Israel's policies in the West Bank and Gaza: a study of underdevelopment, 1967-1986

Ali Jalal Abed
Atlanta University

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.auctr.edu/dissertations

Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
This dissertation centers on the impact of Israeli policies in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip between 1967 and 1986. The focus of the study is to determine the effects of Israeli laws and practices on four major aspects of life in the occupied areas: political, economical, educational and demographical.

The methodology employed in this research comprised a descriptive and comparative analysis of Jordanian rule over the territories with that of Israeli occupational policies. To substantiate our thesis, we examined a number of indicators under each area of discussion using statistical data, governmental documents, newspaper accounts, and personal interviews whenever that was possible. The data collected from Palestinian, Israeli, and independent sources confirmed the research hypothesis which contended that Israeli policies were largely responsible for the underdevelopment of the West Bank and Gaza in several areas of life besides economics.

The significance of the study lies in the fact that it demonstrated unequivocally that Israel's occupational policies were systematic, coherent, and had aims far beyond the routine goals of political domination and economic
exploitation which are salient features of colonialism. According to the collected data, the ultimate Israeli objective in the occupied territories was not merely to benefit economically from its underdevelopmental policies but rather to use them as an instrument to tear down the fabric of Palestinian society and subsequently de-Palestinianize the West Bank and Gaza.

Our findings indicated, however, that the debilitating effects of the Israeli policies on the occupied territories were bound to radicalize the captive Palestinian population and bring about further resistance to the occupation. In the meantime, underdevelopment of the West Bank and Gaza will continue until the occupation itself is terminated.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank my advisor, Dr. Robert Holmes, for his support and guidance throughout the planning and implementation of this study. I am also indebted to Dr. William Boone, Dr. Makidi-ku-Ntima, and Dr. Hashim Gibrill for their advice and constructive criticism in the writing of this work. My thanks go to the many individuals who contributed to this investigation but who wished to remain anonymous for fear of retribution by the Israeli occupation authorities. I am particularly grateful to Mr. Bassam Shakaa, Mayor of Nablus, and Mr. Ibrahim al-Tawil, Mayor of Al-Bireh, for giving me so much of their valuable time. My thanks also go to my brother, Rebhi, for supplying me with local newspapers and other pertinent materials after I concluded my trip to occupied Palestine. Thanks are due to the Organization of Arab Studies in Jerusalem, the offices of the Law in the Service of Man in Ramallah, the West Bank, and to the Palestine Research Center as well as to the Palestine Studies Institute of Washington, D.C., for their invaluable assistance in this endeavor. I would also like to express my gratitude to my beloved wife, Yursa, and my son, Jawhar, for their unfailing support throughout this period of study. Finally, this work is dedicated to my parents, Zakieh and Jalal Johar Abed, and to all the steadfast people of occupied Palestine.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acknowledgments</th>
<th>ii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables in Text</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Maps</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chapter**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statement of the Problem</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conceptual Framework</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outline of Study</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of the Literature</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance of Study</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. The Jordanian Period</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Aspects</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Aspects</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Israeli Occupation and Political Repression</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framework of Military Rule</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Resistance and Israeli Repression</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. The Economics of Israeli Occupation</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial Pattern</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard of Living</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Education Under Israeli Occupation</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of Higher Education in the West</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank and Gaza</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student Harassment</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculty Harassment</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closure of Educational Institutions</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Censorship</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constraints on Expansion</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Demographical Changes</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Emigration</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expulsions</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercion</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imprisonment and Physical Force</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Services</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli Colonization</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annexation</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Confiscation and Expropriation</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli Settlements</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF TABLES IN TEXT

Table

1. Volume of Production of various Agricultural Products of the West Bank .......... 93
2. Distribution of Industries in the West Bank By Areas and Number of Workers in 1979 & 1981 ............................................. 95
3. West Bank Imports According to Countries Imports From and Type of Products for the Years 1981, 1982, 1983 ......................... 104
4. West Bank Exports According to Countries Exported To And Type of Products for the Years 1981, 1982, 1983 ................................. 105
5. West Bank and Gaza Households Possessing Durable Goods for Selected Years .......... 111
6. Area of Buildings That Were Constructed In The West Bank According to Ownership For Various Years ................................................. 112
7. Institutes of Higher Education On The West Bank By Location and Year of Founding As of June 1967 ............................................. 117
8. West Bank and Gaza's Institutions of Higher Education, Date of Founding, and Present Status ................................................................. 119
9. Closings of Educational Institutions On The West Bank By the Occupation Authorities From February to May of 1979 ......................... 132
10. Closure of West Bank Universities Between March 1979 and May 1985 .................. 133
11. Hospitals and Hospitalization By Region For Selected Years ............................... 156
12. Distribution of Confiscated Palestinian Land Surrounding Jerusalem By Size, Location, And Benefiting Jewish Settlements ...................... 163
13. Number of Jewish Settlements According to Location In Various Regions of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the Year of Establishment ....................... 174
14. Number of Jewish Settlers in the West Bank For the Years 1975-1985 .................... 175

LIST OF MAPS

Maps

- Map of Palestine ................................................. v
COUNTRY DIVISIONS

ARMISTICE LINES 1949

CEASEFIRE LINES 1967

Occupied in 1948

Occupied in 1967

EGYPT

JORDAN

PALESTINE

LEBANON

SYRIA

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

ISRAEL

DEAD SEA

WEST BANK

JERUSALEM

NABLUS

BETHLEHEM

HOTEL

ACRE

TIBERIAS

NAZARETH

LAKETIBERIAS

GOLAN HEIGHTS

JORDAN

EGYPT

PALESTINE
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

In 1948 the Zionist movement succeeded in occupying most of Palestine and in creating the state of Israel in the area. The two regions of Palestine that remained under Arab control were the eastern sector and the Gaza strip, with the former being the larger and more populous of the two. Shortly afterwards, the eastern sector of Palestine was annexed by Jordan and came to be known as the West Bank, and the Gaza strip fell under Egyptian administration. In 1967, Israel invaded these two territories and brought them under its occupation. Unlike the Sinai of Egypt or the Golan Heights of Syria, which were also occupied by Israel in 1967, the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza has evoked more controversy, received more media attention, and has remained the thorniest issue in resolving, even on a limited scale, the Arab-Israeli conflict.

As one begins to ponder the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza from 1967 to 1986, the period under study, one is bound to ask some pertinent questions regarding the rationale for the occupier's policies as well as their effects on the indigenous population of the subjugated area. Questions that are likely to arise are the following: Why did the West Bank's Palestinian population fail to increase appreciably in spite of its high birth rate? To what extent had the occupied territory's economy been integrated into Israel's economy? Who was benefiting from that arrangement? On the political level, why did Israel refuse to accept the Palestinian leadership which came to power in the West Bank and Gaza through elections run under its own auspices? How successful had Israel
been in finding an alternative Palestinian leadership to the Palestine Liberation Organization? On the educational plane, what did Israel hope to gain by suppressing the Palestinians' educational institutions in the occupied territories? Also, to what extent had the building of Jewish settlements on the West Bank affected the demography of the area? And finally, were the Israeli policies and practices formulated in a haphazard manner, or were they deliberately designed to bring about underdevelopment in the occupied territories?

It is not the intent of this work to chronicle every aspect of the Arab-Israeli dispute nor to dwell on possible solutions to this vexing problem. The purpose of this endeavor is to assess the impact of the Israeli occupation on the West Bank and Gaza in the areas of economics, politics, education, and demography. Although this study will concentrate on the occupied territories of the 1967 War, particularly the West Bank, it is nearly impossible to discuss them in complete isolation from the rest of Palestine. Hence, occasional reference will be made to the territory which was occupied in 1948 whenever thought to be functional.

Hypothesis

The hypothesis of this work is that the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, through its laws and practices, had largely contributed to the underdevelopment of the said territories in the areas of economics, politics, education, and demography. It seems that whenever attention is given to certain Israeli policies in the occupied territories such as laws regarding residency and traveling, the expropriation of land, the building of Jewish settlements, denial of political freedom, closing of universities and the like, these policies are almost always discussed independently of each other. It is the contention of this writer that many, if not all, of these policies are interrelated and have caused significant
changes in the occupied territories to warrant an in-dept study of their effects on
the West Bank and Gaza.

Obviously, the thrust of this work will be focused on the impact of the
Israeli occupation on the specified areas under study. Nevertheless, to determine
the effects of the occupation and simultaneously test the stated hypothesis, it
will be inevitable to compare the prewar conditions with the postwar conditions.
In doing so, this work will attempt to specifically reveal the extent of the role
which Israeli laws and practices have played in causing such conditions. The
study will also attempt to answer the two questions which make-up the nucleus of
its antithesis. First, what logical rationale could be offered to explain the
relative improvement in the standard of living on the West Bank during the Israeli
occupation? And second, what argument could satisfactorily explain the seeming
contradiction of the proliferation of colleges and universities in a milieu of
underdevelopment?

Conceptual Framework

The parameters of this study are largely set by the above hypothesis. To
avoid obfuscation, two main concepts in the hypothesis require further
clarification so that the reader will appreciate their contextual meaning. The two
concepts are "occupation" and "underdevelopment." The concept of occupation in
this study refers to the Israelis' conduct toward the Palestinians in the West Bank
and Gaza in terms of laws and practices. The differentiation between laws and
practices is made here because on many occasions Israeli practices in the
occupied areas exceeded the realm of Israeli laws. The term "practices"
embraces governmental and non-governmental sanctions. Nevertheless, since
these practices did affect the Palestinian population within the occupied
territories, they deserve to be looked at with equal scrutiny to those of Israeli laws.

The concept of "underdevelopment" in this study does not merely mean a failure to reach an anticipated potential level but connotes decline and stagnation as well. Furthermore, in reference to countries or areas such as the West Bank and Gaza, the term underdevelopment suggests exploitation of one group by another and lack of control by the exploited over its human and material resources. Like most economic issues, the concept of underdevelopment has attracted both socialist and non-socialist writers. Non-socialist writers, on the one hand, tend to view the problem of underdevelopment merely as domination of one economy by another. Socialist writers, on the other hand, contend that the precepts of underdevelopment are directly linked to capitalism, imperialism and colonialism. In this regard, Walter Rodney minced no words when he stated:

A second and even more indispensable component of modern underdevelopment is that it expresses a particular relationship of exploitation: namely, the exploitation of one country by another. All of the countries named as 'underdeveloped' in the world are exploited by others; and the underdevelopment with which the world is now preoccupied is a product of capitalist, imperialist, and colonialist exploitation.¹

The symbiotic relationship between capitalism and underdevelopment was clearly articulated by Andre Gunder Frank in his work Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. He said:

Economic development and underdevelopment are the opposite sides of the same coin. Both are the necessary result and contemporary manifestation of internal contradictions in the world capitalist system . . . One and the same historical process of

the expansion and development of capitalism throughout the world has simultaneously generated - and continues to generate - both economic development (in the capitalist core states) and structural underdevelopment (in the dependent peripheral states).²

Echoing a similar sentiment, Ernest Mandel had observed:

While capitalism has spread all over the world, the greater part of the world has experienced only its disintegrating effects without benefiting from its creative side. Indeed, the unlimited industrial advance of the Western world has been possible only at the expense of the so-called underdeveloped world which has been doomed to stagnation and regression.³

While the collected data of this investigation conclusively confirmed the socialist analysis of underdevelopment, the concept appeared to beget a characteristically unique connotation under the imprint of Israeli occupation. What differentiated the underdevelopment of the West Bank and Gaza from other colonial and neo-colonial settings was its underlying purpose. On the face of it, Israeli occupational policies appeared to be seeking political subjugation and economic domination of the occupied territories. Closer examination, however, indicated that the orchestrated underdevelopment of the West Bank and Gaza was used as a vehicle for a more sinister goal - to de-Palestinianize the occupied areas. It is this particular feature which distinguished the Israeli underdevelopment of the occupied territories from virtually all others in recent history.

Before assessing the effects of Israeli policies and practices on the West Bank and Gaza, it is necessary to at least briefly describe the conditions which


existed in the said areas prior to the occupation. This is essential if we are to understand the extent of transformation which occurred under Israeli occupation. As Walter Rodney pointed out, underdevelopment invariably entails comparisons. Once the conditions on the West Bank and Gaza prior to June 5, 1967 have been clearly described, it becomes imperative to begin studying the data which links Israeli laws and practices to the underdevelopment of the occupied territories.

The concept of occupation rests on two independent variables: laws and practices. The laws affecting the occupied areas are literally hundreds of military orders pertaining to all aspects of life. However, since many of the more recent military orders are modifications of earlier orders and the fact that scores of orders simply deal with relatively minor matters relating to a specific locale, our interest in this study will focus on the orders which had the greatest impact on the indigenous populace in the areas of demography, economics, politics and education — the dependent variables of underdevelopment. The same process will be followed in evaluating the effects of Israeli practices on the dependent variables of underdevelopment. The components of this second independent variable are basically actions, some of which are violent, carried out by non-governmental groups or individuals noted for their extremism. This particular element plays a major role in increasing the fear factor in the occupied territories and subsequently increases emigration among the Palestinians. Thus, this independent variable is directly linked to the dependent demographic variable.

As for underdevelopment, its dependent variables (demography, economics, politics, and education) must be operationalized to confirm or reject our hypothesis. The most obvious measurement for the demographic variable is the emigration factor. The proliferation of Jewish settlements is another equally
clear measurement. The economic variable can be measured in terms of decline in industrial growth, reduction in cultivated land, unemployment, and the extremely slow growth of new businesses. Political underdevelopment could be measured by the number of elections held in the occupied territories since 1967, the degree of free political expression, and the Israeli treatment of the locally-elected Palestinian leadership. The educational variable will be measured by looking at the number of forced closings of colleges and universities, the degree of censorship throughout the educational system, and the stringent regulations imposed on faculty and administrators. As each variable is discussed, comparisons with the pre-1967 conditions will be made and all findings will be noted.

Methodology

Since the hypothesis of this work contends that the Israeli occupation was largely responsible for the underdevelopment of the West Bank and Gaza, it becomes essential that the conditions of the four areas under study be fully explained as they existed prior to the occupation as well as under it. Hence, the methodological approach used in this endeavor is basically a comparative analysis of the economical, political, educational, and demographical conditions that existed in the West Bank and Gaza on the eve of the 1967 War with the most recent data available today on the same areas.

This study employed the following methods for generating data:
1) Literary review and content analysis of government documents, books, journals, and newspapers 2) Discussion with Palestinians from various parts of the occupied areas including students, businessmen, college administrators, and deported mayors. While these individuals may not constitute a representative
sample of the West Bank population, their testimonies and observations provided me with valuable insights on the effects of Israeli policies in their respective fields. For the most part, gathering of data from the field was not an easy task. The very nature of a military occupation, with its attendant restrictions on speech and travel, had hampered, to some degree, my ability to collect information with ease. While there was no difficulty in speaking with ex-mayors whose views were well-known, the situation was vastly different in canvassing the attitudes of common folk Palestinians. This latter group, while willing to share information and give honest reaction to questions about the occupation's impact on their lives, was generally reluctant to be identified by name and visibly uncomfortable by the sight of paper and pen in the hands of the interviewer. Many of those interviewed told this writer that they did not wish their identities revealed for fear of jeopardizing their business licenses, identity cards, or travel permits. Others were concerned that their identification in print would lead to imprisonment, physical harm, or deportation. Whether these fears were real or imagined, they, along with other general restrictions, were sufficient to preclude me from carrying out a scientific survey or even quoting many of these interviewed by name. Therefore, the use of random sampling and unstructured interviews seemed to be the most productive tools for gathering and distilling field information under the circumstances. Employing this method, over three hundred people in various walks of life were interviewed by this writer on the West Bank and Gaza in the course of this investigation.

For the prewar period, Jordanian sources were studied to ascertain the population growth and economic status of the West Bank and Gaza. Similarly, for the postwar period, Israeli records and reports published by the Central Bureau of Statistics were consulted along with other sources to determine any economic or
demographic changes. In the areas of politics and education, various sources were utilized for both the prewar and postwar periods. Among the economic variables compared were the agricultural output, industrial expansion, tourism, construction, and the gross domestic product. In the political arena, the comparison entailed scrutinizing the degree of freedom enjoyed by the local governments in running their affairs, number of local elections held, and the constraints placed on the freedoms of speech, press, and assembly.

Educationally, the variables considered were the closing of schools, extent of censorship, and other restraints on academic freedom. Unstructured interviews of academicians and administrators were used to obtain data in this field. The demographic variables included Palestinian emigration and the growth of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. While census reports and statistical abstracts were used to extract the quantitative aspect of this area, other sources were employed to clarify the qualitative aspect of it. Throughout this comparative analysis, it was indispensable to identify and discuss the relevant Israeli laws and practices and determine the correlation, if any, between them and underdevelopment in the four areas under study.

Outline of Study

This study is organized into seven chapters. Chapter One provides the framework for this effort. Chapter Two focuses on the economic and political developments in the West Bank and Gaza between 1948 and 1967. This is essential if we are to be cognizant of the conditions that prevailed in the said areas prior to the Israeli occupation. It is data collected on the latter part of this period which will be instrumental in determining whether the occupied territories experienced development or underdevelopment under Israeli control. Chapter
Three scrutinizes the impact of Israeli policies on the political life of the occupied territories. The main components of this chapter encompass a review of the constraints on political activities imposed by the military commander of the occupied areas and Israel's search for an alternate Palestinian leadership to the Palestine Liberation Organization. The second component of this chapter includes a discussion of the 1976 municipal elections and the creation of the Village Leagues. The fourth chapter examines the effects of the Israeli occupation on the economy of the West Bank and Gaza. It entails looking closely at the military orders and restrictions which had bearings on both agriculture and industry.

Chapter Five provides an examination of the effects of the Israeli occupation on the educational aspects of the West Bank and Gaza. The aim here is to study the cultural dimension of underdevelopment under Israeli occupation. Chapter Six dwells on the occupation's effects on the physical and human resources of the West Bank and Gaza. The chapter highlights the most pernicious features of the occupation — Palestinian expulsions, expropriation of land and water resources, and the building of Jewish settlements.

Finally, Chapter Seven gives a summary and conclusion of the study. The objective here is to assess the data presented and to convey a picture of the true nature and workings of the Israeli occupation.

Review of the Literature

A tremendous body of literature has been written on the Arab-Israeli conflict from both sides of the fence as well as from third and independent parties. The gigantic task of sifting through this incredible amount of literature for relevant data is further complicated by the differing views presented and by
the biases of the authors.

Notwithstanding the various viewpoints, most works dealing with the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza tend to fall under one of two broad categories: either as part of the macro-historical perspective of the Arab-Israeli conflict as a whole or within the micro-view of just one of its facets. Although the macro approach tends to deal with the occupation chiefly as a link in the long chain of the Arab-Israeli struggle, it serves a most useful purpose for those who seek to comprehend how the occupation fits into that struggle. The advantage of the micro-view approach, however, lies in the fact that the focus is generally limited to one aspect of the occupation thus lending itself to much greater detail than found in the macro approach.

One of the earliest works that examined the Israeli occupation from the macro-historical perspective was Khalid Kistainy's *Wither Israel? A Study of Zionist Expansionism* (1970). This work was based on Israeli and Zionist sources and dealt with the early history of Palestine as well as with Israeli policies in the areas occupied following the 1967 war. Fred J. Khouri's book, *The Arab-Israeli Dilemma* (1985), is a classic illustration of the cursory manner in which some authors, using the macro-view, treated the effects of the Israeli occupation on the West Bank and Gaza. In this work, Khouri, delineated the Arab-Israeli conflict from biblical times to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and its aftermath. Throughout this discourse, Khouri's concern was largely focused on the numerous attempts that had been made to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. The impact of the Israeli occupation on the West Bank and Gaza was not accorded even one chapter in the entire book.

Since the subject of this study dealt specifically with the effects of the Israeli occupation on the West Bank and Gaza, it became imperative that a closer
look should be focused on literature which employed the micro-view in this area. As a result, a number of works which examined the effects of the occupation on the politics, law, economics, education, an demography of the West Bank and Gaza were selected to demonstrate the tension in the literature and possibly indicate the areas which demanded further exploration. In general, the vast majority of works on the Israeli military rule of the West Bank and Gaza were critical of the occupation for two major reasons: the debilitating effect it has had on the occupied areas, and for seeing it as the chief obstacle to peace between Palestinians and Israelis. However, some Israeli writers have portrayed the Israeli occupation as benign, and others have viewed the occupied areas as an integral part of Israel and thus felt no need to address the issues of the West Bank and Gaza in the framework of occupation.

In the political arena, Shmuel Sandler and Hillel Frisch, authors of Israel, the Palestinians, and the West Bank (1984), seemed to deliberately but awkwardly blur the political realities of the West Bank in their attempt to analyze the Palestinian nationalist movement. While acknowledging the widespread support enjoyed by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) on the West Bank, the authors described the PLO as an "external entity" and charged that it controlled the politics of the occupied areas with an iron fist. Unlike many Israeli writers, however, Moshe Maóz argued in Palestinian Leadership on the West Bank (1984) that Palestinian nationalism was not on the way out during the latter part of the Jordanian Period, and that the 1976 municipal elections on the West Bank gave cohesiveness to the local Palestinian leadership. Maóz affirmed that:

A major theme in Israeli policy toward the West Bank was to forbid, by both word and deed, Arab political activities and to curtail the establishment of an all-West Bank leadership, be it Palestinian-nationalist or Jordan-oriented (p. 87).
According to Maoz, Israel's reason for allowing the municipal elections was an attempt to promote stability without fomenting political leadership. The value of Maoz's work went far beyond its analysis of the 1976 municipal elections on the West Bank in that it touched on the dynamics of Palestinian politics inside as well as outside the occupied areas.

In the economic sphere, a number of books and pamphlets have been published with varying points of view, facts, and conclusions. Israel's Ministry of Defense, for example, put out a publication in 1982 titled, Coordinator of Government Operations in Judea-Samaria, Gaza District, Sinai: A Fourteen Year Survey (1967-1981), which expressed in laudatory terms the effects of the occupation on the Palestinians' economic sector. The Israeli publication asserted that:

Since 1967 economic life in the area has been characterized by rapid growth and a very substantial increase in living standards, made possible by the interaction of the economies of the areas with that of Israel. Economic development has proceeded without the jolting dislocations that might have been expected from the drastic political change that occurred in 1967 (p.3).

Fawzi A. Gharaibeh arrived at a diametrically opposite conclusion to the above Israeli survey in his book, The Economies of the West Bank and Gaza (1985). The book's most salient feature was its analysis of how Israel reshaped the West Bank's and Gaza's economies to serve its own interests. Gharaibeh argued that Israel induced the occupied territories' dependency on it through three major avenues: recruitment and exploitation of Palestinian labor, restriction on movement of products from the territories to Israel, and the free flow of Israeli goods into the occupied territories. Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, Israeli writers Sandler and Frisch maintained in Israel, the Palestinians,
and the West Bank (1984) that Israel's domination of the occupied areas did not prevent the West Bank from having "economic autonomy" (p.49).

In Benefits and Burdens: A Report on the West Bank and Gaza Strip Economies Since 1967 (1977), Brian Van Arkadie used disparate sources such as Arie Bregman's Economic Growth in the Administered Areas, 1968-1973 (Jerusalem: Bank of Israel Research Department, 1975), and Jamil Hilal's The West Bank: Its Social and Economic Structure 1948-1974 (Beirut: Palestine Liberation Organization Research Center, 1975) to purportedly present an objective analysis of the occupied areas' economies. Van Arkadie observed that the economies of the West Bank and Gaza developed noticeably during the first nine years of Israeli occupation. Van Arkadie attributed the modest increase in the occupied territories' GNP to employment of West Bankers and Gazans in areas occupied in 1948 rather than to actual growth in the West Bank and Gaza themselves. He also ascribed the lack of growth in the industrial sector of the occupied areas chiefly to lack of investments. What conditions or policies precluded investment? Van Arkadie was not quite specific about that beyond pointing to the inhospitable economic climate which Israel created in the West Bank and Gaza (p.107). In The West Bank Data Project: A Survey of Israel's Policies (1984), Meron Benvenisti claimed that Israel's policies on the West Bank were neither well-thought-out nor were they part of a "grand design." Benvenisti asserted that:

All major decisions shaping the economic history of the occupation were taken on the spur of the moment, as a reaction to immediate pressures, usually by politicians who did not perceive the long-term implication of their decisions or by low-level bureaucrats who lacked high-level guidance (p.11).

I found Benvenisti's claim vacuous and misleading at the same time. Evidence
presented by this study clearly demonstrated that policies regarding all aspects of life on the West Bank flowed directly from the West Bank Area Commander and not from low-level subordinates as Benvenisti contended.

In the realm of law, two divergent works dealing with the West Bank have typified the wide gap which frequently separated the two primary antagonists. While Allan Gerson's book, *Israel, the West Bank and International Law* (1978), largely defended Israel's position in the West Bank, Raja Shehadeh and Jonathan Kuttab's book, *The West Bank and the Rule of Law* (1980) exposed the many illegalities committed by the Israelis against international law. Gerson's bias was so blatant that he failed to deal with Israel's violations of international law in the areas of deportation, detention, and torture. Furthermore, Gerson desperately looked for loopholes in international law to justify Israel's settlement-building in the West Bank. He argued that since there was no evidence that Jewish settlements were being built on land of displaced people, then international law was not violated. Shehadeh and Kuttab did not merely prove Gerson wrong on this latter point but also presented a concise explanation of how Israel formulated a code of laws to serve its interests on the West Bank by adopting and/or amending out-dated Turkish, British, and Jordanian laws. Whenever a situation arose, they asserted, whereby an "appropriate" law from the three systems could not be found, the Israeli Military Commander of the Areas was able to legislate it through military orders.

The educational field in the occupied areas has yet to receive the scholarly attention it truly deserves. Sarah Graham-Brown's book, *Education, Repression, Liberation: Palestinians*, was probably the best work on this subject through the early 1980's. Her study did not only reveal the inequality of education between Arabs and Jews in the occupied areas, but also exposed the constraints under
which Palestinian education had to operate in countries like Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Kuwait. Aside from being highly informative, Graham-Brown raised some provocative questions which dealt with the challenges facing Palestinian education such as relevance, linkage with employment, and control. It was in this connection that Graham-Brown observed that "Education is not simply a tool for liberation. It is at the same time, part of the terrain on which the struggle for liberation must take place." Munir Fasheh's essay on education in Occupation: Israel Over Palestine (1983), edited by Naseer H. Aruri, was insightful since it was largely based on personal experiences in the occupied territories.

Unlike the issue of education, Jewish settlements in the occupied territories have greatly inflamed emotions on both sides of the conflict and have engendered a large number of works on this subject. In Taking Root: Israeli Settlement in the West Bank, the Golan and the Gaza-Sinai (1980), William Harris used extensive Israeli sources to explain in depth the issues most directly related to Israel's settlement policy such as security, agricultural development, land and water resources in terms of effects on Arabs and Jews. Harris went beyond criticizing the building of Jewish settlements to suggesting that stability in the region could only come about if a Palestinian-Israeli agreement was reached on the basis of self-determination for the Palestinians in exchange for recognition of Israel by the Arabs. Perhaps more forcefully than Harris, Merle Thorpe argued in Prescription For Conflict (1984) that the continued expansion of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories could very well lead not merely to the annexation of the West Bank and Gaza but also embroil Israel in a perpetual war
with the Arabs. Thrope also addressed the role of the United States of America in this regard in these words:

It is also important for Americans to understand that our government's aid to Israel assists the Israeli government in pursuing this plan, and that the United States therefore shares responsibility for its immediate as well as long-term effects (p. 12).

Desmond Stewart's emotions occasionally surfaced when he discussed the issue of Jewish settlements in The Palestinians: Victims of Expediency (1982). Contrasting Israeli settlements on the West Bank with Palestinian villages, Stewart said:

Yet here, too, an air of menace blows from settlements imposed on strategic hilltops since the occupation, and at an accelerated rush since the Camp David agreement. And a sense of intrusion. For the villages you see from the Nablus road grow from a beautiful head. The settlements, by contrast, are the false eyelashes, the nylon wigs of a transvestite spy (p. 34).

To Rabbi Meir Kahane, the picture drawn by Desmond Stewart on the issue of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories was totally erroneous. In They Must Go (1981), Kahane made the following assertion:

I do not feel sorry for the Arabs of Eretz Yisrael (Land of Israel), no matter how much they feel that the land is theirs. I do not feel for them because I know that the land is not theirs, that it is Jewish (p. 57).

