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A pilot social welfare model for refugees with attention to southern African refugees in particular

Ninzi Vili
Atlanta University

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A PILOT SOCIAL WELFARE MODEL FOR REFUGEES WITH ATTENTION TO SOUTHERN AFRICAN REFUGEES IN PARTICULAR

A SUBSTANTIVE PAPER
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF ATLANTA UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SOCIAL WORK

BY
NINZI VILI

SCHOOL OF SOCIAL WORK

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30314
FRIDAY, JULY 25th, 1980
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I wish to thank the following people for assisting with my research and for having the patience to work with me and advise me.

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To my mother who understood all my difficulties and frustrations whilst studying.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The problems associated with refugees throughout the world are basically similar in general as they relate to social welfare. There is a particular need for research to be done with attention paid to the Southern African Refugees from the Republic of South Africa i.e. Namibia and Zimbabwe.

Fortunately Zimbabwe, Formerly "Rhodesia" has experienced a war of liberation. Since that momentous and historic event, the United Nations and interested countries, have given assistance to former Zimbabweans are being encouraged to be self-sufficient as possible.

The only two countries in Africa who have not been liberated, and who are still fighting their wars of liberation are the oppressed majority—all non-white of the Republic of South Africa and Namibia—which was formerly called by the colonizers, South West Africa.

Refugees normally evolve as a result of political conflict and or military onslaught and oppressive governmental actions against a large number of the indigenous population. This oppressed segment, which finds the existing situations to be unbearable usually seeks an alternative way of living. Often times an alternative way of life cannot be achieved in their natural homeland forcing them to adopt and adapt to a new way of life outside their natural homeland.

Previous attempts to improve the quality of life inside one's own country have resulted in the termination of life itself, imprisonment or forced exile.
This has been the case of the Southern African refugees who since as far back as 1960 were forced to flee their countries of origin and seek asylum in neighbouring countries. This refugee population consisted of all ages, all races—white and non-whites included, and people of diverse educational and political backgrounds. The reasons for forced emigration were multi-fold either to seek further education abroad—free of racist ruling, either to improve the quality of their life, and last but not least to rejoin their preferred political party to gain military skills which would/will enable them to free that part of the country.

But what happened? And why the call for a social welfare system to assist the needs of Southern African in these various host countries.

Whatever social welfare problems the refugees experienced in the Southern sector of Africa, and their countries of origin have been further complicated by the newness of the distinct cultural differences between the country of origin and the country of asylum. This has often resulted into a cultural shock for the refugee. Therefore, as a result acclimication in the country of asylum has been delay.

Acclimization has been delayed for are or more of the following reasons combined;

a. lack of communicative skills in the vernacular of the present society impedes social interaction,

b. cultural and linguistic differences have hindered the assimilation process,
c. government clauses promoting employment of nationals over refugees—retard refugees from seeking employment and education. This has been a very major problem for refugee self-efficiency.

Also the refugees have had some severe psychological stress in this diasporic situation. Quoting the Information Secretary of the Botswana Embassy in Washington, Mr. Sipho Mpofu, some refugees found and still find the existing situation intolerable and unbearable as quoted previously they experienced in some cases language and culture differences. Their view of life was different, the food was different, even the way the people lived in their host countries was different.

On a more deeper level they wanted and needed acceptance—they were frustrated trying to fit in the new society. The host country could despise them because they are refugees. Thus then one bears the stigma of being a refugee.

Another factor was and is that the host countries are politically independent, and Southern Africa was not. But during February 1980, Zimbabwe obtained its freedom and independence. The Republic of South Africa and Namibia are still under a settler regime. These above factors have contributed largely towards an arrogant attitude of the host countries citizens towards the refugees.

Also because of refugee status the international community was and is giving aid to the refugee population—this is in the form of food, money and shelter to the extent that to the indigenous population. The refugees were living better than they did.
Quoting from an Atlanta Constitution article of Tuesday, April 24th, 1978, it is stated that the refugees in Botswana for example "are generally insulted by the local tribesmen." They are greeted by a cold shoulder if not open hostility. It rankles the "natives" of Botswana that the strangers live in comparatively comfortable camps eating meat and vegetables and ground corn provided by the United Nations and warming themselves under United Nations blankets at night.

While the United Nations spent a million dollars last year (1978) to feed and clothe the refugees in the three camps near the northern city of Francistown, only about 80,000 of Botswana's 600,000 inhabitants are employed. Hunger is rampant in a country rich in diamonds and beef.

"In this part of the country the Botswana people are the refugees, said J.H. Munaimati a Botswana official who helps administer the camps near the borders of Zambia and Rhodesia. "When they see the assistance flowing into the camps they want it also. They became beggars."

Thus when the Soweto students of the black township in Johannesburg, Republic of South Africa rebelled in 1976, they escaped to bordering countries who hosted them. There students created social upheavals which culminated into hostility between the host community and the local people. Thus little social interaction between refugees and host communities.

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1 The Atlanta Constitution, Tuesday, April 24th, 1979. pp. 1-14-A.

2 Quote From the Botswana Information Officer, Mr. Sipho Mpofu – July 1980, Washington, D.C.
Purpose

The purpose of this study is to explore the practicality of developing and implementing a social welfare model for reducing the grave problems of the necessary refugee population in Southern Africa.

Review of Literature

There have also been the physical and psychological sufferings of Southern Africa Refugees in the Diaspora—that is in Africa and abroad. For example in February 6th, 1979 a former black student leader was killed by a parcel bomb in Botswana—although the South African government denied any involvement in the incident. In the same year, and same month February 12, 1979, an official of the African National Congress of South Africa was killed and two others injured by an explosion in a Zambian building housing various Southern African opposition groups.

From the mid-sixties until today, Namibians (South West Africans) are forced to flee their countries to neighbouring countries such as Angola, even Mozambique and Botswana. But because of the escalating war against Angola, Botswana again is facing another influx of refugees from Angola and Mozambique. Even some host countries empathetic towards the Southern African refugee situation are forced to arrest refugees under the cloak of "protective custody". A case in point was May 6th, 1976, when Zambia had to arrest forty (40) members of a dissident political party, and it was also quoted
that more than 1,000 Namibians were imprisoned because of dissident inter-party political views.\(^3\)

Another issue compounding the problem of acclimization and adaption to the host country is that refugee status has also placed the individuals in a unique social, and economic and political situation. To be a refugee means that one is:

a. prevented and forbidden to participate in national, economic and social programs provided by the host country for their own citizens. Thus why the stress in my paper is for an evolvement of a Social Welfare program to service the refugee population,

b. there is no one particular government responsible and accountable for the economic, social and political flight of refugees,

c. International Agencies servicing refugees have uncoordinated assistance with varying goals and directives. The International Agencies participate in refugee services are mainly the International Red Cross Society; the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, the Lutheran World Federation.

Since there is no government responsible for the plight of refugees this responsibility was assumed in part by various liberation groups (political organizations responsible for the final freedom of their country) and they have shared such responsibilities with the following:

a. Sympathetic governments - African and International

b. The O.A.U. (Organization of African Unity)

c. Charitable International Organizations for example the International Red Cross, and Oxfam of Britain.

d. Religious organizations for example the Lutheran World Federation and the World Council of Churches.

e. International Educational Organizations, the African American Institute of the United States, the Phelps - Stokes Fund of the United States and the International University Exchange Fund of Scandinavia, namely Sweden.

Liberation groups have developed on a political basis and have obtained most of the financial resources from sympathetic governments, charitable international and national organizations. However, these resources are limited because of the increase in the refugee population in these host countries. The refugee population is more in the increase with the revolutions of young non-white Southern Africans (witness the last disturbances in Elsies River, Cape Town, South Africa in May and June 1980, when in the bloodiest attack since the Soweto rebellion four years ago.) South African riot police killed up to sixty Blacks and wounded 200 others. This revolt was the latest in a wave of protests and strikes that have shaken South Africa since April 1980.4

Coupled with the above fact is South Africa's military invasion of Angola,5 and its involvement in the rebel fighting of Mozambique.6

Receptive governments are normally those who border the South African countries, namely the former High Commission territories of Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana, including

Zambia, Mozambique and even Angola. These countries have experienced high levels of inflation and are not economically independent of the Republic of South Africa with its giant economy in comparison with other Black African countries. This limits the amount of contributions these countries can provide. Most of the funds servicing refugees are obtained from foreign governments through the UNCHR Office. 

For example in the "report of the Economic and Social Council" Assistance to South African Student Refugees—Report to the Secretary General

"A-34-345 11 July 1979, Thirty-Fourth Session, Item 12 of the preliminary list states in its introduction that in resolution 31/126 of 16 December 1976, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to take immediate steps to organize and provide emergency assistance for the care, subsistence and education of South African student refugees in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. A mission, dispatched by the Secretary-General to the three countries in February 1977, assessed the situation and recommended a programme which inter-alia, called for the capital expenditure of about $7 million and recurring annual costs estimated at $1.4 million which would provide additional education facilities and reception/transit centers for the refugee students in the three host countries."

Thus by October 1979 you found the following countries contributing to this programme. They are as follows:

7

Countries Contributing in Alphabetical Order. Sum in U.S. Dollars

Argentina 4,000.00
Australia 39,091.00
Austria 35,000.00
Barbados 500.00
Belgium 62,000.00
Brazil 5,000.00
Burma 1,000.00
Canada 252,101.00
Chile 1,000.00
Denmark 330,974.00
Finland 87,851.00
France 115,000.00
Germany, Federal Republic of 50,000.00
Ghana 1,740.00
India 2,000.00
Indonesia 2,500.00
Iran 5,000.00
Ireland 26,000.00
Italy 15,000.00
Liberia 1,000.00
Libyan Arab Jamohiriya 20,000.00
Malaysia 1,000.00
Mali 2,066.00
Netherlands 124,362.00
New Zealand 16,083.00
Nigeria 10,000.00
Norway 764,706.00
Papua, New Guinea 200.00
Philippines 2,000.00
Sweden 250,114.00
Togo 436.00
Trinidad and Tobago 1,250.00
United Kingdom of Great Britain 1,250.00
and Northern Ireland 222,750.00
United States of America 1,000,000.00
Venezuela 2,000.00
Yugoslavia 1,000.00

Total Contributions 3,449,724.00

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In addition, the following pledges are/were outstanding:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Contributing in Alphabetical Order</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Italy</td>
<td>50.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>200,000.00</td>
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<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>1,000.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Libyan Arab Jam Ahiriya</td>
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<td>Peru</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phillippines</td>
<td>2,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>5,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>1,000.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Contributions 292,422.00

In the Report on UNCHR Assistance Activities in 1978-1979, and Proposed Voluntary Funds Programs and Budget for 1980 should be noted that a United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa was evolved.

"The UNCHR continued to administer funds on behalf of the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa. An amount of $200,000.00, was made available for the period July 1, 1978 to June 30, 1979 to provide for living allowances, medical care, establishment of assistance education, travel and other needs of refugees from South Africa. A detailed report on the use of the funds is submitted every year to the trustees. The contribution supplements assistance provided by UNCHR from general and special programmes for statistical expenditures spent

on Southern African refugees by the UNCHR and fellow member countries."10 (See Tables I-VI with expenditures for 1978 to actual estimates for 1979, and projected expenditures for 1980).

As this is already 1980, the fiscal year book of UNCHR report will possibly be out in 1981. Also included are UNCHR expenditure reports in Botswana, Lesotho, Republic of Tanzania, Swaziland, and Zambia.

Charitable contributions have been primarily in the form of scholarships for advanced studies beyond high school (post high education) and also via food and clothing, but in reality not contributing directly to the refugees' overall problem. What should be noted here is that the scholarship aid is directed toward the young South African student, but there are a number of families with young babies and these families also need food, clothing and shelter, and also some financial assistance.

International host and religious organizations as mentioned before, basically provide scholarship assistance. The shipment of food and clothes to host countries has been implemented by internationally known organizations, the International Red Cross and the Lutheran World Services, Oxfam of Britain, to name a few.

The United Nations has addressed the legal status of the displaced persons in the form of legal documents by amending that all host governments should provide legal travel documents for refugees, and also by redefining the term refugee.

Here is an extract from the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.

**Article I**

A. For the purposes of the present Convention the term "refugee" shall apply to any persons who:

1. has been considered a refugee under the Arrangements of 12 May 1926 and 30 June 1928 or under the Convention of 28 October 1933 and 10 February 1938, the protocol of 14 September 1939 or the Constitution of International Refugee Organizations' decisions of non-eligibility taken by the International Refugee Organization during the period of its activities shall not prevent the status of refugee being accorded to persons who fulfill the conditions of paragraph 2 of this section.

2. as a result of events occurring before 1st January 1951 and owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such a fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. In the case of a person who has more than one nationality the term, "the country of his nationality" shall mean, each of the countries of which he is a national, and a person shall not be deemed to be lacking the protection of his country of his nationality if, without any valid reason based on well founded fear, he has not availed himself of the protection of one of the countries of which he is national.
B. For the purposes of this Convention, the words 'events occurring before January 1, 1951' in Article:

1. Section A, shall be understood to mean either
   a. 'events occurring in Europe before January 1, 1951,' or
   b. 'events occurring in Europe or elsewhere before January 1, 1951', and each contracting state shall make a declaration at the time of signature, ratification, or accession, specifying which of these meanings it applies for the purpose of its obligations under this Convention.

2. Any contracting state which has adopted alternative
   a. may at any time extend its obligations by adopting alternative,
   b. by means of a notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

C. This Convention shall cease to apply to any person falling under the terms of section A if:

1. He has voluntarily re-availed himself of the protection of the country of his nationality,

2. having lost his nationality; he has voluntarily re-acquired it,

3. he has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the protection of the country of his new nationality,

4. he has voluntarily re-established himself in the country which he left or outside which he remained owing to fear of persecution,

5. he can no longer, because of the circumstances in connection with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality, provided that this paragraph shall not apply to a refugee falling under section A (1) of this article who is able to involve compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for refusing to avail himself to the protection of the country of nationality,
6. being a person who has no nationality he is, because the circumstances in connection with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist able to return to the country of his former habitual residence. Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to a refugee falling under section A (1) of this article who is able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for refusing to avail himself to the protection of the country of nationality.

D. This Convention shall not apply to persons who are presently receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection or when such protection or assistance has ceased for any reason, without the position of such person being definitely settled in accordance with the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations. These persons shall ipso facto be entitled to the benefits of this Convention.

E. This Convention shall not apply to a person who is recognized by the competent authorities of the country in which he has taken residence as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of nationality of that country.

F. The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that:

1. he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes,

2. he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee, or

3. he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

General Obligations

Every refugee has duties to the country in which he finds himself, which require in particular that he conforms
to its laws and regulations as well as to measures taken for the maintenance of public order.

Article 7

Exemption From Reciprocity

1. Except where this Convention contains more favorable provisions, a contracting state shall accord to refugees the same treatment as is accorded to aliens generally.

2. After a period of three years' residence all refugees shall enjoy exemption from legislative reciprocity in the territory of contracting States.

3. Each contracting state shall continue to accord to all refugees the rights to which they were already entitled in the absence of reciprocity, at the date of entry into force of this Convention for that state.

4. The contracting states shall consider favourably the possibility of according to refugees, in the absence of reciprocity, rights and benefits beyond those to which they are entitled according to paragraphs 2 and 3 and to extend exemption from reciprocity to refugees who do not fill the conditions provided for in paragraphs 2 and 3.

5. The provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 apply both to the rights and benefits referred to in articles 13, 18, 19, 21, and 22 of this Convention and the rights and benefits for which this Convention does not provide.

Article 26

Freedom of Movement

Each contracting state shall accord to refugees lawfully in its territory the right to choose their place of residence and to move freely within its territory, subject to any applicable aliens generally in the same circumstances.
Article 27

Identity Papers

1. The contracting states shall issue identity papers to any refugee in their territory who does not possess a valid travel document.

Article 28

Travel Documents

1. The contracting states shall issue to refugees lawfully staying in their territory travel documents for the purpose of travel outside their territory unless compelling reasons of national security or public order otherwise require, and the provisions of the schedule to this Convention shall apply with respect to such documents. The contracting states may issue such a travel document to any other refugee in their territory; they shall in particular give sympathetic consideration to the issue of such a travel document to refugees in the territory who are unable to obtain a travel document from the country of their lawful residence.

2. Travel documents issued to refugees under previous international agreements by parties there to shall be recognized and treated by the contracting states in the same way as if they had been issued pursuant to this article.

Article 31

Refugees Unlawfully in the Country of Refuge

1. The contracting states shall not impose penalties on account of their illegal entry of presence, on refugees who coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of Article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entrance or presence.

2. The contracting states shall not apply to the movements of such refugee restrictions other than those which are necessary and such restrictions shall only be applied until their status in the country is regularized or they obtain admission into another country. The states
shall not apply to the movements of such refu-
gee restrictions other than those which are:
necessary and such restrictions shall only be
applied until their status in the country is
regularized or they obtain admission into another
country. The contracting states shall allow
such refugees a reasonable period and all the
necessary facilities to obtain admission into
another country.

Article 32

Expulsion

1. The contracting states shall not expel a refu-
gee lawfully in their territory save as
grounds of national security or public order.

2. The expulsion of such a refugee shall be only in
pursuance of a decision reached in accordance
with due process of law. Except where
compelling reasons of national security other-
wise require, the refugee shall be allowed to
submit evidence to clear himself, and to appeal
to and be represented for the purpose before
competent authority or a person or persons
specially designated by competent authority.

3. The contracting states shall allow such a refugee
a reasonable period within which to seek legal
admission into another country. The contracting
states reserve the right to apply during that
period such internal measures as they may deem
necessary.

Article 33

Prohibition of Expulsion or Return ("Refoulement")

1. No contracting state shall expell or return
("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever
to the frontiers of territories where his life
of freedom would be threatened on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion.

2. The benefit of the present provision may not
however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are
reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger
to the community of that country.
Article 34

Naturalization

1. The contracting states shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges and costs of such proceedings.

Article 35

Co-operation of the National Authorities with the United Nations

1. The contracting states undertake to co-operate with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or any other agency of the United Nations which may succeed if, in the exercise of its functions and shall in particular facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the provisions of this Convention.

In order to enable the Office of the High Commissioner or any other agency of the United Nations which may succeed it, to make reports to the competent organs of the United Nations, the contracting states undertake to provide them in the appropriate form with information and statistical data concerning:

1. the condition of refugees,
2. the implementation of this Convention, and
3. laws, regulations and decrees which are or may hereafter be, in face relating to refugees.

O.A.U (Organization of African Unity) Amendment

These above laws then protected the refugees of Europe, until the O.A.U. spelled out laws governing specific aspects of the problems of refugees in Africa. This was in 1969. The only difference(s) with the 1951 Convention of

This was done in the City of Addis Ababa, the 10th day of September, 1969.

These were then the following conditions:

a. The Preamble read as such:

We, the Heads of State and Government assembled in the city of Addis Ababa from 6–10 September 1969:

1. Noting with concern the constantly increasing numbers of refugees in Africa and desirious of finding ways and means of alleviating their misery and suffering as well as providing them with a better life and future.

2. Recognizing the need for an essentially humanitarian approach towards solving the problem of refugees.
3. Aware however, that refugee problems are a source of friction among Member States and desirous of eliminating the source of such discord.

4. Anxious to make a distinction between a refugee who seeks a peaceful and normal life and a person fleeing his country for the sole purpose of fomenting subversive from outside.

5. Determined that the activities of such subversive elements should be discouraged in accordance with the Declaration and the problem of refugees adopted in Accra, Ghana in 1965.


7. Recalling Resolution 3212 (XXII) of 14 December 1967 of the United Nations General Assembly relating to the declaration on Territorial Asylum.

8. Convinced that all the problems of our continent must be solved in the spirit of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity and the African context.

9. Recognizing that the United Nations' Convention of 28 July, 1951, as modified by the protocol of 31 January 1967, constitutes the basic and universal instrument relating to the status of refugees and reflects the deep concern of States for refugees and their desire to establish common standards for their treatment.

10. Recalling Resolutions 26 and 109 of the O.A.U. Assemblies of Heads of State and Government, calling upon Member States of the organization who had not already done so, to accede to the United Nations Convention of 1951 and to the protocol of 1967 relating to the Status of Refugees and meanwhile to apply their provisions to refugees in Africa.
11. **Convinced** that the efficiency of the major Convention is to solve the problem of refugees in African Nations by the High Commissioner for Refugees.

**B. Asylum**

1. Member states of the O.A.U. shall use their best endeavours consistent with their respective legislations to receive refugees and to secure the settlement of those refugees who, for well founded reasons, are unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin or nationality.

2. The grant of asylum to refugees is a peaceful and humanitarian act and shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act by any Member State.

3. No person shall be subjected by a Member State to measure such as rejection at the frontier return or expulsion, which would compel him to return to or remain in a territory where his life, physical integrity or liberty would be threatened for the reasons set out in Article 1, paragraphs 1 and 2.

4. Where a Member State finds difficulty in continuing to grant asylum to refugees, such Member State may appeal directly to other Member States and through the O.A.U. and such other Member States shall in the spirit of African solidarity and international co-operation take appropriate measures to lighten the burden of the Member State granting asylum.

5. Where a refugee has not received the right to reside in any country of asylum, he may be granted temporary residence in any country of asylum in which he first presented himself as a refugee pending arrangement for his resettlement in accordance with the preceding paragraph.

6. For reasons of security, countries of asylum shall, as far as possible settle refugees at a reasonable distance from the frontier of their country of origin.
C. Co-operation of the National Authorities with the Organization of African Unity:

In order to enable the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity to make reports to the competent organs of the Organization of African Unity, Member States undertake to provide the Secretariat in the appropriate form with information and statistical data requested concerning:

a. the condition of refugees,
b. the implementation of this Convention, and
c. laws, regulations, and decrees which are, or may hereafter be in force relating to refugees.11

Although the amendment of the O.A.U. has alleviated a psychologically stressful situation for Southern African refugees, the overall social and economic welfare services for refugees have not been adequately addressed or resolved by any of the organizations or institutions which have attempted to alleviate this problem.

Thus then, the rationale for study in my research is an attempt to develop a comprehensive human service plan to address the needs of Southern African Refugees disengaged from their land because of internal political and economic oppression by white settler regimes.12

The purpose of the present Southern African refugee is a long range goal of our refugees to oneday/someday returning to their countries of origin, and when they do return to seek ways and means to design and develop their own resettlement


12 For example the white settler regimes of the former British Empire in Zimbabwe.
programs for the development of their country or nations as of present in Zimbabwe (formerly "Rhodesia) we have the problem of the rehabilitation - repatriation of those refugees who have been in a diasporic situation for as long as 20 years. Since Zimbabwe is now "free" hundreds have returned to their native land, and there are (1) no jobs and (2) no identified and accessible social services to take care of their immediate needs and long range social services. Some of them have lost their families - so who do they turn for help? Their families or family members have been decimated by the former white Rhodesian forces against guerilla forces during the liberation war years.

The rationale for this study is that the refugee population in the diasporic situation is going to be prolonged and protracted. The Republic of South Africa and Namibia are the only two (2) remaining countries to be freed of white colonial settler regime in Southern Africa.\textsuperscript{13} (See footnote 13). Thus once again one has to envisage a mass migration of Southern Africans to the stabilized independent states of Africa, again countries like Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia, and Mozambique. This time with the added influx in population from such countries as Angola, Mozambique, even Zimbabwe and Lesotho because of the social/

\textsuperscript{13} The white settler regimes in the Republic of South Africa from Britain, and Holland and the white settler regimes in Namibia from Germany and now the Republic of South Africa. Namibia is now a United Nations mandate, colony rule and administered by white South Africans.
political disturbances occurring there presently. For example, Botswana has lost its President, who was very instrumental in refugee aid work; Lesotho is witnessing internal strife with the deposition of their long time Prime Minister, Jonathan Lebua, Mozambique and Angola are experiencing political raids from their long time enemy - the white settler regime of the Republic of South Africa.

Methodology

This study then is to assess refugee social welfare in the above host countries and to provide an alternative model programs, or expand an existing model. The research design will be descriptive research using a content analysis methodology.

Specific objectives in my research are to develop economic opportunities for Southern African refugees in their diasporic situation by creating a skill portfolio by assessing their skills, that should coincide with the developmental needs of the host countries.

What I have attempted to do is by conducting a questionnaire to assess some of the skills our refugees have. The demonstrative sample was small, about 18 refugee individuals from the Atlanta and Washington area, from Southern Africa.

I also want to illustrate what past models have done, and what present models are attempting to do. My present model to be utilized will be the Zimbabwean model evolved in Zambia, whilst they were still a refugee colony. I will show how they utilized their skills in the settlement process.
Hypothesis

The lack of a social welfare model in the refugee host countries have resulted in the inability to respond effectively to the human needs of the Southern African refugees.

Assumptions

1. A well planned social welfare program will focus on the special human needs of the refugees.

2. A social welfare program will aleviate the suffering of the refugees by planning the adjustment in an orderly manner.

3. A social welfare program will transcend the physical needs of the refugees for food and shelter to spiritual, human personal growth, health and welfare needs.
Limitations

1. At this juncture I cannot discuss the present resettlement process, as it is too early to assess and evaluate the present situation in Zimbabwe.

2. There will be no opportunity to get just hand feedback from refugees or governments who administer these camps.

Survey instruments utilized would include a Sample Questionnaire distributed to a small population of South African students (Republic of South Africa) in Atlanta and Washington, D.C. (June-August 1980). There were two groups utilized, a young student refugee group and a professional group—older members who had been in the U.S. for more than a decade. The student group were recent arrivals, arriving during the past 5 years. In all, 18 were interviewed, unfortunately I could not interview the Zimbabwean compatriots, the Namibian compatriots, or the white South African military draft dodgers. Thus for charts utilized, I will only be able to use non-white or interviewees.

Data Analysis

Thus, Experimental Group—Young South African Student Refugees.

Table I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Country of Origin (Azania)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table I (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Country of Origin (Azania)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Worker</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production Unskilled Labor</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headman</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Please specify)</td>
<td>Students</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Number of Students: 18

### Table II

**Southern African Refugees (Republic of South Africa)**

Reasons for leaving South Africa.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>Self</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Idealistic commitment</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal gain &quot;opportunism&quot;</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental social pressure</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal security</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 18

Number of Responses: 18

---

Table III

Southern African Refugees (Rep. of S.A.) Occupation at time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurse</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom Fighter</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (please specify)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Number of Students: 18

Table IV

Southern African Refugees (Rep. of S.A.) Age and Sex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Male and Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-62</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 18
Table V


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Skill Categories</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medical Profession (includes M.D.S, Pharmacists, Nurses)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional, Technical and Managerial</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>94.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical and Sales</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming, Fishing, Forestry and Related Areas</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Processing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Trades</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benchwork, Assembly Repair</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Construction</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Students</strong></td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Theory

Model of Comparison

I will currently use the Zimbabwean model as it is liberated Southern Africa's latest example. Zimbabwe formerly called Rhodesia fought a protracted liberation war against their former white settler regime for over 20 years.

During their war of liberation the Zimbabwean set up refugee camps in neighbouring countries such as Botswana and
Zambia, Mozambique, and the Republic of Tanzania. I will quote the Zimbabwean refugee settlements in Zambia, Botswana, and finally the repatriation efforts of the International word in the 1980s.

Zimbabwean Refugee Settlement in Zambia

This refugee settlement was organized by the Zambia Christian Refugee Service (ZCRS). It began its operation in 1967 at the request of the government of the Republic of Zambia in order to assist in the operation of rural refugee settlement. It was financed by the Lutheran World Federation in co-operation with the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees.

Here was the breakdown of the refugee population at the beginning of 1970 in 1979 (according to UNCHR and Refugee, Commissions, Ministry of Home Affair in Zambia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>% of Total Refugee Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabweans</td>
<td>46,891</td>
<td>70.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angolans</td>
<td>11,440</td>
<td>17.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibians</td>
<td>5,639</td>
<td>8.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others include</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ugandans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambiques</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malwians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zairieans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>66,371</strong></td>
<td><strong>60.00%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

In this camp the Zimbabwean refugees developed their own projects to make themselves self-sustaining and semi-independent. For example, in their camps they had projects such as art workshops; garment working shops; adult literacy classes. They also had within their camp, a normal school system, clinics providing adult and childrens services and a maternity clinic. They also had agricultural or farming projects. It also had political and cultural education. The most important is that this camp utilized the existing skills of the Zimbabwean refugee obtained in their mother country. It also helped evolve new skills in the refugee. This was to enable the Zimbabwean refugee to utilize such skills when the war of liberation was over and they could return to a free Zimbabwe.

**Zimbabwean Refugee Settlement in Botswana**

By June 1980, there was a decrease in the refugee population in Botswana. From a total of 35,000 to a total of 382. This was due to the repatriation of Zimbabweans refugees back to independent Zimbabwe.

How did Botswana take care of the refugees from Zimbabwe. What model(s) did she adopt?

First of all in the early stages of their migration in the early 1960's, the refugees from Zimbabwe were represented by their political leaders who had already paved a way in the host country to receive their respective refugees. For example political parties such as ZANU (Zimbabwe African
National Union/would have a representative in Botswana, who would receive the members of their political party. Shelter was already there in the form of a "political party house." Perhaps there were plans to transport them abroad for post-high education or military training.

With the advent of an escalating liberation war in Zimbabwe there was an increase in the refugee population coming into Botswana. This refugee population were placed in refugee camps based on political affiliation, or political party membership.

Thus in Francistown, Botswana there were:

a. the Francistown Refugee camp which was administered by ZAPU (Zimbabwe African Peoples Union),
b. Selebe Pikwe Camp - ZAPU administered,
c. Dukwe Camp - ZAPU administered,
d. Gaberone Refugee Camp (United Nations administered)

These camps were autonomous and self maintained.

These camps were sometimes separated because of sex gender. For example, the Francistown camp in Botswana was a male camp with few females and children. The Dukwe camp was mainly for women, with a few men.

The refugee camps in Botswana also had their particular functions. At the Francistown camp refugees developed their own projects. For example, art work, a shoe making shop, a tailoring shop. There was also a clinic run by the International Red Cross. There were also educational programs.
In February 1979 the refugees in this camp started to develop projects on a short term and long term basis.

