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The U.S. policy towards the Middle East: the case of the 1990-1991 Gulf War

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ABSTRACT

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

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THE U.S. POLICY TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST:
THE CASE OF THE 1990-1991 GULF WAR

Advisor: Dr. Benneson DeJanes

Dissertation dated December, 1998

This study has unfolded the U.S. policy toward the Middle East in general and the U.S. response to the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis in particular. It has uncovered the fact that throughout different phases of history the U.S. policy in the Middle East was shaped by its national interests. U.S. interests in the Middle East, as elsewhere, are determined on the basis of strategic considerations and access to resources and markets. At a more specific level, however, U.S. policy objectives in the Middle East over the past several decades, until the 1990-1991 U.S.-led war in the Persian Gulf, were to: contain Soviet expansionism and influence in the region, ensuring a steady flow of the region's oil and petro-dollars to the west and Japan; defend
the security of Israel; secure a permanent U.S. military base in the region; and as a result of the collapse of the Cold War order in 1990, establish the U.S. as world leader. The United States has significantly achieved these goals. In fact, by defeating Iraq, the United States has further secured its national interests in the Middle East. The Gulf War was carried out to this end.
THE U.S. POLICY TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST:
THE CASE OF THE 1990-1991 GULF WAR

BY

IHMOUD ALI ABU SALIM

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THE FACULTY OF CLARK ATLANTA UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

The emergence of the Middle East as an area of politico-economic and strategic importance to the United States is a fairly recent phenomenon. Before the Cold War, U.S. involvement in the Middle East was mainly limited to the defense of commercial interests, primarily oil. The circumstances in which the U.S. emerged as a superpower at the end of World War II changed the nature of its involvement with the Middle East "from a distant political observer to one exercising prerogatives of a traditional imperial power protecting the status quo." ¹ During the 1940s, in preparation of the policy that eventually became the "containment" strategy against the Soviet Union, the U.S. diplomat, George Kennan had designated the Middle East as one of the most important areas to be protected within the American sphere of influence. ² Later, the Eisenhower Doctrine (1957), the Nixon Doctrine (1969), and the Carter

¹Salim Mansur, "The (Persian) Gulf War: The United States and the Middle East," The Iranian Journal of International Affairs 3, no. 3 (Fall 1991).

Doctrine (1980) committed the United States to responding directly or through local states if any threats were to occur, or if the U.S. were invited to respond through any state in the area.

The Eisenhower Doctrine extended the containment policy from the northern tier states to the Middle East in general. Congress subsequently authorized the use of armed force to assist non-communist Middle Eastern nations threatened by armed aggression from any country controlled by "international communism."

The Nixon Doctrine specified that the United States would furnish military and economic assistance to nations whose freedom was threatened but would expect those nations to defend themselves. The result of the policy review was the president's endorsement in November 1970 of what became known as the "twin-pillar" policy. Its rationale was that the United States had strategic interests in Iran and Saudi Arabia, which meant that U.S. support for either nation would alienate the other. Despite their mutual distrust, cooperation between the two nations was felt to be essential in the face of growing Arab radicalism.

The 1973 OPEC's oil embargo contributed significantly to the increase of U.S. concern about the Middle East and, in fact, since then the region has been consistently an area of major preoccupation of the American foreign policy establishment. The Islamic revolution in Iran, in 1979,
appeared to be another blow for U.S. interests in the region. The overthrow of the Shah's regime showed the perils of policy based upon client regimes, lacking internal legitimacy and dependent on external support for their existence. Moreover, the Islamic revolution in 1979 posed an ideological threat to all Arab regimes, particularly to the Gulf monarchies. Thus Washington policy makers viewed its containment as necessary for both the survival of the client regimes and the protection of other U.S. interests in the region.

In 1980 President Jimmy Carter responded to the turmoil in Iran and particularly to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by promulgating a new doctrine which states that America's "vital interests" would compel it to resist any efforts by outside powers to control the area.¹¹ In short, during this time United States policy towards the Middle East was:

1. to ensure access to adequate oil supplies at low prices,
2. to contain expanding Soviet influence in the region,
3. to promote stability in the region (by protecting the client regimes), and
4. to advance the "Middle East peace process" while ensuring the continued security of the state of Israel.

During the eight-year long Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), Iraq enjoyed sympathy and support from the U.S. and the conservative monarchs and emirs of the Middle East, all of whom helped to develop Iraq’s defense build-up. But once the Iran-Iraq war stopped, Iraqi arms build-up became a matter of concern to and virtual obsession of the United States and Israel. Reports of Iraq's missile capabilities, of its nuclear program, of its chemical weapons arsenal, and of the smuggling of military technology frequently became headlines in the press. The Central Intelligence Agency reported that: "Saddam was bent on turning Iraq into an Arab superpower--a balance to the U.S., the Soviet Union, and Japan."  

Despite its external power projection, Iraq did not gain much from its 8-year long war with Iran. Rather, it had increased a huge debt. Moreover, the huge cost of the Iran-Iraq War and the cost of post-war reconstruction placed Saddam's Iraq in a confrontational posture with his Arab backers like Kuwait and the other Gulf states. The dispute between Iraq and Kuwait over borders and the demands of Iraq to have rights to the Kuwaiti islands of Warbah and Bubiyan on the mouth of Shatt-al Arab as deep water access to the (Persian) Gulf, the differences over oil pricing and production quota contributed to the uneasy relationship

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between Baghdad and Kuwait. These disputes, however, were considered to be advantageous for U.S. and U.S. policy makers. They chalked out their strategy accordingly. In fact, in the post Iran-Iraq war period, Iraq was challenging the U.S. on the two matters of greatest importance to its Middle East strategy: its commitment to ensure Israeli military superiority over any combination of Arab states, and its unhindered access to plentiful and relatively cheap sources of energy.

It was thus no wonder that when Iraq and Kuwait prepared to meet in Saudi Arabia at the end of July 1990 to negotiate their differences--over boundaries, shared oil fields and war debts--the U.S. encouraged Kuwait to be intransigent. The inflexibility of the Kuwaiti leaders reflected confidence that the western powers and in particular the U.S., given the relationship established during the 1986-87 "tankers war" would not allow Kuwait to be militarily bullied or have its security undermined.

On the other hand, the ambitions of Saddam exceeded the capabilities of Iraq. Saddam misread the lessons of the war

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7 Ibid.
with Iran and failed to correctly assess the altered conditions of world politics in the context of the Soviet collapse as a superpower. Since the Islamic revolution in Iran, the U.S. had been watching the situation in the (Persian) Gulf and the Middle East with uneasiness. Its hegemonic influence was challenged by indigenous developments within the region. Hence a growing conviction was demonstrated during the Reagan administration for reasserting its place in the world through an unhesitating use of military force when deemed necessary or favorable.\(^8\) It is in this backdrop that Saddam Hussain invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990.

Once Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait, Washington moved vigorously. President Bush sent his Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney to Saudi Arabia. Secretary Cheney persuaded the Saudi king about the need for American military deployment in Saudi Arabia by saying that "the purpose of American military deployment would be strictly defensive."\(^9\) The U.S., Cheney told King Fahd, wanted to deal with Iraq through economic pressure, however it might "lash out" and the military presence was intended to deter it, "to prevent a war." With the agreement of the King, the deployment of American troops started in the desert land of Saudi Arabia. Although the initial dispatch of 100,000 troops to Saudi

\(^8\)Mansur, 475.

\(^9\)Hallaj, 7.
Arabia was explained as a defensive deployment for the protection of Saudi Arabia, the possibility of war was indicated very early by Bush when he declared, on August fifth, that the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait "will not stand." Later the decision to increase American troops to just under half a million in mid-November clearly demonstrated that the U.S. was going "the extra mile for the war option" rather than staying firmly with the policy of economic sanctions around which there existed a near unanimous international consensus.

The U.S. decided to defeat Saddam Hussain on the battlefield. All its other moves—diplomatic and political—were meant only to buy time until history in the Middle East was set on a new course at 7:00 pm EST on January 16, 1991. The decision of President Bush to wage war on Iraq is thus a case worth study and scrutiny. As Hooshang Amirahmadi, a perceptive analyst of the Middle Eastern affairs has mentioned, "The foreign policy of any nation is based on some real and changing national interests rather than any immutable abstract principles. There is often a big gap between propaganda and actual policy."

The United States is no exception here. Moreover, the most important fact about U.S. foreign policy is that it

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tends to simultaneously pursue a multiple of overlapping, and often conflicting or inconsistent economic, political and strategic interests. The present study will attempt to identify the factors that contributed to U.S. intervention in the (Persian) Gulf war of 1990-1991.

*Purpose of the Study*

The main purpose of the study is to examine U.S. policy objectives in the Middle East in general and to the 1990-1991 Gulf War in particular. The study would critically examine the competing explanations suggested so far by scholars on the causes of the Gulf War. These explanations include:

1. the "oil" explanation,
2. the Israel factor,
3. the end-of-the-Cold-War explanation,

An attempt will also be made to identify which contributing factor was greatest in causing the U.S. to act decisively.

*Research Questions*

While it is an exploratory study, keeping in mind the purpose of the study, the following research questions will be addressed.

1. What was the background of 1990-1991 Gulf War and what was Iraq's motive behind the invasion of Kuwait?
2. What were the primary factors that led the U.S. to fight the war in the Gulf?

- was it fought for "oil"?
- was it aimed at providing a lesson to potential aggressors elsewhere?
- was the war aimed at curbing the power of an emerging regional power in the Middle East and thereby ensuring the security of Israel?
- was it an attempt by the U.S. in the post-Cold War era to establish itself as the world leader?

3. Was the war conducted in a manner to pursue certain foreign policy objectives?

4. What were the short term and long term implications of the war for the United States?

Organization of the Study

The study will be divided into seven broad chapters.

Chapter I. Introduction

- Statement of the Problem
- Purpose of the Study
- Research Questions
- Methodology
- Significance of the Study
- Organization of the Study
- Literature Review

Chapter II. Theoretical Framework and Key Concepts
Chapter III. The Middle East: A Geopolitical Overview

Chapter IV. Evolution of the U.S. Concept of National Interest in the Middle East

Chapter V. The 1990-1991 Gulf War
   • Background
   • Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait
   • U.S. Response to the Crisis

Chapter VI. Conclusion

Notes and References

Bibliography

Research Methodology

This study will be based on the premise that U.S. foreign policy is rooted in the concept of national interest. Four exploratory hypotheses will be examined:

1. The Oil Factor.
2. The Israeli Factor.
3. Containing Resurgent Islam: Preserving the Status Quo Politics in the Middle East and Finding a Permanent Base for the U.S. in the Region.
4. Quest for World Leadership in Post Cold War Era.
Hypothesis One: The Oil Factor.

Oil has been central to the United States' view of the Gulf and the role of oil must therefore be reconciled with U.S. behavior. For examining this hypothesis we would look into the following issues:

1. a theoretical foundation in theories of imperialism,
2. a specifiable and quantifiable interest of the U.S., i.e. western dependence on Middle Eastern oil
3. an apparent threat to that interest, i.e. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait
4. evidence of U.S. perception of a threat to the interest (in the domestic U.S. debate).

Hypothesis Two: The Israeli Factor.

It was an important Israeli interest to see Iraq militarily weakened. The Israelis also actively sought the intervention of the United States. Published reports and documents show that in the months before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Israel itself and its supporters in the U.S. sought to highlight Iraq as a threat, especially after Iraq acquired military capabilities and chemical weapons that were capable of reaching Israel.

To explain the "Israeli" factor in the U.S. policy towards the Gulf War, the following issues would be studied:

1. Israeli factor in the general theory explaining U.S. policy in the Middle East,
2. Substantial Israeli interests in seeing the destruction of Iraq's military establishment,
3. a clearly stated preference by most advocates of a policy for the use of force against Iraq.

Hypothesis Three: Securing Permanent Military Facilities in the Middle East and Preserving the Status Quo Politics in the Region

The U.S. intervened militarily in the Gulf crisis as it wanted to protect its client regimes in the gulf which were conduits for promoting its imperialist interests in the region. In other words, the United States was looking for an opportunity to secure its permanent military presence in the Middle East for preserving the status quo politics in the region (as represented by the pro-American conservative governments such as Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf sheikdoms) in the fear of the resurgent Islam.

It is worth noting that during the Cold War era communism was considered by the U.S. government as the main threat to the Middle East, but there has been a change in this policy since the mid-1980s, particularly since President Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the former Soviet Union and the Islamic revolution took place in Iran. From then on the growth of Islamic movements began to replace the spread of communism in the Middle East as the main concern to the United States.
The major elements of this hypothesis that would be studied in this section are the following:

1. U.S. response to the Islamic revolution in Iran.
2. Iran-Iraq war and the policy of U.S. to the crisis.
3. The nature of contemporary Islamic movements and how these cause concern to the United States.
4. U.S. policy towards the pro American conservative gulf regimes, especially towards Saudi Arabia and other monarchies in the region.

**Hypothesis Four: U.S. Quest for World Leadership in Post Cold War Era**

With the decline of Soviet powers, the United States was determined to fulfill its objective of undisputed global hegemony. The gulf conflict provided the launchpad for the creation of a "new world order" in which the U.S. would lead and everyone else would follow.

To substantiate this hypothesis we would posit the following observations:

1. The Gulf war could have been avoided.
2. The U.S. acted hastily without giving chance for a diplomatic solution.
3. How the U.S. did not attempt to limit conflict but went beyond a limited effort to accomplish broader foreign policy goals such as permanent Middle East hegemony.

Sources of Data

Both primary and secondary data will be used for the study. Primary sources will include:

2. Weekly compilation of presidential documents.
3. Public papers of the presidents of the United States.

Secondary sources will include:

1. Published books on the subject.
2. Scholarly and journalistic articles.
3. Newspaper reports, etc.

The combination of the above-mentioned primary and secondary source materials would help to provide information on the problem of study.

Significance of the Study

This study is of enormous significance for an understanding of contemporary U.S. foreign policy, especially U.S. policy in the Middle East and the evolving global system. The study focuses upon U.S. policy toward the
East in general and during the Gulf War of 1990-1991 in particular. This topic is one of paramount importance, not only for the U.S. policy makers, academicians and the general public at large, but also for all the states, governments, peoples and students of international relations. Although many books and journal articles have been written on this area and much has been written on the Gulf War as well, no systematic study has been conducted so far on our chosen topic. The study thus would enrich the existing literature on the subject. The data and analysis of this study will be useful to students, scholars and policy makers, as well as those who are involved with developing and executing foreign policy, especially its policy to the turbulent Middle East region.
CHAPTER II
THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL INTEREST

The term "national interest," as K. J. Holsti has pointed out, "Has been used (or abused) as a device for analyzing nations' (foreign policy) objectives."¹ The meaning and use of national interest thus, for obvious reasons, have been debated by the analysts, policy-makers and diplomats; however, no consensus has yet been achieved on the subject. Nevertheless, the term has clearly retained currency among practitioners of foreign policy. Many have opined that national interest is the prime consideration in foreign policy.²

Charles Beard, in his seminal work, The Idea of National Interest published in the early 1930s, traced the


²As Alfred Mahan has put it: "Self-interest is not only a legitimate, but a fundamental cause for national policy, one which needs no cloak of hypocrisy...it is vain to expect governments to act continuously on any other ground than national interest. They have no right to do so, being agents and not principals." The Interest in America in Sea Power--Present and Future (Boston: Little & Brown, 1897), as quoted by Golam Mostafa, "National Interest and Foreign Policy: A Case Study of Bangladesh's Relations with the Former Soviet Union, 1980-1990" (Ph.D. diss., Carlton University), 20.
evolution of the concept from the ancient to the modern period through several stages. According to Beard, ancient Greeks, Persians, Egyptians and Romans also pursued the interests of their territorial/political entities; but these interests were defined either in religious or in dynastic terms. The "dynastic" interest meant "the desire of each monarch to maintain and if possible, extend his domain and his control over land and people." With the increase of the groups within the domain who came to attach their specific interests to those of the monarch, the dynastic base gave way to the concept of raison d'etat, which became, in turn, intermingled with the idea of national honor.

However, the concept of national interest differs from the concepts of "national honor" and "national prestige."

According to Douglas Kinney:

National Honor is less concrete than National Interest. . . . National honor is most interesting as a political phenomenon and most important as a factor in decision-making when it tempers or contradicts concrete National Interests in favor of standing in the system. . . . National Interests . . . are the stuff of solutions, and National Honor the essence of problems.


The difference between national interest and national prestige has been highlighted by Robert Gilpin. Gilpin explains national prestige through the prism of power and capabilities. According to him:

Whereas power refers to the economic, military and related capabilities of a state, prestige refers primarily to the perception of other states with respect to a state's capabilities and its ability and unwillingness to exercise its power.6

The use of the concept of "national interest" in a modern sense began with the emergence of European nation-states in the 16th and 17th centuries. The date usually given is that of the Westphalian state system that was established in 1648.7 As Beard has mentioned:

With the emergence of the national state system, the increase in influence of popular political control, and the great expansion of economic relations, the lines of a new formula--national interest--were being laid down.8

The essence of national interest, however, remained the same before and after the 1648 divide, but in the modern context it has been explicitly linked to the concept of a nation-

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7The Westphalian state system recognized equal sovereignty of European states, territorial integrity, neutrality as well as the right to preserve and promote their national interests. See Lynn H. Miller, Global Order: Values and Power in International Politics (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985), 17-34, quoted in Golam Mostafa, National Interest and Foreign Policy (New Delhi: South Asia Publishers, 1995), 11.

8Beard, 21.
state which had emerged as the supposed "natural" organizing principle of humanity.⁹

Among the scholars who advanced the idea of national interest in the first half of this century in the academic files are E. H. Carr, George Kennan, Walter Lippmann and above all, Hans Morgenthau, all of whom had differing definitions and perceptions of the concept.

Thus, defining national interest is problematic. Some scholars suggest that:

The concept is too broad, too general, too vague, too all-inclusive to perform useful analytic functions, to serve as guideline for policy makers, as organizing concept for scholars, or as a criterion of judgment and evaluation for the criterion.¹⁰

Joseph Frankel also referred to it as a "singularly vague" concept and mentioned that there was no entry under the heading of "national interest" in the Oxford Dictionaries, the first edition of the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, or the Dictionary of Social Sciences.¹¹

Second, various criteria have been used to define national interests. For example, the realists view National Interests in terms solely of material gains--military,

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⁹Mostafa, National Interest and Foreign Policy, 11.

¹⁰Sondermann, 126-27.

political and economic (we will elaborate this view later). Others (for example James Billington) argue that national interest should be understood both in terms of material and non-material aspects.12

National interest may also be pursued for both offensive and defensive purposes and may thus be defined in an expansionist as well as in defensive matrix. It has been used to justify expansion and promotion of political, economic and ideological objectives globally, as well as to secure the minimalist objectives of survival and the protection and preservation of a nation-states' sovereignty.

In short, there is no consensus on precisely what constitutes national interest. Interpretations vary according to ideological and philosophical positions and preferences of the analysts.

**National Interest and Realism**

The realist perception of national interest has been propounded mainly by E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau. Later the concept was developed and modified by other scholars like Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Kenneth Waltz, Robert Gilpin, Stephen Krasner and others.

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The realist perception of a state is based on several premises; that the state is the best available type of political organization; that a state's drive for power is inherent and thus requires the maintenance of a capacity to defend itself, that states enjoy absolute power and authority in domestic politics, but in international arena, where they interact with others, they have to negotiate and compromise on national interests (except the core ones), that international order is anarchic and power is the determining feature of relations, and finally that states must acknowledge that their capacity to influence the international system depends on their power capabilities. Thus, in the international arena, states are assumed to behave rationally.

For Morgenthau the national power of a state is assumed to be based on two sets of factors: stable (tangible) and unstable (intangible). The stable factors include geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population and national character. The unstable factors are national morale, quality of diplomacy and quality of government.¹³ Foreign policy is seen as an instrument at the disposal of state for safeguarding its national interests by means of its power (overt and covert).

Debate Between Realists and Neorealists

Realists consider national interest to be the main basis and motive force by which political actions of states should viewed. To quote Morgenthau:

It is not only a political necessity but also moral duty for a nation to follow in its dealings with other nations but one guiding star, one standard for thought, one rule of action: the national interest.\textsuperscript{14}

Realists define national interests in terms of "high politics" (politics, military and security), not "low politics" (trade, finance, monetary-exchange and others). They are less interested in ideology, economy, morality or other aspects of national interest. As Morgenthau puts it, "It [the U.S.] should make a pact with the devil himself--if it is in the national interest to do so."\textsuperscript{15} E. H. Carr also believed that "relations between states are governed solely by power, and that morality plays no part in it."\textsuperscript{16}

It is worth noting that classical realism dominated the study of foreign policy in the immediate post-World War II decade. By the late 1950s, the realist view of state-centric analysis of international relations was challenged from within the same paradigm. Kenneth Waltz, Robert Gilpin,


\textsuperscript{15}Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 388.

Kindleberger and Krasner were among the scholars who challenged the classical realist perception and are known as "neorealists."

Kenneth Waltz attempted to provide a structural explanation of international relations by differentiating between national and international politics. For him, national politics are hierarchic, vertical centralized, heterogeneous and directed. International politics, on the other hand, are anarchic, decentralized, horizontal, homogenous, undirected and mutually adaptive. He challenged the classical realist view of a state's capabilities to maximize its interests in the international arena, by arguing that the state's options at the international level are limited and conditioned by the system within which it interacts with others.17 Thus, implications of a state's interactions cannot be known without the knowledge of the situation where these interactions occur. To quote Kenneth Waltz as he has narrated the debate:

The neorealist's world looks different from the one that earlier realists had portrayed. For realists, the world addressed is one of interacting states. For neorealists, interacting states can be adequately studied only by distinguishing between structural and unit-level causes and effects. Structure becomes a new object of inquiry, as well as an occasion for argument. In light of neorealist theory, means

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and ends are differently viewed, as are the causes and effects. Realists think of causes running in one direction, from interacting states to the outcomes their acts and interactions produce. Neorealist theory (on the other hand) shows that causes run not in one direction, from interacting units to outcomes produced but rather in two directions. One must believe that some causes of international outcomes are located at the level of the interacting units. Since variations in unit-level causes do not correspond to variations in observed outcomes, one has to believe that some causes are located at the structural level of international politics as well. Realists cannot handle causation at a level above states because they fail to conceive of structure as a force that shapes and shoves the units, causes at the level of units interact with those at the level of the structure, and because they do so, explanation at the level of units alone is bound to mislead. If one's theory allows for the operation of both unit-level and structure-level causes, then it can cope with both the changes and the continuities that occur in a system.18

Robert Gilpin agrees with Waltz. However, he goes further by including economic and technological capabilities of states. Gilpin states that interests of nations change with the redistribution of power (which is a continuous process) caused by economic, technological and other developments. Thus the states that have gained more power seek to alter the system in favor of their national interests. Their pursuits are calculated in terms of balancing costs and benefits.19

In short, the neorealists generally analyze national interests in terms of power, but they define power broadly

18Ibid., 77-78.
19Gilpin, 13.
by including economy and technology along with military and strategic factors. Like the realists, they also recognize the role of the state, but, for them, states are not the only actors in the international arena; states' roles and actions are influenced and dominated by the international structure within which they interact. The neorealists usually used deductionist methodology and separate foreign policy (the domain of a state) from international relations (dominated by major powers).  

In an attempt to reduce the gap between the two approaches--realism and neorealism--Robert Cox suggests:

International structure constitutes parameters of frameworks for action, and shapes and limits the functions of the actors, but the actors are also a product of history and their functions are conditioned by social, economic and military pressures of their environments.  

Stephen Krasner also emphasizes that in striving for national interests, states confront internal as well as external resistance. So national interest, Krasner argues, is not only determined by external factors, but also

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20"Realism's approach is primarily inductive, neorealism is more heavily deductive." See Waltz, 77.

"depends upon the instruments of control that states can exercise over groups within its own society."²²

**Defining National Interest**

What follows from the above discussion is that national interest can be described as the perceived needs and desires of a sovereign state in relation to other sovereign states that constitute its external environment. In other words, the pursuit of national interest can be defined as a policy or policies designed to promote and protect interests of a particular time, as contested with differentiated interests of individuals, groups, or sub-groups, or the interests of mankind as a whole.²³ National interests are reflected both in domestic and external policies. Shifts and changes in domestic coalitions and in international relations may require a redefinition of national interests by a nation-state. Political, economic and technological changes also redistribute power both at domestic and international levels, which may likewise compel nation-states to redefine their national interests.

Donald E. Nuechterlein has identified four basic interests of nation-states and four levels of interest and


suggested that those national needs form the underpinning of national foreign policies. The four fundamental interests are: (1) Defense interest, (2) Economic interest, (3) World-order interest and (4) Ideological interest.

Defense Interest. The protection of the nation-state and its citizens from the threat of physical violence by another country, and/or protection from an externally inspired threat to the national political system.

Economic Interest. The enhancement of the nation-state's economic well-being in relations with other states.

World-order Interest. The maintenance of an international political and economic system in which the nation-state can feel secure and in which its citizens and commerce can operate peacefully outside their own borders.

Ideological Interest. The protection and furtherance of a set of values which the citizens of a nation-state share and believe to be universally good.24

Some explanation of the relationship among these four basic interests is in order (see Table 1). First, the order in which they have been placed does not suggest any priority of one over another. Unless a nation-state is able to defend its territory and citizens--either through a strong defense

---

force or in alliance with a major power, or both—none of the other three interests is likely to matter.