Significance of Study

As shown above, several studies have already examined the effects of the Israeli occupation on various aspects of Palestinian life on the West Bank and Gaza, but hardly any one of them has provided an in-depth analysis of the multifarious instruments employed by the occupation authorities to achieve such effects. Nevertheless, evidence presented in some of these works buttressed the hypothesis of this study and even confirmed it in certain areas. Gharaibeh's
work, for example, attested to the severe impact that the Israeli policies have had on the economies of the occupied territories. In *The Economies of the West Bank and Gaza*, Gharaibeh argued convincingly that the Israeli occupation was directly responsible for hindering economic development on the West Bank and Gaza. Evidence presented in this study has led to a conclusion quite similar to that of Gharaibeh's. The study's contribution in this respect was that it delineated the military orders and directives which constituted the body of Israeli policies in this field. Moreover, the interviews with Palestinians in all walks of life provided a glimpse of the resulting human agony from these policies.

Data which was gathered by Israeli writers such as Meron Benvenisti and Moshe Ma'oz came unwittingly close to confirming the study's hypothesis. Benvenisti stated in *The West Bank Data Project: A Survey of Israel's Policies* that Israel's occupational policies "dealt a blow to the economic viability of the Palestinians as a community" (p. 9) and were in the process of turning the West Bank into Israel's "suburbia" (p. 63). In *Palestinian Leadership on the West Bank*, Ma'oz provided material and insights into Israel's hostile stance and ceaseless efforts to prevent the rise of a genuine Palestinian leadership in the West Bank. This study's findings, coupled with the information provided by Ma'oz, Benvenisti, and Van Arkadie clearly refuted the arguments presented by Shmuel Sandler and Hillel Frisch in *Israel, the Palestinians, and the West Bank*. These two writers had asserted that the West Bank was enjoying "economic autonomy" under Israeli occupation, and that "benefits and services were accorded by the Israeli authorities on the basis of non-political administrative rules" (p. 61).

On the question of Jewish settlements and demographical changes, the modest contribution made by this study, along with the persuasive discussion of Merle Thorpe in *Prescription For Conflict* and the powerful arguments of Raja
Shehadeh and Jonathan Kuttab in *The West Bank and the Rule of Law*, exposed the glaring flaws in Allan Gerson's book, *Israel, the West Bank and International Law*. Overall, what differentiated this study from most prior research in this area was that it focused on the mechanisms utilized by the Israelis in the West Bank and Gaza not only as devices to perpetuate the occupation but also as tools of underdevelopment in the occupied territories. Furthermore, the study exposed the contours of Israeli laws and practices on the West Bank and Gaza as a coherent policy with specific, albeit undeclared aims.
CHAPTER TWO

THE JORDANIAN PERIOD

BACKGROUND

In less than two decades, the West Bank suffered two severe blows — the first in 1948 and the second in 1967. This chapter examines the aftermath of the 1948 war as well as the effects of the Jordanian Period (1950-1967) on the political and economic life of the West Bank.

It is quite evident that Emir Abdallah of Transjordan had harbored annexationist designs on all of Palestine prior to the Arab-Israeli war of 1948. In two meetings with Golda Myerson (later Meir), one in November of 1947 and the other in May of 1948, Abdallah made it abundantly clear that he wished to incorporate all of Palestine into his kingdom and that he was willing to give the Jewish community local autonomy. In a similar vein, Abdallah's foreign minister, Tawfiq Pasha, tried to persuade the British that the Palestinian state envisaged by the United Nations would be "politically and economically unviable"; and thus, Transjordan should move into the bulk of the area allotted to the Arab community of Palestine.¹ Some suspect that the architect of this particular plan was John Bagot Glubb, the chief British advisor to Abdallah and the commander

of Transjordan's Arab Legion. Others argue that King Abdallah's interest in Palestine was part of his grandiose plan to extend his influence over all of "Greater Syria." The latter was to include Transjordan, Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon. Regardless of who devised the plan, or whether the plan encompassed all or part of Palestine, it is quite clear that Abdallah was seeking to satisfy his personal ambitions or his British sponsors at the expense of the Palestinians.

Four days after Abdallah's second meeting with Golda Meir, the Arab-Israeli War of 1948 started. The 1948 War resulted in splitting Palestine into two unequal parts. In the larger part, approximately 72 percent of the total area, the state of Israel was established. In the remaining area, comprising about 28 percent, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were created. These results failed to satisfy the Palestinians' hopes of asserting their sovereignty over the whole country, and fell short even of the United Nations General Assembly's plan of partitioning Palestine into two relatively equal Arab and Jewish states.

The 1948 War had such a tremendous impact on the West Bank that practically every major aspect of its life was substantially changed. For the first time in its history, the eastern, hilly portion of Palestine lost its economic, political, and communication links with the coastal areas of the country. And since the West Bank's links with Transjordan were virtually nonexistent, its new

---

2Prittie, pp.125-126.

3Israel Gershuni, "King Abdallah's Concept of 'Greater Syria'." in Anne Sinai and Allen Pollack, ed., The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the West Bank: A Handbook, pp. 139-140.

situation was described as "an island isolated between Israel and the East Bank." This left only the east side open for the West Bankers to have access to the outside world. Naturally, the West Bank, and shortly afterward Jordan, became highly dependent on routes through Syria and Lebanon to maintain their trade links. Demographically and economically speaking, the new situation on the West Bank was drastically altered by the influx of 350,000 refugees who were forced out of their homes from the occupied areas. Moreover, the situation was further aggravated by the cease-fire lines which caused dislocations affecting 144 square miles of land and 150,000 residents of the West Bank. As a result of the cease-fire arrangement, many Palestinians living along the demarcation lines found their homes in the West Bank and their farmland in Israeli hands. These Palestinian West Bankers suffered a fate no less miserable than their refugee brothers who lost all of their possessions. The fact that they continued to live in their own homes precluded them from qualifying for any United Nations assistance as other refugees. As a result, for many years they had to live in abject poverty, and on occasion suffer death for their attempts to harvest their crops across the cease-fire lines. In short, the 1948 War wrought havoc with the West Bank's political economy and rendered it vulnerable to outside influences. King Abdallah of Transjordan was awaiting such an opportunity.
Following the 1948 War, Abdallah moved quickly to translate his ambitions into reality by taking several steps to annex the east-central part of Palestine. The initial preparatory step was accomplished on October 1, 1948, when many Palestinian "notables," who were invited to Amman by King Abdallah, declared that no Palestinian government would be formed until all of Palestine was liberated. The second step occurred on December 1, 1948, when a large number of the Hashemite supporters in the West Bank gathered in Jericho and called for unity between the West Bank and Transjordan under the leadership of King Abdallah. Abdallah, who attended the meeting, declared himself "King of Palestine." On April 24, 1950, a Jordanian parliament composed of East and West Bankers ratified the union of the two banks. It is important to note here that neither a plebiscite nor a referendum was employed before the Jericho Meeting or after it to involve the Palestinians of the West Bank in determining their future. King Abdallah had no intention of affording the Palestinians such an opportunity. In fact, the formation of an "all-Palestine government" and a Palestinian National Council in Egyptian-administered Gaza might have prompted Abdallah to hasten the annexation of the West Bank.

---


11 Ibid.

From the very outset, the basic difference between the Palestinians and the Jordanian regime has been the way they viewed and assessed the 1948 War and its consequences. For the Palestinians, the 1948 War was a national disaster that could be remedied only through the liberation of their land.\textsuperscript{13} It is worth noting that even the endorsement which Abdallah extracted from the Jericho Conference lacked a sense of permanency in that it considered any solution that failed to take into account all of Palestine would not be viewed as final.\textsuperscript{14}

Therefore, Palestinians in general, including many of those who supported King Abdallah, regarded their "unity" with Jordan as a temporary arrangement. The Jordanian rulers, on the other hand, felt that the war had served their interest in that it increased their power and thus were quite content to maintain their status quo.\textsuperscript{15} These two diametrically opposing views regarding occupied Palestine set the stage for a continuing conflict between the Jordanian monarchy and the Palestinians. Based on their two divergent views, the Palestinians and the Hashemite regime pursued different and irreconcilable political goals. The primary objective of the Hashemite regime was to solidify its rule over both banks of the Jordan River and to gain a shroud of legitimacy for that rule. The Palestinians' avowed goal was to liberate occupied Palestine using Jordan as a

\textsuperscript{13}Shaul Mishal, "Jordanian and Israeli Policy on the West Bank," in Anne Sinai and Allen Pollack, eds., \textit{The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan}, p. 211.

\textsuperscript{14}J. P. Richardson, \textit{The West Bank: A Portrait}, p. 45.

\textsuperscript{15}Shaul Mishal, "Jordanian and Israeli Policy on the West Bank," in Anne Sinai and Allen Pollack, eds., \textit{The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan}, p. 211.
springboard to achieve this aspiration.\textsuperscript{16} It is within this framework of differing views and contradictory goals that the Palestinians and the Hashemite regime had to formulate their relations with each other throughout the Jordanian period. In the remaining part of this chapter, we will examine how the West Bank fared both politically and economically during the Hashemite era.

**Political Aspects**

The Palestinians' political development on the West Bank between 1950 and 1967 was largely determined by the degree of success or failure they had in steering Jordan's policy toward nationalistic goals and by the degree of freedom they had in expressing themselves and running their local affairs.\textsuperscript{17} To achieve their political goals, Palestinians on the West Bank utilized basically two instruments: political parties and municipalities. Political parties served as the Palestinians' chief vehicle in their attempt to guide Jordan toward a nationalistic stand in regional and international affairs. For domestic matters, the municipality was the most commonly used tool to improve the lot of the Palestinians.

To maintain its monarchial structure, the Hashemite regime labored incessantly to keep the Palestinians from getting into sensitive political and military positions. These posts were generally held by East Bankers. However, to placate the Palestinians, many were assigned to nonsensitive areas within the

\textsuperscript{16}Bailey, pp. 2-3.

\textsuperscript{17}Shaul Mishal, "Jordanian and Israeli Policy on the West Bank," in Anne Sinai and Allen Pollack, eds., The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the West Bank, p.211.
Jordanian bureaucracy. Also, a false sense of political equality was perpetuated by the Jordanian regime in keeping the Chamber of Deputies equally divided between the West Bank and the East Bank, even after a significant increase of population in the latter. It is estimated that the number of eligible voters in the East Bank rose from 129,000 in 1950 to 274,571 in 1954, while the number for the West Bank dropped from 175,000 to 171,357 during the same period.

Formal equality in the kingdom of Jordan, however, did very little in alleviating the Palestinians' sense of alienation and discontent. The assassination of King Adballah on July 20, 1951, was viewed as a clear reflection of the Palestinians' unhappiness with the annexation. Being more politically conscious than their brother on the East Bank, the Palestinians demanded "curtailment of the King's power and that the Cabinet be made responsible to parliament." Following the demise of King Abdallah at the hands of a Palestinian nationalist, Prince Talal ascended to the throne and some changes were effected. Among these changes were Talal's approval of amending the constitution whereby dismissing the cabinet required only a simple majority instead of the original two-thirds. This change in effect made the Cabinet more accountable to

18Maoz, p. 25.


21Anne Sinai and Allen Pollack, The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the West Bank, p.28.

22Ibid.
parliament. King Talal also sought a more harmonious relationship with both Egypt and Syria.23 These internal and external modifications in Jordan's policies reflected, to some degree, the political influence enjoyed by the Palestinians at that time. But even these cosmetic changes and the somewhat dubious influence of the Palestinians in Jordan were of a short duration. When King Talal was declared mentally ill and thus unfit to rule, Hussein, his son, was handed the reigns of power in May, 1953.24

Hussein's rule heralded a period of uncertainty for the Palestinians in general and the West Bankers in particular. This uncertainty and even frustration was no more apparent than in the relationship that developed between the central government and the municipalities. One of the major outlets for political expression utilized by the Palestinians within the Jordanian system of government was the municipalities. Shortly after the annexation of the West Bank in 1950, there was a growing demand for revising the restrictive Municipalities Law of 1934. In a petition to the district governor in 1951, a number of Hebron residents outlined the necessary changes in the law which included "a lowering of the voting age from 21 to 18; called for the abrogation of a city tax qualification for voters; recommended fixing the number of municipal councillors in accordance with the size of the population; suggested that council members have the right to choose the mayor; and, finally, maintained that the municipal council be responsible to the people for its activities."25 In essence,

23Ibid.

24Ibid.

25Maóz, p. 27.
the recommendations offered by the Hebron petition amounted to a call for
greater autonomy and a redistribution of power between the local and national
governments. However, the very nature of the Jordanian monarchial system
which stressed "the overwhelming power residing at the centre, as opposed to a
division of powers toward the periphery" precluded any meaningful
development of a Palestinian local autonomy.

In 1954, Jordan adopted the Town Municipalities Law which incorporated
many of the reforms that were suggested in the Hebron petition. This legislation
was very short-lived, however, since the central government feared that it could
very well undermine its authority on the West Bank. To regain control, the
government enacted a new Town Municipalities Law of 1955 which restored to
the central government the power to specify the number of councillors in each
municipality as well as the authority to dismiss them. In addition, a major
revision of the 1954 law was to give the Minister of the Interior the power to
appoint the mayors and set their salaries. Council members were left with the
minor task of selecting the deputy mayor from among themselves. All efforts
by the West Bank mayors to change the Municipalities Law of 1955 proved to be
fruitless. The central government in Amman formed a committee in 1956
ostensibly to reconsider the law, but it remained unchanged throughout the
Jordanian period. Nevertheless, the central government's appointments of

26Maóz, p. 27.

27Ibid., pp.28-29.

28Jordan, Law of Municipalities, No. 29, 1 May 1955, Article 34 (1 and
2), and Article 35 (1).

29Maóz, p. 29.
mayors and councillors were not always unchallenged as was the case in Ramallah in 1956 and Araba in 1966. The most effective method used by local councils in influencing the selection of the centrally-appointed functionaries was to threaten collective resignation if the appointees were unacceptable to them.30 This occasional demonstration of defiance, however, did not generally serve to buttress their efforts to strengthen local rule. On the contrary, all conflicts pertaining to city council appointments resulted in the intervention of the central authorities, and thus deepened their involvement.31

To facilitate the control exercised by the minister of the Interior, a support structure was created in the late 1950's to augment his role. The West Bank was divided into three administrative-territorial regions, each called Muhafaza, which consisted of smaller units called Liwas. This system was modified somewhat shortly after it was established to increase local participation. The earliest reform was introduced in 1960 whereby the Muhafiz, the regional official, was given power to make the local appointments instead of the Minister of the Interior, and thus "opened up more civil service positions for West Bank candidates rather than central 'imported' functionaries."32 Further "reforms" followed in 1962 which empowered the Muhafaza to appoint a Public Advisory Council that represented many local groups and organizations. This body, which

30 Al-Difá, January 4, 1956. (Arabic)

31 Maóz, pp. 37-38.

32 Ibid., p.31.
purportedly represented genuine local concerns, had merely powers of recommendations.33

Nevertheless, the cosmetic appearance given to the Jordanian municipal system did not camouflage its true unitary and restrictive nature. The Hashemite regime controlled the entire municipal structure through the office of the Minister of the Interior. In 1957, the Minister of the Interior issued an order which required mayors and other city employees to obtain official permits if they wished to travel outside the boundaries of their towns.34 This close supervision extended to all levels of the administrative hierarchy and was maintained through the district governor.35 Even when it came to carrying out its daily and routine functions, a city council found itself shackled by the administrative need to obtain approval from district officers. Decisions such as purchasing asphalt, paving a schoolyard, or buying fodder for animals required approval from the district office.36 The ultimate administrative tool of coercion in the hands of the Amman government, however, was the power to dismiss the local councils. Although used sparingly, the central government did not hesitate to employ this measure in dismissing the city councils of Jerusalem in 1950, Nablus in 1951, Yâbad in 1954, Hebron, Bethlehem, and Tulkarm in 1962.37 A more common

33Ibid.

34Maôz, p. 32.

35Ibid.

36Ibid., p.34.

37Ibid., p.33.
occurrence was to selectively replace mayors or council members for the sole purpose of having the view of the central government represented in city councils. The dismissal of the mayor of Tulkarm by the Minister of the Interior in 1952 demonstrated such a point. In other words, Amman's dealings with local councils amounted to nothing less than a "heads, I win, tails, you lose" arrangement, which in effect reminded the latter to tow the line of the former or else. This particular mechanism, more than any other, made a mockery of the so-called local rule.

In addition to constitutional controls, the central government also exercised financial controls. The annual town budgets were approved by the minister of the Interior, and any further loans or even transfer of funds within the approved budget required the sanction of the central government. Moreover, the Minister of the Interior determined the amount of taxes to be collected from the municipalities as well as the share to be kept by each. This strict financial supervision imposed by the central government was a flagrant violation of the 1955 Municipalities Law which stated that municipalities have "independence in financial matters." Aside from near total dependence of the municipalities on the central government, West Bank towns suffered from outright discrimination at the hands of the authorities in Amman. This was clearly illustrated in the allocation of fuel and transit taxes by the Minister of the Interior. In the early

38 Al-Difa, February 7, 1952.

39 Itihad, June 16, 1965. (Arabic)

40 Jordan, Law of Municipalities, No. 29, 1 May 1955, Section 3 (1).
1960's, the Interior Ministry divided the said taxes whereby Amman received twenty-eight percent, while Nablus and Hebron received six percent and three percent respectively. In fact, a preponderance of evidence indicates that West Bank municipalities rarely had adequate revenues to cover their basic needs. Jābari, mayor of Hebron in the early 1960's, accompanied his request for 5,000 dinars from the fuel taxes with a plea that "The municipality of Hebron is suffering from extreme financial difficulty that makes it hard for it to fulfill its duties." In another situation, the mayor of Jenīn complained that he had to request a mere 400 dinars from Amman for three consecutive years just so they could pay the rent on a primary school. Complaints about discrimination were also voiced by West Bank parliamentarians such as Anwar Nusseibeh who stated that "Jerusalem municipality was discriminated against by the government as it was almost the only town in Jordan that did not receive assistance from the government." But, as shown earlier, Jerusalem certainly was no exception.

The final mechanism used by the Jordanian regime to keep the West Bank municipalities under its thumb was the rigging of municipal elections through its agents who frequently served as heads of local election committees. These "election officials" had control over the registration of voters. On at least two occasions, Hebron in 1951 and Araba in 1966, government officials were accused of stuffing the boxes with doctored ballots of illiterate voters to ensure the

41Maöz, p. 35.
42Ibid., p.36.
43Ibid., p.36.
elections of their favored candidates. The most outrageous form of governmental interference was its occasional attempt to fix elections in exchange for bribes. In an interview with Moshe Maoz, Mustafa al-Masri recalled that he was approached by the district's Muhafiz in the 1964 mayoral elections in Salfit and was offered a guaranteed victory in return for 2,000 dinars. When al-Masri rejected the proposal, the Muhafiz offered the same deal to one of his opponents.

In 1965 the Jordanian regime introduced what was hailed as a reform measure designed to promote local councils and diminish the powers of the district governors. To accomplish this goal, the central government established a Public Advisory Council to assist the Minister of the Interior in matters relating to local budgets and unfulfilled council recommendations. But aside from adding local color to the government's machinery, the measure was meaningless in terms of giving local councils more control over their affairs. It is worth noting that the Public Advisory Council, which was expected to convene monthly, met only once in Nablus in May, 1965. Fearing that the Advisory Council could become a true forum for local government, the central government cancelled the rest of the meetings but kept the Council on paper. It appears that this last effort by the Jordanian regime was just another fig-leaf in its policy of creating an illusion of autonomy on the West Bank in return for gaining

44Ibid., p.38.

45Maoz, p. 35.


47Maoz, p. 39.
legitimacy among the Palestinians. As it turned out, neither autonomy for the Palestinians nor legitimacy for the Jordanian regime resulted from this policy on municipalities. The only clear consequence was that the Jordanian government, through its monopoly on legal authority and use of intervention at various levels of the electoral process, played a pivotal role in the shaping of structure and direction of local rule on the West Bank. In essence, the net result of such manipulations had been the complete and utter dependence of the municipalities on the central government which reduced local rule to little more than its name.

While the Palestinians found little room for political expression in the government-dominated municipalities, their situation was not so bleak with regard to political parties. Two chief factors can be discerned as the underlying causes for this configuration: first, political parties' positions were often supported by neighboring states or regional movements; and second, they had the capacity to function without the central government's assistance and in spite of its restrictions. Following the 1948 War, a new Palestinian leadership emerged and set out to correct the course of Jordan's relations vis-a-vis Israel, its Arab neighbors, and the rest of the world, with greater emphasis on the first two. The new leadership was well aware of the infamous role of King Abdallah in the 1948 War in which he surrendered the towns of Lydda and Ramleh, abandoned the Egyptian army at Faluja, and gave up to the Israelis 400 square kilometers at the Rhodes Armistice Talks. Hence, the new leadership sought to bring about major political changes through opposition politics within and without the parameters set by the Hashemite regime.

---

48 Abdallah al-Tall, Karithat Filastin (The Calamity of Palestine), Cairo, 1959, pp.467-68, 528-29. (Arabic)
The early years of the Jordanian era were characterized by the rise and development of political parties led mostly by noted Palestinians. Foremost among them was the Jordanian Bāth (Renaissance) Party which derived its philosophy and guidance from the Bāth Party of Syria. This group was led by Bahjat Abu Gharbiyyah and Abdullah Nāwas of Jerusalem, Abdallah al-Rimawi of Ramallah, and Kamal Nasir and Musa Nasir of Bir Zeit. The National Socialist Party (NSP) was led by Anwar and Rashad al-Khatib of Hebron, and Hikmat al-Masri of Nablus. The National Front Party, similar to the NSP but with greater leftist leanings, was founded by Qadri Tuqan and Abd al-Qadir al-Salih of Nablus and Rashad Maswadah of Hebron. Unlike the preceding three parties, the Communist Party was founded during the British mandate and was led by Dr. Abdal-Majid Abu Hijlah of Nablus, Fāiq-Warad of Ramallah, and Dr. Yāqub Ziya al-Din of Jerusalem. And finally, the Tahrir (Liberation) Party, a rightest, religious movement which was founded by Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani of Jerusalem and Ahmad al-Dāur of Tulkarm. Without exception, all of the parties' leaders were from the West Bank.

In considering political parties as an outlet for Palestinian political expression, three major questions need to be raised: What gave rise to their growth? What kind of relationship existed between the parties and the Jordanian government? And finally, how successful were they in serving as a vehicle for Palestinian political thought? The volatile political climate which persisted in Jordan during the 1950's was most definitely charged by several regional and international events as it was with local factors. Paramount among these were the nationalization of the Suez Canal, the 1956 Tripartite attack on Egypt, and

49Bailey, p.8.
the rising tide of nationalism that was sweeping the Arab world. The West Bank, where the expectations and frustrations were high, appeared to be more affected by the regional and international developments than the East Bank. As for domestic factors, many Palestinians were not merely anti-Hashemites but also resented the subordinated position they had to accept within the kingdom of Jordan.\(^{50}\)

Throughout the Jordanian period, relations between most of the political parties and the Hashemite regime were marked with a great deal of tension. Aside from the assassination of King Abdallah in 1951 and the Prime Minister Hazza al-Majali in 1960, this period witnessed an attempted military coup d'etat in 1957 and numerous demonstrations and riots.\(^{51}\) Nationalist political parties were suspected of being the moving force behind such events. For the most part, however, the Hashemite regime tolerated the activities of political parties, both legal and illegal, as long as they did not constitute a serious threat to the government. The fact that the Communist Party was allowed to operate, naturally under the watchful eyes of the Jordanian security forces, was an excellent illustration of the government's policy at that time.\(^{52}\) To ensure containment of political parties, the government used suppression and co-optation of party leaders.

The Jordanian constitution which was decreed on January 2, 1952, provided for the existence of political parties under the condition that their activities

\(^{50}\)Cohen, pp. 15-16.

\(^{51}\)Bailey,, p.18.

\(^{52}\)Cohen, pp.238-39.
must be "peaceful and non-violent; it must be directed toward lawful ends; and the internal regulations of the parties must conform to Jordanian law."\(^5^3\) This last stipulation was interpreted to give the Jordanian government the right to investigate political parties and determine their eligibility for acquiring a permit to operate. The ease or difficulty in which a political party obtained an official permit reflected in a large measure the degree of coziness between the party and the state. Political parties that were supportive of the Jordanian regime, such as the National Socialist Party, National Party, and the Arab Constitutional Party, had no difficulty securing such a permit.\(^5^4\) The political parties which encountered varying degrees of difficulty in getting official governmental sanction were the Arab Renaissance Party and the Liberation Party. The application of the former was repeatedly rejected because of its leftist leanings and its links with Syria, and the latter was refused at least once because of its emphasis on religion and its contention that the type of government a nation wants should be a matter of choice.\(^5^5\) A third category included the political parties which did not even attempt to apply for a permit to operate. Paramount among these were the Arab Nationalist Party (al-Qawmiyun al-Arab), the Communist Party, and the Moslem Brothers. Since the Moslem Brothers referred to themselves as an association rather than a party, and were on relatively good terms with the Hashemite regime, they were exempted from the permit requirement. The Qawmiyun were viewed as too radical by the Jordanian

\(^{53}\)Ibid, p.231.

\(^{54}\)Cohen, p.233.

\(^{55}\)Ibid., p. 234.
government and hence did not bother to apply. The Communist Party had no choice in the matter since it was already outlawed by the Jordanian War on Communism Law of May 2, 1958. Whether sanctioned or not, all nationalist political parties were generally kept under close surveillance by the Jordanian security services. It is important to note that the Jordanian government had planned to move against the nationalists long before it actually did in April 1957. On January 13, 1957, the director general of Jordan's security services ordered a compilation of lists of all political activists opposed to the regime so as to expedite their arrest when deemed necessary.

The question of how successful the political parties were in serving as a vehicle for Palestinian political goals is a complex one. This is particularly true since nationalist forces and events beyond Jordan's frontiers played a significant role, which could not be discounted, in affecting the course of developments within the Hashemite kingdom. Nevertheless, it was the nationalist political parties that were largely responsible for creating the proper conditions for political changes, especially in regional affairs.

Throughout the Jordanian era, Palestinian nationalists made it their business to "expose and publicize government policies considered detrimental to their cause—policies involving the curbing of armed infiltration into Israel, the maintenance of secret contact with the Jewish state, or the adherence to Western political initiatives that sought to end the Arab-Israel conflict."

56Ibid., p. 232.


58Bailey, p. 4.
Exposure of such policies was invariably followed by street demonstrations which casted a shadow on the legitimacy of the Jordanian regime in Palestinian eyes. It is this capability of the Palestinian nationalists to organize the masses and actually create instability which coerced the Jordanian government to pursue a policy of "moderate hostility toward Israel—moderate as a precaution against being destroyed by its western neighbor, but hostile as a precaution against being overthrown by the Palestinians."\(^5\)

Political parties in Jordan had their apex between 1954 and 1957. Gamal Abed al-Nasser's ascendancy to power in Egypt and the subsequent British withdrawal from the Suez Canal Zone signaled the start of an upsurge of Arab nationalist movements. Nasser's interest in uprooting the remnants of colonialism from the Arab world and his concomitant goal of Arab unity made him a natural ally of the Palestinians and virtually all of the nationalist political parties. Moreover, Jordan appeared as a logical choice for the confluence of Nasser's anti-imperialist drive and the Palestinian-dominated political parties' interest in changing the direction of Jordan's foreign policy. The two forces found a tangible target in 1955 in the British-sponsored defense organization called the Baghdad Pact. Several Arab countries, particularly Egypt, and all nationalist political parties in Jordan, viewed the Baghdad Pact as a vehicle to strengthen Britain's hold in the Middle East. When Jordan was "invited" to join the Pact, Palestinian nationalist elements flexed their muscles in conjunction with the outside pressure applied by Egypt to ensure an outright rejection. The

\(^{59}\)Bailey, p.5.
nationalists had their way. Capitalizing on their victory of keeping Jordan out of the Baghdad Pact, Palestinian nationalists began to press for severing Jordan's connection with Britain. The most obvious symbol of that connection was the presence of British officers in the country's armed forces. Recognizing how precarious his throne had become, King Hussein complied with the nationalists' demands and ousted the British officers in March of 1956. Under further pressure, new parliamentary elections were held in June of 1956. The results of that election were a resounding success for the nationalist forces. A solid majority of anti-regime representatives took their seats in parliament and formed a nationalist government under the premiership of Sulayman al-Nabulsi, a politician of West Bank origins. Nabulsi's nationalist polices earned him increased popular support and the suspicion of King Hussein simultaneously.

Seeing that Jordan was drifting in a direction not to his or his western friends' liking, Hussein decided to move against the Nabulsi government in particular and nationalist political parties in general. Hussein viewed the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, the release of jailed communists, and the election of two known communists to the Chamber of Deputies as ominous developments. When Nabulsi largely ignored the young king's objections to his policies, Hussein swiftly dismissed his cabinet. This event signaled a sharp downward trend for the nationalist forces in Jordan.