At the Selebi Pikwe camp the function was different. This was a semi-settlement camp and for shelter they had to use tents. It was a semi-settlement camp for easy flight when attacked by the white Rhodesian and white South African armies. This camp had:

a. an adult literacy project,
b. a normal school system,
c. garment making shops,
d. child clinic,
e. farming projects,
f. educational projects for political and cultural education, and
g. skills bank to tap the existing technical and professional skills of the refugees.

The Dukwe Refugee Camp was mainly for women, but there were a few men. Emphasis here was on:

a. agriculture,
b. handicrafts,
c. a clinic for treating all types of illnesses,
d. a maternity clinic run by the International Red Cross,
e. a formal school system—preschool, primary and secondary (high school in the U.S.),
f. recreation hall,
g. a bakery, and
h. a grocery shop.

The Gaberone camp (United Nations run) was merely a resident camp with a mixture of all Southern Africans, that is Azanians, Namibians, and Zimbabweans.

In order to service their refugee population, Botswana was aided by the BCR (Botswana Council for Refugees), the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) and the BCC (Botswana Christian Council).
Administrative Structure

There was always:

a. A Director,
b. A Social Worker
c. A Political Party Leader responsible for discipline of party members and political organizational structure.
d. International organizations provided extra staff eg. nurses, welfare officials, and doctors.
e. The Botswana government provided the school system, and organized other types of vocational training eg. handicrafts, in fact it was the government of Botswana that was responsible for the co-ordination of all these camps.

In the 1980's Botswana has now to deal with refugees from Azania (mainly Soweto), Malawi, Lesotho, Mozambique, and Angola. What the Botswana government is doing, is to build another refugee camp north of Gaberone called "Mosetsana". This refugee camp will service the remaining refugee population by building villages for them. For example, there will be villages for the Angolans, Azanians, Basotho, Malawians, and Mozambiqueans.  

Repartriation of Zimbabwean Refugees Back to Independent Zimbabwe, Starting February 1980

At the request of the present government of Zimbabwe under President Robert Mugabe, the Secretary-General of the

16 From Mr. Mpofu-Chief Information Officer, Embassy of Botswana, July 1980, and Mrs. Tenjiwe Lesabe, Youth Services Co-ordinator (ZAPU) February 1979.
United Nations had asked the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees to co-ordinate for an initial period of humanitarian assistance programme for repatriates and displaced persons inside Zimbabwe. The estimated cost involved was $110 million, and about 114,000 tons of food necessary for the persons concerned until the next April harvest of April 1981.\footnote{From UNCHR - News from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. No. 2, June/July 1980.}

It is too early in 1980 to evaluate the success of the repatriation project.

Presentation of Results

In conclusion, to develop a social welfare program for refugees from Southern Africa in their various host countries will prove to be quite difficult. Refugees are already been serviced by various ways and means. The Appendixes attached especially from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees will exemplify the types of services rendered—whether on a short term or long term basis. The United Nations, and International and host organizations have essentially two types of aid.

a. Educational by granting scholarship aid to the student refugees.

b. by the African host countries, encouragement of settling for this interim period.

Therefore, what should be noted is the different stages of
refugee assistance rendered by these host countries. They are as follows:

a. Relief Assistance – Food, clothes, shelter and financial assistance (usually a monthly stipend).

b. Rehabilitation – To the environment of the host country – this is not a permanent basis. It has to be noted and accepted that the Southern African Refugees in the camps of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Zambia is not to stay permanently. The goal is to finally go back to a free Southern Africa.

c. Resettlement – This has been discussed before. Resettlement is usually in chosen areas where the refugees can develop and utilize their skills. This is also not on a permanent basis. The long range plan is to return to their country of origin when it has been "liberated."

A. Repatriation or Return

At present this cannot be evaluated. My main examples were the Zimbabweans and currently it is too early to assess the success of resettlement.

Historically the examples of Angola, Mozambique show us that these countries are experiencing economic difficulties because of the presence of economic, military superior white South Africa – which is aided by the western imperialistic powers to deliberately impoverish these newly independent countries, and keep them in a perpetual state of under development.
Summary

The Southern African refugee problem is going to be a long and protracted one. But there should be optimism, Gary Walker in his "Report to the Congress" on Development Needs and Opportunities for Co-operation in Southern Africa presents the following:

1. The U.S. Congress and other concerned countries should develop a detailed comparative analysis of the performance of various bi-lateral and multi-lateral channels of assistance on a cost effective basis. The strengths and weaknesses of the UNCHR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross), UNICEF (United Nations International Child and Educational Fund) and the church World Service, USAID (United States Agency for International Development) and other organizations and bureaus could be examined and recommendations made with respect to the most effective vehicle for which types of assistance and at what cost.

2. The peripheral role played by the O.A.U. and its Bureau for the placement and education of African refugees should be assessed in detail and recommendations made which would either strengthen these institutions on this field or explain why they are not able or willing to be more active.

3. Institution building in host countries could be assessed. How might assistance be targeted to strengthen the capacity of legal organizations to cope with the refugee problems in their own country? A number of asylum states in the region have local Red Cross societies, Boy Scouts, Brigades with various functions and committees whose responsibility is to deal with refugee problems. What institutional staffing, organizational and other constraints might be lessened with what type and volume of assistance.
4. Examine host government readiness to cope with sudden influxes in terms of their planning and organizing ability. Could a "Disaster Relief" office be set up or strengthened in a appropriate ministry to encourage continuous planning for certain agencies and the preparation of occasional reports assessing the country's state of readiness.

5. Greater examination of the interaction between refugees and host nationals under varying circumstances could yield valuable information. How much resentment actually exists among local people towards refugees who receive international assistance? Are there additional ways to integrate refugee and non-refugee aid? What are the economic and socio-logical implications of "spontaneous" settlement of refugees in border villages?

6. An opinion survey and census among refugees could be extremely instructive. A survey could provide some objective indicators of refugees' perceived needs and provide a clearer understanding of how much the refugee views his/her status, the host country, donor officials, etc. It could also double as a skills inventory and provide better data on which donor agencies could base their budgets and target vocational and other training programs.

7. There should be an indepth study of the white South African military refugees - why are they deserting? And what contribution can they make to the present Southern African war of liberation.?18

In the final analysis it will be necessary to actually conduct this survey in Africa (Botswana; Lesotho; Swaziland; and Zambia) in order to objectively confine the various need dimension.

Definition of Terms and Phrases

Potholm (1, pp. 86-90) identified six types of refugees as follows:

1. The classical refugee (largely agrarian and fleeing conflict cases).

2. Adaptive refugees (a classical refugee who may come to prefer the host country or have been a de facto immigrant originally).

3. An upwardly mobile refugee (one who comes to the host country ostensibly for political reasons but is actually seeking a new life or better opportunity).

4. The vagabard refugee ("those who want neither work nor opportunity, citizenship or repatriation, but simply wish to see the world). Potholm states that many of these refugees develop skills in picking donor agencies which will respond to their needs.

5. Mentally disturbed refugees (those who were mentally disturbed in their home countries and those who become disturbed through being a refugee). And finally

6. The infiltrator refugee (defined as the by product of international intrigue and continued which minority domination in Southern Africa and the existence of repressive governments elsewhere). Potholm points out that South African and Southern Rhodesian agents have attempted to go abroad under the guise of refugees in order to infiltrate MMS and refugee settlements.

7. White South African Military Refugees - Young white South Africans who have fled or are fleeing the white South African army that is waging a war on Namibia - and before its independence - Zimbabwe. These white South Africans refused to be drafted and to participate in white South Africa's military onslaught on Namibia. They are opting out to go to outside countries - mainly England, America and Australia. The interesting fact about these "white military refugees" is that they get instant refugee
status whereas the original non-white or black South Africans had to undergo numerous pressures before they were granted refugee status. United Nations adopted a resolution for military draft dodgers to be accepted as refugees.

AAC  All African Conference of Churches
AAI  African American Institute
ACABQ  Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetry Questions
ACC  Administrative Committee on Co-ordination
ANC  African National Congress
BPEAR  Bureau for Placement and Education of African Refugees
ECA  Economic Commission for Africa
ICMC  International Catholic Migration Services
ICRC  International Committee of the Red Cross
IRC  International Rescue Committee
IUEF  International University Exchange Fund
LWF  Lutheran World Federation
OAU  Organization of African Unity
PAC  Pan Africanist Congress of Azania
PF/ZANU  Patriotic Front/Zimbabwe African National Union
PF/ZAPU  Patriotic Front/Zimbabwe African Peoples Union
SWAPO  South West Africa's Peoples Organization
UNDP  United Nations Development Program
UNESCO  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNETPSA  United Nations Education and Training Program for Southern Africa
List of Article

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Appendix VI - South African Blacks Defy Racist Terror
Appendix VII - South African Troops Attack Angola
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UNITED NATIONS
EDUCATIONAL AND
TRAINING PROGRAMME
FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA
INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa has been in operation for eight years. The number of fellowships and training awards which the Programme has awarded has grown from 14 in 1968 to 744 in 1971 to 1,131 in 1973, and at the present time as a result of the concern and generosity of Member States of the United Nations, 1,285 young people are enjoying training and educational opportunities which would otherwise have been denied them. The participants in the Programme include young people from Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Namibia, Sao Tome and Principe, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. At the time 35 States from all regions of the world are making financial contributions to the Programme totalling $1.5 million. In addition, another 30 States have offered assistance in kind, namely scholarships for training in their own countries. Simultaneously, of great importance are the contributions to the well-being of the students being made by those countries which are host to large numbers of students.

The General Assembly at its 29th session decided, in view of the dimensions which the Programme had achieved, it would be timely to request the Advisory Committee for the Programme (comprising of representatives from Canada, Denmark, the United Republic of Tanzania, India, Venezuela, Zaire and Zambia, and of which I have the honour to serve as Chairman) to undertake in consultation with the Secretaries-General an evaluation of the Programme’s achievements and the way and means of its further development. This evaluation exercise was carried out in the early part of 1975. Its conclusions, endorsed by the General Assembly at its 30th session, underlined in particular the fact that the Programme has been a significant and worthwhile humanitarian effort by the international community and that a continuation and expansion of the Programme was desirable at this stage to meet the increased need arising from recent developments in the territories concerned. To this end, while expressing sincere appreciation to those governments which have offered contributions of varying nature, it underlined the need for continuing and even more generous contributions. I would not mean to imply here that the Programme must or should expand indefinitely, but rather to suggest that at this key time, assuming even modest further growth, the costs of supporting some 1,375 students to the conclusion of their training programmes will require continuing efforts on the part of all concerned governments.
I believe that the Programme is a humanitarian effort in which the United Nations can take pride. I feel that in the years to come it will become increasingly evident that the Programme has proven to be in preparing young people to play a full and active role in the affairs of their respective countries as they become independent of any foreign rule and self-governed. I wish to thank the Member States, the administrations, all those who have demonstrated and who will continue to demonstrate their concern and support for the young people of southern Africa, in training them for a future which I trust will be one of promise, hope and achievement.

H.E. Dr. Saul F. Rae.


Policy

Scholarships are awarded for academic, professional and vocational studies outside the territories concerned. The general policy of the Programme emphasizes the granting of awards in educational and training institutions in the African continent. However, scholarships are awarded to well-qualified students for high level study and training outside Africa in cases, for instance, where facilities for the required studies are not available or are inadequate in Africa.

Most awards are for studies up to the first university degree. In recent years, however, there has been a marked increase in the number of awards for graduate degrees.

Assistance under the Programme

Assistance under the Programme is granted in the form of individual annual scholarships tenable at established secondary schools, universities and advanced technical and vocational courses.

Decisions on scholarships (granted on annual basis) are made by a Selection Panel of Secretariat officials at Headquarters on the recommendation of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) offices. Before making new grants, however, priority is given to extending previous awards made under the Programme, provided the applicant has maintained a satisfactory record. To date, no candidate who has met that standard has had his award terminated before completion of the course for which the award was originally made.

As the anticipated total amount of voluntary contributions is usually known by the end of March in any given year, funds are allocated at that time for renewals and for new awards. Every effort is made to ensure that new awards are fairly distributed among eligible groups.

On several occasions, the Programme has been called upon to assist in emergency situations.

For example, in 1973, about one hundred black students at the University of Rhodesia were expelled, many of them fleeing to neighbouring countries. The Programme received applications from those students who were in urgent need of sponsorship to complete their interrupted university studies. A number of these students were directly sponsored under the Programme for completion of their university degree programmes.

In 1975, at the request of the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia and in cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Programme arranged scholarships for a number of young Namibians who had recently arrived in Zambia from Namibia and were in need of secondary education. As of March 1976, 81 of this group of Namibians had been placed in secondary institutions in the Congo, Ghana, Nigeria and Mauritius.

*According to an agreement concluded in 1970, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) contributes towards the education of bona fide refugees from southern Africa up to the first level of secondary school while the Programme concentrates on providing assistance at higher levels.

*Later called Namibia
Future of the Programme

During the last two years, the political situation in southern Africa has changed dramatically. In Angola and Mozambique, for example, the system of education before independence was woefully inadequate and there was a grave exodus of skilled personnel, including many teachers. To enable these newly independent countries to embark on their own development course, the need for massive assistance programmes has been recognized in order to strengthen their educational systems and to provide crash courses for their returning cadres in the technical and professional services.

For those other countries and territories in southern Africa which have not yet attained independence or majority rule, the same reasons for which the international community established the Educational and Training Programme are ever more compelling today, especially in view of the hastening pace of political change in southern Africa.

As far as the Programme itself is concerned, on the whole there has been measurable improvement in recent years with regard to the academic qualifications of applicants, the performance of the scholarship holders and the level of degrees obtained. There can be no doubt that the Programme has proved a significant and worthwhile effort by the international community in assisting persons who hitherto had been deprived of equal opportunities for education and training. In effect, the very success of the Programme to date has created a situation whereby the increasing need for scholarships by qualified students has proven greater than available resources. This situation has been heightened due to the needs of the newly-independent countries, the increase in post-graduate awards and the substantial rise in tuition and related fees, as well as the cost of living, in many countries.

Therefore, in order to maintain the necessary expansion of the Programme to meet current needs, even more generous contributions on the part of the international community will be required in the coming year. Annex II indicates the number of students by nationality (total 1375) assisted under the Programme during 1974/1975. Many of these scholarships were in response to urgent requests for educational assistance during a period of rapid political change in southern Africa. However, the rising costs of scholarships due to world-wide inflation and the level of contributions in 1976 have presented the Programme with the necessity to increase its activities, especially the granting of new awards.

It is hoped that the level of contributions in the future will not only offset the rising costs of individual scholarships due to inflation but will also enable the granting of new awards to increasing numbers of well-qualified candidates.

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of new awards</th>
<th>Number of awards extended</th>
<th>Number of scholarship holders</th>
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<td>272</td>
<td>454</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969/70</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>505</td>
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<td>1970/71</td>
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<td>556</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971/72</td>
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<td>744</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972/73</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>873</td>
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<td>1973/74</td>
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<td>1974/75</td>
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* Awards under the Programme from 1968 to 1975.
Annex I
Applications and Awards, 1970/71 to 1974/75

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<td>381</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>714</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total: scholarship holders</td>
<td>550</td>
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<td>873</td>
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<td>Awardscompleted</td>
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<td>190</td>
<td>215</td>
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*The Committee is composed of representatives of Canada, Denmark, India, the United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Zambia and Zaire. Representatives of the United Nations Councils for Namibia, the Special Committee against Apartheid and the organization of African Unity participate as observers in the work of the Committee.

ANNEX II
Placement by Region, 1974/1975

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<th>North America</th>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>970</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>74</td>
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ANNEX III
Contributions by Governments - 1968-1975

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### ANNEX III

**CONTRIBUTIONS BY GOVERNMENTS -- 1968-1975**

(continued)

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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td>811,168</td>
<td>907,472</td>
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By Derek T. Dingle

NORFOLK—Many say man's inhumanity to man makes thousands weep. But for some, like Monica Moorehead, human suffering procreates anger.

The 28-year-old educator of the Tidewater area manifests this anger constructively in an attempt to obliterate oppression and imperialism home and abroad. The vehicle that Miss Moorehead has utilized is the World Workers Party (WWP).

The WWP is a left-wing organization opposed to neocolonialism and suppression of the lower class and advocates the socialization of business and industry. The WWP's inception came during their involvement in the Congolese struggle against Belgium's imperialism in 1961. Since then, the group has been a moving force in other international revolutions.

Miss Moorehead, who has been active within the group since her graduation from Hampton Institute in 1974, has currently been involved in the South African liberation movement. She says the conditions in which blacks have to live in the country are unbearable due to the system of apartheid (separation of the races).

According to Miss Moorehead, the South African government has divided the educational funds by race. From 1978 to 1979, the South African government has spent approximately $900 dollars per white child, $440 dollars per Indian child, $281 dollars per coloured (mixed) child, and $89 dollars per black child.

In addition to an inadequate education, 40 percent of the total black population live in bantustans, which are South African concentration camps. An estimated 100,000 blacks a year have been forced by the South African police to mine gold and coal for the country in such camps.

For black women in the country, they are also designated to go to bantustans on a notice of 72 hours or less. Black women are compelled to work in textile and food processing plants, where they are paid slave wages.

Miss Moorehead said that all these problems that plague blacks are devised under the apartheid system, which exchanges decency for monetary gain.

"Apartheid is the highest form of racism. It is propped up by a world system that puts profit before everything else," she said.

Last month, the incensed teacher got her chance to voice her views on the apartheid system as a representative for the WWP at the Conference on Women Under Apartheid in Montreal, Canada.

The conference was sponsored by the Bu Quebec and Committee Against the Decade of the World's Women for financial, political aid for South Africa, and in particular stated that it was directed towards the women who were suppressed twice under the system.

"We emphasize the women because more than the men and family on these ships are taken to work," Moorehead explained.

Miss Moorehead is also responsible for blacks in South Africa.
security at hundreds of potential industrial targets and legislation that obliges owners of industrial "key points" designated by the Government to take adequate steps to protect them. The new law, with a maximum fine of $26,000, also prohibited press reports of guerrilla attacks on strategic targets without prior Government approval.

But the Government's immediate worry was the Soweto anniversary coupled this year with a decision by militant black groups to make June 15 Biko Day in memory of Stephen Biko, the young black activist who died of brain injuries in a Pretoria prison in 1977. Police Minister Louis le Grange contended that black militants were planning to use the ceremonies to broaden existing unrest, which has taken fewer than 10 lives.

Proclamation Is Appealed

The proclamation on gatherings outlawed the kind of meetings in churches that have marked the June 16 anniversary for the last three years in Soweto and elsewhere. The meetings have attracted as many as 10,000 blacks to a single church in Soweto and have taken on the appearance of political rallies, with anti-Government speeches by political and religious leaders.

The principal commemorative gatherings in Soweto this year were to have been held at the Regina Mundi Catholic church and were to have included speeches by Bishop Desmond Tutu, general secretary of the South African Council of Churches, and Dr. Nthato Motlana, unofficial leader of Soweto's one million residents. Bishop Tutu, a figure of growing importance in the black resistance movement, telephoned the Justice Minister Schlebusch, yesterday in an effort to have the proclamation repealed.

The Bishop said later that he had asked Mr. Schlebusch to accept the genuine desire of blacks to mourn the dead in the 1976 upheaval. He said he told the minister that the country's 19 million blacks were as offended by the ban as Afrikaners, the ruling whites, would be if a future black government forbade commemoration of the Day of the Covenant, the anniversary of the victory of the Afrikaners over the Zulus at the Battle of Blood River on Dec. 16, 1838.

March Also Broken Up

Mr. Schlebusch was unyielding, and Bishop Tutu urged blacks to stay at home and avoid clashes with the police. "Silence can also be a protest," he said. However, crowds of up to 400 blacks gathered outside the Regina Mundi as the police carried away a demonstrator after disturbances in Soweto, a suburb of Johannesburg.
The government proclamation, reported the New York Times, "was the most severe restriction on political activity in nearly 200 years."

Despite the ban, a reported 400 Blacks showed up at a church in Soweto June 15. They were barred by police. When some regrouped and tried to march to another church, cops fired tear gas and beat demonstrators.

On June 16, protesters again defied the proclamation in several areas. This time police opened fire in Soweto, Bloemfontein, and Noordgezicht, a suburb of Pretoria. They were barred by stevedores staying away from the docks.

The authorities closed six teachers' colleges in the area because of the protests.

Facts on the number of killed and wounded in the June 17 and 18 police attacks are available only from "official" sources: the government.

Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) won a sweeping victory in the elections held in late February, defeating the candidates favored by the white settlers and the British and South African governments. The country gained its formal independence on April 18, with Mugabe becoming the first Black prime minister.

ZANU's electoral victory and the attainment of independence after years of bitter struggle greatly fired Black expectations.

Textile workers, shoe company employees, bus drivers, manufacturing workers, and many others walked off their jobs in Salisbury, Bulawayo, Gwelo and other cities in March to press for higher pay.

Kangai's announcement followed three months of labor unrest that has swept the country, drawing in tens of thousands of Black workers in more than 100 strikes, most of them for higher pay.

The strike wave began shortly after the workers to return to their jobs. Kangai himself broadcast an appeal on March 25 for an end to the strikes.

Some of the strikers heeded Mugabe's call. Others did not.

In early May, the strike wave again went into an upswing. Some 4,000 Black coal miners, earning US$3 a day, walked off their jobs to demand US$3 an hour. They were employed at the Wankie coal mine in northwestern Zimbabwe, a mine that is owned by the Anglo-American Corporation, a giant South African firm.

Some 8,000 workers at the Hippo Valley sugar estates, also owned by Anglo American, briefly struck before returning to work under Kangai's urging.

On May 13, about 5,000 gold and asbestos miners went on strike for higher pay.

And on May 20 some 2,000 workers at Zimbabwe's largest iron and steel plant, located in the town of Que Que, did likewise.

In addition to the labor unrest, there have been mobilizations against the police force, which is still predominantly white-led.

The government's response to the latest uprising is an escalation of violence.

But the fact that the revolt is deepening in the face of this repression is tribute to the fighting spirit and determination of the Black majority of South Africa.

"I am giving you five minutes to disperse," a top police officer ordered a group of protesters June 16.

A Black youth stood directly in front of him and said, "It's our country, not the government's country."

**Zimbabwean workers win pay increases**

The new Zimbabwean government, in face of a continuing wave of strikes, announced on May 28 that it would soon establish a national minimum wage to cover the country's approximately one million Black workers.

At a news conference in Salisbury, Labour Minister Kumbirai Kangai said that Parliament would enact a minimum wage law on July 1, setting minimum monthly wages of US$108 for industrial workers and US$46 for domestic workers and agricultural laborers.

Since Black wages had been kept extremely low under the previous white supremacist regime of Ian Smith, this minimum wage law will require employers to grant substantial wage increases, in some sectors doubling the workers' current pay.

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On May 28, the same day as Kangai's announcement about the minimum wage, Blacks demonstrated in Salisbury demanding replacement of the existing police force with a "people's police" composed entirely of Blacks.

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**From Intercontinental Press/Inpress**
Death Toll Rises in South African Rioting as Policemen Again Open Fire

Continued From Page A1

months later with at least 600 people dead, most of them killed by police gunfire.

But the indications so far are that the young blacks at the center of the 1976 protests are reluctant to revert to widespread confrontations with the police in black satellite townships like Soweto, outside Johannesburg, which was largely calm today after minor skirmishes on Monday.

The relative peace elsewhere in the country enabled the Government to concentrate on curbing the disorders in Cape Town and nearby population centers with a heavy concentration of “coloureds,” as South Africans call the 2.7 million people of mixed race who occupy a middle position between whites and blacks in the official racial hierarchy.

Intensity Surprises Whites

The intensity of the outburst surprised many whites. While they have long feared a violent uprising among the country’s 18 million blacks, whites have tended to take for granted the quietude of the mixed-race population, which traces its origins to relations between black Cape women and the forebears of the white Afrikaners who rule today. With many mixed-race people speaking Afrikaans as a first language, Afrikaners seeking security against blacks have often seen them as natural allies.

However, bids for change in the official position on mixed-race people met strong resistance within the ruling National Party, particularly among political leaders in the western Cape, where people of mixed race are a majority. The party has rejected appeals for an end to racial barriers between the two groups, and Prime Minister P. W. Botha has said that mixed-race people will never sit in a single parliament with whites. The stand has stiffened.

who call themselves black and identify with the revolutionary black underground.

The current rioting broke out in at least half a dozen of the mixed-race townships that skirt the southern and eastern flanks of the city, as well as in the mixed-race areas outside Paarl, a wine making center 45 miles to the east.

But the worst violence, and most of the deaths, occurred in Elsie’s River, where tens of thousands of mixed-race people live in drab, Government-built apartment blocks and cramped brick houses on grassless ground, separated here and there by clusters of corrugated iron shacks.

Youths Stone Passing Vehicles

In the initial phase of the upheaval, youths gathered along roads into the city and stoned passing vehicles. Some of the vehicles were halted, overturned and set afire, blocking roads. At least 15 white drivers were injured, and some reportedly shot at the youths with firearms they carried.

The situation deteriorated after dusk and remained chaotic through much of today. Gangs of youths roamed the streets attacking vehicles and setting fire to factories, liquor stores, supermarkets, small shops and schools. Dozens of buildings were gutted, including a textile plant where damage was estimated at close to $4 million. Buildings that were not burned were looted.

Reporters who were allowed in the riot areas under police escort reported several instances of arsonists and looters being shot dead by police patrols. In other cases police were reported to have shot in self-defense after their vehicles were attacked by angry crowds.

“Hooligan Elements” Cited

The Government account was that what had begun as a protest against racial conditions degenerated into a rampage applied to miscreants of mixed race.

Minister, Mr. Le Grange, who three weeks ago issued an official statement of regret after the police shot two youths dead for throwing stones, came out this time with a declaration of war on those responsible for the chaos.

“We are concerned now with criminal, violent, skollie elements and we will act relentlessly against them,” Mr. Le Grange said, using an Afrikaans pejorative applied to miscreants of mixed race. He added: “No longer is this community action but a case of completely irresponsible elements. They don’t care what damage is done to their own people.”

“What is more,” the Minister added, “they are murderers of policemen.” This was taken as a reference to the death on Monday night of a 20-year-old white police constable.
Death Toll Rises in South African Rioting

Continued From Page A1

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Young Man Injured In Riots Near Cape Town, South Africa, Is Treated Before Being Taken To A Hospital

By John Kane-Berman
Constitution Special Correspondent

JOHANNESBURG — Fourteen-year-old Shirley September's desk was empty when her classmates arrived for lessons at Lavana Primary School in Lavender Hill, Cape Town, on Wednesday morning. She had died with a bullet in her brain the day before, one of 42 reported dead in the racial violence that swept through the city's segregated "colored" townships this week (though police put the figure at 30).

Shirley was not very bright, said her teacher, "she was a very friendly little girl and always had a smile for everybody. It was a terrible shock when we learned of her death."

Official permission for public gatherings permitting, Shirley will be given a hero's burial. For to South Africa's 2.5 million colored minority she is a martyr in the intensifying, bitter struggle for equality.

"God's stepchildren" is how a South African author once described Shirley's people, for their situation is in many ways the most tragic of all in this country.

They are the filling, someone else once the sandwich between black and white nati. They are also the embodiment of white Souca's guilty conscience, for they are the offs sex across the color line, something which white Afrikaner nationalists regard as one of the sins of all.

Culturally, the so-called colored people much closer to white Afrikaners than they black Africans. They share a language with Afrikaners, and many of them worship in (seg "daughter churches" of the Calvinist Du formed churches that are so influential an
How Ford workers dealt blow to apartheid

The current rise in the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa was signaled in late 1979 and early 1980 when several hundred Black workers employed by the Ford Motor Company in Port Elizabeth waged a struggle for their rights.

Strikes by Black workers in South Africa are frequent, but this one was distinguished by the strikers' open anti-apartheid stand. They turned for leadership to a Black anti-apartheid group, the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organization (PEBCO), headed by Ford workers Thozamile Botha.

In propaganda aimed at justifying its lucrative investments in South Africa, Ford passes off its South African subsidiary as a "progressive" employer devoted to advancing South Africa's Blacks.

But between 80 and 90 percent of the company's Black workers were earning below the minimum poverty level, and the real incomes of workers in the lower grades had declined over eight years. Promotions of Blacks into higher job categories were still limited, and racism in the factory was still pervasive.

The struggle at Ford began when 700 workers walked off the job October 31. They were protesting Ford's dismissal of Botha for his anti-apartheid activity. After workers staged a rally outside the plant, management caved in and reinstated Botha.

On November 13 Black workers briefly stopped work to protest the racist behavior of some of the white workers. Two days later hundreds held meetings in the engine and assembly plants to air grievances. On November 21, workers at the Struandale assembly plant struck.

Management fired all the strikers. About 600 workers struck the General Tire and Rubber Company, linked to the American firm, and were also fired. Reinstatement of the workers became the main issue in the struggle.

Some 1,000 Black workers boycotted Ford's canteens. And strikes spread to local paper and tire plants.

The workers turned to PEBCO for leadership because they felt the Black union at Ford was too subservient. It favored accepting a management offer to rehire the dismissed workers as new hires without seniority or accumulated benefits. The strikers formed a committee that affiliated with PEBCO.

PEBCO's support to the Ford workers led to rapid expansion of its influence. By mid-November, the organization was holding meetings of more than 10,000 in Port Elizabeth and its influence spread to other cities.

In an effort to stem the unrest, the apartheid regime arrested several dozen Ford workers and PEBCO leaders. Two PEBCO leaders were "banned," a restriction that limits movement and bars political or trade-union activity.

But attempts to hire scabs to replace the striking workers failed. The strike won support from anti-apartheid forces throughout the country. Bishop Desmond Tutu, of the antiapartheid South African Council of Churches, and the Azanian People's Organization pledged solidarity.

On January 9, Ford management accepted the workers' demand for reinstatement with full pay, pension, and seniority rights.

The Ford workers' determination had paid off.

This victory inspired PEBCO to continue rallies and protests against apartheid, sometimes mobilizing thousands of people.

And the regime is still trying to crush the organization. Top leaders were arrested on January 10. They were released February 27 in the wake of big protests in Port Elizabeth, but Botha and two other PEBCO leaders were banned.

Bombings at oil installations

Bombs went off at two synthetic petroleum plants and an oil refinery in South Africa June 2, causing $8 million in damage.

South African police are attributing the bombing to the African National Congress, an anti-apartheid organization.

The ANC was banned in 1960 after attempting for more than a decade to lead nonviolent protests against the racist regime. Nelson Mandela, the most prominent leader of the ANC, was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1964. He is still a prisoner.