TABLE 1
NATIONAL INTEREST MATRIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic Interest at Stake</th>
<th>Intensity of Interest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Survival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense of Homeland</td>
<td>. . . . . .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Well-being</td>
<td>. . . . . .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favorable World Order</td>
<td>. . . . . .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion of Values</td>
<td>. . . . . .</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Second, it is obvious that the four interests are not mutually exclusive and that policy makers must accept trade-offs among them. For example, the economic interests of certain industries within a state may be sacrificed at times to enhance a world order interest involving another country whose friendship and cooperation are needed to enhance stability in an important part of the world. Third, a nation's ideology forms an important part of its national interest. This ideology is important in determining how the government reacts to international issues.
Another point worth mentioning is that the defense interest as described here entails only the protection of the homeland, the citizens and the political system of the nation-state. It does not include alliances with other states, but may include strategic bases whose primary function is the protection of the homeland of a close ally. The world-order interest deals with a multitude of international issues, many of which are handled through international organizations. As far as political issues are involved, a prime objective of a world-order interest is to maintain a balance of power favorable to one's own feeling of security.

Identification of the basic national interests involved in foreign crisis is only the first step in determining foreign policy, however. The next step is to assess correctly the intensity of that interest, on the stakes that the political leadership of a country believes are involved.

In order to analyze better the differing degrees of interest that a government perceives to be involved in given international events, Nuechterlein has categorized four intensities as follows.

Survival issues. The very existence of the nation-state is in jeopardy, either as a result of overt military attack on its own territory, or from the imminent threat of attack should an enemy's demands be rejected. The key to whether an issue is a survival issue or vital issue, based on a scale
of priorities, is the degree to which there is an immediate credible threat of massive physical harm by one state on another. By this definition, there probably are no economic world-order or ideological interests that qualify. Only a defense interest, as defined above, would ever reach that level of intensity.

Vital issues. Serious harm will likely come to the state unless strong measures, including the use of conventional military force, are employed to counter an adverse action by another state or to deter it from undertaking a serious provocation. A vital issue usually provides a government with sufficient time to seek help from allies, bargain with the antagonist, or take aggressive countermeasures to warn the enemy that he will pay a high price if the political, economic or military pressure is not withdrawn. Unlike survival issues, vital issues may involve not only defense interests but also economic, world-order and, in some cases, ideological interests.

Major issues. The political, economic and ideological well-being of the state may be adversely affected by events and trends in the international environment that thus require corrective action in order to prevent them from becoming serious threats (vital issues). Most issues in international relations fall into this category and are usually resolved through diplomatic negotiation. When diplomacy fails, governments then reconsider how deeply
their interests are affected by the event or trend in question. If, in the final analysis, a government is unwilling or unable to compromise on what it considers to be a fundamental question, it has implicitly ascertained that the issue is a vital one. On the other hand, if negotiation and compromise are deemed to be the best course of action, then the issue probably is a major one. Most economic problems between states are major, not vital issues. The same is true of ideological problems, although states sometimes cloak other problems in ideological garb in an effort to mobilize public opinion at home and abroad.

Peripheral issues. The well-being of the state is not adversely affected by events or trends abroad, but when the interests of private citizens and companies operating in foreign countries are endangered. Obviously, the large and powerful multinational corporations are usually given a higher priority by the parent country since their earnings and taxes have become a significant effect on the economic well-being of the home state. Each nation-state makes its own determination on how greatly it values commercial enterprises operating abroad. For some, these companies constitute major issues of national interest; for others, they are only of peripheral importance.25

25Ibid., 79-80.
Applying a National-Interest Matrix to Foreign Policy Analysis

To clarify how the national-interest matrix can be used as a research tool, Donald Nuechterlein uses the Suez crisis of 1956, a crisis with not dissimilar characteristics to the Gulf War of 1991. During that crisis the Eden government in Britain decided to use force against Egypt after President Nasser's abrupt nationalization of the Suez Canal.

The Eden government decided that Britain's economic interests were so endangered by the potential closure of the canal that it could not compromise with Nasser. Therefore, the British economic interest in the canal was, in Eden's view, so great that the issue was a vital one that had to be met with force since Nasser refused to negotiate suitable guarantees on use of the canal. Other British interests were also involved. Nasser was seen as a threat to Western-oriented governments in the Middle East (world order interest), and he was clearly moving his country into a closer relationship with the Soviet Union and following an anti-democratic course at home (ideological interest). Eden probably saw the world-order interest as vital and the ideological interest as major, at least, and he therefore decided against any compromise with Nasser and for the use of force. Thus we can illustrate the national-interest matrix (in Table 2 as follows) how Britain viewed its
interests in October 1956 and can conclude that force was a likely course of action.\textsuperscript{26}

TABLE 2
BRITAIN AND THE 1956 SUEZ CRISIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic Interest at Stake</th>
<th>Intensity of Interest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Survival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense of Homeland</td>
<td>. . . . .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Well-being</td>
<td>. . .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favorable World Order</td>
<td>. . .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion of Values</td>
<td>. . .</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Conclusion

Nuechterlein and others agree that the concept of national interest is of powerful significance in foreign policy analysis. The concept has received wide acceptability among the observers and analysts of the international political scene also because it infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics. It makes foreign policy decisions of a nation-state intelligible and understandable.

\textsuperscript{26}Ibid., 80-81.
It is true that the realist school of international politics tends to disregard the interplay of emotions or moral values as a guide in foreign policy decisions. To establish the concept of national interest as a useful tool for understanding state behavior, one should add an ideological dimension as well. Moreover, we must recognize that "states do not have a single national interest, ordained by some philosopher king, but many interests, which are determined through the political processes of their respective systems." Policy makers also look at the potential costs of actions they might take to counter an unfavorable event or trend in another country. In other words, the degree of interest which the United States or any power has in a specific international issue results from a process of thinking through the value-and-cost question that the leadership perceives.

The national-interest matrix suggested by Nuechterlein provides a systematic means for analyzing and weighing the relative importance of the basic interests involved in all international issues, both for one's country and for others. The matrix does not provide definitive answers concerning policies governments will adopt in a crisis. It can be said that the foregoing elaboration of the concept of national interest will help understand the behavior pattern and

27Ibid., 91.
foreign policy response of a country to any particular international crisis. The matrix will also allow more realistic judgments by foreign policy makers with regard to ends and means in national security policies. It is for this reason that in the present study we have chosen the Nuechterlein's national-interest matrix as a tool for analyzing U.S. policy towards the Middle East, and in particular, Washington's military response to the Gulf Crisis during 1990-1991. Before the theoretical framework is applied to the case study, an overview of the broad setting in which the Gulf War was set will be provided.
Throughout history the Middle East has been a rich and diverse region of enormous cultural significance. It is home to three of the world's great religions--Christianity, Islam and Judaism--and has provided many other contributions to civilization. In the twentieth century the discovery of the largest petroleum deposits in the world made the Middle East vital to the international economy.\(^1\)

The region is so strategically important because of its oil assets and its location at the cross roads of three continents. At the same time, the Middle East has been afflicted with conflicts that seem to defy solution. Disputes between Arabs and Israelis, Iranians and Iraqis, Iraqis and Kuwaitis and other antagonists have gone beyond disagreements over territory or fears concerning conflicting geo-political and economic goals. Middle East combatants have often hated each other because of decades of mutual hostilities and ethnic, religious and cultural prejudices.\(^2\)


\(^2\)Ibid.
The main objectives of this chapter are to review first the geographic location and composition of the Middle East, more specifically defining Middle East, its land, people, languages, and religions and second, the political overview, especially, the crises over the Middle East.

Defining the Middle East

There is no universal acceptance of the term "Middle East," or universal agreement as to its boundaries. The term "Near East" is often used in both popular and scholarly contexts instead of Middle East.3

The term Middle East has been traced back with certainty only to 1900. It may have been in use in Britain's India Office since the mid-nineteenth century. It first came into prominence when used by the American naval historian Alfred Thayer Mahan in 1902 to describe the region around the Gulf. The commonly accepted definition of the Middle East now encompasses a greater area than that defined by Mahan. The geostrategic overtones of the term linger on.4

The term Middle East came into popular usage during World War II with the establishment of the British Middle East command and the Allied Middle East Supply Center. Both


served the North African and Asian countries west of India. Since then, the term Middle East has become increasingly more popular than that of Near East. However, the terms Middle East and Near East are sometimes used interchangeably, or the Near East may refer only to the Balkans or to the Balkans and Egypt plus those lands near to and east of the Mediterranean, including Southwestern Asia. Similarly, the Middle East has been variously defined broadly as the area from Morocco on the Atlantic Coast to Pakistan in Asia and from Turkey to Sudan. The narrowest definition concedes only the Arab countries on the eastern Mediterranean, plus Turkey, Iran, and Israel. The Middle East became familiar in the United States and Europe in World War II when both the British and the Allied headquarters in Cairo-Egypt known as H.Q. Middle East, covering large parts of northern and eastern Africa as well as Iran, Turkey, and all the Arab states east of the Suez Canal.

The confusion caused by using both terms, Middle East and Near East, to describe and locate countries in each region became apparent when one examined the U.S. government's use of the terms Middle East and Near East.

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6Drysdale, 11.
Tareq Y. Ismael, Secretary of State John Foster, in his statement in the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957, defined the Middle East as the area extending from Libya in the West to Pakistan in the east, from Turkey in the north to the Arabian Peninsula in the South. He also indicated that the terms Middle East and Near East are interchangeable. A year later, President Eisenhower, in his 1958 address to the United Nations General Assembly, used the term Near East but did not mention the Middle East. The State Department also indicated that the terms are reciprocal but that they included only the countries of Egypt, Syria, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the Gulf Emirates of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ras al-Khaymah, Umm al-Qaiwain, Ajman, and Fujairah, Bahrain, Oman, and Kuwait. The Secretary of State and the State Department each defined the Middle East quite differently. In 1959 a geographer in the State Department concluded that the Middle East could not be defined because there is no standard definition of the Middle East and the confusion of the proper use of the term, different views have been held in the literature to describe the era in question. According to Tareq Y. Ismael, the Middle East is:

That area centered on the Fertile Crescent (including the states of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan), the northern belt (Turkey and Iran), the Nile Valley (Egypt and Sudan), the

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7Ismael and Ismael, 2.
This division, like any other, is rather arbitrary, but takes into account the major characteristics shared by the included states. Although Alasdair Drysdale describes the Middle East as follows: Turkey, Iran, Israel, and the Arab States east of the Suez together with Egypt and Libya. Sudan and Cyprus are sometimes included, less often Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. According to Drysdale, the Middle East in certain areas extends far beyond the outer limits of some of the states of the region, whereas in other areas—as in Southern Sudan—different cultural regions impinge on it. The geopolitical influence of the Middle East and North Africa extends into Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Indian Ocean as well as into the Sahara and the Horn of Africa. No grouping of states can claim to belong to so many geopolitical realms. The coastal states of North Africa are African, Mediterranean, Islamic, and Arab, all influenced politically and economically by nearness to Europe. Most of the states of the Middle East are in Asia, but they have strong ties with the Euro-Mediterranean world or the Afro-Indian Ocean world, or both. All but Cyprus and Israel are Islamic; only Cyprus, Iran, Israel and Turkey are not Arab. 9

8Ibid., 3.

9Drysdale, 11.
For an operational definition here, the term Middle East will be used to cover the views most commonly held in the literature which include all Arab states, including North Africa (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia), the Nile Valley (Egypt and Sudan), and non-Arab states including Iran, Israel, and Turkey. The total area of the Middle East delimited in this fashion is about 14,243,684 sq. km. Its population approaches to nearly 397,143,884 million. Geographically, the Middle East is an area of contrasting geographical features that range from swampy regions, where coal beds are formed, to steep cliffs and jagged peaks. Most of Arabia is slanted coastal block that climbs gradually from sea level in the northeast to 12,000 feet in the southwest until it reaches Yemen, where a sharp drop occurs and the land rushes down into the troughs and rifts that constitute the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The southern plateaus, other than the break at Yemen, continue into North Africa without much change or disturbance in the landscape, creating a region of seemingly endless, relatively flat, sand-covered surfaces. Central Turkey and Central Iran are also elevated plateaus that sometimes reach

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10Total area of the combined countries of the Middle East including all Arab states and Iran, Israel—including the occupied territories of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights—and Turkey are added up for all countries together. Population also added up for all countries in the region. See The Europa World Yearbook, Vols. 1 and 2 (London: Europa Publication Limited, 1998).
a height of 8,000 feet. The various systems of rugged mountains with their formidable peaks, deep valleys, and sheer drops to narrow coastal lowlands that vividly command the Middle Eastern scene.\textsuperscript{11} The Middle East may be roughly classified in three zones: the Plains of North Africa and Arabia, the Fertile Crescent, and the Northern Tier. The vast deserts of the Sahara in north Africa and the Rub al-Khali in Arabia cover over 95 percent of this region. The Qattara Depression, over 4,000 square miles in size, is located near the Mediterranean in Egypt's portion of the eastern Sahara. The remaining 5 percent of the Plains of North Africa and Arabia include two distinct areas. These areas consist of a transitional territory described as desert scrub country and rich Mediterranean coastal zone that stretches from the wide Delta westward for most of the length of North Africa and the Atlantic Coast of Morocco as far south as Casablanca.\textsuperscript{12} The Fertile Crescent includes a narrow coastal zone flanked by the sea on one side and a rather low coastal range of mountains running north to south on the other. Along the southern border of Turkey, the Fertile Crescent arches eastward through a gap in the

\textsuperscript{11}Ismael and Ismael, 8.

mountains to include the desert scrub lands of Syria and Iraq before joining the rich river basins of the Tigris and Euphrates. The region terminates at the northern end of the Persian Gulf. The Northern Tier is an area of mountains and plateaus that is linked to a mountainous system stretching from the Alps in the west to the Himalayas in the east. Both Turkey and Iran are located on high plateaus surrounded by mountains.¹³

The importance of the position of the Middle East came from its location as a corridor of East-West communication. The value of its waterways—-the Turkish Straits, the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandeb, the Straits of Hormuz, and the Gulf—-for communication, travel, and trade is illustrated by the difficulties to outside powers caused by the 1956 and 1967-75 blockades of the Suez Canal and the "tanker war" in the Gulf in the late 1980s.¹⁴

The People, Language and Religion

There are three major linguistic groups in the Middle East: Semitic, Persian, and Turkish. Of the Semitic-speaking population, the Arabs are the most numerous. Although there are many dialects, there is only one written Arabic, and it is understood by educated Arabs everywhere.

¹³Ibid., 223.
¹⁴Ismael and Ismael, 3.
Arabic is spoken from the Atlantic coast of Morocco to the shores of the Persian Gulf. Small groups continue to speak Aramaic or Syrian, which was the Semitic lingua franca of the area at the time of Christ. Hebrew, which at one time virtually disappeared as a living language, was revived and modernized by Zionist settlers in Palestine. It is now the official language of Israel.

Iranian languages, after being eclipsed by Arabic for several centuries, were revived around the 11th century. Persian is the language of the largest number of Iranian speakers and is the official language of Iran. Turkish-speaking people of modern Turkey came to the Anatolian Peninsula in the 11th and 12th centuries from central Asia. They have lived in a single identifiable state since the Turkish Republic was created with the breakup of the Ottoman Empire following World War I. Finally, it should be pointed out that there are numerous isolated peoples who speak various languages, including among others, Kurds, Armenians, and Greeks.

People in the Middle East can be divided into three majors groups--Arab, Turkish, and Persian--and a number of

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15Weatherby, 226.
16Peter Avery, Modern Iran (Pareger, 1965), 7.
18Weatherby, 226.
smaller groups--Kurdish, Berber, and Assyrian. Arabs constitute the single largest majority, numbering about 200 million, or two-thirds of the region's population. Turkish inhabitants make up the second largest group. Persians rank as the third largest group in the region.\textsuperscript{19} According to Tareq Y. Ismael, in order to understand the political dynamics of the Middle East, it is as essential to discern the distinctions between groups as it is necessary to recognize the similarities among them. For instance, Arabs may be Christian, Jewish, Muslim, or some other faith; generally what determines ethnic identification is language. On the other hand, what determines religious identification is declaration of belief. Muslims may or may not be Arabs; and so too Christians, Jews (or any of the other religions extant in the Middle East). Thus, Kurds are Muslims but not Arabs; Christians may or may not be Arabs or Kurds, and so on.\textsuperscript{20}

The Middle East is the birthplace of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. With more than 200 million Muslims in the Middle East, Islam is the most influential religion in the region. Islam has been the dominant religion in the Middle East for almost 1400 years. Today less than 10

\textsuperscript{19}Ismael and Ismael, 11.

\textsuperscript{20}Ibid.
percent of the population of the region is non-Muslim.\textsuperscript{21} Christianity and Judaism also originated in the Middle East and there are a significant number of Christians and Jews living there today. Jewish communities can be found in most Middle Eastern states, but since 1948 the largest concentrations have, of course, been found in Israel. The creation of Israel in 1948 may be viewed as a product of the politicization of Judaism in the form of national movement.\textsuperscript{22} Table 3 shows the countries, area, population, and economic characteristics of the Middle East and North Africa, as part of the Arab states. As mentioned before, there is no agreed definition to the extent of the Middle East. There is, however, a wide consensus that Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Egypt, and the Arabian Peninsula States must be included by all definitions. North African Arab States and Sudan--the Nile Valley--have been associated with other Middle Eastern States and they are part of the political reality of the region. See the Middle East map (Figure 1).

The Middle East and North Africa may be divided into three distinct regions. These regions include the Plains of North Africa and Arabia, the Fertile Crescent, and the Northern Tier. The Middle East is an area of contrast

\textsuperscript{21}Weatherby, 228.

\textsuperscript{22}Ismael and Ismael, 11.
Fig. 1: Middle East Map

- Estimated population in 1993
- Percentage of population rise since 1988
- Member of the Arab League
- International border
- Borders of republics of the former USSR

- Capital
- Not known (includes immigrants/foreign nationals etc.)
- Not available
**TABLE 3**

**STATES OF THE REGION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALGERIA</td>
<td>2,381,740</td>
<td>29,830,370</td>
<td>a. 4%</td>
<td>a. 12%</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
<td>$ 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b. $4,000</td>
<td>b. 50%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c. 38%</td>
<td>c. 38%</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAHRAIN</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>601,318</td>
<td>a. 3%</td>
<td>a. 1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>$ 3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b. $13,000</td>
<td>b. 38%</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1995 est)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c. 61%</td>
<td>c. 61%</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGYPT</td>
<td>1,001,450</td>
<td>64,824,466</td>
<td>a. 4.9%</td>
<td>a. 16%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>$ 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b. $2,900</td>
<td>b. 34%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c. 50%</td>
<td>c. 50%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRAN</td>
<td>1,640</td>
<td>67,540,002</td>
<td>a. 3.6%</td>
<td>a. 21%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>$ 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b. $5,200</td>
<td>b. 37%</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c. 42%</td>
<td>c. 42%</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRAQ</td>
<td>437,072</td>
<td>22,219,289</td>
<td>a. 0%</td>
<td>a. N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>very heavy relative to GDP (unknown)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b. $2,000</td>
<td>b. N/A</td>
<td>(since 1991)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c. N/A</td>
<td>(since 1991 Gulf War)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISRAEL</td>
<td>20,770</td>
<td>5,534,672</td>
<td>a. 4.6%</td>
<td>a. 3.5%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>$ 25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b. $16,000</td>
<td>b. 22%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c. 75.5%</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Includes Arabs in the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights.
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>JORDAN</td>
<td>89,213</td>
<td>4,324,638</td>
<td>a. 5.9%</td>
<td>a. 6%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>$ 7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b. $5,000</td>
<td>b. 28%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c. 66%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUWAIT</td>
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<td>(1995 est)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(1993 est)</td>
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<td>c. 54%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(1994 est)</td>
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<td>c. 52%</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(1993 est)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c. 55%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1994 est)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>YEMEN</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c. 51%</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

including some of the world's most famous deserts mountain ranges, and rivers. Oil is the most important natural resource of the region. A scarcity of water under agricultural development throughout most of the Middle East. The monotheistic religion--Judaism, Christianity and Islam--have developed in the Middle East. Today Islam is the professed religion of 90 percent of the population in the Middle East. Most political activities in the Middle East today is affected by religion, although, nationalism is another feature of Middle Eastern politics. Various forms of nationalism have developed in Turkey, Arab nationalism in Egypt, Iran, and Israel. Finally, the main political feature of the Middle East is the Arab-Israeli conflict, sometimes referred to as the Middle East Problem. 23

Oil and the Middle East

Oil is the great natural resource of the region. Although accurate production figures are sometimes hard to obtain, the Middle East petroleum exports to Europe, Japan and the United States amount to about two-thirds of the world's total petroleum exports. 24 About 66 percent of the world's known recoverable oil reserves are located in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf region. Only 2.6 percent are

24 Ibid., 227.
found in the United States and 1.9 percent in Western Europe. The big five Gulf producers together have enough oil in the ground, once developed, to supply the market for at least another century at current rates of production. Persian Gulf producers account for almost all the world's post-Gulf crisis excess production capacity--most of this in Saudi Arabia. However, Middle Eastern oil is not equally distributed throughout the area. Some oil is found in Turkey, Egypt, Syria, and Israel, but the large countries are located in Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, and along the Gulf in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Sheikdoms. Kuwait accounts for about 18 percent of the world's reserves, while Saudi Arabia accounts for 25 percent. The Arab world's oil reserves accounts for 56 percent of the world's total.

The major Middle East oil producing countries and Venezuela formed the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to increase their bargaining power against the unified positions adopted by the major companies. OPEC's increasing importance confirm that its control over two-thirds of the world's proven reserves of oil. The Persian Gulf members of OPEC are especially important, because they control over 80 percent of OPEC's reserves,


\[26\] Ismael and Ismael, 16.
with Saudi Arabia alone accounting for more than a third.\textsuperscript{27} Although in 1980 OPEC provided over 45 percent of the world's oil production, in 1989, 38 percent of the world's oil came from OPEC. By contrast, the 1990s are likely to see market power in the hand of five or six OPEC producers. Only Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, and possibly Iran will be left within a few years with either excess capacity.\textsuperscript{28}

It should be pointed out that the 1970s was the golden decade for the producer nations. The decade opened with the government of the producer nations--their bargaining power considerably enhanced through OPEC--demanding higher prices for their resources, greater overall control over production and pricing, and larger shares in the revenues generated from export. This has been achieved by the Tehran agreement of February 1971, along with similar concessions already gained by Libya, marked the beginning of a rapid end to dominant roles previously played by western multinationals in the world oil market.\textsuperscript{29} During the 1970s Saudi Arabia saw the emergence of oil as a potential weapon for the Arab cause against Israel. This was clear during the 1973 Arab-


\textsuperscript{28}Ramsay, 40.

Israeli War when a group of Arab producers, led by Saudi Arabia, successfully deployed the oil weapon-embargo protesting U.S. support for Israel during the 1973 war. The embargo, which involved a decision by the participants to cease all exports to the United States and Netherlands, accompanied by a 5 to 10 percent cut in their oil production, had grave economic consequences for the consuming nations. Accordingly, the producer states raised oil prices from about $3 a barrel in September 1973 to $11 per barrel by January 1974. In addition, some OPEC producers maintained their right to determine the final destination of their oil. The oil revenues for Middle Eastern governments jumped approximately from $20 billion in 1973 to almost $90 billion in 1976, and are consistently rising. However, despite the increasing influence of OPEC during the 1970s, in which some have described it as the OPEC decade, Charles W. Kegley has pointed out that whether OPEC as an organization will be able to regain the cohesion necessary to act as a potent political and economic force in directing the world energy market is, however, problematic. The members of the already fragile organization differ widely in their financial needs, oil reserves, political regimes, foreign policy objectives, and political

30Ibid.

31Diller, 10.
aspirations. They are also geographically and politically distant, with widely disparate sociocultural systems, population sizes, levels of income, internal problems, and external challenges. Increasingly, however, the six Persian Gulf members of the thirteen-member organization will be the only ones that matter. One factor that will enhance the position of the Persian Gulf states is the rapid growth in recent years of the demand for energy in Third World countries. The dramatic rise in the oil revenues of the six Gulf members of OPEC—Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, and Qatar—during the 1970s and 1980s, $185 billion in 1980, has indeed increased the importance of the region's role in global politics and U.S. foreign policy concerns, acquiring important commercial and financial dimensions.

Political Overview of the Middle East

The Middle East is the inheritor of five thousand years of history. It is the birthplace of the world's three great monotheistic religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. For almost 1400 years, Islam has been the religion of over 90 percent of the region's inhabitants. The effect of religion on politics is more pronounced in the Middle East than probably any other region in the world.