60 Ibid., pp. 10-11.
61 Ibid., p. 12.
62 Ibid.
63 Bailey, p. 13.
Feeling threatened, following Nabulsi's downfall, the nationalist military officers of the Jordanian army plotted to overthrow the king. Being informed in advance of the attempt by his loyal Bedouin troops, Hussein was able to thwart the revolt.64 Following the abortive attempt to overthrow the government, Hussein quickly imposed martial law, banned political parties, and jailed hundreds of political activists.65

These setbacks notwithstanding, Palestinian nationalists still felt that their best hope of liberating their occupied land was through Arab unity. Their strategy was to work toward getting Jordan into an alliance with Syria and Egypt and possibly Iraq before confronting Israel.66 To this end, at least on paper, the nationalists made some progress. In October of 1956, Jordan joined Egypt and Syria in an agreement to unify their military commands as a contingency plan in the event of a war with Israel. This was followed by a cultural agreement among the same countries in March of 1957 for the purpose of unifying their curriculums and inculcating their students with a nationalist spirit.67 For the Palestinians, these steps portended good things to come, including the goal of Arab unity. But


65Richardson, p.61.

66Bailey, p.9.

67Ibid.,p.13.
these and other steps never materialized into a durable, tangible structure for unity. The dissolution of the union between Egypt and Syria in 1961 and a host of other conflicts between the Arab countries led to general disillusionment among the Palestinians who had counted on Arab unity as the key for solving their dilemma.\(^{68}\) By the mid-1960's, the Palestinians were divided into two main groups: those who were assimilated by the Hashemite regime and those who felt that the liberation of Palestine could be attained only when the Palestinians themselves become the vanguard of that struggle rather than waiting for Arab unity.

Among those co-opted by the Jordanian government were Anwar al-Khatib of the National Socialist Party and his cousin, Rashad al-Khatib. The former served as Jordan's ambassador to Egypt in 1964 and the latter became the minister for national economy. Also, Hanna Atallah of the NSP and Qadri Tuqan of the National Front Party served in the capacity of foreign ministers of Jordan in the 1960's. Even Ali Abu Nuwar, the purported leader of the coup d' état attempt in 1957, was allowed to return from exile and was later assigned Jordan's ambassadorship in France.\(^{69}\) Among the Palestinian nationalists, on the other hand, the concept of Arab unity was rapidly losing ground to the new concept of Palestinian entity as the key for liberating Palestine. One of the most ardent promoters of this concept was a young Palestinian engineer by the name of Yassir

\(^{68}\text{Ibid., p.16.}\)

\(^{69}\text{Ibid.}\)
Arafat. Arafat strongly believed that "the liberation of Palestine was the road to Arab unity" and not vice versa. The Qawmiyun, however, held on to the concept of Arab unity as the key to liberation until early 1964. This attitude was clearly reflected in a statement regarding the concept of "Palestinian entity" which the party issued in April, 1964 — "We believe that the Palestine problem is the problem of the entire Arab nation, and that our struggle for Palestine is at the very heart of our struggle for the realization of its objectives; unity, liberation, socialism, and the redemption of Palestine." This very position was largely abandoned in just a few short months. The Qawmiyun, recognizing the futile attempts at Arab unity in the late 1950's and early 1960's, embraced the new concept of Palestinian entity late in 1964 and set their conditions and guidelines for this development. The basic precepts demanded by the Qawmiyun for supporting a "Palestinian entity" were: "a genuine Palestinian leadership, the right of this leadership to represent the Palestinians in all Arab and international forums; total political, financial, and administrative independence; and finally, that the Palestinian organization be allowed to participate in political events affecting the Arab world as a whole." In short, the Palestinian nationalists were basically adopting a new strategy for the liberation of their homeland and also for dealing with their Arab brothers. This transformation in Palestinian politics was embodied in the establishment of the Palestine Liberation


71 "Communique on Palestinian Entity" issued by al-Qawmiyun al-Arab, April 1964.

72 Cohen, p. 141.
Organization in May of 1964, thus posing the greatest challenge to the Hashemite regime over the representation of the Palestinians since the annexation in 1950.

It is safe to conclude that political parties during the Jordanian period, in spite of their small size, enjoyed considerable support among the Palestinian population. This was illustrated by the fact that most of the parties' leaders, as well as rank and file, were from the West Bank. While political parties engaged in many varied activities, the most memorable one usually resulted from their collision with the Hashemite regime, taking the form of mass demonstrations, occasional street violence, arrests and trials. At the very least, political parties of the Jordanian era served as an "outlet for the Palestinians' feelings of frustration, desire for social change, and search for a political solution to their predicament." 

Economic Aspects

The 1948 War and the subsequent annexation by Jordan in 1950 left an indelible mark on the West Bank's economy. The extent of the West Bank's economic integration into the Jordanian economy remains debatable. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this study my concern lies in assessing the growth and development of the West Bank during this period, so as to facilitate my work in drawing a comparison between the West Bank's Jordanian era and that of the Israeli occupation.

The severance of the West Bank and Gaza from the rest of Palestine as a result of the 1948 War was a crippling blow to the economies of the two

---

73Ibid., p. 251.
territories. To both territories, the creation of Israel meant a loss of markets, raw materials, and a disruption of their domestic trade links. In addition, the West Bank lost its access to the Mediterranean Sea. Meanwhile, the economies of the West Bank and Gaza were virtually isolated from each other and existed under two distinctly different sets of conditions. The fate of the economy of the Gaza Strip was even worse than that of the West Bank. The Strip's economy was shattered as it lost its links with the rest of Palestine, and had to cope with an influx of dislocated Palestinians which was greater than its native population. Having the Strip administered by the Egyptian government as a "unit quite distinct from that of Egypt" did not alleviate its problems in the least.

The next obvious question is: how did the West Bank economy fare under Jordanian rule?

Following the annexation, the West Bank and the East Bank did not develop on equal footing. The unequal development of the two banks, however, was not in the least accidental. In its efforts to strengthen the center as opposed to the periphery, the Jordanian government concentrated on building the infrastructure of the East Bank. This entailed the building of a transportation and communication system which greatly enhanced the economic outlook on the East Bank. Further, this huge construction project was followed by the deepening of

---


75Ibid.

76Ibid.
the port of Aqaba on the Red Sea, Jordan's only seaport. This center-periphery configuration characterized the East Bank-West Bank economic relations in virtually all aspects except tourism.

At the very outset of the Jordanian annexation, the West Bank enjoyed a definite economic edge over the East Bank in the areas of agriculture and industry. The West Bank economic edge was very short-lived, however, as the emphasis shifted to the East Bank. The shift was far more apparent in the industrial sector than it was in the agricultural field. Throughout the Hashemite rule, the West Bank's agricultural production accounted for 33 to 40 percent of Jordan's output. The size of the agricultural output fluctuated widely from year to year, depending on the amount of precipitation. The weather notwithstanding, the agricultural sector, thanks to improvements in farming techniques, registered an annual growth rate of 13.4 per cent in the years 1959-1966. Despite the healthy growth rate, preferential treatment was definitely accorded to the East Bank in the area of irrigation. The East Ghor Canal, built exclusively on the East Bank, irrigated land equivalent to one third of the irrigated land on the West Bank. In the meantime, the amount of total irrigated land on the West


78 Richardson, p. 55.


80 Ibid.
West Bank industry during the Jordanian era consisted largely of small businesses employing an average of less than ten workers each. Most of these businesses were concentrated in the Jerusalem area where tourism served as the main gravitating source of revenue. The industry's chief products included textiles, furniture, soap, food processing, matches, shoes, and artifacts for the tourist trade. The industrial development that Jordan nurtured after the annexation of the West Bank was almost exclusively concentrated in the East Bank. Statistics show, however, that in 1966 the West Bank had 53 percent of all the manufacturing and mining operations in Jordan, although the vast majority were of the small-scale variety. It was not surprising, therefore, that the West Bank contributed a mere 20 percent of Jordan's industrial production between 1959 and 1966. Despite this imbalance, the West Bank economy benefited somewhat from the booming Jordanian economy which averaged eight to ten percent annual increases by 1965. In fact, the West Bank industrial sector developed more rapidly than any other in the economy at a rate of 16.6 per cent.


82Richardson, p.56.

83Ibid


for the years 1965 and 1966.  

As for tourism, this was one particular area in which the West Bank maintained a definite edge over the East Bank during the Jordanian period. The West Bank's tourist trade, largely based on its historical and religious sites, accounted for 80 to 90 percent of the country's tourism income. As if to explain the good fortune of the West Bank in this area, one embittered Palestinian commented that "since they could not transfer Jerusalem, the only thing they allowed was the development of the tourist industry." Tourism in Jordan was definitely on the rise throughout the early and mid-1960's. Nearly 600,000 tourists visited Jordan in 1966 and spent over 30 million dollars, an increase of 200 percent over 1960. While the whole country benefited from tourism, however, the West Bank profited the most.

The Jordanian economic policy of strengthening the center over the periphery had other repercussions on the West Bank, not all of which are easy to measure. Since most of the economic activities in terms of construction, transportation and communication building, along with agricultural and industrial projects were taking place on the East Bank, many West Bankers felt they had

86Gharaibeh, p.13.


89Bailey, p. 20.
little choice but to migrate eastward and work.\textsuperscript{90} Statistics show that the West Bank's share of Jordan's population fell from 62\% in 1948 to 56\% in 1952, and down to 47\% by 1961.\textsuperscript{91} Migration of Palestinian labor outside of Jordan was also considerable during this period. According to the 1961 census, over 50,000 of the nearly 63,000 Jordanian emigrés were Palestinian.\textsuperscript{92}

Palestinians in the West Bank were quite cognizant of the discriminatory treatment that they were being subjected to by the Hashemite regime. West Bankers often cited the fact that the government refused to utilize the potash of the Dead Sea or to open a university on the West Bank as proof of their claims of injustices.\textsuperscript{93} Others pointed to the deliberate neglect of the city of Jerusalem as a vivid illustration of the Jordanian regime's two-track policy for the two banks. Despite all protestations, it took the Jordanian government nearly ten years to confer an administrative status on Jerusalem, the capital of mandate Palestine.\textsuperscript{94} The new status was meaningless, however, since it was devoid of any financial or political clout. Of the three banks operating in Palestine and Transjordan in 1946, only one was headquartered in Amman. This situation was drastically changed by 1965, as eight of the nine banks operating in the country

\textsuperscript{90}Plascov, p. 37.

\textsuperscript{91}Anne Sinai and Allen Pollack, p. 121.

\textsuperscript{92}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{93}Plascov, p. 36.

\textsuperscript{94}Shmuel Sandler and Hillel Friseh, \textit{Israel, the Palestinians, and the West Bank} (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1984), p. 36.
were headquartered in the capital.\textsuperscript{95} Furthermore, the Jordanian government utilized economic favors as a weapon to prevent the West Bank from acting as one political unit. The city of Nablus was occasionally favored economically over Jerusalem and Hebron for the purpose of deepening any political divisions that may have existed between them.\textsuperscript{96} This method was largely successful for the Jordanian regime since "the Palestinians themselves had conflicting notions of their priorities, every town seeing itself as the one most entitled to any development scheme."\textsuperscript{97}

Despite the subtle and not so subtle discriminatory practices of the Jordanian regime toward the West Bank, the latter became an integral part of the kingdom's economy by 1967. The economic outlook of the West Bank improved considerably during the last six years of Jordanian rule. The annual growth rate for this period was estimated at 8.8 percent, not far behind the 9.1 percent for the national average.\textsuperscript{98} The difference in per capita output between the West Bank and the East Bank was also narrowed appreciably during the same period. While per capita output in the West Bank rose from fifty-three Jordanian Dinars (JD) in 1961 to sixty-seven JD's in 1966, it remained constant at eighty-two JDs for the East Bank. It is believed that economic expansion in the

\textsuperscript{95}Ibid., p.38.

\textsuperscript{96}Plascov, p.37.

\textsuperscript{97}Ibid., p.36.

\textsuperscript{98}Gharaibeh, p.9.
West Bank exceeded the population growth thereby accounting for the twenty-six percent increase in the per capita income. In the East Bank, however, the economic expansion was swallowed up by the substantial increase in population. Moreover, it is estimated that by the mid-1960's the West Bank produced sixty to eighty-five percent of the country's agricultural yield and forty-eight percent of its industrial output. These figures, when converted to currency, accounted for forty percent of the government's revenues and nearly one third of its foreign currency income.

The 1948 War and its aftermath left the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in such a quandry that its long term effects are still being felt today. Many Palestinians looked upon the 1948 setback as well as the Jordanian annexation as a temporary state of affairs that soon would be rectified through Arab unity. The Jordanian government, however, did not necessarily view the 1948 War as a defeat and certainly did not think of its hold on the West Bank as temporary. The Hashemite regime looked upon the West Bank as a prize for its involvement in the war, and aimed to gain both control and legitimacy in the newly acquired territory. The Jordanian government, through its coercive machinery, managed a fair hold on the West Bank, but its claims of legitimacy were, at best, very tenuous. After nearly fourteen years of fruitless efforts to move Jordan into a genuinely nationalistic posture through political parties, parliamentary pressure,

99Ibid., p.10.

100Anne Sinai and Allen Pollack, p.12.
and street demonstrations, the Palestinians opted to be the vanguard of the struggle through direct revolutionary action. The rise of the Palestinian resistance movement, manifested namely in the Palestine Liberation Organization, was clear evidence that the Jordanian regime failed to gain substantial legitimacy among the Palestinian masses. On the economic level, the Jordanian government locked the West Bank into a subordinated position in a two-tier system. Despite the discriminatory practices, however, the West Bank managed through improvements in the agricultural sector and remittances from abroad, to average over eight percent growth rate in the period 1961-1967. Generally speaking, the struggle between the Jordanian government and the Palestinians of the West Bank resulted chiefly in sapping the strength of the latter which undoubtedly slowed down its political and economic development. Nevertheless, by the time the 1967 War broke out, the West Bank economy was relatively stable and healthy; and the Palestinians had finally found a framework for their political expressions in the Palestine Liberation Organization.
CHAPTER THREE

ISRAELI OCCUPATION AND POLITICAL REPRESSION

The Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 drastically altered the situation in these two areas in practically every respect. The political sphere was certainly no exception. In the course of this study, however, it became apparent that economical, educational, and demographical issues could not be meaningfully discussed before a clear delineation of the political aspects were revealed. Hence, an examination of the Israeli occupation's impact on the West Bank's political scene will be presented in this chapter. Of particular interest is the extent of political freedom that the Palestinians were able to exercise locally and nationally under the existing conditions. This entailed answering at least two salient questions. First, what obstacles did the West Bank Palestinians encounter in voicing their support for a national representative body? Second, how well did local governments, particularly the municipalities, serve as an avenue for political expression and in exercising authority over their respective domains? To determine the Palestinians' political status during the occupation period, though, it was imperative to understand and assess the framework under which the Palestinians had to function. More specifically, this required a close look at the effects of Israeli military orders and practices on the occupied territories.

FRAMEWORK OF MILITARY RULE

Israel was fond of giving the impression that its administration of the West
Bank was carried out with little interference in the lives of the indigenous population who "largely run their own affairs in accordance with Jordanian law."\textsuperscript{1} Of course, nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, Israel's role in the political underdevelopment of the West Bank began on the very first day of the occupation. Section 2 of Military Order Number 2 clearly stated that:

\begin{quote}
All laws which were in force in the Region on June 7, 1967 shall remain in force as long as they do not contradict this Proclamation or any other proclamation or Order issued by me (West Bank Area Commander), or conflict with the changes resulting from the establishment of a military government by the Israel Defense Forces in the Region.\textsuperscript{2}
\end{quote}

It is worth noting that since the issuance of this proclamation the military government decreed hundreds of military orders which have "resulted in extensive alterations of the Jordanian law in force in the area."\textsuperscript{3} The laws that the Israeli military government chose to retain, however, were basically punitive regulations that were promulgated by the British in Mandatory Palestine and were never rescinded by Jordan. Among these Regulations were the following:

Under Regulations 72, 75 and 76, the power of search and arrest is granted to military personnel as well as to police. Regulations 86-100 are the legal grounds for the maintenance of censorship. Regulations 109-111 authorize a military commander to restrict, by Order, the movements of an individual and his employment, to impose police control on his residence, and to require his administrative detention for an unlimited period of time.

\begin{enumerate}
\item Raja Shehada, "Israel's Usurpation of the Law," \textit{Middle East International} (June 20, 1980), p. 10.
\item \textit{Military Orders, 1967-68, Vol.1} (Ramallah, West Bank: Law In The Service of Man), p. 3.
\item Jonathan Kuttab and Raja Shehadeh, \textit{Civilian Administration In The Occupied West Bank: Analysis of Israeli Military Government Order No. 947} (Ramallah, West Bank: Law In The Service of Man, 1982), p. 10.
\end{enumerate}
Regulation 112 authorizes the High Commissioner to order the deportation of a person from the country and the prevention of a person's entry into the country.

Regulation 119 authorizes a military commander to order the forfeiture of property where there is reasonable ground to believe that such property has been fired from; and also to order its demolition.

Regulation 124 authorizes a military commander to impose a curfew.

A military commander is authorized to order the closing of an area so that ingress thereto and egress therefrom shall be by permit only.

Regulation 129 authorizes a military commander to open businesses closed as a result of an organized strike, and to order the closing of business premises.

Israeli military courts justified the adoption of the above regulations on the basis of Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, which stipulates that "the penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force." Israel's adherence to the Fourth Geneva Convention, however, was very selective and perfunctory at best. For example, Israel, a signatory of this Convention, had completely ignored the provision which states that "Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportation of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the occupying power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive." Deportation, as we shall see later in this chapter, was a tool employed rather frequently by the Israelis in the occupied territories. In other words, when it comes to local or international law,

---

4Regulation in Force on the West Bank, quoted in Anne Sinai and Allen Pollack, eds., The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the West Bank (New York: American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East, 1977), pp. 228–229.

5Ibid., p. 230.

Israel applied whatever suited it at any given time and amended or rejected the rest. Israel's view of the Geneva Convention's applicability to the West Bank was a case in point.

Israeli control of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is regarded as "beligerent occupation" in the legal terminology of international law as codified in the Geneva and Hague Conventions. The law pertaining to "beligerent occupation" looks upon the seizure of territory as "a tactical but temporary necessity of war; until a peace treaty is signed and the territory is returned, the law tries to balance the military needs of the occupying power with the human needs of the inhabitants of the occupied territory."7 Israel's laws and practices in the occupied areas were simply designed to exclusively serve the interests of the occupying power. In fact, as is the case with all colonial powers, there was no evidence to indicate that a serious effort had been made to "balance" the military needs of the occupier with the human needs of the occupied. For its part, Israel even rejected being characterized as a "beligerent occupier" and instead viewed itself as a "liberator" of the West Bank and Gaza. This view was clearly articulated by Israel's Minister of Justice, Y.S. Shapiro, who on June 27, 1967, said that "Israel should not view herself as a military occupant in territory which Israel defense forces liberated from foreigners and which are recognized portions of Eretz Israel."8 Any pretense that Israel would deal with


the occupied territories according to international law was dropped on October 22, 1967, with the issuance of Military Order No. 144, which officially "deleted" the Geneva Convention as having supremacy over security legislation. Although the "liberator" role was easily refuted according to international law and to the Jordan-Israel Armistice Agreement of 1949, this Israeli view could very well shed some light on the motives behind Israel's actions in the occupied territories.

Less than five months after the West Bank was occupied, an Israeli military government was established to administer it. The military government consisted of two major components: a military sector to oversee political and security matters, and a "civilian" sector to supervise economic and administrative matters. The final authority in both sectors, however, rested with the Military Commander of the West Bank. Keeping in line with their policy of maintaining the occupation through cost-effective methods, the Israeli Military Government ruled the occupied territories indirectly. In addition to the 500 Israeli officials who held all the key supervisory positions, approximately 12,500 local inhabitants were engaged in the daily administering of the areas' affairs. Naturally, as with all military governments, the use of force or the threat of force was the Israelis' ultimate tool for resolving problems in the occupied areas. No one described

9Ibid.


11Gerson, pp. 110-111.

the political configuration on the West Bank more succinctly than Moshe Dayan did on February 2, 1979, when he stated that, "The Israeli army dominates; no forced Israelization, we are the government." It is interesting to note that the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza shared many similarities with other occupations, but obviously more with some than with others. For example, the similarities between the United States' occupation of Japan following World War II and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza were limited to political and economic domination of the occupied by the occupier. The U.S. occupation of Japan, for instance, was largely concerned with the demilitarization of the occupied territory to prevent it from becoming a security threat to the U.S. or to its Asian neighbors. Even when the U.S. imposed economic "reforms" on Japan, one of the chief objectives was to eliminate the Japanese war production capacity. While this did not necessarily apply to either the West Bank or Gaza, Israel did use the pretext of security as a fundamental reason for its occupation. Unlike the U.S. occupation of Japan, however, the Israeli occupation of the West Bank was used as a framework for a creeping annexation and a Judaization process. In this respect, the attempt at settlement by the Israeli occupation was more akin to the French occupation of Algeria and the English and Dutch settlement of South Africa. In all three cases the occupying power established


and tried to maintain two separate societies—ruler and ruled. John Henrick Clarke described the similarities between Israel and white South Africa as follows:

Both Israel and white South Africa are artificial settler states created by the political backwash of Europe. While mentally and culturally they are parts of Europe, they are removed from it geographically. This is the basis of the schizophrenia that prevails in Israel and South Africa. These European settlers are involved in a perpetual contradiction. They are stubbornly trying to establish a nationality in nations that never belonged to them. They are doing this at the expense of the indigenous population in the countries where they have settled.16

It was under and against these tremendous constraints that the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza had to wage a struggle to survive and develop politically.

National Resistance and Israeli Repression

In discussing political development, or lack of it, in the occupied territories, a distinction must be made between the affective and effective aspects of this phenomenon. The affective aspect was manifested in a tremendous growth of national consciousness among the Palestinians during this period and was reflected in their demonstrations, strikes, and writings. The effective or operative aspect here refers to the Palestinians' struggle to build a structure through which affective political behavior was channeled. Affective political behavior was bound to remain disorganized and underdeveloped without a vehicle to give it shape and direction. This author contends that Israel had consistently

worked, through its military orders and practices, to prevent the emergence of a
genuine political vehicle for the Palestinians in the occupied territories.

When Israel took control of the occupied territories, local government was
structured according to Jordanian rule in the West Bank and to Egyptian
administration in the Gaza Strip. The local leadership of the West Bank basically
played the role of "middle man" between the local inhabitants and the central
regime in Amman. Moreover, the local leadership was largely composed of
members of prominent families which enjoyed economic or social status in their
immediate areas. Recognizing that the local political structure of the West
Bank could generally fit into its occupation design, the Israelis took several
political and administrative measures to maintain the configuration which existed
in the area prior to 1967. This entailed buttressing the Mukhtars (village
mayors) in rural areas and reinforcing the local authority of city and town
councils in the urban areas. In 1967, the military government issued Military
Order No. 80 which extended the "Tenure of the Local Administrative
Authorities" and authorized them to "operate on less than full quorum." This
was followed later in the same year by Order No. 191 which enabled the "'Person
Responsible' to appoint a Mukhtar instead of having him elected, and to remove a
duly elected or appointed Mukhtar if he believes him to be unfit for his job,

17Isa Al-Shuaibi, "The Development of Palestinian Entity-Consciousness,"

18Ibid.

19Jonathan Kuttab and Raja Shehadeh, Civilian Administration In The
Occupied West Bank: Analysis of Israeli Military Government Order No. 947
(Ramallah, West Bank: Law in the Service of Man, 1982), p. 33.
delinquent in his duties, or abusing his position."\textsuperscript{20} Military Order No. 237 of 1968 and Nos. 266 and 365 of 1970 simply expanded the authority of the "Person Responsible" in administering the rural areas.\textsuperscript{21} Military Orders 194 and 236 largely empowered the "Person Responsible" to do with the municipalities what he had already been given power to do with regard to Mukhtars and village councils.\textsuperscript{22} It should be noted that the title "Person Responsible" referred to the military governor or any official designated by him to carry out his orders. As these military orders indicated, all political power in the occupied territories rested with and flowed from the office of the military governor. All others working with the military governor were merely functionaries who simply implemented the military government's policy. Among other things, the 1967 War and its consequences clearly exposed the serious leadership deficiency in the Arab world as a whole. The need for a strong and genuine leadership was no where more urgent than in the West bank and Gaza to resist the occupation. As early as February of 1968, the Israeli Minister of the Interior declared that all of the areas occupied by Israel in 1967 were no longer "under enemy sovereignty," and that "for practical purposes they had become Israeli areas."\textsuperscript{23} The purpose behind the statement, it was explained, was not annexation but simply to "legalize" the movement of people between Israel and the occupied areas.

\textsuperscript{20}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 38.


\textsuperscript{22}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 482.

\textsuperscript{23}Al-Shuaibi, p. 57.
On the other hand, to buttress its own claims of sovereignty, Jordan continued to "pay the salaries of the officials of its former administration in the West Bank and to sanction both annual and extraordinary financial allotments to various economic, social, and municipal institutions registered in Jordanian records and laws." The West Bank inhabitants at that time sided with Jordan on the question of sovereignty because the threat of annexation and Judaization was very real. The general Palestinian attitude was that "if the Israeli aims on the West Bank were to be thwarted, it was essential to adhere to legal formulas and previous situations which enjoyed some kind of restriction on Israeli freedom of action." Another plausible reason for the Palestinians' attitude was the absence of a coherent Palestinian leadership in the occupied areas at the time. This was the case for two reasons: pro-Jordanian elements were still in control of municipal positions, and the PLO was still in the embryonic stage.

One of the earliest efforts at "political" resistance in the occupied territories was a clumsy and feeble attempt by thirty pro-Jordanian West Bankers who offered to cooperate with the occupation authorities in exchange for promises of a West Bank state. As a result of the Israeli snubbing, the pro-Jordanian elements suffered a loss of prestige among the Palestinian populace.

---

24 Ibid.

25 Al-Shuaibi, p. 59.

Another minor attempt of political resistance was the formation of an Islamic Committee which protested the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem. A more serious effort to organize the West Bank politically to resist the occupation was embodied in the establishment of the Higher Committee for National Guidance in September, 1967. This group took some practical steps in organizing demonstrations and strikes and in encouraging the formation of local committees to work against the occupation. The deportation of the High Committee's leaders in December, 1967, however, coupled with the failed effort by the Communist and other leftists to form a National Front, resulted in a seemingly political paralysis on the West Bank for most of the first year of occupation. A spurt of political expression occurred in late March 1968, following the PLO's successful fight against the Israeli forces in the Battle of Karamah on the East Bank. But, once more, deportations and administrative detentions were primarily responsible for blocking and even inhibiting any substantive effort to organize politically. Political activity remained largely dormant on the West Bank until King Hussein unleashed the Jordanian army against the PLO and Palestinian refugee camps in Amman in September, 1970. This event sent shock waves across the West Bank

---


29 Ibid.
and crystalized the differences between the pro- and anti-Hussein forces. While traditional leaders such as Muhammad Ali Al-Jaabri of Hebron and Anwar Nusseibeh of Jerusalem, called for a cease-fire, the new leadership blamed Hussein for the massacres and called for his overthrow.30

Though largely ineffectual, the sprouting of new Palestinian leaderships on the West Bank in the first five years of the occupation was an area of concern to the governments of both Israel and Jordan. To strengthen the hand of the traditional leadership, which did not pose a threat to the occupation authorities, and simultaneously project a liberal occupational policy, the Israelis announced in November, 1971 that municipal elections were to be held on the West Bank. Knowing that voting was limited to property owners as it was under the Jordanian regime, leftist groups were reluctant to participate in an election that heavily favored one segment of Palestinian society over the others. The PLO also feared that the elections could confer legitimacy on the traditional leadership, which in turn could be used to justify their collaboration with the Israeli occupiers. Therefore, both local leftist groups and the PLO called for a boycott of the elections to deny them legitimacy.31 Needless to say, with the exception of the mayors of Ramallah and Tulkarm, who ran on a nationalist platform, the 1972 elections were swept by the traditional leadership.32 Despite the election results and the repressive Israeli measures, the resistance movement continued to enjoy

30Metzger, Orth, Sterzing, pp. 151-153.

31Ibid.