The New York Times reported June 3 that an ANC spokesperson in London had claimed responsibility for the bombings.

The South African regime is trying to whip up a witch-hunt around the bombings, targeting all expressions of hatred for apartheid.

"The possibility of a new round of detentions and bannings of those deemed responsible for widening unrest in the country" was under consideration, John Burns reported in the June 3 New York Times.

The South African regime also stepped up threats against Mozambique, which has granted political asylum to members of the ANC.
S. African Blacks defy racist terror Cape Town youth revolt
Continued from front page

Indiscriminate slaughter of Angolan villagers as punishment for Angola's support to the Namibian people. In addition to trying to intimidate SWAPO forces, the South African regime hopes to weaken and, if possible, topple Angola's independent government.

De Figueiredo told the UN Security Council the results of the first bloody raids: "They have killed over 370 men, women, and children," he said. "They have wounded more than 255 people, many of whom will succumb to their injuries. They have destroyed vehicles, bridges, houses. They have killed much of the livestock, depriving the remaining populace of its food and livelihood. They have mined roads and fields."

Contrary to the South African regime's original contention that its invasion lasted only one week, De Figueiredo disclosed that the South African occupation and military attacks have continued. He detailed the positions of South African forces in his country as of June 23, weeks after the South African regime claims to have pulled out:

- "... since June 23, 1980, a motorized infantry brigade of the racist South African Armed Forces has been on Angolan territory. There is one infantry battalion in Eval, one infantry battalion in Mongua, and another one north of Kwamato.
- "Then there are two battalions of paratroopers, one on the road between Ankua and N'Giva, and one on the road north of Neone.
- "One company of armoured cars are northeast of Ongo, and one motorized infantry battalion supported by 32 artillery units, mortars, and AML-90 armoured cars are in the area region, including that of Zimbabwe.

South Africa's invasion of Angola came in the midst of deepening resistance within South Africa to apartheid.

Since mid-April, large-scale student protests have swept the country, involving more than 100,000 in school boycotts and rallies.

The student protests have coincided with the outbreak of several major Black strikes involving thousands of teachers, textile workers, auto workers, rubber workers, and others.

South African authorities have responded with a major crackdown within the country, arresting key Black figures and killing and jailing demonstrators.

Substantial gains have reportedly been won by some Black strikers, however, and the upsurge is apparently continuing despite the news blackout by U.S. media.
Angolans mobilize against S. African invaders

By Nan Bailey

A counteroffensive by the Angolan army has succeeded in pushing back battalions of South African troops who launched an invasion of Angola beginning June 7.

A photograph of one of the raiding South African aircraft shot down by Angolan troops shows the plane with NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) markings. This evidence supports charges made by Angolan leaders that the South African assault has the backing of major imperialist powers.

Sara Rodrigues, a correspondent for the radical newsweekly Guardian, reports from Angola that a communiqué released by the Angolan Defense Ministry detailed the results of that country's counteroffensive.

The army of the apartheid regime carried out raids on Namibian guerrilla camps and Angolan villages, killing hundreds in the first few weeks. But Angolan troops have now driven the South Africans out of at least three towns they had occupied—Mongua, Evale, and Mulemba.

As the fighting took place, South African planes continued to strafe villages and Angolan troop columns.

Lucio Lara, a leader of the MPLA, Angola's ruling party, called on Angolans to mobilize to defend the country.

He warned they must be prepared for further attacks and that the South African "operations are not directed only at SWAPO [the South West Africa People's Organisation, which is fighting for the liberation of Namibia]—the South Africans have much wider objectives."

Rodrigues also reports that Cuban troops in Angola have been deliberately held back from the fighting so far in accordance with an MPLA decision. MPLA leaders explained that this is being done to avoid spreading the government is pressing its attacks on Black rights fighters within the country.

A group of clergymen arrested in a government crackdown earlier this year went to trial July 1. All were convicted of violating the Riotous Assembly Act with their participation in a march protesting the detention of another church leader.

Three of the clergymen were sentenced to jail for fifty days while thirty-two others were fined.

But resistance to the apartheid regime continues.

As Black GM and Ford workers ended a strike which won them higher wages, Black meatworkers in Cape town went out on strike, challenging management's refusal to meet with a negotiating committee elected by the workers.

Construction has been halted at a Johannesburg coal conversion plant after two days of protests by 2,000 Black workers angered at hearing that one of their co-workers had been shot by South African officials.
APPENDIX IX

BOTSWANA

Area ........................................... 600,372 sq. km.
Estimated population ....................... 720,000 (mid-78)
Population density ............................ 1.20 per sq. km.
Rainy season ................................. Approx. October - April

Settlement of refugees or displaced persons.
19. The number of refugees in Botswana increased substantially during 1978 primarily due to arrivals from Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). During the course of the year, over 25,300 Zimbabweans arrived in Botswana, though this number was partially offset by the transfer of 11,600 persons to Zambia, of whom some 3,000 women and children were air-lifted, due to extremely crowded conditions in the transit centres. By mid-1979 there were approximately 20,300 refugees in Botswana, of whom some 96 per cent were in transit centres or at Dukwe settlement.

20. The influx of Zimbabweans continues to strain the capacities of the transit centres at Francistown and Selebi-Pikwe, where over 9,000 refugees are housed. The situation with regard to refugees at Dukwe settlement is somewhat better, as the agricultural settlement has successfully progressed to the point where over 10,000 individuals have established a community in a little over a year. Due to the large numbers of Zimbabweans entering Botswana, it was decided to increase the capacity of the settlement from its original target population of 10,000 to 20,000. The refugees at Dukwe, as well as those in the transit centres, continue to benefit from WFP food aid. Medical services are provided by the International Committee of the Red Cross as well as the Botswana Red Cross, and the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) has made available administrative staff.

21. Faced with the task of providing assistance to South African refugees, the majority of whom attempt to find accommodation in or near the capital, the Government of Botswana and UNHCR are formulating plans for a residential/educational centre outside the capital. The potential beneficiaries of this centre would be South African refugees who are neither enrolled in an educational institution nor employed.

22. The emphasis on educational assistance for South African refugee students remains a priority in Botswana. The Educational Resource Centre in Gaborone offers remedial programmes and correspondence courses to refugees prior to their placement in educational institutions either in Botswana or elsewhere. Essential buildings at the two secondary schools, which are presently under construction with financial assistance from UNHCR, will be completed in time for the commencement of classes in January 1980.

GENERAL PROGRAMMES

Local integration

23. Assistance to individuals: In 1978, an amount of $55,266 was obligated for assistance towards the local integration of individual refugees. Refugees were assisted to realize projects of their own such as the establishment of small businesses, crafts and farming activities. It is foreseen that the 1979 allocation of $50,000 will suffice until the end of the year, and an allocation of $58,000 is proposed for 1980, of which $10,000 would be set aside for the provision of rent subsidies.
24. Transit, reception and residential centres for Zimbabwean refugees: Due to overcrowding in the transit centres, it has been necessary to expand services made available at Francistown and Selebi-Pikwe. In 1978 an amount of $613,571 was obligated to finance recurrent costs in the centres as well as the procurement of tents and vehicles, and alterations to Francistown which included the addition of three dormitories and a health post. The allocation of $200,000 originally foreseen for 1979 has been increased by $356,218 from the Programme Reserve. In order to provide for the continuation of services at the centres, it is proposed to allocate $692,000 in 1980. The two existing transit centres continue to provide the most basic necessities for Zimbabwean refugees. Over 9,000 are now occupying space originally planned for 1,500 individuals, however, and the Government of Botswana has recognized that the present situation cannot continue indefinitely. For this reason, a new centre at Selebi-Pikwe is being planned which will alleviate the burden on the two existing centres and permit the formulation of a programme of appropriate educational/vocational training as well as limited agricultural activity. It is proposed to allocate $700,000 in 1980 for the initial phases of site development and basic construction of this new centre.

25. Residential centre for South Africans: As was mentioned in the introduction, plans are progressing for a residential centre for South African refugees. The Government is considering a site at Mosetsanamontle, some 100 kms from Gaborone, for the centre. From the 1979 combined allocation of $350,000 for a residential centre and the low-cost housing scheme at Selebi-Pikwe, an amount of $314,000 remained available at the time of writing for the establishment of the proposed centre. This amount has been increased by $100,000 from the Programme Reserve and an additional allocation of $140,000 is proposed for 1979 under the new and revised projects formula, thus making a total of $554,000 available. Implementation of this project is expected to continue into 1980; it is proposed to allocate $50,000 in 1980 to cover recurrent costs for the centre until the end of the year.

26. As was reported last year, 90 low-cost houses were constructed in 1978 in order to provide accommodation for refugees of various origins, and $36,000 have been committed to cover recurrent costs in 1979. An allocation of $39,000 is proposed for 1980 for similar purposes.

27. Dukwe settlement: The agricultural settlement at Dukwe, located approximately 120 kms west of Francistown, has developed into a successful community since April of 1978. As was mentioned earlier, the planned capacity of the settlement has been increased from 10,000 to 20,000 in order to accommodate increasing numbers of Zimbabweans seeking refuge in Botswana. In 1978 the allocation of $1.3 million was totally obligated for the initial development of the settlement. The revised projections for 20,000 refugees call for additional funds however; as the 1.2 million allocation approved by the Executive Committee for 1979 will not suffice. It is thus proposed that an amount of $1,760,000 be made available in 1979 under the new and revised projects formula. The speed with which this settlement has been established is partly due to the fact that in certain instances the Government has advanced funds when UNHCR has not been in a position to make immediate payments. The authority of the Executive Committee is requested to reimburse the Government, should such a procedure prove necessary, once funds are available in October. An allocation of $1 million is requested for 1980.
28. **Lower secondary education**: The Educational Resource Centre in Gaborone has enjoyed remarkable success since it was established in 1977. Its flexible approach to meeting the varied educational needs of refugee students has provided a model for other areas of Botswana. In 1978, $30,000 were provided from the General Programmes to finance the operation during the last months of the year. The approved 1979 allocation of $50,000 is deemed sufficient for this year and an allocation of $55,000 is requested for 1980.

29. Funds have been made available from the 1978 and 1979 Special Programmes to provide lower secondary scholarships for South African refugee students in Botswana. With the prospect of approximately 160 places being available at this level in 1980, an allocation of $119,000 is proposed for next year.

**Counselling**

30. As was the case in past years, the Counselling Service of the Botswana Council for Refugees (BCR) is jointly supported by the Botswana Council of Churches, the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC), the International University Exchange Fund (IUEF) and UNHCR. In 1978 UNHCR obligated $14,935 towards the total budget. With the increasing refugee caseload in Botswana, it has been proposed that a post of Director General be added to the staff in order to co-ordinate BCR activities with the Government and voluntary agencies. An amount of $3,450 has been made available from the 1979 Programme Reserve to increase the original allocation of $25,000. An allocation of $27,000 is requested for 1980.

**Supplementary aid**

31. In 1978, $249,524 were obligated for supplementary aid, 43 per cent of which was used for assistance to South African refugees. It is anticipated that the 1979 allocation of $320,000 will suffice to the end of the year, barring any unexpectedly large influxes of refugees into the country. For 1980, an allocation of $296,000 is requested.

**Programme support and administration**

32. An amount of $64,059 was obligated for programme support in 1978 against an allocation of $54,000. The increase, in the main due to travel, was financed by transfers between allocations. To maintain the Branch Office at its present strength, allocations of $68,100 and $79,800 are proposed for 1979 and 1980 respectively.

**SPECIAL PROGRAMMES**

33. **United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa**: From the allocation administered by UNHCR on behalf of this fund for the period 1 July 1978 to 30 June 1979, $53,000 were made available in 1978 to provide relief and maintenance for South African refugees in Botswana.

34. **Special Programme for southern Africans**: Funds made available to the High Commissioner in response to his special appeal of 8 June 1977 on behalf of southern Africans were utilized to finance several projects during the course of 1978 in a total amount of $5,628,268. Of this amount, $4.2 million were obligated for the construction and equipping of one junior and one senior secondary school which will provide an additional 960 places for students in Botswana. Out of this total, the number of places available for refugee
students will be in proportion to UNHCR’s contribution to the total cost of these schools. A further amount of $590,320 was obligated to construct and equip 90 low-cost houses for refugees at Selebi-Pikwe. The refugee student population in Botswana has placed a heavy burden on the educational facilities of the country, as was recognized in the Secretary-General’s reports on the subject (documents A/32/65 and A/32/65/Add.1). In an effort to lessen the burden, an amount of $447,000 was obligated to construct and equip a 72-bed hostel at the University College of Botswana. A total of $325,000 was obligated to finance an emergency air-lift of Zimbabwean women and children from transit centres in Botswana to Zambia, in order to relieve serious over-crowding in the centres. Several smaller amounts were obligated to cover transportation costs for students accepted in schools abroad, running costs of the Educational Resource Centre and rent subsidies of refugees living or in transit in Botswana. Similar efforts are being financed from the General Programmes in the current year.

35. In 1979, an amount of $48,000 was made available from the Special Programmes for southern African refugee students at the lower secondary level. Contributions in kind for southern Africans in 1979 have so far totalled $27,550.
### UNHCR EXPENDITURE IN BOTSWANA

(All figures in thousands of US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of funds and type of assistance</th>
<th>1978</th>
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<th>1980</th>
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<td>Local integration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Individual refugees</td>
<td>55.2</td>
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<td>Transit/reception centres for Zimbabweans</td>
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<td>Assistance to southern African refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
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<td><strong>Regular Budget (3)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Grand Total (1 - 3)</strong></td>
<td>8,143.0</td>
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<td>6,115.1</td>
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/a/ Obligations incurred against overall allocations
SWAZILAND

Introduction

198. Refugees mainly from South Africa continue to arrive in Swaziland in increasing numbers. There were approximately 700 urban refugees at the end of 1978, in addition to some 3,000 rural South African refugees who, with their herds of cattle, have entered the south-east part of the country, and for whom the Government has only recently requested UNHCR assistance. A third of this group has arrived in the past few months and was initially assisted from the Emergency Fund. Nearly 45 per cent of the group consists of school-age children.

199. Local integration measures are considered a priority for promoting self-sufficiency and efforts are being pursued to identify durable solutions for both urban and rural refugees. A number of proposals to establish small enterprises have been received from refugees. Those without specific skills will be assisted within the context of a programme which will provide training in such fields as electricity, ceramics, woodworking and weaving.

200. Emergency assistance in the form of food, domestic utensils, blankets and clothing has been provided to the group of 1,000 refugees who fled from South Africa during the past year. Plans are being prepared to assist them and some 2,000 other South African refugees to resume their traditional farming activities.

201. The Mphaka Refugee Centre was constructed in 1978, following recommendations made in United Nations General Assembly reports on Emergency Assistance for South African Student Refugees (documents A/32/65 and A/32/65/Add.1). The Centre, comprising a lower secondary school, boys' and girls' hostels, a dining facility, transit centre and staff houses, was damaged by storms early in 1979. The school was, nevertheless, opened in May 1979.

GENERAL PROGRAMMES

Local integration

202. Assistance to individuals: As was reported in previous years, opportunities for the local settlement of refugees in Swaziland have proved limited. The 1978 allocation of $51,000 was, therefore, not utilized and was transferred within General Programmes. However, it now appears that it will be possible to establish refugees in small enterprises, and to this end the approved 1979 allocation of $5,000 has been increased by $1,000 from the Programme Reserve. Any additional expenditure this year will also be financed from the Reserve and to ensure the momentum of this effort an allocation of $35,000 is proposed for 1980.

203. Rural refugees: Initial assistance to some 1,000 newly-arrived South African rural refugees has been financed from the Emergency Fund (for details see paragraph 206 below). A tentative plan of operations has been drawn up for the settlement of this group, as well as over 2,000 other South Africans, in rural communities near Mphaka in the Lubombo District in south-eastern Swaziland. Health facilities and schools will be provided but the major emphasis will be placed on agriculture. An allocation of $200,000 is proposed under the new and revised projects formula for 1979. Since technical surveys will be undertaken before the plan of operations is finalized, the entire allocation may not be obligated in the current year. The authority of the Executive Committee is, therefore, requested to carry over any remaining balance for commitment in 1980. An allocation of $300,000 is proposed for 1980 to continue the agricultural settlement of this group.
<table>
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<td>Approved appropriations/orig. estimates</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Local integration</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual refugees</td>
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<td>6.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>218.0</td>
<td>759.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[a/\] Obligations incurred against overall allocations
Emergency Fund

210. In March 1979, the High Commissioner allocated $104,000 on behalf of newly-arrived South African refugees in Swaziland. Funds have been committed to purchase food, blankets, clothing and domestic utensils, as well as for administrative expenditure. Proposals for continued more durable assistance to these refugees have been made under General Programmes.

SPECIAL PROGRAMMES

United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa

211. From the allocation administered by UNHCR on behalf of the Fund for the period July 1978 to June 1979, an amount of $39,000 was obligated to provide for the relief and maintenance of South African refugees in Swaziland.

Assistance to southern African Refugees

212. Mpaka Centre: UNHCR made available $1,060,000 in 1978 towards the cost of construction and equipment for the Mpaka Refugee Centre, the recurrent costs of which are currently being financed from General Programmes.

213. Thokoza School: Prior to the opening of the Mpaka Centre, lower secondary education was provided in 1978 at the Thokoza school, for which $78,450 was obligated in 1978. These funds were utilized to equip, run and maintain the school under an agreement with the Mennonite Central Committee in Swaziland.
APPENDIX XI

UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

Area ........................................ 945,087 sq. km.
Estimated population .................... 16,550,000 (mid-78)
Population density ......................... Approx. 17.51 per sq. km.
Rainy season ................................. November/December to March/April
UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

Introduction

231. Taking into account a small influx during the year and the results of a census carried out in the Ulyankulu settlement, it was estimated that the total number of refugees in the United Republic of Tanzania was 160,000 by the end of 1978. Of this total, some 129,500 were Burundian, most of them living in organized rural settlements, 25,000 Rwandese, 4,100 Ugandans and smaller numbers from southern Africa and other African regions.

232. Most of the Office's activities in the United Republic of Tanzania during 1978 year focused on assistance to organized rural settlements. Implementation of UNHCR assistance programmes in the settlements for refugees from Burundi is governed by tripartite agreements between the Government, UNHCR and the Lutheran World Federation/Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service (LWF/TCRS), the latter acting as implementing agency. Both the Government and LWF/TCRS contribute in cash and in kind. These settlements are those at Ulyankulu and Katumba (the largest refugee settlements in Africa), and the new settlement at Mishamo.

233. Since the establishment of Ulyankulu in 1972, the number of refugees has risen to a level which far exceeds the agricultural and economic capacity of the settlement. Consequently, it was agreed in 1977 to transfer some 25,000 refugees from Ulyankulu to a new settlement at Mishamo. A census completed in March 1978 revealed that the Ulyankulu population was around 47,250.

234. At the request of the Government, and in compliance with the recommendations of a viability survey conducted in May 1977 and with the findings of a detailed soil survey carried out by the National Soil Service (NSS) in 1978, the three partners have agreed to postpone the handover of Ulyankulu settlement to the authorities until 30 June 1980. This decision was made in order to permit the reduction of the original 13 villages to 11, the relocation of refugee farms to more fertile land, and the re-arrangement of water supply systems and the road network. This programme and the overall consolidation of the settlement are designed to enable the refugees remaining in Ulyankulu, after the transfer of some 25,000 persons to Mishamo, to become entirely self-sufficient.

235. The Katumba settlement, which currently accommodates over 66,000 refugees, was established in 1973 and was officially handed over to the Government on 30 June 1978. Since 1 July 1978, all recurring costs have been incorporated in the district budget.

236. The new rural settlement at Mishamo is designed to accommodate the excess population of Ulyankulu and 12,000 to 15,000 refugees from the border area of Kigoma region. The purpose of the Project is to assist refugees to become self-sufficient in agriculture and to integrate them into the local community and national economy. Detailed studies of water resources, land fertility, as well as engineering and layout plans were all completed in 1978. The plans foresee the establishment of 21 villages at Mishamo; each village to consist of 375 family plots, with an additional 25 plots to allow for future expansion. The villages are surrounded by arable land, providing each family with 5 hectares.

237. The rural settlement for Ugandan refugees at Kigwa was established as a joint undertaking by the Government and UNHCR in 1973. The refugee population remained at 2,000 in 1978. The handover of Kigwa to the Government was postponed to December 1979, because construction of a community education complex and the
second phase of the water supply system had not been completed, due to a shortage of building materials and logistics problems. It is anticipated that the Government will complete these constructions prior to handover.

238. The caseload of some 3,500 refugees living in urban areas, in particular the capital, comprises mainly students in need of scholarships; others require local settlement assistance, supplementary aid or resettlement opportunities. Assistance projects in favour of this group are mainly administered by the Christian Council of Tanzania (CCT). During the period under review many individual urban refugees including South Africans, have been provided with care and maintenance pending their placement in academic or vocational institutions, in employment, or pending identification of durable solutions to their specific problems.

GENERAL PROGRAMMES

Local integration

Refugees from Burundi

239. Ulyankulu settlement: In 1978, UNHCR obligated $625,000, LWF/TCRS made available some $225,000, while the Government provided land and services. A survey was undertaken in 1978 to determine the viability of Ulyankulu and Katumba settlements and $7,776 were obligated for this purpose. A water development programme, including the maintenance of boreholes, construction of two more dams and improvement of water distribution system continued throughout the year. Contrary to previous years, throughout 1978, the settlement headquarters and the refugees had adequate water for domestic use. The pipeline which was laid in 1977, from one of the larger waterholes to one of the driest sections of the settlement has been completed and is operational, with two alternating pumps. Every group of ten houses has been provided with one water tap, thus eliminating excessively long walks for water from the village to dams and water ponds.

240. A variety of food crops are grown at the settlement. However, as a result of extensive flood damage in 1978, sales of the crops, particularly tobacco, generated an income of only $517,962 for refugees. This amount represents a decrease of $90,934 in comparison with the earnings of the sale of cash crops in 1976/77. With their income, the refugees were in a position to contribute some $6,000 for the construction of the village grocery and butchers shops. The livestock and poultry development programmes, begun in recent years, progressed well. While arrangements were being made to register the multipurpose co-operative at Ulyankulu with the Tanzania Rural Development Bank, efforts were also pursued to form a village co-operative for each of the 11 villages to be reconstituted in Ulyankulu. Construction of basic infrastructure was undertaken last year, mainly utilizing refugee labour and locally produced building materials. In following with the Government policy of Universal Primary Education (UPE), the total number of classrooms has been raised from 45 to 90.

241. The 1979 approved allocation of $400,000 has been entirely committed in the first half of the year. This allocation was approved to cover six months until handover; it has proved insufficient to cover the new capital investments and recurrent expenditures mentioned in the introduction; it has, therefore, been increased by $150,000 from the Programme Reserve. A new allocation of $270,000 is proposed to cover the costs of the last months of 1979. An allocation in 1980 of $630,000 is proposed to finance assistance to the settlement until mid-year when the Government will assume full administrative and financial responsibility for Ulyankulu.
242. Katumba settlement: In 1978, LWF/TCRS contributed an amount of $159,000 and UNHCR obligations amounted to $678,118. These monies were in addition to other contributions made in cash and in kind by the Government, and WFP. Food crops are grown and maize and tobacco are cultivated mainly for commercial purposes. In 1978, refugees earned $668,000 from cash crop sales; this represents an increase of some $105,500 over income earned in 1977. Construction of buildings and settlement infrastructure continued at a satisfactory pace, with an emphasis on self-help labour. Within the framework of the Government policy of UPE as well as the overall consolidation of the settlement, the construction of one dispensary was completed and work is progressing on four additional permanent schools, 90 UPE classrooms, and 20 teachers' houses.

243. Mishamo settlement: In 1978, UNHCR obligated an amount of $1,491,432 towards this project LWF/TCRS made available an additional $250,000, while the Government provided land and services. In addition to some 200 auxiliary staff who were already stationed at Mishamo, about 1,000 refugees were transferred from Ulyankulu to Mishamo by the end of 1978. Each family had already started to cultivate its five hectare plot. All the refugees were provided with preventive medicines before leaving Ulyankulu and basic necessities such as food, clothing, blankets, sets of agricultural tools and domestic utensils. Within the context of agricultural development programmes, two TCRS agricultural project officers have developed research farms of one acre each, in five locations in the settlement, to study the suitability of chemical and natural fertilizers and various types of local and imported seeds.

244. Construction of temporary and basic infrastructure was pursued last year mainly using refugee labour and locally produced materials. Two staff houses, a day care centre, a dispensary, a village co-operative shop, a library, 117 "improved houses" and 123 pit-latrines were completed. The water development programme has resulted in the completion of four hand-dug wells in the first village. A primary school has been established; it has seven classes and a total enrolment of 135 pupils.

245. From the 1979 approved allocation of $2.5 million an amount of $610,000 has been committed in the first half of the year to finance the power supply at the settlement headquarters, the development of a water supply and distribution system, the purchase of vehicles and agricultural equipment, tools, seeds, insecticides, fertilizers; village development; aid to co-operatives; construction of buildings and basic infrastructure; rural development activities, and recurring expenditures. As was reported last year, the overall budget for the Mishamo settlement, which is included in a detailed plan of operations, totals $18.5 million and covers the period 1978 to 1983. An allocation of $4,750,000 is proposed for 1980 to cover extensive and intensive assistance programmes for a total of over 37,000 refugees.

Refugees from Uganda

246. Kirwa settlement: In 1979, UNHCR increased the approved 1977 allocation of $90,000 by $35,000 from the Programme Reserve, to cover unforeseen expenses related to the construction of the community education complex and to the second phase of the settlement water supply system.
Multipurpose assistance

247. In 1978, $61,422 were obligated for immediate relief, care and maintenance, travel and other assistance mainly to southern African refugee students. Assistance measures include care and maintenance and the establishment of a farm project under the auspices of PF/ZANU, to enable the beneficiaries to become self-supporting in food production. In the first half of the current year $30,000 have been committed from the approved 1979 allocation of $100,000. An allocation of $225,000 is proposed for 1980, primarily to cover UNHCR contributions towards the establishment and operation of an African National Congress (ANC) vocational training school/Community Centre at Morogoro, as well as to assist other southern African refugees living in the United Republic of Tanzania or in transit through the country.

Lower secondary education and vocational training

248. In 1978, the total allocation of $80,000 was obligated to provide scholarships to 120 students. Half of the approved 1979 allocation of $100,000 has been committed. An allocation of $118,000 is proposed for 1980 to cover educational assistance for some 250 students.

Counselling

249. In 1978, UNHCR contributed $8,235 to cover the salary of a refugee counsellor under a project operated by the CCT, in addition to the newly recruited social worker, who functions as an assistant to the counsellor. The All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) and the International University Exchange Fund (IUEF) also participated in the financing of this service. Some 600 refugees sought guidance and material assistance in the course of the year. From the approved 1979 allocation of $12,000 an amount of $9,654 has been committed. An allocation of $12,000 is proposed for 1980.

Supplementary aid

250. In 1978, $20,000 were obligated on behalf of some 450 refugees of various origins, including Ugandans, Rwandese, Burundi and southern Africans, for food, medical care, accommodation, clothing and travel. The funds were administered partly by the CCT and partly by the UNHCR Branch Office. The total approved 1979 allocation of $20,000 has been committed, and an allocation of $25,000 is proposed for 1980.

SPECIAL PROGRAMMES

251. Education Account: In 1978, $296,872 were obligated to enable 127 refugee students to pursue their studies at the higher secondary level, in academic or vocational training institutions and at university. Assistance under this project was administered partly by the Government and partly by CCT. By mid-1979, $91,000 had been committed to provide scholarships to refugee students at the various levels.

252. Other trust funds: As was reported in previous years, an amount of $1,985,714 was obligated in 1976 as a contribution towards the construction of a secondary school with boarding facilities for some 320 pupils in Tunduru. In spite of the prolonged delay in construction work due to unforeseen logistics problems, transport difficulties and the outbreak of cholera in the area, it is expected that most of the buildings will be completed during 1979. The World Bank is involved in the technical supervision of this project, which is implemented by the Government. As indicated in last year's report the school
will accommodate refugees and nationals, and the national authorities, in turn, have undertaken to admit refugees to secondary schools throughout the country on the same basis as nationals of the United Republic of Tanzania.

Assistance to southern African refugees

253. In 1978, UNHCR committed $350,000 towards the construction of a community centre to be administered by the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and which to provide accommodation, vocational training and rehabilitation facilities mainly for South African refugee students. The construction of this centre is expected to begin as soon as the plans have been approved. A voluntary agency donated an ambulance in 1979 in support of this effort.

United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa

254. From the allocation for the period July 1978 to June 1979 administered by UNHCR on behalf of this Fund, $20,000 were obligated to cover accommodation and monthly subsistence allowances for South African refugees.
APPENDIX XII

COUNTER INFORMATION SERVICES
—A TRANSMATIONAL INSTITUTE AFFILIATE

90p

BLACK SOUTH AFRICA EXPLODES
CONTENTS

Counter Information Services
9 Poland Street, London W1. 01-439 3764
Anti-Report No. 17
Supported by the World Council of Churches, Programme to Combat Racism

Soweto 16 June
The government's attempt to enforce the use of Afrikaans in black schools sets off a pupils' rebellion. Within days the Johannesburg and Pretoria townships are ablaze.

Workers on the Move
Millions of black and coloured workers strike against apartheid. The biggest strike in South Africa's history.

The Continuing Struggle
Despite the killings and mass arrests, black youth is consolidating its protest in South Africa. Though many have fled the country, those remaining are organising a continuing struggle.

The Cape Goes Up
The news travels a thousand miles to the Cape. Black demonstrations protesting the Soweto killings are murderously smashed by the riot police.

In the Townships
South Africa is in serious economic trouble. Increasing unemployment and soaring living costs fuel black demands.

Bibliography

Strike and Counter Strike
Pupils and workers in Soweto organise a successful three-day strike. The police organise hostel-dwellers to attack pickets and student demonstrators.

Arming Apartheid
Western investment contributes directly and indirectly to the hardware used by the riot police to kill demonstrating schoolchildren.

Appendix
Arms and Suppliers

Solid Colour
Coloured township solidarity with the Blacks deals apartheid a body blow in the Cape. White reprisals are savage.

Nationalist Impasse
There is no way in which Vorster's ruling party can meet black and coloured demands without destroying apartheid itself.