32Kegley, 335.
33Acharya, 10.
## TABLE 4

**OPEC CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION, 1979-91**

(Millions of Barrels Per Day)

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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>.99</td>
<td>.97</td>
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<td>1.04</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>1.23</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2.21</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>2.17</td>
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<td>2.04</td>
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<td>1.01</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1.21</td>
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<td>1.78</td>
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<td>5.10</td>
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<td>1.11</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>1.18</td>
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<td>0.30</td>
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<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.41</td>
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<td>17.35</td>
<td>14.25</td>
<td>13.13</td>
<td>12.84</td>
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<td>14.09</td>
<td>15.65</td>
<td>17.10</td>
<td>17.81</td>
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## TABLE 5

**OPEC MIDDLE EAST OIL REVENUES, 1974-91**

(Billions of U.S. Dollars)

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<td>57.6</td>
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<td>25.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>5.7</td>
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<td>26.0</td>
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<td>8.4</td>
<td>12.1</td>
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<td>11.7</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>15.2</td>
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<td>12.5</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>15.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6.0</td>
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<td>15.6</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>10.4</td>
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<td>4.8</td>
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<td>2.8</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>7.8</td>
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<td>3.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
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<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>164.6</td>
<td>153.8</td>
<td>219.4</td>
<td>197.5</td>
<td>122.8</td>
<td>94.8</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>114.2</td>
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The Middle East has played a pivotal role in world affairs since ancient times. Forming the land bridge between Asia, Africa, and Europe, the Middle East has the strategic attention of Europe, and later the United States and the Soviet Union. Regarding the strategic importance of the Middle East, Joseph Weatherby states that, "There is a saying in the West that the Middle East is a region that is too important to the outside world to allow it to be governed by Middle Easterners." 

The Middle East has been characterized by instability for many centuries due to factors such as ethnic and religious diversity and maldistribution of natural resources before the development of nation states in the region. There is agreement among many who discuss West Asia or the Middle East that those regions experience periodic war and revolution. According to Yasumasa Kuroda, the region is so unstable and subject to so many crises and wars of various magnitude, "it is unstable by design." Great Britain and France, which dominated much of the region, following the

34Weatherby, 214.

35Ibid.

collapse of the Ottoman Empire (1453-1918) at the end of World War I, drew national boundaries and placed kings in certain areas to ensure that the Arab World would forever be divided. As the Ottoman Empire finally collapsed in World War I, all Arabs were subjugated to new western colonial masters after 400 years of Turkish rule. It was then easy for the European nations to continue their hegemonic rule in the region even after the Arab nations became independent. After the Arabs were divided and national boundaries drawn by colonial powers, mainly Britain and France, the new countries naturally developed their own national interests and agenda that were antithetical to Arab unity and independence.37

Colonial power continued to control the faith of the region since World War I and even after World War II. During this period, the policy of "divide and rule" was the colonial practice in the region. The creation of the Zionist Movement in Europe in the late 19th century marked the beginning of the most crucial political instability in the Middle East of what has come to be known as the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Zionism was a political movement among European Jewry that led, beginning in the late 19th century, to increased Jewish immigration to Palestine and ultimately to the

37Ibid., 55.
successful establishment of an independent Israeli state in 1948, had its roots in specific conditions in 19th century Europe. Continuous anti-Semitism throughout most of the Europe, culminating in the Nazi Holocaust of European Jewry during World War II finally led most Jews and the great many others in the west to view with favor the idea of an independent Jewish state in Palestine, where more than half a million Jews had established themselves by the end of the year.

From its inception the Zionist movement faced general opposition in the Middle East, not only from the Arabian inhabitants of Palestine but also from the larger Arab world of which Palestine was considered a part. The Arabs of Palestine were ill equipped to meet the challenge posed by the determined Zionist movement. As the 20th century began, Palestine, like most Arab societies, was seriously underdeveloped. Long centuries of relatively oppressive foreign rule (for four centuries since 1516, the Ottoman Empire had ruled Palestine) had fragmented the Palestinian Arabs politically and trained them effectively in the virtues of political accommodation. As a result, the Palestinian Arabs had no tradition of independent political

38Diller, 10.
39Ibid.
40Ibid., 11.
organization. They were disturbed by the Zionist movement, and lacked effective political institutions to secure their own rights and interests.

The European powers were competing for influence and domination in local regions throughout the rapidly declining Ottoman Empire. The European Zionists recognized that they could advance their cause by backing the imperial aims of the European power most likely to prevail in the context for influence in Palestine. This ambition was achieved in the last days of World War I, when Great Britain concluded that support for the Zionist movement would significantly serve its imperial interests in the Middle East. On November 2, 1917, the British government issued the famous Balfour declaration, named after Lord Arthur James Balfour, the British foreign minister:

His Majesty's Government views with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.\(^\text{41}\)

Many observers regard this declaration as the beginning of what has come to be known as the Arab-Israeli conflict. The U.S. Congress adopted a resolution approving the declaration in September 1922.

\(^{41}\text{Ibid., 63.}\)
In July 1922 the League of Nations approved an arrangement giving Great Britain a mandate over Palestine. The mandate which went into force on September 22, 1923 contained a preamble incorporating the Balfour declaration and stressing the Jews historical connection with Palestine. Britain was made responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of a Jewish national home. Between 1923 to 1948 many hundred thousands of Jews immigrated to Palestine. In early 1947 the United Nations set up a committee of inquiry which ultimately recommended that Palestine be divided in to separate Arab and Jewish states with Jerusalem becoming an international zone under permanent UN trusteeship. On November 29, 1947 the UN General Assembly ratified that decision. British set May 15, 1948 as the date its mandate would end. On May 14, 1948, the British high Commissioner left Palestine and the state of Israel was proclaimed. Minutes after Israel declared its independence on May 14, 1948, the United States became the first country to recognize the Jewish state.42

Arab-Israeli Struggle

Since the end of the World War II the Arab-Israeli conflict has been the central political issue in the Middle

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42Ibid., 64.
east. The day after Israel declared its independence Arab-Israel war broke out. Contingents from five Arab countries: Egypt, Trans Jordan, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon invaded Palestine. The war was stopped on January 7, 1949 and Israel held over 30 percent more territory than had been assigned to the Jewish state under the UN partition plan. The Palestinian state envisaged by the UN plan never materialized. Israel gained about 25 hundred square miles. Trans Jordan which annexed territory on the west Bank of the Jordan river and transformed itself into the state of Jordan gained 22 hundred square miles. Egypt took the Gaza strip, about 135 square miles. Jerusalem was divided between Israel and Jordan. It has been estimated that more than 700,000 who had lived in the area taken over by Israel became refugees.43

The Suez Crisis

The second Arab-Israel war again tore the Middle East in 1956, when President Nasser of Egypt nationalized the British run Suez Canal and refused to guarantee the safety of Israeli shipping. Nationalization of the canal directly threatened British and French interests. The British government held 44% of all shares in the Suez Canal Company; Private French investors held more than three quarters of

43Ibid.
remaining shares. In addition both nations were heavy users of the canal, which provided the shortest waterway to their oil supplies in the Persian Gulf. The two governments froze Egyptian assets and began planning for joint military action, secretly enlisting Israel's participation in the plan.\textsuperscript{44} Israeli armed forces attacked Egypt on October 29 and by October 31 had occupied the Israeli peninsula to within 10 miles of Suez Canal. Britain and France began air strikes against Egyptian targets on October 31 and British and France troops joined the battle on November 5. By November 7, British and French forces had secured control of the canal. Despite the close U.S. relationship with Britain, President Eisenhower vigorously protested the Suez invasion. After intense international pressure from the United States, Britain and France withdrew their forces from Egypt in December 1956.\textsuperscript{45} Although Egypt was defeated in the war, Nasser's stature in the Arab world was bolstered. The 1956 war did not solve the Arab-Israeli territorial conflict, only temporarily altered the military balance in the area. The war increased Arab hostility toward Israel and Nasser began to successfully promote the concept of Arab unity.

\textsuperscript{44} "U.S. Policy in the Middle East" in \textit{The Middle East}, Chapter 3 (Congressional Quarterly Inc.), 65.

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 65-66.
Middle East tension exploded again on June 5, 1967 with the start of the six day war on May 23, 1967. President Nasser of Egypt imposed a blockade of the Gulf of Agaba. The blockade halted most Israeli shipping and threatened to strangle Israeli economy. Nasser imposed the blockade following his demand that the U.N. Emergency force be removed from the Gaza strip and the Gulf of Agaba outpost at Sharm el-Shikh. The United Nations relented and withdrew the emergency force. At the same time, Nasser moved a substantial Egyptian force into the Sinai peninsula and Syria. Iraq and Jordan signed a treaty of mutual defense and began to mobilize their forces. Fearing imminent attack, Israel decided to strike first. Its war planes started surprised attack on Egyptian air fields and destroyed the bulk of the Egyptian air forces on the ground. Then in a lightning move across the Sinai Peninsula, the Israeli army broke the Egyptian blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba and once again put the Israeli soldiers on the banks of the Suez Canal. Hundreds of Egyptian tanks and artillery pieces were destroyed in Sinai. In the east Israel's forces ousted Jordanian troops from the old section

47 Ibid., 22.
48 Ibid., 23.
of Jerusalem and seized control of all Jordanian territory west of the Jordan river. In the North Israel captured-the Golan Heights. The 1967 war substantially altered the political balance in the Middle east. Israel's smashing victory stunned the Arabs and left Israel in a position of strength. In contrast to 1956, when Israeli forces were withdrawn in response to strong Washington pressure, Tel Aviv at once announced that Israel would remain in the occupied territories until decisive progress a permanent settlement had been made.

On November 22, 1967, the UN Security Council unanimously approved a resolution (Security Council Resolution 242) aimed at bringing peace to the Middle East. The document called for (1) withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied Arab areas; (2) an end to the state of belligerency between the Arab nations and the Israel; (3) acknowledgment of and respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every nation in the area; (4) the establishment of secure and recognized boundaries; (5) a national waterways in the area; and (6) a just settlement of the refugee problem. President Nasser died in September 1970. He was succeeded by Anwar Sadat. As Sadat's differences with the Soviet Union became

49 UN Resolution 242, p. 395.

more acute, he concluded that Egyptian and Soviet goals were incompatible. On July 18, 1972 Sadat ordered all 20 thousand Soviet military advisers out of Egypt. Sadat's action severely damaged the Soviet position in the Middle East. The Soviet Union responded by expanding ties to Syria, Iraq and Palestine liberation organization.

The October War of 1973

The fourth Arab-Israeli war broke out on October 6, 1973. Egypt and Syria launched an attack on Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the Jewish calendar. Egyptian and Syrian troops broke through Israel's forward fortifications and advanced into the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. Nearly 90,000 Egyptian troops crossed the Suez Canal over ran existing Israeli defenses. Despite the success of the initial Egyptian and Syrian strikes into Israeli occupied territory, Israeli forces recovered. They broke through the Egyptian lines and drove to the western bank of the Suez Canal on the other front, they advanced to within twenty miles of Syrian capital of the Damascus. At this time President Nixon carried out a massive air lift of war materials for Israel.\textsuperscript{51} To avoid the prolong war the U.S. and Soviet Union sponsored a joint resolution calling for an immediate cease fire and implementation of the 1967 Security

\textsuperscript{51}Ibid.
Council resolution 242 was presented to the Security Council on October 21. 52 Egypt and Israel was agreed and finally the crisis defused, when both Washington and Moscow agreed to a Security Council resolution, establishing an international peace-keeping force.

Camp David Agreement: A Treaty for Peace

Following the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 in order to achieve a comprehensive peace settlement, President Jimmy Carter devised a strategy for achieving a comprehensive peace settlement. 53 The Soviet Union responded favorably and the result was a joint statement on the Middle East, issued on October 1, 1977 calling for a conference to work out a full resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict incorporating all parties concerned and all questions. In fact, President Carter persuaded President Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Begin of Israel that led to an agreement. Finally, the Camp David agreement was signed on September 17, 1977 by Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat. 54

There were two agreements at Camp David, one dealing with Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula and peace arrangements between Israel and Egypt, the other a

52 The Middle East, 69-70.
53 Ibid., 71.
54 Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr., A Concise History of the Middle East (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979), 301-03.
framework for settling the future of the West Bank and Gaza.\textsuperscript{55} After the Camp David agreements on December 10, 1977, Sadat and Begin received the Nobel Peace Prize for the Camp David agreement.

However, most Arabs saw the Egyptian unilateral agreement with Israel as an act against Arab solidarity to achieve a comprehensive peace settlement. After the Camp David agreement Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, the PLO, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Tunisia, the UAE, North Yemen and South Yemen adopted a package of tough political and economic sanctions against Egypt. Egypt was also expelled from the Arab League and the OIC.\textsuperscript{56}

\textit{Crises in the Persian Gulf}

Since 1979, instead of Arab-Israeli conflict, Persian Gulf crises received the world attention. In that year the Iranian revolution, the U.S. Embassy hostages crisis in Tehran, a second round of oil price increases, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan converged to focus the world's attention on the Persian Gulf. During the 1980's the Iran-Iraq War underscored the Gulf's volatility as well as its strategic and economic importance. In September 1980,

\textsuperscript{55}Ibid.

by Iraq's invasion of Iran, the eight year war threatened the flow of oil throughout the Gulf and ultimately involved the United States and other countries outside the regions.\textsuperscript{57} In 1988 a tense peace was concluded between Iran and Iraq. But two years later in 1990 the region was again engulfed in war when Iraq invaded and occupied oil rich Kuwait in August 1990.\textsuperscript{58} This crisis remained at the forefront of international agenda for seven months. President Bush responded to the invasion by pulling together an international coalition authorized by the UN Security Council to oppose Iraq. Nearly 40 nations contributed combat forces transport, assistance, medical teams or financial aid to the joint effort to force Iraq from Kuwait.\textsuperscript{59} The Persian Gulf crisis was the first major test of the effectiveness of the UN Security Council to confront international aggression in the post-cold war era.

By early March 1991, a U.S. led multinational coalition force had driven the Iraqi army from Kuwait and occupied much of southern Iraq. Finally Kuwait was liberated on February 27, 1991.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{57}Ibid.


\textsuperscript{59}\textit{The Middle East,} 90.
Toward an Arab-Israeli Peace Agreement

The decline of the Soviet economy in the late 1980's and the eventual dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 virtually removed Moscow's influence from the Middle East. The Arab entities that had depended on Moscow, especially Syria and the P.L.O., were left without a patron. In 1990, the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait led to hopes among many Palestinians that Iraq would function as a rallying point for anti-western and anti-Israeli sentiment. But the overwhelming defeat of Iraq, forces in 1991 by an American led multinational forces that included Arab nations compounded the Palestinian isolation.61 The goal of establishing a Palestinian homeland did not appear to be achievable through confrontation. Moreover Israel's position had grown stronger because of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the defeat of Iraq.

Globally the American position also had improved because of continuing disintegration of the Soviet Union. Moscow was increasingly turning inward to address its domestic, political and economic crises. Since its withdrawal from Afghanistan, completed in 1989, it had shown much less interest in an assertive role abroad. By the end of 1991, the Soviet Union had completely dissolved. Its

60Ibid., 92.

61Ibid., 91.
main successor state was not in a position to project military or financial influence into the Middle East.

In July 1992 Israeli voters returned the labor party to power, led by Yitshak Rabin, the Labor Party sought negotiations with the Palestinian. All these events created a situation in the Middle East which dictated a move toward peace. The United States as the only super power sponsored the peace negotiation. After years of fruitless negotiation and intermittent warfare, diplomatic success in 1993 and 1994 transformed the Arab-Israeli conflict.62 On September 13, 1993 PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat shook hands with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin at a dramatic White House ceremony and their foreign ministers signed a historic document, the first ever between Israel and the PLO, recognizing each other and agreeing on the outlines of a plan to end their long conflict.63 The declaration of principles established a framework for Israeli transfer of the Gaza Strip and the city of Jericho to the control of a new Palestinian authority.

The agreement was followed in May 1994 by the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Gaza Strip and Jericho. The PLO-Israeli agreement was followed by successful negotiations between Jordan and Israel. On July

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62Ibid., 98.

63Ibid., 99.
24, 1994, King Hussein of Jordan and Prime Minister Rabin of Israel signed the Washington Declaration which formally ended the 46 year state of belligerence between their nations. On October 26, a Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty was signed on the border between the two nations with President Bill Clinton in attendance. Although Syrian-Israeli negotiations were not so fruitful, expectations were high among diplomats and the Syrian people that a peace agreement could be concluded immediately, returning the Israeli occupied Golan Heights to Syria. Since 1994, the government controlled Syrian Press toned down its criticism of Israel and the remaining several hundred Syrian Jews were granted exit visas.64 The Jordanian-Israeli agreement may, in the future, put pressure on Syrian President Hafez-al-Assad to compromise with Israel.

Conclusion

Throughout history, the Middle East has been a rich and diverse region of enormous culture and significance. It has spawned three of the world's great religions--Christianity, Islam and Judaism--and has provided many other contributions to civilizations. In the 20th century the discovery of the largest petroleum deposits in the world made the Middle East vital to the international economy. The region is also

64Ibid., 99-100.
strategically important because of its oil assets and its location at the crossroads of three continents.

Perhaps more than any other region, the Middle East has been afflicted with conflicts that seemed to defy solution. But the march towards peace, including the signing of the PLO-Israeli agreement and the Jordanian-Israeli agreement, brokered by the United States, and the negotiations between Syria and Israel, created a possibility of permanent solution to the Middle East problem. Constructing long-term settlements requires not only carefully drawn compromises backed by international guarantees, but also fundamental changes in the attitudes of people toward their enemies.
CHAPTER IV

EVOLUTION OF THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Introduction

Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, U.S. interest in the Middle East changed and developed with the changing nature of U.S. national interest. Joe Stork argues that "U.S. interests in the Middle East, as elsewhere, are determined on the basis of strategic considerations and access to resources and markets."¹

In the 19th century U.S. involvement in the Middle East was dominated by religious, philanthropic, and academic organizations. Presbyterians first arrived in Lebanon (then part of Syria) in the 1820's, subsequently founding the American University of Beirut.² In the late 19th century missionaries from the Reformed Church

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established a string of missions in the Persian Gulf from Iraq to Oman. Prior to World War II, official interest in the Middle East was limited to the defense of commercial interests, mainly oil.³

The geo-strategic importance of the region changed dramatically during World War II. The Middle East was increasingly viewed by U.S. and British military planners as a significant theater of operation, which would serve as a launching pad for the insertion of allied forces into southern Europe as well as a transit zone for movement of desperately needed military supplies to support the ground forces of the Soviet Union. The Middle East received further significance during the Cold War. The Cold War generated requirements for access to military facilities in the region, alliance formation on the part of the United States and transfers by Washington of military supplies to favored friends and allies. By the end of the 1950s the United States had a substantial military presence in the region. Meanwhile strong U.S. support for the creation of the state of Israel and its recognition by the United Nations (UN) in 1948 forged a relationship with this eastern Mediterranean nation that has been a pillar of U.S. policy. In fact, with the birth of the Cold War, the United States added two more

³Ibid.
objectives to its Middle East Policy apart from control of oil and support of Israel.

**Development of U.S. Policy in the Middle East**

The containment of Soviet influence in the Middle East during the Cold War era remarked the beginning of the U.S. involvement in the region. The containment of Soviet influence was known as the Truman Doctrine. In his famous speech of March 12, 1947, before a joint session of Congress that became known as the Truman Doctrine, the United States had formally announced its readiness to meet the challenge of Soviet expansionism. In subsequent years the policy makers in the United States increasingly pressured the U.S. military establishment to play a more prominent role in the security of the Middle East. In October 1950 President Truman provided the first presidential security guarantee to Saudi Arabia, stating that:

The United States is interested in the preservation of the independence of Saudi Arabia. However, because of United States commitments in other areas it is in the United States interest that the United Kingdom have primary responsibility for Israel and the Arab States. 4

The Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957 rose as an effort to fill the vacuum created by the British and the French later collapse after the 1956 Suez War. In his address before

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Congress on January 5, 1957, President Eisenhower called for not only providing military and economic assistance programs for the region but also authorizing the use of armed forces as the President deemed necessary "to protect the territorial integrity and political independence of any Middle Eastern State facing overt armed aggression from a country controlled by international communism." By the announcement of the doctrine the second U.S. objective was the security of the region. Eisenhower promoted the establishment of a security agreement among Britain, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey known as the Baghdad Pact of 1957. However, after Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact in 1958, the United States continued its commitment for the security of the region with the remaining Baghdad Pact nations and its successor organization known as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTCO).

President John F. Kennedy had been a strong critic of Eisenhower's policy regarding the Soviet influence and the security of the region, when he came into office in 1961. The Kennedy administration sought to enlarge the size of the U.S. armed forces by creating the U.S. Strike Command (STRICOM), to utilize the newly enlarged U.S.-based army forces for operation in the Third World. This new strike

\[5\text{Ibid., 116.}\]
\[6\text{Ibid., 117.}\]
command took the responsibilities for the Middle East, which in fact was created to meet the responsibilities undertaken in the Eisenhower years.\textsuperscript{7}

In fact, these military preparations were combined with some political implications for U.S.-Middle East policy. In December 1962, during his meeting with the Israeli foreign minister Golda Meir, President Kennedy announced the U.S. commitment to the security of Israel. He said: "It is quite clear that in case of invasion of Israel, the United States would come to the support of Israel. We have the capacity and it's growing."\textsuperscript{8} It seems that Kennedy's statement was supported by the growing U.S. conventional military capabilities for Middle East operations which gave him the power and confidence to make such a security commitment that neither Truman nor Eisenhower would have felt comfortable to give, even if it were in their policies.\textsuperscript{9} In addition, the Kennedy administration clearly recognized the growing Soviet influence in the region and became convinced that it was necessary to correct the growing arms imbalance against Israel. President Kennedy indicated that a "balance of power" would be a guiding principle of American Middle East policy, and the United States will increase the arms sales to Israel.\textsuperscript{10}

\textsuperscript{7}Spiegel, 123.
\textsuperscript{8}Ibid., 123.
\textsuperscript{9}Ibid., 106-07.
The Johnson administration policy toward the Middle East became more concerned with the growing power of President Nasser of Egypt with the Russians' support. In the belief that Nasser's influence in the region were a threat to the more friendly regimes of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, the Johnson administration decided to continue to maintain the balance of power in the region by providing more arms to Israel, with the belief that a strong as well as secure Israel might be in the best interest of the United States. However, the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 marked a significant turning point in U.S.-Israeli relations. The Johnson administration strongly supported Israel during the war and became directly involved. According to Tareq Y. Ismael, the United States directly participated in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. He said:

Using information obtained by invoking the Freedom of Information Act, Stephen Green (1984) was able to determine that the U.S. Air Force directly participated in the June 1967 war against the Arabs. The United States, with infrared cameras designed for night vision, helped Israel by providing reconnaissance flights at the outset of the spectacular pre-emptive attack that annihilated the Egyptian Air Force. Green speculated that President Lyndon Johnson ordered the U.S. Air Force to take part in the war to destroy as many MIGs as possible so that the Soviets would be busy supplying new MIGs and weapons to Egypt rather than to North Vietnam.


\[11\] Ibid., 198.

\[12\] Ismael and Ismael, 60-61.
Moreover, the United States did not join the Soviet and Arabs calling for withdrawal by Israel from the territories occupied during the war. It helped Israel to resist diplomatic and military pressure to pull back. Despite the U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which guided the overall Middle East peace settlement, the United States interpreted the principle of return of occupied territories in the same spirit as did the Israelis. It refused to condemn Israel as an aggressor in the U.N. debates following the War.\textsuperscript{13} However, the U.S. strategic interest in the region during Johnson's administration were in fact limited to the establishment of U.S. military capabilities as a full U.S. regional command for the Middle East.

In fact, the importance of the Persian Gulf as an area of strategic interest to the United States became more clear during the Nixon era. The British decision to withdraw from the region in 1970s and the Vietnam War were the origins of the United States policy in the region with regard to containment of Soviet influence. Actually, the historical context leading to the application of U.S. policy in the region, especially the application of the Nixon Doctrine and the role of a regional power to protect western interest were the prime considerations of the policy makers in the United States during the 1970s.

\textsuperscript{13}Groisser, 199.
The decision of the British government to withdraw from the Persian Gulf by 1971 was in fact influenced by three major factors. The first was the British government's desire to cut government expenditures, and the second was the growing anti-British movement in the Arab world headed by Nasserite Arab nationalism. The maintenance of a British military presence abroad was a serious charge on Britain's balance of payments. Second, that the maintenance of the British military presence east of Suez has been considered as a mistaken choice of priorities. Third, that in the Gulf the British government was once again backing the wrong side, the "feudal" society of Arab sheikhs rather than the new emergent forces of Arab nationalism.

In backing the feudal sheikhs, Britain was alienating their inevitable successors, and challenging yet again the influence of Nasserite nationalism. However, without the British presence, the critics said, the Gulf might become an area of persistent unrest in which local conflicts between rival Arab states and subversive movements as well as international tension between Arabs and Iranians could erupt and be exploited by the Soviet Union, imperiling western oil interests and supplies. Such risks certainly cannot be ignored. Historically, the Gulf has usually been an area of division and flux rather than of unity and stability, partly

because it marks the line of stress between rival Arab and Persian cultures and partly because it lacks any indigenous focus for its small and scattered Arab communities.

The long-standing cultural and political disputes in the area comprise a formidable list, ranging from general sense of territorial rivalry between Iran on one side and the Arabs on the other, and between the Arabs in themselves. Between Iraq and Iran there are conflicting claims to navigation rights in the Shatt al-Arab waterway in the south, and the Kurds in the north. On the other hand, further conflict arises between the position of Iraq as the leading Shiite Arab Muslim country in the Arab world and the position of Iran as the largest Shiite non-Arab Muslim country in the area.