32Richardson, p. 84.
widespread support in the occupied territories. When scores of West Bankers attended the Palestinian National Congress in Cairo in 1972, the Israeli military governor declared that all the participants had to "forfeit" their right to return to their homes.33 As far as the Israelis were concerned, these Palestinians violated section three of Military Order No. 284 (September, 1968) which stipulated that "it is prohibited for any resident of the area to consciously come in contact with a hostile organization while staying outside the area."34 The penalty for making such a contact, according to Military Order 284, was a ten-year imprisonment or 5,000 pounds fine or both. It is interesting to note that the Order did not call for exile or deportation as the Israelis decided to do in this case. This leads us to conclude that Israel's primary aim in this instance was simply to deprive the Palestinian community in the West Bank of its nationalistic leadership and to inhibit future leaders from following the same path.

Continued Israeli attempts to tighten its grip on the occupied areas elicited further resistance from the Palestinians on all fronts including the political one. On August 15, 1973, the Palestine National Front (PNF) was established in response to Israeli activities on the West Bank and Gaza. This was an amalgamation of several nationalistic and progressive groups which previously operated separately under the Front for Popular Resistance in the West Bank and the United National Front in Gaza.35 The Front utilized several non-violent

33Metzger, Orth, Sterzing, p. 159.


means to counter Israeli attempts to consolidate their hold on the occupied areas. The means ranged from organizing rallies and petitions to working on behalf of the victims of Israeli expropriations and the boycotting of municipal elections in Jerusalem which were designed to legitimize the annexation of the eastern sector of the city. A primary goal of this organization was to provide a broadly-based, grass-roots leadership that could supplant the narrowly-based traditional leadership on the West Bank. The PNF's strength grew considerably following the October War of 1973 and was reflected in the success of its campaign to boycott the city council elections in Jerusalem. As a result of its efforts, only eight percent of the people of East Jerusalem went to the polls. The continued growth of the PNF caused the Jordanians as well as the Israelis to react harshly to this organization. In an attempt to undermine the influence of the PNF and simultaneously prop up the traditional leadership, Jordan sent millions of dinars to finance its supporters on the West Bank. For its part, the military government used deportation and administrative detention to achieve the same goal. Jiryis Qawwas and Arabi Awwad, two prominent leaders of the PNF, were deported in December of 1973. By April of 1974, six other leaders were deported as well, including Suleyman Najjab, Chairman of the West Bank's Communist Party. In addition to these deportations, 150 PNF activists were put into administrative detention. Commenting on this wave of arrests, the Israeli newspaper Davar

36Ibid.

37Metzger, p.161.

38Ibid.

39Metzger, p. 163.
said:

The detainees included all active leaders of Jordan's illegal Communist Party. . . . They organized themselves as the 'Palestinian National Front' and began activities . . . . They are chiefly representatives of the class of young, educated Arabs—teachers, engineers and those active in underground professional associations.40

Israel's objective was abundantly clear—to nip in the bud any organization which could serve as a vehicle for the political aspirations of the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza.

Recognition of the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people" at the Arab summit in Rabat, Morocco, in 1974 and by the United Nations later in the same year complicated matters considerably for Israel in the occupied areas. While the triumphs of the PLO in the international arena gave a big boost to the nationalist forces on the West Bank, they had an opposite effect on the traditional and pro-Jordanian elements. In light of the newly found successes of the PLO on the outside and PNF on the inside, Israel began to debate the possibility of an "administrative autonomy" for the West Bank under the traditional leadership but within the occupation framework.41 It was against this backdrop of developments that the 1976 municipal elections were held. Israel's primary objective was to have pro-Jordanian and traditional leaders maintain their control of the municipalities in a purportedly democratic election, thus negating the PLO's claim of being the sole representative of the Palestinians everywhere, including the occupied territories.42 But contrary

40Ibid., p. 164.

41Metzger, p. 168.

42Ibid., pp.165-166.
to Israel's wishes, and obviously unlike their stand in the 1972 elections, the nationalists decided to plunge into the electoral battle for the municipalities. When it became apparent that the PNF candidates met the registration deadline for the elections while significant number of the traditionalists did not, the military governor was prompted to extend the registration period for obvious reasons. The chief reason for the traditionalists' lukewarm interest in the elections was the rapid decline of their political stature at a time when the PLO enjoyed widespread popularity. The Jerusalem Post commented on the extension as follows:

Officially this has been attributed to the 'pressure of numbers' but the deadline is believed to have been extended to enable more moderates to put forward their candidacy, with the aim of counter-balancing the radical tide which had swept the registration lists by the first deadline.

Despite Israel's interference, the 1976 municipal elections were a stunning victory for the nationalist forces on the West Bank. In practically all of the large towns, with the exception of Bethlehem, the PNF won a decisive majority of the council seats as well as the mayor's position. In terms of numbers, the nationalist bloc won 148 out of the 191 total number of seats. The results of the 1976 elections were an unequivocal testimony to the strength of Palestinian nationalism on the West Bank, and of which the elected municipal officials became the undisputed symbol. Newsweek commented on the meaning of the elections' outcome by saying that "after the vote Israel had proof positive that

43 Ibid., p. 170.
44 Metzger, p. 170.
45 Aruri, p. 51.
Palestinian nationalism was no longer just a fig leaf for political terrorists but a rallying cry for most of the West Bank. This of course, was the last thing Israel wished to see. The question for Israel was not what to do about the newly-elected leadership but rather how to go about undermining it.

Israel's Search for Alternate Palestinian Leadership

Israel's approach to destroying the Palestinian leadership at the municipality level was twofold: to render the municipalities useless in terms of their usual functions and to build up certain elements outside the nationalistic municipalities that were more amenable to its policies. In the summer of 1976, Dr. Menachem Milson was appointed as the new advisor on Arab affairs to the military governor of the West Bank. It soon became clear that Milson's primary goal was to undermine the political base of the nationalistic mayors. This was done using subtle and sometimes not so subtle means. To begin with, the procedure of communication between the mayors and the military governor was altered to become a channel for humiliation. Instead of the military governor going to the mayors when the need arose, as was previously done, the reverse became the norm. Moreover, with the exception of signing Israeli loans, written confirmation of agreements ceased to emerge from the military governor's office. Even the loan agreements were tenuous at best, since the binding version was always written in the Hebrew language which most West Bankers could not read, and which were arbitrarily cancelled by the Israelis any


47Metzger, p. 179.
time they wished. Mr. Ibrahim Al-Tawil, former mayor of Al-Bireh, made the following comments on the Israeli methods of dealing with the West Bank municipalities:

Most of the communication between the military governor and the mayors took place over the telephone. But even when we met with him, we never got anything in writing even when we requested it. By doing this, it was easy for him to change any verbal agreements reached in a previous meeting. This happened often enough but we could not prove it to the media or anyone else. Moreover, we were generally kept in the dark about the latest military orders and changes in Israeli policies in the occupied areas.

The political impotence of the mayors was exposed further by "the military government's interventions in the mayors' attempt to provide the cities with vital infrastructure and projects for city development." Termination of the Ramallah sewage system project after millions of Israeli pounds were spent, and the stoppage of a school construction in Nablus shortly before completion were two glaring examples of the military government's efforts to impair the mayors' political clout. Similarly, the military government prevented the improvements of water systems for many towns even though the funds were made available by the localities. Furthermore, financial constraints were imposed by the military government on the municipalities not merely to limit their services and growth but also to effectively erode the power of mayors and city councils. Among the

48 Ibid.


50 Metzger, p.179.

51 Ibid.
many fiscal restrictions that they continued to live under were the following: "They cannot levy any taxes without prior approval by the occupation authorities. They are also restricted in collecting grants and financial aid from the Arab world, and if they did receive aid, they had to expend it according to a plan approved by the military government." Karim Khalaf, mayor of Ramallah, clearly understood the goal of the occupation authorities when he succinctly commented:

In this way, the Israeli authorities are trying to stop the city councils from involving themselves with the people's problems. They want to show the people, 'What kind of mayors and city councils are they anyway? They don't do anything for you at all.'

Another method employed by the military government to undermine the popularly elected officials was to prop up the traditional and so-called moderate elements among the Palestinians of the occupied territories. Some of these individuals gained notoriety, at the municipalities' expense, because they were able to assist others in routine problems connected with the military government. The Israeli newspaper Haaretz summed up the Israeli strategy towards the newly elected West Bank municipalities as follows:

Dr. Milson, with the approval of the commander of the territory, General David Hagoel, and the coordinator of activities in the (occupied) territories, General Abraham Orly, attempted to enlarge the power of other representative bodies in the West Bank, for example, of the chambers of commerce, thereby

---


limiting the influence of the elected city councils as the only representatives of the people.54

A similar appraisal was made by Zavi Baráel, an Israeli journalist, in Davar on July 24, 1977:

It seems clear that it is the policy of the military government to reduce the powers of the mayors by redefining their status . . . . encouraging the rise of a new leadership, consisting of members of the Chambers of Commerce, certain notables and persons prominent in the field of education, to compete with the mayors, with the object of constructing a new system of centres of power.55

The ascendency to power of Menachem Begin and the Likud party in Israeli politics brought about radical efforts to find, or create if necessary, a submissive Palestinian leadership which was willing to accept their programs and designs. This Israeli search for an acceptable political leadership in the occupied territories led to the creation of the so-called Village Leagues in 1978. The Village Leagues' primary purpose was to "echo and help facilitate" Israel's occupational policies.56 It was widely believed that Begin founded the Village Leagues as an answer to the nationalist voices and pro-PLO sentiment which continued to permeate all levels of the Palestinian community. To strengthen the hand of the Village Leagues, the Israeli military authorities gave them extensive licensing powers.57 Under the Israeli occupation, nearly everything that an individual wanted to do required obtaining a license or a permit from the

54Ibid.


57Ibid.
military authorities or their agents. Among other things, permits were needed to rent a tractor, or even plant an olive tree. The intended Israeli message to the Palestinians of the occupied territories was loud and clear: "Cooperate with the Leagues or else."^58

The Israeli military government found few collaborators to activate its Village Leagues' scheme. The most outspoken head of the Village Leagues was Mustafa Dudin, a former Jordanian minister from the Hebron district. In an interview with France-Soir, Dudin reportedly said: "Let's be frank. The Israelis are on the West Bank to stay. Everybody knows they have no intention of leaving and we do not have the power to remove them. So let's be realistic: Let's cooperate with them."^59 On a different occasion, he was quoted in Háaretz (September 9, 1977) making a veiled anti-PLO statement by saying that "only the inhabitants of the West Bank, Hebron and Nablus can speak on behalf of the Palestinians living in these places, and not persons who do not even have any relations there."^60 Outside the Village Leagues but still within the scheme of building an alternate leadership to the PLO in the occupied areas, the Israeli government and press gave disproportionate attention to two obscure West Bank lawyers, Aziz Shihadeh and Hussein al-Shoyoukhi, for their efforts to undermine the PLO's popularity. While both men were pro-Jordanian in their political leaning, al-Shuyoukhi rejected the use of military action as a liberation tool and

58Hirschfield, p. 302.

59Ibid. p. 303.

60"The Search For Alternatives to the PLO," p. 134.
had hoped to hold a conference of PLO opponents in an Arab capital. No such conference was ever held.

Although neither man developed any considerable following, these men and others like them continued to sow divisions among the Palestinian masses at the behest of the Israeli occupiers. The Israeli position on this subject was clearly enunciated by Ezer Weizman, Defense Minister at the time, in Yediot Aharonot (September 5, 1977): "Israel is glad to encourage any Palestinian quarter that expresses opposition to the course pursued and the methods employed by the sabotage organization." Without doubt, Weizman was referring to the PLO when he said "sabotage organization." Regarding the extent of Israel's involvement in nurturing an anti-PLO block, the Israeli journalist, Y. Ben Haim, of Davar wrote the following:

If Israel wants the growth of anti-PLO trend, but this question is naive, because everyone active in this field realizes that the military government and security leaders who represent Israel are in constant contact with the leaders of the new initiative in the West Bank and not only encourage but help them ... the anti-PLO initiative in the West Bank indicates an attempt--which at this stage is being presented as independent--to sabotage PLO's efforts to represent all the Palestinians.

Despite the Israeli backing, the Village Leagues which numbered seven in 1983 remained little more than an empty shell. Almost immediately, Palestinians resisted the imposition of such a body among their ranks. The leaders of the Village Leagues were branded as collaborators and traitors and treated as such.

61 Ibid, pp. 132-133.

62 "The Search For Alternatives to the PLO" p. 134.

63 Ibid., pp. 135-136.
Several heads of the Village Leagues were assassinated and those who survived commanded no respect at all among the Palestinians in the occupied areas.\textsuperscript{64}  
In the meantime, Palestinians in the occupied territories looked to the National Guidance Committee (NGC) for leadership on national issues. The NGC became quite active following the 1976 elections. Its effectiveness was reflected in the numerous strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations it was able to organize and coordinate which concerned the military government on the West Bank. the NGC's active support of the PLO made it an obvious target for the occupation authorities.\textsuperscript{65} On November 8, 1981, the military government issued Order No. 947, which in addition to elevating the status of a vast number of military orders to that of permanent laws, had the effect of "formally establishing a new structure of civilian government of the West Bank which is empowered to function within the limits determined by the Order."\textsuperscript{66} The head of the Civilian Administration was empowered by Order 947 to administer a large body of laws and military orders covering appointments, issuing of permits and licenses, and a host of regulations affecting many facets of economic life. Article 5 of this Order authorized the head of the Civilian Administration to "delegate to others the authority to create secondary legislation based on the law and the military orders he is charged with administering."\textsuperscript{67}  

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{64}Hirschfield, p. 303.
\item\textsuperscript{65}"After the National Guidance Committee," \textit{Journal of Palestine Studies}, Vol. XIV, No. 3 (Spring 1985), pp. 175-176.
\item\textsuperscript{66}Kuttab and Shehadeh, p. 14.
\item\textsuperscript{67}Ibid, pp. 16-17.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
population by officers of the Civilian Administration to get endorsements from Village Leagues before having their requests considered was a case in point. In short, Order 947 was a serious blow to the nationalist leadership on the West Bank. Military Orders 993 and 994, which revised Order 970 and 971 respectively, empowered the head of the Civilian Administration to assume the powers of the city councils or any of its members in the cities of Nablus and Ramallah if the former felt that the latter was not carrying its responsibilities according to law or if it failed to cooperate with it. These Orders set the stage for evicting the nationalist mayors out of office and for destroying the cohesion of the NGC.

Early in 1982, Jewish terrorists were suspected of planting bombs in the cars of the mayors of Nablus, Ramallah, and Al-Bireh. The mayors of the first two cities, Bassam Shakaa and Karim Khalaf, were maimed by the explosions while Ibrahim Al-Tawil escaped injury. In resolution 471 of 1980, the Security Council of the United Nations condemned the attack on the mayors and held that Israel was indirectly responsible since it had "failed to provide adequate protection to the civilian population in the occupied territories in conformity with the provision of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War." Even Mayors Fahd Al-

---


Qawasmeh of Hebron and Muhammad Milhem of Halhoul, noted for their ability to express the Palestinian cause in non-inflammatory language, were deported to Jordan a few months earlier.\(^71\) The Israeli government had flatly refused to comply with U.N. resolutions 468 and 469 of May 1980 which called on Israel to rescind its deportation decision.\(^72\) In an interview in Washington, D.C., Mayor Milhem commented on the possible reasons for his and Qawasmeh's deportation by saying: "We were so successful in talking to Israelis that it was one reason the military governor expelled us: we showed we could maintain bridges with Israelis,"\(^73\) Milhem was referring to contacts with the Israeli public and not the Israeli government. By March of 1982, dismissal of West Bank mayors who were not cooperative with the military authorities was well under way. Within a few months, at least seven elected West Bank mayors were ousted and replaced by Israeli officials.\(^74\) The refusal of the municipal council of Dura to cooperate with the authorities as a protest against the establishment of the "Civilian


\(^74\)Sandler, p. 154.
Administration" resulted in the collective dismissal of the whole council. Why did Israel launch a massive, punitive campaign against the Palestinian leadership on the West Bank at that time? I put this very question to Mr. Bassam Al-Shakaa, former mayor of Nablus and a victim of the Israeli assault, in August of 1986. In part, Mr. Shakaa said:

The military authorities were very frustrated over the failure of the Village League idea. They were equally frustrated in not finding other quislings to sing their tune. The Israeli authorities became very hostile towards the National Guidance Committee simply because it appeared to be effective in articulating and crystalizing the Palestinians' political sentiments. And since these sentiments reflected their wishes to end the occupation and to have the right to self-determination, the Israeli military government used restrictions and deportations against the mayors to undermine the goals as well as the structure of the National Guidance Committee.

All of the Israeli measures to weaken and destroy the NGC were quite consistent with Israel's policy to prevent the development of any organization that could serve as a building block in the structure of Palestinian nationhood. In fact, when Israel realized that truly democratic elections on the West Bank could only pave the way for such organizations and nationalist forces in general to come to the fore, Israel simply moved to prevent such a process from occurring. According to Jordanian law, which Israel claims to uphold on the West Bank, municipal

---


76 A personal interview with Bassam Al-Shakaa in Nablus, West Bank, August, 1986.
elections should take place every four years. Since 1976, however, Israel had refused to allow democratic elections anywhere in the occupied territories. The refusal appeared to have been motivated by political rather than military or security considerations. This point was illustrated when members of the Municipal Council of Dura, a Palestinian town in the Hebron district, requested from the High Court of Justice a permission to hold open elections. The occupation authorities countered the Palestinian appeal with an affidavit submitted by Brigadier General Binyamin Ben Eliezer which demanded that the Palestinians' request be denied on the basis that elections would be "exploited by terrorist organizations and their lackeys in the region." A senior assistant to the State Attorney's office echoed the same sentiment by warning that democratic elections in the West Bank and Gaza are "in the interest of the PLO and its supporters ... and this is sufficient cause for Israel to prevent that." Needless to say, the occupation authorities had their way and no elections were held in Dura or anywhere else in the occupied areas since 1976.

The successful repression of the nationalist leadership in the occupied territories did not put an end to Israel's search for an alternate one. According to Yehuda Litani, an Israeli journalist, the political void left by the NGC was not


78"Ibid.

79"Ibid."
locally filled by either the Village Leaguers or the pro-Jordanians. In the mid 1980's, however, and with Israel's sanction, Jordan renewed its efforts to bypass the PLO's representation of the Palestinians on the West Bank. This was done by buttressing its supporters with money and by withdrawing its recognition of the nationalist elements on the West Bank. Jordan, for example, expanded the role of the Islamic Waqf (Islamic Trust) a Jordanian ministry, to encompass everyday concerns such as handling of applications for Jordanian passports and the like on the West Bank. Financial assistance, including $4.5 million from the U.S., was channeled to the occupied areas through Jordanian agents.

Taher Kanann, Jordan's minister of planning, described his government's five-year plan of spending $1.3 billion in the West Bank through mayors appointed by Israel as an urgent humanitarian step. The minister denied that the development plan was an attempt to strengthen pro-Jordanian elements or that it had any political implications. The minister's denials seemed unconvincing in light of the fact that in early August of 1986, Jordan withdrew its recognition of the elected mayors. This was nothing more than a belated approval of what Israel had

---


81"PLO or No One", Al-Fajr (Jerusalem: The West Bank, August 8, 1986), p.5. (Arabic)


already done. These Jordanian moves, Al-Quds newspaper argued, were part and parcel of an Israeli scheme to return parts of the occupied territories to Jordan while retaining sovereignty over the rest. It is interesting to note that the scheme, occasionally called the Jordanian option, did not include the PLO or self-determination for the Palestinians. In the end, the net result of this scheme did not differ from any previous Israeli plan. In fact, no matter how these plans were packaged the Israeli goal remained the same: No self-determination for the Palestinians in the occupied territories.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ECONOMICS OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION

COLONIAL PATTERN

Historically, the economy of occupied territories is generally shaped by the constraints and limitations of the occupying power. In this respect, the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza most certainly fits this classic colonial pattern. Since 1967, the occupied territories had been a protected domain for Israeli manufactured goods and a source of cheap, unskilled labor.\(^1\) It is within these parameters that one can come to grips with the political-economic configuration and consequences of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank.

Long before the 1967 War, some Israeli leaders had given serious thought to the type of economic relationship Israel should have with its Arab neighbors. Abba Eban, a former foreign minister, articulated this thinking when he described the envisioned relationship as "not the relationship which exists between Lebanon and Syria; it is far more akin to the relations between the United States and the Latin American Continent."\(^2\) In other words, Eban was basically advocating the core-periphery model as the framework for Israel-Arab relations, in which the former acts as the core and latter serves as the periphery. Israel had its golden opportunity to implement such a system following the occupation of the West Bank.

---


Bank and Gaza in 1967. Through the use of military orders and other practices as instruments of domination, Israel managed to regulate and restrict the economy of the occupied territories, and thus maintained the core-periphery relationship which ultimately served its interests.

From the very outset of the occupation, the Israelis had been integrating the economies of the West Bank and Gaza into their own economy without taking the crucial step of formal integration. For some, the reason for doing so was political, since formal integration was tantamount to annexation. For others, Meron Benvenisti among them, the reason Israel had stopped short of formal integration was chiefly economic. Formal and total integration, it was argued, meant the extension of the "social welfare system that dominates the economic scene in Israel." This meant "selective taxation and massive subsidies, direct involvement in refinancing, infrastructure development, massive aid in recession periods, differential tariffs, and foreign currency manipulations." Naturally, Israel did not want to extend these "privileges" to the occupied areas because it would have had the effect of keeping the Palestinians on the land. In short, Israel wanted the benefits of the occupation without the burdens. Both explanations, however, appeared to emanate from the Israelis' general view of the West Bank.


5Benvenisti, p. 9.
and its people. In this regard Benvenisti affirmed:

Israelis perceive themselves as the only legitimate collective in the land of Israel, and therefore all Palestinian claims to communal (economic and political) rights are illegitimate and, by definition, subversive. This view, though diffused and controversial among Israelis ideologically, served as an unwritten guideline for economic decision makers.6

While the aforementioned policies and perceptions pointed to a purposeful underdevelopment of the West Bank's economy by the occupying power, they did not reveal the extent of that underdevelopment. It is the object of this chapter to examine the effects of the said policies, induced by perceptions or otherwise, on various aspects of the West Bank's economy.

Agriculture

Agriculture had always been the most significant and productive branch of the West Bank economy.7 Under occupation, however, Israeli policies had placed a number of restraints which led to stagnation in this sector. Some of the restraints came in the form of military orders which regulated and constricted various aspects of farming, ranging from planting to marketing. Other restraints took the form of practices which deprived the agricultural sector of some valuable land and water resources. Collectively, these Israeli measures brought about changes in the agricultural domain that were designed to serve Israel's needs rather than those of the West Bank. The restraints became starkly clear when shipments of vegetables, plums, and grapes from the West Bank to Israel were prohibited between 1967 and 1971.8 Later on, when the sale of Palestinian

---

6Benvenisti, p. 12.

7Ibid., p. 14.

8Benvenisti, p. 15.
winter tomatoes and cucumbers precipitated a decline in the profits of Israeli farmers, restrictions and quotas were imposed on the Palestinian farmers through Order 1039. The underlying theme of Israel's policy in this regard had been that the agricultural products of the occupied areas should complement instead of compete with Israeli products. Hence, a number of Israeli agronomists were assigned to the West Bank to guarantee the goal of non-competitiveness with Israeli agricultural products.

One of the earliest measures imposed by the Israelis on Palestinian farmers was Order 47 of 1967 which prohibited the import and export by the West Bank of all agricultural products, plants and animals, without a permit from the occupation authorities. By controlling the valves of trade, Israel placed itself in the commanding position of regulating, to a large extent, the growth, or lack of, of the West Bank's agricultural sector. Within the West Bank, even the seemingly mundane matters relative to agriculture were made complex by the Israeli regulations and military orders. An illustration of this was the issuance of Order 134 in 1967, which prohibited the transfer or operation of a tractor or any piece of agricultural machinery in the West Bank without a permit from the "Person Responsible." Order 1015 of 1982, to cite a more recent example,
which pertained to monitoring the planting of fruit-bearing trees also hampered agricultural development on the West Bank. The second provision of this order prohibited West Bankers from planting any fruit-bearing tree without first obtaining a written permission from the appropriate authorities and meeting their "conditions."13 The third provision denied West Bankers the right even to replace old trees with new ones without a permit. To add insult to injury, Palestinians had to pay a fee to secure the permit if the authorities chose to set a fee. Provision 10(A) of the same order dictated that individuals who failed to follow its directions may be imprisoned for one year, or pay a fine of 1,500 shekcles or both. Moreover, once an individual was found guilty of violating this order his or her trees were uprooted at the "offender's expense".14 To get their point across, Israeli soldiers uprooted 1,500 olive trees which they claimed were planted illegally in Obeidiyya village in the West Bank.15 Decree 1039 extended decree 1015 to include restrictions on the planting of vegetables and the need of "non-Jewish" farmers to acquire a permit beforehand. Rafael Eatan, a Knesset member, described the objective of the decree as a means "to pressure hostile elements and to benefit positive elements."16 But the underlying purpose of the decree, as Avigodar Feldman put it, was far more reaching than simply using it as


14Ibid.


leverage. He said "in order to receive a permit to grow tomatoes on one's own land, one must prove ownership to it. Not every arab (sic) has such official ownership documents and so it often happens that the land over which ownership cannot be proven, falls into the hands of the state of Israel." Needless to say, these decrees and military orders left many West Bankers in a quandry regarding their very viability as farmers. Not only did the West Bank farmers have to cope with a complex web of decrees and their debilitating effects, but had to stand helplessly as the occupying authorities deprived them of some of the best farm land and a substantial part of their water resources.

Early in the occupation period, the Israeli military government issued a number of military orders declaring large tracts of land "closed areas" under the pretext of security considerations. Several former Jordanian military camps, for instance, were designated as closed areas although many of those were located on arable land and could have easily been used by the local Palestinian inhabitants. The takeover of four camps by Orders 201 through 204 in January of 1968 was a direct result of the "closed area" policy which was employed by the occupation authorities to justify their control of the land. Practically each one of these military orders imposed severe punishments and fines on those who violated the restrictions by entering the said areas without permission. The "closed area" policy was not by any means limited to former army camps, but extended to

17Ibid


19Ibid.
private, arable land as well. Palestinian farmers protested the closing of these areas and called for their reopening. Among those who made their feelings known to the military governor was Tahseen Al-Faris, chairman of the executive committee of the Agricultural Marketing Cooperative in the Nablus District. In a speech on January 5, 1982, Al-Faris requested "the opening of the closed areas to the farmer whether it is for cultivation, grazing, or erecting structures, as well as terminating all acts of confiscation and takeover of lands in all provinces so that our farmers can put the land into good use."20

Any pretense that the Israelis may have used to exploit the West Bank's natural resources during the first three years of occupation was dropped on June 5, 1970. On that date, the military government issued Order 389 which gave the military governor the power to control all natural resources in the occupied territories.21 In essence, this order merely provided a stamp of authority to practices that were already underway. For example, at the outset of the occupation, Israel destroyed 140 irrigation pumps just west of the Jordan River. Some felt that this was done to deprive the local population of its livelihood and facilitate its emigration.22 Moreover, it confiscated scores of wells which led to the shrinking of irrigated land from 100,000 dunums in 1966 to 98,000 dunums (a

---

20Arab Society Documents, No. 50 (Jerusalem: Center of Statistical Studies, Organization of Arab Studies, n.d.). (Arabic)


dunum is about \(\frac{1}{4}\) of an acre) in 1981. Furthermore, Israel had dug up thirty artesian wells in the Ghor region with a capacity of producing more than half the volume pumped by the 314 Arab wells combined. Meanwhile, the use of water resources by West Bankers for agricultural purposes had been subjected to Israeli constraints which in effect had frozen the level of consumption to twenty percent higher than that of 1967. Other measures included appropriation of all farm land in the Jordan Valley which was suitable for cash-crops but required irrigation, and a prohibition on well-drilling by Palestinians throughout the West Bank. The seriousness of the underdevelopment of water resources on the West Bank was clearly described by Paul Quiring, Programme Director for the Mennonite Central Committee in Jerusalem. On September 12, 1977, Quiring said:

"The development of such wells for the Israeli settlements must be seen against the backdrop of water development in the Palestinian sector. I am aware of no Palestinian villages or individuals on the West Bank which have been permitted to drill new irrigation wells since 1967. Mekorot (Israeli National Water Authority) has, however, allowed six wells to be drilled for domestic purposes. This lack of water resource development and the confiscation of wells on "absentee" property means that there are fewer wells providing less water for Palestinian agriculture in the Jordan Valley today than were available on the eve of the 1967 war."

---

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.