Prime Minister John Vorster "The Government will not be intimidated, and orders have been given to maintain order at all costs".
The South African regime is based on violence and repression, but the level of violence currently being practiced by the police is unprecedented. In 1960 at Sharpeville 69 Blacks were killed in ten minutes, but since June 1976, officially the death figures are 386. Despite the so-called abolition of petty apartheid, and Vorster's policy of detente, the black urban areas in South Africa are now treated by the white police as enemy territory.

And the official figures are a gross cover-up of the truth. The policy of instant violent repression, with peaceful demonstrations being met with tear gas and bullets, means that the toll of dead and injured is actually incalculable.

Rumours are rife of morgues filled to overflowing, refrigerated lorries stuffed with the dead. However despite massive censorship the truth as revealed by newspapers and eyewitnesses is shocking enough. Yet the attempts by the police and South African government to suppress the reality of what is happening in the townships is aided by the media's acceptance of the regime's racist analysis. Any demonstration is a riot, any protester is a hooligan or tsotsi.

The crimes of the police and the brutality of the regime are not the only aspects of the situation obscured by this collaboration with the official propaganda.

The larger distortion is a denial that the black explosion in South Africa which has rocked the white apartheid regime to its very foundations is an explosion of consciousness. Liberal optimists in and out of South Africa have long embraced the dream that, given the great wealth and resources of South Africa, the government might in the course of time be persuaded to divert a slightly larger cut of the profits in the direction of the Blacks — that the pain and frustration of black existence might be gradually lessened. That particular myth has crashed in flames at the same time as the South African economy. As black unemployment rockets towards 2 million, and white unemployment begins to appear in the statistics the lesson is driven home that sitting on a goldmine is no longer the key to all economic problems.

It is no longer possible to buy time. The crisis has increased the pressures on blacks to an unbearable degree — and it has coincided with the emergence of a new generation of young Africans who are not content with the submissive attitudes and low-key demands of their parents. They have seen the success of black liberation movements against white minority regimes in Angola and Mozambique. In Angola they have also seen the physical defeat of white South African troops. In Rhodesia majority rule seems inevitable.

The struggle against apartheid and white supremacy has been firmly established both inside and outside South Africa. But the history of confrontation and repression since June has enormously boosted the growth of black consciousness. Apart from anything else the original demands, for the removal of Afrikaans as a teaching medium, have borne fruit, despite furious denials from the administration that the concession would be made. Perhaps the greatest blow to apartheid has been the solidarity demonstrated between black and coloured (mixed race) workers. It has always been a major plank of apartheid policy that the coloureds should be treated preferentially, with officially recognised trade unions, and skilled technical jobs in industry. The coloured demonstrations in Cape Town and elsewhere effectively destroyed the myth that by dividing the racial groupings the white government could divide the loyalties of black workers.
THE GEOGRAPHY OF
THE SOUTH AFRICAN UPRISING
1976

This map shows the nation-wide areas of unrest which started in Soweto, on June 16.

1. June 16: Soweto.
3. June 18: University of Zululand at Ngoye, near Empangeni.
15. June 23: Jouberton township, near Klerksdorp, Western Transvaal.
22. August 4: Soweto violence flares again.
23. August 7: New Brighton, Port Elizabeth (boxing match).
26. August 11: Cape Town's three townships; Langa, Nyanga, Guguletu.
27. August 18: New Brighton, Port Elizabeth.
Hector Petersen was the first to die in Soweto on 16 June 1976.
When Hector Peterson, a thirteen year old school boy, was shot in the back at point blank range outside Orlando West High School, the bullet came from the pistol of a white policeman. It was a spark that was to set South Africa alight, leaving hundreds dead and thousands crippled and maimed.

The tide of South African history had turned. As the full story unfolds, it is clear that the official version underestimates the extent of the uprising and conceals the severity of the killings.

**Afrikaans**

The immediate issue was the Afrikaans language. Until two years ago, Blacks in secondary school were taught in English. Now the authorities, despite resistance from teachers, school boards, headmasters and students, were trying to enforce a rule that half of all subjects would be taught in Afrikaans, the language of the most hated and reactionary section of Whites.

All year, opposition to the change built up...

**Monday 17 May** Pupils at Orlando West Junior Secondary walk out. The 1600 pupils say that they have had enough and will not go back until Afrikaans is withdrawn. The following day, two higher primary schools, Belle and Thulaziswe also strike. Newspapers report "children milling around the grounds, some dancing and skipping unconcernedly while teachers waited patiently for them to change their minds'.

The Inspector of the West Rand Education Council is puzzled: 'Have you ever heard of 13 year old children striking? The public does not realise that there are many who want to spread unrest in South Africa. I don't know who is behind the strike — but it is not the children'.

The strike spreads. Pinville Higher Primary pupils walk out. First reports of striking pupils stoning police cars emerge. Some pupils drift back to school.

**Saturday 5 June** Talks between Vorster and Kissinger are announced for next month.

**Sunday 6 June** Pupils set up pickets and try to prevent a return to school. Some schools are stoned.

**Tuesday 8 June** A police car in the grounds of Naledi High school is set alight, and the police stoned. Tear gas is used to disperse demonstrating students.

The Parents Association in Soweto responds immediately: 'This is not the way to put an end to Afrikaans in the schools. Go back to school and leave it to us to deal with the matter'.

**Thursday 10 June** Pupils throughout Soweto refuse to take a Social Studies paper in Afrikaans. The following day, Morris Isaacson School comes out on strike. More trouble at Naledi High where police are investigating the burnt car. Windows are broken and telephone lines cut.

A warning that the situation is getting serious is sent to the government by the Institute for Race Relations, but they are accused of 'over-reacting' by the Ministry for Bantu Education.

**Sunday 13 June** The Parents Association calls a meeting on the language question for 4 July in an attempt to cool the growing tension.

**Tuesday 15 June** Pupils of the secondary schools in Soweto plan a walk out and a meeting for the next day at the stadium in Orlando West.

**Day One**

**Wednesday 16 June** Exactly what triggered off the uprising will probably remain a mystery. Certainly there was enough tension and excitement around Soweto that day to have sparked trouble in a dozen different places. Before 7.00 am 15,000 schoolchildren had massed. Their intention was to march on Orlando Stadium, the huge open space at the centre of Soweto.

The demonstration had been carefully planned for two days by a committee of senior pupils from several Soweto schools. Although these students were not yet having to learn subjects in Afrikaans, the rumours that they would shortly be forced to were persistent.

From all directions, students leaving home met up with others from their schools. They were to converge at the Orlando West Junior Secondary; chosen not only because it was central to the march on the Orlando Stadium, but more because this was the first school to take up the strike.

Singing and cheering, the students made their way through the tail end of the morning rush hour towards the stadium. Boys and girls aged between 12 and 20. Students from Orlando North, Naledi High and the Morris Isaacson School, where many of the leaders came from. Alongside them, thousands of primary school children, many from Soweto's best known school, Orlando High.

The pupils carried placards made out of exercise-book covers and old cardboard boxes: "Down with Afrikaans"; "Afrikaans is a tribal language"; "Blacks are not dustbins"; "Afrikaans is oppressors language".

As they passed schools they called to students to come and join them. As the different groups merged, the entire hill and the surrounding area were covered in youngsters. "As I drove into their midst, they made way for me and stood on both sides of the road with their fists raised and shouting "power" at the tops of their voices. They were in an extremely jovial mood. The whole atmosphere was quite a happy one." (eyewitness)

One of the principals of a school emptied by the marching students called for the police. 'A student told the others: "Brothers and sisters, we have just received a report that the police are coming. I appeal to you to keep calm and cool. Don't taunt them, don't do anything to them. We are not fighting."' (Weekend World)

The police arrived. Both white and black, they came in vanloads armed with semi-automatic rifles, sub-machine guns, tear gas and batons. The police had loud hailers, but no attempt was made to talk to the pupils. Outside Orlando West Junior School, where the strike had started six weeks earlier, the police formed a line in front of the pupils. 'We thought they were going to disperse us with loud hailers or a loud speaker, or maybe talk to us. But they talked to themselves.' (Barney)

The students were waving placards and singing 'God save our nation' in Sotho, and they shouted 'we don't want police here'. 'Then a white policeman threw...
a canister, and we saw this smoking thing coming and we thought it was some kind of bomb, so we ran back, but afterwards we saw it was only smoke so we came back again.' (Barney)

Then other policemen started throwing tear gas. The students held their ground. In the front ranks students rubbed shoulders with ten year olds.

'A white policeman in uniform then pulled out a revolver and aimed it at the pupils standing just in front of him. A colleague of mine said "look at him, he's going to shoot the kid".'

The policeman fired and more shots followed. The students then attacked the police. The schoolboy killed was 13 year old Hector Petersen. The pathologist's report suggested that when the bullet entered he had his back to the officer and was bending forwards.

Photographer Samuel Nzima of The World said later: 'The first shot was fired before the children started throwing stones. Then absolute chaos broke out. The children ran all over the place and stoned the police.

10.00 am News of the shooting raced round Soweto. There were 15,000 students absent from school that day, and what had started as a peaceful and united march turned into an uprising. Pupils, many of them in school uniform, surged through the town, screaming their anger and frustration. A number of children lay dead on the road outside Orlando Junior School, others ran bleeding through the streets.

Barricades were set up and vehicles set alight. As more police arrived students ran out of side streets, attacked them fiercely with stones, and ran away again. Government buildings and government property took the brunt of their anger. One white official was pulled out of his marked car and held hostage.

Nearly all the administrative offices of the Bantu administration were attacked, and burned or smashed up. Post offices, beer halls and bottle stores are the property of the Bantu administration and its major source of income. Slogans appeared on walls and the students shouted 'less liquor, better education' and 'we want more schools and less beer halls'.

12 noon The destruction of buildings representing government oppression was accompanied by the outright use of FN rifles and sub-machine guns by the police. Many reporters told of indiscriminate shooting at Blacks.

Children killed

"I saw a young boy of six or seven fall with a bullet wound. He had a bloody froth on his lips . . . I took him to the Phefeni clinic but he was dead when we arrived." (World reporter)

"The children began stoning the police. Some surrounded the police and stoned them from all directions. Shots were fired. I remember looking at the children in their school uniforms and wondering how long they would stand up to the police. Suddenly a small boy dropped to the ground next to me. What frightened me more than anything was the attitude of the children. Many seemed to be oblivious to the danger. They continued running towards the police - dodging and ducking. I began to take pictures of the boy who was dying next to me. Blood poured from his mouth and some children knelt next to him and tried to stop the flow of blood." (Alf Kumalo, South African Sunday Times)

Police reinforcements poured into Soweto. By midday the whole township was out of control. At this point the South African police's new para-military anti-urban terrorism unit was called in. It was the first time the unit, using hand-picked men from stations all over the Reef, had been used against Blacks.

3.30 pm One unit of 55 men and three officers led by Colonel Theunis Swanepoel entered Soweto. A crowd of four to five thousand had gathered at Orlando West. Vehicles had been overturned and set alight and the crowd were throwing stones.

'It was a chaotic situation. Four vehicles were burnt. It was the most waaansinnig (demented) scene I have come across in my life.' (Swanepoel) He said he realised that he would have to fight through the crowd to break them up. They used only high velocity rifles.

'Tear gas would have had no effect and a baton charge would have been suicide.' Swanepoel claimed to recognise the leader of the crowd 'from the movement he made with his hands'. He fired a single shot at him, but he disappeared into the crowd. Then he fired a further eight shots at the 'lieutenants of the leader on either side of him' and the crowd dispersed. (Colonel Swanepoel was formerly chief
interrogator for the security police and has been denounced by name by the United Nations General Assembly.)

Security Net

Many of the students believed that these units were the army. They were wearing camouflage overalls and carrying rifles. Most of them on 16 June were really young boys, who looked as though they were still being trained. They used automatic rifles; there is not one shot, you just hear drrrr... (eyewitness)

Far from controlling the situation, paramilitary units only added fuel to the confrontation. A black plain clothes policeman and a white official of the Bantu Affairs administration were ‘captured’, beaten up and held hostage.

Police action was restricted to ‘sorties’ from the central police station and a security zone close by. Units of police would locate groups of pupils and students and then the confrontation followed, the pupils throwing stones and the police shooting down any students who stood their ground.

One large group of students, at the far end of town, stopped a huge trailer lorry full of beer. The cargo was smashed and the lorry set alight. Then the local administrative office of the Bantu Affairs administration was set alight and the records destroyed. The officials fled.

The demonstrators marched to White City No 1 Office and ransacked it before setting it alight. Police helicopters, which had been called in, tried to break up the crowd by dropping tear gas canisters. In an area stretching from Mzimhlope through Meadowlands up to the Zola-Naledi complex, at least ten Putco buses, nine administration offices, a post office, golf clubhouse, a bank and a library were gutted, and eight bottle stores and two bar lounges destroyed.

Reporters arriving on the scene were not allowed near any of the bodies that lay on the open ground. Police guards were placed on the bodies and reporters told ‘it’s none of your business’. The bodies were eventually taken away in police vans.

Day Two

Thursday 17 June ‘Uncontrollable fury and the burning hostility of the people’ was the mood of the township on day two. (eyewitness)

The newspapers tried to claim it was the rots (hooligan) element taking over where the students left off. Shops were destroyed throughout the townships. Groups of pupils went to shopkeepers and demanded to see their trading licences. If the shops were owned or part-owned by Whites, they were burnt down immediately.

The police on Day Two used different tactics. They shot at random. Anyone who raised a clenched fist or shouted ‘power’ at the security forces was a ‘ring-leader’. Children, bodies holed by bullets and arms still clenched in the power
salute, lay on the bloody ground. Eye-witnesses tell of police shooting their victims in the genitals. (Barney)

The unrest spread beyond the South Western Townships.

Small groups of students left Soweto to spread the news of the killings and to encourage other pupils and students to support them. Kagiso township, just to the north of Soweto, erupted. At Tembisa, on the other side of Johannesburg, the students organised a march in sympathy with the students of Soweto. At the same time, 400 white students of Witwatersrand University expressed their solidarity with a march in the centre of Johannesburg. The black pupils and white students in the front ranks were joined by black bystanders.

A crowd of Whites in shirt-sleeves carrying chains and crowbars, and later reported to be plain clothes police, tore into the march and attempted to break it up. Evening papers carrying pictures of Blacks and Whites heading the march said that the march later reformed and eventually dispersed peacefully.

Alexandra

News of Soweto had reached Alexandra township the day before, and the anger of the schoolchildren erupted as they made their way to school that Thursday. By 7.30 am the West Rand Administration Board offices were badly damaged. Dozens of vehicles had been set alight and two Putco buses were burning fiercely near the centre. A huge road block was set up in the centre of the township with the words 'why kill kids for Afrikaans' written in large letters across it. The police quickly set up headquarters in the damaged WRAB office block and hundreds of riot squad police moved about the township armed with automatic weapons. Argus reporters told how the township echoed to the sound of automatic fire and the screams of young children.

Soweto

Putco suspended the bus services, leaving many stranded workers to swell the numbers on the streets. The pall of smoke that hung over the township made it impossible for the police to co-ordinate their operations from the air. At various points students and residents had set up barricades and created 'no-go areas'. Newspapers described police activity as 'indiscriminate killing' and 'inaction'. 'The police opened fire without warning, and I saw several people fall, I looked at them and three appeared to be dead.' (Star)

One reporter in a police patrol described how the patrol was 'ambushed' by youths hurling stones. 'Our driver trying to avoid the rocks ran into some barrels placed in the road by the rioters, immobilising us. Police leapt from the armoured car firing. Both policemen in the car with me fired their pistols. The stone-throwers disappeared behind the store. Although the plain clothes men reckoned at least two of the youths had been hit, we did not dare to stop and check.'

At Zola, Ikwezi, Moletsane, Mofolo North and Naledi, the rebellion continued. Offices and shops were looted. Trucks were overturned and cars stopped and set alight by groups of young people. 'Passing police vehicles ignored them.' (Star)

Orlando Police Station, the centre of the
police operation against the rebellion, was surrounded on all sides by chanting schoolchildren. At intervals police armed with rifles and sub-machine guns would leave to investigate 'incidents' in the township. In most cases they fired shots, threw tear gas canisters and then retreated, making no attempts at arrest. On the rugby pitch opposite the police station air-force 'Alouette' helicopters would land, pick up loads of tear gas and fly off again. 'About 9.00 am, police brought in the blood-spattered body of an African. It lay on the grass outside the station all morning.' Star

A 'Super Frelon' helicopter flew low overhead. Inside it was the Deputy Chief Commissioner of Police, conducting an on the spot investigation. As a result the Witwatersrand Command (army) was put on standby.

As well as sealing off Soweto, the police ordered people in Roodeport, Mondeor and other places bordering on Soweto not to leave their areas. All leave was cancelled. Anxious Whites were informed by officials of the municipal services in Johannesburg that essential services would not be affected by the 'riots' as the black municipal labourers were housed in hotels 'elsewhere'.

9.00 am A clash was reported between police and pupils in Dobsonville. Several people were killed. In Naledi, described as the main trouble spot, angry youngsters created a 'no-go area'. In Klipstwon the roads were made impassable by crowds throwing stones. In Dube, the 'middle class' area of Soweto, Barclays Bank was burned down and food delivery vehicles halted by students.

Alexandra, Friday 18 June. An armed policeman keeps angry bystanders at bay after a black driver and his passenger were shot dead as they drove through the township. The car overturned after the killings. Moment later the crowd seized sticks and dustbin lids and attacked the police surrounding the car shouting 'Why don't you kill us too?' A volley of shots was fired and as the crowd drew back a man lay dead on the verge. Alexandra's second day of violence had begun.
Killings

Besides the bodies brought to Orlando Police Station, the hospital at Baragwanath on the outskirts of Soweto was filling up with the victims of the police shootings. A five year old girl, Tandi Plaatjies, was one of the first reported victims. She was brought in with a boy of about 14 who was never identified. The gates to the hospital were manned by police anti-riot squads, and at one point black nurses in the hospital, 'mostly women in starched white uniforms', attacked them for the way they were delaying the admission of badly wounded children. A young boy who had been shot three times by the police was kept waiting outside the hospital gate. He had been attacked in police action on the playing fields of Masekhene Primary School. Shortly afterwards another child was brought from the same place. At this point police cleared reporters from the hospital gate.

As night fell the police admitted that the death toll had risen to 58 (two Whites), with 788 (five Whites) injured. (Sunday Times 20.6.76). They could see no end to the violence and the trouble was spreading. Asked if he felt the situation was in danger of getting worse, Major General W.H. Kotze, in charge of the anti-riot squads, replied: 'Can it get worse? We have no contact with the rioters and they have no contact with us.' He refused to say how many police were being deployed or what type of units were in use, although journalists on the scene estimated that there were well over 1,000.

Although Soweto was quieter by midnight, the neighbouring township of Kagiso erupted. What had started as a demonstration by black pupils became increasingly violent towards nightfall as they were joined by older people back from work. Five people were being shot by police. Soweto's hospital was full, and casualties of the evening's shootings in Soweto and Kagiso were taken to Lenator Hospital near Krugersdorp. Official figures for admission were 66 very badly injured.

In Johannesburg the evening newspapers were full of pictures of that day's street fighting.

Day Three

Friday 18 June News of the killings and brutality spread through the townships and reserves of South Africa. A thousand kilometres away in the Cape, police were taking 'all necessary precautions' around the black townships of Guguletu, Langa and Nyanga. The violence spread with the news, sometimes as a spontaneous outburst of anger, sometimes in direct response to the tightening grip of the authorities attempting to head off the uprising.

At 5.00 am workers waiting in Vosloorus township for buses to Johannesburg became angry because the buses were being delayed by road blocks and security checks. When the buses arrived at last, the waiting crowd stoned them and then set light to them. A police mortuary van that arrived on the scene was stopped at the same time, overturned and destroyed.

By first light a huge pall of smoke hung over Alexandra township to the north-east of Johannesburg. By early morning the whole of the business district was burning, and large areas of the town were turned into 'no-go areas' by the angry students and residents. Thick black smoke drifted across the prosperous suburbs of Lombardy East and West.

Traffic between Johannesburg and Pretoria, and out to Kempton Park and Jan Smuts airport was disrupted, and police used road blocks to divert traffic around Alexandra.

On the campus at the black University of Zululand near Durban, 500 kilometres from Soweto, nearly 2,000 students assembled to protest. By 7.00 am they had set light to the University buildings and had driven out all the white staff.

Three buildings, a church, the admin block and the library, were burned. Flames could be seen in Empangeni, 18 kilometres away. News that a similar protest planned at the (black) University of the North and directed at the Department of Afrikaans had been quashed by security forces only inflamed student anger. But by 11.00 am the Zululand campus was surrounded by para-military units and the protest had been quelled.

There were angry scenes in Tokosha and Daveyton in the Benoni district south of Soweto, in Natalspruit and Katlehong at Germiston, and in Vosloorus at Boksburg, just south of Johannesburg. And to the east of the city at Tembisa near Kempton Park there were reports of attacks on police and administration property.

Soweto

Meanwhile in Soweto the uneasy holl that had settled over the township during the night was broken by the outbreak of further violent protests. More buildings were burnt. The lack of detailed information reflects the restrictions placed on journalists. Reporters were told of fierce fighting between a task force and black youths in the Klipspruit neighbourhood of Soweto. The numbers killed and injured were never announced. But Colonel Gerber, the assistant police chief, said that the situation in Soweto was still
unchanged and ‘very confused and ugly. At this stage it is impossible to say whether the army will be called in.’ Just how haphazard the police shooting was is illustrated by the fact that a famous footballer Ariel ‘Pro’ Khougoane was shot through the head as he drove through the Rockville Shopping Centre in Soweto. News of his death spread like wildfire.

One reporter who slipped through the police road block reported: ‘In Soweto now a white skin is a death warrant — unless under the protecting guns of the police. And the white police are edgy and angry. They are unable to understand what is going on and are none too gentle with black suspects. The black police, there are hundreds concentrated at Orlando Police Station, say little and do as they are told.’ (Star)

The bodies of dead protesters, bundled into blankets, lay around the police station precinct. A large crowd lingered ‘sullenly’ not far away, and occasionally a tear gas canister would be lobbed and they would move back. The commanding officer of operations in Soweto admitted that he was ‘perplexed by the black mind’.

Press men close to the police station were ‘hustled away’ when repeated screams of ‘Baas, moenie my slaan nie’ (‘Boss, don’t hit me’) were heard coming from the cells. Police jostled round the door and window to see what was going on inside.

People returning from work to Soweto in the evening had to walk. What few buses and taxis did run stopped at the outskirts of the town and dropped their passengers. Many workers didn’t want to use the buses anyway, and there were sporadic outbreaks of stone-throwing directed at the Putco buses.

The chairman of the West Rand Administration Board admitted that all Soweto’s administration buildings had been destroyed, together with a substantial proportion of government property. All the beer halls and bottle stores had been looted and burnt and at least 120 vehicles burned out. ‘Even a bank and a library have been burnt out. This was simply because it is white man’s property.’ (Star)

A reporter on the Rand Daily Mail, Mateu

Colonel Swanepoel once head of Security Police interrogation, led the riot police attacks in Soweto.

Nonyane sat outside the police station in Orlando throughout the night of the 17 June. He heard people screaming in the charge office.

‘He saw a group of 20 students being tortured by black policemen outside the charge office in the middle of the night. The students were led into a courtyard and made to hop for twenty minutes while police hit them with batons and rubber hoses all over their bodies.

‘Bodies of people killed in the rioting were laid outside the police station and the pile grew throughout the night. In the early hours of the morning the students were again brought out, forced to hop for another 20 minutes and then told by policemen to load corpses into the mortuary van. As they did so the van attendant kicked and assaulted them.’

(Evidence given to the Cillie Commission RDM 25.9.76)

‘There is no danger of fires spreading in Soweto among the small individual houses’ he added. (Sunday Express)

The Authorities Give Way on Afrikaans Mr M.C. Botha, Minister of Bantu Education, claimed that Afrikaans had not been compulsory anyway and schools could apply to deviate from the 50/50 principle of half of all school subjects being taught in Afrikaans. ‘It was clear’, he said, ‘that the tragic circumstances in Soweto were caused by misunderstanding and confusion.’

No such mediation was offered by the Deputy Minister, A.P. Treurnicht, who asserted that ‘it was in the Bantu’s own good that he learned in Afrikaans. And where government builds schools and pays subsidies, is it not their right to determine in which language pupils must be taught’ (Weekend World).

Casualties

The police admitted that at least 97 people had died and more than 1,000 were injured in the uprising. They did add that an unknown number had been shot during ‘looting and troublemaking’ over the weekend.

The Soweto Parents Association called a meeting to discuss the huge problem of burying all the victims.

Day Six

Monday 21 June Rebellion and violence spread to African townships around Pretoria, and there was renewed protest in other parts of the Transvaal. By the end of the day another ten people were dead. By midday there were towering columns of smoke over Mamelodi, Pretoria’s ‘showpiece’ urban township — ‘never before the scene of political rioting’. (Cape Times)

In Atteridgeville, within sight of Pretoria’s skyscrapers, the shopping centre was set alight and crowds of blacks confronted the police throughout the day. Petrol bombs were thrown into many of the township’s bottle stores and by mid-afternoon smoke filled the area.

Day Four/Five

Saturday/Sunday 19/20 June An uneasy peace settled over the townships, although most areas were reported as being ‘very tense’ throughout the weekend. Many of the deliveries of basic foodstuffs to the townships were stopped. In Soweto dozens of shops were closed, but any vans trying to make deliveries were stopped by angry residents and either sent back or destroyed. The deputy fire chief of Johannesburg admitted that fire and ambulance services had not been operating in Soweto since Thursday.
Further north in Mabapone, the main targets were the buses belonging to the African Bus Service. More than a dozen red and white buses lay burning along the township road, and the company’s main terminus was set on fire.

Trouble started outside the local high school when pupils refused to go to the classrooms after morning assembly. Again, the first victim of police bullets was a boy of 13.

In Mamelodi trouble spilled outside the townships and at one point threatened to spread into the white suburbs of Silverton and Jan Niemand Park.

The main road between Mabapone and Pretoria was blocked most of the day by large groups of young Blacks, and employers in Pretoria claimed that very few workers from the township turned up for work. Of those who did manage to get through, many were stopped at road blocks outside the city. Nervous security police seemed uncertain of the intentions of Blacks they let into the city. Many were turned back.

In the afternoon five Whites were attacked by a Black in John Vorster Square in the centre of Johannesburg, shouting ‘black Africa’ and ‘Take revenge for the children of Soweto’. After a chase, a Black was wounded by police bullets and taken to the central police headquarters. Minutes later he plunged to his death from the fourth floor of the police building.

Day Eight/Nine

Wednesday/Thursday 23/24 June

Police tell the parents to get their children off the streets. ‘Children will be injured because the police are forced to act harshly and we don’t want to hurt children.’

This statement sparked off a discussion among young people in the townships. It is quite clear that the traditional leaders, the parent organisations, had no control over the situation. One student said: ‘We cannot take it any longer. It is our parents who have let things go on far too long without doing anything. They have failed. We have been forced to fight to the bitter end.’ (The World)

The Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, M.C. Botha, alleged that the riots had been deliberate and had been planned and prepared by Whites. Blacks had been incited. The government had to contend with ‘reckless liberals’ who were exploiting misunderstanding among black people.

The latest casualty figures released by the police claim that 176 have been killed and thousands injured.

The latest casualty figures released by the police claim that 176 have been killed and thousands injured.

The townships appeared quiet apart from isolated incidents in Lynwyse/Witbank, and Daveyton near Benoni. The movements of security forces to the Pietermaritzburg suggested that they anticipated the trouble spreading.

By 25 June the two State mortuaries at Hillbrow and Fordsburg were filled to capacity, despite the fact that a constant stream of parents and relatives were taking bodies away. The police ordered the surplus of bodies to be held at the hospital mortuaries.

At the weekend a highly ominous government plan emerged, to make the Makgotla - tribally-based vigilante groups in the townships - legal.

Meanwhile the parents of the scores of pupils killed in Soweto plan a mass funeral. Strong contingents of police patrol the townships, and in the streets of Soweto ‘hippo’ patrols rumble constantly through the streets.

Thursday 1 July

Considerable anger was aroused in Soweto by the government decision to ban the mass funeral of victims. On Tuesday and Wednesday funerals took place all over the Reef without incident. Many unidentified victims of the uprising were given a pauper’s funeral – buried in unmarked graves. The townships are quiet but tense.

The following Sunday, M.C. Botha permitted the principals of each school to choose the main medium of instruction.

At the beginning of the week, many charged with rioting are set free. But behind the lull and the widely reported releases, the police began rounding up leaders of the black organisations.

Thursday 8 July

Reports emerged that many children, some as young as eight, were being held in police cells. Major General Kotze and Brigadier Roos of John Vorster Police Headquarters denied all knowledge of children still being in custody. But when told that reporters had seen them they said: ‘What do you think would happen if we let them run around the streets? Do you think that we would ever find them again?’ No precise charges were to be brought against the children.

The lull persisted until 19 July. There were constant rumours of further unrest, but nothing definite happened. The police stepped up security operations. But persistent press reports of further
Soweto—children shout defiance and give ‘power’ salutes around burnt out delivery van.

Rebellion continues. Fort Hare University was closed until further notice. There were scattered cases of arson reported in Soweto, Sharpeville, West Transvaal and Nelspruit.

Thursday 22 July After being closed since 16 June, the schools were officially reopened. The majority of the township schools remained empty. Civic leaders and teachers made it known that the pupils were not at school because they were too frightened of police violence.

Heavily armed police continued to patrol the streets of Soweto. The sight of an armoured patrol was enough to send people fleeing from the streets. In the face of criticism the head of Soweto CID, Colonel Visser, said he saw ‘no reason for police being blamed when they are obviously there to protect the public in cases of intimidation’.

Tuesday 27 July The schools began to fill, but Mamelodi High and Irene Farm School were set alight and extensively damaged. These two cases of arson marked the beginning of the next stage in the uprising of Soweto. Over the next ten days or so 50 or more schools went up in flames. On the evening of 27 July six schools and a youth club were destroyed in Soweto. The next day another five Soweto schools were damaged by fire; Zola High, Orlando West High, plus Eisele High, Phiri High, Tladi Primary, and, in Diepkloof, Madibane High. The flames spread throughout the Transvaal, Natal and the Orange Free State.