Between Iran, Saudi Arabia and the smaller sheikdoms there have been several disputes over the so-called median line in the Gulf, which demarcates the areas of offshore oil exploration and exploitation. Iraq, Iran and Kuwait have a long history of border disputes left over by the British, although the British presence in the Gulf area contributed much to the stability of the region for a long period of time. The small sheikhdom of the Gulf has been kept under the British control regarding their tribal disputes. With British withdrawal the stability of the region has been

threatened by revolutionary movements such as the Baathist regime in Baghdad, which is hostile to all forms of traditional government—particularly sheiks, sultans and shahs, and all forms of western presence in the area. These movements have always been supported by the Soviet Union as anti-imperialist movements in the Middle East at large. Actually, the British military presence in the area had frozen many of the regions' tribal, ethnic, dynastic, and territorial disputes. As independent entities, the ability of the Gulf states to withstand any recurrence of these disputes and their ability to stand for any external threats was in some doubt.16

The British withdrawal from the Gulf affected the politico-strategic elements of U.S. interest in the region. These elements became more important and central to U.S. regional concerns, particularly the flow of the region's oil. The United States became more concerned with the stability of the new independent small Gulf states, and the problem of preserving the conservative status quo in the region after the British withdrawal. Meanwhile, U.S. interest in insuring the survival of those states had become stronger as a result of a number of factors. Apart from being the largest oil producers, they shared the same concern for growing Soviet influence and Soviet-sponsored anti-western movements in the region. Their policies with

16Ibid., 728.
respect to the flow and price of oil were more flexible than those of the radical regimes. The political environment in the producer nations, as well as their attitudes toward the U.S. and other industrially developed countries, clearly had an impact on how they approach oil production and price decisions. Revolutionary regimes in the region exhibited considerable hostility to western oil interests, especially when it comes to address the Arab-Israeli conflict.

There is a growing tendency among the monarchies to use a "carrot" approach by suggesting more favorable consideration and being more sympathetic to the oil supply to the west (an exception being the Saudi Arabian-led 1973 oil embargo) in return for more political support for the Palestinian cause.\textsuperscript{17} The link between Gulf security, western access to oil, and the Arab-Israeli conflict were other major politico-strategic developments for the United States during the 1970s. The role of the Gulf states in the Arab-Israeli conflict had been considered as a secondary one by the United States in terms of military capacity and attitude. However, the economic capability of the Gulf states, following the dramatic jump in oil revenues, was the key factor in this issue. Joseph Sisco, State Department official in 1975, recognized that the major Arab oil producing countries:

\textsuperscript{17}Department of State Bulletin 80, no. 2043 (October 1980), 41-42.
Have become the principle financial support for the Arab states more directly involved in the Middle East conflict . . . . their views [on the Arab-Israeli issue] are very important, and they are regularly consulted by the Arab parties to the [peace] negotiations as well as by the Palestinians.\textsuperscript{18}

The transition of the Gulf from a traditional geopolitical location as an extension to the Indian Ocean for the British to a position of significant strategic and economic importance to many industrial countries in the world became a primary objective to the United States policy during the 1970s. The United States became more interested in the stability of the region. The United States has had a long and profitable cooperation with the two major regional powers in the Gulf, Iran and Saudi Arabia, both of whom share mutual interest in the stability and progress in the region.

Joseph Sisco, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, in his statement made before the Subcommittee on the Near East of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, said:

We have also recognized that the tensions arising from regional conflicts can spread to neighboring states and disrupt their stability and orderly development. The Gulf area is not immune to the virus of the Arab-Israeli conflict, whose peaceful and just resolution remains an overriding goal of our Middle East policy.

Holding to these principles, we have over the last few years carefully examined our posture towards the strategic Gulf region—an area undergoing spectacular economic growth and social change, an area which has experienced a decade of historic political evolution, an area where American interests are of great significance.\textsuperscript{19}

Thus the security of Israel, a significant U.S. interest in the region, as well as ensuring the stability of and cooperation with the more moderate Gulf states, upon which western access to oil depended, were the prime objectives of the policy makers in the United States during that time. Moreover, the power vacuum caused by the British withdrawal created a considerable reaction among the Great Powers, mainly the United States and the Soviet Union. The U.S. Navy planned to take over part of the British naval base recently vacated at Jufair in Bahrain and the Russians were, at the same time, considering stretching their naval presence in the Indian Ocean.\textsuperscript{20} Actually, Soviet naval entry into the Indian Ocean soon after the announcement of the British withdrawal caused a great deal of concern in the west, and some analysts even predicted that the Pax-Sovietica would replace the Pax-Britannica in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. In April 1968, Lucius Battle, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East, told the U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee that:

\textsuperscript{19}Department of State Bulletin (September 1970), 241-42.

Further withdrawals are contemplated by the British in the years ahead, the temptation on the part of the Soviets to fill a vacuum or at least maneuver in troubled waters is very great. This represented a threat to western interest.21

In fact, the U.S. attitude to the British plans to withdraw from the region were indicated by Under Secretary of State Rostow's statement that measures were being taken to fill the vacuum created by the British withdrawal, in which local states like Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait might be considered to take the security responsibilities of the region.22 Since the 1968 announcement by the British government of its decision to withdraw from the Gulf by 1971, U.S. policy has centered on support for the two largest pro-western states on either side of the Gulf--Iran and Saudi Arabia--in order that they might play key strategic and regional security roles.23 This policy came to be known as the "twin-pillar" policy adopted by the Nixon administration after the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine in 1969. With the adoption of this policy, U.S. arms sales to Iran and Saudi Arabia dramatically increased as an effort to build up local powers which would be expected to assume

21Middle East Record 4 (1968): 73.

22Ibid.

increasing responsibility for collective security with the increasing amount of arms, but without direct participation of U.S. forces. However, in the 1970s, U.S. policy in the region was focused on its efforts to promote Iran as the prime regional factor defending security and western interests in the region. Actually, this policy owed its origins to several factors, the most important among them being the shape of U.S. global strategic posture in the wake of the Vietnam war. Within this context, the Nixon Doctrine of 1969 announced the following principles:

The United States will keep all its commitments. We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with the U.S., or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security and the security of the region as a whole. In cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as appropriate. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.

It seems that the Nixon administration had not yet considered the security issues in the Gulf as the prime direct of the U.S. geopolitical mood. The ability of a local state to assume the responsibility for the region's security on the West's behalf was the desire of the Nixon

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24Ibid., 535.


26Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 224-25.
administration during that time. That state was Iran. The U.S. views on the role of Iran as a regional leader were not new. The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations had all considered the role of Iran in the region, but not until the British decision to withdraw from the Gulf had the United States considered the power vacuum more seriously and turned to Iran as an alternative to the British security and stability role in that region. However, the Vietnam War was the major issue dominating United States policy during that time. For this reason, the U.S. policy toward the Gulf became more dependent on a regional state to fill the power vacuum. In this regard, the Nixon Doctrine urged nations in that region to increase their ability to defend themselves. It was said that the United States would continue to ship arms but should not be expected to send its troops to defend other countries.27

Apart from this, Iran and Saudi Arabia became the twin-pillars of a U.S. policy announced in 1972 by Assistant Secretary of State Joseph J. Sisco, of placing reliance on two states to provide for local and regional security and stability.28 The Shah's desire to take the role was announced by him immediately after the British

27Acharya, 22.

announcement to withdraw from the region. To support his desire, the Shah planned to modernize Iran's military forces, which he believed necessary to fill the power vacuum created by British withdrawal, to respond to the potential threat posed by increased Soviet activities in the Persian Gulf, and to build up moderate pro-western regimes in the Middle East to offset "radical" Arab regimes.

All of these points were reported to have been sympathetically received by the U.S. administration. Accordingly, the Shah was specifically seeking assurances from the United States that Iran could buy more modern arms to give Iran "a balanced and significant defense force of her own." Such a force, according to Iran, would be able to cooperate with friendly powers in the area such as Saudi Arabia or Kuwait to maintain stability in the strategic Persian Gulf.29 The United States was more sympathetic with the Shah's desire. According to Joseph Sisco, Iran had "both the will and the capability" to be a key player in providing for stability in the Gulf and the continued flow of oil to consumer countries.30 As Henry Kissinger put it, although Iran's desire to play the role was not only consistent with U.S. strategic objectives, but also achievable without any cost to the U.S., since the Shah was willing to pay for the

29Middle East Record 4 (1968): 83.
30Department of State Bulletin (4 September 1972), 244.
American equipment out of his oil revenues.\textsuperscript{31} In fact, Iran fit the American foreign policy concept as enunciated by the Nixon administration, namely, a policy of building and strengthening selected power centers in the region. Under this concept, the United States would provide a backup support for selected countries in the form of sea-based naval and air power without being directly involved, and expected the local and regional powers to provide immediate security for themselves. For this reason, the United States engaged in a large scale transfer of arms to Iran and, to a lesser extent, Saudi Arabia.\textsuperscript{32} Also, the United States increased its diplomatic efforts in the region in the shape of friendship and further cooperation. Joseph Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State, in his statement before the Subcommittee on the Near East of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in 1972, said:

\begin{quote}
We believe that the resultant closer governmental contacts will contribute substantially to furthering our interests in commercial and technological exchange with these new states and in encouraging the trend toward cooperation among them.\textsuperscript{33}
\end{quote}

Accordingly, the United States extended its diplomatic presence into the region in the forms of small missions. Further top administration figure visits included President

\textsuperscript{31}Kissinger, 1264.

\textsuperscript{32}Contrell and Hanks, 540.

\textsuperscript{33}Department of State Bulletin (4 September 1972), 243.
Nixon coming to Iran, the Vice President coming to Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's visit to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait and Yemen. However, in its efforts to increase the security of the region by relying more on Iran and Saudi Arabia as the pillars to U.S. policy, the Nixon administration provided increasing amounts of arms to Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iran became the largest buyer of American made arms during the 1970s. The Shah perceived Iran's military capability as central to its new regional security role. Therefore, between 1970 and 1977, the Iran defense budget rose by 1,100 percent, from nearly $880 million in 1970 to $9.4 billion in 1977.

Following the 1974 oil price increase, the percentage of the military expenditures increased by approximately 141 percent from the previous years since 1970. With this huge military build-up, Iran became the dominant military power in the Persian Gulf area. A U.S. Senate committee report in 1976 noticed that, upon delivery between 1976 and 1981 of equipment ordered to date, Iran on paper can be regarded as a regional superpower. Actually, for the United States, the Shah's role in serving U.S. interest in the region--access

34Ibid., 243.


36Ibid., iii.
order in the region, and the role of U.S. arms transfers in its overall strategic framework, all received considerable praise in U.S. overall Gulf policy.37 According to Amitav Acharya, the Shah dominated the U.S. strategic framework for the region until the revolution in 1979 toppled his regime. While he ruled, American policy makers were generally appreciative of his regional security posture. The policy of reliance on him, combined with the Nixon Doctrine, was considered to be a major U.S. foreign policy success in the post-Vietnam era. The Shah was seen to be domestically strong and his foreign policy was deemed to be both responsible and fully compatible with U.S. interests in the region. His quest for military power was viewed to be worthy of American support.38

The second partner of this twin-pillar policy was Saudi Arabia. With the adoption of the twin-pillar policy by the Nixon administration, Saudi Arabia became the second largest state in the Gulf region which would be expected to assume increasing responsibility for collective security with increasing U.S. arms, but without direct participation of U.S. forces.39 In the early 1970s, at the time of the British withdrawal from the Gulf, Saudi Arabia began to

37Acharya, 23.
38Ibid.
modernize its armed forces. This led to increased military sales and military involvement in the country, and this trend is expected to continue for the foreseeable future. The military modernization program and U.S. involvement in this program matched those in Iran in cost value; however, the major differences were in Saudi Arabia the U.S. concern was the need to build the basic infrastructure for advanced weapon system and rapid military deployment. Accordingly, U.S. military sales to Saudi Arabia were worth over $30 billion between 1971 and 1980. More than 60 percent of the military spending represents the value of construction projects, and the other 40 percent was divided between training and hardware. Much of their construction projects were managed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which at the end of the 1970s held military and other related facilities projects worth more than $20 billion.

Actually, being the pillars of U.S. policy did not prevent Saudi Arabia and Iran from imposing their political

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and economic conditions on the western access of oil. While Saudi Arabia was more flexible on prices, it was the driving force behind the political restriction on the flow of oil to the west in relation to the support to Israel.\(^{43}\) Iran, on the other hand, did not join the Arab oil embargo against the West and Israel in 1973, but it did use its leading role in OPEC to increase the price of oil, not for political reasons, but for its own economic needs.\(^{44}\) However, despite its continuing supports to Israel, the Nixon administration did manage to strengthen the position of the United States in the Arab world. The Arab states reestablished diplomatic relations broken off during the War of 1973. The Arabs also terminated their oil boycott of the United States. President Nixon visited Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Israel, met with regional leaders, and pledged closer cooperation with the Arab states, in order to preserve peace and stability in the region by relying more on regional powers which was the main objective of the Nixon Doctrine, rather than direct U.S. military intervention. Accordingly, President Nixon stepped up military aid to the region, especially to Iran to be the guardian of the Persian Gulf and protector of the virtual oil supply routed to the West.\(^{45}\)

\(^{43}\)Acharya, 24.

\(^{44}\)Kissinger, 1262.

\(^{45}\)Groisser, 200.
When Nixon resigned as president in 1974, Gerald Ford became U.S. president. As Israel became more dependent on U.S. economic and military support, the Ford administration increased pressure on Israel to change its position regarding the Arab's occupied territories in order to get the Arabs to the peace table. He declared reassessment of the entire U.S. Middle East policy and temporarily restricted the flow of economic and military assistance to Israel, and forced Congress to drop this proposal.46

It is quite clear that the Nixon Doctrine and its twin pillar policy, which was also endorsed by the Ford and Carter administrations, was in fact challenged by its own pillars. Saudi Arabia, for example, was the driving force behind the 1973 Arab oil embargo against the west. The linkage between the Gulf oil and the Arab-Israeli conflict changed the whole scenario of U.S. policy in the Middle East. Despite the lack of their military power, the Arab Gulf states have become the principal financial support for the Arab states more directly involved in the Middle East conflict. Their views on the Arab-Israeli issue, said State Department official Joseph Sisco in 1975, are very important and they are regularly consulted by the Arab parties to the peace negotiations as well as by the Palestinians.47

46Ibid., 202-03.

47U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Special Subcommittee on Investigations, The Persian Gulf, 1975: The Continuing Debate on Arms Sales:
However, Henry Kissinger disregarded the linkage between oil and the way the United States conducted its policy in the Middle East. He said:

It is commonly believed that tensions in the Middle East do not particularly help the world oil situation. The United States has taken the position that it would conduct its negotiations in the Middle East independent of any oil pressures. And American policy will not let itself be affected by oil pressures.\(^\text{48}\)

In fact, it had been fully recognized by many U.S. officials during the 1970s, that if the United States was to secure a settlement ensuring Israel's right to exist, which they believed a significant U.S. interest in the region, then it had to seek the cooperation of the pro-western segment of the Arab states.

The connection between the Persian Gulf security and a just and lasting resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict came to recognize both in the Gulf region and in the United States. The Saudi action in 1973 was a stab in the back for the twin pillar policy and its basic goals, the free flow of the region's oil. Saudi Arabia, under King Faisal's leadership in 1973, fully recognized that among outside powers, the United States, because of its continued commitment to the security of Israel and its friendly relations with the more moderate Gulf states, had a unique

ability to play an affective role in the search for a comprehensive Middle East pace.

The gradually increasing linkage became quite clear during the Carter administration. In his remarks to community leaders on March 20, 1980, President Jimmy Carter stated that his Camp David peace initiative between Egypt and Israel in 1978 was tied to the Persian Gulf stability. He said:

This is intimately tied in with the Persian Gulf stability, with the threat to the region in Southwest Asia by the invasion of the Soviet Union [Afghanistan], and with energy supplies for our country and also with an overdependence of our nation on imports of oil from the region countries. There is no way to separate these issues.49

Although his goals for the Middle East were basically the same as his predecessors, President Carter took an even more active role as a peace conciliator and mediator in search for an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. While committed to Israel's security and survival, he also gave Arab leaders assurance of his awareness of their needs and concerns. In 1978 President Carter received a great credit for helping to get President Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Begin of Israel to sign a peace agreement at Camp David, with the

U.S. as a full partner, which was considered as an outstanding diplomatic triumph.\textsuperscript{50} However, 1979 began with the fall of the Shah of Iran and ended with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. These events were pre-conditions for a major shift in U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf region. It appears clear that the twin pillar policy associated with the Nixon Doctrine and the reliance on local power, mainly Iran and Saudi Arabia, did not prevent direct and unilateral use of U.S. power to maintain stability in the region in order to protect its vital interests.

The 1979 events forced a transition in America's role. The U.S. lost Iran as one of its greatest allies in the Middle East. The revolution of 1979 replaced the most pro-western ally in the region by a rabidly anti-American Khomeini regime. This had a great influence on the world oil market. The Iranian shortfall of oil production doubled oil prices from $12.81 per barrel in 1978 to $23.50 in October 1979.\textsuperscript{51} The American hostage crisis and the growing concern among smaller Gulf states for their security and their loss of confidence of the American responses all had a great deal of influence on the adoption of the Carter Doctrine.

\textsuperscript{50}Philip, 203.

\textsuperscript{51}Bernard Reich, "The United States and Iran: An Overview," in U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Economic Consequences of the Revolution in Iran, 1979, 10-14.
According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Carter Doctrine recognized that the security of the United States had become interdependent with the security of three central and inter-related strategic zones consisting of Western Europe, the Far East, and the Middle East-Persian Gulf area. Among them, the Persian Gulf appeared to become a significant strategic zone in U.S. Security Planning.\(^5\)

The second threat to U.S. interests in the region came after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This Soviet threat brought with it another challenge to U.S. policy and interest in the region. Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affair under the Carter administration, described U.S. interest in the Gulf as long-standing, major and interrelated. He outlined the factors effecting U.S. interest in the region, which he believed that since the British withdrawal, had changed little in nature but have grown in importance:

- The area's strategic location and its significance to maintaining a global strategic balance,
- The significance we place on the sovereignty and independence of these countries as part of a more stable world,
- The world's vital need for the region's oil, and
- The importance of these states in international finance and development and as markets for our goods and technology.

As he referred to the growing importance of the region to U.S. and its allies' interests, Saunders also said:

We then spoke of the vital flow of Gulf oil to our NATO allies and our friends east of Suez. Now we ourselves have become excessively dependent upon Gulf oil.53

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan represented a serious threat to the security of the Persian Gulf region and indeed, to the vital interest, mainly oil, of the United States and its allies. In his address before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City on March 6, 1980, Defense Secretary Harold Brown said:

Oil is the lifeblood of modern industrial societies. Sixty percent of the world's imported petroleum comes from this region: about 13% of the oil consumed in the United States and much higher percentages for our allies—45% for Germany and 75% for France and Japan. The loss of this oil to the economies of the West and the industrialized Far East would be a blow of catastrophic proportions.54

Secretary Brown also defined U.S. interests related to the Gulf region as:

- To insure access to adequate oil supplies,
- To resist Soviet expansion,
- To promote stability in the region, and
- To advance the Middle East peace process, while insuring—and indeed, in order to help insure—the continued security of the state of Israel.55


54Department of State Bulletin, vol. 80, no. 2038 (October 1980), 1.

55Ibid., 63.
As the 1970s closed with these two events—the loss of Iran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the 1980s opened with how to respond to these challenges. In fact, the Carter administration's response to these two crises had two aspects. The first, related to crisis management, presented short-term measures to deal with the present situation. These included economic sanction, diplomatic efforts through the United Nations aimed at punishing Iran for holding American hostages and the Soviets for invading Afghanistan, increased U.S. naval deployment to demonstrate American resolve to friends and enemies alike, and diplomatic missions to the Gulf region to reassure the pro-Western regional clients of continued U.S. commitment to their security and stability. The second aspect was the adoption of a long-term military strategy to replace the defunct twin pillar doctrine as a basic framework for U.S. policy in the region. This involved increasing demand for building a U.S. force protection capability to deal with contingencies in the region. Therefore, the Carter administration decided to rely more heavily on the U.S.'s own capability to protect western interest in the region.56

In his State of the Union address on January 23, 1980, President Jimmy Carter stated that:

These two acts—one of international terrorism and one of military aggression--present a serious

56Acharya, 49-50.
challenge to the United States of America and indeed to all the nations of the world.

I am determined that the United States will remain the strongest of all nations, but our power will never be used to initiate a threat to the security of any nation or to the right of any human being. We seek to remain secure—a nation at peace in a stable world. But to be secure we must face the world as it is. Three basic developments have helped to shape our challenges:

- The steady growth and increased projection of Soviet military power beyond its borders;
- The overwhelming dependence of the Western democracies on oil supplies from the Middle East; and
- The press of social and religious and economic and political change in the many nations of the developing world—exemplified by the revolution in Iran.57

In the aftermath of the Iranian revolution, the Carter administration took immediate steps to shape up its weakened position in the Gulf region. At this point, the U.S. was dropping its non-interventional stance of the past decade and was prepared to use its own military forces to protect its interest in the Persian Gulf.58 Defense Secretary Brown stated that: "In the protection of those interests including the protection of the oil flow from the Middle East, we will take any action that is appropriate including the use of military force."59

57 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 80, no. 2035 (February 1980), A.


In fact, the fall of the Shah of Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were the motives behind the adoption of the Carter Doctrine. The Doctrine was a definitive statement of U.S. policy to meet the strategic threat posed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. President Carter, in his State of the Union address in January 1980, declared:

Let our position be absolutely clear, any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region would be regarded as an assault on vital interests of the United States and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.60

The Carter Doctrine signaled to the Soviet Union the willingness of the United States to use force in the Gulf to protect its vital interests. It sought to create the real expectation of U.S. military action if the Soviet Union attempted to siege the Gulf oil fields or cut off the west's vital oil lifeline from the region. Washington underscored the firmness of commitment by ordering an overflight of the Gulf by B-52 strategic bombers in January 1980 following the Soviet troops movement near Iran.61 The Carter Doctrine, in fact, reflected the beginning of the direct U.S. involvement in the region. With the fall of the Shah, whose removal

60Department of State Bulletin (February 1980), B.

undermined any continued application of the Nixon Doctrine regarding the Persian Gulf, the Iranian pillar had fallen, and the Saudi pillar was too weak to protect western interest.\textsuperscript{62}

On the other hand, the Carter Doctrine was too backed up with the newest military option, the Rapid Deployment Forces (RDF). The RDF had been in the planning stages for several years and was intended to enhance the U.S. military presence in the Middle East. Initially, it was to consist of three Marine brigades of 5,500 each to be ready by 1985.\textsuperscript{63} However, the RDF concept was subjected to criticism both by outside experts and in the Congress. Senator Edward Kennedy, who saw the unilateral and unlimited U.S. commitment embodied the Doctrine as "hazardous and ineffective."\textsuperscript{64} Criticism of the Doctrine was not in fact related to the needs for strengthened U.S. military force to meet any future challenges to U.S. interest in the Gulf. It was, however, to the ability of the Carter administration to back the Doctrine with the level of force it needed. Senator Robert Dole accused the Carter Doctrine of being "nothing but a propaganda that the Soviet will pay little


\textsuperscript{63}McDonald, 100.

\textsuperscript{64}Congressional Record, 30 January 1980: S651-S653.
attention to.\textsuperscript{65} However, an overall evaluation of the Doctrine ended with congressional approval supporting the commitment to use U.S. military force to ensure western access to Persian Gulf oil.\textsuperscript{66} Actually, security and stability of the region, containment of Soviet influence, and ensuring the free flow of the region's oil were the primary objectives of U.S. policy in the region during the Carter administration with its support of the idea of a more active and direct role of U.S. military force.

The Reagan Doctrine, unlike previous doctrines, had less direct consideration to the Middle East in terms of urgency. According to Sanford Lakoff, the Truman Doctrine was tailored to apply to Turkey and Iran as well as Greece. The Eisenhower Doctrine led to the first dispatch of U.S. marines to Lebanon. The Nixon Doctrine led the United States to rely on Iran to be the policeman of the Persian Gulf and, to a lesser extent, on Israel as a stabilizing force in the area to the west of the Gulf. The Carter Doctrine, in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and to the overthrow of the Shah in Iran, announced a resolve to protect vital interests in the Gulf by any means necessary, including military force. Although the Reagan Doctrine, while once more sweeping and less specific than any of its

\textsuperscript{65}Congressional Record, 1 February 1980: S808-S809.

\textsuperscript{66}New York Times, 2 December 1979, A16.
predecessors, it too carried implications for the Middle East.\textsuperscript{67}

The Reagan administration policy toward the Middle East was in fact less motivated by the idea of the importance of the region to the United States' interests. It has been viewed generally by the conventional Cold War strategy and the general commitment to resist the spread of Soviet influence to the region by a variety of ways. However, the main theme of the doctrine regarded the Middle East has been reflected in a set of active policies for the region, in particular:

1. A commitment to Israel's security and to cooperation with Israel for the sake of common interests in regional stability.

2. Support for and cooperation with pro-western or moderate Arab states, chiefly Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, for the sake of maintaining ties to the Arab world and of preventing the internal subversion or external overthrow of these regimes, and in the expectation that these states will play some role in protecting western access to oil and cooperate with the United States in the event of an emergency requiring direct U.S. intervention.

3. Readiness to mediate in the Arab-Israeli conflict, in the belief that amelioration of the Palestinian issue would greatly improve Arab attitudes toward the United States.