The Israeli assault on the West Bank's land and water resources continued unabated well into the 1980's. According to Hashim Saleh, mayor of Tobas, Israel had caused great destruction to agriculture in his area. He said:

The Israeli occupation authorities destroyed over two thousand housing units that were specially set aside for the farmers of the Tobas area, blew-up 140 projects and related structures that were used for irrigation, confiscated eighty thousand dunums of irrigated land and built settlements on it, dug up a number of artesian wells to such great depths that caused the drying up of wells owned by the local inhabitants as well as the natural springs in the area of Ain al-Biada and al-Bardali. 28

In addition to the general restrictions imposed on agriculture in the West Bank, Palestinian farmers were periodically subjected to methods of intimidations employed by government officials and settlers alike. A common practice was to intercept the farmers' trucks during the harvest season as they attempted to sell their produce in different parts of the occupied areas. On September 11, 1986, to cite a recent example, customs agents and policemen set up roadblocks at the entrances to Jerusalem and prevented the farmers from transporting their products to the northern or southern areas of the West Bank, confiscated part of the produce and destroyed other parts, on the pretext that they had failed to secure a permit. 29 Just two days after this incident, Israeli settlers uprooted 120 olive and almond trees in the Palestinian village of Kariut

---


29"Farmers Are Prevented From Transporting Their Produce Through Jerusalem," Al-Quds (September 11, 1986).
Since the owner of the trees did not violate any laws and his title to the land was not in question, the uprooting act can only be seen as another intimidating method to discourage other Palestinians from pursuing farming as a career or quite possibly to deprive them of their livelihood.

As a result of the Israeli policies, the greatest change in West Bank agriculture had been the reduction in the amount of land under cultivation as well as the number of people employed in this sector. Depriving the Palestinians of control over the land and water resources had led to a substantial reduction in the size of cultivated land on the West Bank. Since 1967, the cultivated land area had declined by 100,000 acres, about one-fifth of the total area under cultivation. The number of people engaged in agricultural pursuit had also decreased from 42.5 to 28.5 percent in the West Bank and from 31.6 to 16.5 percent in the Gaza Strip. While some of this decrease was attributed to improvement in technology which reduced the need for manual labor, it was also a reflection of the loss of arable land to Israeli expropriations and the shrinkage of the agricultural sector on the West Bank.

30 "Bulldozers Continue to Uproot Olive and Almond Trees in Kariut," Al-Quds (September 13, 1986).


32 Said, A Profile of the Palestinian People, p. 23.

Agricultural production on the West Bank had a modest growth in some areas during the occupation period due to greater mechanization and better seed selection as the figures in Table 1 (p. 87) show. A close look at these figures would indicate that inconsistency rather than consistency was the norm in growth pattern, and that when seen over a seventeen-year period the growth becomes modest indeed. Given the fluctuations in the increases in production, one tends to be hesitant about reaching a conclusion that a substantial development had taken place in West Bank's agriculture during the Israeli occupation. Even if we were to accept the notion that moderate growth had taken place in this sector, one cannot help but wonder about the extent of growth that could have occurred had the 100,000 dunums lost to agriculture been in use, or drilling of wells for irrigation had been allowed, or if the numerous restrictions on planting and marketing had not been imposed. Therefore, it is the conclusion of this writer that the agricultural sector of the West Bank had been underdeveloped during the occupation period simply because Israeli policies had kept it from reaching its potential.

Industry

The underdevelopment of the industrial sector was more profound than that of the agricultural sector in terms of growth, or more appropriately, lack of it. Israel's policy toward Palestinian industry, whether on the West Bank or Gaza, was clearly aimed at bringing about stagnation and even decline in production. Regarding the Palestinian industry, Israel's industrialization plan recommended a policy of "no participation, financing and investment." The plan appeared to

---

34Benvenisti, p. 18.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grains</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&amp; Potatoes</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>139.9</td>
<td>147.3</td>
<td>149.4</td>
<td>159.5</td>
<td>182.3</td>
<td>172.9</td>
<td>166.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watermelons</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>80.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&amp; Squash</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olives</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>62.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citrus</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>74.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Fruits</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>105.9</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>85.5</td>
<td>93.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meats</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>42.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eggs (in millions)</td>
<td>——</td>
<td>——</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

35 Attiah, Jibril, and Talab, eds., p. 203.
have demographic as well as economic goals since it called for "restricting industrial development" in all of the urban centers of the West Bank.\textsuperscript{36}

Small as it was, the industrial sector of the West Bank had steadily declined under the constraints of Israel's occupational policies. Despite the shortage of data in this area, a comparison of Awartani's survey of industries in the West Bank in 1979 with that of Mohammad Masrouji in 1984 was adequate to provide evidence of the general decline that occurred in the industrial sector. Based on those two surveys, Table 2 shows the distribution of industries in the West Bank by areas and number of workers employed for the years 1978 and 1981. (Table 2 is on page 95). Table 2 shows a significant decrease in the total number of industrial sites in the West Bank between 1978 and 1981 —459 to be exact.\textsuperscript{37} This decrease did not merely indicate stagnation but negative growth as well. In the category of small workshops (1 to 9 workers), there was a decrease in all areas except Jerusalem. In workshops hiring between 10 and 19 employees, five out of the eight areas witnessed a decrease. In the category of 20 to 49 workers, there was a decrease in three areas, increase in two, and three areas remained unchanged. In the industries of 50 workers or more, the number of factories in all areas either remained the same or declined except for Toulkarm, which had opened one factory of that size. The reduction in the number of factories was clearly reflected in the industrial sector's share of the gross domestic product, which dropped from 9.0 percent in 1968 to 8.2 in 1975, and to 6.5 percent in

\textsuperscript{36}Benvenisti, p. 18.

\textsuperscript{37}Attiah, pp. 227-228.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>184</td>
<td>083</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toul Karm</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>09</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>104</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>339</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>08</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>171</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>062</td>
<td>090</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethlehem</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>270</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>06</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>710</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jericho</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>2106</td>
<td>1619</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2268</td>
<td>1809</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What caused this decline in the West Bank's industrial sector? More specifically, were Israeli regulations and practices largely responsible for the retardation in this area? Military Order 219 of 1967 forbade the use of any engineering or construction equipment without first registering it and having it pass inspection. A construction contractor explained the impact of the order as follows:

This regulation put several small contractors out of business because they were not able to replace the equipment which the Israeli inspectors rejected. As a result of this, there was a slowdown in the Arab construction sector, which is probably what the Jews aimed to do in the first place.

Moreover, while Military Order 470 of 1972 empowered the "Person Responsible" to issue and cancel licenses for crafts and industries, Order 471 extended his power to exempt others from obtaining such licenses if he so desired. Although some of the regulations imposed by the orders appeared innocent and routine, their application was done in a most capricious manner. Mayor Shakaa of Nablus explained their implementation this way:

Israeli orders and regulations dealing with Palestinian industry and trade in general have been used for a dual purpose: first, to suppress industrial expansion and ensure non-competition with Israeli products;

38Benvenistoi p. 15.

39Kuttab and Shehadeh, p. 39.

40 Personal interview in Jerusalem in August, 1986.

41Kuttab and Shehadeh, p. 49.
and second, to use them as an instrument to punish political dissenters and to reward collaborators.\footnote{Personal interview with Mayor Bassam al-Shakaa of Nablus in August of 1986.}

If there were any doubts about the restrictive nature of the early military orders in this domain, they were laid to rest by Military Order 653 of 1976. This Order prohibited people in the occupied territories from producing, importing or exporting certain products without a license from the "Person Responsible."\footnote{Kuttab and Shehadeh, p. 54.}

This in effect led to the constriction, or even suffocation, of industrial growth in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Hanna Nasser, owner of a towel factory in Bethlehem, attributed the lack of growth in the West Bank's industrial sector to two pestering problems resulting from Israeli regulations. He said, "In the West Bank we have had no banks since 1967 and we are unable to buy any new machines to improve the efficiency of our work."\footnote{Daoud Kuttab, "See No Evil, Speak No Evil," Al-Fair (August 8, 1986), p. 16.} This feeling of being suffocated in the industrial sector was also enunciated by Anwar Nusseibeh, director of the East Jerusalem Electricity Corporation. Nusseibeh observed that:

\begin{quote}
The Jerusalem Electricity Company is continually being harassed by the occupation authorities in an attempt to squeeze it out of business. They are doing this for political reasons as much as for economic ones. They don't want a major Palestinian company to stay on its feet. The regulations they passed, especially the one setting a ceiling on our prices of electricity but not on the goods they sell us, are designed to prevent any further expansion of our services and ultimately to devour our company.\footnote{Personal interview with Anwar Nusseibeh in Jerusalem in July of 1986.}
\end{quote}
It is worth noting that early on, through Order 159, the military governor had assumed the power which was given to the Council of Electrical Authority in the West Bank by the Jordanian government in 1967.46

To preclude Palestinian industry from competing with Israeli products, Israel employed a number of measures to shut down such industries and to prohibit potential competitors from being established. A tomato paste factory, the only one of its kind at the time in both the East and West Bank, was forced to close in the 1970's.⁴⁷ One-way trade from Israel and heavy taxation were the main reasons cited for this closing. In yet another case, a request of some Palestinian entrepreneurs to open a cement factory in Hebron in the early 1980's was blocked by the Israelis for the simple reason that Israel already had such an industry.⁴⁸ In 1985, the occupation authorities imposed several new restrictions on the West Bank's industry that insured its underdevelopment. Among other things, the Israeli authorities decreed that no new Arab industrial locations would be permitted or established, nor would any existing ones be allowed to expand.⁴⁹

In addition to all of the preceding restrictions, the West Bank's industrial sector had to compete in an unfair contest with Jewish industries being built on

---


47Personal interview with a member of the Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce in July of 1986.

48Ibid.

the West Bank itself. By 1983, six Jewish industrial parks had been built on the West Bank, occupying 1,260 dunums and employing 2,500 workers. These Jewish industries were entitled to receive massive support from the Israeli government in terms of investments, selective taxation, and subsidies. For being in the occupied territories, these industries were "eligible for grants of 30 percent and loans of 40 percent of their investment at a real interest rate of 0.5 percent or, linked to the dollar of 6 percent. Plants are entitled to free physical infrastructure and to short-term credit facilities." Since the Palestinian industry on the West Bank was neither eligible for any of the preceding facilitators of business nor was it allowed to receive assistance freely from Arab countries, it was literally impossible for it to experience any significant growth under these conditions. If any development in the industrial sector was taking place, it was a Jewish development. Furthermore, the Israeli government had planned to construct 14 more Jewish industrial parks in the West Bank by year 2010. Therefore, the future of the Palestinian industry on the West Bank appeared to be bleak indeed if the Israeli plans were to proceed uninterrupted.

Tourism

Agriculture and industry were not by any means the only sectors of the economy that stagnated from Israel's occupational policies. In fact, no branch of

50Benvenisti, p. 17.

51Ibid.

52Benvenisti, p. 17.
the West Bank economy had suffered more from Israeli policies than tourism. As indicated in Chapter Two, tourism was a healthy and vibrant sector of the economy under Jordanian rule. Within a short time after the occupation began, the tourist trade in the West Bank started to descend. This decline became evident over the years in terms of the number of hotels in operation, the number of beds available, and the number of annual guests received at these hotels.

In East Jerusalem, the number of hotels remained constant at 40 from 1964 to 1984.53 In the rest of the West Bank, the number of hotels decreased from 29 in 1970 to 16 in 1984.54 The number of available beds in West Bank hotels also decreased from 868 to 645 during the same period. Moreover, a sharp decrease occurred in the number of guests registering at these hotels. Based on Israeli statistics, the number of guests at West Bank hotels, not counting Jerusalem, plummeted from 20,483 in 1968 to 10,511 in 1984.55 The underlying causes behind this slide in the tourist trade can be traced to Military Orders 87 and 173 of 1967. In effect, Order 87 transferred all the power given to the Jordanian government under the Temporary Jordanian Tourism Law to the "Person Responsible" under the Israeli occupation.56 The Order cancelled all licenses and appointments made by the Jordanian government in this field and made renewal

53Attiah, p. 267.

54Ibid., p. 265.

55Ibid., p. 268.

56Kuttab and Shehadeh, pp. 33-34.
conditional to the approval of the "Person Responsible." Order 173 prohibited "travel agents and tour guides from offering any services in the West Bank except as part of a tour originating in Israel and licensed by the 'Person Responsible' and fulfilling the terms and conditions of such license." The effect of this Order on the West Bank's tourist industry was clearly devastating. Since the Order linked their work to tours originating in Israel, Palestinian travel agents found themselves at the mercy of their Israeli counterparts. The situation for Palestinian tourist agencies deteriorated further when the occupation authorities added new regulations on March 28, 1984. The latest regulation stipulated that those who wish to run a travel or tourist agency must first secure a five-thousand dinar promissory note from a licensed bank to get a permit to operate. Furthermore, the bank note must be renewed annually according to the regulation. These regulations did not merely make it more difficult and expensive to establish a tourist agency, but also made it a most precarious business adventure. In short, the continued existence of a Palestinian travel agency depended on the goodwill of the Israeli tourist industry and the whims of Israeli banks.

In addition to the governmental constraints, the West Bank's tourist industry was subjected to some practices which had eroded its position even further. Several individuals engaged in the tourist trade confided to this writer that the

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid., p. 38.

Israelis did their utmost to dissuade Americans and Europeans from staying in the Arab sector of Jerusalem and the West Bank in general. An Arab hotel owner asserted that he heard Israeli guides, on more than one occasion, telling English-speaking tourists that they should be wary of Arabs because they "cheat and steal", and that their safety could not be guaranteed if they slept in the Arab section.60 On the official level, the Israeli Tourist Ministry, through its offices overseas, promoted only Israeli hotels thus diverting most of the tourist business in their direction.61 Further, Arab hotels, like other West Bank businesses, suffered from the heavy taxation they were subjected to by the Israeli tax collectors. Not only was this practice prohibited by international law, but it was also done in a most arbitrary manner. A member of the Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce echoed the sentiment of many Palestinian businessmen when he described the tax-collectors' methods of operation this way:

They (Israeli tax-collectors) always seem to assume that Arab businessmen cheat on their taxes by concealing their true incomes. Therefore, instead of using the business records to determine the correct amount of taxes, tax-collectors resort to estimating the Arabs' income which invariably turns out to be greater than the real income. To lend this unfair practice some credence and justify their robbery, the Jewish tax-agents would pounce on Arab businesses at their busiest times and then use that hour of work or day as a yardstick to estimate the establishment's income for the rest of the year.62

60 Personal interviews with Palestinian hotel-owners in the Jerusalem-Bethlehem area in July of 1986.

61 Attiah, p. 270.

62 Personal interview with a member of the Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce in July 1986.
The Palestinian Refugee Camp of Kalandia, just north of Jerusalem, was subjected to such a practice in June of 1985. As the Border police and the regular police encircled the camp, tax officials ordered all the stores within the Camp to close for business as they went inside each one to assess them for tax purposes. According to the Israelis, the Palestinians were not paying the "appropriate" taxes and therefore were fined 10,000 dollars.\textsuperscript{63}

The Israeli restrictions and practices that were imposed on practically all aspects of the West Bank's economy did not merely underdevelop the affected sectors, but, as expected, had a devastating impact on both trade and labor.

\textbf{Trade}

Prior to the 1967 war, both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip ran a deficit in their trading with the outside world. The exports from both areas were basically agricultural products and their imports were mostly industrial products and some foodstuffs.\textsuperscript{64} Once the occupation set in, the direction of the flow of trade shifted, but the deficit continued. Since the occupied areas had very little choice in the matter, as is the case in practically all other occupied territories, Israel became their greatest trading partner. Table 3 and 4 not only confirmed this fact, but signified the high degree of dependency of the occupied on the occupier. The dependence of the West Bank on Israeli imports appeared to be on the increase as evidenced by the statistics in Table 3.

\textsuperscript{63}Personal interview with several merchants in the Kalandia Camp in July 1986.

\textsuperscript{64}Van Arkadie, p. 77.
TABLE 3
WEST BANK IMPORTS ACCORDING TO COUNTRIES IMPORTED FROM AND TYPE OF PRODUCTS FOR THE YEARS 1981, 1982, 1983**
(IN JORDANIAN DINARS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries Imported From</th>
<th>Type of Product</th>
<th>1981</th>
<th>1982</th>
<th>1983</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>19,782,727</td>
<td>17,110,769</td>
<td>19,742,667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>113,748,000</td>
<td>125,267,000</td>
<td>136,072,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>133,530,727</td>
<td>142,377,769</td>
<td>155,814,667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>321,212</td>
<td>163,077</td>
<td>213,846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>2,518,182</td>
<td>3,275,385</td>
<td>5,604,615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,839,394</td>
<td>3,438,462</td>
<td>5,818,461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Countries</td>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>942,424</td>
<td>2,066,154</td>
<td>1,959,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>13,778,788</td>
<td>14,347,692</td>
<td>13,001,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14,721,212</td>
<td>16,413,846</td>
<td>14,960,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUMULATIVE TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>151,091,333</td>
<td>162,230,077</td>
<td>176,593,794</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The total of imports from Israel increased from over 133 million dinars in 1981 to over 142 million in 1982 and to nearly 156 million in 1983. As for exports, it

65Attiah, p. 244.
should be noted that most of the manufactured goods "exported" to Israel from the West Bank and Gaza were largely the result of "subcontracting arrangements with Israeli firms producing food, textiles, leather, and building material. The sale of agricultural products has been restricted to prevent competition with Israeli farmers."

---

**TABLE 4**

WEST BANK EXPORTS ACCORDING TO COUNTRIES EXPORTED TO AND TYPE OF PRODUCTS FOR THE YEARS 1981, 1982, 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Type of Product</th>
<th>1981</th>
<th>1982</th>
<th>1983</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Imported From</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>7,803,030</td>
<td>6,549,230</td>
<td>8,380,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>37,554,545</td>
<td>35,389,231</td>
<td>40,287,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>45,357,575</td>
<td>41,938,461</td>
<td>48,667,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>8,521,212</td>
<td>11,941,538</td>
<td>9,654,667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>18,163,636</td>
<td>23,743,077</td>
<td>18,788,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>26,684,848</td>
<td>35,684,615</td>
<td>28,442,667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Countries</td>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>815,181</td>
<td>326,153</td>
<td>413,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>815,181</td>
<td>326,153</td>
<td>413,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CUMULATIVE TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>72,857,604</td>
<td>77,949,729</td>
<td>77,523,333</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The cumulative picture of exports versus imports was not an encouraging one for the West Bank's economy. In 1981, for example, imports exceeded exports by 100 per cent. The situation worsened in 1982 and by 1983 imports surpassed exports by 128 percent. Statistics show that the trade deficit between the West Bank and

---

66 Benvenisti, p. 10.

67 Attiah, p. 243.
Israel were merely $26.8 million in 1968, but grew to $263.2 million in 1984.\(^{68}\) Similarly, trade deficit between Gaza and Israel mushroomed from $11.4 to $161 million during the same period.\(^{69}\) This was simply further evidence of the high degree of dependency that the occupied territories had reached on their occupier.

**Labor**

Lack of any substantive economic development in the West Bank and Gaza caused Palestinian workers to flock in large numbers to Israel or to Israeli settlements in search of employment. Israeli law required Arab workers from the occupied territories who wanted to work in Israel to register at one of thirty employment offices scattered in the West Bank and Gaza.\(^{70}\) According to the decree, registered workers would be assigned work based on the needs of the Israeli economy.\(^{71}\) By 1985, the number of workers from the occupied territories who were employed in Israel and on the settlements reached 72,000 and 24,624 respectively. The vast majority of this labor force was engaged in construction and service jobs, and less than 16 percent worked in industrial jobs.\(^{72}\) In other words, Palestinian laborers in Israel were basically doing the type of jobs that

\(^{68}\) Attiah, pp. 241.

\(^{69}\) Ibid.


\(^{71}\) Ibid.

most Jews refused to do.

All workers from the West Bank and Gaza were classified by Israeli economic legislation as "non-resident workers". As such, these Palestinian workers were not eligible for the social benefits accorded to their Israeli equals under the Social Security Law. 73 It is worth noting that Palestinian laborers who were employed by Israelis were required to contribute to Israel's Social Security System like their Jewish counterparts. Using this practice, the Israeli government amassed huge but undetermined sums of money during the first nineteen years of occupation and did not spend one shekel of it on these workers for retirement, disability or unemployment benefits.74 Moreover, since Palestinians were not allowed to join the Histadrut, the Israeli Labor Union, Palestinian workers in Israel had no union protection against layoffs and arbitrary dismissals.75 For this reason, recessions in the Israeli economy affected the Palestinian worker more immensely than the Israeli worker. This may have seemed as a positive development for the occupied territories since that meant increasing their labor force. This was irrelevant, however, because Israeli restrictions had already caused a shrinkage in some sectors of the occupied areas' economy and stagnation in others. Hence, Palestinian workers who lost their jobs in Israel generally became unemployed or emigrated in search of work.

73Ibid.

74Schwartz, p.2.

Having one third of the occupied areas' labor force employed in Israel and in the settlements had an adverse effect on the economic development of the West Bank in general, and the agricultural sector in particular. According to a number of farmers, the increased Arab labor in Israel and the Jewish settlements had not merely driven up the cost of labor on the West Bank, but also deprived it of badly needed "working hands" for the development of the area. Generally speaking, Palestinian laborers in Israel earned between 60 to 90 percent more than their counterparts in the occupied areas. It is worth noting, though, that these same laborers received less than half the average Israeli wage for similar work. The conditions and wages for other Arab workers in Israel, especially the illegal laborers, were far worse. A large number of Arab workers, mostly children, were exploited by Israeli employers, particularly in the agricultural sector. The process used in selecting these workers, their treatment at work, and the wages they received had all the earmarks of a slave market. Writing in Davar, Nahum Barnea said:

The fate of the little Beduin children, the Kunte-Kintas of the state of Israel, is really touching. They get up at dawn for their long march to their Jewish boss who exploits them mercilessly. The work in the sun and the money they get cannot buy them 5 falafel (an inexpensive vegetable patty) portions in Jerusalem.

---

76 Personal interview with farmers in the Jenin-Toulkarm region in August 1986.

77 Sai'd, p. 24.

Being largely integrated into the Israeli economy, the labor market of the occupied territories was naturally affected by the major currents impacting the occupier's economy. To prop up its ailing economy and to reduce the deficit, estimated at more than four billion dollars, Israel adopted a number of measures in 1985 which had a detrimental effect on the economy of the occupied territories, and naturally, their labor force.⁷⁹ Among the measures affecting Arab workers were the imposition of a production tax of thirty-eight percent and a property tax of six percent. For Jewish workers, the rates were one percent and about two and a half percent respectively.⁸⁰ Furthermore, with Arab workers earning less than fifty-nine percent of their Jewish counterparts, the increase in prices of consumer products by ten to twenty percent was devastating for Arab employees.⁸¹ The extent of the devastation was clearly reflected in a comparison of the loss of income to inflation between Arab and Jewish workers. It was estimated that the loss of income due to inflation was thirty-eight percent for Arab workers and a mere one percent for Jewish workers.⁸² The chief reason for the discrepancy was that Palestinian wages, unlike Israeli wages, were not

---


⁸⁰Ibid.

⁸¹Ibid.

linked to the inflation index. According to this formula, Israeli laborers were protected from the ravages of inflation by linking their wages to the ever increasing cost of living index. In other words, any increase in the cost of living was automatically matched by an increase in the Israeli worker's income. This formula, however, did not apply to Arab workers.

**Standard of Living**

The relative improvement in the standard of living in the West Bank and Gaza was generally presented by Israel as an indication of economic development in the occupied territories. To support this contention, Israeli statistics were offered to show a marked increase in consumption, especially of durable household goods, among the Palestinian population as shown in Table 5. Other Israeli sources pointed to the fact that West Bank residents had only 6,300 telephones in 1967 and 7,500 cars in 1968. By 1980, the number of cars had risen to 33,000 and the number of telephones climbed to 19,000. While Israeli propagandists were quick to claim credit for this obvious increase in consumption of durable goods in the West Bank and Gaza, they conveniently failed to mention that most of these commodities were far beyond the reach of the average Palestinian worker.

---


TABLE 5
WEST BANK AND GAZA HOUSEHOLDS POSSESSING DURABLE GOODS
FOR SELECTED YEARS 85
(PERCENT OF ALL HOUSEHOLDS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>West Bank</th>
<th>Gaza</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electrical or Gas Stove</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas of Electrical Range for Cooking</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>70.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical Refrigerator</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>66.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washing Machine</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television Sets</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>70.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Car</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Israelis also pointed to the "active" housing industry as another indication of improvement in the standard of living on the West Bank. Claims of progress in this area, however, were somewhat inconsistent as shown by the figures in Table 6.

As clearly seen in Table 6, the bulk of investment in construction had been carried out in the private sector. Construction in the public sector, on the other hand, generally declined throughout the occupation period and finally came to a standstill in 1982 and remained that way through 1984. This decrease was largely attributed to the reduction in the construction of schools and other public facilities due to Israeli impediments.  

By using consumption and to a lesser degree construction as the only criteria to measure the standard of living on the West Bank, one may conclude that a moderate improvement had taken place in this area. One cannot conclude,
however, that there was any serious linkage between the improvement in the standard of living and the underdevelopment of practically all sectors of the economy on the West Bank as explained earlier in this chapter. Then, to what do we attribute the considerable increase of purchasing durable goods in the occupied territories? There were a number of factors which accounted for this increase in consumption. First, as indicated earlier, many of the Palestinians who lost their land to Israeli expropriation or were forced out of the market by restrictive measures joined the ranks of wage-earners and thus had more cash at their disposal. Second, substantial amount of remittances were sent on regular basis from relatives working outside the occupied areas. This money augmented their income and made it possible for them to buy some of the durable goods and thus improved their standard of living. Third, the funds funnelled by the Jordanian-Palestinian Coordination Committee to various institutions and municipalities to stem the tide of emigration had undoubtedly increased the cash flow in the West Bank and contributed somewhat to the superficial appearance of improvement in the standard of living. Israel prohibited the entry of such funds in August of 1981. Last but not least, while it was true that some Palestinian families had more capital at their disposal, their options of what to do with it were very limited. Israeli economic constraints precluded most Palestinians from


89Mansour, pp. 19-21.
making any serious investment in agriculture or industry. The increase in their purchasing power of Israeli durable goods.

The underlying causes for the moderate level of activity in the construction sector, chiefly housing, were largely the same as those for purchasing durable goods. The only major difference between the two was that the housing industry, limited as it was, had been motivated by social and political factors as well as necessity. Nevertheless, according to several Palestinian contractors, the construction industry in the Palestinian sector had been operating on a relatively low level due to Israeli obstacles. Three contractors independently stated that for every building permit issued to the Arabs, four or five requests were denied. At any rate, while the building of private homes and the purchasing of durable goods gave the appearance of prosperity, they did not contribute in any significant way to long-term economic development.

---

90 Gharaiheh, p. 115.

91 Mansour, pp. 19-21.

92 Personal interviews with construction contractors on the West Bank in July/August of 1986.
CHAPTER FIVE

EDUCATION UNDER ISRAELI OCCUPATION

Education is considered a fundamental pillar to the growth and development of any modern society. The disruptions and dislocations caused by the 1948 War accentuated the value of education for the Palestinians as an asset that could not be taken away from them as other worldly possessions. Hence, once the Jordanian government "committed itself in the 1950's to a national educational system, the Palestinians, including the poorest refugees living in UNRWA camps, took advantage of the opportunity."\(^1\) The advent of the Israeli occupation in June of 1967 caused many Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to search for ways to salvage what they had and improve on it if feasible. In this regard, while Palestinian progress on the elementary and secondary level was rather negligible, their achievements on the university level, at least in terms of numbers, was somewhat impressive.

These achievements caused the Israeli authorities to employ numerous tactics and measures to impede the growth and development of higher education in the occupied territories and to reduce the quality of education for those who persisted in seeking it. This chapter will attempt to focus on the methods and military orders utilized by the occupation authorities as well as their effects on the realm of academics in the following areas: student and faculty harassment, closure of universities, censorship, and restrictions on physical expansion.

\(^1\)Richardson, The West Bank: A Portrait, p. 57.
Before delving into the various aspects of educational underdevelopment, it is only fitting that this discourse provides a reasonable explanation of why there was a sudden growth of colleges and universities in the first twelve years of the occupation period. In 1967, only eight institutions of higher education (those beyond secondary school) were in existence on the West Bank. Most of these institutions, as shown in Table 7, served as teacher-training and vocational centers, had relatively small enrollments, and offered a period of study of no more than two years. Students who wished to pursue a university education had to seek it in neighboring Arab countries or outside the Arab world.²

Following the 1967 War, the difficulty for West Bankers to enroll in the universities of Jordan was further complicated by the Israeli restrictions on travel. Among the restrictions were that young males under the ages of twenty-six were prohibited to depart the West Bank for less than six months at a time. This measure greatly increased the cost of education outside the West Bank and consequently discouraged some students from studying abroad.³ Further restrictions against students of the Gaza Strip from entering Egyptian universities following the camp David Accords in 1978 prompted many Gazans to


see the necessity of establishing their own university. The Palestinians' response to their much reduced access to higher education was to turn inward and build their own universities. Another equally important factor was the fact that some

### TABLE 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Institute</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Year Established</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bir Zeit College</td>
<td>Ramallah District</td>
<td>1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Najah College</td>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's Teacher Training Institute</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRWA'S Men's Teacher Training Institute</td>
<td>Kalandia, Jerusalem District</td>
<td>1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men's Teacher Training Institute in Arroub</td>
<td>Hebron District</td>
<td>1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men's Teacher Training Institute</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Agricultural School</td>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRWA'S Women's Vocational and Teacher Center</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>1962</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

4Ibid., p. 86.