The police admitted that police security patrols were being continually hampered by bands of stone-throwing youths in the townships.

Sunday 1 August In the previous week, student leader Mashinini called for a return to school: ‘We can only conquer
when we have a strong standpoint and stand as one.' The Soweto Students Representative Council was formed to represent the interests of the pupils and students in Soweto. The burning of schools is condemned and a call made for a return to school.

Tuesday 3 August Searching for the leaders of the Black Consciousness Movement, police entered a number of schools to interrogate and arrest. Shots were fired as students took on the police. Students poured out of the schools in Soweto and Tembisa.

Wednesday 4 August A huge eruption of violence took place in the townships around the Reef. The press emphasised the spontaneous nature of the eruption, but it was quite clearly the result of an intensification of police activity directed against students, and particularly the new student leaders, returning to school. The action was centred on Alexandra and Soweto.

Police circled Soweto with a "huge blockade". Demonstrating students in school uniform attempted to persuade workers not to go to work. A stretch of the main line to Johannesburg was torn up and all trains into Johannesburg were cancelled. Buses taking workers to the city were stoned and jeered by angry students.

Two of the pupils were shot point blank by tear gas canisters and seriously injured.

Thursday 5 August Student marches on the second day of the new upsurge of student protest were confronted by security police implementing a hit and pursue procedure. There were shootings in Pinville and White City and reports of a massacre of pupils cornered in a yard deep in Soweto. The following day Mr. Prinsloo, the South African Commissioner of Police, announced that the police were on standby throughout South Africa and large reinforcements had been sent to Soweto. He added: We are not happy with the situation in Soweto. The disturbances are showing no sign of coming to an end and it seems that responsible people in Soweto cannot or will not do anything about the situation... We cannot allow our system of justice to fall to pieces to meet the demands of a handful of students.

In the last two days police sources admitted nine people shot dead and over 40 injured.

Sunday 8 August The marches, the stoning, the firing of schools, continued, reaching a climax with students marching through Montshiwa township near Mafeking on the afternoon of 8 August and burning down the Legislative Assembly building. The police admitted that more than 200 people had been arrested in the recent unrest including most of the alleged 'leaders of the Black Consciousness Movement' (The Argus). In Hammanskraal another 197 pupils, 97 of them women, were arrested by police after the burning of a school building.

Wednesday 11 August The schools were empty again and not even the teachers turned up for classes. Kruger announced that 'indefinite preventative detention' had been introduced to wipe out the 'Black Power Movement, which is the main cause of unrest in the townships. The ideology is completely negative and completely destructive, and it does not hold any possibility for discussion or anything like that at all, and it is a very difficult thing to try and contain.' (The World)

Saturday/Sunday 14/15 August Winnie Mandela, symbol and leader of the Black Parents Association, was arrested. Twenty six black students were arrested during a peaceful protest in Mdantsane near East London, and following the arrest of Mrs Mandela, 38 other key members of the Black Parents Association were also picked up. No black organisation was spared, and by the end of the weekend more than 60 prominent Blacks were in detention. Appeals to Kruger to 'meet' black leaders to avert further conflict were met with the retort: 'There is no one to see, they are all behind bars'.

Throughout Wednesday heavy firing was heard coming from the area as students massed to march on the White-owned industrial area. The fighting lasted all day. Brigadier Kriel of the riot police claimed: "The violence is the final throes of the unrest that has disrupted South Africa for nearly two months". The two-day struggle around Port Elizabeth left 33 dead.

The official figure for deaths since 16 June was given as 231 dead and 1,200 injured.

In a speech which greatly amused his Nationalist audience and which was widely reported in the press, Kruger said of the blacks: 'He knows his place, and if not I'll tell him. The Blacks always say 'We shall overcome', but I say we shall overcome.' He also admitted that many of those arrested 'may never be charged but may be held indefinitely under the new 'preventative detention' laws'.

By the end of the month 800 people were officially detained, including 77 leaders of the Black Consciousness movements (The Star 30.8.76).
A thousand miles away in the black townships around Cape Town, the tension built up.

Minor incidents involving riot police and students at the Universities of Cape Town and the Western Cape occurred. The sight of vanloads of heavily armed riot police roaming the area became commonplace.

Wednesday 11 August

The black townships of the Cape witness the start of a wave of protest that has not yet ended. Our source in South Africa describes how it happened.

‘At 8.15 am Langa High school students congregated on the sports field, instead of assembling in front of their teachers to break up for their classes, which is the customary practice. A visibly apprehensive crowd of onlookers from all walks of life materialised gradually.

‘Nobody asked what was the matter, or what the students were discussing. The meeting itself was well out of earshot, but student after student could be seen gesticulating, obviously striving to hammer a point home. A distinct feature of the meeting was the fact that the discussion was neither confined to nor monopolised by the recognised clique.

‘As the meeting dragged on, three vanloads of riot police sped past the school towards Langa police station. It was now 8.45 am. The crowd, which had been growing spasmodically, became restless. About ten students appeared from the direction of the railway station and greeted the crowds, who responded en-
husiastically with Black Power salutes. Police entered the school, and spent about 30 minutes inside. They left again, without trying to address the students. When teachers tried to negotiate with the students they were booed until they had to retreat to the offices.

About 45 minutes after the police had left, the students left the school and trickled into Washington Street in a peaceful demonstration in solidarity with the victims of Soweto.

The students advanced towards the bachelors' quarters area of town, followed by a group of teachers determined to see that the demonstration remained orderly. They in turn were followed by a convoy of riot police vehicles.

The entire procession was almost surrounded by the crowd, which began shouting at the police. As the demonstration approached a bottle store, stones were thrown by the crowd. The students turned back towards the centre of the township, and the stone throwing stopped.

'Eventually, after marching a little longer, the students returned to school, and at 2.00pm they broke up formally.'

A police officer gave the screaming crowd five minutes to disperse, and within minutes tear gas was fired straight at the massed crowds as stones and bottles began to rain down on police vehicles.

Riot squad dog handlers singled out people from the crowd and set the dogs on them. 'The man was brought down screaming by the snarling dog and arrested, his clothing tattered and blood spilling from his head and legs.'

A woman shouted 'You come to kill innocent black people and children. Why don't you get out of our township?' She was arrested.

By a quarter to six the bottle store was ablaze, a single quarters block was on fire, and the police were again using tear gas to disperse the crowd.

Arrests

In the adjacent townships of Guguletu and Nyanga, similar demonstrations took place in the morning, and were met with immediate violence by the police.

Students from Fezeka and I.D. Mkize schools, who tried to march to Langa to link up with the demonstration there, were dispersed by a volley of tear gas canisters. They reformed and went to Nyanga, and marched from school to school bringing out more pupils.

Then they continued their march, moving towards the Walter Teka primary school. At the entrance to the school, the riot police were waiting. They gave them eight minutes to disperse, and when they didn't, police fired tear gas into the marchers and managed to arrest 30 of them. Those who could retreated to the bushes that separate Nyanga from Guguletu.

Within ten minutes they were on their way to Guguletu police station. The station was surrounded by the angry crowd, who were washing down their faces with bottles of water as a defence against the tear gas thrown at them. Volunteers surfaced to put the demands for the release of the arrested students.

Eventually all the students were released — except one. The anger of the crowd redoubled, police fired tear gas canisters repeatedly, vehicles were stoned. The last student emerged...

All the eyewitness reports of the demonstrations in Langa and Guguletu stress that they were peaceful until the police attacked.

Police action

'I am convinced that the situation could have been contained. The interference of the police aggravated a potentially explosive situation... It is a fallacy to attribute all violent incidents to the skollie (hooligan) element, the way the press did.' (Langa Shop owner)

'It was a peaceful demonstration till the police arrived. It is only a pity that the
police fired on the mobs because the people then adopted a militant stand. When your kids are shot you cannot keep your cool. I saw people fleeing in panic and shot as they were running away.' (A resident)

It is very unclear when the police started shooting to kill, or who the first victims were. All we can say definitely is that armed police killed sixteen unarmed Africans that day, and wounded at least 51 more.

6.00 pm As people came home from work in Cape Town, they joined in the demonstrations. The bottle stores, long resented by the black inhabitants of the townships, were set on fire.

Heavily armed
As night approached, police operations took on the character of a search and destroy mission into occupied territory. Henrie Geyser of The Argus describes such a mission into Guguletu. 'Clouds of smoke filled the air and flames lit up the night sky as several buildings and beer-halls burnt . . . We left the police station about 9.30 in convoy of six mesh protected police vehicles and accompanied by about 80 heavily armed policemen.

'The atmosphere was tense as the convoy cruised through the scarred township. Rocks and bottles smashed down on the police vehicles.

'From where we stood we could see the flashes of gunfire as the convoy used rifles and teargas to break up the crowd . . . other police carried the wounded to a large police vehicle . . . 20 minutes later we were back at the police station where dead and dying were transferred into waiting ambulances.'

From inside the police station, where reporters were then confined, the crackle of machine gun fire could be heard through the long night. Loud explosions echoed across the Cape Flats some time before midnight — probably gas cylinders exploding in the fires.

Thursday 12 August Early in the morning, Colonel Kotze, the officer in
LETTERS

MEDICAL ATTENTION HELD TO RANSOM?
The riot torn areas were cut off - people could only enter and leave the area under police supervision. The injured could only reach hospitals through them and those who didn't want to give themselves up were effectively cut off from medical attention.

Many victims who were brought to trauma units were seen to have bullet wounds - an excruciating and very effective method of controlling "mobs".

Others had multiple broken bones and perforation wounds of 9 mm Panaslellums, others had slashed skin.

It is alleged that a black doctor who was treating his injured people, was discovered. When they came to arrest him the people refused to let him go and the police shot the doctor in the leg.

In trauma units, 22 inch calibre bullets were used - this they said, was proof that there is inter faction fighting and that many of the casualties weren't police caused at all, yet it is alleged that many South African Police carry their own weapons besides the standard 9 mm Panaslellums.

These are but a few incidents alleged to have occurred - few of which were reported in the daily press, but from the above one could conclude that medical services are being held for ransom at the price of political gain.

If this is true, it is contrary to medical ethic and shouldn't be tolerated.

4TH YEAR MEDIC

Letter in University of Cape Town Student Magazine

The school where, from a helicopter hovering overhead, tear gas canisters were lobbed at them.

In Nyanga a crowd of schoolstudents and others gathered at a roadblock on the Lansdowne Road, and confronted a line of policemen. Six riot vans of police reinforcements with dogs rushed to the scene. Teargas was thrown, and most of the crowd moved away when the gas reached them, but some began throwing stones at the police.

The police fired a short volley. When the crowd dispersed, three bodies lay on the ground.

2.00 pm Once again Langa students marched on the police station. One student, carrying a white flag, disappeared inside and stayed for three quarters of an hour. He reappeared flanked by six policemen asking for a list of names of those arrested. The pupils marched quietly back.

8.00 pm The townships were totally cut off from the outside world by the police. One hundred and thirty riot police had been airlifted in by Hercules transport from the Reef. With Brigadier Visser, they had gained their experience in Sophieseto.

'I have been sent down to put a stop to the rioting here and that is just what I am going to do' claimed the Brigadier. Journalists, though not allowed into the townships, reported that heavily armed police with dogs were combing the township, and that at intervals gunshots could be heard.

By that night, most of the social, business and administrative machinery of Guguletu, Langa and Nyanga was in ruins. Beerhalls, post offices and government buildings had all been destroyed.

Anti-riot vehicles roamed ceaselessly along the sullen streets and past the fire gutted shells of public buildings. Late last night police officers reported the townships tense but quiet. (RDM 13.8.76)

Friday 13 August The three townships are quiet, with only one storming incident being reported. All deliveries of milk, bread and meat to the shops had been disrupted, and deliveries were only going to selected points on the outskirts of town.

Saturday 14 August For the moment an uneasy calm had returned to the Cape townships. On a blackboard in a school in Nyanga a crude map was drawn, writes one of our informants. On it were the words 'Cape Town comrades, Mdantsane comrades, Soweto comrades, Maputo comrades... all these comrades must unite. NO RACIALISM. NO COLONIALISM. EQUALITY.'

Sunday 22 August The student shot dead by police at the head of the demonstration on Thursday 12 August was an 18 year old pupil at Langa High School. His fellow students wished to mark his death with a mass funeral procession.

The chief magistrate at Wynberg ordered that the funeral be restricted to parents and close relatives. The students defied the ban. They were met with tear gas grenades and baton charges from the police at the grave side.

Monday 23 August Five hundred Blacks demonstrated in Guguletu, singing and chanting. They were dispersed with tear gas and a baton charge.

Langa High school students made a statement. 'We want our fellow students who have been detained to be released, and other detainees, regardless of colour. Equal job, equal pay. Free education. We will never attend classes unless these demands are fulfilled, and the South African government will experience daily rioting if the above mentioned demands are not fulfilled.'
STRIKE AND COUNTER STRIKE

Tuesday afternoon. A policeman and an interpreter on a police ‘hippo’ address a crowd of hostel dwellers outside Mzimhlope Hostel. As he finishes speaking the hostel dwellers singing war songs and brandishing assegais go on the rampage.
Weekend 21/22 August  

Over the weekend, A.N.C. leaflets calling for a three day general strike were put under the door of every house in Soweto. This operation was organised by the Soweto Students Representative Council and involved careful planning the week before. Black office workers had been approached and asked to make copies of leaflets calling for the stayaway. At the same time, rumours of the strike spread among workers, and pickets were out at many stations the previous week of people who thought the strike ought to start immediately.

'We had realised we had gone as far as we could, and it was now important that we strike at the industrial structure of South Africa.' (Mashinini) Street corners in Soweto were covered in posters supporting the call.

Monday 23 August  

Before first light the streets were full of people standing around uneasily. Those who had decided not to support the strike had left the township the night before, and slept at work. But most waited to see how everybody else would react. Pupils set up pickets at the stations and it was soon clear that the strike would be fully supported.

The taxis were not operating, and no buses had been running within the townships for some weeks, so anyone trying to go to work would have been conspicuous. On the outskirts of town, Putco buses had police security escorts, and every bus carried a police marksman.

The trains ran virtually empty, despite the fact that the groups of students picketing the stations were far outnumbered by riot police in armoured 'hippos'. At the entrance to Soweto a huge contingent of police stood guard. A small group of hostel dwellers ignored the strike, refused to listen to the pleas of the pupils picketing the stations, and boarded the train for Johannesburg.

At Phefeni station a larger band of hostel dwellers armed with kieries (wooden club-sticks) was confronted by pupils. Police used teargas to disperse them. In one incident a bystander on his way to work was shot dead, and at least six other people were wounded.

The strike did not spread to Pretoria, but in the Mamelodi township large groups of students attempted to stop people going to work. Buses were stoned and set alight. Police reinforcements were rushed to four schools after pupils had threatened to burn them down. Police in vans, armed with hand guns, semi-automatic rifles and clubs confronted groups of black students.

In the evening there was more violence in Soweto as the police carried out their threat to 'protect' anyone who went to work. Workers returning from the city, most of them hostel dwellers, were met by police at the station. Students picketing the stations were picked off by police sharp-shooters, and on several occasions whole groups of demonstrators were blasted by fine buckshot.

What happened in the next few days is confused. To the outside world it was presented as a spontaneous 'backlash' by Sowetans who wanted to go to work. The fact that the backlash was confined to the hostel dwellers and had been predicted by the police and employers throws some light on its nature. Evidence that emerged later, and a closer reading of events, indicates that the backlash was planned and fuelled by the security forces.

On Sunday 22 August, Major General M. Geldenhuys warned: 'Agitators who attempt to enforce a work stayaway in Soweto will experience a backlash from law abiding citizens in the townships. People in Soweto are getting sick of these people, and because of this the police are not worried.'

On Monday night, 23 August, a number of homes were set alight as a reprisal against those who broke the strike.

Tuesday 24 August  

The morning of the second day of the strike found most people in Soweto supporting it. The World carried a warning from Colonel Visser, head of C.I.D.: 'Go to work and disregard the groups of young intimidators telling people not to go to work. People must go to work and just thrash the children stopping them.'
Again there was some confusion early in the morning as thousands of workers, men and women, lined the township roads seemingly uncertain as to whether to go to work or not. Early editions of the evening paper, the Star carried a banner headline on its front page; 'Soweto Backlash Killings' and recounted an event of the previous night when two students picketing the station near the Mzimhlope hostel were beaten to death by hostel dwellers returning from work. The story implied there had been further killings, but no other paper carried the story.

But on Tuesday afternoon the long predicted and already reported 'backlash' actually happened. In a supposed reprisal for the burning of some rooms in the Mzimhlope hostel, 'a thousand Zulu impi went on the rampage'.

First reports told of hundreds of Zulu hostel dwellers, hounded into a massive impi (tribal band), armed with sticks, assegais and piki (long bladed knives), charging through the streets breaking into homes and attacking householders.

The centre of activity was the area by Mzimhlope hostel. Police reported to have watched from their hippos without taking action as the warriors rampaged through the area of Orlando West, scouring streets and homes in search of "chummy" children. (RDM 25.8.76)

The propaganda continued: 'I have no knowledge of these rampaging Zulus, but if it is happening I am not surprised. If people want to organise themselves into resisting them, we can't stop them. People are getting very fed up with the things that are happening in Soweto' (General Pimpo)

In the outlying Meadowlands area of Soweto, the news that 'the Zulus are coming' spread like wildfire, and many residents left their homes and fled. According to eyewitnesses, bands of hostel dwellers led by police 'hippos' roamed the streets, and when groups of youths tried to block their way, the police fired on them with shotguns. Hostel dwellers were then allowed a free hand to attack them into their homes. Many houses were burned down.
Backlash

Men carrying butcher knives, pangas, omahawks, kiersies and stones started chasing people around. What amazed me was that as they assaulted people, heavily armed police stood by and did nothing to protect the residents. The hostel dwellers wildly swinging their weapons shouted 'we will kill these people' (Star). Another Star reporter confirmed the story, and pointed out that the main target seemed to be young men.

The 'backlash' dominated the news. There were reports of six to ten killed by Tuesday evening, and Baragwanath hospital full of people with bullet and stab wounds. But elsewhere in Soweto, pupils were organising pickets on exit roads to prevent people going back to work. On one road, they set up a barricade, but police broke it up with rifles and shotguns.

A reporter who spent the night in Orlando West saw a different side of the 'backlash'. After witnessing neighbours fleeing the township to seek refuge in townsships deeper in Soweto, after watching houses being stoned and raided by heavily armed Zulus, I chose a coal box to shelter in. At 2.15 in the morning a police loud hailer warned Zulus (in Zulu) to stop siding houses; "We didn't order you to destroy West Rand (Administration) Board property. You were asked to fight people only, so you are asked to withdraw immediately." This restored peace to a terrified Orlando West after hours of looting. (RDM 26.8.76) This reporter was later detained.

Wednesday 25 August

On the day the students tagged 'D' day, the strike held firm. Employers admitted that absenteeism was high, in some sectors better, in some worse, than in the previous two days. For the third day running, there were large pickets at the station. Workers who broke the strike were jeered, and some students shouted 'Give our regards to your masters. We'll catch up with you tonight'. There was no reported increase in the number of hostel dwellers going to work.

Asked how many victims the backlash had claimed, police said they were still 'collecting' bodies. Stories that women had been captured and raped in the township were rife.

In Pretoria, Mr Kruger, Minister of Police, told reporters 'People are allowed to protect themselves against physical intimidation. The situation will calm itself once people realise there is a strong backlash' (Star 25.8.76).

As Kruger spoke, a group of about a thousand Meadowlands residents raided the Mzimhlope hostel in an attempt to rescue the women they believed were being held hostage inside. Police in hippos outside the hostel fence fired FN rifles at the crowd. The crowd scattered.

Orders to kill

A journalist who managed to get inside witnessed further evidence of police involvement. 'There I saw a policeman dressed in camouflage suit armed with an FN rifle. Through an interpreter the policeman said "You are warned not to continue damaging the houses because they belong to the West Rand Administration Board. If you damage houses you will force us to take action against you to prevent this. You have been ordered to kill only these troublemakers"'. Indeed, two hostel dwellers from Pholomong were shot by police that day.

Police said they had found 20 bodies in the riot area that day, and 13 of them had panga wounds. General Prinsloo appeared on TV and described reports that police were urging hostel inmates to attack trouble makers as 'utter nonsense'.

But under cover of darkness, heavily armed groups of men moved out of the hostel. In front, and on each side, 'hippo' armoured cars moved with them. A Star reporter had heard, just a few minutes earlier, a black uniformed policeman telling them to eat and drink well so 'they could kill on full stomachs' (Star 26.8.76).

Residents of the area, grouped together to defend themselves against the expected onslaught, had to flee as the police opened fire. They left their belongings in the street as the 'Zulu impis' advanced. Eye witnesses saw three people shot by the police, and their bodies thrown into police vans. Two other bodies with bullet wounds were left lying in the street. (World 26.8.76)

Back to work

The 'backlash' sweep continued. In White City Javabu more than ten people were wounded when police opened fire on groups of people standing on the street and near shops. The mother of an eight month old baby was shot in the back.

Other areas suffered this police-led assault: Naledi; Tladi; Moletsane; Mapetsa; Mofolo; Moropane and Rockville. Baragwanath hospital was full. The overstretched ambulances were diverted to Leratong hospital in the West Rand. Taxis and cars passing by were pulled in to take the dead and wounded to hospital. (World 26.8.76)

Thursday 26 August

The strike was over. From five in the morning the streets were full of people going to work. Buses and trains were running as usual, and employers in Johannesburg and the industrial area reported almost full attendance.

But the 'supervised rampage' of the night before had left many dead. Kriel of riot control told the press that 21 people had died so far, ten as a result of police action.

At dawn a large convoy of trucks full of heavily armed men was seen moving from the hostels on the outskirts of Soweto deep into the township. Wherever the convoy went trouble was reported, and the main targets seemed to be the schools.
A Soweto worker dies in police orchestrated 'backlash'.

Despite a news blackout, a number of newspapers had residents phoning in and saying that children were being attacked at school, and whole schools had been evacuated. The worst affected neighbourhoods were Naledi, Mofolo, Dube, Tladi and Emdeni.

Selected targets

Despite police denials, newspapers were now giving evidence of overt police collaboration in the 'backlash'. Star reporters saw one group of hostel dwellers moving into Zone 7, Meadowlands, alongside a police 'hippo'. They reported that the police appeared to be firing ahead. They did not interfere with the hostel dwellers. Star reporters also said that two black policemen in a police van (licence no. TJ 320 824) went through the affected area today urging people to arm themselves to fight "Black Power tsotsis". When a group had formed and the police officer allegedly took note of the decision and promised to convey it to police headquarters, and he "assured the meeting that no-one would be prosecuted for carrying weapons and police would co-operate with the people present" (Sworn testimony of witness 15.8.76).

The police officer also said that they had received permission from the government to re-establish the Home Guard and 'remove all dirt'. Members of the Black Parents Association were listed by name and the group decided: 'when the next sign of trouble breaks out and any damage is caused to any house belonging to a committee or school board member or a policeman, then steps should be taken to attack the homes of the Black Parents Association' (Sworn testimony of witness).

It was also said that they had received permission from the government to re-establish the Home Guard and 'remove all dirt'. Members of the Black Parents Association were listed by name and the group decided: 'when the next sign of trouble breaks out and any damage is caused to any house belonging to a committee or school board member or a policeman, then steps should be taken to attack the homes of the Black Parents Association' (Sworn testimony of witness 15.8.76).

Police plot

It was now widely felt within the townships that the whole backlash had been planned and orchestrated, and that the Zulu Inkatha Cultural Movement had been the vehicle for the operation. Michael Mzobe leader of the Dube hostel inmates made an impassioned plea to 'our brothers at Mzimhlopel hostel' to stop fighting other Blacks.

By Thursday 26 August, the Zulu Bantu, Chief Buthelezi was calling on the
On Wednesday 25 August, the pupils of Bonteheuwel High refuse to go to classes and gather outside the school.

The riot squad convoy arrives. As it moves past the school stones and rocks rain down. The squad stops — and fires a volley of teargas canisters at the pupils. An angry crowd of parents and bystanders collects, and begins shouting at the police and throwing stones at them.

The pattern was repeated at Modderdam and at Arcadia High. At Arcadia one van circled the school firing teargas, and was stoned in return.

A crowd collected — mainly women and children. Police trucks moved behind the school and were met with jeers from the crowd.

Pupils from the Modderdam High School then joined the crowd and the emotional tirade of cheers, jeers and boos was punctuated with blasts from single barrel shotguns.

### Murder

Then four plainclothed detectives arrived in a small blue car. One jumped out and was assisted by another policeman in grabbing a demonstrator and dragging him to the car.

Women screamed and swore at the policemen as stones hailed down. One detective, baton in hand, gun in the other, opened fire.

The detectives then got into their car and fled while stones rained down on the vehicle and women screamed abuse.

Then everyone turned towards the body of Christopher Truter.

"He was attended to by a member of the crowd while his sister cried and his brother ranted. Riot police still on the scene tried to quiet him, saying: "It's not a bullet wound, it's from a stone. Your own people did that."

But he would not believe them and neither would the crowd. Minutes later the brother was pushed into a riot squad van." Christopher Truter died on 1 September, shot in the head. (Cape Herald 31.8.76)

Police described Bonteheuwel as a 'slagveld' — a battlefield.

### Hospital arrests

5.00 pm A large group of coloured protesters burst out of Bonteheuwel onto a bridge over the N2 trunk road, and forced the rush hour traffic to run a gauntlet of stones and rocks.

While traffic police sealed off all roads into the suburb, riot squad reinforcements moved in, their vehicles sweeping through the township, hurling tear gas canisters at demonstrators and into backyards. Parents gathered up small children and ran for cover. Clouds of stinging tear gas filled the streets.

The rent office was set alight, and a supermarket blazed. The police started using guns as well as tear gas and batons. At least one man was shot dead, and many more wounded. Many of the injured hid in the townships following police arrests of those admitted to hospital with bullet wounds.

Police described Bonteheuwel as a ‘slagveld’ — a battlefield.

### Thursday 26 August

Sporadic confrontations continued during the day. Police tried out new tactics. A riot squad attacked a crowd with tear gas and batons. Then they withdrew, but they left several of their number concealed in a nearby house. The crowd reformed. A ‘decoy’ ear drove past in the direction of the hidden police, drawing the stonethrowing crowd forward. As the crowd drew closer, the hidden police stepped out of the house, letting loose into the crowd with shotguns, and the rest of the riot police returned to mop up.
Athlone, Wednesday
1 September

Sandra Peters, an 11-year old Coloured girl, was sent by her grandmother to the butcher to fetch some meat. Schoolchildren were demonstrating peacefully in Klipfontein Road at the time. A neighbour's child was watching from the balcony of a shop. She saw Sandra walk past, and then saw the police start shooting at the crowd. She ran back to Sandra's mother, Kathleen Peters. "When everyone ran off, Sandra was left lying on the pavement", she said.

Mrs Peters and Sandra's sister Josephine rushed to Athlone police station to find out what had happened to Sandra. They got no answer; instead, they were both arrested and thrown in jail. They were not released until 3.00 pm the next day.

Sandra had either been shot twice or the bullet had split in her head. She was critically wounded. She needed an urgent operation, but before they could operate the doctors needed the approval of a parent. Sandra's father is dead, and the doctors could not find Mrs Peters until the next day because she was in jail. Sandra died on Friday night, 3rd September.

Friday 27 August

Quietier the situation remained tense. That night, Prime Minister Vorster lashed out at the commentators. "Those people who cry "Wolf, wolf" are doing South Africa an ill service. They are placing the whole future of South Africa into the hands of the enemy. The enemy want to find us in a crisis and they want us to admit that we have a guilty conscience. But looking over the history of South Africa's achievements, I say we have no reason to feel guilty about anything. I want to make it clear that nowhere in the world have .four million done so much for 18 million as in this despised South Africa." His Afrikaner audience cheered loudly.

Weekend 28/29 August

A women's hostel at the University of the Western Cape, and Belgravia secondary school in the coloured township of Athlone were burnt down. A church hall is set alight and a car is petrol-bombed in Bonteheuwel.

Monday 30 August

Students continued their boycott of classes. Singing and carrying placards saying 'We abhor police brutality and violence', and 'We want rights not riots' they marched round the school grounds in heavy drizzle.

At the coloured University of the Western Cape the rector threatened students who failed to attend classes with being barred from exams. Attendance was still well down.

Principals promised that schools would soon be back to normal. Police Minister Kruger said he wouldn't see any black or coloured leaders until he was sure the unrest had finally ended.

Police imposed an information blackout on casualties. No-one knew whether a person who disappeared was in the morgue, in jail or in hospital, if they were alive, dead or dying.

The weekend lull proved to be short-lived, and tension mounted again as police carried out a wave of arrests and detentions. As well as students, the police detained the leaders of the Coloured Labour Party, and (the next day) Joe Thloloe, President of the Union of Black Journalists.

Wednesday 1 September

The day before, the crowds had dispersed quickly when the riot squads attacked with tear gas. This time the police hoped to break the Athlone protest once and for all.

First they blocked off the roads. Then they rushed into the crowd of demonstrating children with dogs and batons, inflicting as much injury as possible.

The news of this attack spread rapidly, and parents, residents and pupils from other areas converged to support the protest. Rocks and bottles were used as missiles, and oil drums, lumps of concrete and metal fencing provided barricades. Labourers from a building site hurled bricks at passing police vehicles.

The police continued to 'trap and attack'. At one point they spread their vehicles around Klipfontein road and then moved in from the many side roads. They had already set up road blocks on either side of the demonstrators.

The vehicles drove the demonstrators into the centre of the trap - and then attacked with batons and shotguns. Despite this and many other punitive police attacks, the demonstrations continued for most of the day.

Into White areas

At the same time in Cape Town's city centre, African school children were demonstrating. Two hundred African students assembled at Cape Town station. Soon they were joined by students arriving in trains from the seven schools in the black townships of Langa, Guguletu and Nyanga.

To the stunned amazement of Cape Town's Whites, they streamed through the city centre, with their placards denouncing job reservation and the pass laws. 'Away with Apartheid' . . . 'Equal
protesters or anyone else — and ignored police warnings to disperse' (5.9.76).

Though the protests continued in the city centre for another two hours, the crowds slowly dispersed. When they returned to the townships, as often as not they were met with gas and shot-gun fire, for the wave of protest had spread far beyond the city centre.