4. Readiness to interject U.S. forces in order to safeguard western access to Middle East oil.

5. Readiness to use diplomatic pressure and force (where it is not counter productive) against terrorism on the understanding that terrorism

is a form of low-intensity warfare directed against western interests by hostile states with indirect assistance from the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{68}

The Reagan administration policies in the Middle East were driven by the standard attitude of the containment policy and the idea of resisting the Soviet influence and threats to the vital interest of the west in the region. Its commitment to the security of Israel and cooperation with Israel for the sake of common interests has been affirmed by the Reagan administration by verbal commitment and, even more importantly, by tangible actions. President Reagan declared that after the fall of the Shah, Israel remained the one regional ally on which the United States could still count.\textsuperscript{69} The Reagan policy supported and implemented the Carter administration's effort to equip a U.S. force for possible use in the defense of the west's vital interests in the Persian Gulf oil resources. The Reagan administration recognized that the western allies and Japan depend heavily on oil imported from the Gulf and decided to support the continuing effort to build the RDF to protect the west's interest in the region. As a result, the Reagan administration announced in June 1987 that the United States would re-flag Kuwaiti oil tankers operating in the Gulf and provide them with naval and air defense,

\textsuperscript{68}Ibid., 129.

\textsuperscript{69}Ibid., 130.
which has been considered as an attempt to use U.S. force to protect its interest in the region.\textsuperscript{70}

Another attempt by the Reagan administration to use U.S. military force in the Middle East was the determination to resist terrorism. The destruction of the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1982, the hijacking of the cruise ship Achille Lauro in 1985 which had been forced by aircraft from the American Sixth Fleet to land in Italy, and the major use of force to combat "state terrorism" come in April 1986, with the raid on Libya. All indicated the administration attempt to use U.S. military force to protect U.S. interest abroad.\textsuperscript{71}

Regarding the 1980-88 Iraq-Iran War, the United States found itself facing another threat to its interest in the region after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the loss of the Shah in Iran. This threat came from the fear of another oil shock and the possible threat to the conservative regimes in the region by the spillover of the conflict. Yet, while the situation was very serious, the United States had little chance to influence the course of events.\textsuperscript{72} At the time, the United States had no diplomatic relations with either side. Cooperation with Iran was

\textsuperscript{70}Ibid., 135.

\textsuperscript{71}John Dumbrell, American Foreign Policy: Carter to Clinton (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997), 84.

\textsuperscript{72}Washington Post, 25 September 1980, A36-37.
impossible in regard to the hostage crisis, and the case of Iraq was also hostile. On the other hand, an attempt by the U.S. to take sides with either Iraq or Iran was restricted by a fear that any help it might extent to either side could push the other towards Moscow. Also, the United States feared that a clear victory for either side would jeopardize its interest in the region. 73

The nature of U.S. policy toward the Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war was influenced by these considerations. It had four basic objectives.

1. to ensure the continued free flow of oil.
2. to seek a balance of power between both sides so that neither achieved victory,
3. to keep the Soviets out of the conflict or to gain a dominant position in either side, and
4. to ensure the security and survival of the conservative regimes in the region. 74

However, the concept of neutrality in the conflict was not fully followed by the Reagan administration. In fact, the U.S. policy makers were determined to protect the United States' interest and friendly regimes from the continuation of hostilities in the Gulf. The Reagan administration increased its commitment to Saudi Arabia security and strengthen U.S.-Saudi military cooperation. The sale of the AWACS package to Saudi Arabia, which also


74Acharya, 127.
linked to the long-term strategy in the region, became a symbol of growing U.S. concern over the future consequences of the war in the Gulf.\textsuperscript{75}

The second shift in the Reagan administration's neutrality policy toward the war was the beginning of a U.S. tilt towards Iraq, in an effort from the administration to keep the balance of power intact, after the Iranian advance during the third year of the war. This policy was adopted by the Reagan administration in order to achieve the no-winner equation of the war.

During 1984 the Reagan administration's political support for Iraq became more clear by the removal of Iraq from the list of unfriendly states, and blaming Iran for continuation of the war.\textsuperscript{76} In addition, the political-diplomatic support for Iraq was backed by economic means. A U.S. commodity credits was made available to Iraq for the purchase of U.S. agricultural products, and the U.S. Banks encouraged by the Reagan administration to extend credit guarantees to an Iraqi pipeline construction project.\textsuperscript{77} Although a full diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Iraq has been established in November 1984, and the Reagan administration's support for Iraq was apparently extended

\textsuperscript{75}Ibid., 130.

\textsuperscript{76}Middle East International, 29 June 1984.

\textsuperscript{77}U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Development in the Persian Gulf, June 1984, 51.
into the strategic arena. According to Amitav Acharya, this included intelligence information, in the form of photos taken by U.S. satellites and reconnaissance aircraft, on Iranian positions and installations which were, or would be, targets of Iraqi bombing missions. Later the CIA established a direct secret link between Baghdad and Washington to improve the communication channels transmitting U.S. intelligence, William Casey, reportedly encouraged Iraq to carry out more raids on Iranian installations.

Apart from the Cold War politics, the Reagan Doctrine offered American sponsorship to all enemies of communism in the developing world. According to John Dumbrell, in regard to the Middle East, the Reagan administration officials oriented their understanding to the problems of the Middle East within a framework provided by containment theory and geopolitical security considerations. Strategic consensus for the region was the declared goal. Richard Burt of the State Department told the House Foreign Affairs Committee in March 1981 that the new administration:

. . . viewed the Middle East, including the Persian Gulf, as part of a larger politico-strategic theater, the region bounded by Turkey, Pakistan and the Horn of Africa and we view it as a strategic entity requiring comprehensive

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78 Acharya, 133.
79 Ibid., 133.
80 Dumbrell, 80.
treatment to insure a favorable balance of power. 81

The Reagan Doctrine's main objective regarding the Middle East was in fact the continuation of the standard U.S. policy toward the region. It added new dimension to the ways U.S. policies have been carried out, with its overriding concern with the Soviet challenge, its readiness to use force in defense of western interests, and its willingness to support states and movements whose aims are compatible with those of the United States. 82 Although the Reagan Doctrine reflects a recognition that U.S. interests in the region are multiple. The Middle East energy sources are vital to the security of the West, the region's trouble spots are potential flashpoints for conflict with the Soviet Union, the importance of the region as a marketplace for U.S. manufactured goods and arms sales the commitment of the U.S. to the security of Israel, all are multiple factors combined with the general attitudes of U.S. policy in the region. The Reagan Doctrine is no different. However, the ways of how it was carried out are what discriminated the doctrine from the previous ones. The use of U.S. military force against state-sponsored terrorism, as in Libya, the use of force against unfriendly regimes in Central America, and re-flagging the Kuwaiti oil tankers

81 Ibid., 81.
82 Spiegel, Heller and Goldberg, 139-40.
during the Iraq-Iran War are clear evidence of the direct U.S. intervention against any threats to its interest in the Middle East. After the announcement of the Reagan Doctrine, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) was established in Tampa, Florida on January 1, 1983. Its responsibility encompassed all of the Gulf nation including Afghanistan, Iran, Jordan, Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, and two non-Arab States in Africa, Ethiopia and Kenya.  

The Bush administration policy towards the Middle East was more aggressive and decisive. The invasion and occupation of oil rich Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990 set in motion a crisis that would remain at the forefront of international agenda for seven months. President Bush responded to the invasion by pulling together an international coalition authorized by the United Nations Security Council to oppose Iraq. In his August 8, 1990 speech announcing the first deployment of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia, President Bush declared:

Four simple principles guided our policy. First, we seek the immediate, unconditional, and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Second, Kuwait's legitimate government must be restored to replace the puppet regime. And third, my administration, as has been the case with every president from President [Franklin D.] Roosevelt to President [Ronald] Reagan, is committed to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf. And

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83Ismael and Ismael, 62.
fourth, I am determined to protect the lives of American citizens abroad.\textsuperscript{84}

The Bush administration directed a major diplomatic initiative aimed at Security Council adoption of a resolution to authorize the use of force against Iraq if it did not withdraw from Kuwait. The campaign culminated in the adoption of the Security Council's resolution 678 on November 29, which set January 15 as the deadline for Iraq to pull out of Kuwait. After that, the resolution authorized the member states to use all necessary means to enforce previous U.N. resolutions demanding the withdrawal. Once the U.N. deadline passed, Bush acted swiftly. On January 16, he ordered coalition forces to begin a sustainable bombing campaign against Iraq. On February 24, after thirty-eight straight days of bombing, the allies launched a ground offensive into Kuwait and Iraq, which totally defeated Iraqi defenders. On February 27, President Bush announced a cease-fire and declared Kuwait liberated.\textsuperscript{85}

With the election of Bill Clinton to the presidency, the Clinton administration remained committed to expanding the Arab-Israeli peace. Although the president's foreign policy in several parts of the globe were being sharply


criticized by the Republicans, the Middle East was perceived as an area of success for Clinton.

Secretary of State Christopher sought to build on this success by conducting shuttle diplomacy between Syria and Israel. Clinton lent the prestige of his office to this enterprise by meeting with President Asad on January 16, 1994 in Geneva. President Clinton facilitated the peace treaty on September 13, 1993, at a sun-drenched ceremony on the White House lawn, where Yitzhac Rabin and Yasir Arafat shook hands and their foreign ministers signed a historic document, the first ever between Israel and the P.L.O., recognizing each other and agreeing on the outlines of a plan to end their long conflict.\textsuperscript{86} So, from the rapidly changing scenario of the Middle East it is discerned that, during the Clinton administration, the United States saw all four of its traditional goals in the Middle East advanced:

1. The security of Israel was improved by the weakening of Iraq, during the Gulf War and the conclusion of peace agreements between Israel and the P.L.O. and Jordan,

2. The same agreements brought by tangible hope that a second objective might be achieved--a permanent Arab-Israeli peace,

3. Although the United States remained dependent on Persian Gulf oil for a growing share of its energy needs,

\textsuperscript{86}Ibid., 98.
the victory over Iraq preserved U.S. access to that oil. The success also strengthened U.S. strategic relationships with Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf oil producing states.

4. The collapse of the Soviet Union had eliminated Moscow from the Middle East picture ending fears that conflict in the Middle East could touch off a super power confrontation. 87

The significant importance to the west of the Middle East in general and the Persian Gulf in particular, goes beyond the political and strategic location of the area to the world political stability. The Middle East as the world's largest energy source and rich market for investment became significantly important for the economic well-being of the western industrial nations. Economic interests, on the other hand, are the most important factors which affected U.S. policy toward the region.

Oil

The western industrial nations and Japan became more dependent on Persian Gulf oil after World War II. As mentioned earlier, historically the U.S. oil companies introduced the first major element of U.S. interest in the region. In the late 1930s, the Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) introduced the first element of the commercial interests of the U.S. in Saudi Arabia. In its first years in

87 Ibid., 100.
the country, ARAMCO had found itself in the grocery business, the refuse collection business, hardware and other businesses; it provided health services, education, sanitation, banking, housing, telephone, road construction, trucking and many others. By the mid-1960s, ARAMCO was buying $16.9 million worth of construction and services a year from Saudi Arabia firms. It also set up a home ownership program under which Saudi Arabia employees have bought more than 6,500 homes. 88 ARAMCO, which later became a mostly state-owned company, handles all but about 2 percent of total Saudi production. The four U.S. "parents"—Exxon, Standard Oil of California, Texaco, and Mobile—still own 40 percent of ARAMCO's producing assets. 89 The Saudi efforts to take over ARAMCO's assets was by far the widest Saudi-U.S. economic issue. In June 1978, it was reported that the U.S. partners had already been paid nearly $3 billion—about half the value of their oil producing and refining assets—exclusive of their huge gas-gathering, power-generation, and other industrial projects in the kingdom. 90

The importance of the Middle East oil to the U.S. became one of the main considerations of the policy makers in the United States through the years since its discovery.


89Cooley, 499.

90Ibid.
Aside from such broad considerations, which derive from U.S. interest in having healthy trading partners to buy American made goods, the U.S. has a specific interest in oil sales to Europeans and Japanese markets. Of oil produced by U.S. firms outside the United States, over two-thirds come from the Middle East and North Africa—mostly Libya and Algeria. In addition, worldwide United States income from direct petroleum investments abroad, during the 1960s, was $1.8 billion in 1966, in which over $1.1 billion, more than half, come from the Middle East and Libya. Indirectly, American investments in the Middle East stimulate purchases by the nations of the area of American capital goods, petrochemicals and other products, service, and management fees. Many American wage earners working for United States firms in the Middle East and North Africa, also remit substantial portions of their pay to the United States. In fact, imported oil had become a critical factor in the economic security of the west. Between 1950 and 1973, oil imports as an energy need of the U.S., Europe and Japan increased from 30 percent to about 53 percent by 1973. According to Walter J. Levy, oil consumption in the non-communist world

91Lenczowski, 41.
92Ibid.
increased from 10 million barrels daily in 1950 to 39 million in 1970, and projected 67 million for 1980. U.S. oil consumption increased from 7 million barrels daily in 1950 to 15 million in 1970, and projected 21 million for 1980.94 Accordingly, because of growing U.S. dependence on Middle East oil, the United States became more aware of the rising price of the region's oil. During the 1970s, as a result of two major political events, namely the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the Arab oil embargo associated with it, and the 1979 Iranian revolution, the price of oil dramatically increased causing a significant impact on the world financial market.

According to John K. Cooley, because of growing U.S. dependence on Middle East oil and the rising price of the oil, the U.S. trade deficit in 1977 reached a record $26.7 billion, of which $7.5 billion is attributed by the Department of Commerce to the imbalance of U.S. trade with the Near East and North Africa. Figures are likely to be higher for 1978 and 1979.95 Cooley also referred to the importance of the area to the U.S. economy during the 1970s. He said:

. . . the area probably never has been of such vital importance to the United States as in 1979. Events like the upheaval in Iran, the resulting


95Cooley, 491.
world shortfall of Iranian oil, and the new uncertainties this has brought to the Arab states of the Persian Gulf oil reservoir, which supplies better than 60 percent of the west's energy needs, have an inescapable economic impact here.\textsuperscript{96}

It has been fully recognized by the policy makers in the United States that the region's oil is so vital to the U.S. economy. In the words of Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State in 1972, "The American interest in the Gulf tends to be characterized in terms of oil." According to Sisco, American companies are heavily invested in the development of the oil resources of the region, and the returns in their investment have made substantial balance of payments.\textsuperscript{97}

Actually, the main concern in the Persian Gulf region is oil. The dependence of the industrial nations, including the U.S. on oil imported from the region has been well documented. The region holds approximately 55 percent of the world's reserves and in recent years has provided as much as 28 percent of the U.S., 61 percent of European and 70 percent of Japanese imports.\textsuperscript{98} Therefore, any threat to win oil supply or to dictate its price, particularly at a time of tight balance between supply and demand could threaten the economies of the western nations.

\textsuperscript{96}Ibid., 489.

\textsuperscript{97}Department of State Bulletin (4 September 1972), 242.

\textsuperscript{98}Bruce R. Kuniholm, Persian Gulf and United States Policy (Claremont, Calif.: Regina Books), 35.
Ensuring continued free flow of the region's oil and its reasonable price became a primary objective for the policy makers in the United States. In order to achieve that, stability and security of the region are so vital to the national interests of the United States. Richard N. Cooper, Under Secretary for economic affairs, in his address at Brown University on March 7, 1980, referred to the stability of the region and its relations to the economic security. He said:

A world in which 60% of crucial commodity comes from 14 nations, with the supply heavily concentrated in a political unstable area, in not a comfortable one. And the medium-run outlook promises to be more worse rather than better, with prospective demand outrunning prospective supply.

This outlook has several implications. The first is slower world economic growth, with possibly devastating implications for developing nations. The second is more inflation, with its corrosive effect on our own institutions. The third is that it will give rise to divisive competition among oil-consuming nations for the limited supplies of oil, with a corrosive effect on political harmony among allies. Finally, it suggests a dangerous vulnerability to interruptions in supply which may come about as a consequence of political turmoil or by military action, e.g., a Soviet move into the Persian Gulf.99

Actually, maintaining stable and friendly relations with the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, after the loss of Iran in 1979, are crucial to the economies of the United States and its western allies. The 1973 Arab oil embargo was clear evidence to the importance of the

99Department of State Bulletin (October 1980), 33.
region's friendly attitudes toward the United States and its western allies. According to Amitav Acharya, the embargo—which involved a decision by the participants to cease all exports to the United States and the Netherlands, accompanied by a 5 to 10 percent cut in their oil production—had grave economic consequences for the consuming nations in general and the United States in particular. The producer states raised oil prices from about $3 a barrel in 1973 to over $11 per barrel by January 1974. For the United States, the embargo caused a reduction of some 2.7 mbd in imports by 1974, and the increase of the price of oil led to a U.S. GNP loss of about 2.5 percent in 1973-1974, equivalent to $30 billion of prevalent prices.\textsuperscript{100}

In his statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East in the U.S. Congress, Acting Deputy Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs Gerald A. Rosen said:

Today [July 1, 1980] the United States receiving about a million barrels a day less oil than a year ago, but U.S. payments for imported oil in 1980 are expected to reach $90 billion. This import bill will make it harder to master inflation and overcome the current recession.\textsuperscript{101}

Also in his remarks, Rosen recognized the importance of the free flow of the region's oil by saying that:

If we are unprepared to cope with reduced oil supplies, the result would be a rapid bidding up

\textsuperscript{100}Acharya, 9-10.

\textsuperscript{101}Department of State Bulletin (October 1980), 39.
of world oil prices which would impose tremendous economic costs on the U.S. Any interruption of these reduced supplies—whether by accident or political design—would impose still more serious costs.\textsuperscript{102}

Moreover, it has been noted that the world oil market was directly affected by events in the Persian Gulf region. Following the 1979 Iranian revolution, the world oil market noticed a dramatic change in the issue of supply and demand equation. On the other hand, the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War caused an increase of production and sharp fall in prices. However, the region's oil became more relevant to the U.S. during the 1980s. This trend was evident in 1986 when Vice President George Bush appealed to the Saudis to stabilize the oil price situation after most of the oil companies' decisions to cut their exploration budgets.\textsuperscript{103} In this case, the Gulf still remain the most important source of oil to the United States to meet any future or sudden increase in world oil demand. The growing demand for Gulf oil by the United States was fully represented by the House of Representatives Committee on economic stabilization remarks on August 7, 1990. Their subject was "U.S. Economic and Energy Security Interests in the Persian Gulf," chaired by representative OAKAR who in his opening statement said:

\textit{It was almost exactly two years ago (on July 14, 1988) that our subcommittee held its first hearing on the impact of events in the Persian Gulf vis-a-}

\textsuperscript{102}Ibid., 37.

\textsuperscript{103}Acharya, 8.
vis U.S. energy security and economic stability. Since then, we have held nine hearings on various aspects of this one subject.

Our findings were summarized in an extensive statement to the full House last year, which I wish to make a part of this record. We expressed our deep concern at that time over the growth of U.S. dependency on imported oil. We pointed out that President Reagan made a formal finding that oil imports of approximately 38 percent "threatened to impair the national security."

What did we see happen? Last year the dependency ratio climbed to 42 percent, and for the first 7 months of 1990, climbed again to 45 percent of U.S. consumption. There are some estimates that the dependency ratio will be more than 50 percent for 1990.104

The Gulf states provided almost half of the world's oil imports. Because their absorptive capacity is, at least in the short run, limited in relation to their enormous oil reserves, they have considerable flexibility in production policy. These Gulf countries have generally been on the moderate side in OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] price issues, and they have tended to produce more than their domestic needs as an effort to help meet international demand.105

The commercial and financial dimensions of the region's oil in U.S. policy was related to the economic activities of the oil multinationals, whose estimated


capital investment in the Gulf were at some $50 billion, which the annual income from these investments was equal to half the U.S. balance of payment deficit at that time.\textsuperscript{106} In fact, these states are very significant to the U.S. economy.

\textit{Market}

The oil producing countries in the Persian Gulf had gradually become an important market to the United States investment. Following the dramatic rise in the oil revenues of the region as a result of the price increases in the 1970s, the Persian Gulf states have been acquiring the money to expand imports on a huge scale, making the region the fastest growing market for U.S. goods and services.\textsuperscript{107}

A State Department report to the Congress in 1973 stated that the Persian Gulf is an area which will provide almost unlimited opportunities for the sale of every kind of U.S. goods and services. It is an area which is ideally complimentary to the high technology and management services that the United States can provide.\textsuperscript{108}

\begin{enumerate}
\item[108]Acharya, 11.
\end{enumerate}
Among all states in the region, Saudi Arabia became the largest market for U.S. goods and services during the 1970s and 1980s. Joseph W. Twinan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, told Congress on July 1, 1980 that the U.S.-Saudi economic ties has expanded significantly. According to Twinan, in 1980, about 37 percent of U.S. exports to the Middle East and North Africa are going to Saudi Arabia.\textsuperscript{109}

However, in 1980 U.S. exports to the Gulf countries exceeded $7 billion a year, representing about one-half of U.S. sales to the Middle East. Sales to these countries said a state department official in 1980, provide employment for some one-quarter million Americans.\textsuperscript{110} U.S. commercial interest in the region significantly increased through the years. Trade with the Middle Eastern region, especially the oil producing countries, became an important factor for the balance of payment to the U.S. economy. The establishment of the Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation (JCEC) between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. in 1974 provided a symbolic economic relationship between the two countries. The commission is considered an important instrument for furthering the U.S.-Saudi economic relations. Through the JCEC in 1978, American companies had won contracts worth $23 billion. The number of American companies licensed to work

\textsuperscript{109}Department of State Bulletin (October 1980), 43.

\textsuperscript{110}Ibid., 7.
in the kingdom had risen to 173 by the end of 1978. Treasury Department Director of Saudi Affairs, Bonnie Pounds, in 1978 said:

Saudi Arabia was the largest U.S. market in the Middle East and the United States expected to do more than $4 billion in business in the kingdom by the end of 1978; projections indicated that overall Saudi imports would reach between $18 and $20 billion, some 25-30 percent more than the 1977 import level.112

According to John K. Cooley, in order to stabilize the economy and to enhance the balance of payment with those oil exporting countries, the U.S. policy makers, both the Congress and various executive departments reportedly encouraged U.S. export sales to recycle oil revenues from the major oil exporters, like Saudi Arabia, to help offset the imbalance, strengthen the dollar, protect jobs and otherwise stimulate the U.S. economy.113

The huge amount of oil revenues the Gulf states had gained during the 1970s helped to finance a massive development program with an ever-growing demand for western, especially U.S., goods and services. Saudi Arabia alone in its five year development plan, 1975-1980, has deposited $142 billion for this purpose. As one U.S. trade official points out, the region lacks trained manpower and has limited industrial capacity and raw materials which

111Preece, 533.
112Ibid.
113Cooley, 491.
must be imported, and "U.S. industry is highly qualified to respond to this demand for high-technology products and services."\(^{114}\) In its report to Congress, the U.S. General Accounting Office on October 26, 1977 stated that:

Oil sales account for 95 percent of Saudi Arabia's total revenues, and increases in prices from an average $3.28 a barrel in 1973 to $10.46 in 1974 have given the Saudis unprecedented resources for both military and economic development. Increased spending for economic development has heightened the Saudi demand for American goods and services. In 1974, 31 percent (about $1.8 billion) of Saudi Arabia's imports come from the United States. The U.S. Embassy stated that 1975 U.S. exports to Saudi Arabia were about $2.5 billion; in 1976 they had risen to $3.5 billion.\(^{115}\)

Accordingly, the number of U.S. business firms in Saudi Arabia is increasing. U.S. officials point out that more than 270 such firms have offices in Saudi Arabia, and the number of U.S. government employees and American businessmen in that country is also increasing. Embassy officials estimated that 25,000 Americans are in Saudi Arabia during this time.\(^{116}\)

Arms Sales

A major component of U.S. trade has been armaments. The United States had emerged by 1975 as the largest supplier of weapons and military services to the countries

\(^{114}\)Ibid.

\(^{115}\)U.S. General Accounting Office, 5.

\(^{116}\)Ibid.
in the Persian Gulf region. With the adoption of the twin pillar policy by the Nixon administration and the Shah's desire to fill the power vacuum after the British withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971, Iran became the largest purchaser of American made military equipment in the region. Between 1972 and 1978, Iran ordered $19.5 billion worth of arms from the United States. One Congressman has referred to this as the most rapid build-up of military power under peace time conditions of any nation in the history of the world.\textsuperscript{117} With the U.S. encouragement and support of the modernization of both Iran and Saudi Arabia military conditions, through massive arms sales, between March 1970 and March 1977, Iran's defense budget increased approximately from $880 million in 1970 to $9.4 billion in 1977. A U.S. Senate committee report in 1976 pointed out that Iran is considering to purchase additional sophisticated military equipment from the U.S. as a proposed arrangements of "weapons for oil."\textsuperscript{118} According to Andrew D. Pierre, the Iranian market became a bonanza for U.S. weapon manufacturers, both by government to government, and by private contractors, under the guidance of the Department of Defense. Some, like the Grumman Corporation, were able to gain financial support from the Shah of Iran

\textsuperscript{117}Murray, 25.

for its new weapon system. At the time of the downfall of the Shah in 1979, U.S. military sales to Iran worth $12 billion was waiting delivery over the next 5 years.\textsuperscript{119}

The second largest purchaser of U.S. arms after Iran during the Shah's regime was Saudi Arabia. After the British withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971, U.S. policy had been to encourage Iran as well as Saudi Arabia to assume primary responsibility for the security of the Persian Gulf. The growing U.S. military commitment in Saudi Arabia is designed to support the U.S. foreign policy objectives in the region which are:

1. insuring continued access to Saudi Arabia's tremendous oil resources and its air space and ports.

