated through the United States intelligence community.
The FBI's ultimate goal was to provide the appropriate level of security at an Olympic venue, based on the most current information available in the prevention of terrorist and major criminal activities during the 1996 Summer Olympic Games. However, assessing the terrorist threat to the United States have always presented a challenge. Two terrorist groups; 1) indigenous homegrown groups that currently operate in the United States and 2) the international groups with operational capabilities in the United States were monitored. Indigenous groups such as the Aryan Nation, a right-wing supremacist, has demonstrated sophisticated tactical capabilities and has assassinated law enforcement personnel in the conduct of their action. For example, the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City bombing which resulted in over one hundred sixty-eight deaths is classified as a right-wing attack on the government. This is considered the worst terrorist incident on American soil. It further affirmed that the aim and motivation of right-wing extremists span a broad spectrum of anti-federalist and seditious beliefs and radical and religious hatred, masked by a transparent veneer of religious precepts.

The July 27, 1996 Centennial Park bombing despite a massive $303 million security operation, with more than 30,000 police officers, private security guards, military personnel and special agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other auxiliary agencies, has proven that terrorism is always one step ahead of government responses and learning to survive. It could be argued that the perceived emergency response structure incorporated at the Developmental Phase
for the 1996 Games by the Olympic Security Planners in theory was a sound effort.

Venue commanders were expected to identify all areas of their venue operations plan and develop each area in their respective plans. Prior to implementation of their venue operation plan, all outstanding issues were to be resolved within the OSSG planning structure and their agency. This included; a). defining the roles of support agencies with any secondary jurisdiction with the support of MOU/MAA of required, and b). developing procedures for reporting all Olympic-related public safety incidents to the ACC and JCC or JOC. For example, minor incidents required no incident reports, but entry into a logbook; while significant incidents, report through the proper channels was required.

The most up-to-date technological advances in the security industry and state of the art equipment were utilized. It ranged from the latest in communication, intrusion devices and video surveillance equipment at the tactical to omni-directional closed-circuit TV cameras, sometimes referred to as “speed-domes,” at the Olympic villages. The most advanced computer programs to provide the necessary intelligence on any person or group planning disruptive or destructive activities were employed by ITAG with the OIC.

The findings of the study recognized that there were administrative and organizational flaws in the decision-making process. Various gaps were discovered within the chain of command. For example, the relay of information between the APD agency command center, the JCC, SOLEC, and BMC. Also, that security forces may have been overwhelmed with bomb threats and reports of suspicious
packages. Furthermore, incidents reported to the Bomb Management Center (BMC) were significantly higher than anticipated. Finally, shortage of manpower, excessive working hours of security personnel, and fatigue may as well have explained the poor coordination response to the bomb explosion at Centennial Olympic Park.

Using the case study approach, the Black September terrorist incident of 1972 in Munich, West Germany was assessed in order to evaluate US counterterrorism measures in the event of an attack, in terms of law enforcement agencies' effectiveness and jurisdictional authority.

Atlanta, compared to Munich, indicated that each incident is unique. Tragic as the actual number is, however, the bomb-shattering effect had little to do with numbers. Like nearly every act of terrorism, placing the device was the ultimate beat-the-system game by the bomber.

Study findings of the 1972 terrorist attack during the Munich Games and the Centennial Park Bombing during the Atlanta Games, suggest that security preparations will remain a massive undertaking for future host cities. Therefore, developing a comprehensive Olympic Security plan will remain a complex and coordinated task.

Tragic as the actual number is, however, the bomb-shattering effect had little to do with numbers. Like nearly every act of terrorism, placing the device was the ultimate beat-the-system game by the bomber.

In the final analysis, the Atlanta Games will go down in history and eventually
be remembered as the first fatal terrorist attack directed at the civilian population and, therefore, at the Olympics themselves rather than the athletes of a particular country as was the case at the Munich Games. The best an Olympic host city can hope for is that the few images with which it will forever be linked are of athletic feats, not of the deaths and bomb threats.