5Mahshi and Rihan, pp. 46-47.
politically-conscious Palestinians viewed the supporting of local universities as a means of maintaining their national identity and subsequently resisting the occupation. As a result of these two contributing factors, both of which were a by-product of the Israeli occupation, there was a dramatic increase in the number of colleges and universities on the West Bank as evidenced in Table 8. In addition to the institutions listed in Table 8, several community colleges were established on the West Bank offering a period of study of two to three years. Among these were Khaddouri Agricultural Institute, Al-Tira Community College, Vocational Training Center, College of Al-Umma, Al-Ibrahimiia College, and Al-Rawda College. Israel did not initially interfere in the establishment of the West Bank universities basically for two reasons: to project the image of managing a benign occupation and because it did not expect them to succeed. Some argued, however, that the establishment of Arab universities on the West Bank was viewed by the Israeli leadership as a step towards "stabilizing" the area by nurturing "a moderate Palestinian leadership that could serve as an alternative to the radical Arab guerilla organizations." Therefore, regardless of the motive, it

---


7Attiah, pp. 156-157.

8Al-Jirbawi, pp. 28-29.

is fair to conclude that the Israeli occupation was largely responsible for the sprouting of institutions of higher education on the West Bank and Gaza.

To both Palestinians and Israelis, universities in the occupied territories became a symbol of Palestinian cultural and national identity, a matter of great pride to the former and a source of serious concern to the latter. Some of these universities did not merely serve their communities by producing well-educated graduates who made their contribution to society after graduation, but provided

10Attiah, p. 152.
programs which strengthened the student-community relationship long before graduation. Students at Bir Zeit University, for example, were required to complete 120 hours of community service during their four-year terms. This community service included "work in public institutions, physical work such as paving village roads, helping farmers during the busy harvesting seasons, teaching in the university's literacy programme, and occasionally helping the staff do social surveys." This phenomenon, however, did not go unnoticed by the occupation authorities. Once the universities began to play an active role in Palestinian society, Israel spared no time or effort to restrict their functions and obstruct their growth. As far as the Israelis were concerned, allowing the Palestinians to build up their universities was a serious miscalculation.

Student Harassment

Working on the premise that it is far easier to control and manage uneducated individuals than educated ones, the occupation authorities focused a great deal of attention on restricting and disrupting normal life for students and faculties of universities-colleges in the West Bank and Gaza. Furthermore, the Israelis' view of the West Bank universities as centers for "terrorism" rather than beacons of learning may very well explain their "pattern of raids, closures, detentions, arrests, interrogations - about which any student on campus may tell you in great detail." Pursuant of this line of reasoning, the Israeli occupation


12 Ibid.

authorities adopted a systematic policy of harassment which was designed to forestall or even preempt most, if not all, situations which could lead to organized students' protests.

The most common form of harassment that students and teachers alike found themselves subjected to was the uncertainty of whether they would make it to class on time, or even have any classes to attend once they arrived on campus. A student at al-Najah University described the problem this way:

Hardly a week of school passes by without one form of interruption or another by the occupation forces. They (the Israelis) try to keep us off balance by their random but frequent assaults on the universities. It is very irritating and frustrating. But we know their goal behind these tactics and we are not about to give in to them.¹⁴

The occupation soldiers effectuated and perpetuated this uncertainty by the frequent roadblocks they erected on roads leading to the universities. The problem became immensely worse when the soldiers confiscated the students' identification cards, which they were required to carry on the their person whenever they traveled in the occupied territories.¹⁵ To illustrate the extent of complications posed by such seizures, Dr. Robert Ashmore of Marquette University cited in his booklet, Palestinian Universities Under Israeli Occupation, the case of three Bir Zeit University students whose identity cards were confiscated in October of 1983 and were unable to replace them until March of 1984.¹⁶ In a variation of this practice, but for similar purpose, the Israeli

¹⁴Personal interview with a student from al-Najah University in Nablus, August, 1986.


¹⁶Ashmore, pp. 9-10.
authorities on the West Bank demanded that commuting students of Bir Zeit University obtain a special travel permit to get to campus. When the university refused to comply with this regulation, Israeli forces prevented the students from taking their examinations.\textsuperscript{17} The impact of these practices went far beyond disrupting the students' educational development to literally throwing their daily lives into turmoil. The uncertainty over whether one can take examinations on time was particularly acute for high school seniors who had to take the Tawjihi exam. This examination was not only significant in terms of graduation from high school, but also in determining whether or not a student would be accepted in a university. \textit{Al-Haq}, a newsletter published by Law in the Service of Man (LSM) in the West Bank, reported in its July/August 1986 issue that it was able to verify the arrest of at least eight students just before or during the Tawjihi examination. The newsletter pointed out that since the arrested students were not charged with any offenses and were not even interrogated, one can only conclude that the occupation authorities were simply aiming at disrupting the students' educational development.\textsuperscript{18} In an earlier survey conducted by LSM, it was established that the Israeli military authorities arrested thirty-four students between June 16 and June 22 of 1983 for no apparent reason other than keeping them from taking the Tawjihi exam. LSM arrived at that conclusion in view of the fact that no charges were brought against the students, and that they were


\textsuperscript{18}"Arrests During Tawjihi Exams," \textit{Al-Haq}, No. 14 (July/August 1986), p.5.
released four or five days after the examination was over.¹⁹

Detention and deportation were mechanisms generally utilized by the occupation forces against the student leadership to paralyze students' organizations. Just one week following the revival of the 1945 British Mandate Emergency Regulations in 1985, four students from al-Najah University were placed under administrative detention for six months.²⁰ Later on, in September of 1986, practically the entire student leadership at al-Najah University was either imprisoned or placed under town arrest. This wave of arrests encompassed the president of the Student Council, the deputy president, the director of student affairs, and the financial secretary.²¹ Using a slightly different tactic, the Israeli authorities simply banned the president of the Student Council of Bir Zeit University from attending classes for six months, without levelling any charges against him.²² Bir Zeit University commented on this policy in a press release on June 3, 1985, which stated in part: "If the army commands veto power over student attendance at universities then any notion of academic freedom for Palestinian universities is seriously undermined."²³ Similarly, the implications of

¹⁹Graham-Brown, pp.74-75.

²⁰Ashmore, p. 10.


²²Ashmore, p. 12.

deportations had not been lost on the Palestinians of the occupied territories.

After the occupation authorities deported three students from the West Bank on October 2, 1985, al-Najah University issued the following statement:

On 2 October 1985, the Israeli government deported three Palestinians from the occupied territories, Amin Magboul, Bahjat Jayyousi and Walid Nazzal . . . There is another more ominous, dimension to the problem of these three young men's deportation: it sets the political and legal stage for the possible resumption of large-scale arbitrary expulsions of Palestinians from their homeland.24

The ultimate form of harassment employed by the Israelis against Palestinians in the occupied areas was the use of physical force. West Bank universities were not immune from wanton physical attacks by either the Israeli security forces or the Israeli settlers. Throughout the occupation period, the Israeli army did not show any restraint or hesitation in using excessive force, including the shooting of defenseless students, in the name of keeping order.25

The firing on demonstrators at Bir Zeit University on November 21, 1985, was one of dozens of occasions in which the Israeli army resorted to deliberate killings.26 The Israeli soldiers manning the roadblock outside of Bir Zeit University detained the car that was transporting one of the wounded students for half an hour before allowing it to proceed to the hospital. As a result of the

24 Al-Najah National University, Press Release: Two Al-Najah Students Deported (October 5, 1985), in Arab Studies Society Documents, No. 1655.

25 Graham-Brown, p. 96.

delay, Sharaf al-Tibi, an engineering student bled to death.\(^{27}\) Settlers' violence was just as savage. Between 1980 and 1984, for example, Israeli settlers carried out no less than thirty attacks against educational institutions in the occupied territories. The attacks ranged from assaults on kindergartens and elementary schools to bombings and firings on secondary schools and universities.\(^{28}\) Until 1986, the most serious assault on educational institutions was against the Islamic University of Hebron in which three students were killed and thirty others were wounded.\(^{29}\) Among other things, these attacks highlighted the irony of Military Order 817 of 1980. Supposedly, the order called for the stationing of "guards" near educational institutions that enrolled students who were 16 years of age or older for the purpose of protecting Jewish settlers.\(^{30}\) The attitudes of all the students and professors that this writer had talked to regarding this order were best summed up by Khalil Tufakgi, a former teacher in the West Bank. He said:

The presence of the Israeli soldiers on roads leading to the colleges and universities of the West Bank is designed more for harassment of Palestinian students and teachers than for the protection of any Israeli settlers. Besides, none of the universities is located close enough to any of the illegal settlements to warrant the Israeli military presence.\(^{31}\)


\(^{29}\)Ibid.

\(^{30}\)Kuttab and Shehadeh, p. 57.

\(^{31}\)Personal interview with Khalil Tufakgi in Jerusalem, August, 1986.
Faculty Harassment

In addition to all of the harassment cited above, teachers in the occupied territories had to endure restrictions on their eligibility to get and maintain their jobs. The most damaging measure in this regard was the enactment of Military Order 854 in 1980. Article Four of this order prohibited teachers who were convicted of "security offenses" or held under administrative detention from teaching without first securing a special permit. Article Five of the same order left the matter of determining who would receive a teaching certificate in the hands of the Israeli officer in charge of education, along with the local chief of police and the military governor. Allegedly, the latter two would be consulted to "take into consideration matters of public order." The effect of this order was most insidious for the entire teaching profession in the occupied areas. Jonathan Kuttab, a Palestinian lawyer in the West Bank, described the effect and magnitude of this decree as follows:

The impact of this regulation is only realized when we recall that "security legislation" governs a wide range of activities including distribution of leaflets, participation in demonstrations, scribbling slogans on walls and listening to unauthorized political speeches. It encompasses almost every conceivable political activity. Few individuals in this highly politicized society can manage to escape committing an act which can be considered under the order a security offense.33

This order had in effect reduced the "pool" of prospective teachers and made the jobs of those who were already in the teaching profession most vulnerable.


33Ibid., p. 4.
Moreover, the order had subjected the whole educational system to political manipulation by the Israeli authorities. To discourage educated Palestinians from teaching in the West Bank and Gaza, the occupation authorities decreed in 1983 that Palestinian teachers were prohibited from holding a second job to supplement their already meager incomes. Furthermore, the restrictions imposed on employment in the educational field coupled with the restrictions in the field of economics had left most college graduates with little choice but to emigrate. This "brain-drain" had in turn deprived the West Bank of skilled workers and impeded the growth of colleges and universities.

In an effort to restrict the influx of foreign professors on the West Bank, Israel demanded that all foreign instructors sign a statement condemning the Palestine Liberation Organization as a prerequisite to getting a work permit. The crux of the statement was the following:

I hereby declare that I am committed not do any kind of work and not to give any services directly which will help or support the so called PLO organization or any other hostile organization which is considered hostile as indicated in the order concerning banning of instigatory actions and hostile publicity (modification 1) (Judea & Samaria) (No. 938) 5742 (1982).

When all of the twenty-eight foreign professors at al-Najah University refused to sign the pledge, the occupation authorities deported the first three objectors to make an example of them for the others. One of the deportees was Tayseer Al-

34 Graham-Brown, p. 76.

35 Kuttab, pp. 8 - 9.

36 Graham-Brown, p. 94.
Kelani, dean of education at the university. At Bethlehem University, eight foreign professors, four of them Americans, were "barred" from teaching when they refused to sign the anti-PLO statement. Officials of Bethlehem University were particularly concerned that their English department would be seriously affected by the Israeli actions since one-fourth of them happened to be foreigners. Others perceived the problem to be of greater depth and magnitude. Among those was Peter Heath, an American professor at Bir Zeit University, who remarked that the anti-PLO statement "seems to be the beginning of a concerted effort to gain control of Palestinian institutions on the West Bank."  

The purported withdrawal of the pledge as a requirement for obtaining a teaching permit in November of 1982 turned out to be just a play on semantics. An Israeli spokesman for the occupation authorities put it this way:

Foreign professors would no longer be required to sign a separate statement to obtain work permits, but that some form of assurance that they did not support hostile organizations would be included on the applications for the work permits themselves.

---


Therefore, the change was in the form and not in the substance of the policy. The essence of the pledge, however, was nothing short of harassment of faculty members and an outright abridgement of academic freedom.

The Israeli authorities were equally innovative in finding ways and means of making life more difficult for local teachers in the occupied territories. Before the 1983–84 academic year began, the Israelis required the entire faculty of Gaza Islamic University to obtain permits from the military governor. The occupation authorities invoked Egyptian Order 380 as basis for their requirement. The university's protestation that the order applied only to the al-Azhar University of Egypt and not to the Islamic University of Gaza went unheeded, and six teachers were arbitrarily denied such permits. Town arrest was another weapon in the occupiers' arsenal which was also used against some teachers. Faculty members who were suspected of being politically active, even non-violently, were commonly placed under severe restrictions by the military authorities to curtail their activities. Zahera Kamal, a physics teacher and an active member in a number of cultural and social organizations on the West Bank, was among those targeted by the occupation authorities. While Zahera was allowed to travel to Ramallah to teach at the Women's Training Center, she was required to appear at the Moscobiya police station in Jerusalem at 2:30 p.m. on a daily basis. Moreover, Zahera had to spend all her evenings at home, and this requirement

\begin{itemize}
  \item [41]Graham-Brown, p. 95.
  \item [42]Ibid.
  \item [43]"West Bank Teacher: Prisoner of Conscience," Palestine Perspectives (March 1984), p. 10.
\end{itemize}
was monitored by frequent police calls to her house. Zahera's case was not unique, however, for at least sixty-one other Palestinians suffered a similar fate in 1983 alone. 44

Unlike Israeli educators, Palestinian teachers who sought to improve their conditions by organizing members of their own profession were viewed with suspicion and treated as if they were political saboteurs. Once teachers formed committees in various districts to represent them, the occupied authorities responded by firing some, transferring others to remote locations, and coercing about 100 teachers to take early retirement. 45 Other forms of pressure included assaulting their homes and confiscating their books. 46

Israel also took steps to obstruct the return of Palestinian teachers living abroad as part of its wide-ranging policy of restrictions against Palestinian educational institutions in the occupied territories. According to Hikmet al-Masri, chairman of the Board of Trustees at al-Najah University, it was extremely difficult for Palestinian professors who were living abroad to obtain "family reunion" - an approval from the Israeli authorities which in turn gives them permanent resident status in the West Bank. In fact, Masri pointed out, as of September 1979, only the president of al-Najah, Dr. Kayed Abdul-Haq, was

44 Ibid.

45 General Committe of "Teachers for Public Schools, Press Release Regarding the Occupational and Financial Conditions of Teachers in West Bank's Government Schools (March 12, 1984), in Arab Studies Society Documents, No. 1089.

46 Ibid.
able to secure such a reunion successfully.\textsuperscript{47} Denying Palestinian professors reunion with their families had the effect of keeping them in permanent exile from teaching on the West Bank and Gaza. Restrictions on the movements of both faculty and students became more severe after the summer of 1980. Two of the three unnumbered regulations which accompanied Order 854 (1980) dealt with prohibiting entry to the West Bank of principals, teachers and students who intended to work in educational institutions without first securing "a written personal permit issued by a military commander."\textsuperscript{48} The language of the regulations was so vague and expansive, Kattab argued, that their restrictions could apply not only to foreigners and movements of teachers and students between the "administered" territories, but can also be applied to people within the various territories.\textsuperscript{49} These regulations simply strengthened the hand of the military commander in controlling the transfers of teachers within the West Bank and Gaza.

**Closure of Educational Institutions**

Closure of schools by the military commander or by any of the military governors of the six districts was a common practice employed by the occupation authorities to disrupt the educational process on the West Bank. Using the rubric of "security and order", the occupation authorities viewed students' protest, "inciting" material on campus, and cultural exhibits as a pretext for the

\textsuperscript{47}"Hikmet al-Masri," \textit{Arab Studies Society Documents}, No. 34 (1979).

\textsuperscript{48}Kuttab, \textit{Analysis of Military Order No. 854}, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{49}Ibid.
closures. \textsuperscript{50} On May 9, 1979, the Council for Higher Education in Jerusalem protested the frequent closing of educational institutions on the West Bank and issued a list (Table 9) of the chief closings that were prompted by Israeli interference between February and May 1979. Israel's goal behind these closings was not merely to cut into class time, but to cast a dark cloud of uncertainty over the viability of educational institutions in the West Bank as a whole.

\begin{center}
\textbf{TABLE 9}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
\textbf{CLOSING OF EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ON THE WEST BANK BY THE OCCUPATION AUTHORITIES FROM FEBRUARY TO MAY OF 1979\textsuperscript{51}}
\end{center}

\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{Date of Closing} & \textbf{Name of Institution} & \textbf{No. of Students Affected} \\
\hline
Feb. 12-April 8 & UNRWA Preparatory Boys School in Kalandia & 800 \\
March 5 - April 6 & Bethlehem Secondary Boys School & 630 \\
March 5 - April 6 & Hisham Ben Abdel-Malek Secondary Boys School, Jericho & 328 \\
March 11 - N.A. & Ramallah Secondary Boys School & 500 \\
March 12 & UNRWA Women's Vocational and Teachers Training Center, Ramallah & 650 \\
March 12 & Women's Teacher Training Institute, Ramallah & 216 \\
March 13 - April 7 & Halhoul Secondary Boys School & 800 \\
March 16 - April 1 & Dura Secondary Boys School & 600 \\
March 25 - April 2 & All educational institutions in the West Bank & 247,412 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\textsuperscript{50}Khalil Mahshi and Ramzi Rihan, "Education: Elementary and Secondary," in Emile A. Nakleh, \textit{A Palestinian Agenda for the West Bank and Gaza}, pp. 44-45.

While Palestinian awareness largely foiled the achievement of this Israeli goal, the occupation authorities succeeded in causing major disruptions in the normal routine of West Bank universities as shown in Table 10.

**TABLE 10**

**CLOSURES OF WEST BANK UNIVERSITIES BETWEEN MARCH 1979 AND MAY 1985**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bir Zeit</th>
<th>March/April 1979</th>
<th>4 days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May/July 1979</td>
<td>2 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>November 1980</td>
<td>1 week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov. 1981/Jan 1982</td>
<td>2 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feb/April 1982</td>
<td>2 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July/Oct 1982</td>
<td>3 months (old campus)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>February/May 1984</td>
<td>1 month (new campus)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March/May 1985</td>
<td>2 months</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Bethlehem:       | June/July 1982  | 4 weeks      |
|                  | March/April 1983 | 4 weeks    |
|                  | Nov 1983/Jan 1984 | 2 months |

| Al-Najah:        | June/Sept 1983  | 3 months     |
|                  | Aug/Nov 1984    | 4 months     |

| Hebron:          | March/May 1983  | 2 months     |

Pretexts for the closings ranged from demonstrations and cultural exhibits.

52Graham-Brown, P. 96.
occuring on the campuses to acts of resistance by Palestinians not at all linked to the educational institutions.53 The frequent closure of West Bank universities caused considerable disruption in their academic programs and just plain havoc in their schedules. Professors' attempts to improvise by holding classes outside the closed campuses were forbidden as soon as the Israelis discovered that they were taking place.54 Saeb Easaikat, spokesman for al-Najah University, described the effects of his school's closure in 1985 this way: "The closure will delay this year's graduation until late November and will disrupt the registration process for next fall's freshman class."55 The students, as seen in Table 10, suffered more than any other party as a result of the closures. A student at Bir Zeit University appeared to reflect the agony and frustration of his peers regarding the closures when he said:

Closing of the universities is my-- I should say our biggest problem. It is a problem of uncertainty, we don't know when the university will close and we don't know when it will open. There are delays in instruction, in examinations, and yes, delays in graduation. One does not know if he is going to graduate in four, five, or even six years.56

While students and teachers were the primary victims of this Israeli policy, the closure of some universities had a detrimental effect on the community as a


54Ibid., pp. 95–96.


56Personal interview with a Bir Zeit University student in Ramallah, West Bank in August, 1986.
whole. For example, since Bir Zeit University had the only laboratory in the West Bank which could "determine the quality of new drugs for pharmacy sale and hospital use", its frequent closure placed the health of many Palestinians in jeopardy. Moreover, closure of universities tended to retard and even destroy certain scientific experiments which required controlled conditions or frequent monitoring. This insidious practice drew criticism and condemnation from a group of Hebrew University professors who labeled it as a form of collective punishment. In their Report on the Conditions of Universities in the Occupied Territories, 1981, the professors concluded that:

Closing a university by the military government is an extreme and harsh measure which prevents all members of faculty and students from studying, teaching and doing research... a form of collective punishment which is imposed on all students and teachers, with no connection to their personal responsibility for the events which resulted in punishment.58

Censorship

Israel's underdevelopment of education in the occupied territories was manifested in yet another form: censorship. This instrument was utilized to expurgate books, journals, newspapers, and any other published material originating in or reaching the occupied territories. The scope of this mechanism was later expanded to encompass audio-visual materials as well through Order 1079.

The "legal" basis for Israeli censorship has rested largely on the decreeing of three Military Orders (Nos. 50, 91, and 101). One of the earliest Military Orders directly affecting the field of education on the West Bank was Order 91 of

57 Ashmore, p. 9.

58 Ibid., pp.9-10.
1967. This Order was general in nature in that it transferred to the "Person Responsible" all the authorities vested in Jordanian laws and regulations for determining educational policy on the West Bank. Military Orders Nos. 50 and 101, on the other hand, were more specific in that they empowered the occupation authorities to censor any printed matter in the occupied territories regardless of its source of publication. Moreover, they stipulated that individuals who are involved in importing, publishing, or distributing such material must obtain a permit from the military commander to carry out their functions. Order 1079 basically amended Order 101 by adding to the censored printed matter audio-visual material such as films, tapes and records.

Shortly after the occupation began, the Israeli authorities outlawed the use of fifty-five textbooks on the West Bank, twenty-two of which were in the field of Arabic literature and three were purely Islamic religious books. In Gaza, the Israeli censors banned seventy of the seventy-eight textbooks in use at the time. To ensure adherence to the bannings, the occupied authorities set a penalty of one year imprisonment or 2500 Israeli shekels or both.

59 Kuttab and Shehadah, p. 34.
60 Ashmore, pp. 6-7.
61 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
While the number of banned books reached its apex in 1981 with about 3000 titles on the list, this figure was revised downward to slightly more than a thousand. The list was periodically updated by the Israeli censors to purportedly prevent "politically inciting" material from falling into the hands of the occupied population. Naturally, the determination of what was considered politically inciting was left solely to the Israeli censors. More often than not, however, the censored lists included works from a variety of subjects that can hardly be judged politically inciting. A sample from the last eighteen books that were banned in 1984 was a case in point. Among them were the following: Panorama of the Modern Novel, Al-Mutanabbi and Children, Lectures in Modern Arabic Literature, Part II, and Hearts Painted Blue. None of these books can be deemed politically inciting by any stretch of the imagination.

Educationally, Arab East Jerusalem underwent the greatest alteration of all of the occupied territories. Once the annexation of East Jerusalem became official, Israel replaced the Jordanian curriculum with its own. This change remained in effect until the mid 1970's when the Jordanian curriculum was restored. However, poor conditions in the public schools prompted many to shift to private schools. The fate of education in the rest of the West Bank was not much better. Restrictions on imported textbooks, for example, was a common


67 General Union of Palestinian Students, p. 2. Also in Aruri, p. 311.

68 Aruri, p. 311.
occurrence. On the average, Israel has refused import permits to between nine and fourteen UNRWA textbooks annually between 1979 and 1984.69

Furthermore, while Israel allowed the Jordanian curriculum to remain in effect in the schools of the West Bank, the occupation authorities "changed syllabuses (sic) and censored and altered textbooks, especially those dealing with history and social sciences."70 Books which included references to Palestinian national aspirations or conveyed Palestinian history with pride were banned without exception.71 Meron Benvenisti acknowledged that: "It may be that only 3–4 percent of imported titles are censored, but the titles censored represent 100 percent of all works which express, instill or foster Palestinian-Arab national feelings and national heritage."72 Israeli deletions of "references to Palestinian nationalist sentiments or to Palestine as a political or geographical entity" made it very cumbersome to teach literature and social science courses.73 A secondary school teacher in Ramallah commented on the impact of Israeli censorship this way:

In the social science field, the textbooks are not directed to teach the children about their history, the geography of their county, or the structure of their society. The curriculum in the West Bank has not changed in the past twenty years. Due to lack of change and censorship, many of the

69Graham-Brown, p. 66.

70General Union of Palestinian Students, p.2.

71Richardson, p. 95.


73Graham-Brown, p. 66.
developments around the world are not known to the students through their textbooks.74

Israeli censorship, on occasion, was used as a pretext for raids on public libraries and colleges campuses. Israeli forces, for example, twice raided the only library in Gaza, the Red Crescent Society Library, once in 1983 and again in 1985, allegedly to confiscate books considered illegal by the occupation authorities. During the first raid, books were confiscated and the administrators were fined; on the second raid, wall paintings as well as books and periodicals were whisked away.75 Similarly, the raid on Bir Zeit University on March 1, 1985, was supposedly carried out for the purpose of confiscating "inciting material." The "inciting material" in question consisted of books, posters and tapes that were part of a cultural exhibit. One week following the raid, Gneral Orr ordered the closing of the university and had roadblocks set up to prevent students and faculty from reaching three of the four colleges on campus.76

On August 11, 1986, to cite another example, the spokesman of al-Najah University and a lecturer of the same institution were charged with "possession of inflammatory printed matter." The charge against the university spokesman was based on the seizure of innocuous "university public relations bulletins, student council publications issued at Al-Najah and Bir Zeit Universities, and articles on Al-Najah from the local and foreign press."77 The lecturer, Abdel Satter

74Personal interview in Ramallah, West Bank in July of 1986.


76Ibid.

Kassem, was charged with writing a book about life in Israeli jails. 78

Censorship of newspapers on the West Bank was strictly enforced by the occupation authorities. Not only did the Israeli censors scrutinize every issue of a newspaper, deleting articles in part or as a whole, but also denied editors the right to inform their readers that their papers were being censored. 79 An official of Al-Fajr told this writer that his newspaper, like all other Palestinian newspapers in the occupied territories, must submit a copy of every upcoming issue to the Israeli censor in the early evening of the day before publication. The censor, according to the official, returned the articles with the "necessary deletions" by midnight. 80

Officially, the occupation authorities claimed that censorship was employed solely for "security reasons". This explanation, however, was woefully inadequate in view of the fact that the bulk of the books on the banned list did not threaten the security of Israel but merely highlighted the cultural achievements of the Palestinian people. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the underlying objective behind Israeli censorship was chiefly political. In the process of weakening the Palestinians' cultural and national identity, censorship was a conspicuous contributing factor in the underdevelopment of education on the West Bank.

78 Ibid.

79 Ashmore, p. 7.

80 Personal interview in Jerusalem in August of 1986.
Constraints on Expansion

While most universities in the West Bank had expanded somewhat from their very modest beginnings, their physical growth was greatly impeded by the Israeli occupation. To accomplish this goal, Israel had largely relied on two basic tools: denial of building permits and pressure on finances.

Early in the 1980's, the occupation authorities applied the "iron fist" policy in the educational sphere as they did in the political domain. Using ludicrous excuses for their actions, the Israelis prevented al-Najah University from building a new engineering wing for "security" reasons, and blocked expansion at Bethlehem University for the alleged purpose of protecting "archaeological treasures."81 Israel’s refusal to allow Bethelhem University to incorporate a program for training tourist guides as part of its hotel management curriculum was an illustration of how restrictions on educational institutions had a direct effect on the economy—in this case tourism. Similar efforts by al-Najah and Bethlehem Universities to establish agricultural departments were also rejected by the occupation authorities.82 In all of these cases, Israeli interference had led to containment of the educational growth and subsequently to constriction of the West Bank’s economy. Problems with expansion were not unique to al-Najah and Bethlehem Universities, however. Hebron University, for example, was in dire need to construct new buildings to accommodate its growing student population.