In Maitland several hundred pupils marching to the station were scattered by gas and batons. Some fled into houses, others into the Post Office. They were trapped, dragged out and beaten. Many were arrested. The riot squads raced from school to school.

'The Riot Squad attacked Trafalgar High School in District Six, close to central Cape Town, leaving many injured and a 15 year old boy, Shaheed Jacobs, shot dead. The children of Trafalgar were standing on the playground watching tear gas being fired in the city below.

'A police car stopped in the road outside and a policeman jumped out and baton-charged a boy of nine or ten. As the police pulled off the watching pupils booed. Immediately the car stopped and, without warning, policemen fired tear gas.'

The children fled into the school buildings. There was chaos inside as hundreds of children tried to find water, their faces streaming. Later some pupils went and tied posters to the playground fence reading: 'We want rights not riots' and 'Give us Justice'.

Almost immediately two riot vehicles appeared and without warning police shot more tear gas, birdshot, and rifle shot at the fleeing children.

A marksman picked pupils out from the top of one of the riot vehicles with his rifle. A bleeding boy fell to the ground. The principal ran forward to help him, but was ordered back.

In the confusion and anger some children threw stones from vantage points inside the school. The police then jumped the fence and charged into the school via an open side entrance. In one classroom two policemen stood guard at the door with rifles while four others beat up one teacher and three boys inside.

'On the same day, at Alexander Sinton High School in Athlone, many children were injured during a brutal attack on the school by the riot squad. Many children and bystanders were shot; a polio victim was beaten up and is now permanently crippled in hospital; others broke arms and legs when they jumped from upstairs windows to escape police who threw tear gas into classrooms and then entered the rooms, protected by masks, and beat up both children and teachers.' (Letter from two South African teachers to The Guardian 1.11.76)

After a bloody two days something over 400 people had been arrested, and an unknown number lay injured and dead.

Pupil Uprising

Weekend 4/5 September Over the weekend, while community and church spokesmen made speeches calling for reforms, more police were sent into Cape Town from the predominantly Afrikaner Transvaal.

Meanwhile Vorster was arriving in Zurich to meet Henry Kissinger, and passing off the protesters as Communist attempts to harm the talks. The following week marked the 10th anniversary of his premiership.

Fires and stonings continued throughout the weekend on the Cape. Five schools were extensively damaged, and Athlone Library and Magistrates Court buildings were set alight.

Monday 6 September The week started quietly. Attendance was low at the schools, and on Monday night the education authorities decided to close all coloured schools for the rest of the week. The police were drawing up new tactics, including special measures for areas where Whites might be affected. According to a police spokesman, 'Minimal tear gas will be used, and greater use will be made of birdshot.'

Tuesday 7 September This was a day of protest all across the Cape, taking in District Six, Cape Flats, Crawford, Athlone and Guguletu, on to Stellenbosch, Ravensmead, Parow and Tiervlei, and out as far as Hout Bay, Somerset West and Diep River.

The pupils started early. Some formed demonstration marches which were invariably broken up. Some, from the beginning, kept in small groups of around 20, stoning cars and converging on focal points such as Alexander Sinton High School.

Others slipped into the city in buses, trains and taxis, avoiding the police cordons. In the city centre the pupils now used hit and run tactics, breaking car windscreens, dodging police, forming up into larger groups, then dispersing rapidly as the police acted.

The new tactics had been learned quickly. At first the police tried to avoid using their guns, so that when they attacked, the protesters stood their ground and hit back, dodging, ducking the batons and throwing rocks in return. They often made fools of the police.

'A young uniformed policeman, chasing a student, tripped and fell insensible to the ground after his fleet-footed target dummy-ran him into a pole. He was taken away in an ambulance to loud jeers and whistles from construction workers and bystanders next to a nearby building site.'

The police soon put out the pressure. At one point four truckloads of riot police screamed up wearing gas masks, carrying shot guns, FN rifles and Uzi machine pistols, and with Alsatian dogs. The crowd fled for cover as the firing broke out, a barrage of shotguns, rifles, service revolvers and tear gas guns.

Bullets ricocheted off the facade of Barclays Bank as the crowd fled past. A black man lurched, walked round in a tight circle with a puzzled expression on his face, then collapsed dead on the pavement, shot in the chest.

In the street three girls were carried bleeding to a light truck, moaning and crying. Blood welled through the fingers of a girl in school uniform as she clutched her stomach. She was laid face down in the back of the van and shielded by students.
“Black Power was strictly for the Blacks. Coloured Power was something that people just thought of – a pipe dream, but not real, not something to die for. Now all that’s changed – and it’s the children who have brought about that change.”

Police immediately charged at the group round the van and clubbed them as they shouted ‘No violence! No violence!’. Ignoring the injured girls the police motioned the driver to get on his way.

Away from the city centre the level of protest had risen significantly. As well as stoning vehicles and making road blocks the demonstrators were attacking all identifiable elements of the regime’s infrastructure, from police vehicles to schools and liquor stores.

The inhabitants of Ravensmead, a ramshackle coloured township 12 miles north of Cape Town with a large squatter population, conducted a major battle against the police. What began as a march of children and adults quickly escalated as a road block was set up in one of the main streets and set alight.

As the police moved in they were confronted with a wall of flame as petrol-soaked tyres were ignited. Petrol bombs flew, as well as stones, setting buildings and police vehicles alight. The police responded with automatic weapons, but were unable to control the situation.

Many factories in the nearby Parow industrial area were forced to shut down, and as late as 10 pm more police reinforcements were being sent in.

Wednesday 8 September In the early hours of Wednesday morning the police managed to clear most of the streets of Ravensmead, but the township was littered with the debris of the previous day. The streets were choked with burnt out cars, tyres, glass from smashed windows and rocks and stones. This provided the ammunition for Wednesday’s confrontations, and again the battle built up throughout the course of the day.

Once more the factories of Parow were forced to close down, and white staff had to be escorted out of the area under a hail of rocks. As the struggle in the Cape reached its climax the protest spilled for the first time into the white suburbs. Cape Town’s Retreat district was worst hit, as demonstrators stoned vehicles, broke into shops and other buildings, making off with the goods and lighting fires. Petrol bombs were thrown at white houses in Fish Hoek from moving vehicles.

This was also the day on which Vorster broke his long silence, when he addressed a Nationalist Party meeting in Bloemfontein. To the delirious applause of 6,500 Party faithfuls he stated that, ‘the government is always prepared to talk about anything which will improve conditions for Blacks in South Africa, but not on the question of one man one vote. . . . There is no way of governing South Africa other than by the policy and principles of the National Party . . . The government will not be blackmailed by violence into giving one man one vote in South Africa . . . Law and order must be restored immediately and maintained . . . The police have contained the disorder under difficult circumstances and with a minimum of violence . . . If it does not stop, and stop immediately, other steps will have to be taken’. (Rand Daily Mail and others 9.9.76)
Deaths Concealed

Figures for dead and wounded are virtually impossible to come by, but at just two hospitals on the Cape—Victoria and Groote Schuur—doctors and sisters counted a total of 73 dead on the night of Wednesday, 8 September. No visitors were being admitted, nor was anyone being discharged. At Woodstock Hospital black staff were having to steal medical equipment in order to treat victims privately. All hospitals appear to have been under heavy armed guard. (University of Cape Town Riot Information Service 14.9.76)

“arly the people we have spoken to say that the actual death toll is very much higher than official figures. These people include religious leaders, nurses, teachers, families who have lost relatives, and leaders in the Moslem community. One doctor claims that 70 babies died of tear gas poisoning at the Peninsula Maternity Hospital. Parents who have been to collect the bodies of their children from the mortuary, and mortuary employees, are saying it is full.

“The chief engineer who is to build the new Cape Town mortuary said he had refused entry even though he had written permission from the City Council to inspect the functioning of the mortuary. Bodies are not released for burial until relatives have signed a document stating that the dead person was “actively involved in rioting”.” (The Guardian 1.11.76)

Vigilantes

Thursday 9 September  The Sunday Tribune  called this the “worst day of unrest since the outbreak of Black/ Coloured violence in the Cape just over a month ago.” Given the death-count of 73 at only two hospitals the previous night, the estimates of Thursday’s deaths—under 20—are hopelessly inadequate.

The police admitted to shooting 12 people dead in Manenberg alone, where the battles stretched late into the night. Many factories around Parow and Bellville closed down completely. There were attempts to fire two white schools, and a number of others either closed down or had round the clock vigilante patrols.

Further away from the city, at Paarl, the demonstrations were carried right into the Huguenot business district. In the same area the Helshoogte Pass between Stellenbosch and Banhoek remained partly closed following extensive attacks on cars and trucks. Vehicles were only allowed through in police-protected convoys.

At the Afrikaans University at Stellenbosch white students were arming themselves—and also, reportedly, being armed with FN rifles. As well as guarding their campus they were going into action alongside the riot squads against the ‘rioters’. Meanwhile Kruger flew into Cape Town with Smit, the white Minister of Coloured Relations, to hold talks with coloured ‘leaders’.

Friday 9 September  The level of protest in the townships immediately surrounding Cape Town began to ease. Elsewhere it continued unabated, spreading from Paarl as far afield as Mossel Bay, George, Oudtshoorn and Wellington.

In Port Elizabeth 550 pupils of two high schools were arrested and herded into the police station yard. ‘Admission of guilt’ fines of R30 were summarily handed out, and at least half were detained.

Friday also saw the opening of the Coloured Representative Council (or simply an advisory body). The president of the (white) senate announced a long list of ‘concessions’, which had been agreed between Vorster and the coloured representatives. These were mainly aimed at the coloured middle-class, consisting of various trading concessions for businessmen, plus a few improved facilities in public buildings.

Saturday 10 September  The Peninsula was now comparatively quiet, but the weekend was marked by a series of shootings of Blacks and Coloureds by trigger-happy Whites seeking out victims. Four of the six known to have been killed were shot by Whites in civilian clothing.

Three major points emerge from this period of struggle in the Cape. The first is that it was the children who were at the core of the protests. The second is that an enormous cover up operation had masked the true extent of police violence.

The third is that the Coloureds have rooted their struggle firmly in the same ground as the Blacks, traumatising the Whites of the Cape in the process.

‘If you’d told the parents a month ago that Manenberg and Athlone, Goodwood and Bonteheuwel, Paarl and Oudtshoorn would be burning and their children shot, wounded, or under arrest, they wouldn’t have believed you . . . Black Power was strictly for the Blacks. Coloured Power was something that people just thought of—a pipe dream, but not real, not something to die for. Now all that’s changed—and it’s the children who have brought about that change.’ (White teacher at coloured school, quoted in Sunday Tribune 12.9.76)
Mr J. Kruger, Minister of Justice, Police and Prisons, has encouraged white vigilantes to kill if necessary to protect their property.
Gunshops have never done such good business, as white civilians buy up new consignments as soon as they appear on the shelves.

In some cases white civilians have been equipped by the security forces.
The State's answer to workers' militancy.

Monday 13 September 'Azikwelwa' Zulu for 'We do not work'. Over the weekend 'Azikwelwa' leaflets were distributed throughout Soweto by the Soweto Students' Representative Council, calling for a three day strike. Versions appeared in Zulu, English and Sesotho. Their advances included: the killing of children by Kruger's police; detention without trial; the docking of wages of those who had gone on strike before; the attacks on demonstrators by some hostel workers.

There was a special message for the hostel - 'Hostel people do not fight'. Everyone the instructions were to keep off the streets.

Soweto was still asleep at 3am on Monday - 'A time when thousands are usually up and about preparing for work' (RDM 14.9.76). The usual morning rush hour never began. Only nurses, exempted from the strike, and a few, mainly old people queued at the bus stops and taxi ranks to get to work.

That day half a million Blacks joined the strike on the Reef. The trains ran almost empty, and by 8am only nine of the Johannesburg Transport Department's bus drivers and conductors had turned up to work out of a workforce of 132. The cancellations that resulted made little difference, as there were hardly any passengers.

Some sections of industry and commerce reported only 2% attendance by African staff, and none more than a third. Many employers who knew of the strike had tried to make up production in advance the previous weekend. The Chamber of Commerce reported that firms drawing their labour from townships 'like Alexandra' had less absenteeism.

News of a massive police operation in that township soon revealed why. Several hundred police had sealed it off completely. A house to house search had been made, but any adults or children not at work or school were either arrested or sent there. Over 800 Blacks were taken to jail from the township.

Police 'Protection'

Initially the police pretended that the operation was not connected with the strike, but was 'a crime preventative operation aimed at flushing out criminals and layabouts' (RDM 14.9.76). Later Brigadier Kriel admitted that it was 'a clean-up operation, aimed at protecting those who wished to work, and rounding up agitators' (ibid).

There were other police efforts to break the strike. In Diepkloof township for instance, two policemen entered Mr Ben Motshabi's home and found him in the kitchen. When asked why he was at home he said that going to work was dangerous. The police forced him to go out into the road, where they flagged down a black motorist and despite his protests made him take Mr Motshabi into his car.

3.30 pm Soweto had taken on almost a holiday atmosphere with people wandering through the streets and boys playing games of soccer. But as those who had gone to work returned home, they were confronted by angry residents and hostel inmates. Police moved in with guns to protect them, shooting dead at least two people and injuring many others. In one hostel two inmates were killed by their fellows for strike breaking. This time there was no doubt about the unity of the workers of Soweto. On the previous Sunday 1000 residents and hostel inmates had met in a bid to patch up their differences. The main purpose was to ensure that the hostel dwellers knew about, understood, and would support the strike. This way police efforts to turn hostel inmates against the demonstrators—as they had done in the first strike—could be foiled. 'As one Soweto student excitedly pointed out: 'The hostels are now on our side'.' (The World 15.9.76)

The day was comparatively quiet else-
where, but there were sporadic incidents at the Cape, and in the coloured township of Conville. There a farmer was hit on the head by a stone as he drove past demonstrators. He pulled out a gun and fired four shots at them. He was joined by other motorists and police, who also opened fire. A coloured girl aged 13 was killed and two men seriously injured. In Bonteheuwel, in a similar incident, three young coloured people were shot by a white motorist.

Tuesday 14 September The strike stayed firm but the police machine swung into action first thing in the morning in Soweto. Gunfire could be heard in the eastern area of the city. In the Phefeni, Phomolong and Mzimhlope townships they opened fire in the streets and at railway stations when the strikers attempted to picket. A number of people were reported injured.

Once the morning picketing was over Soweto became quiet. There were slightly more people at work that morning. Many who had worked the previous day slept over in their offices and factories. They were joined by the few who came in on Tuesday morning, either because of financial necessity or because of threats by employers. 'I have five children and no husband—what can I do?' said one restaurant counter assistant (Star 15.9.76).

All attempts at protest by pupils were met with mass arrests. In New Brighton outside Port Elizabeth, pupils from Cowan and Newell African schools were marching to the police station to protest at the arrest of KwaZakele High School pupils the day before. 'The march was brought to a quick end by prompt police action.' (RDM 15.9.76)

Summary Justice

They were dragged off to the jail and special courts were set up to mete out summary penalties. 271 were sentenced. Boys received eight cuts with a cane. Girls, over 18, received a R50 fine—or 50 days in prison. Girls under 18 received suspended sentences.

As this was happening 250 students arrested the previous Friday and as yet unsentenced were having their cases adjourned until the end of October in another Port Elizabeth court. Near Durban 285 pupils aged between 12 and 23 were also arrested when they attempted a protest march in sympathy with Soweto students.

It was generally quiet in the Cape Peninsula. One youth was shot dead and another badly injured in Guguletu. A group of youths had tried to stop a post office van passing through the township. Police inside the van had opened up on them with FN rifles.

Cape Town’s students and workers had been planning a strike in the Cape ever since the first one in Soweto. It was due to begin the next day, and leaflets had been distributed throughout the townships:

Biggest Ever Strike

But the authorities were doing their utmost to disrupt the strike. The Cape Town Chamber of Commerce released a hard-line ‘no work no pay’ statement. The police promised protection to those who went to work.

At least three leaflets were circulated in the attempt to disrupt the strike. Two, printed in English and Sotho, opposed strikes outright. A third, widely circulated among passengers at railway stations and bus terminals read: ‘WORKERS PLEASE NOTE, ‘OUR BIG STRIKE FOR WEDNESDAY AND THURSDAY IS NOW POSTPONED UNTIL NEXT WEEK. WE WILL CALL ON YOU AGAIN.’ And thousands of anti-strike leaflets were dropped from a helicopter over the townships.

There were angry scenes in Soweto again that night as some of those who had gone to work returned. The police were out in force breaking up the pickets, at Mzimhlopho, Nancefield, Dube and Diepkloof in particular. At least three people were shot dead. Whilst most newspapers took (at face value), police reports that only three people were shot dead in the three days, The World reported that at least 16 had been killed in the first two days alone.

Wednesday 15 September Half a million black people were on strike in the Reef, and this time they were joined by up to 80% of the quarter million Coloured workers 1,000 miles away in the Cape. It was, without doubt, the biggest strike in South Africa’s history. Among the companies badly hit in the Reef were Metal Box, where only 15 of 250 workers turned up at its main Industria plant; Advance Laundries, where only 50% turned up; Premier Milling; OK Bazaars (50-70% away); Checkers (50-70% away).
A temporary lull in Black/White confrontations

In the Cape women workers led the strike. The clothing industry, 90% of whose 50,000 strong workforce are women, had to resign itself to two days lost production.

The Cape Stops

Most other industries and services were hit as well. At the docks 80% of the stevedores did not come to work. Milk and bread could not be delivered, and engineering, steel industries, garages and shops were affected. Many construction sites closed.

Although there were sporadic attempts to set civic offices and schools on fire, and occasional stonings, the Cape was relatively quiet.

In Port Elizabeth, however, protest flared again. Buses, trucks and cars were stoned, and by 11am all buses had been withdrawn from the New Brighton township. Another 150 pupils were arrested.

Rigid Control

At Thaba Nchu, Bloemfontein, police were pelted with stones when they removed students who had not handed in declarations signed by their parents, accepting financial responsibility for any "riot" damage that might be caused at the school.

In Soweto that evening more Blacks were killed and injured as police again tried to break up pickets and impose rigid control on the city. At Merafe station they fired from the bridge over the railway into the groups of pickets.

Thursday 16 September

It was back to work day in Soweto, with tens of thousands of workers flocking to railway stations, taxi and bus ranks. Some students felt the strike should continue, and police attacked small groups of pickets attempting to stop people going to work. Groups of students gathered along the railway line between Naledi and Ikwezi. Police travelled along it in a two coach train, firing teargas and shots at them as they passed.

In Cape Town it was the second day of the planned strike, and more workers than ever responded, particularly in industrial areas. The strike was estimated at 70-80% complete in industry, and 40% in commerce.

Solidarity attacked

"Many employers tried to discourage workers from participating in the boycott. They warned them beforehand that they would not be paid for the days they stayed away. On Wednesday, some employers announced the dismissal of workers who had stayed away from work. But the workers were not intimidated. Even more workers stayed away from work on Thursday than on Wednesday. The workers were determined to take their stand alongside the other protesters." (Imanyano September 1976 - this workers' paper was subsequently banned).

During the night the housing offices in Macassar, the coloured township near Somerset West, had been fired and seriously damaged. In many white residential districts at the Cape, vigilantes were out all night patrolling the streets.

8.15pm

A power failure plunged the area into inky blackness, and the protest flared up again. Throughout the Athlone district and in Manenberg, Grassie Park, Bishop Lavis and Kewtown, barricades were erected across streets, piles of tyres set alight at intersections, and drain covers pulled up to block roads. Bottle stores and shops were broken into and set alight. Any vehicle moving was stopped or stoned; police had to escort vehicles out of the area in convoys. Attempts were made to sabotage the main railway line to the black and coloured townships.

Young coloured detainees near Cape Town
Riot police attack coloured demonstrators in Cape Town

Three jeeps full of police reservists in camouflage uniform cleared burning tyres from Eastern Boulevard on the fringe of the white areas. A spokesman said: 'This is only the beginning. Soon we may be doing more than putting out fires' (RDM 17.9.76).

Police opened fire on the crowds, and described the toll of dead and injured as 'heavy'. Officially 12—one a 15-year-old schoolgirl—were shot dead. More than 50 were admitted to hospital with serious bullet wounds.

Friday 17 September The strike in the Cape ended, and the coloured and black workers went back under threat of victimisation and sacking. The streets were littered with debris from the previous night: burnt mattresses, car seats, boxes and tyres; fragments of glass and large rocks.

Henry Kissinger was arriving in South Africa at 3.30 pm. That morning in Soweto pupils at Sekano-Ntoane High, Morris Isaacson High, Jabulani Junior Secondary, Tladi Junior Secondary and Thesele Junior Secondary Schools demonstrated against his visit.

The pupils had placards condemning Kissinger's visit. A huge one on a churchyard wall read 'Dr Kissinger, get out of Azania (South Africa)—don't bring your disguised American oppression into Azania'. Others simply referred to him as a murderer.

At Sekano-Ntoane High the main school gate had been locked while the pupils massed in the school grounds, singing freedom songs and waving placards.

The police blasted the gate open. Three vans drove in loaded with heavily armed policemen. They started shooting at the pupils, who scattered. There was a great deal of confusion. Pupils screamed in pain.

At Jabulani Junior Secondary the bodies of two pupils in school uniform lay dead after the police opened fire. A schoolgirl was shot dead outside Tladi Junior Secondary.

Altogether at least six students died and a further 35 were taken to hospital seriously injured. But the police succeeded in their main objective. They removed the placards. General Kriel explained afterwards that the police had opened fire 'in self defence'.

'They were damaging property with their stone-throwing and police were forced to open fire to protect themselves when stones were flung at them', he said (RDM 18.9.76).

3.30 pm 'The world's most important visitor to South Africa from the world's most powerful nation' arrived at Waterkloof Air Base outside Pretoria. Waiting to greet him as he stepped off the plane were Dr Hilgard Muller, Minister of Foreign Affairs—and General Hendrik van den Bergh, head of BOSS and the secret police.

There were several petrol bombings and firings of buildings in Johannesburg, and the city was rife with rumours and bomb hoaxes. Scores of people had to be evacuated from one major fire in the city centre. The incidents had been timed to coincide with the visit.

'The two-day stay-away in Cape Town cost the city more than three million man hours. The clothing industry—with a 49,000 labour force and the largest single employers in the Peninsula—lost two full days of production. Only 15 per cent of workers showed up on these days. About 150,000 to 200,000 Cape workers forfeited more than a third of their weekly pay packets to obey the strike call.' (Sunday Express [S.A.] 19.9.76)

Minister of Defence Botha, in a major policy speech to the National Party Cape Congress the following Monday appealed to Whites, Coloureds and Indians to accept the fact that they needed each other and (gave) a warning to Coloureds that their future did not lie in a link-up with Black power' (The Citizen 21.9.76).
The black workers whose labour has created the wealth of the South African state have been brought to the point where to die at the hands of the riot police is hardly worse than to survive life in the townships.

The demands for basic human rights now being voiced by these workers and their children have never been more ideologically acceptable to the white regime, but while South Africa was affluent it could buy the time in which to manoeuvre its apartheid strategies. It could also buy the allies and suppliers to support its position. But now the South African boom is over. The economy is collapsing, and the Whites can no longer pretend to themselves or anyone else that black demands can be defused politically or met economically.

'South Africa is in serious economic trouble. Continued economic decline will mean political and military impotence. Continued economic decline will mean political and military impotence. Continued economic decline will mean political and military impotence. Continued economic decline will mean political and military impotence. Continued economic decline will mean political and military impotence.

'In the euphoria of the early 1970s some $20 billion worth of capital-hungry projects were inaugurated, including uranium enrichment, the Sasol II coal gasification development, the Sishen-Saldhana iron ore project, and the Richards Bay Harbour project. It was assumed that the gold price would go on rising and help pay for such an ambitious infrastructure program.'

But in 1975 the rapid rise in imports caused a balance of payments crisis which forced the government to deflate the economy just as the world recession was really hitting export earnings. This balance of payments problem was greatly aggravated by the fall in the price of gold from a peak of $200 an ounce at the end of 1974 to less than $110 per ounce in August 1976.

In 1975 imports exceeded exports by a record R1,616m. By March 1976 the figures were heading for a deficit of R2,230m for the year. In July the government imposed a 20% deposit on imports - the cash to be frozen for six months with no interest - and put up bank rates. Despite the severity of these measures the 1976 balance of payments deficit will not be below R1,500m.

Arms Spending

Added to the balance of payments crisis is the very high level of government spending. In 1975 the government deficit reached R1,353m, up from R816m the year before. In the first three months of the 1976-77 financial year the government overspent by R700m. The main reason for the increasing deficit is the ever expanding military budget.

'Increased defence expenditure was almost entirely responsible for this higher level of expenditure' admitted the South African Reserve Bank in its review for the financial year 1975-76. Again, in its quarterly review for September 1976 it pointed out that 'The further increase in real government consumption spending was caused mainly by a further substantial increase in defence spending.' The expansion of the military budget shows no sign of slowing. The original budget figure for military expenditure for 1976-77 was R1,350m, 17% of the total budget. That represents an increase in military spending of 42% on 1975-76, and is three times the 1973-74 figure. Even so Defence Minister P.W. Botha has already said that it will be a substantial underestimate.

In the first financial quarter of 1976-77 government expenditure rose by R264m. Of this increase, we would attribute at least R200m to 'defence', which would mean a figure of around R1,750m a year on military expenditure — an 80% increase on last year.

Blood Money

Faced with growing deficits the South African government is raising taxes and slashing subsidies. It has already borrowed up to the hilt abroad thanks to the massive state corporation schemes — capital commitments of R11,573m have been made by public corporations for the next five years — and has had to rely heavily on borrowing from the banking sector within South Africa Internal bank lending to the government has trebled over the last two years to R3,000m. The two largest South African banks, Barclays and Standard, are both British controlled. Between them they are lending the South African government almost enough money for its entire defence budget.

The white regime used to claim 'Capital investment in South Africa yields one of the highest returns in the world' (The Banker 1973). Those days are over. The crisis of profitability now besetting the country is reflected in the economy's inability to finance new investment from its own resources. In 1973, 74% of all new investment came from internal funds. By 1974 this had fallen to 47%, and in 1975 reached a new low of 30%. £1.44 in £1.

£1.66 in £1.
The myth of the Black middle-class

A man with a matric has the pick of jobs. For example, a top salesman like Mr. Tom Mboya, who works for Ellerines, earns really big money — and because he works on commission as well as pay, the sky is the limit so far as money is concerned. But of course, the one thing a really good salesman needs is persistence. Business Week US.

Foreign investment capital is drying up too. 'Because of the Angolan war and the consequent fears among foreign investors abroad for Southern Africa's political stability, all long term capital markets are effectively closed to them.' (Sunday Times (S.A.) 23.5.76) The proportion of long-term loans has fallen from 45% in March 1975 to 29% a year later. 'South Africa's foreign debt is mounting so fast and becoming so short term that Finance Minister Horwood is piling up a refinancing and growing interest burden over the next few years of alarming proportions.' (Sunday Times 1.8.76)

In November 1976 Citibank (USA) arranged a $110m Eurodollar credit. This falls far short of the $300m that Horwood was after, and has cost the South African government more. The Financial Mail is very clear — 'With each political upheaval raising loans gets more difficult. The economic implications of the recent riots are going to depend chiefly on the reaction of foreign investors.' Without substantial foreign money — at least R1,000m a year — South Africa cannot finance its traditional current account deficits nor achieve the economic growth rates needed to maintain employment.'

The American magazine Business Week is even more pessimistic. The South African economy needs a 6.5% real growth rate to absorb the 25,000 entrants into the black labour market each year. The government's economic policies make it clear that there is no hope of obtaining such increases in the foreseeable future.

Unfortunately for the South African government, foreign bankers are so worried by both the nation's economic and fiscal woes and the prospect of black unrest, that they are unlikely to loosen their purse strings lightly.' (15.11.76)

In August 1976 a standby credit of R151m from the IMF was announced. But this money has strings attached. The government deficit has to be cut and private credit squeezed. Import deposits are also to be removed in February 1977. These measures can only tighten the net around the government. Already the two major white union confederations are threatening to quit
has three of the South African equivalent of the social contract if prices continue to soar while wages are controlled. However it is the Blacks who are bearing the brunt of the economic crisis. We have already detailed the massive black unemployment, now growing at 20,000 a month, and losing your job, for a South African Black, means more than losing a weekly wage. Black workers who lose their jobs have seven days before they are 'endorsed out' of the urban areas. They have their passbooks stamped to show they must leave the area and return to the 'rural homeland', where unemployment and starvation await them.

The Unemployment Insurance Fund - 'the workers' great bulwark against joblessness' - is meaningless for the vast majority of Blacks. Those who contribute rarely receive any benefits - at best a few rand after weeks of waiting. Many employers do not bother to register their employees in the scheme. 'Influx control' - the official term for dispersing unemployed Blacks and reducing their numbers in the industrial areas - has shown an unusual increase over the past few months. (Sunday Tribune 22.8.76)

The regime has also been tightening up its enforcement of the Physical Planning Act, which allows no more than 2 or 2½ Blacks to be employed for every White in white areas. Penalties for employers of illegal Black workers are to be increased, the workers themselves to be prosecuted, and 100,000 jobs are threatened.

The effects of high and increasing levels of unemployment before the recent strikes have been to increase the vulnerability of militants at work, who have been heavily victimised over the last two years. The result has been that strikes by black workers showed a marked decrease in the run up to the confrontations which began in June 1976. According to the Minister of Labour, 1.3m man-hours were lost through black strikes in 1973, 653,000 in 1974, and only 86,000 in the nine months to September 1975. (The Star 22.11.75)

Soweto

'Row upon row of tiny little eggbox houses... Most of the roads unmade, street lighting often lacking, electricity often absent, many miles from the place of work, inadequate transport and no security of tenure.' (Bishop of Johannesburg June 1976)

Soweto is one of the more monstrous creations of the apartheid state. One of the largest towns in Africa, it consists of 87 square kilometres of single storey concrete and corrugated iron 'housing units' - 100,000 of them - close-planted in symmetrical rows with dirt roads in between. When it rains the streets, without storm water drainage, become rivers of mud. The air is often thick with smog. Most of the houses have no electricity, and a large proportion have no running water either. Poverty is the norm, as is violent crime, hunger and disease.