2. encouraging a politically stable, moderate Saudi Arabia to play a constructive role in Middle East affairs, and

3. protecting U.S. access to the growing Saudi market for imports.\textsuperscript{120}

Unlike Iran, about 63 percent of U.S. military sales to Saudi Arabia have been for military construction managed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The huge U.S. military construction programs of the Corps were estimated by some sources in 1978 to be $24 billion for the entire Saudi


\textsuperscript{120} U.S. General Accounting Office, 4.
program. In his statement before the Congress on November 4, 1975, Lt. General Howard M. Fish said:

The Army Corps of Engineers is an active participant in the construction program, fulfilling management requirement to insure that program objectives are attained for the Saudi government. The Saudi government and the United States have entered into foreign military sales agreements which provide for the delivery of military equipment, technical services, and assistance to the Saudi Arabian government in return for cash payment.

Accordingly, between 1971 and 1980, U.S. military sales to Saudi Arabia, worth over $33 billion. Most of the military expenditures were focused on construction and training, managed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers which at the end of the 1970s held projects in the country worth more than $20 billion. In addition, the U.S.-Saudi military corporation continued through the 1980s. The centerpiece of this was the 1981 sale of the AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) package to Saudi Arabia at a total price of $5 billion. The AWACS package was part of a U.S. military commitment to the security of the region, which included the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), including

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121 Cooley, 500.
122 U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs, Military Sales to Saudi Arabia: Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs. 94th Cong., 4 November and 17 December 1975, 2.
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman, as a U.S. commitment to their security and to strengthening their ability to defend themselves against any Soviet or Soviet supported threat. By helping the GCC states defend themselves, the United States could avoid politically risky and potentially counter-productive intervention in low-level conflicts in the Gulf. Thus, U.S. security assistance to the regional countries could compliment the whole U.S. security plan for the region and enhance, but not substitute, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF). However, in addition to the security issue, the economic factor remained a valid one. See Table 5.

**TABLE 6**

**U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL STATES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Assistance</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
<th>Oman</th>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>Arabia</th>
<th>U.A.E.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FMS Cash Sales (1975-1987)</td>
<td>481.6</td>
<td>1.533</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>59.974b</td>
<td>1,159.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMS Guaranteed (1975-1987)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>190a</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>254b</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total no. of Military Student Trained (1983-1987)</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1,196</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3,646</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Figures are for 1974-1987 period.
b Figures are for 1979-1987 period.

Among all the GCC countries, Saudi Arabia continued to be the largest buyer of U.S. military equipment by a substantial margin. The AWACS deal was the most important one between the United States and Saudi Arabia during the 1980s.  

**Investment in the United States Market**

The only three Arab countries in the Gulf, except Iraq, with financial surpluses available for investments are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Because of their traditional economies and small populations, these states could not spend a substantial portion of their oil revenues after their local needs. However, much of their surplus was recycled to the west, especially to the United States. These countries, as members of OPEC, became very involved in many economic activities in the United States. According to Cooley, critics of the growing involvement of the United States and Saudi Arabia in each other's economies claim that U.S. Treasury data underestimates total OPEC surpluses since the oil price increase of 1973. This data shows that some $43.25 billion, or about one-quarter of the Treasury's estimated OPEC investible surplus, was invested in the United States from 1974. Treasury instruments, corporate stocks and bonds, and commercial bank deposits accounted for $31.8 billion, while direct investment,

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124 Acharya, 130-35.
prepayment on U.S. exports and debt amortization make up the remaining $11.4 billion.\textsuperscript{125}

However, Cooley also referred to a study made by the American Jewish Committee of the subject prepared in October 1978 which contends:

These figures do not take into account two other ways that OPEC members funds are placed through third parties, and through substantial holdings in foreign branches of U.S. banks—the actual total of such investment in the United States could conservatively be estimated at $50 billion and another $10 billion were accounted for by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates. The Saudi share must have been close to $50 billion—a sum which was probably increased by $10-$12 billion in 1978.\textsuperscript{126}

However, despite all critics, such as those who claimed that "Arabs are buying America," these investments provided substantial benefits to the U.S. economy. By cash availability in the U.S. money market, these petrodollars inflow reduced the need for government borrowing from the private sectors and kept interest rates lower, which in the end, helped to increase overall economic activities.

On the other hand, these Gulf states required payment to their oil in U.S. dollars. As one study put it:

The final customer who puts petrol in the tank of his car or oil under his heating boiler pays for the product in his local currency. The producer of the crude oil, however, requires payment in U.S. dollars. Accordingly, for this reason and by investing in the United States, the Gulf countries

\textsuperscript{125}Cooley, 495.

\textsuperscript{126}Ibid.
helped to keep the U.S. dollar stronger against any other major currencies.127

U.S. Interests in the Middle East: The Cold War Period

The Middle East assumed greater strategic significance during the period of the Cold War. The war generated requirements for access to military facilities in the region, alliance formation on the part of the United States and transfers by Washington of military supplies to favored friends and allies. In fact, during the Cold War period, the traditional U.S. interests in the Middle East were:

2. Ensuring access to Persian Gulf oil for USA and its West European and Japanese allies.
3. Support for Israel's sovereignty and security.
4. U.S. Arms Sales and Supply to Middle East.128

Containment of Expanding Soviet Influence in the Region

As a matter of fact the main argument behind the containment policy of the United States was that the Soviets would gain wider influence in the Third World, achieving strength from this and use this strength to dominate the industrial regions of Europe and Asia


(Eurasia) and then would exploit Eurasia's resources to threaten the United States. In fact there was very little debate over whether the United States should attempt to limit Soviet influence in the Middle East. The proposition was widely accepted among the policy community in Washington that if the Soviet Union was allowed to obtain a dominant influence over the resources of the area, it would pose a substantial geo-political threat to the economic well being and military security of NATO countries and Japan. So the primary U.S. interest in the Middle East was fixed by the policy makers as the containment of Soviet influence. Henry Kissinger in June 1970 clearly pointed out that the object of U.S. policies was "to expel the Soviet military presence (from the Middle East) before they become....firmly established." The United States in the Cold War era adopted the means of confronting the Soviets, alliance building, super power cooperation and the political and economic development in the Middle East in order to contain the Soviet influence in the region.


131Kissinger's remark on "expelling the Soviets from the Middle East" is quoted by Marvin and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger (New York: Dell 1975), 22.
Confronting the Soviets

Confrontation has been one of the prominent means of attempting to oppose Soviet intervention in the Middle East, since World War II. President Truman bluntly informed Stalin in 1946 that the United States would not put up with Stalin's failure to honor his war time agreement with Churchill for a withdrawal of British and Russian military forces from Iran at the end of the war. If the USSR did not honor its commitment, Truman warned, the United States would be compelled to bring this Soviet malfeasance before the newly formed United Nations and prospects for Soviet-American political cooperation would be severely undermined. The President also strengthened his verbal demands with redeployment of U.S. naval forces. Stalin reassessed the stakes and pulled his troops behind the Soviet-Iranian border.132

In the 1973 October war, reacting to indications that President Leonid Brezhnev was preparing to dispatch Soviet paratroops into the Sinai to rescue the Egyptian third army corps from the Israelis, the Nixon administration put United States forces on a high alert status around the world and Kissinger announced that any Soviet military intervention would spell the end of the détente relationship. Brezhnev backed off and allowed Kissinger to work with the Israelis.

132Brown, 136.
in his own way to obtain a cease-fire with the Egyptians.\textsuperscript{133} In response to the Soviet Union's 1979 invasion of Afghanistan and Islamic revolution of Iran, the Carter doctrine came into being with the establishment of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) (later known as Central Command) which would enable the United States to strike with massive force. It was aimed at repelling any attempt by the Soviets to gain control of the Persian Gulf region.\textsuperscript{134} Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. was busy in building its confronting policy towards Soviet Union in the Middle East.

\textit{Alliance Building}

Widening the containment line in the Middle East by reinforcing existing alliances and constructing new ones has been the favorite policy of the U.S. governments since the Truman doctrine. This policy was seriously questioned after the overthrow of closest U.S. friend in the Middle East, the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and his replacement by anti-western, anti-American regime led by Ayatullah Khomeni. Even the alliance building strategy was re-instituted with trumpets at the start of the Reagan administration under the banner of "Strategic Consensus."

\textsuperscript{133}Ibid., 137.

The heyday for alliance building in the Middle East was the period of Foster Dulles' tenure as secretary of State (1953-1959). Foster Dulles promoted the security agreement between Britain, Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey known as Baghdad Pact. The Iraqi withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact led to the United States effectively joining the remaining Baghdad Pact nations by renaming the alliance as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).

This network of alliances in the northern tier of north-west Asia would constitute a barrier to Soviet penetration of the Persian Gulf - Middle East region. Alliance building was another major Cold War device of the United States for Soviet containment.

Super Power Cooperation

This was the means of containing the Soviet influence that was initially adopted by the Carter administration. The main theme of the super power cooperation theory was that the Kremlin can be induced to moderate its aims and behavior in the region, provided that the United States accepts the Soviet Union as an equal partner in efforts to get the local parties to resolve their differences and also

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135Brown, 138.

136President Carter took the guidance for super power cooperation from the Brookings Institution study, toward peace in the Middle East, in which Zbigniew Brezezinski had a large hand. See Ibid., 141.
as a guarantor of the peace. This philosophy was reflected in the October 1, 1977 joint U.S.-Soviet call for a reconvened Geneva Conference. But opposition to such a joint Soviet-American approach to Middle Eastern affairs came from countries in the region which did not want to be treated either as objects of a super power condominium or as parts of the super powers mutually agreed upon spheres of influence. Anwar Sadat's historic trip to Jerusalem in November 1977 to start the first direct negotiations on a peace settlement between an Arab state and Israel was prompted in part by his fears of precisely such results from the October 1977 joint Soviet-American statement.

Political and Economic Development

A fourth approach attempted to limit the Soviet Union's influence in the Middle East by reducing the need of the societies in the region to become dependent on Soviet help for security or economic well being and by reducing the susceptibility of the local regimes and movement to subversion by Moscow leaning revolutionaries. This approach was based on the premise that Soviet influence in the region supposedly will be reduced as the countries in the area gain in national self confidence and political stability. The resultant economic prosperity might also help build up a substantial middle class committed to political and economic

\[137\text{Ibid.}\]
liberalism. Under this approach U.S. policies in the Middle East were exclusively directed toward country and regional development objectives. The containment of Soviet influence was simply a by-product. The main advantage of this policy was that it did not require the recipient of the U.S. assistance to compromise their third world and domestic legitimacy by sacrificing Cold War nonalignment for the role of U.S. pawn. It also provided a rationale for U.S. decision makers to favor relatively progressive governments who were committed to work toward liberal modernization and to bring pressure on traditional governments like Saudi Arabia to institute domestic reform before they fall victim to the revolutionary tides sweeping the region.

Ensuring Access to Persian Gulf Oil

During the Cold War period Persian Gulf oil supplied the life blood of America and its west European allies especially the industrial societies.

A denial of access to Persian Gulf oil would threaten the security and well being of the United States. The United States imports about 40 percent of the oil it consumes and about 30 percent of this comes from the countries of the

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138Ibid., 142.
139Ibid., 143.
### TABLE 7

**ESTIMATED WORLD CRUDE OIL RESERVES BY REGION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Barrels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Persian Gulf</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>257.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>98.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>97.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>92.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>56.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central South America</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>58.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe and U.S.S.R.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>58.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far East</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Persian Gulf. Western Europe imports more than 80 percent, of which approximately 60 percent comes from the Persian Gulf.\(^{140}\)

Even as prices for oil from the Persian Gulf quadrupled during the 1970s and as the Arab oil producers demonstrated that they could and would embargo oil exports to countries

\(^{140}\)Ibid., 144.
supporting Israel, the import dependence pattern of the western industrial countries and Japan was not substantially altered.

Actually about 66 percent of the world's known recoverable oil reserves are located in the Persian Gulf; only 2.6 percent are found in the United States and 1.9 percent in western Europe (Table 7). Therefore how to ensure access to Persian Gulf oil was the prime concern of the United States throughout the Cold War period. The two most obvious ways of attempting to ensure access to Persian Gulf oil were (1) to cultivate friendly relations with oil producing countries, and (2) to maintain military capabilities for intervention against hostile governments or movements and for direct seizure of the oil production facilities.

Friendly Relations

The cultivation of friendly relations with oil producing countries of the Middle East has been an important characteristic of U.S. policy since World War II. In the early post war period the U.S. and the western countries were engaged in oil exploration and had complete control over pricing. However, with the nationalization by

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142 Brown, 145.
Middle Eastern governments of oil resources and production, the United States has been deeply involved in negotiations with the producer-country governments and with the organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) on the terms of trade, including price per barrel arrangements.\textsuperscript{143}

Moreover since the oil producing countries had accumulated huge holdings of dollars and were able to recycle these petro-dollars by purchase or investments in the United States, friendly relations with these states were deemed necessary for the economic interest of the United States. In fact U.S. denial of friendly relations with the oil producing countries would be disastrous on the U.S. economy. Regarding the impact of Saudi Arabia, on U.S. economy Sheikh Yamani has pointed out:

Saudi Arabia...alone is in a position to inflict very severe damage on the world economy as a whole or on selected group of nations....If the Saudi simply cut production to the level needed to meet their own development, there would be...depression in the United States in which the rate of unemployment would at least double. the price of oil would double and the inflation rate would rise.\textsuperscript{144}

\textsuperscript{143}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{144}Yamani is quoted by Walter Levy in "Oil: An Agenda for the 1980's," \textit{Foreign Affairs} 59, no. 5 (Summer 1981): 1098-99.
Military Intervention

Whenever the U.S. access to the oil of important supplier countries is threatened, a debate comes in the U.S. policy circles over whether the United States should intervene militarily to secure access. Military intervention to counter any attempted strangulation of the industrial world by the oil producers was publicly contemplated by the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Asked by Business Week magazine whether he had considered military action to secure oil at reasonable prices, Kissinger replied that this would be "a very dangerous course," but added:

I am not saying there is no circumstance where we would use force....It is one thing to use it in the case of dispute over price, but it is another where there is some actual strangulation of the industrial world.145

Actually, the United States deployed its military forces in the Persian Gulf in different phases of the Cold War. In 1979, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Islamic revolution in Iran, the United States moved forward to the Middle East with the Carter doctrine which advocated any means including military option to foil any attempt by any outside force to control the Persian Gulf region.146 While the Reagan doctrine clearly supported the U.S.


presence in the Gulf to ensure the access to oil, Ronald Reagan stated:

The United States and its allies maintain a presence in the Gulf to assist in the free movement of petroleum, to reassure those of our friends and allies in the region of our commitment to their peace and welfare, to ensure that freedom of navigation and other principles of international accord are respected and observed - in short to promote the cause of peace.147

Similarly after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the United States deployed military in Saudi Arabia and led the multinational military operation against Iraq. The rationale behind the costly and bloody military operation was to ensure U.S. access to the oil of the Persian Gulf.

Support for Israel’s Sovereignty and Security

Since the founding of the State of Israel in 1947-48 the U.S. support to the Jewish nation in the Middle East originated primarily out of moral consideration.148 The U.S. commitment to the Jewish nation in the Middle East was founded in the consensus of concern among American Jews and their fellow Americans for the fate of the Jewish people in the Middle East. This concern became a U.S. national


148Brown, 150.
interest in reaction to the slaughter of millions of Jews by Hitler in World War II.

The second important reason behind U.S. support toward Israel during the Cold War period was U.S. national security and national interests, which was ensured by the role played by Israel. In the Middle East, Israel successfully prevented victories by radical nationalist movements in Lebanon, Jordan and Yemen as well as in Palestine: Israel has a predominant air force in the region. Israel's frequent wars provided battlefield testing for U.S. arms often against Soviet weapons. Israeli military advisers have assisted the contras, the Salvadoran junta and foreign occupation forces in Namibia and western Sahara. Their secret service assisted the United States in intelligence gathering and covert operations. Israel has missiles capable of reaching the former Soviet Union and cooperated with the U.S. military industrial complex, with research and development for new jet fighters, anti-missiles defense systems, and even strategic defense initiatives.\(^{149}\) It is obvious that in the Cold War era U.S. material aid and political backing for Israel discouraged Israel's Arab opponents from becoming more dependent on Moscow or from using oil as a political weapon against the United States. Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger pointed out: "Israel's obstinacy...serves the purposes of both our

\(^{149}\)Boulding, 179.
countries best." It is clearly evident that, throughout the Cold War, the U.S. policy makers used Israel also in its national interest. Leading Israeli intellectual Ishwa Leibowitz noted:

The existence of the Jewish people of 60 to 80 generations...was a heroic situation. We never got from the goyish world a cent. We supported ourselves. We maintained our own situations. Now we have taken 3 million Jews, gathered them there and turned them over to be parasites - parasites of America. And in some sense we are even the mercenaries of America to fight the war of American interest or what the ruling persons in America consider to be American interests.151

U.S. Arms Sales in the Middle East

During the Cold War period, the U.S. arms supply to the Middle East reflected a variety of important U.S. interests in the region. By this time the U.S. enlarged its role as a regional arms supplier. By the early 1980s, the United States was supplying arms to its Middle Eastern regional clients at the rate of $10 billion a year, a fourfold increase over the early 1970s.152 The basic policy of arms sales to the Middle Eastern countries was directed by the 1950 Tripartite declaration between the United States, Britain and France to limit their transfer of arms

150 Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), 621.


152 Brown, 168.
to countries in the region in order to avoid an arms race between the Israelis and the Arabs.\textsuperscript{153}

But the restraints called for in the tripartite declaration were overwhelmed by Middle East complexities from the start. The agreement did not restrict the British and the French from supplying arms to their various Arab clients who were engaged in arms races against one another, and actually the Eisenhower administration encouraged Britain to arm Arab states that were willing to be allies of the NATO countries in containing Soviet attempts to penetrate the Middle East.\textsuperscript{154}

The United States sponsored the Baghdad Pact of 1955 between Britain, Turkey and Iraq and the U.S. rebuff of Egypt's request for arms turned Egyptian President Nasser toward the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union responded by arranging for their arms producing satellite Czechoslovakia to be Egypt's principal arms supplier.\textsuperscript{155}

The Czechoslovakian-Egyptian arms deal threatened Israel's capacity to balance Egypt's military power and Israel looked towards its western allies, especially USA, UK and France, for additional arms. The U.S. and UK refused to supply but France responded positively to Israel's

\textsuperscript{153}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{154}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{155}Ibid.
Because France was anxious to divert Nasser from helping the Algerian rebels and led him toward the Israeli-Egyptian border by supplying arms to Israel.

The U.S. replaced France as the principal arms supplier to Israel by the mid-1960s. France sloughed off this role once she had withdrawn from Algeria and no longer needed Israel as a counterweight to Egypt. Despite the arms deals between Egypt and the Soviet Union, the defeats of Egypt by Israel in 1956 and 1967 led many Arabs to believe these defeats were prompted by the poor qualities of Soviet arms. Some Arabs also believed the Soviet Union was not interested in seeing any Arab state or combination of Arab states achieve either parity with Israel or a military victory against it. This mistrust arose over the quality of Soviet arms to the Arab states. The first Arab state that openly showed its disenchantment with the Soviet arms policy toward the Middle East was Egypt under President Anwar Sadat, who requested the withdrawal of Soviet military experts in 1972. This move was not only motivated by Egyptian skepticism of Soviet claims of sincerity in supplying the Arab states with weapons to challenge Israeli

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156 Ibid.


tactical step. Sadat was preparing to shift from total dependence on the Soviet Union to a dramatic opening in the relations between Egypt and the west, particularly the United States. He was convinced that he ought to reach a bilateral settlement with Israel with the help of the United States. However, before taking any step in the direction of peace with Israel, Sadat decided to prepare for the 1973 October war in order to show that he was negotiating from a position of strength.\textsuperscript{159} At that time Egypt was neither financially capable of buying arms from other sources nor politically on good enough terms with the U.S. to achieve that goal. But the U.S. at that time established what was called a bridge to provide arms and ammunition to Israel during the war.\textsuperscript{160} The Nixon administration continued the transfer of arms to Israel initiated by Johnson administration. Following the 1973 war, Nixon and Kissinger requested the Congress to authorize $2.2 billion in military aid to Israel to prevent a new imbalance from the large scale Soviet military supply of Egypt and Syria.\textsuperscript{161} Apart from this, the Nixon administration also dramatically increased its military sale to Iran, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. The Iranian arms purchase jumped from $236 million during 1969 to over 4 billion in 1974 and the Saudi who were

\textsuperscript{159}Ali, 45.

\textsuperscript{160}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{161}Brown, 169.
buying only $4 million of arms from the United States in 1969 bought nearly $6 billion in 1976.\textsuperscript{162} Between 1950 and 1987 Saudi Arabia purchased more than $30 billion of U.S. defense articles. Much of this was spent on sophisticated aircraft and ultra-modern air, naval and army bases.\textsuperscript{163}

Jimmy Carter adopted a restrictive arms supply policy and issued a directive in May 1977 imposing a ceiling on further military sales. The Carter administration's 1978 request for Congressional authorization of $4.5 billion worth of military aircraft to Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt reflected Carter's new attitude toward the utility of arms transfers as an instrument of U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East.

The Reagan administration had no philosophical problem with the use of arms transfer as a prime diplomatic instrument in the Middle East. Not only did they willingly implement the arms deals their predecessors had negotiated, but they also actively explored opportunities to win friends, solidify alliances and make as many Middle Eastern countries as possible dependent upon U.S. arms supplies for their security.

The 1981 arms package sold to Saudi Arabia (including five AWACs planes) was fully consistent with this

\textsuperscript{162}Ibid.

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approach. The Israelis protested that the 1981 U.S.-Saudi arms deal would alter the Arab-Israeli balance of power. To satisfy the Israelis, the Reagan administration responded to Israeli desire for a U.S. Israeli strategic cooperation agreement that would solidify the U.S.-Israel special relationship. The memorandum of strategic understanding signed in November 1987 by Secretary of Defense Weinberger and Israeli defense minister Sharon further alienated the Saudis. But the Reagan administration's reassurance to the Saudis that the U.S. was impartial on all major Arab-Israeli issues was considered by the Israelis as alarming because they believed it was a decided shift away from the U.S.-Israeli special relationship.

After the Islamic revolution of Iran and during the Iran-Iraq war of 1988, the Reagan administration increased U.S. arms sales significantly to Iraq aimed at weakening the Khomeni's Islamic revolution. In 1982 the Reagan administration opened the door for American sales to Iraq. Reagan took Iraq off the list of terrorist nations and in 1984 he renewed U.S. diplomatic relations with Baghdad which had broken off since 1967. One study shows that American sales to Iraq increased from $571 million to $3.6 billion

164 Brown, 170.


between 1983 and 1989. In fact, the Reagan administration wanted to make Iraq a moderate client state. The Bush administration continued Reagan's policy towards Iraq until August 2, 1990. The above review shows that throughout the Cold War, U.S. arms sales to the Middle East was a core element in its virtual economic interest, which the U.S. did not want to damage. In fact, during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, the United States increased its arms sales to the Persian Gulf countries including Iran (see Table 8).

TABLE 8
TOTAL VALUE OF ARMS IMPORTS, 1984-1988 ($ millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Importing Countries</th>
<th>USSR</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Exporting Countries</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>U.K.</th>
<th>W.G.</th>
<th>Italy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>5400</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3100</td>
<td>2800</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5800</td>
<td>7500</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>2100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.A.E.</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


167 Ibid., 28.
According to Nozar Alaolmolki, since the end of the Persian Gulf War, nearly $40 billion worth of arms have been ordered from the United States, France and Britain by the GCC member states--the GCC states are: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In 1991-1992 Saudi Arabia purchased arms from the United States worth $13.751 billion. Kuwait also purchased arms worth $2.500 billion in 1992.\textsuperscript{168}

Conclusion

Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, U.S. interests in the Middle East changed significantly according to the needs and requirements of the United States. During the 19th century the United States basically had religious, philanthropic and academic interests in the Middle East.

Prior to World War II, official U.S. interest in the Middle East was mainly limited to the defense of commercial interest, principally oil. The Cold War generated greater strategic significance in the Middle East. It created requirements for access to military facilities in the region, alliance formation on the part of the United States, and transfers by Washington of military supplies to strategic friends and allies. The establishment of Israel

marked the beginning of extensive U.S. political, economic and military involvement in the Middle East. In fact, throughout the Cold War period U.S. had four major objectives in the Middle East:

1. ensuring the security of Israel,
2. containing Soviet influence in the Middle East,
3. maintaining U.S. and western access to Middle, Eastern oil in the region and
4. ensuring U.S. arms trade in the Middle East.