82 Ashmores, pp.4-5.
but was not able to do so because of Israeli obstacles.\textsuperscript{83} In the case of Bir Zeit University, Israel had adamantly refused to grant it a permit since 1975 to construct a fine arts building in an area already designated for that purpose by the Israeli Planning Department.\textsuperscript{84}

To ensure that all financial assistance coming from the outside to develop the West Bank was spent according to Israel's specifications, the "Civilian Government" issued Order 974 on June 9, 1982. The Order stipulated that the "Civilian Government" appoint seven members to administer the funds, and that the same government regulate the procedures and methods of how the loans, grants and investments would be made.\textsuperscript{85} Since the issuance of that Order, Israel had not allowed any of the funds to be spent on projects which could serve to strengthen the West Bank economy on long term basis. This policy effectively precluded any meaningful assistance to the universities of the West Bank.\textsuperscript{86}

Rashad Shawwa, mayor of Gaza, lamented the imposed restrictions on the development of higher institutions of learning in the occupied territories in an interview with \textit{News International} on May 20, 1985. He said:

Recently, Israeli authorities have allowed Palestinian institutions

\textsuperscript{83}Personal interview with an administrator of Hebron University in August 1986.

\textsuperscript{84}Ashmore, p.12.


\textsuperscript{86}Personal interview with an administrator of Bir Zeit University in April 1985.
to receive money, provided a permit is obtained in advance. Such funds are brought in hard currency and paid in Israeli money. They are deposited in an Israeli bank at the inflated official price of the shekel, which is 33 per cent less than the free market world price. So, $100 immediately shrinks to $67. The other $33 is in effect indirect taxation taken by Israel ...

The Islamic University, the only institution of higher education in the Gaza Strip, is not recognized by Israel. It is not permitted to build facilities, even though it has the funds to do so. Most of its 4,500 students are forced to study in temporary sheds. In the occupied territories, we are not allowed to build schools. We have been trying to establish a polytechnic institute in Gaza for the last ten years, but the Israeli authorities refuse to let us build it.87

The Israeli practice of charging exorbitant taxes on imported equipment and supplies for the universities of the occupied territories had also added to their financial strain. Occasionally, according to some professors at Bir Zeit and al-Najah Universities, custom duties equaled or even exceeded the value of the imported equipment.88 The British Committee of the World University Service and the International Commission of Jurists observed in their joint report that the import charges on Bir Zeit University goods for the year 1980 approximated fifty percent of their actual value.89 Hence, some of the funds which could have been spent on numerous vital areas were unwillingly diverted to the Israeli coffers.

On the elementary and secondary levels, the record for expansion and development was simply dismal. The building of schools and staffing them with


88Ashmore, p. 6.

qualified teachers did not keep pace with the increases in student population.

During the first ten years of Israeli occupation, no new schools were built. After 1977, too few schools were constructed to meet the basic needs. Bashir Barghuti, editor of a weekly newspaper in Ramallah, commented on the general impact of Israeli policies in the field of education by saying:

Qualified teachers are kept out of the public school if their politics are not well hidden. There are constant problems of textbook censorship and curriculum monitoring, which have the effect of depriving Palestinian students of a knowledge of their own history and culture.

Even for those who managed to graduate from the colleges and universities of the West Bank, the employment opportunities were relatively few in an area characterized by a stagnated economy and the absence of national political structure. It had been estimated that no more than twenty percent of the occupied areas' graduates generally found jobs locally which were commensurate with their qualifications.

In summation, the harsh restrictions imposed on the universities of the West Bank and Gaza, plus the frequent military interference with the movements of faculty and students, had caused major disruptions in their daily functions and clearly impeded their progress. Further, limitations on books, laboratories, libraries, and building expansion of universities had greatly curtailed their development and seriously reduced their ability to plan for the future.

---

90 Graham-Brown, p. 65.


CHAPTER SIX

DEMOGRAPHICAL CHANGES

The demographical changes which Israel had wrought during its first nineteen years of military occupation constituted the most ostentatious as well as pernicious form of underdevelopment in the occupied territories. These changes, particularly in the West Bank, were characterized by two salient features: a considerable Palestinian emigration and a rapid Israeli colonization.

Essentially, the methods employed by Israel to underdevelop the West Bank and Gaza following the 1967 War were not much different from those it used during and after the 1948 War in the coastal, northern and southern regions of Palestine. The fundamental difference between the two situations was the fact that the Palestinians were much more determined to remain on their land following the second Israeli aggression. While this may have necessitated some improvisation of the Israeli methods, their chief instruments remained basically the same. The primary instruments which were directly utilized in the "emigration" feature were expulsion, coercion, and poor health services. The mechanisms of the settlement feature were annexation, land confiscation, and an influx of Jewish settlers and settlements. It is important to recognize at this point that while these instruments and mechanisms were primarily responsible for the demographic underdevelopment of the West Bank, they were not by any means the sole contributors. The restrictive conditions created by the Israelis in the political, economic, and educational fields (Chapters 3, 4, and 5), had an indirect impact on the demographic changes in the occupied territories as a
whole. This chapter focuses on the primary rather than secondary contributors to demographic changes in terms of laws and practices.

PALESTINIAN EMIGRATION

Expulsions

Estimates made by the Jordanian government and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency placed the figure of Palestinians who fled from the West Bank to the East Bank just one week after the start of the 1967 War at 100,000.\(^1\) Nearly 80,000 of the new arrivals were refugees from three U. N. camps near Jericho, which were attacked by Israeli planes on the second day of the war. Based on reports from the refugees themselves, U.N. officials on the scene concluded that "the Israelis appear to be concentrating on pushing out the inhabitants of such frontier villages as Qalqilya and Tulkarm as well as the inhabitants of the refugee camps."\(^2\) Some of the Palestinians who were expelled from the frontier villages testified to U. N. officials in Jordan that "soldiers have ordered people out of their homes to police stations, where they have been picked up by buses, bound for a place called Wadi Badan. From there they have been obliged to walk to the river."\(^3\) In October of 1967, UNRWA reported to the General Assembly of the U. N. that the 1967 War caused 200,000 new refugees.


\(^2\)Ibid.

\(^3\)Schmidt, p. 19.
The "old" refugees from the 1948 War numbered 1.3 million. Another account placed the number of Palestinians who were expelled or simply fled the Israeli terror following the 1967 war at 350,000.

Under considerable pressure by the United Nations, Israel acceded to allowing Palestinians who left the occupied territories as a result of the 1967 War to return to their homes. But Israel's acceptance turned out to be nominal in nature and was probably aimed at defusing the world outcry at its behavior. Considering the cumbersome procedure set by the Israelis for the Palestinians' return and the brevity of time to do it in, Red Cross officials estimated that no more than a small fraction of the 170,000 who wished to return would be able to do so. Moreover, Israel refused to allow any of the residents of the refugee camps near Jericho or the former residents of Jerusalem to return under its program. This obviously indicated a definite Israeli interest in Jerusalem and the border areas, namely to reduce their Palestinian population. In light of this fact which was later confirmed by Israel's expansionist designs, it is reasonable to argue that Israel had long range plans for the West Bank from the beginning of

---


7Ibid.

the occupation period. The same conclusion would be reached if one reviews the Israeli program to reunify Palestinian families which were separated by the 1967 War. The Committee for Reunifying Families stated that although 140,000 Palestinians had requested reunifications with their families on the West Bank and Gaza, only about 19,000 were accepted by the occupation authorities as of February 1987. This figure of returnees became more negligible in view of the continued Israeli expulsions and deportations.

Contrary to Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention which prohibits "deportations of protected persons from occupied territory," Israel chose to apply the 1945 Emergency Regulations of British-mandated Palestine because they allowed deportations. Ann M. Lesch, compiled a detailed and well-documented list of deportees from the West Bank and Gaza for the years 1967 through 1978, which encompassed the names of 1,151 individuals and two tribes that were expelled "en masse." Needless to say, many more Palestinians were deported after 1978. The deportation mechanism was widely used against the dissenting Palestinian leadership in all walks of life. Among the deported on Lesch's list were the following: seven councilmen, thirty-seven student leaders, nine lawyers and judges, forty-two educators, four clergymen, six journalists, twenty-six professionals such as doctors, dentists and engineers, fifteen businessmen, and

9 "Palestinian Families in the West Bank and Gaza Ask Gorbachev to Aid in Reunifying their Members," Al-Quds (February 26, 1987), p.2.


11 Ibid.
sixteen trade union leaders and other activist workers.\textsuperscript{12} What the various lists of deportees did not normally show, however, was that the deportees were usually followed by their families. This simply meant that deportation of individuals had generally induced the emigration of many others.

\textbf{Coercion}

During the first nineteen years of Israeli occupation significant segments of the Palestinian population were subjected to various forms of coercion which invariably included one or more of the following: intimidation, humiliation, imprisonment and physical force. With various degrees of success, these forms of coercion served to induce some Palestinians to leave the West Bank and Gaza and dissuade others from returning.

While intimidation was utilized throughout the occupation period as a weapon to drive the Palestinians into submission, it was used as a tool to induce emigration during and immediately after the 1967 War. Within hours following the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem, military vehicles equipped with loud speakers toured the streets of the city urging its inhabitants to leave through the "safe" road to Jericho and into Jordan.\textsuperscript{13} Similar attempts to frighten the Palestinians to emigrate were made in the cities of Nablus and Bethlehem. In some instances the loud speakers warned the Palestinians, "You have two hours to leave. After that we cannot guarantee your safety."\textsuperscript{14} Tens of thousands of

\textsuperscript{12}Lesch, p. 105.

\textsuperscript{13}Abed al-Rahman Abu Araf, \textit{Jerusalem: A New Configuration for the City} (Jerusalem: Arab Studies Society, 1985), pp.79-80. \textit{(Arabic)}

\textsuperscript{14}Schmidt, p. 19.
Palestinians fled their homes following these warnings apparently fearing a repetition of the Israeli atrocities committed during the 1948 War. A Palestinian from the Jerusalem area who emigrated to Jordan immediately after the 1967 War articulated the views of many others when he said:

When the Israelis moved into Jerusalem and began to issue their ominous warnings, it was too reminiscent of what happened in Deir Yassin (a site near Jerusalem where nearly 300 Palestinians were massacred by the Israelis on April 9, 1948). I did not want the same thing to happen to my family, and that's why we left. Practically everyone I know who emigrated about that time also left for the same reason.15

Some of those who refused to be intimidated into leaving found it too difficult to bear the almost daily humiliations to which they were being subjected. When a Palestinian worker in Amman, Jordan, was asked why he left Jerusalem after the 1967 War, he responded by saying: "No work, no income. Everything expensive. It is for them, too. But they have American assistance. Then, I admit it, fear. No dignity."16 In another case, a Palestinian taxi driver related how he was stopped by an Israeli patrol and was forced to remove his trousers in view of the foreign clients he had in his taxi.17 Shortly after this incident, that taxi driver left the West Bank for Jordan. This case was not an exception. A number of Palestinian men recounted to this writer incidents at roadblocks in which Israeli soldiers spat in their faces, called them sons of bitches, and made lewd remarks about their mothers and sisters in front of the


17Ibid., p. 6.
As if to add insult to injury, Military Order 297 of 1969 required all adults, sixteen years or older, in the occupied territories to apply for an identity card, carry it at all times, and present it whenever ordered to do so by an Israeli soldier or an occupation official.\(^\text{19}\) On a number of occasions, occupation forces made the routine check for identity cards a most humiliating experience for the Palestinians. Israeli soldiers had been known to confiscate the identification card and then force the Palestinians to dance in the street, sometime shirtless or even without trousers, as the price to regain them. According to reporter David Hirst of the \textit{Guardian}, on some occasions, the "Arabs have been invited to bark like dogs, bray like donkeys and - in one case in Hebron - kiss their donkey's ass."\(^\text{20}\) While the humiliation factor did play a role in forcing some Palestinians to leave the country, the number of people who emigrated largely because of it was difficult to determine.

**Imprisonment and Physical Force**

Imprisonment and physical force were two coercive instruments which had been used by the Israelis with two purposes in mind: to subdue the dissenting elements and to encourage mass emigration among the general population of the

\(^{18}\)Personal interviews with Palestinians men in the Ramallah and Hebron areas in July and August of 1986.


occupied territories. It was estimated that approximately, 500,000 Palestinians were either arrested or imprisoned for "security reasons" during the first nineteen years of Israeli occupation.\(^\text{21}\) This figure amounted to more than one-third of the combined populations of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The vast majority affected by these instruments were students, workers, and residents of refugee camps.\(^\text{22}\) Furthermore, physical violence appeared to be concomitant with imprisonment in Israeli jails. Felicia Langer, an Israeli lawyer, stated: "For years torture was used in interrogations in the territories, and I have seen personally with my own eyes hundreds of persons with signs of violence on their bodies.\(^\text{23}\) Outside the walls of prisons, physical violence against the Palestinians by the Israeli army and settlers alike was a common phenomenon. On this facet of Israeli coercion, Langer said:

> It is amazing how easy it is to pull the trigger and fire on demonstrators in the territories, during searches or in any confrontation with the inhabitants. Hundreds were killed by 'shots in the air' that miraculously hit and kill. Only scarcely can we, who are fed by the official versions of 'shots in the air' see with our own eyes the angle of the guns fired directly into the crowd.\(^\text{24}\)

Unlike the regular army, Jewish settlers neither awaited crisis-situations nor bothered to look for pretexts to launch their attacks against the defenseless Palestinian populace. West Bank newspapers were replete with accounts dealing


\(^\text{22}\)Ibid.


\(^\text{24}\)Ibid., p. 5.
with settlers' violence or with assaults that were conveniently attributed to "unknown assailants." The Karp Report, reportedly an investigation of settlers' violence, concluded that the military police's negligence was largely responsible for perpetuating such violence.25 On the other hand, Dani Rubinstein forcefully argued in Davar (February 10, 1984) that the blame for the settlers' violence rested with high officials of the Israeli government rather than with the Israeli police as the Karp Report suggested.26 Regardless of where the blame was laid, the fact remained that the settlers' violence on the West Bank was rather commonplace and had far reaching consequences among the Palestinian population, one of which was to encourage further emigration. What inflamed the situation even more was that men such as Meir Kahane, a vociferous advocate of expelling all Arabs from Palestine, by force if necessary, were no longer characterized as part of the lunatic fringe of Israeli politics. A 1985 study by Van Leer Institute of Hebrew University indicated that forty percent of Israel's high school students supported Kahan's philosophy towards the Palestinians.27 If anything, the results of this study constituted an ominous sign for the future of the West Bank and it inhabitants.

25Ibid.


Health Services

It had been estimated that the population of the West Bank and Gaza at the start of the 1967 war was 1,300,000. It was also established that the Palestinians had one of the highest population growth rates in the world at 3.09 percent. Given these two fundamental facts, one would have expected the Palestinian population in the occupied territories to be well over two million after nineteen years of occupation. This had not been the case for the aforementioned factors (expulsions and other forms of coercion), plus the poor quality of health services.

Deterioration of health services was undoubtedly another contributing factor to the slow growth of the Palestinian population on the West Bank. The two most obvious indicators of this decline were the inadequacy of facilities and personnel to meet the basic health needs of the people, and the relatively high infant mortality rate (IMR) in the occupied territories. Like most other aspects of life, health services on the West Bank and Gaza fell under Israeli control and manipulations following the 1967 War. Neglect and suffering were clearly concomitant with Israeli control of such services. For instance, the Israeli authorities provided the West Bank with merely ten million dollars or less annually from 1983 to 1986 for health services, which came to about thirteen dollars per person. This per capita investment in health services on the West Bank paled in comparison with the two hundred dollars spent in Israel for

---


29Henley, Bergholtz, and Olofsson, p. 135.
similar purpose. This apparent negligence on the part of the occupation authorities was reflected in the decline of the number of governmental hospitals on the West Bank from eleven operating and three more about to open in 1967 to nine in 1987. Table 11 clearly indicated the stagnation in the number of hospitals, the reduction in hospital beds, and the increase in hospitalized patients and operations performed, which had unquestionably created overcrowding and the likelihood for poor service.

According to Dr. Samir Katibah, representative of the doctors' union in the occupied West Bank, normal development of medical services, such as expansion of hospitals or construction of new ones, was deliberately neglected by the occupation authorities through omitting it from their budgets. Dr. Katibah charged that any improvement made in one area of the health services was usually carried out at the expense of other areas. A physician working in Al-Maqasid Hospital in Jerusalem, reputedly one of the better hospitals on the West Bank, described the conditions of health care in the occupied territories this way:

Health services on the West Bank are in serious trouble, but the situation in Gaza is even worse. It is important to note that all government hospitals on the West Bank were built before 1967, and there has been no significant expansion or serious renovations since then. A good deal of the equipment necessary in such hospitals is either defective, outdated, or simply not available at all to us. Even the equipment we

30Henley, p. 135.

31Ibid.


33Arab Journalist Association, "Palestinian Positions from the Heart of the Occupied Territories - Dr. Samir Katibah," in Arab Society Documents, No. 34 (Jerusalem: Arab Studies Society, 1979), p. 34. (Arabic)
### TABLE 11

HOSPITALS AND HOSPITALIZATION BY REGION FOR SELECTED YEARS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GAZA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitals - Total</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitals - Governmental</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beds - Total</td>
<td>1,004</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>904</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>1,393</td>
<td>1,311</td>
<td>1,363</td>
<td>1,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surgical Operations</td>
<td>13,001</td>
<td>12,973</td>
<td>13,294</td>
<td>14,933</td>
<td>10,993</td>
<td>14,454</td>
<td>14,085</td>
<td>14,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEST BANK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

purchased from abroad two years ago is still sitting in the port of Haifa due to Israeli hindrance. Therefore, many of our heart patients and others who require sophisticated equipment for their operations are advised to seek medical care elsewhere.  

The case of the government hospital in the Hebron district was quite illustrative of the type of difficulties and challenges which all government hospitals confronted under the Israeli occupation. This hospital, which was constructed in 1958 to provide services for a population of 60,000 was struggling to service a population of 150,000 in 1986. The problem with this situation was that the hospital, due to inadequate funding and lack of expansion, continued to operate understaffed, with antiquated equipment, and the same number of beds (100) that it started with in 1958. The problems of health care, however, were not limited to government-run hospitals by any means. The poor conditions of health services on the West Bank as a whole were highlighted in a report by a medical team from the Palestine Solidarity Association of Sweden which stated, inter alia, that:

Radiological services are poor and totally antiquated, the available equipment being at least fifteen to twenty years old. Facilities are available for skeletal and chest films, as well as some basic contrast studies, but there is only one radiologist in the West Bank and Gaza Strip... Some health services are totally lacking. For example, there are no beds in the West Bank for chest diseases, or isolation rooms for infectious diseases. There are no emergency or accident services and no facilities for specialized surgical procedures.

34ibid.

35Henley, p. 137.

36ibid., p. 136.

37ibid.
Under such circumstances, health care was bound to suffer with the local Palestinian population paying the price with their lives. The obvious inability of the health services of the West Bank to provide adequate pediatric care commensurate with the needs of the community had led to an increase in the infant mortality rate. In one year alone, the IMR jumped from 30.7 per 1,000 births in 1974 to 38.1 in 1975. In some districts in which births ranged between 2,500 and 2,700 the IMR rose from 70 in 1973 to 80.3 in 1975. Furthermore, deaths among young Palestinian children on the West Bank climbed considerably in the early and mid 1970's due to poor or non-existent health services. Deaths of children up to one month in age rose from 238 in 1972 to 303 in 1975; deaths among children between one month and one year in age soared from 430 in 1972 to 864 in 1974. Pediatric services in the Hebron and Nablus districts remained sluggish throughout the 1970's and well into the 1980's. In the Ramallah district, the situation became markedly worse. While the number of beds designated for pediatric care dropped from 32 in 1971 to 23 in 1976, the number of children admitted rose from 840 in 1971 to 1,200 in 1975. Moreover, the number of nurses who specialized in pediatrics at the Ramallah Hospital fell from twelve to eight during the same period. Following an in-depth study of health care in the West Bank and Gaza in the summer of 1984, a Swedish medical team concluded that:

We have found little evidence to indicate that there has been any significant improvement in health care facilities since 1967, when the Israeli authorities occupied these areas. On the contrary, there are even

38 Arab Journalist Association, pp. 34-35.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.
indications of a deterioration of health facilities during this period.\textsuperscript{41} The horrendous conditions of health services in the West Bank and Gaza, due largely to Israeli hindrance and manipulations, was exacerbated by outright lack of Israeli concern. The closing of the tuberculosis control center in Jerusalem at a time when the disease was still a health problem is a case in point.\textsuperscript{42} This lack of total control over their health services left the Palestinians vulnerable to many infectious diseases. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), the West Bank and Gaza had endured a poliomyelitis epidemic from 1974 to 1980, a diphtheria epidemic in 1979 and 1980, and a measles epidemic in the early 1980's.\textsuperscript{43} Furthermore, the WHO report pointed out, goiter, malaria and intestinal parasites continued to afflict large enough numbers on the West Bank to cause serious concern.\textsuperscript{44} Therefore, although difficult to measure accurately, it is reasonable to conclude that deterioration of health services due to Israeli practices had been detrimental to the population growth of the occupied territories.

**ISRAELI COLONIZATION**

**Annexation**

Demographically speaking, the starkest changes in all of the occupied

\textsuperscript{41}Henley, p. 139.

\textsuperscript{42}Ibid.


\textsuperscript{44}Ibid.
territories occurred in the city of Jerusalem. The two-track policy pursued by Israel in East Jerusalem was nothing short of a systematic Judaization of the Arab sector. The first track aimed at limiting the growth of the Palestinian population in the city by largely restricting their construction within its boundaries. The second track of the policy was based on developing an ever-expanding Jewish presence in the eastern part of the city and its environs.

Prior to implementing their designs for the city of Jerusalem in concrete terms, the Israeli government sought to set the "legal" foundation for them through annexation. On June 27, 1967, just two weeks after the war, the Israeli parliament passed legislation which authorized the Minister of Interior, Haim Moshe Shapiro, to declare all of Jerusalem a united city. On the following day, East Jerusalem was formally annexed with the symbolic proclamation of Shapiro and the publication of the pertaining legislation in the official Gazette as "Declaration of the Extension of the Boundaries of the Jerusalem Municipal Corporation." Not only did Israel annex East Jerusalem with this declaration, but also extended its boundaries southward to within one mile from Bethlehem, eastward to the Mount of Olives, and northward to encompass Kalandia Airport nearly nine miles away. A crucial feature of the new boundaries was that they


47 Ibid.
encompassed the greatest amount of land with the least number of Palestinian inhabitants. An example of this Israeli gerrymandering was the inclusion of lands to the west of Jerusalem belonging to Beit Hanina and Beit Iksa but not the towns themselves. The towns of Abu Dis, Anata, Al-Azaria and Hizma which lie to the east of Jerusalem also lost land to the Israeli annexation but were excluded as well. The same policy was applied in the expansion to the north of Jerusalem where the town of Al-Ram and the Kalandia refugee camp were also excluded.48

Implementation of Israel's two-track policy was evident as early as 1970, the first year since the occupation began in which the Israeli government granted a mere fifty building permits to the Palestinians of East Jerusalem. Further evidence of this policy was demonstrated in 1971 when the Israeli authorities issued 400 building permits to the Palestinians and 7,000 to the Israeli settlers of East Jerusalem.49 The housing problem for the Palestinian residents of Jerusalem did not improve at all throughout the 1970's. Ibrahim al-Dakkak asserted that East Jerusalem was in need of constructing 7,400 housing units between 1968 and 1976 to accommodate its population growth. Instead, only 1,000 units were built, which meant there was an eight-hundred unit deficit for each of the intervening years.50 Kate Maguire, author of The Israelisation of


49Abu Arafat, p. 73.

50Ibid., p.75.
Jerusalem, affirmed that the number of Arab building permits in the city of Jerusalem between 1971 and 1980 did not exceed 1,400.\textsuperscript{51} Describing the physical and demographic changes in Jerusalem, Kate Maguire wrote:

Building permits for Arab applicants seeking to build within the Jerusalem boundaries are almost impossible to obtain due to the special status Israel has given to Jerusalem and the policies maintaining that status entails, and to the scarcity of land and space which is a direct result of massive Israeli building projects since 1967.\textsuperscript{52}

An illustration of Maguire’s point was the fact that the Jerusalem City Council had, for nearly a decade, thrown obstacles in the path of a Palestinian housing project sponsored by al-Waqf in Wadi al-Jouz area of Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{53} To cite another example, the Al-Shaab newspaper reported in its edition of April 17, 1981, that sixty-four Palestinian houses were destroyed in Jerusalem in 1980 supposedly because they were built without a permit.\textsuperscript{54}

The second and equally crucial factor contributing to the Palestinians' housing problem and subsequently to demographical changes in the Jerusalem area was the expropriation of their land. The first large scale assault occurred in January of 1968 when one thousand acres of privately-owned Palestinian land in the Sheikh Jarrah and French Hill areas were confiscated to make way for two Israeli settlements- French Hill and Ramot Eshkol. In addition, a sizable tract of

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{51}Kate Maguire, \textit{The Israelisation of Jerusalem}, (London: Arab Research Centre, 1981), p. 46.
  \item \textsuperscript{52}Ibid., p.43.
  \item \textsuperscript{53}Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{54}Abu Araf, p. 78.
\end{itemize}}
land was confiscated in the Bir-Nabala-Kalandia area and was turned into an exclusively Jewish industrial park. In August of 1970, the Israelis launched a series of land confiscations and appropriations for the purpose of encircling the city with Jewish settlements to ensure its Judaization. The confiscations, amounting to 12,680 dunums (about 3,200 acres), were carried out under the guise of public domain on the orders of Israel's Minister of Finance. The confiscated Arab land was later distributed among the Jewish settlements surrounding Jerusalem as indicated in Table 12.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Dunums (¼ acre)</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Benefiting Settlement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>470</td>
<td>North of Jerusalem</td>
<td>Nevi Yaccoub (Nabi Yaccoub)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,840</td>
<td>Northwest of Jerusalem</td>
<td>Ramot (Nabi Samuel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,240</td>
<td>Southwest of Jerusalem</td>
<td>Talboit Mizrah (Al-Muddabber)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>Southwest of Jerusalem</td>
<td>Gilo (Sharafat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>North of Jerusalem</td>
<td>Attarot (near Bir-Nabala and Kalandia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,130</td>
<td>North of Jerusalem</td>
<td>Shaikh Jarrah (North of Jerusalem)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>North of Jerusalem</td>
<td>Ramat Eshkol (North of Jerusalem)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

55 Mattar, p. 62.
56 Abu Arafa, pp. 84-85.
57 Ibid.
Between 1970 and 1980, more Palestinian land was confiscated near Jerusalem for expanding the existing settlements. Among the documented confiscations were: forty dunums in the Sheikh Jarrah area; five dunums in the Mukkabber mountain; one hundred dunums in Beit Haninah; 500 dunums from Kalandia were added to the industrial park called Attarot; and four hundred dunums southeast of Bir-Nabala were taken to benefit the Ramot settlement. In March of 1980, the Israeli government confiscated a huge tract of land in the Nabi Yaccoub area, approximately 1,100 acres, to establish the South Neve Yaccoub settlement north of the old Jerusalem boundaries. Even the areas beyond the already expanded and annexed Jerusalem did not escape Israeli interference in terms of construction and building permits. The Israeli authorities, for example, had prevented the completion of a housing project for teachers in an area between the towns of Bir-Nabala and Kalandia, both of which lie north of Jerusalem. Two members of the Bir-Nabala town council confided to this writer that they suspected that the freeze on the teachers' housing project was just a prelude to future Israeli expansion. As predicted, the nearby Jewish settlement of Attarot did expand in 1987.

The annexation of East Jerusalem and most of the surrounding area, coupled with the building of Jewish settlements, had a profound impact on the demographic make-up of the city. Despite the increase of the Palestinian population in the city of Jerusalem from 57,5000 in 1972 to 122,400 in 1983, their

58Abu Aara, pp.84-85.

59Mattar, p. 62.

60Personal interview in Bir-Nabala, West Bank, in July of 1986.
percentage vis-à-vis the total population had decreased from thirty-six to twenty-eight percent during the same period. The decrease was the result of a tripling of the Jewish population which was largely due to the implanting of Jewish settlements on Arab land.\textsuperscript{61} Moreover, Israel had built an intricate infrastructure of roads and utilities and created an industrial zone which, through its production and employment, served to perpetuate the demographic changes effectuated by the Israeli government.\textsuperscript{62}

**Land Confiscation and Expropriation**

Another major contributing factor to the demographic alteration of the West Bank and Gaza Strip was the confiscation and expropriation of vast tracts of Palestinian land by the Israeli authorities. On June 12, 1967, a mere two days following the ceasefire with Jordan, the Israeli armed forces completely destroyed three towns on the West Bank - Yalu, Beit Nuba and Emmaus.\textsuperscript{63} In less than two years, the land of these villages was confiscated and transformed into Israeli fields and what came to be known as Canada Memorial Park,\textsuperscript{64} This crude method of confiscation soon gave way to more complex but not less pernicious mechanisms for accomplishing the same goal. The Israeli authorities decreed numerous orders and regulations to effectuate their land-grab schemes and give them a shroud of legality.