Soweto is served by only one hospital - Baragwanath Hospital just outside the South East reaches of the township complex. It was built to serve a community of 600,000. No-one knows for sure how many Africans live in Soweto, but most current estimates are around the 1½ million mark. 'We are more than a hospital says one doctor. 'We're a creche for abandoned children, a home for cripples, a surgical factory for patching up wounds of Soweto violence and overcrowding.' (The Star 29.5.76)

Despite its rambling size Soweto is chronically overcrowded. Up until the mid 1950s there were black townships on three sides of Johannesburg in the west, the north and the east. In Sophiatown in the west, Blacks even had freehold property rights. However, after the Nationalist Party took power in 1948, the policy of keeping all urban Blacks in one area, except for single Blacks living in hostels within white areas was begun. Black freehold rights were eroded until all Blacks became 'sojour-

ners' in the 87% of South Africa officially designated white. Their 'citizenship', as entered in the passbooks, was confined to the 'ethnic homelands'. Soweto did not get its name - an abbreviation for South Western Townships - until 1963, when it was first applied to the 26 segregated townships under the control of the Johannesburg City Council.

Poverty is a basic fact of existence for the people of Soweto, as it is for most Blacks in South Africa. Yet the high level of inflation which has accompanied the country's economic decline over the last two years has hit the Blacks harder than any other group. In July 1976 The Star, in cooperation with the South African Institute for Race Relations and a group of workers, drew up a monthly budget outlining the basic essentials for a black family of two adults, two children and a toddler. It was assumed that both parents worked, the children went to school, the toddler was left in a creche during the day, and the family lived in a Soweto house without electricity.

The minimal budget arrived at was R145 per month. It was based on the barest food needs. Tobacco, liquor, newspapers and magazines, and personal toiletries were not included. Even so, R145 is higher than the average Soweto family income. Many families have only a single wage coming in. A man would be lucky to clear R120 a month, and a woman - a large proportion of whom are domestics - would be unlikely to exceed R70 a month. In addition, many African families are supporting more than three children. Many are also supporting other relatives who need the money to avoid starvation.

The result is that the average Soweto family cannot keep up with price increases on the most basic necessities of life. Without electricity they have to buy coal, firewood, candles and paraffin, all subject to recent price rises. As well as paying extra taxes not paid by Whites (poll taxes and tribal levies), Blacks have to pay for their children's schooling while white schooling is free. In Soweto it costs about R102 per year to send two children to school.

Food prices in Soweto are actually higher than in white areas, due to the government policy of allowing only small, single unit businesses to exist there. Most Blacks try to do their basic food shopping in their work areas as a result, but diet is suffering severely as food expenditure is cut back in order to meet other unavoidable living costs. Recently the government has reduced the subsidy on such staples of African diet as maize and wheat flour, as well as transport.

April 1976 price increases included 18% on maize products and cooking oil, 17% on coffee, 15% on margarine, and 8% on milk. On 1 September a new round of increases was announced, to add 17% to sugar prices, 15% on wheat (following a massive 50% bread-flour increase the previous week), and 16% on tea, as well as large increases in electricity, petrol, rail freight and cement prices.

While the official annual inflation figure, as applied to a white-expenditure-based consumer index, is around 13%, the inflation figure for Blacks, with their narrow range of high-increase expenditure, is several times higher. Garment Worker, a South African union newspaper, has estimated an inflation level for Blacks of almost 100% on an annual basis. (16.7.76)

A recent survey by the South African Medical Institute in the Western Township, Johannesburg, a Coloured area, found that a third of the children were suffering from malnutrition - and this in an area where per capita income is 50% higher than in black areas. (The Star 22.7.76)

Nothing left to lose

The Star's 'Housewife of the Year' competition this year marvelled at a white family of four living on R500 per month. Subsequently, doctors recommended additions to the family's diet, as it was deficient. Shortly before, The Star had published a Poverty Datum Level of R129 per month for a black family of five living in Soweto. Soweto is not unique. The death rate among black infants in Cape Town has nearly doubled in the last year, largely due to malnutrition. (Cape Herald 10.8.76)

Out of work, poverty stricken, starving and overcrowded, the inhabitants of Soweto and other townships across South Africa have been brought to explosion point. There is nothing left to lose. In Soweto they live in misery in a nightmare town. Violent crime runs unchecked in the unlit streets and on the cram-packed trains and buses which ferry a quarter of a million black workers in and out of Johannesburg every day.

In 1974 Soweto had the highest murder
rate in the world, and the crime level has risen since then. The crime figures are inevitably swelled by the high number of school drop-outs without job prospects. Yet despite the high drop-out rate, Soweto's schools are so crowded that the pupil-teacher ratio at some levels is 60 to 1, with teachers forced to do double daily shifts in order to cover all pupils.

Schooling in Soweto is not compulsory. There is an acute shortage of secondary and high schools. Teaching standards are minimal, and there is not a single teacher training school in the townships.

Job opportunities within Soweto are practically non-existent, as black industrialists have been forced by law to move to the homelands, and traders' operations are severely limited. Industrial job opportunities around Soweto are rapidly contracting, both because of the recession lay-offs, and also because new investment is being geared toward capital intensive rather than labour intensive production.

On 18 August 1976 Metal Box announced an investment in the Rand area around Johannesburg, of R1.6m, which will allow the company to double its South African output of tin-plate. This new investment will create just three jobs. This example, though extreme, is not isolated. 'There has undoubtedly been a shift from labour-intensive to capital-intensive investment in recent years,' said the executive director of Assocom (the South African Chambers of Commerce organisation) in an interview in the government backed publication To the Point, October 1976.

Apartheid at Home
Housing provision is another disaster area in Soweto. Quite apart from the miserable size, quality and arrangement of the units, the townships' 100,000 houses are nowhere near sufficient to deal with the size and growth of the population. With an estimated 15,000 families on the waiting list, all fulfilling the rigorous and discriminatory terms of qualification, there is an increase each year of 2,000 married couples in need of accommodation. Most of these couples despair of the years-long waiting list and move in with relatives. The same applies to widows, divorcees, deserted wives and unmarried mothers, none of whom can obtain - or retain - official registration.

As a result sub-tenancy is widespread, with as many as 25 people sharing a two-bedroom unit. The low level of new housing provision fails to make any impression on the problem. BAAAs authorities in such dilapidated areas as Orlando West experience increasing difficulties in raising loans for house building, because the government's priority is towards single-persons' hostels. These prison-like buildings, each holding 2,500 inmates, are due to be doubled in number, from 12 to 24.

As if all this were not enough, the government has even tried to introduce 'ethnic grouping' into its housing policy, despite the fact that a large number of the inhabitants of Soweto no longer think of themselves in tribal groupings, and inter-tribal marriage is common.

Growing Resentment

With crushing social pressures such as these it is little wonder that divorce and separation in Soweto are increasingly common. The women and children are the most immediate victims, as in such cases the wife has to move out of the family house and does not herself qualify for independent registration.

The authorities have made no real attempt to control Soweto's crime. With 55% of the population under the age of 20, and with nothing to do outside of weekend football matches (there is one cinema), the streets belong to the gangs - or did until June 1976. Public telephones are few and far between, and there are only five police stations in the 26 townships. The gangs on public transport have added to the frustration with bus and train facilities which have made transport one of the focal points of black fight-back.

Both buses and trains have a very high accident rate - a combination of overcrowding and poor servicing of machinery, tracks and roads. Commuting to and from Johannesburg involves getting up hours ahead of time in order to negotiate long queues at ticket offices and bus stops, and fighting your way onto the bus or train when it arrives. Station facilities, public address systems, bridges, stairs and toilets are all in a terrible, and often dangerous state of repair.

The only alternatives to this chaos are to walk - and many people work 20 kilometres from their homes - or to take expensive taxis. Many workers are forced to pay up to R30 per month in taxi fares. Bus fares have been increasing steadily over the last two years, firstly as a result of increased fuel costs, and more recently as a result of cuts in the government subsidy.

Putco, the largest bus company, reported riot damage of R279,938 in the year that ended on 30 June. Numerous and militant bus boycotts have been organised, and the police have made every effort to smash them. They have stopped taxis being used as alternative transport to work, ordering everyone out for pass checks and driver's permit checks. Road blocks are set up and cars with black occupants double checked, road- unworthiness being the easiest charge to make. If firms provide private transport for their workers they are charged prohibitive license fees.

This climate of continuous harassment and confrontation with the police can in some measure be seen as a training ground for events since 16 June. Pass infringer's arrests were stepped up. Of the daily prison population of 99,000, no less than a third are in jail under the pass laws. One in every four Blacks is arrested each year for technical infringements of laws that only apply to Blacks. In Soweto black arrestees lose their right to house registration.

Soweto demonstrates all the injustices suffered by black African township dwellers, though similar and sometimes worse conditions exist in all industrial areas of South Africa. The name Soweto is synonymous with apartheid, representing imperialism, oppression and exploitation, with no alternative but starvation in the homelands. It is fitting that the uprising which could spell the beginning of the end for the apartheid regime should have started there.
"South Africa is a dynamic military society whose educational system must train people for war. South Africa devotes millions of rands to the development, manufacture and purchase of armaments. These armaments are necessary and the country is determined to obtain those it needs." (Defence Ministry, 2.10.76)
In the past four years, the South African regime has quadrupled the number of its armed forces to 201,900. It has also organised and trained a Home Guard of 75,000 'Commandos', and set up paramilitary riot squads within the police force operating from 18 key cities.

The distinction between police and army is anyway blurred - their equipment and training are almost identical, and indeed the South African troops helping the Smith regime have always been described as 'police'. The police number 35,000 with a reserve of 17,500. Because of the rapid expansion of the armed forces and the limit to the number of Whites who could be recruited, the South African authorities have been reluctantly forced to draw on the black population.

As well as the 'official' bodies of armed men, white militias are actively encouraged, and the black vigilante groups run by the Urban Bantu Councils in the townships - the Makgotlas - have been given temporary legal status. The Soweto Makgota was used in the Zulu 'backlash' in August.

Civilian Whites are very heavily armed, with almost half the adult white population owning a gun. About half of the guns now coming in are from Russia and Czechoslovakia via Hamburg. Others come from Brazil, France, West Germany, Italy, Spain and Finland, via England and Hong Kong. 'The demand for private firearms has never been bigger in South Africa than it is today. For weeks on end there hasn't been a handgun available in any gun shop in Johannesburg.' (RDM 20.10.76) The 'favourites' are shotguns, preferably automatic, revolvers and automatic rifles. 'The little weapon is out, and the large calibre automatic and the magnum revolver are in.' (Financial Mail 22.10.76)

Both police and army are supplied with weapons by Armscor (The Armaments Development and Production Corporation). South Africa is now self sufficient in many areas of weaponry through Armscor, and the arms used by the police are almost all home produced. As well as rifles, tear gas, ammunition and so on, Armscor produces AMX tanks, Panhard armoured cars, Matra-Thompson Crotale surface to air missiles, field guns, bombs, napalm bombs and air to surface missiles. Its subsidiary Atlas Aircraft provides much of the South African Air Force's aircraft and parts, usually operating under licence from foreign companies.

Gun Running

In 1963, the United Nations passed its arms embargo, calling on all states to cease forthwith the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types and military vehicles to South Africa and 'equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition in South Africa.' It left implementation and interpretation to its member states, and those with substantial trade relations with South Africa have interpreted it so loosely as to make a mockery of it.

Any attempts, overwhelmingly supported by the UN General Assembly, to make the embargo mandatory have been blocked by Britain, France and the USA using their power of veto.

Some governments have openly ignored the embargo. In particular France, South Africa's principal source of military supplies, has delivered some $160 million worth of arms between 1969 and 1973. Over the same period Italy delivered $20 million and the UK $15m. Both the US and Israel have made substantial arms deliveries too.

Like Britain, the US claims to support the embargo, but in fact supplies South Africa with a host of militarily useful equipment, particularly light aircraft. Similarly the West German government claims not to have made any arms sales to the regime, but is involved in the supply of the Transall aircraft and other weapons and ammunition.

Besides these open contraventions of the embargo, many companies have found other ways of supplying the tools of repression to this lucrative market. Licences are granted, manufacturing subsidiaries created, technicians seconded and consultants supplied. We detail some examples below, but this is only the tip of the iceberg.

Many other multinationals indirectly assist Armscor in its efforts to make the...
regime self-sufficient in terms of arms. An armaments industry as sophisticated as South Africa’s depends on a well-developed industrial base. It needs steel (British Steel), oil (BP, Mobil), chemicals (ICI, Shell, Hoechst) and many other materials and know-how. In this sense any company investing in South Africa is contributing to its arms capacity.

Foreign investment in South Africa is falling, partly because of the political impact of the uprising, and also because of South Africa’s economic recession. But it is still an important and continuing factor in enabling the regime to maintain its arms spending, and protect apartheid and with it the profitability of foreign investment.

Arms to the South African government not only protect big business, they are, in themselves, big business. Western governments therefore have a dual role in siding their sale. Every new investment, every new loan ties the bonds tighter between the South African state and Western capitals.

Britain and South Africa—The Arms Trade

The racist regime has immense powers supplied to it by the imperialist world. We know of Landrovers which were used which are British equipment. We know of police equipment in South Africa which comes mainly from Britain. The most sophisticated equipment they have comes from Britain, France and America, and this sows a lot of bitterness inside the people with the realisation that their struggle is a long one and against very powerful enemies. (Masimini)

Britain is still South Africa’s largest trading partner and investor. Almost a quarter of South Africa’s exports come to Britain, and 4 per cent of British exports are destined for South Africa.

Investment in South Africa accounts for some 10 per cent of all British overseas investment — and, more importantly, forms no less than half of all foreign investment in South Africa. Six out of the top ten, and 28 out of the top 100 South African companies are either controlled by British companies or are substantially owned by British interests. The two largest banks are British registered, and control over half of all South African bank deposits.

Plessey

On August 9 1976, Defence Minister Botha opened a factory for the manufacture of integrated circuits. ‘Integrated circuits form part of all sophisticated weapons using electronic systems. A local manufacturer of integrated circuits will be invaluable from the point of view of defence strategy’ he said.

The money for the factory is coming from the South African Ministry of Defence and another government body, the Council for Industrial Research. But all the technical expertise has been provided by Plessey, the British electronics firm. The circuits are being made under licence from Plessey.

No wonder Botha was so pleased. Ever since the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, when the Egyptians destroyed large numbers of Israeli tanks and aircraft, weapons carrying their own target-finding systems have been in the forefront of warfare strategies.

This new factory will for the first time enable South Africa to produce such weapons itself. As Botha pointed out, the South African electronics industry could not undertake the manufacture on its own, owing to the technical complexity, and the fact that the sole market was military.

Racal Electronics

‘South African forces had learnt through the years that they could rely on Racal for equipment and advice when no-one else could. Racal has come to our aid with radio sets and we are very grateful to them on this account. The company has also rendered invaluable service to the South African Defence Force in a consulting capacity.’ (Bierman, Commandant General, 9.8.73)

Racal Electronics is hardly one of the best known British companies. Yet it is one of the most profitable groups, the leading world supplier of radio manpacks and tank radios, and has made vast profits out of arms. Profits have risen every year for 20 years, reaching £19m in 1975, and it has a thriving business in South Africa.

Well over half of Racal’s South African production go direct to the armed services. The most important part of its South African range are the transmitter/receivers used in monitoring and surveillance, and in military situations.

News from Zimbabwe shows that Racal equipment was used in the raid on a Zimbabwean refugee camp in which at least 800 people were massacred by Rhodesian troops. The equipment was in a Ferret armoured car made in South Africa under British Licence which was captured by Mozambique forces and put on display in Maputo.

Marconi

Marconi is building an £8m ‘tropospheric scatter’ system, the backbone of a computer controlled military communication network, for the South African Defence Department.

This strategic equipment was exported from Britain to the South African Defence Department for use in Namibia under loopholes in the regulations. Details of the deal came to light when Jock Hall, a Marconi Electronics engineer who had been working on civilian applications of the system, felt unable to work on a military project for South Africa and exposed the project.

Marconi have never denied that their equipment would be used in Namibia, and in 1973 had carried out a ‘troposcat-ter’ survey in Namibia.

A second Marconi contract for data link equipment to update the South African Air Defence system was signed last year, and despite questions in Parliament the Labour government has not prevented the export of this military hardware.

ICI

Most of the teargas used against the Blacks throughout the uprising is manufactured by African Explosives and Chemical Industries Ltd., which operates the two largest commercial explosive factories in the world. It is 40 per cent owned by ICI. In return for an annual fee, African Explosives also runs two munitions factories for the regime in the Transvaal; it built a third munitions plant for the government in the Cape in 1971.

African Explosives, besides producing teargas (at its factory in Modderfontein) makes nerve gas and chemicals usable as defoliants. In August, 1976 ICI provided R.40m for African Explosives to invest in further capital projects.
The British Connection

These cases illustrate two of the major ways in which British companies drive a massive wedge through the UN arms embargo - through granting licences and setting up subsidiaries. The government, whether Tory or Labour, has done nothing to stop this profitable trade, indeed the South African subsidiary of the government owned British Leyland is busy expanding its production of Land Rovers as part of a new investment of R.17m.

Despite pressure Leyland (South Africa) has consistently refused to recognise black unions. The Landrovers it produces go straight to the police and army.

The British Labour government is further implicated in supporting the apartheid regime. The Export Credit Guarantee Department, a government body, advanced R40 million in May to South African Railways, and in October, together with the British merchant bank Hill Samuel, announced a further R118 million at favourable rates of interest. This year a record number of government subsidised trade delegations will visit South Africa.

The government's instrument with which it pays lip service to the UN arms embargo is the Export of Goods (Control) Order 1970. This prohibits the export of certain arms without a licence. The effect of this is minimal. Besides the fact that the Order does not inhibit delivery or sub-licencing built on British design, there are several other factors:

1. South Africa is granted a 'most favoured nation' status, which means there are several categories of goods that can be sent to South Africa without a licence, yet would on the other hand require one for most of the NATO states.

2. Whilst the order prohibits the sale of many basic items, like guns and ammunition, which South Africa in any case produces itself, it allows the sale of a good deal of sophisticated equipment of military usefulness. For example, you cannot export parachutes - but you can send air-borne radar.

3. The 'policing' of the order by customs is virtually non-existent. It is common knowledge that Finnish rifles reach South Africa via England.

4. When the embargo was introduced the government allowed all existing contracts to continue, including the supply of spares.

There are hundreds of British companies that contribute to the South African regime's armed strength; below we list some of the most important.

British Leyland
J. Brockhouse
Chloride Group
Dunlop
Thomas French
Hawker Siddeley
ICI
Lindustries
Rank Organisation
Thorn Electrical
Westland
British Electric Traction
France has repeatedly stated that they make a modern weaponry to South Africa for distinction between weapons used for external defence and those for internal suppression. But equipment supplied by France such as the Frelon helicopters and the Transall aircraft have been used internally over the last months, as well as in Namibia and Zimbabwe.

The main strike force of the South African Air Force is made up of Mirage fighter bombers and interceptors. A new batch of 18 Mirages was delivered in 1974. From 1977 the Mirage F-1 will be licence produced within South Africa itself, greatly increasing the air force’s strike capacity.

The four helicopter squadrons are also entirely French equipped. Puma helicopters, of joint Franco-British design have found their way to Pretoria since 1973, and the French-West German Transall transport plane has also been delivered. France paid the German companies involved in his project DM66m. for the transaction.

Ground-to-air missiles, which are the foundation of any modern air defence system, have been provided by France through an ingenious arrangement; in 1964 construction of the Cactus ground-to-air missile system was begun in France according to South African specifications and with the participation of South African scientists. About 85% of the cost was paid by South Africa. The existence of the programme was only revealed in 1969 when Botha visited France to view a test launching of the missile. By 1973 three batteries had been deployed on the Transvaal border, pointing towards Mozambique.

According to the French producers France has retained the sales rights for the missile, so it cannot be re-exported from South Africa. But Cactus was included in Botha’s 1972 list of possible items to be exported to ‘friendly countries’. The question of who owns the sales rights will probably remain unsettled until South Africa actually delivers a Cactus system to another country.

France has signed the notorious Koeberg nuclear power plant construction contract. Credit Lyonnais led a consortium that financed no less than R850 million of the R1000 million project. Besides the nuclear power plant, recent deals include Saimarie’s purchase of four French built container ships worth R240 million and South African Airway’s purchase of four Airbuses worth R70 million, all heavily financed by French government export credits. France is now the fifth largest supplier to South Africa, and French investment has doubled to around R800 million since 1970.

**Germany (FDR)**

Recent weeks have seen a redoubling of the South African effort to build up the West German connection. In October Connie Mulder, Minister of Information, was in Germany and in early November Owen Horwood, Minister of Finance, Jan Marais, chairman of the Trust Bank and a number of others were in Dusseldorf to preside at investment conferences and talks.

In recent years West Germany has rivalled the UK as South Africa’s major supplier and is the fourth largest market for South African goods. Investment has been heavy, particularly in chemicals – Hoechst and BASF – and cars – Volkswagen and BMW.

Perhaps the most controversial assistance given to the regime in terms of military aid is the supply of compressors for the uranium enrichment plant at Valindaba in South Africa. This uses the jet nozzle system – suitable for military production.

The West German government has always denied that it is giving military aid to the apartheid regime, but German companies have helped build the Advocaat surveillance system, 137 heavy duty military trucks were supplied in 1974, Daimler Benz has sent UNIMOG military vehicles to the Army, the military Airbus being built with France is currently being delivered and four German designed and engined patrol boats are being built in Haifa for the South African Navy.

A company in the Thyssen group has been building tanks for the South African Army, and the FDR has also supplied a complete plant for the construction of armoured vehicles. All these supplies are subject to government permission under the External Trade Act.

**Israel**

In the spring of 1976 Prime Minister Vorster visited Israel and was escorted by the Commander of the Israeli navy round a guided missile patrol boat built in Haifa. He also inspected the Israeli made Kfir fighter bomber and there are reports that South Africa is interested in a tank de-
Valindaba nuclear energy headquarters. Components supplied by Germany here could be used to produce nuclear weapons.

signed especially for desert conditions and in an anti-tank helicopter that Israel is developing.

Already, South Africa imports heavy mortars, some types of small arms and munitions from Israel, as well as electronic equipment and communications devices. The Uzi sub-machine gun designed by Israel is produced, under sub-licence from Belgium, within South Africa itself.

Nato

For some years now South Africa has been granted access to the NATO defence equipment coding system, with the UK, US, France, Germany and Holland providing new computerised material. This has been used in the Advocaat surveillance system based at Silvermine in Cape Province, with a substation at Walvis Bay in Namibia. South African officers have been trained in the Federal Republic of Germany to operate the system.

There is considerable support for the South African regime within the upper echelons of the Western military machine. NATO high command has linked itself as closely as possible with the South African military, making riot control, anti-guerrilla warfare, nuclear and missile technology readily available.

The South African regime has access to the entire technology of oppression through support from those in power within NATO's governments and military-economic institutions. Only the political constraints arising from the regime's brazen apartheid policies prevents that support exhibiting itself more openly.

Companies and governments throughout the world are supplying the white South African regime with the weapons and the know-how to murder black freedom fighters within its borders and beyond.
Wherever they go, people look great.

Malnutrition exposed on a Slater-Walker farm.
Despite its monolithic appearance, the Nationalist Party is in fact an alliance of two groups with very different economic interests, united by a common cultural heritage. The ‘verkramptes’ represent mainly farming interests, and the ‘verligtes’ represent industrial interests with links with international capital.

The interests of the verkramptes lie in keeping black wages as low as possible, reflected in the fact that black agricultural wages are about one fifth of those in the industrial sector. The verligtes, on the other hand, are more aware of the need to boost productivity and stabilise the black workforce by raising wages and granting concessions over job reservation and trade union rights. They also see the black worker as a means of limiting the power of the white trade unions and reducing overall costs by upgrading Blacks into Whites’ jobs, while continuing to pay Blacks at their traditional lower rates.

The conflict of interests between verkramptes and verligtes is reflected in the contradictory policies that the Nationalist Government tries to follow. It has, for example, publicly committed itself a number of times to backing attempts by employers to reclassify jobs so that they are no longer reserved for Whites. Yet at the same time it is currently trying to enforce a law which makes it an offence for industrialists in most areas to employ more than 2 or 2.5 Blacks for every White.

Rigid

Already the contradictions in the Nationalist Party are becoming quite public. The concessions on the use of Afrikaans in schools, and the institution of limited-lease home ownership in black townships have led the verkramptes to fear ‘the downfall of the volk’. Thirty-six of them, led by Jaap Marais and Albert Hertzog, recently demonstrated on Vorster’s lawn and were arrested. They were freed after a night in jail, and no prosecutions were brought.

At the same time there have been several physical attacks directed at the verligtes rather than the ‘Blacks’. The offices of M.C. Botha, Minister of Bantu Education, who imposed the Afrikaans ruling, have been attacked, and R150,000 of damage caused by a secret organisation, modelled on the war-time fascist group ‘Ossewa Brandwag’. In common with other Nationalist newspapers, Beeld had been calling for greater concessions to Blacks.

In short, the problem facing Vorster is that to go too far in granting concessions would both fuel Blacks’ demands for political rights, and also cause a rebellion among the white trade unionists and employers who depend on apartheid in jobs for one of the highest standards of living in the world.

But the crisis in the Nationalist Party is only a reflection of the bigger crisis facing the white regime and the apartheid ideology. Vorster’s predecessor, Verwoerd, summed up the regime’s view of Blacks. ‘There is no place for him in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour. What is the use of teaching a Bantu child mathematics when it cannot use it in practice?’

Black resistance to the language issue was dramatically and rapidly escalated into total opposition to white rule and apartheid. The slogans and the attempts to demonstrate in the centre of the white towns show that black resistance cannot be bought off with petty concessions.

Too wide

Vorster knows that the demands already being raised in the townships will, if met, spell the death of apartheid. At the Nationalist Party’s Transvaal Congress in September 1976 he refused a multiracial convention on the grounds that it was designed to bring about one man one vote, and to destroy all the ‘beneficial measures’ that separate development had brought the country.

The gulf between white and black consciousness is too wide to bridge. We have had indications from sources close to the Cillie Commission that their ‘findings’ will attribute the unrest to white agitators outside the townships. Apartheid, and the high white standard of living that goes with it, can only be preserved by crushing the Blacks’ militancy. Black demands can only be achieved by destroying apartheid.

The future of South Africa lies between the ability of the security forces to destroy black resistance in the townships and trade unions, and the ability of that black resistance to survive.
THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE

Thursday 23 September In Johannesburg, the students decided to carry the protest into the white areas. The police knew of this, and all morning they stopped cars and searched trains coming out of Soweto.

Eugene Vilikazi was one of the thousands of workers travelling into Johannesburg that morning. He later made a sworn statement before a commissioner of oaths.

'The train was not running normally. It kept stopping ... We decided to hitchhike along the highway to Mlamlankuzi ... On our way we saw police in camouflage uniforms coming towards us. We heard the sound of bullets coming towards us. I neither saw nor heard loudspeakers warning us to disperse. One of the policemen shouted 'Skiet hom' (Shoot him).

'We were caught in the situation. We could not move forwards or backwards. The students stampeded off the road. Some women fell. I tried to assist them. The police stopped coming towards us in their vehicles, but they still kept shooting.

'I started running away. The bullets seemed to be concentrating on me. I then realised that a student I had met on the train was running with me. He was just in front of me. Almost immediately he fell. I went to him and saw that he had been shot through the back of the neck.

'The police had crossed the highway. I started running again. I was exhausted. They shot me in the leg. I fell near a big rock. A bullet hit the rock. They came towards me. I lay quite still. I heard one of them say 'Hulle is Klaar'; (They are finished). They went away.'

The Net

Vilikazi managed to struggle back onto a stationary train. But his troubles were not over. At New Canada station 'police boarded the train. They were looking for students. Some were arrested. The adults sat around me and gave me a newspaper. I pretended to read the paper and the police passed me by.'

Despite all these police precautions, some 1500 students managed to slip through their net and reach the centre of Johannesburg. In Jeppe and Eloff streets they unfurled their banners and chanted 'Kruger, release detainees'. Within minutes four police vehicles screeched to a halt, and launched a baton charge.
The march turned into a running battle between black demonstrators and police aided by gangs of white students. Windows were smashed and older people who could not get out of the way in time were trampled.

In Mzimhlope and Pholomong, uninhibited by the presence of Whites, the police used their guns at will. In the centre of Johannesburg, only batons were used. Four hundred Blacks were arrested according to the police — unofficial sources put the figure much higher. After they dispersed the crowd the police swept through the city picking up as many Blacks between the ages of 14 and 25 as they could.

At that very moment Mr Heunis was outlining his view of the problem to the Nationalist Party Conference in Port Elizabeth. Unemployment was the culprit, he argued and went on to say ‘there could not be talk of constitutional or evolutionary development in group relations unless there was economic progress (Star 23.10.76)

That day the police sealed off Alexandra again, searching cars, arresting people and refusing entry to journalists. Heavy gunfire was reported from the township, both that day and the following two.

### School Massacre

One police car drove to Mara Higher Primary school. The police emerged with their guns at the ready. Seeing this, the pupils, who were inside working quietly, panicked and fled towards the sports field. The police opened fire.

The school fence was trampled flat by the frantic school children, and the police drove straight over the fence in pursuit. They shot one child on the other side of the road from the school by a shop, and when other children tried to move his body, they opened fire again wounding many more.

‘The police parked their car next to the stores, got out and looked at the corpse before buying soft drinks.’ (RDM 1.10.76)

One policeman, not satisfied with this, went ‘patrolling’ on foot. This involved shooting several more students with his rifle, and wounding a 17 year old orphan standing in his back yard, who was not even at the school.

An ambulance collected some of the wounded, but many others refused to go in it, fearing further police victimisation.

Friday 24 September ‘At present the police have only used a soft hand in dealing with the rioters’ announces Connie Mulder, Minister of Information.

Late September and early October saw a comparative lull in the struggle, but increased police reprisals and detentions. Yet another layer of young Blacks identified as leaders of the consciousness movements were arrested, as well as black trade unionists and black journalists.

### Drinks Ban

Most of the activity of the young Blacks in the townships was in the campaign against the ‘shebeens’ and beer halls. The beerhalls are owned and run by the white Bantu Affairs Administration. They provide a major source of income, and a major drain on black wages. The shebeens are illegal beerhalls, tolerated by the police who get substantial rake-offs from them.