Apart from this the United States also pursued several lesser policy goals that are related to its four main objectives including combating terrorism, preventing the spread of nuclear and chemical arms and improving economic and security ties with moderate Arab states. Actually during the 1970s when Britain abrogated all its defense responsibilities in the Gulf and the foreign oil companies gradually lost their oil concessions, U.S. interests in the oil became strategic as well as economic. With American involvement in Vietnam, President Richard Nixon adopted a strategy of transferring weapons to regional allies prepared to bolster their self-defense capabilities. In the Persian Gulf when the Shah of Iran signaled his willingness to become the Persian Gulf "Policeman," Washington accepted it. A 1972 Presidential decision initiated a major arms sales program for Iran but sought to balance it on the Arab side of the Gulf with arms sales to Saudi Arabia, which was well known as America's two pillar policy.
However, by the end of the 1970s this two pillar policy had begun to crumble. In the following year eruption of armed conflict between Iran and Iraq brought the Persian Gulf to the brink of instability, threatening western access to vital oil supplies. Toward the end of the 1980s a Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza shattered complacency about Israel's occupation of those territories and initiated an Arab-Israeli conflict. By the 1990s with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War politics, containment of the Soviet Union ceased to be a politico-military objective.
CHAPTER V
THE 1990-1991 GULF WAR

Introduction

Regarding the 1990-91 Gulf War, Shlomo Gazit wrote:

The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, the subsequent political and military steps and their culmination in Operation Desert Storm carried out by an international coalition under US leadership, resembles a Greek tragedy: each of the actors wanted to halt the slide toward the war, yet fate willed otherwise. And it was fate that determined the course of events.¹

The invasion and occupation of oil rich Kuwait by Iraq on August 2, 1990, set in motion a crisis that would remain at the forefront of the international agenda for more than seven months. American President George Bush quickly declared the annexation of what Iraqi President Saddam Hussein called the "19th Province of Iraq" an unacceptable act of aggression.² President Bush responded to the invasion by pulling together an international coalition authorized by the United Nation's Security Council to oppose Iraq. Nearly


forty nations contributed combat forces, transport vehicles, medical teams and financial aid to the joint effort to force Iraq from Kuwait. The Persian Gulf crisis was the first major test of the effectiveness of the UN Security Council to confront international aggression in the post Cold War era. President Bush and Secretary of State Howard Baker directed a major diplomatic initiative aimed at Security Council adoption of a resolution to authorize the use of force against Iraq if it did not withdraw from Kuwait. The campaign culminated in the Security Council's adoption of November 29, 1990 resolution 678, which set January 15 as the deadline for Iraq to pull out of Kuwait. After that, the resolution authorized member states to use "all necessary means" to enforce previous UN resolutions demanding the withdrawal.

Once the UN deadline had passed, Bush acted swiftly. On January 16, once he ordered coalition forces to begin a sustained bombing campaign against Iraq, virtually every target of military significance in Iraq had been bombed. On February 24, 1991 after 38 straight days of bombing, the allies launched a ground offensive into Kuwait and Iraq. By early March 1991, the U.S.-led coalition force had driven the Iraqi army from Kuwait and occupied much of southern Iraq, completing the liberation of Kuwait. However, this

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chapter seeks to focus on the 1990-91 Gulf war. In this regard our discussion will center on three aspects:

I. Background of the war

II. Iraqi invasion of Kuwait

III. US response to the crisis

Background of the Gulf War

Historical Background of Kuwait

Kuwait is a small country of 6,880 square miles (16,600 sq. km.) with about 1.8 million people.4 It is bordered on the south by the Neutral Zone of Saudi Arabia and on the north and west by Iraq. The 130 km. border between Kuwait and Iraq has never been demarcated. The main Kuwaiti islands, Bubiyan and Warbah, face the Iraqi port of Ummal Qasr and Iraq's sea cost. Bubiyan is about 1.6 km. from Kuwait and 8 km. from Iraq, while Warbah is about 3.2 km. from Kuwait and 1 km. from Iraq. These islands are critical to the security of Iraqi oil loading facilities in the Gulf. Kuwait is strategically exposed to pressure from Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia. It is particularly vulnerable to Iraqi pressure because Iraq can deploy its forces with only short warning.5


5Ibid.
Modern Kuwait had its origins in the middle of the 17th century. The rise of the Sheikdom of Kuwait under the ruling Al-Sabah family suggests that the town of Kuwait was built in the early 18th century (about 1716). Kuwait was first shown on a map produced by the Danish traveler Niebuhr. Before that, the name "Grane" had appeared in European documents used for trading in the region.6

As a small trade town, Kuwait was built by Barrak, the Sheikh of the Bani Khalid tribe, who ruled Eastern Arabia in the 17th century.7 The geographical position of Kuwait on the important Persian Gulf and desert caravan trade routes, allowed the Kuwaiti merchants to carry goods from Kuwait to the neighboring countries and the Mediterranean. This led to the growth of Kuwait in the 18th century. Kuwait's trade with India and Mediterranean countries increased continuously during the 19th century.8 The ruling Al-Sabah was the first independent Emir of Kuwait. The Al-Sabah was chosen by the inhabitants of Kuwait in the tribal manner to administer justice and general affairs of the town. By the end of the 19th century, most of the Arabian peninsula was governed by the independent rulers who did not acknowledge the authority of the Ottoman Sultans. Instead, they

6Ibid.


8The Middle East, 8th edition, 100.
established treaties of friendship with Great Britain. In
the Anglo-Turkish convention of July 29, 1913, the territory
of Kuwait was recognized as an autonomous khuza of the
Ottoman Empire. Its territorial boundaries were defined and
practical autonomy was conceded to the Kuwaiti Emir, Shaish
Mubarak. Mubarak established a clearly independent status
free from Ottoman influence.9

With the beginning of World War I and Britain fighting
the Ottomans, Kuwait, under the leadership of Mubarak took
the side of the British. After Mubarak's death in 1915,
Kuwait was ruled by Jabir, who was followed by Salim in
1917. Jabir followed examples set by Mubarak and supported
the British. Salim, a strict observer of the Muslim faith
was sympathetic to the Ottomans. This attitude towards the
Ottomans provoked the British to such an extent that they
threatened Salim by declaring they would not respect the
1899 agreement if Kuwait were subjected to foreign attack.10
However, Salim was determined to defend the entire territory
of his Sheikhdom against any aggressor.

In the meantime, Abd-al-Aziz, the ruler of Najd and al-
Hasa was not willing to accept the 1913 demarcation of

9The 1913 agreement between the British and the
Ottomans, agreed the borders of Iraq, Kuwait and Najd.
According to that agreement, Kuwait's borders in the south
extended to Jabal Munifa, about 160 miles south of its
present borders with Saudi Arabia. This agreement was made
when Kuwait was run by Sheikh Mubarakal-Sabah, the most
powerful ruler in the Arabian peninsula at the time. Ibid.

10Ibid.
boundaries between Kuwait and his domains. The tension between Abd-al-Aziz and Salim increased when Kuwait was attacked by Ikhwan who was supported by Abd-al-Aziz. Britain intervened in the conflict and arranged the Uqir conference to solve the problem of the borders between Kuwait and Najd.

Sir Percy Cox\(^{11}\) called Iraq, Kuwait and Najd together for a conference which was held at Uqir, the seaport of al-Haso in 1922. Although the 5-day long conference was ended without any progress, Sir Percy Cox was determined not to go home without any settlement. He took the initiative and informed the parties that he would himself decide on the type and general line of the frontier, which ended the impasse. Sir Percy Cox took a red pencil and very carefully drew on the map of Arabia a boundary line from the Persian Gulf to Abal Anaisan, close to the Trans Jordan frontier.\(^{12}\) This gave Iraq a large area of territory claimed by Najd. He also deprived Kuwait of nearly two-thirds of its territory and gave it to Najd, ignoring the previous Anglo-Turkish agreement which had drawn the Kuwait boundaries. South and west of Kuwait proper, he drew out two zones, which he declared would be neutral and known as the Kuwaiti

\(^{11}\)Sir Percy Cox was the British high official at that time who was working on matters of utmost importance; the settlement of differences over mutual borders.

Neutral zone and the Iraq Neutral zone. The results of the al-Uqir conference were satisfactory for Iraq and allowed Abd-al-Aziz Ibn. Su'ud of Najd to gain territory at the expense of Kuwait. Kuwait lost two-thirds of its southern territories that extended 160 miles beyond its present borders.

History shows that Iraq had long ambitions to exert political and military influence over Kuwait. These ambitions were realized immediately after the British withdrawal from Kuwait on June 19, 1961. The Iraqi revolutionary regime of Abdul Karim very quickly reacted to the British action. On June 25, 1961, Iraq laid claim to Kuwait on the grounds that the Sheikhdom was an integral part of Iraq. While the Iraqi government tried to convince Arab and world public opinion that Kuwait was an integral part of Iraq, Kuwait rejected the Iraqi claim vigorously by providing evidence that it had never belonged to Iraq. Beginning July 24, 1959, Kuwait successively became a member of the following international organizations: The International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the Universal Postal Union (UPO), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), United Nation's Education, Scientific

13Ibid.
14Anderson and Rashidian, 102.
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the International Labor Organization (ILO). Membership in these organizations can be interpreted as an international recognition of the independence of Kuwait. On July 20, 1961, Kuwait became the member of the Arab League. Kuwait was admitted into the United Nations on July 29, 1961. Kuwait achieved full independence on June 19, 1961. In 1963 Iraq recognized the independence and complete sovereignty of Kuwait.

Immediate Background of the War

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was not a sudden incident, but rather the outburst of Iraq's decades-long grievances over Kuwait. The following factors caused the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait:

1. During the early 1970s, Kuwait was caught up in the Iraq-Iran dispute over the Shatt-al-Arab. Iraq's need to find some way to load large tankers without being vulnerable to Iranian military action and its reliance on a water way that was subject to silting and placed its parts within Iranian artillery range, led Iraq to seek a less vulnerable location. Iraq could not achieve such security within its own territory or territorial waters. Iraq's coastline was only 38 miles wide and the only port that was not dominated from the Iranian shore was dominated by the Kuwaiti islands.
of Warbah and Bubiyan. Having built up its port and naval facilities at Ummal Qasr, Iraq demanded access to Kuwaiti waters and territory to build an offshore oil loading facility with pipelines crossing Babiyan. Kuwait refused this demand out of fear that Iraq may permanently seize the islands. Iraq sent troops into northern Kuwait on March 20, 1973, occupying the island of Babiyan as well as the area surrounding the Kuwaiti border post at Samita and causing the closing of the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border. Relations steadily improved after 1975 and Iraq formally abandoned its claim to all of Kuwait. However, Iraq's claim over Kuwait as part of the former Ottoman province of Basra and as an integral part of the geographical unit situated to the southwest of the Shatt-al-Arab river--Iraq's neutral zone of access to the Persian Gulf--acted as a pretext to justify Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

2. The second important cause behind the war was the effect of the eight year long Iran-Iraq war which caused serious economic damage to Iraq and its domestic conditions. According to The Economist, prior to the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq's economy was in serious trouble, despite a 50 percent growth rate in 1989. Low oil prices did not help Iraq to pay

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its large debt or to purchase essential imports. Iraq's 1989 oil revenues were estimated at about $15 billion—not enough to pay for $11 billion of civilian imports (including $3 billion of food imports), $5 billion of arms, $3 billion of debt repayment, and $1 billion of transfer by foreign workers. Oil and refined oil products are the source of 97 percent of Iraq's exports. Iraq faced a 50 percent inflation rate, a food shortage and unemployment of soldiers who were to be demobilized from the Iran-Iraq war. Iraq's dependence on oil and imported food for its revenues increased many times over since its war with Iran. In addition, Iraq increased its dependence on imported raw materials and manufactures. In 1989, nearly half of all imports came from the United States and the European community, and 10 percent from Turkey. These domestic conditions were important factors prior to the invasion of Kuwait.\textsuperscript{18}

3. The Iraqi regime accused Arab Emirates of launching an economic war against Iraq. Iraq demanded that the Arab states had been violating the organization of petroleum exporting countries (OPEC) quotas. In fact, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates were the major offenders, as Iraq claimed.

Kuwait's OPEC quota was 1.5 million barrels a day, but for some time Kuwait had actually produced 2.4 million barrels a day, which was considered a major factor in depressing the prices of oil. Iraq argued that these depressed oil prices were making it impossible for Iraq to recover economically. The violation of oil quotas was considered by Saddam Hussein as economic war against Iraq.¹⁹

4. Kuwait’s importance to the international economy is far beyond its size. It sits atop the fourth largest oil reserve in the world. If Saddam could have added the Kuwait’s oil resources to Iraq’s and used his superior military might to bully Saudi Arabia and smaller Gulf oil states into supporting Iraq’s position in OPEC, he could have dominated the oil production and pricing policies. ²⁰

5. Iraq’s effort to acquire nuclear weapons and its stocks of conventional, chemical and biological weapons made that country a long-term military threat to the entire Middle East and perhaps beyond.²¹

6. Iraq’s government had demonstrated an appetite for military conquest and a capacity for shaking the security of the region. Since 1980, Iraq had invaded Iran, resorted to the use of chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers, and


²⁰The Middle East, 8th edition (Congressional Quarterly), 109.

²¹Ibid.
fired ballistic missiles against Iranian citizens. In addition, it used poisoned gas against its own Kurdish population during a campaign to eliminate the Kurdish resistance movement. These aggressive acts, combined with the restrained world reaction to Iraq's behavior, gave Iraq the courage needed to invade Kuwait.22

7. Although Iraq had claimed victory in its war with Iran, there had been no profit in it. Iraq had a difficult time recovering from the war. Saddam Hussein sought help from Kuwait, the Emirates and Saudi Arabia. He argued that Iraq's long and costly war with Iran had not been Iraq's private business but the defense of the entire Arab world against Iran's shift in fundamentalism. He had made a number of demands. First of all, he wanted Kuwait, Emirates and Saudi Arabia to forgive their loans to Iraq. Second, he wanted Kuwait to pay Iraq 2.4 billion for the oil stolen from Iraq through eight wells dug into the Rumaila oil field on Iraq's side of the border. But all his demands were rejected by the fellow Arab leaders with the Emir of Kuwait in the lead.23

8. Iraq's ambition was to assume a leading role in the entire Arab world. It had expected to achieve it by means of the war against Iran, but the way it conducted that war on the ground did not allow Baghdad to benefit on the Arab

22Ibid.
23Hillsman, 42.
scene and eventually added to its harsh frustrations. The strategic advantages expected to achieve from a takeover of Kuwait were to make up for the earlier war time failures, and render Iraq a leading and pivotal Arab force after all.24

9. During the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam Hussein reestablished diplomatic ties with the United States, although Iraq had been identified as a terrorist state. These ties had been broken by Iraq in 1958. Since he opposed Iran and the Khomeni, he became the incarnation of the old saying, "The enemy of my enemy is my friend." To help Iraq in its war with Iran, the CIA passed to Iraqi intelligence services information on Iran gathered by its spy satellites. The U.S. extended agricultural credits to Iraq and American banks were encouraged to lend the Iraqis money. The Reagan administration remained silent when Iraq used intermediate range ballistic missiles against Iranian cities. As payment for his sacrifice in opposing the Iranian revolutionaries, he was rewarded with huge amounts of assistance, notably weaponry. His stock rose to the point that when an Iraqi missile slammed into the USS Starke, killing several Americans on a Kuwaiti reflagging mission, there was hardly a murmur of condemnation. Likewise, when he gassed Kurds within his own territory, the international system treated the act with disingenuousness, as a doubtful occurrence but an internal act under the circumstances. In fact, the end of

24Alpher, 8.
the Iran-Iraq war left Iraq with an impressive arsenal of weapons.\textsuperscript{25} After U.S. troops were sent to the Middle East, a joke going around the Pentagon was that if an American soldier got shot, it would probably be with a Soviet bullet. But if he was wounded by a chemical or biological warhead, the missile would probably have been designed by an American computer. Actually, this huge arsenal of weapons provoked Saddam Hussein to invade Kuwait and made him confident to sustain its control over Kuwait.\textsuperscript{26}

10. In spite of the strains in U.S.-Iraq relations, Saddam Hussein ironically seems to have had good reason to believe that the United States had given him the green light to invade Kuwait. A few days before the Iraqi attack on Kuwait, Hussein called on the American Ambassador, April Glaspie. He repeated his complaints that Kuwait had violated the OPEC agreements on oil supplies and prices, and that Kuwait had stolen Iraqi oil by digging slant wells under the border to tap the oil deposits on the Iraqi side of the Rumaila oil field. Moreover, Hussein's feeling was that in 1923, Great Britain gave Kuwait the two uninhabited islands that blocked the approach to the Iraqi port, fixing the borders of Iraq in such a way as to deny Iraq a port on the

\textsuperscript{25}Snow, 184.
\textsuperscript{26}Hillsman, 40.
Gulf. Saddam Hussein obviously thought that he had a strong case for moving against Kuwait.\(^{27}\)

In his meeting with Ambassador Glaspie, Saddam Hussein threatened not only to use force against Kuwait, but also against the United States if tried to stop him. Ambassador Glaspie, acting on the instructions from President Bush and the State Department, replied that the "United States had no opinion on the Arab v. Arab conflict such as Iraq's dispute with Kuwait, although it opposed the use of force and continued to support its friends in the region."\(^{28}\) Hussein interpreted this as U.S. permission to march into Kuwait. Moreover, Glaspie herself indirectly admitted that she knew of his intentions to attack Kuwait when she informed the New York Times in September 1990: "Obviously I did not think—and nobody else did—that the Iraqis were going to take all of Kuwait."\(^{29}\)

It is obvious that the United States clearly underestimated the Iraqi capacity to attack Kuwait despite the Iraqi threats. Ambassador April Glaspie explained to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 1991 that the reason for ignoring Saddam's warnings was that "We foolishly

\(^{27}\)Ibid., 43.


\(^{29}\)The U.S. Ambassador in Baghdad was interviewed by the New York Times in September 1990.
did not realize he was stupid and impervious to logic and diplomacy."  

Any fair analysis of the situation should not hide any fact regarding this conflict. Saddam Hussein invited the U.S. ambassador to Baghdad on July 25, 1990. Although there were differences between the Iraqi and the U.S. versions of what happened in that meeting, Congressional leaders who had seen the coded cables received from the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad later confirmed the accuracy of the Iraqi version. While stressing the desire of the U.S. government to see the Gulf Crisis resolved peacefully, U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie, directed by the State Department and President Bush, may have misled Saddam Hussein regarding the position of the United States toward the situation in the Gulf.

According to Omar Ali, Ambassador Glaspie made the following five mistakes:

1. The ambassador did not sternly warn President Saddam Hussein that the U.S. government was aware of the concentration of Iraqi troops on the Kuwaiti borders and that the occupation would be met with force.

2. On the contrary, the ambassador flattered Saddam Hussein and was apologetic for the campaign against him in the U.S. Congress and the media. The ambassador even told

30Quoted Snow, 18.

Saddam Hussein that many in the United States agreed that the price of oil should go up to $25 per barrel.

3. The U.S. ambassador again failed to warn Saddam Hussein when he informed her about his pledge to President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, that Iraq would not use force while the negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait, expected to commence within a few days, were going on. In view of the drastic measures later taken by the United States unilaterally and through the United Nations, the ambassador should have informed Saddam Hussein that the charter of the United Nations contains other options to settle conflicts by peaceful means, options such as arbitration or referral to the ICJ.

4. The ambassador made yet another mistake by informing Saddam Hussein that the US government did not have an opinion on the border dispute between Iraq and Kuwait. According to Omar Ali, if that was the case, then why, after Iraq’s defeat, did the United States and Britain push through the Security Council the 1932 demarcation of the borders between Iraq and Kuwait? Why did the ambassador fail to inform President Hussein that the United States considered the border as agreed upon in 1932 as the legal frontiers between the countries? Or she could also have informed him that if Iraq refused to return to these borders, it would have to agree to submit the dispute to settlement by other peaceful means. For example, Egypt and
Israel were able to settle the dispute on Taba Coastal Strip with the help of the United States, which convinced the two countries to solve the dispute by peaceful means. Now Bahrain and Qatar have agreed to submit their borders dispute to the ICJ. After listening to Saddam Hussein's explanation about the border dispute and Iraqi historical claims with regard to the border with Kuwait, the UN Secretary-General suggested it would be helpful if Iraq agreed to submit the border dispute to the ICJ, but this was done after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Furthermore, Saddam Hussein might have wanted to know what the reaction of the United States would be if he decided to use force against Kuwait.

5. The ambassador told Saddam Hussein that the United States did not have a defense treaty with any country in the Arabian Gulf. Although true, this statement may have been the final clue to Saddam Hussein's decision to attack Kuwait. Many Arabs who sympathized with Iraq and who did not want to see a war between Arab countries described this interview as an enticement to Saddam Hussein.32

Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait

On August 2, 1990, Iraqi military force, on order from Saddam Hussein, crossed the Kuwaiti border and occupied the entire country within six hours, after which Hussein

32Ibid., 88-89.
announced that Kuwait was being incorporated into Iraq as an "eternal merger." In fact, the world was visibly surprised when Iraqi forces moved across the border and overwhelmingly defeated the tiny Kuwait armed forces. The Emir, Sheik Jaber al-Ahmed al-Sabah and his entourage rapidly fled to Saudi Arabia. After the consolidation of occupation, Baghdad announced Kuwait as the nineteenth Province of Iraq. It has been reported that the Iraqi occupation was bloody and destructive. The Iraqi deliberately destroyed many of the country's wealth and assets, much of what had no strategic or military purpose or benefit, causing a flood of refugees out of Kuwait. In reaction, the Kuwaiti embassy in Washington hired publicity firms regarding the Iraqi destruction of occupied Kuwait, looting by the Iraqi troops for the country's wealth, torture and summary executions of Kuwaiti citizens, and more. The story of the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador who claimed that Iraqi troops took incubators from Kuwaiti children, is well known as an effort to gain public support to remove Iraq from Kuwait. This story proved false and became an embarrassing issue because it was part of the Kuwaiti publicity campaign. It became more embarrassing because she did not reveal her true identity as the daughter of the ambassador, as discovered

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33Hillsman, 45.

34The Middle East, 8th edition, 111.
later by a journalist. 35 It was also reported that during the invasion, she was outside Kuwait. Ali charges that congressional supporters of Israel knew of her identity but failed to reveal it. 36

U.S. Response to the Crisis

Immediately after the Iraqi invasion, on August 2, 1990, the United States demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and called for an emergency session of the United Nations. 37 In fact, President Bush's primary concern on the day after the invasion was deterring an Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia. The Saudi's massive oil reserves were vital to both U.S. and world economy. He called a full National Security Council (NSC) meeting to discuss the matter.

General Colin Powell, head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pointed out the President called a full NSC meeting for 8:00 a.m. the next day. The talk was disjointed and unfocused, as much time was spent discussing the impact of the invasion on the price of oil and on how we should respond to Saddam's aggression. According to Powell, Bill

35 Ali, 92.

36 Ibid., 94.

Webster, the CIA director, gave a bleak status report. He said:

The Iraqis are within eight tenths of a mile of the Saudi border. If Saddam stays where he is, he'll own twenty percent of the world's oil reserves. And a few miles away he can seize another twenty percent. He'll have easy access to the sea from Kuwaiti ports. Jordan and Yemen will probably tilt toward him, and he'll be in a position to extort the others. We can expect the Arab states to start cutting deals. Iran will be at Iraq's feet. Israel will be threatened.\(^{38}\)

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Saddam's threat to gain control over the Saudi oil became a major concern of President Bush and his National Security Council, most of whom would seek a military response to the crisis. President Bush drew a line in the sand for Saddam Hussein and went "the extra mile for the war option." The military option was immediately considered by the policy makers in Washington. Generals Powell and Schwarzkopf were already representing their military plan to the White House. A full scale military offensive deployment was prepared to move to Saudi Arabia. President Bush pressed the Saudi Arabian government to allow American soldiers to be stationed in that country to defend it from any attempt by Saddam Hussein to cross the border. President Bush had already made up his mind to send troops. Secretary Cheney was appointed to lead the delegation team to convince King Fahad to allow the deployment of U.S. military troops in his country.

General Schwarzkopf, one of the most important members of the team, stated that only Secretary Cheney and he were to speak. According to Schwarzkopf, Secretary Cheney made a few remarks during the meeting with the king about the gravity of the situation, and then said:

Here is the message that President Bush has instructed me to convey. We are prepared to deploy these forces to defend the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. If you ask us, we will come. We will seek no permanent bases. And when you ask us to go home, we will leave.

General Schwarzkopf briefed the king on the situation by showing the king satellite intelligence photographs of Iraqi missiles pointed at Saudi Arabia and Iraqi forces massing near the Saudi border. The king, after discussion among the members of the royal family, turned to Cheney and said, "Okay," allowing the deployment of U.S. forces in his country.39

Meanwhile the diplomatic issue quickly moved to the United Nations. The Americans and the Soviets took the lead in introducing a series of resolutions under Chapter VII of the U.N. charter. This chapter referred to action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of peace, and acts of aggression. Under this charter, Article 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, and 51, all of which authorized the Security Council to act upon any given

situation to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with the situation. The U.N. Security Council, led by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, introduce a series of resolutions under Chapter VII of the U.N. charter, which authorizes collective security actions regarding the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. These resolutions are:

1. Resolution 660 (1990). Adopted by the Security Council at its 2932nd meeting on 2 August 1990. The Security Council, alarmed by the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 by the military forces of Iraq, determining that there exists a breach of international peace and security as regards the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Acting under Articles 39 and 40 of the charter of the U.N.

   a. condemns the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait,
   b. demands that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990,
   c. calls upon Iraq and Kuwait to begin immediately intensive negotiations for the resolution of their differences and supports all efforts in this regard, and especially those of the League of Arab States,

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d. decides to meet again as necessary to consider further steps to ensure compliance with the present resolution.