Endnotes


2 Ibid.

3 The PCCT is the successor committee to the Interagency Group on Terrorism, referred to in Chapter III.

4 Another group, the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism, has help fund R & D in the Counterterrorism area, but focuses on technologies of particular interest to the intelligence community.


7 Douglas Pasternak and Jennifer Seter, “Let the Games Begin,” 60.
APPENDIX A

GEORGIA METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREA

CHATTANOOGA

AUGUSTA

COLLUMBUS

SAVANNAH

ALBANY

Courtesy of Carl Vinson Institute of Government
The University of Georgia
# APPENDIX B

**LAW ENFORCEMENT'S ROLE VS. ACOG SECURITY'S ROLE**

## ROLE INSIDE OF A VENUE

**Law Enforcement**
- All Arrest Situations
- Criminal Investigations
- Crowd/Demonstration Control
- Emergency Public Safety Response
- Bombs/EOD
- Tactical Response
- Dignitary Protection
- Air Support
- General Assistance to Private Security when Requested

**ACOG/Private Security**
- Perimeter and Interior access control
- Magnetometer Screening
- Contraband Searches
- Checking out Accreditation Badges
- Crowd Management
- ACOG Asset Protection
- Intrusion Deterrence and Detection
- Traffic Control (Private Parking Lots)
- Olympic Family Security
- Enforcement of House Rules

## ROLE OUTSIDE OF A VENUE

- Normal and Routine Public Safety Duties and Responsibilities
- Enhanced Patrols in Parks, Shopping and Entertainment Areas
- Enhanced Traffic Control
- In-Transit Security (Safe Corridors, High Risk Delegation Escorts)
APENDIX C

SPORTS EVENTS AND VENUES

20

Within Olympic Ring

- Athletics (Olympic Stadium)
- Badminton (Georgia State University)
- Baseball (Atlanta-Fulton County Stadium)
- Basketball (Georgia Dome)
- Basketball (Morehouse/AUC)
- Boxing (Georgia Tech)
- Fencing (Georgia World Congress Center)
- Gymnastics - Artistic (Georgia Dome)
- Handball (Georgia World Congress Center)
- Hockey (Clark Stadium)
- Hockey (Herndon Stadium)
- Judo (Georgia World Congress Center)
- Marathon (City of Atlanta)
- Race Walk (City of Atlanta)
- Swimming/Diving (Georgia Tech)
- Table Tennis (Georgia World Congress Center)
- Volleyball (Ozuni)
- Water Polo (Georgia Tech)
- Weightlifting (Georgia World Congress Center)
- Wrestling (Georgia World Congress Center)

7

Outside 60 Mile Radius

- Canoe/Kayak-Slalom
  Ocoee River, TN
- Football Preliminaries
  (Birmingham, AL, Miami, FL, Orlando, FL, Washington, DC)
- Softball (Columbus)
- Yachting (Savannah)

14

Within 60 Mile Radius

- Archery (Stone Mountain)
- Canoe/Kayak-Sprint (Lake Lanier)
- Equestrian (Conyers)
- Football Finals (Athens)
- Gymnastics-Rhythmic (Athens)
- Modern Pentathlon (Various Sites)
- Mountain Biking (Rockdale County)
- Road Cycling (Buckhead)
- Rowing (Lake Lanier)
- Shooting (Wolfe Creek)
- Tennis (Stone Mountain)
- Track Cycling (Stone Mountain)
- Volleyball (Athens)
- Volleyball, Beach (Clayton Co.)

Courtesy of the Atlanta Police Department
BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS:


JOURNAL AND MAGAZINE ARTICLES


Fraser, Jim. "Terrorism: Special Events Management," *The Police Chief* 58, no. 6 (June 1991): 54-56.


Post, Nadine M. “Atlanta Obsesses Over the Olympics.” EWR 234, no. 24 (995): 30-35.


Putney, Rufus D. "Enhancing Anti-Terrorism Skills." The Police Chief 58, no. 6 (June 1991): 40-41.


PUBLIC DOCUMENTS