“There are more beer halls than schools and you find these beer halls are situated right in the terminals of the buses, stations and offices where you pay rent. So when your father comes home from work, he either goes to the beerhall or pays rent and when he goes home he is left with only 5 Rand . . . These beer halls are what is breaking them down and lowering the dignity of black people.’ (Barney)

At the end of September a slogan campaign began — using both persuasion and threats. ‘Less liquor, more education!’, ‘Away with boozers’, ‘No more liquor till next year, Please we need sympathy’, were some of the many wall slogans. On October 11, the liquor ban began. Shebeen keepers were asked and warned to close down. In one case a shebeen’s entire stock was emptied into the streets, while in another students agreed to postpone the ban for a week.

The approach to the hostel dwellers was a particular problem. ‘We were closing the shebeens on the first day among the residents, as distinct from the hostel dwellers. We needed a different approach for the hostels’, recorded one student.

### Plot Misfires

The police were once again trying to stir up trouble with the hostel dwellers. ‘There have been rumours of a backlash although there is no such thing’ said a group of Guguletu students.

‘On Tuesday we went to Nyango East where the hostels are’: The students allege that the hostel dwellers were told by the police to arm themselves because they were going to be attacked by the students.

“As we were passing from Guguletu to Nyanga East we came across a barricade. The people were armed with kieries and so forth. There were two camps. Our force and their force. There was a police car behind their lines.

“One of our students stepped forward and brushed his hands to show that he was unarmed. He wanted one of the hostel dwellers to come and speak. At that point a teargas canister was fired at the student and the police charged us’’ (Muslim News 22.10.76)

Besides attempting to create another backlash, an attempt which failed this time, police were busy attacking the anti-shebeen squads. ‘I noticed a half lame boy leaving the NY3 Shopping Centre. Just then a riot truck arrived. The kids in front of the shop scattered with a coloured policeman on their heels. The lame boy was left standing dumbfounded.

‘The coloured policeman with the green jersey over his uniform attacked the boy. The other riot policemen arrived and attacked the boy as well. He was attacked as he tried to free himself. When he tried to cross the road the police beat him up with their batons on the body, head and other parts until he collapsed.’ (Muslim News 22.10.76)
General David Kriel — top killer?

Continuing oppression.

Below: A mourner is shot dead at Mashabane’s funeral.

When the watching women protested the police answered ‘Are we supposed to smell that he is a cripple’ and later beat one of the women up. The crippled boy’s right eye was closed, his right arm swollen, and he can no longer sleep at night.

Confident

The anti-liquor campaign was overwhelmingly successful. The police failed to use hostel workers to aggravate tribal divisions in the townships. It marked a significant change in the political situation, so that a group of Guguletu students could say ‘We have gained the confidence of most of the community. People have realised what we are trying to achieve.’

A regular drinker said ‘What the kids are doing is right. They had to force a ban on shebeens because we lacked the will power to do so.’ The significance of the students’ ability to initiate and carry through such a campaign was not lost. ‘Our children have suddenly become politicised’, said one Cape Town father. ‘They feel the political stand their parents take is insincere. As parents we have achieved nothing. We have failed politically.’ (Weekend Argus 16.10.76)

In the Cape, seven out of the eight bottle stores were burnt down, and the other closed down. In Soweto prohibition was total.

The very success of the shebeen actions contributed to the police decision to escalate the violence once more — to
prove who really controlled the townships.

Sunday 17 October Police were unable to control a furious crowd of nearly 700 Blacks in Soweto after a mass funeral for a schoolboy. Sixteen year old Dumisani Mbatha had been missing from home since September 16, the day of the ships. Nearly 700 Blacks in Soweto after a mass funeral for a schoolboy. He had 'become ill' in jail — and died in police custody. At least seven other people are known to have died in police hands — many many more are still missing. Several thousands attended Mbatha's funeral. The City Engineer's Department was stoned, and 27 vehicles burnt.

Saturday 23 October The police were taking no chances. As the cortège at the funeral of Annah Mkhwanazi left the house, police attacked. They attacked the mourners with rifle butts — and fired indiscriminately on them as they fled. At least one person died with a police bullet in his back, ten were wounded and over 100 arrested. Chasing mourners, police entered houses and smashed their contents, making arrests with maximum violence.

Sunday 24 October The funeral of Jacob Mashabane, who allegedly hanged himself whilst in police custody, was scheduled to take place at mid-afternoon at Doornkop on the outskirts of Soweto. Well in advance the police cars had taken up positions in the cemetery, armed with shotguns and sub machine guns. As the crowd of four or five thousand mourners entered the cemetery, the police opened fire.

'Scores of screaming people managed to scurry through the fence and run for safety in the veld, while others battled through a swamp just outside the cemetery' reported an eye witness. The result of this unprovoked attack on the graveside crowd was six deaths, and well over over 50 seriously wounded.

'General Kriel said that through their prompt action yesterday, they had been able to prevent a recurrence of the damage caused last Sunday.' (Natal Mercury 25.10.76)

This funeral was one of six incidents of unrest reported that weekend. They ranged from Soweto, where police opened fire at two funerals, to Alexandra township where buses were stoned, and to the eastern Transvaal.

Mass Arrests

In late October and early November the townspeople were sealed off and raided by hundreds of police. They moved from house to house in an attempt, residents believe, to crush the Soweto Students Representative Council.

At Morris ISAACSON high school 60 children and 12 teachers were arrested and taken away in police vans. There were numerous cases of children being arbitrarily picked up on the streets. 'One father said that as he stood in his garden watching his eleven year old daughter and eight year old niece at the gate, two policemen in camouflage outfits scooped them up and took them away in a van. They were released the next day.' (Sunday Times 14.11.76)

Major General Kriel, the police officer in charge of 'riot control' denied that children were picked up without explanation and said that the arrests must have been connected with arson.

As a result of the police action hundreds of children fled from their homes, going to friends and relatives, moving from house to house each day, and being sent by worried parents to the rural areas.

By the end of the first week in November Soweto's 250 black schools were virtually empty. Many students also sought refuge in neighbouring countries. A Botswana government spokesman confirmed that since June more than 500 children had crossed the border, and over 150 were known to have fled to Swaziland.

Monday 1 November The Soweto Student Representative Council called a five day stay-at-home, but this time it did not succeed. Both Railways and buses reported normal services, and although the atmosphere was tense no incidents were reported.

The strike, called in sympathy with those in detention was ignored by the vast majority of workers. They agreed with the students' demands, but in conditions of starvation wages and chronic unemployment, the failure of the black consciousness movement to connect with the black trade unions meant that the breakdown of this tactic was inevitable. The fact that the better organised black workers, in the mines and in Natal, have not yet responded to the uprisings in the townships is also indicative of the gap between the young blacks and the trade unions.

Monday 8 November Figures compiled by the South African Institute of Race Relations show that 1,281 Blacks have been found guilty at trials arising out of the uprising. Of these 926 were under 18 years old. They were found guilty of public violence, riotous assembly, incitement, theft, housebreaking and arson.

Of those under 18, 528 were sentenced to receive between four and eight cuts with a cane. One hundred and thirty nine adults were also sentenced to caning. Typically, an eight year old child was sentenced to five cuts of the cane for 'attending an illegal gathering'.

At least another 2,915 Blacks are still awaiting trial. Those detained on 31 October included 25 office bearers of black consciousness organisations, 42 school children, 61 university students, 16 clergymen, 19 community programme workers, 21 teachers and lecturers and 13 juveniles.

The Christian Institute of South Africa, in its banned publication South Africa — a 'Police State?' claims that well over 2,600 people had been arrested between 16 June and 20 September.

'Swoop upon swoop was made, and among many others Mr Kenneth Rachidi was detained. He is the National President of the Black People's Convention (BPC) which is seen to be the political umbrella of the Black Consciousness Movement with more than 70 affiliated groupings ranging from scholar and student organisations to church and cultural movements. His arrest was followed by those of the remaining national leadership of BPC...
DEATH IN SOUTH AFRICA

Throughout the period covered by this report there were official admissions of 386 killed and 1500 injured as a result of police action. In nearly every incident it was quite clear to us that the official figure was a deliberate underestimate. In one night in Cape Town, for instance, doctors and staff at just two hospitals reported 70 deaths, while the official police figure for the whole city was nine deaths. The information used by CIS in the compilation of this report contains details of 456 deaths and 2,160 injured by police action. A Rand Daily Mail listing of named dead at the end of December 1976 gave a total of 499.

The true figure will never be known. Police officials say that the death toll is a matter of 'national security'. The fact is that thousands of Blacks are missing, and many have been given paupers' burials in unmarked graves. All our informants are convinced that well over a thousand have been killed by the security forces.

There is another side to the official statistics. Evidence given to the Cillie Commission by the senior state pathologist revealed that well over half of those shot by police around Johannesburg had been shot in the back.

The formidable list of organisations and groupings which have had their leadership clapped into prison range from BPC, the South African Students Organisation (SASO), the South African Students Movement (SASM), the Black Community Programme (BCM), the Black Women's Federation, the Soweto based Black Parents Association, Black church organisations, to individual black students.

Charges Changed

The Institute points out that many charges of public violence and arson are being changed to charges under the Sabotage Act of 1962, which carries a minimum sentence of five years. Members of the Institute have now been detained.

The third and fourth weeks of November were relatively quiet, though police searches for pupils continued in the townships. There were reports that the police were making checks using school registers. The exodus of fleeing pupils continued, and the South African police blocked the roads on the Swaziland and Lesotho borders, arresting many of those attempting to flee the country.

Monday 29 November In the Cape Town townships of Nyanga and Guguletu students mounted a new offensive against shebeens and informers, and also attempted to persuade contract workers living in hostels to join a strike due to start on 6 December. Fighting broke out between the contract workers and the students, giving the police an opportunity to cordon off the townships and conduct a house to house search for 'ringleaders'. Three hundred Africans were arrested.

Weekend December 4/5 The fighting between contract workers and demonstrators continued over the weekend. Two youths were killed and several houses burned down. Riot squads rushed in, firing on the crowds. At least five Africans were shot dead and 14 wounded. Dozens more were arrested.

Tuesday 7 December On this day official attempts were being made in Cape Town to end the four month
school boycott by 30,000 pupils in the city’s three African townships. “The boycott resulted in almost total absenteeism by high school pupils at the end-of-year examinations, not only in Cape Town but also in Johannesburg.” (Guardian 9.12.76)

The Director of Bantu education for the Cape Province was offering a special six-week intensive course, with exams in February, to enable pupils to catch up. Young black militants, however, were saying that there would be no return to school until the Bantu education system was abolished.

“The aim of Bantu education has been to arrest the Westernisation of the Africans, and withhold from them, particularly in white areas, positions or opportunities beyond the level of certain forms of menial labour.” (ibid)

Struggle Continues

December has seen the continuance of the government and police tactics against students, journalists and trade unionists. Since June at least 30 journalists have been silenced in South Africa by indefinite detention orders, and the authorities are now directing their attention at editors. The editor of the Daily Dispatch has been prosecuted, and the editor of The World interrogated.

“Surprisingly although school children in Soweto and Cape Town’s black locations have successfully organised several two- or three-day stay-aways from work, the country’s factories themselves have remained quiet. The one or two industrial disputes were not related to the Soweto upheavals.

“So it is all the more astonishing — and ominous — that the Government should have started to suppress the black labour movement. In the past few weeks it has banned 27 trade unionists and members of the university wages commissions.” (Financial Times 8.12.76)

Kruger claimed that none of the 27 were banned for their trade union work, but sceptical observers saw this as an attempt to mollify the international trade union movement, in view of the threat by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions to organise a blacklisting of South African transport and goods in January 1977. Meanwhile the bannings have hit the Metal and Allied Workers Union particularly hard, with its three top officials taken out of operation. This union has been fighting for union recognition in Leyland South Africa, a subsidiary of British Leyland, for the last three years. ‘All its efforts have met blunt refusal’ (Financial Times 8.12.76).

Whereas the silencing of individual trade unionists and journalists is a relatively simple matter for the security forces, the students present a different problem altogether. They are numerous, fearless, and their political awareness, mirrored by their organisational ability and the level of their demands, grows daily. Although hundreds have been killed, and thousands wounded and arrested, their voice has not been suppressed. The struggle continues.
The following sources were used in the preparation of this report:

**South African Newspapers:**
- The Star
- The Argus
- The World
- The Rand Daily Mail
- Sunday Times
- Muslim News
- Cape Times
- Sunday Tribune
- Die Transvaler
- Beeld
- The Garment Worker
- Cape Herald
- Sunday Express
- Natal Mercury
- Die Burger
- The Citizen

**South African Magazines**
- Financial Mail
- To the Point
- Drum
- Comment and Opinion
- South African Digest
- Sash - the Black Sash Magazine
- Bandwagon

**Other South African Sources**
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- Standard Bank Monthly Review
- South African House of Assembly Debates (Hansard)
- Report of the Transkei Study Project 1976
- University of Cape Town Student Representative Council
- 'Riot Information Service'
- Umnanyano (Wages Commission of the University of Cape Town) Baseball
- (Wages Commission of the University of Witwatersand)

**Books**
- Callinicos & Rogers, South Africa After Soweto, Pluto Press 1977.
- Christian Institute of South Africa, South Africa - A 'Police State',

**Interviews**
- Barney Makhatle and Tsietse Mashinini. Leading members of the Soweto Student Representative Council who fled Soweto and South Africa and are now in Britain. A number of other interviews were obtained from Blacks and Whites in South Africa.

**Other Sources**
- S.I.P.R. - Arms and the Third World.

**SUBSCRIBE**

**BACK COPIES STILL AVAILABLE**

- Racism Who Profits - the growth in racism as the recession hits home
- Women Under Attack
- Who's Next for the Chop
- Cutting the Welfare State (Who Profits)
- Where is Lucas Going?

- Unilever's World
- Your Money and Your Life
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Have collected an exhibition of photographs on the black uprising in South Africa. We are indebted to the Defence and Aid for the use of photographs from this exhibition and for information supplied. We are also grateful for access to the research facilities of the fund.

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United Nations, New York, U.S.A.

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ISBN: 0305-1242
1974

To arm Mirage F1-A pre-series aircraft

1974

All in service 1974

FRANCE Aircraft

1962

Aerospatiale Alouette II helicopter

6 in service 1974

1964

Dassault Mirage III-C all-weather interceptor
ground attack fighter

Arms: Matra R.530 AAM; all in service 1974

1965-66

54

Aerospatiale Alouette III helicopter

62 in service 1974

1965-66

20

Dassault Mirage III-E long-range fighter-bomber/intruder version

Arms: AS 20/30 ASM; all in service 1974

1966

4

Dassault Mirage III-R recce version of III-E

All in service 1974

1966-67

16

Aerospatiale Super Frelon multi-purpose helicopter

All in service 1974

1968

3

Dassault Mirage III-B trainer. 2 seater version of III-A pre-series aircraft

All in service 1974

1968

16

Aerospatiale Alouette III helicopter

62 in service 1974

1969-70

9

Transall C-160 (Fr/FRG) transport helicopter

$33m: all in service 1974

1970

3

Aerospatiale Alouette III helicopter

62 in service 1974

1970-71

20

SA 330 Puma (Fr/UK) transport helicopter

$27m: all in service 1974

1971

1

Dassault Mirage III version unknown

Replacement

1973

4

Dassault Mirage III-D trainer. 2 seater version of III-E

All in service 1974

1974

18

Dassault Mirage III-E fighter-bomber

Follow-up order mid-1972

1975

16

Dassault Mirage F1-C all-weather interceptor

First of 1971 licence prod. agreement for possible 100 units; all French-built delivery to start 1975

Second of 1971 licence prod. agreement: some components to be built by Atlas; first Atlas-produced FT to be completed in 1977

32

Dassault Mirage F1-A ground-attack fighter

Missiles

1963 (96)

Matra R.530 AAM

$4m: to arm Mirage III-C

1965-66 (60)

Nord AS. 20 and AS. 30 ASM

To arm 6 Wasp helicopters

To arm Panhard APCs

Pre-production types: deployed along border with Mozambique; production in France to South African specifications: R&D financed to 85% by South Africa

To arm Mirage FI

1975

Matra R.550 Magic AAM

Ordered early 1974. South Africa one of the first customers

1975

Milan (FR/FRG) portable ATM

To arm Super Frelon helicopters: ordered 1974

1977

Aerospatiale AM 39 Exocet air-launched AS missile

Armoured Vehicle

1963

Panhard AML-60 and AML-90 AC

Prior to licence production

1952-54

50

HS Vampire FB. 5 fighter

27

HS Vampire T.55 trainer

(1955) (5)

Auster A.O.P. monoplane

(1955) 9

HS 104 Devon C Mk 1 light transport

(1955) 2

HS 114 Heron transport

1957

8

HS Avro 696 Shackleton Mk 3 maritime recce/bomber

1959

1

Vickers Viscount 781 transport

1962

6

BAC Canberra B(I) Mk 12 bomber

1964

6

Westland Wasp HAS Mk 1 ASW helicopter

1965

3

BAC Canberra T Mk 4 trainer

1965

16

HS Buccaneer S. Mk 50 strike/bomber

1966

4

Westland Wasp HAS Mk 1 ASW helicopter

1969

4

HS 125 "Mercurius" transport

1971

3

HS 125 "Mercurius" transport

1973-74

6

Westland Wasp HAS Mk 1 ASW helicopter

Armoured Vehicle

(1950) (40)

Comet medium tank

Centurion Mk 5 main battle tank

(1956-60) 250

Saracen APC

(1963-64) (60)

Ferret AC

Warships

1950

1

Destroyer "W"-class: "Jan van Riebeeck"

1952

1

Destroyer "W"-class: "Simon van der Stel"

1954

1

Seward defence ship, "Ford"-class: "Gelderland"

1955

1

Seward defence ship, "Ford"-class: "Nautilus"

1955

1

Escort minesweeper, "Tom" class

1956-62 (6)

ASW frigate type 15: "Vrystaat"

1963

2

ASW frigate type 12, "President"-class: "President Kruger", "President Steyn"

1963

1

ASW frigate type 15: "Vrystaat"

1963-64

2

ASW frigate type 12, "President"-class: "President Kruger", "President Steyn"

1955-59 (168)

1

Destroyer "W"-class: "Jan van Riebeeck"

1952

1

Destroyer "W"-class: "Simon van der Stel"

1954

1

Seward defence ship, "FORD"-class: "Gelderland"

1955

1

Seward defence ship, "FORD"-class: "Nautilus"

1955

1

Escort minesweeper, "Tom" class

1956

1

ASW frigate type 15: "Vrystaat"

1963

2

ASW frigate type 12, "President"-class: "President Kruger", "President Steyn"
### Warships

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<td>1970-72</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Submarine, &quot;Daphne&quot; type: &quot;Emily Hobhouse&quot; new &quot;Johanna van der &quot;Kerwe&quot; &quot;Marta van Riebeeck&quot;</td>
<td>Displ. 500t: $37.8m: Under construction 1973: unconfirmed</td>
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<td>1978</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>&quot;Agosta&quot;-class submarine</td>
<td>Displ: 1 200t: u.c. $30.7m: order 1975</td>
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### Aircraft

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<td>1950</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Lockheed P-3V Neptune maritime recce/bomber</td>
<td>Not in service 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Sikorsky S-51 helicopter</td>
<td>Not in service 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Douglas C-47 transport</td>
<td>Mill. version of DC-3: all in service 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Sikorsky S-55 helicopter</td>
<td>Not in service 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sikorsky S-55 helicopter</td>
<td>Not in service 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Cessna 185 Skywagon multi-purpose monoplane</td>
<td>Assigned to Army and Citizen Force: to be replaced by AM.3C from 1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Lockheed C-130B Hercules transport</td>
<td>All in service 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Cessna 320 Skynight multi-purpose monoplane</td>
<td>Not in service 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Cessna 185 Skywagon multi-purpose monoplane</td>
<td>Assigned to Army and Citizen Force: to be replaced by AM.3C from 1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Douglas C-54 transport</td>
<td>Mill. version of DC-4: all in service 1974</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Missiles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>AIM-9 Sidewinder AAM</td>
<td>To arm Sabre fighters: not in service 1974</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Armoured Vehicle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1957-58</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>M-3 AC</td>
<td>All in service 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>V-150 Commando APC</td>
<td>Unconfirmed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Italy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>AL-60F5 (USA/It) light-utility transport</td>
<td>Resold to Rhodesia same year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Piaggio P.166S &quot;Albatross&quot; search and surveillance version of P.166 light transport</td>
<td>All in service 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Atlas &quot;Impala I&quot; (M.B. 326K) light-strike version of M.B. 326</td>
<td>First of licence production agreement: 6 delivered complete. 15 as knocked-down parts, rest as partly-finished components</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Aermacchi AM. 3C general purpose monoplane</td>
<td>U.C.= $120,000, fully equipped: ordered 1972, delivered delayed, factory: to replace Cessna 185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Piaggio P.166S search and surveillance version of P.166 light-transport</td>
<td>Ordered 1972</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Argentina

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Atlas &quot;Bobok&quot; (Aeritalia AM. 3C) general purpose monoplane</td>
<td>Licence production: being supplied in component form for local assembly: order 1971</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Canada

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### FR Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Dornier Do 27B general-purpose monoplane</td>
<td>Not in service 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td></td>
<td>MBB BO 105 helicopter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>'Airbus' Transport</td>
<td>To go into service with SAAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNIMOG vehicles</td>
<td>South African Army In service 1976</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Portugal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Corvette &quot;Joao Couthino&quot;-class</td>
<td>Displ: 1250t: ordered 1975: known as Project &quot;Taurus&quot;: to be built in Portugal on FRG licence: missile-equipped: may have been cancelled after April 1974 change of regime in Portugal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Denmark

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tanker &quot;Tafelberg&quot;</td>
<td>Displ. 12 500t: launched 1958 carries helicopters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Israel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td></td>
<td>Gabriel SS missile</td>
<td>Order announced mid- 1974: to equip 4 ships</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Armoured Vehicle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Centurion Mk 5 main battle tank</td>
<td>Ex-UK: 100 in service 1974</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Jordan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>Tigercat SAM system</td>
<td>Delivery incl. 555 combat missiles. 162 practice missiles, launchers, maintenance equipment: resale to Rhodesia expected: ex-UK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Armoured Vehicle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Centurion main battle tank</td>
<td>Resale to Rhodesia expected: ex-UK, refurbished</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX XIII

UNITED NATIONS
OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

With the compliments
of the
Chief of Mission
of the
Washington Liaison Office

Dear Mr. Matthews:

For your information.

Chris Thorne
Liaison Officer
OVERALL REQUIREMENTS OF IMMEDIATE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR THE REINSTALLATION
AND REHABILITATION OF RETURNEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS WITHIN ZIMBABWE UNDER THE
COORDINATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES

A. REINSTALLMENT (1 April 1980 - 30 September 1980)

Provision of:
- transport to home districts;
- shelter through self-help schemes for the construction of
  traditional dwellings;
- resettlement package comprising domestic equipment, utensils
  and immediate needs;
- agricultural implements, seeds, fertilizers, tillage
  equipment and animal pens and dips;
- training and re-orientation by local agricultural extension
  workers.

B. FOOD (May 1980 - April 1981)

(i) Provision, through WFP, the EC and other sources, for a 12-month Emergency
    Programme comprising 3 or 4 items, ideally for delivery to central stores
    against free distribution locally of equivalent quantities stored locally.

(ii) Provision of logistical support for the internal distribution of food.

(iii) Local procurement of supplementary food for vulnerable groups on a
     limited basis.

C. HEALTH (1 April 1980 - 31 March 1981)

(i) Repair of basic health facilities at rural/village level (dispensaries,
    clinics, hospitals, mobile clinics).

(ii) Provision of medical equipment and supplies to rural health facilities.

(iii) Provision and training of medical personnel and auxiliaries.

(iv) Immunisation programme.

D. EDUCATION (1 April 1980 - 31 March 1981)

(i) Repair and reactivation of church and governmental schools.

(ii) Provision of books and educational materials.

E. WATER (1 April 1980 - 31 March 1981)

Renovation or repair of damaged domestic water supplies.

F. ROADS (1 April 1980 - 31 March 1981)

Repair of rural access roads and bridges.

G. SOCIAL SERVICES

Specialized facilities for the handicapped, orphans and aged.

H. PROGRAMME RESERVE AND PROGRAMME SUPPORT AND ADMINISTRATION

27F 139/4 P 8/11

3/10
ASSUMPTIONS:

1. Of the 660,000 potential beneficiaries, 60,000 are single persons outside a family unit and 600,000 are in 100,000 family units of 6 persons (3 adults and 3 children).

2. Almost all of the 660,000 potential beneficiaries will return to rural areas.

3. Shelter will be of traditional construction made of locally provided material and construction on a self-help basis.

4. Beneficiaries will be provided with the basics for subsistence farming:
   - a summer crop package
   - a winter crop package
   - hand implements
   - limited mechanical tillage equipment
   - pens and dips for animal husbandry
   - supplies for animal disease control

5. The emphasis in the Health Sector will be towards the repair of Government and church clinics and hospitals for the provision of primary health care and in-patient facilities.

6. The emphasis in the Education Sector will be on the repair of primary schools including provision of equipment and supplies.

7. The repair of water supply systems will be for domestic and subsistence farming purposes.

8. The repair of roads will concentrate on non-tarmac access roads and bridges in rural areas.

OVERALL COSTING:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>RHS</th>
<th>US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Resettlement:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) Transport</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>80,030,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Shelter</td>
<td>10,400,000</td>
<td>370,072,144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Domestic package</td>
<td>11,200,000</td>
<td>398,941,987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv) Agricultural package</td>
<td>27,500,000</td>
<td>949,775,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(v) Training</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>3,536,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>52,100,000</td>
<td>1,829,518,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Food</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>3,536,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Health</td>
<td>7,600,000</td>
<td>26,674,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Education</td>
<td>5,500,000</td>
<td>19,348,541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Water</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>5,356,098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Roads</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>3,536,098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Social Services</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>3,536,098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Reserve and Programme Support</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>7,072,197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>71,700,000</td>
<td>248,061,577</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: United Nations exchange rate; RHS 1.00 equals US$ 1,536.
## Costing by Sector and Component

### A. Resettlement

1. **Transport to home districts:**
   - Group transportation at the rate of RFS 0.50 per kilometer per bus of 50 persons for an average journey of 300 km.
   - **RHS**
   - **US$**
   - **3,072,197**

2. **Shelter**
   - Provision of traditional construction materials at RHS 40 per hut:
     - 1 hut per single person .............. 2,400,000
     - 2 huts per family ..................... 8,600,000
   - **15,975,423**

3. **Domestic resettlement package**
   - Single persons x RHS 20.- .............. 1,200,000
   - Families x RHS 100.- .................. 10,000,000
   - **17,204,301**

4. **Agricultural package**
   - (a) Winter vegetable package:
     - RHS 10 per family .................... 1,000,000
   - (b) Summer crop package
     - RHS 140 per family ................... 14,000,000
   - (c) Agricultural implement package
     - 4,600,000
   - (d) Mechanical tillage equipment
     - 500,000
   - (e) Animal husbandry
     - 6,000,000
   - (f) Animal disease control
     - 1,000,000
   - (g) Training programme
     - 1,000,000
   - **42,242,704**

### B. Food

1. Logistical cost of food distribution including transport and storage facilities
   - **300,000**

### C. Health

1. **Repair of damaged clinics and hospitals**:
   - (a) 65 government clinics x RHS 5,000 .... 325,000
   - (b) 35 church clinics x RHS 5,000 ....... 175,000
   - **500,000**

2. **Repair of damaged rural hospitals**:
   - (a) 20 government hospitals x RHS 100,000 2,000,000
   - (b) 30 church hospitals x RHS 100,000 .... 3,000,000
   - **5,000,000**
(iii) Re-equipment of reactivated clinics:
  (including supplies)
Initial capital and running costs at
RHS 5,000 per clinic ................................ 500,000
(iv) Immunisation programme .......................... 1,600,000

D. EDUCATION

(1) Repair of damaged primary schools:
   (a) 200 government schools x RHS 20,000 .... 4,000,000
   (b) 20 church schools x RHS 20,000 ...... 400,000

(ii) Re-equipment of primary schools:
  (including supplies)
Initial capital and running costs
  at RHS 5,000 ........................................ 1,100,000

E. WATER

Renovation or repair of water supplies ............... 1,500,000

F. ROADS

Repair of rural access roads and bridges ............ 1,000,000

G. SOCIAL SERVICES

H. RESERVE AND PROGRADY SUPPORT

RHS 71,700,000  USS 110,138,248
QUESTIONNAIRE: RE-ASSESSMENT OF NEEDS AND RESOURCES FOR SOUTH AFRICAN REFUGEES IN TANZANIA AND BOTSWANA

PROPOSED HYPOTHESIS

This questionnaire is to center around the needs of South African refugees in Tanzania or Botswana. The project is aimed at offering social welfare services to South African refugees in Tanzania or Botswana because they do not have easy access in utilizing the services of their various host countries, namely Tanzania, Botswana and Zambia. The target population is the South African refugee.

IDENTIFICATION OF CONCEPTS TO BE MEASURED

1. Personal Data: Age, Sex, Marital Status, Children, Income, Environmental Background.
2. Reasons for migrating.
3. Choice of relocation sites.
4. Reception indices (Government and Community)
5. Assistance needed.
6. Assistance received.
7. Present state of condition.
8. Program recommendation.
9. What skills did you have upon arrival in host country.
10. How was these skills utilized.

PROCEDURE

1. Oral, i.e., the researcher will conduct oral interviews.
2. Self-administered - i.e., the sample population will write down their individual answers.
13. If there was an organization that could have utilized your skills would you have stayed in the host country?
   a. No
   b. Yes
   c. Other

14. How many countries have you resided in since your departure from South Africa. Did these countries utilize your skills.
   a. No
   b. Yes
   c. Other

ADDRESSING AND ASSESSING SOCIAL AND WELFARE NEEDS

15. What types of shelter were provided for you in the host country?
   a. Rooms
   b. Houses
   c. Hotel accommodations

16. What type of assistance did you initially seek for when you arrived in host country?
   a. Educational assistance
   b. Welfare assistance
   c. Other

17. What type of assistance was most readily available for you?
   a. Educational
   b. Welfare
   c. Other

18. How did you go about attaining help?
   a. Government agencies
   b. International agencies
   c. Other (Specify)

19. What resources (welfare, educational, health, political) were available to you?
   a. All
   b. Some
   c. None

20. How were they made available?
   a. Direct
   b. Indirect
   c. Other (Specify)