\textsuperscript{61}"Demographic Data Released," *Palestine Perspectives* (March 1985), p. 10.

\textsuperscript{62}Maguire, pp. 45–46.

\textsuperscript{63}Metzger, pp. 135–137.

\textsuperscript{64}Ibid.
At first, large expanses of land were declared "closed areas" for military training by invoking Military Order No. 3 of 1967. Occasionally, however, such lands were "transformed" into requisitioned areas for settlements. Kiryat Arba and Beqaot areas were illustrations of such changes. A second but commonly used pretext for "closing" Palestinian land had been the raising of the specter of security. Initially, most of the land affected by such policies were outlying areas near the Jordan River and a buffer zone near Gaza. Order 151 (October 1967), for example, decreed that a large area adjacent to the Jordan River, known as Ghor al-Urdun, was a closed area for security reasons. In 1972, however, the term "security" was given a much broader definition by the Israeli occupiers. Order 391 of 1972, for instance, empowered the military governors to terminate Arab construction in any area which they considered vital for "the security of the Israeli army in the area or for public order."

Among the earliest measures employed by the Israelis to take control of Palestinian land in the West Bank was the issuance of Order 58 of 1967. This Order enabled the Israeli government to claim custody of property owned by the Palestinians who left their land before as well as after the 1967 War without

65Benvenisti, p. 31.

66Ibid.


providing them with a genuine legal recourse to claim back their property.69

Having designated itself as the "Custodian of Absentee Property," the Israeli Military Administration had exclusive control of said properties.70 As a result, Israel "leased" nearly 30,000 of the 430,000 dunums of "Absentee Property" to Jewish agricultural settlements, primarily in the Jordan Valley.71 The decreeing of Order 59 in 1967 was another early and sweeping measure in which Israel laid claim to all of the land already registered to the Jordanian government as state land. This order brought 750,000 dunums of Palestinian land under immediate Israeli control.72

To expropriate Palestinian land for Jewish use, the Israeli authorities "amended" Jordanian Law No. 2 of 1953.73 This law, which was originally designed to permit the government to expropriate land for public use, was amended by the Israelis to bypass the established procedures of the Jordanian legislation. A major part of the amending process was embodied in Order 172 which transferred the property owners' right of appeal from the governing court to an "Objections Committee" that was composed exclusively of Israeli military officers.74

69Benvenisti, p. 30.

70Abu-Lughod, p. 6.

71Benvenisti, p. 30.

72Ibid.

73Abu-Lughod, pp. 24-25.

74Ibid.
Further amending of this Jordanian law empowered the military commander to remove resisting Palestinian property owners by force and sentence them to five years imprisonment. The land acquired by this method of compulsory purchases was largely used to provide Israeli settlements with roads, water reservoirs and cesspools. To complete the legal facade and thus consolidate their hold on the bureaucratic machinery concerning land laws, the occupation authorities decreed Orders 450 and 451 in 1971 to transfer the powers vested by Jordanian law in the Directors of Lands and Surveys and the Survey Department to the "Person Responsible."

To satisfy their ever-increasing appetite for Arab lands, Israeli "land experts" proposed that Israel revert to the "national patrimony" policy which it employed against the Palestinians following the 1948 War. In essence, the policy called on Israel to claim all the land "except what the [Arab] villages can prove is theirs under the narrowest interpretation of the law." To implement this policy, the Israelis carried out a survey of the West Bank in 1976 which divided the land into three categories: cultivated, arable but not cultivated, and non-arable. The Israeli aim behind this division was explicitly clear in the directives of the Land Authority which stated that "if the land is not registered

---

75 Abu-Lughod, pp. 24-25.

76 Benvenisti, p. 31-22.

77 Kuttab and Shehadeh, p. 49.

78 Benvenisti, p. 32.

79 Ibid.
and land claims settled, one can assume that the area can be claimed as state land, if the land is not cultivated." Based on this criteria, according to Benvenisti, two-thirds of the West Bank's territory was vulnerable to Israeli absorption. Ian Lustick summed up the meaning of this Israeli policy rather succinctly:

National Patrimony has consistently been taken to mean only the Jewish population. Land settlements and development on areas adjudicated to the state in all of its capacities—vacant land, public land, state domain, Arab Absentee Property, etc.—have been assigned exclusively to Jewish institutions, settlements and individuals.

In the event that none of the pretexts to obtain the Palestinians' land seemed to offer adequate justification, the Israelis generally relied on the services of "armed agents" and Arab "front" men to do their bidding. The Israelis were fond of citing the Jordanian "decree of death" to those who sell land to the Jews as justification for their covert methods in acquiring Arab land. A history professor at Bir Zeit University, however, offered a different explanation for Israel's utilization of this method. He said:

On the whole, Palestinians refuse to sell their land to the Israelis because they consider it a national dishonor to do so and not because of any unenforceable Jordanian decree. They are very aware nowadays that holding on to the land is another means of resisting the occupation. Hence, the Israelis resort to various means of trickery for procuring the Palestinians' land. A favorite method of theirs is to use one or two of their Arab lackeys, say from the Hebron area, to buy land in the vicinity of Ramallah where they themselves are not well-known, and then transfer it to

80Benvenisti, p. 32.

81Ibid, p. 33.

Israeli hands. This process is generally repeated in other areas until the lackeys are identified and dealt with which is not always easy to do.83

Israeli Settlements

It is significant to note that Article 49 of the Geneva Convention which prohibits the occupying power from deporting residents of an occupied territory also prohibits the occupying power from moving its civilian population into the occupied areas.84 The outright violation of this international law and the enormity of the Israeli government's involvement in the building and populating of Jewish settlements on the West Bank and Gaza were clear indications of Israel's systematic effort to alter the demography of the occupied territories.

Israeli settlement of the West Bank evolved in three distinctive stages: the Allon Plan, the Gush Emunim-Likud stage, and the build-up of Suburbia.85 Scarcely one month after the 1967 War, the first concrete plan for settling parts of the West Bank was submitted to the Israeli Cabinet in July of that year. Named after its architect, Yigael Allon, the plan basically called for a string of settlements along the Jordan Valley ostensibly to provide Israel with "new political and defensible borders", with more emphasis on the latter rather than the former. The plan also proposed the "annexation of the Etzion Block and Latrun Salient," areas south and west of Jerusalem.86 Even before the Allon

83Personal interview of a Bir Zeit University professor in the West Bank in August of 1986.
84Abu-Lughod, p. 2.
85Benvenisti, p. 51.
86Ibid.
Plan received official approval in 1968, Israeli outposts were being established along the Jordan River. By 1975, two strings of Jewish settlements, twenty-two in all, were established on the rift bed and its western slopes.87 In 1986, the number of settlements in the Jordan Valley reached twenty-eight and more were being planned.88 (see map on p. 172).

The 1973 Arab–Israeli War and the political upheaval that was wrought in its aftermath brought about a temporary lull in settlement building between October, 1973 and October, 1975. The signing of the second disengagement agreement between Israel and Egypt, however, marked the start of the second stage of settlement construction.89 While this stage was largely fueled by Gush Emunim's religious zeal, the government's role should not be underestimated. This was clearly manifested in the perceptions of Israel Galali and Abraham Ofer, heads of Committees on Settlements and Housing respectively. Whereas Galali called for a liberal interpretation of the Allon Plan, Ofer promoted the concept of encircling Jerusalem with a belt of Jewish settlements.90 Following the 1977 Israeli elections, the settlement goals of the victorious Likud Party and Gush Emunim confluenced in the Drobles Plan which stated, inter alia, that:

State land and uncultivated land must be seized immediately in order to settle the areas between the concentrations of minority populations and around them, with the objective of reducing to the minimum the possibility for the development of another Arab state in these regions. It would be

87Ibid.

88Attiah, p. 356.

89Benvenisti, p. 52.

90Ibid.
JEWISH SETTLEMENTS, 1983/2010

KEY
EXISTING PLANNED TYPE

TOWN

KIRYAT

TOSHAVA

YISHUV KEHILATI

SANEH OUTPOST

Note: When two symbols are combined, one indicates the type of settlement that exists, the other the type that is planned. For example, the symbol denotes an existing yishuv kehilati and a planned toshava.

difficult for the minority population to form a territorial continuity and political unity when it is fragmented by Jewish settlements.\textsuperscript{91}

Once it was recognized that ideology and religious zeal were not sufficient motivators by themselves to populate the West Bank, the Israeli government embarked on a process of creating Jewish suburbs in the greater metropolitan area of Jerusalem, and infused it with a massive subsidy program to attract more settlers. This included selling developers land at a fraction of the cost and providing settlers with outright grants and interest-free loans.\textsuperscript{92} To attract settlers, the following enticing advertisement appeared in Yiddish under a picture of a 100 dollar bill on the front page of Hamodia, an Israeli newspaper, on December 23, 1982: "They Are Giving You? Grab! What is being given away? Land and housing subsidies, to settlers in new towns in Judea and Samaria."\textsuperscript{93} Beside settlers, however, the Metropolitan Plan had been "designed to bring more areas of the West Bank under Israeli control, extending from Bethlehem in the south to Ramallah and El Bireh in the north."\textsuperscript{94} While several settlements were planned in this area, the master plan had already been anchored by three major settlements: "Efrat, south of Bethlehem, with 5,000 apartments; Maaleh Adumin, east of Jerusalem on the road to Jericho, with 7,000 apartments; and

\textsuperscript{91}\textsuperscript{Ibid.}


\textsuperscript{93}Goell, p. 39.

\textsuperscript{94}Mattar, p. 62.
Zeev Givon, south of Ramallah, with 5,000 apartments. Based on the amount of money already spent, it had been estimated that for each settlers family on the West Bank the Israeli government spent between $120,000 and $150,000. This was undoubtedly a definite commitment to Jewish settlement on the West Bank. The most obvious indication of this Israeli commitment, of course, was the large number of settlements that were established since the advent of the occupation as shown in Table 13. The increase in the number of settlements on

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Establishment</th>
<th>Nablus</th>
<th>Ramallah</th>
<th>Jerusalem</th>
<th>Hebron</th>
<th>Jordan Valley</th>
<th>Gaza</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-1983</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-1984</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-1985</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-1986</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-1987</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

95 Ibid. p. 63.
96 Thorpe, p. 36.
97 Attiah, pp. 351-357.
the West Bank, particularly in the 1980's was accompanied with a substantial increase in the number of Jewish settlers as shown in Table 14.

In the face of a relentless Israeli settlement-building program in the occupied territories, the U. N. Security Council adopted resolution 446 on March 22, 1979. In essence, the resolution called on Israel to "desist from any action which would result in changing the legal status, geographical nature and demographic composition of the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem."98

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Settlers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>2,581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>3,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>5,023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>7,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>10,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>12,424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>16,119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>20,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>27,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>42,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>52,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The above figures do not include the Jewish settlers in East Jerusalem.


Following the passage of this resolution, the U. N. Security Council set up a Commission composed of Bolivia, Zambia, and Portugal to monitor the occupied territories with regard to Israeli settlements. This Commission reported to the U. N. Security Council on December 4, 1979 that "Israel was pursuing its systematic and relentless process of colonization of the occupied territories in complete disregard of United Nations resolutions and Security Council decisions."100

Barring any major political or military changes favoring the Palestinians, further Jewish settlement in the occupied territories appeared to be a certainty. The 1984 power-sharing agreement between the two major Israeli parties, Labor and Likud, stipulated that the unity government had the authority to build twenty-seven new settlements in the occupied territories. Since only six settlements were built during Shimon Peres term, it was expected that the hawkish Itzhak Shamir will push for building the remaining twenty-one settlements during his term as prime minister.101 On a different level, the Gush Emunim movement, which advocated annexation of the West Bank, was clamoring for further Jewish settlement in "Judea and Samaria." Moshe Levinger, a well-known proponent of the settlement issue, asserted recently that Gush Emunim will soon focus its efforts on establishing settlements in the heart of Jericho, Gaza, Nablus, and Hebron.102

---


The confidence exuded by Levinger and others about future Jewish settlement in the West Bank was largely based on a number of measures which the Israeli government had taken to create the "legal" structure for further expansion. To begin with, any doubts about Israel's intentions regarding the occupied territories were laid to rest by the Labor government in 1973 as it drew up a manifesto which "explicitly stated that Israel would not return to the 1967 borders and that there would be no Palestinian state on the West Bank." 103 Second, to facilitate the Israeli expansionist schemes and simultaneously restrict Palestinian growth in the occupied areas, Israel had created the Supreme Planning Council to oversee decisions of municipal governments of the West Bank in the areas of planning, zoning, and general land use. 104 Third, Jewish settlers on the West Bank were not subject to any of the Israeli-imposed rules and regulations which permeated every aspect of Palestinian life. Through Orders 783 and 947, Israel virtually created the framework for two separate societies on the West Bank. 105 Whereas Order 783 defined the jurisdictions of the Jewish divisional councils on the West Bank, Order 947 created the "Civil


104 Nakhleh, p. 3.

Administration" for the Arab areas in the same territory.\textsuperscript{106} In effect, the two Orders cited above had set the stage for two separate communities in which one, the Palestinian, had no control over its own affairs.

CHAPTER SEVEN
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Within twenty years, the West Bank suffered two major blows which were directly related to Israeli aggression—the first in 1948 and the second in 1967. The first blow led to the dismemberment of Palestine and the severance of the West Bank from the rest of the country, thus crippling it and making it an easy prey to the power-hungry Hashemite regime of Jordan. The second and even more devastating blow from which the West Bank has yet to recover from was the Israeli occupation of the area in 1967. Therefore, it is not too presumptuous to conclude that the West Bank has experienced two occupations since 1948—Jordanian and Israeli.

Under Jordanian tutelage from 1950 to 1967, the West Bank endured both political subordination and economic domination. While the Hashemite regime in Amman committed itself publicly to equality between the two Banks as well as to the liberation of Palestine, it labored consciously to dominate the West Bank politically and economically and made sure that the subject of liberation remained within the confines of rhetoric. For their part, most Palestinians initially viewed Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank as a temporary phenomenon that would precede the liberation of their homeland. The mainstream Palestinians at that time had two basic objectives: to have control over their local affairs and to steer the Jordanian government toward adopting a policy that would eventually lead to the liberation of occupied Palestine. The obvious contradictions between the goals of the Jordanian regime and the Palestinian
people and their subsequent collisions over the years shaped the course of their relations throughout the Hashemite era which ended in June of 1967.

On the issue of political equality, the Hashemite regime focused on formalities rather than substance. Throughout most of the Jordanian period, Palestinians as a whole were rarely assigned sensitive political or military positions. Nevertheless, to perpetuate the myth of political equality, West Bankers were allowed to hold equal number of seats in the Chamber of Deputies as did the East Bankers. The illusion of equality was further enhanced by the co-optation of traditional Palestinian leaders who were largely guided by their self-interests. The hard political realities of the Jordanian-Palestinian configuration, however, were far different from the image which the Hashemite regime wished to convey. On the local level, Palestinians had little control over their affairs as the Minister of Interior controlled virtually all of the strings from Amman. On the national level, political parties of every persuasion functioned under the watchful eyes of the king's security services. Whatever limited successes were achieved by the Palestinian-dominated parties in formulating Jordan's foreign policies, such as the expulsion of British military advisors and the rejection of the Baghdad Pact, they were the result of regional factors as much as they were of internal pressures.

On the economic front, the West Bank was relegated into a secondary position by the Jordanian government as the focus shifted to the East Bank. With the exception of tourism, the West Bank lagged behind the East Bank in terms of growth in practically every economic activity.

As a result of the Israeli blitzkrieg in June of 1967, the West Bank and Gaza fell under Israeli occupation which has continued to this very day in 1987. To
ensure total control over the occupied territories, the Israeli government concentrated virtually all of the legislative and administrative powers in the hands of the "Military Commander of the Area." Based on this total control, a large number of military orders (about 1,200 thus far) had been issued to serve the Israeli interests. While most of the orders in the early years of the occupation revolved around the maintenance of control and security, their scope widened considerably as the occupiers' intentions to keep some or all of the territories became clearer. The net result of these orders along with the general practices of military and non-military personnel have had such a highly negative impact on the West Bank and Gaza that they were primarily responsible for their underdevelopment in many respects.

On the political level, Israel has had one overriding obsession—to prevent the emergence of a nationalist Palestinian leadership on the West Bank and Gaza. Practically every move, order, or tactic employed by Israel in this field was designed to serve that goal. Israel's adoption of the punitive regulations decreed by the British in Mandatory Palestine was one of the first and most convenient tools for suppressing political expression. Another part of Israel's strategy in this area was to basically maintain the archaic Jordanian system for local rule which allowed the traditional leadership to keep vacuous positions while the military government held all the power. Later on, Israel was compelled to change its tactics as widespread support for the PLO in the occupied territories was reflected in the resounding success of the Palestine National Front candidates in the 1976 municipal elections. Obviously, Israel did not anticipate such an outcome. Unhappy with the results, the Israeli authorities used various methods to dispose of the new Palestinian leadership, clamped down
on the PNF and its successor, the National Guidance Committee, and have refused to hold municipal elections in the occupied territories ever since that time. Meanwhile, Israel searched in vain for an alternate leadership on the West Bank that could serve to discredit the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and simultaneously collaborate with the occupation authorities. In this respect, Israel has neither succeeded nor is it expected to in the foreseeable future.

Taking into consideration all the punitive methods used by the Israelis to hinder the growth of a genuinely nationalist Palestinian leadership on the West Bank, it can be easily argued that the Israeli military government sought nothing less than the Palestinians' political demise. To a large degree, the Israeli military government succeeded in subordinating the structures of local government and had effectively prevented the emergence of an authentic regional government on the West Bank. Even when compared with the nearly autocratic Jordanian system, the local political institutions on the West Bank had suffered a much worse fate during the Israeli occupation. Not only were the West Bankers denied any political freedom or control over their political institutions, but were even stripped of the bare minimum of symbolic participation they had under the Jordanian regime. Without a doubt, the first nineteen years of Israeli occupation has resulted in the political underdevelopment of the West Bank.

Underdevelopment, however, was not by any means limited to the political sphere. The economic pattern that developed between Israel and the occupied territories following the 1967 War had all the earmarks of a core-periphery configuration. Under the new conditions, the economic relationship between the occupied territories and Israel was characterized by exploitation of the former by
the latter. The first economic casualty of the Israeli occupation was the tourist trade of the West Bank. Not only did the number of Arab tourists drop to a trickle due to Israeli restrictions, but the bulk of other tourists was monopolized by the Israeli tourist industry as well. Growth in the agricultural sector was also hampered by Israeli restrictions and practices. Numerous orders were issued in this regard which shackled the agricultural development of the West Bank and Gaza every step of the way. Among other things, the restrictive regulations covered planting, irrigating, and marketing. Israel's basic objective in this area was to ensure that the occupied territories agriculture complemented rather than competed with Israeli products, a clear indication of the existence of the core-periphery arrangement in this case. Furthermore, the loss of arable land due to Israel's "closed area" policy on the West Bank and Gaza made an already bad situation for the Palestinian farmer far worse.

The constraints placed on the West Bank industries coupled with the subsidies and protection provided to their Israeli counterparts had virtually eliminated all basis for fair competition and subsequently led to general stagnation and even decline in some areas of the Palestinian industrial sector. The few permits that were issued periodically to start new industries or expand existing ones on the occupied territories were generally given to small craft shops or to those who appeared to be collaborating with the occupation authorities. Moreover, the buildup of Jewish industrial parks on the West Bank had undermined the Palestinian industry even further as it made inroads into the Palestinian market. The unfair competition and the restrictive conditions imposed on the West Bank industries created such a suffocating business climate that it prompted some businessmen to seek investment in other countries.
The paralysis of tourism and stagnation of both agriculture and industry on the West Bank and Gaza had a telling effect on the occupied territories' trade as well as its labor force. As the occupation dragged on, both occupied areas became increasingly dependent on Israel in terms of trade. The trade deficits between the West Bank and Gaza on one hand and Israel on the other increased several folds between 1968 and 1984. This dependency of the occupied on the occupier was another clear sign that the core-periphery theory was definitely at work between Israel and the occupied territories. Similarly, the increase in unemployment in the West Bank and Gaza which resulted from the general slowdown of their economies made the Palestinian labor force highly vulnerable to Israeli exploitation. Nearly 100,000 Palestinian workers were employed by Israel in 1985. Unlike their Israeli counterparts, Palestinian workers were generally exploited in terms of low wages, poor working conditions, and lack of social benefits.

In the case of education, the process of underdevelopment came about in slow and subtle ways at first, then accelerated considerably as Israel began to perceive it as a source of danger to its occupation. Following the 1967 War and the imposition of travel restrictions, the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza found themselves largely cut-off from the educational institutions of the Arab countries, namely Jordan and Egypt. This relative isolation necessitated an inward search to fill that vacuum. Hence, the establishment of several colleges and universities on the West Bank and Gaza to accommodate the rising local need for higher education. The number of educational institutions beyond the high school level rose from eight in 1967 to eighteen in 1982.
Initially, Israel did not object forcefully to the establishment of such institutions for two reasons: first, it appeared to serve its propaganda purposes of claiming a benign occupation; and second, the trend was expected to fizzle out in the long run due to lack of support. Contrary to the Israeli assumption, the West Bank colleges and universities did not merely manage to survive but became a hotbed of dissent against the occupation and a source of genuine leadership of Palestinian nationalism. Israel's response to this phenomenon was the utilization of several measures, all of which were designed to hinder the daily functions of the universities as well as impede their long-term development. The Israeli measures included student and faculty harassment, closure of educational institutions, censorship, and restrictions on expansion. Virtually all of these measures proved to be very damaging to Palestinian education in the occupied territories. Israeli restrictions on Palestinian professors who were living abroad but wished to return to the West Bank and Gaza had considerably reduced the pool of teachers who were willing to work under such harsh conditions.

Harassment of students through delays at roadblocks, seizures of identity cards, arbitrary detentions, and occasional physical attacks made the generally routine pursuit of learning a very hazardous one. Moreover, the frequent closings of colleges and universities by the Israeli authorities had clearly disrupted all facets of academic life. Students and faculty members were almost constantly rearranging their schedules for registrations, exams, meetings, and even graduations. As a result of these disruptions, a greater number than usual increasingly opted to complete their studies abroad.

Education on the West Bank and Gaza was further diluted by Israeli censorship. While Israel's goal behind the use of censorship was primarily
political, the censor's net inadvertently ensnared many intrinsic works of poetry, literature, history, and even religion. The fact that these works which did not convey any political messages were targeted by the censor lends credence to the premise that Israel was attempting to weaken the Palestinians politically by destroying their cultural foundations. Finally, Israel's unwillingness to permit several colleges and universities in the West Bank and Gaza to expand, despite the availability of Palestinian and other Arab financing, was probably the clearest and most tangible indicator of underdevelopment of Palestinian education under Israeli occupation.

Unlike other occupying powers, such as France in Chad and Djibouti or Portugal in Angola and Mozambique, Israel did not limit its underdevelopment of the occupied territories to the areas of politics, economics, and education. Being a settler-state, Israel's concern with the demography of the occupied areas was paramount. Following the initial expulsion of over 200,000 people within the first few months of the occupation, the demographic changes encompassed the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem and its surrounding area, the confiscation and appropriation of about sixty percent of the West Bank, and the building of over 160 Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. These measures which enhanced the growth of the Jewish presence on the West Bank were accompanied by regulations which were designed to produce the opposite effects for the Palestinian community. Among these were the constraints on Arab housing, particularly in Jerusalem, and the reduction of health services for the Palestinians throughout the West Bank. Another favorite mechanism used by the Israelis for demographical as well as other purposes was the tool of deportation. In an attempt to weaken the Palestinian community, Israel deported over 1,500
individuals between 1967 and 1986, many of whom were leaders in their localities or their professions. In addition to the "legal" tools in terms of orders and regulations, several forms of intimidation were used by the Israeli military and Jewish settlers to induce Palestinian emigration from the West Bank and Gaza. While a large share of the intimidation and acts of violence could be attributed to the Jewish settlers, it is rather pedantic to separate their actions from that of the regular armed forces which provided them with arms, training, supplies, and protection.

As one reviews the four areas under study (politics, economics, education, and demography), it is relatively easy to discern that nearly all of the Israeli laws and practices in the occupied territories dovetailed in the process of underdevelopment. Based on historical experience, however, the exploitation of the occupied by the occupier for political and economic hegemony is not an unusual phenomenon. Therefore, one is bound to ask whether Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza fits that common historical model or not. If not, what other goals did Israel hope to achieve through the pursuit of policies which were basically designed to cause underdevelopment in the occupied territories?

From the very beginning of the Israeli occupation, there was no illusion about its nature or its intentions. The nearly immediate annexation of East Jerusalem following the 1967 War, the destruction of villages, and the confiscation of land were very ominous signs for the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza. Moreover, when several Israeli leaders, in and out of government, spoke of the need to hold on to some or all of the occupied territories, it became abundantly clear that annexation was the ultimate goal of the Israelis. Israel's dilemma, however, was how to get the Palestinians' land
without its people to ensure the Judaization of the newly occupied territories. This was the critical factor which differentiated Israel's policies in the occupied areas from that of most colonial powers. Even the most analogous situations to the Palestinians' predicament in modern history, such as those of the Algerians under French rule and the South Africans under the apartheid regime of Dutch and British settlers, differed somewhat from the situation in Palestine in that the occupiers of Algeria and South Africa did not seek to expel the indigenous population completely out of their homeland as the Israelis were attempting to do. To accomplish this pivotal goal, without incurring the wrath of the world's public opinion, Israel had employed various means to achieve it. These means encompassed the enactment of laws and adoption of policies that had unsettling and suffocating effects on the occupied areas which led to their underdevelopment in many spheres. The data presented here did confirm the study's hypothesis that a clear and direct cause-effect relationship had existed between Israeli laws and practices and underdevelopment of politics, economics, education, and demography of the occupied territories. Israel, however, was not using underdevelopment simply to gain hegemony in the occupied territories, but as a vehicle to empty the land of its indigenous population. In other words, underdevelopment was essentially providing the underpinning of Israel's de facto annexation of the West Bank and Gaza. However, since Israel has failed to reduce the Palestinian population of the two territories during the first nineteen years of occupation to a "manageable" level, it is bound to increase the pressure on the people of the occupied areas to induce their emigration. Only if that occurs will Israel consider formal annexation of the West Bank and Gaza. But new Israeli pressures, not unlike previous tactics, will not operate in a total
vacuum. It is an established fact that the Palestinians of the occupied territories, in spite of their meager resources, have always found ways to confront the occupation and resist its hegemony in all of its manifestations. While this resistance varied from time to time, from one area to another, and from one sector of society to the next, the continued occupation and its spiraling harsh measures are bound to radicalize the remaining Palestinian population and stiffen their resolve to end it. Therefore, it would be reasonable to conclude that as long as the Palestinians are denied their inalienable right to self-determination, continued strife and armed conflict are inevitable.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Personal interviews with mayors, students, teachers, businessmen, and workers on the West Bank and Gaza in the summer of 1986.

A collection of Israeli Military Orders for the period 1967 to 1984 which is available at the library of Law in the Service of Man in Ramallah, the West Bank.

A collection of documents found in the library of Organizaiton of Arab Studies in Jerusalem. Among other things, this collection encompasses statistical data, press releases of various labor, educational, and civic organizations as well as other pertinent material from Israeli and Jordanian sources.


Secondary Sources

Books


Jerusalem: Organization of Arab Studies, 1986. (Arabic)


Sinai, Anne, and Pollack, Allen, eds. *The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the*


Journals and Magazines


Newspapers


"Farmers Are Prevented From Transporting Their Produce Through Jerusalem." Al-Quds, 13 September 1986.


Kidder, Rushworth M. "Terrorism, Idealism, and the West Bank Universities."
The Christian Science Monitor, 24 March 1986, p. 27.


"Levinger Unmasks Gush Emunim's Intentions to Settle in the Center of Jericho and Nablus." Al-Fajr, 12 August 1986, p. 2.

"Palestinian "Families in the West Bank and Gaza Ask Gorbachev to Aid in Reunifying Their Members." Al-Quds, 26 February 1987.

"PLO or No One." Al-Fajr, 8 August 1986, p. 5.