2. Resolution 661 (1990). Adopted by the Security Council at its 2933rd meeting on 6 August 1990. Reaffirming its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990. Noting that resolution 660 has not been implemented by Iraq and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait continues with further loss of human life and material destruction, and called upon the adoption of resolution 661 by the Security Council acting under Article 42 of Chapter VII of the U.N. charter for economic sanctions against Iraq and demand Iraq's total and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.

3. Resolution 662 (1990). Adopted by the Security Council at its 2934th meeting on 9 August 1990. Recalling its resolution 660 (1990) and 661 (1990). Gravely alarmed by the declaration by Iraq of a "comprehensive and eternal merger" with Kuwait, demanding, once again, that Iraq withdrew immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990.

4. Resolution 664 (1990). Adopted by the Security Council at its 2937th meeting on 18 August 1990. Recalling the Iraqi invasion and purported annexation of Kuwait and resolutions 660, 661, and 662, deeply concerned for the safety and well being of third state nationals in Iraq and Kuwait and demands that Iraq permit and facilitate the
immediate departure from Kuwait and Iraq of the nationals of third countries and grant immediate and continuing access of consular officials to such nationals; Iraq take no action to jeopardize the safety, security or health of such nationals, in addition, compliance with the former resolutions.


6. Resolution 666 (1990). Adopted by the Security Council at its 2939th meeting on 13 September 1990. Recalling its resolution 661 (1990), paragraphs 3(c) and 4 of which apply, except in humanitarian circumstances, to foodstuffs. Recognizing that circumstances may arise in which it will be necessary for foodstuffs to be supplied to the civilian population in Iraq or Kuwait in order to relieve human suffering.

7. Resolution 667 (1990). Adopted by the Security Council at its 2940th meeting on 16 September 1990. Reaffirming its resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990), and 666 (1990) considering that the decision of Iraq to order the closure of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and to withdraw the immunity and privileges of these missions and their personnel is contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, the
international conventions of 18 April 1961 on diplomatic relations and of 24 April 1963 on consular relations, to both of which Iraq is a party, and the international law. Acting under Chapter VII of the charter of the U.N., the Security Council determined to ensure respect or its decisions and or Article 25 of the charter of the U.N., deeply concerned that Iraq, notwithstanding the decisions of the Security Council and the provisions of the conventions mentioned above, has committed acts of violence against diplomatic missions and their personnel in Kuwait, the council consider not only to express its immediate reaction but also to consider further concrete measures to ensure Iraq's compliance with the council's resolutions.


9. Resolution 670 (1990. Adopted by the Security Council at its 2943rd meeting on 25 September 1990. The Security Council, reaffirming its resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990), 666 (1990) and 667 (1990) condemning Iraq's violation of these resolutions and of international law, and the treatment of Iraqi forces of Kuwaiti nationals, including measures to force them to leave their own country and mistreatment of
persons and property in Kuwait in violation of international law. The Security Council determined to ensure by all necessary means the strict and complete application of the measures laid down in resolution 661 (1990), and to ensure respect for its decisions and the provisions of Article 25 and 48 of the charter of the U.N.

10. Resolution 674 (1990). Adopted by the Security Council at its 2951st meeting on 29 October 1990. Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990), 666 (1990), 667 (1990) and 670 (1990). The Security Council stressing the urgent need for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait, for the restoration of Kuwait's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, and of the authority of its legitimate government. Condemning the actions by the Iraqi authorities and occupying forces to take third state nationals hostage and to mistreat and oppress Kuwait and third state nationals, and the other actions reported to the Security Council such as the destruction of Kuwaiti demographic records, forced departure of Kuwaitis, and relocation of population in Kuwait and the unlawful destruction and seizure of public and private property in Kuwait including hospital supplies and equipment, in violation of the decisions of this Council, the charter of the U.N.'s, the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Vienna
Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations and international law.


the charter of the United Nations for the maintenance and preservation of international peace and security. The Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the charter, determined to secure full compliance with its decision:

1. demand that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and decides, while maintaining all its decisions, to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of goodwill, to do so;

2. authorizes member states cooperating with the government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements, as set forth in paragraph 1 above, the foregoing resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area;

3. requests all states to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken in pursuance of paragraph 2 of the present resolution;

4. requests the states concerned to keep the Security Council regularly informed on the progress of actions undertaken pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the present resolution;
5. decides to remain seized of matter.\textsuperscript{41}

In fact, soon after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Bush administration decided to make the U.N. the center of international legitimacy for any actions against Iraq. The Bush administration launched a diplomatic campaign to carry out the diplomatic issue through the U.N. to create an anti-Iraq consensus within the international community. As mentioned before, the Bush administration succeeded in building an international attitude against Iraq in the U.N. which ended with the adoption of many U.N. Security Council resolutions following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and its aftermath. However, the Bush administration found that the Soviet Union agreed to use the UN charter as a justification for stopping Iraq's aggression. When Bush decided to make the U.N. the centerpiece for U.S. action, he never had been a U.N. champion, but to get help from other allies and to appeal to the moral sense of Americans, Bush found that the use of U.N. served the interests of both the Arab states and the Soviet Union, which would have had difficulty in simply backing the unilateral decisions of the United States.\textsuperscript{42}

According to Lester, Bush and Secretary of State James Baker used every possible means to get unanimous U.N. Security


Council backing for the U.S. decisions and to maintain U.S. control of the military command in Saudi Arabia. Through phone calls, personal contacts, economic packages and diplomatic favors, Bush and Baker maneuvered UNSC votes much more than they could control votes in the U.S. Congress.

These U.N.S.C. votes has been conducted as follows:

August 2, 1990 - Resolution 660
Condemns invasion. Demands unconditional and immediate withdrawal.
Vote: 14 for, 0 against, 1 abstention (Yemen)

August 6, 1990 - Resolution 661
Imposes economic sanctions. Authorizes non-military measures to enforce trade sanctions.
Vote: 13 for, 2 abstentions (Yemen and Cuba)

August 9, 1990 - Resolution 662
Declares Iraq's annexation of Kuwait null and void.
Vote: Unanimous (15-0)

August 18, 1990 - Resolution 664
Condemns Iraq for holding foreign nationals hostage and demands their immediate release.
Vote: Unanimous (15-0)

August 25, 1990 - Resolution 665
Outlaws all trade with Iraq by land, sea, and air. Bars financial dealings with all U.N. members.
Vote: 13 for, 2 abstentions (Yemen and Cuba)
September 13, 1990 - Resolution 666
Establishes guidelines for humanitarian food aid to Iraq and occupied Kuwait.
Vote: 13 for, 2 opposed (Yemen and Cuba)

September 16, 1990 - Resolution 667
Condemns Iraq for violence against foreign embassies and diplomats in Kuwait. Demands protection for diplomatic and consular personnel.
Vote: Unanimous (15-0)

September 24, 1990 - Resolution 669
Agrees to consider exceptions to Resolution 661 for shipment of humanitarian supplies and authorizes examination of requests for economic assistance under Article 50.
Vote: Unanimous (15-0)

September 25, 1990 - Resolution 670
Tightens embargo on air traffic and authorizes detention of Iraq's merchant fleet.
Vote: Unanimous (15-0)

October 29, 1990 - Resolution 674
Holds Iraq responsible for all financial losses resulting from invasion and seeks evidence of human rights abuses by Iraqi troops in Kuwait. Calls for the release of third-country nationals and the provision of food to those being held against their will.
Vote: 13 for, 2 abstentions (Yemen and Cuba)
November 28, 1990 - Resolution 677
Condemns Iraqi attempts to alter the demographic composition of Kuwait and destroy the civil records maintained by the legitimate government of Kuwait. Mandates Secretary General to take custody of a copy of the Kuwaiti population register.
Vote: Unanimous (15-0)

November 29, 1990 - Resolution 678
Authorizes "member states cooperating with the government of Kuwait" to use "all necessary means" to uphold the above resolutions, while giving Iraq "one final opportunity, as a pause of goodwill" to abide by the resolutions by January 15, 1991.
Vote: 12 for, 2 against (Yemen and Cuba), 1 abstention (China).43

Bush had gained the support of the Soviet Union in addition to his NATO allies, who in the end made it easy to gain additional U.N. actions against Iraq. Between August 2 and November 29, 1990, the U.N. Security Council passed ten resolutions, in addition to resolution 660 and 661, which had condemned the conquest of Kuwait and called for economic sanctions. The most crucial were resolution 678, which set a deadline for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait on January 15, 1991, authorizing the use of force, under Article 44 of

43Department of State Dispatch, vol. 1, no. 14 (3 December 1990), 296.
Chapter VII of the U.N. charter, to force the Iraqi withdrawal. It was the first time such a vote had been taken by the U.N. Security Council and the adoption of that number of resolutions in that short period of time. Finally, the U.N. Security Council's resolutions were used by the U.S. and its allies not only to condemn Iraq, but to justify actions being taken by the U.S.-led multinational force. In 1990, George Bush's new world order included the U.N., especially if the U.S. could dominate it.44 However, the U.S. responses to the crisis are listed below.

Deployment of US Troops in Saudi Arabia

Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the United States was worried about a probable Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia, which could jeopardize the Saudi's massive oil reserves and threaten vital U.S. interests. After the invasion, U.S. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney met with King Fahad of Saudi Arabia. King Fahad invited American troops into Saudi Arabia to protect the kingdom against any further advance by the Iraqi army. This deployment was termed Operation Desert Shield. On August 6, 1990, President Bush ordered a U.S. military build-up in the Persian Gulf that was to reach the level of 500,000 US men and women in the brief period of five and a half months.45 The build-up of

44Lester., 59.

45Snow, 187.
Desert Shield was an unprecedented achievement in logistics with a stunning flow of weaponry, personnel, equipment and supplies sent a long way in a short period of time. King Fahad also asked the United States to invite the Arab and Muslim forces to join the defensive coalition. The Gulf states of Qatar, Oman, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates sent 5500 troops while Egypt sent 30,000, Syria sent 21,000, while other Muslim states such as Pakistan, Senegal and Bangladesh sent token forces. Throughout the crisis, Great Britain was the staunchest western ally of the United States. It contributed 35,000 troops, the largest western contingent to the multi-national force, next to the United States. It also provided unqualified support to the US initiatives. France also made a sizable contribution with 17,000 forces. Actually, the United States encouraged broad international participation in the military effort to defend Saudi Arabia and enforce UN sanctions. The Bush administration succeeded in building a broad multinational coalition that proved to be enduring and resilient. More than two dozen nations contributed combat forces to the defense of Saudi Arabia and the eventual liberation of Kuwait. On November 8, 1990, the Bush administration renamed Operation Desert Shield to Operation Desert Storm, by

46Wells, 455.

47Snow, 187.
sending offensive weaponry and infantry to the Gulf to force Iraq out of Kuwait.

**TABLE 9**

**CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MULTINATIONAL COALITION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Troops/Tanks/Planes/Aircraft/Personnel</th>
<th>Troops/Tanks/Planes/Aircraft/Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>100 troops, 2 transport planes and 2 warships</td>
<td>Morocco-2000 troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2 warships, 1 supply ship</td>
<td>Netherlands-3 warships and 18 combat aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>6000 troops</td>
<td>New Zealand-2 transport planes and medical personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2 mine sweepers, 1 supply ship, 3 other ships and 6 transport planes</td>
<td>Niger-480 troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Medical personnel</td>
<td>Norway-1 support ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2 warships, 1 supply ship, 18 combat aircraft, 12 other planes</td>
<td>Pakistan-5000 troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>200 chemical defense troops and 150 medical personnel</td>
<td>Poland-Medical personnel and 1 hospital ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1 ship</td>
<td>Portugal-1 transport ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>30,000 troops, 400 tanks</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia-66,000 troops, 550 tanks and 300 planes and 8 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>17,000 troops, 350 tanks, 38 combat aircraft and 14 ships</td>
<td>Senegal-500 troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>5 mine sweepers and 3 other ships in the eastern Mediterranean and 18 war planes</td>
<td>Soviet Union-4 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>35,000 troops, 120 tanks, 60 combat aircraft and 18 ships</td>
<td>Spain-3 war ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1 ship</td>
<td>Sweden-Medical personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) combined force of 10,000 frontline troops</td>
<td>Syria-19,000 troops deployed in Saudi Arabia, 50,000 deployed along the Iraqi-Syrian border and 270 tanks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>7,000 frontline troops, 34 combat aircraft</td>
<td>Turkey-100,000 troops deployed along the Iraqi-Turkish border, 2 warships in Persian Gulf and 7 ships in the eastern Mediterranean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>United States-430,000 troops, 2000 tanks, 1800 combat aircraft and more than 100 ships including 6 aircraft carriers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

U.N. Sanctions

Soon after the Iraqi invasion, the Bush administration decided to make the U.N. the centerpiece for any actions against Iraq. The Bush administration launched a diplomatic campaign to create an anti-Iraq consensus within the international community. The United Nations Security Council became the focus of this campaign.

On August 2, 1990, the same day of Iraqi invasion, Thomas Pickering, the U.N. Ambassador to the U.S., led the Security Council in adopting resolution 660 which condemned the aggression and called for an immediate Iraqi withdrawal.\footnote{The U.N. Security Council resolution 660 (1990). The resolution was adopted by a vote of 14 in favor, 0 opposed, 1 abstention (Yemen).} Four days later, the Security Council passed Resolution 661, which established an almost total embargo on Iraqi commerce. The embargo was to include all imports going to and exports coming from Iraq, except for humanitarian shipments of medicine and food.\footnote{The U.N. Security Council resolution 661 (1990). The resolution was adopted by a vote of 13 in favor, 0 opposed, and 2 abstentions (Yemen and Cuba).} Iraq was particularly vulnerable to complete economic embargo because it depended almost completely on oil exports for foreign earning and it imported about 75 percent of its food. Resolution 661 called for all U.N. member states to observe the embargo. Resolution 661 (1990) was adopted by the Security Council at its 2933rd meeting on 6 August 1990.
The Security Council reaffirmed its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990, deeply concerned that that resolution has not been implemented and that the invasion by Iraq of Kuwait continues with further loss of human life and material destruction.

Determined to bring the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq to an end and to restore the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait.

Noting that the legitimate government of Kuwait has expressed its readiness to comply with resolution 660 (1990).

Mindful of its responsibilities under the charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Affirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of the charter. Acting under Chapter VII of the charter of the United Nations:

1. Determines that Iraq so far has failed to comply with paragraph 2 of resolution 660 (1990) and has usurped the authority of the legitimate government of Kuwait,

2. Decides, as consequence, to take the following measures to secure compliance of Iraq with paragraph 2 of resolution 660 (1990) and to restore the authority of the legitimate government of Kuwait;
3. Decides that all states shall prevent:

(a) The import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait exported there from after the date of the present resolution;

(b) Any activities by their nationals on in their territories which would promote or are calculated to promote the export or trans-shipment of any commodities or products from Iraq or Kuwait, and any dealings by their nationals or their flag vessels or in their territories in any commodities or products originating in Iraq or Kuwait and exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to Iraq or Kuwait for the purposes of such activities or dealings;

(c) The sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels of any commodities or products, including weapons or any other military equipment, whether or not originating in their territories but not included supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in humanitarian circumstances, food stuffs, to any person or body in Iraq or Kuwait or to any person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from Iraq or Kuwait, and
any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote such sales or supply of such commodities or products;

4. Decides that all states shall not make available to the government of Iraq or to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in Iraq or Kuwait, any funds or any other financial or economic resources and shall prevent their nationals and any persons within their territories from removing from their territories or otherwise making available to that government or to any such undertaking any such funds or resources and from remitting any other funds to persons or bodies within Iraq or Kuwait, except payments exclusively for strictly medical or humanitarian purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs;

5. Calls upon all states, including states non-members of the United Nations, to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution notwithstanding any contract entered into or license granted before the date of the present resolution;

6. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations and recommendations:
(a) To examine the reports on the progress of the implementation of the present resolution which will be submitted by the Secretary-General;

(b) To seek from all states further information regarding the action taken by them concerning the effective implementation of the provisions laid down in the present resolution;

7. Calls upon all states to cooperate fully with the committee in the fulfillment of its task, including supplying such information as may be sought by the committee in pursuance of the present resolution;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance to the committee and to make the necessary arrangements in the secretariat for the purpose;

9. Decides that, notwithstanding paragraphs 4 through 8 above, nothing in the present resolution shall prohibit assistance to the legitimate government of Kuwait, and calls upon all states:

   (a) to take appropriate measures to protect assets of the legitimate government of Kuwait and its agencies;

   (b) not to recognize any regime set up by the occupying power;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the progress of the implementation of the present
resolution, the first report to be submitted within thirty days;

11. Decides to keep this item on its agenda and to continue its efforts to put an early end to the invasion by Iraq.50

It is clear that resolution 661 (1990) provided no explicit authorization of a military blockade to enforce the sanction. The United States insisted that it had the right to use military force to prevent break of an embargo.51 On August 16, 1990, U.S. naval forces in the Gulf began interdicting ships carrying cargo to or from Iraq. The British concurred in this judgment but the other three permanent members of the Security Council, the French, Chinese and Soviets, claimed that a new resolution was necessary if military force were to be used to prevent leakage through the embargo. On August 25, after much lobbying by the United States, the Security Council passed resolution 665, which authorized the use of force necessary to ensure compliance with the embargo against Iraq.52


The Security Council:


51The Middle East, 8th edition, 114.

52Ibid., 114.
Recalling its resolution 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990) and 664 (1990) and demanding their full and immediate implementation.

Having decided in resolution 661 (1990) to impose economic sanctions under Chapter VII of the charter of the United Nations.

Determined to bring an end to the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq which imperils the existence of a member states and to restore the legitimate authority, and the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait which requires the speedy implementation of the above resolutions.

Deploring the loss of innocent life stemming from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and determined to prevent further such losses.

Gravely alarmed that Iraq continues to refuse to comply with resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), and 664 (1990) and in particular at the conduct of government of Iraq in using Iraqi flag vessels to export oil.

1. Calls upon those member states cooperating with the government of Kuwait which are deploying maritime forces to the area to use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the
provisions related to such shipping laid down in resolution 661 (1990);

2. Invites member states accordingly to cooperate as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the provisions of resolution 661 (1990) with maximum use of political and diplomatic measures, in accordance with paragraph 1 above;

3. Requests all states to provide in accordance with the charter such assistance as may be required by the states referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution;

4. Further requests the states concerned to coordinate their actions in pursuit of the above paragraphs of this resolution using as appropriate mechanisms of the military staff committee and after consultation with the Secretary-General to submit reports to the Security Council and its committee established under resolution 661 (1990) to facilitate the monitoring of implementation of this resolution;

5. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.53

In fact, between August 2 and November 29, 1990, the U.N. Security Council passed 10 resolutions in addition to 660 and 661, which condemned the invasion of Kuwait and called for economic sanctions. The most crucial were resolution 665 and 670, which permitted the enforcement of naval and air embargo against Iraq and Kuwait and resolution

678, which set a deadline (January 15) for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, after which the allies could use "all necessary means" to force a withdrawal. In fact, the U.N. blockade quickly succeeded in cutting off virtually all of Iraq's exports and by some estimates 90 percent of its imports.

**U.S. Congressional Approval for the Use of Force**

Since the end of World War II, American presidents have employed the armed forces in actions short of war over two hundred times. 55

Regarding the president's decision, James Meernik wrote:

> The literature on U.S. foreign policy making unambiguously demonstrates that because of his constitutional prerogatives and political incentives as well as congressional weakness in foreign policy, it is the president who exercises supreme control over the nation's military actions. 56

This has been considered as the opportunities for presidents to use military forces for political purposes. However, specific events ought to alert presidents to threats to American political, economic, and military interests. International events, where the president have

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56 Ibid., 122.
reason to consider as a threat to the United States, also motivated the President to use military forces as a policy option where there was evidence of one of the following:

1. The situation involved a perceived current threat to the territorial security of U.S. its current allies, major clients, or proxy states;

2. The situation posed a perceived danger to U.S. government, military, or diplomatic personnel, to significant number of U.S. citizens, or to U.S. assets;

3. Events were perceived as having led, or likely to lead to advances by ideologically committed opponents of the U.S. (i.e., communists or "extreme leftists" broadly defined) be they states, regimes, or regime contenders;

4. Events were perceived as likely to lead to losses of U.S. influence in regions perceived as within the U.S. sphere of influence, especially viewed as Central and South America;

5. Events involved inter-state military conflict of potential consequence: in human and strategic terms, or events, because of civil disorder, threatened destruction of substantial number of persons.57

According to Meernik, opportunities to use force may be divided into five different categories of events. First are cases containing major threats to the U.S. itself, its NATO allies, Japan, South Korea, and other states with whom the

57Ibid., 123.
U.S. enjoys particularly close relations, such as the various incidents regarding the status of Berlin and incidents along the demilitarized zone in Korea. Second, there are actions taken by governmental or non-governmental actors regarding U.S. military forces, government personnel, civilians, property, or economic assets. For example, Fidel Castro's nationalization of American business in Cuba in the early 1960s. North Korea's capture of the U.S. Pueblo, or the takeover of the U.S. embassy in Iran in 1979, all fall under this type of opportunity to use force. Third, there are the instances in which the Soviet Union or other communist guerrilla groups attempted to advance their interests, such as Vietnam, Laos, Angola, and Afghanistan. Fourth, are those events taking place in the western hemisphere, such as the riots in Colombia in 1948, the various insurgency movements in El Salvador and Nicaragua, and the military coups in Brazil (1964) and Chile (1973). Finally, there are the major wars of concern to the U.S. for their potentially disruptive effects, such as the Iran-Iraq war, the various wars among Israel and her neighbors, and the conflicts between India and Pakistan.\footnote{Ibid., 125.}

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, considered as an international event, should have alerted President Bush to threats to U.S. political and economic interests in the region. However, the deployment of large
numbers of American forces in Saudi Arabia along with huge multinational forces and their war preparedness against Iraq, triggered a constitutional debate on the division of war powers between the executive and legislative branches in the United States. Most law makers asserted that, because the responsibility to declare war rested with Congress, the president did not have the power to launch a military offensive against Iraq without prior congressional approval, unless Iraq attacked U.S. forces. Having Vietnam experience in mind, and the public fear of that experience, the Congress held many sober and considered debates regarding the issue. As Congress continued to look for alternatives before granting a resolution, the President and his team, especially Secretary of State Baker and Secretary of Defense Cheney, in an effort to rally public support throughout the U.S. and abroad for Bush's policy in the Gulf, defined the U.S. goals regarding the Iraqi invasion by stating: "The mission of the American troops was defensive. A line had been drawn in the sand," he said in defense of any invasion of Saudi Arabia. The American ambassador to the U.N., Thomas R. Pickeringm hailed the decision to draw such a line as "an historic moment."59

In his August 8, 1990 speech to the nation, Bush claimed that his mission was the need to stop further aggression. He said:

59Hilsman, 47.
America does not seek conflict. Nor do we seek to chart the destiny of other nations. But America will stand by her friends. The mission of our troops is wholly defensive. Hopefully, they will not be needed long. They will not initiate hostilities but they will defend themselves, the kingdom of Saudi Arabia and other friends in the Persian Gulf.\textsuperscript{60}

Bush, also, in his August 15, 1990 speech to Pentagon employees, discussed the ramifications of Hussein over gaining control of Saudi Arabia: "Our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom and the freedom of friendly countries all around the world would suffer if control of world's great oil reserve fell into the hands of Saddam Hussein."\textsuperscript{61}

President Bush tried to explain his purpose behind sending American troops to Saudi Arabia in order to gain the American public support to his mission. He announced that the American purpose was to prevent Saddam from taking over Saudi Arabia. However, once the American troops deployed in the Gulf, and Bush had demanded the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, his position probably was similar to his campaign slogan, "Read my lips--no new taxes."

Secretary of State Baker took the same step in his October 29, 1990, address before the Los Angeles World Affair Council to explain why America was in the Gulf. Secretary of Defense Cheney, in his October 30, 1990,


\textsuperscript{61}Hilsman, 48.
address before the Pittsburgh World Affair Council, argued for U.S. strategic interests in the Gulf. In fact, despite all criticism, President Bush managed to gain support for his policy both locally and abroad. He proved to have unbounded energy and a dazzling display of personal diplomacy. He managed a massive international political campaign condemning Iraq's aggression worldwide and through the United Nations. Although he used his executive power by sending a large number of American troops to Saudi Arabia without Congress' approval, a spokesperson for the administration said that, like Reagan, Bush considered the War Powers Act unconstitutional. He sent Congress "a notification [for the dispatch of troops] consistent with the Act, rather than the formal document the Act requires." He claimed that the President's role as Commander-in-Chief empowered him to order offensive action against Iraq. The president, however, promised to consult with Congress in regard to this Gulf policy.

In early January 1990, when last ditch diplomatic efforts to persuade Iraq to withdraw failed and war became more likely, Bush appeared to have enough votes in the Congress to win approval for the war option. He sought to


63Hilsman, 47.

64The Middle East, 8th edition, 90.
rally the government and the country behind his policies by asking Congress to authorize an attack against Iraq if one became necessary in his judgment.

The U.N. Resolution 678 authorized the use of all necessary means to force Iraq to comply with all U.N. resolutions regarding the invasion of Kuwait. President Bush asked Congress to support this resolution by passing a congressional resolution authorizing the use of U.S. military forces pursuant to U.N.S.C. resolution 678, and the use of U.S. military forces against Iraq. He sent identical letters to the speaker of the House of Representatives Thomas S. Foley, Senate majority leader George J. Mitchell, Senate Republican leader Robert Dole, and House Republican leader Robert H. Michel. The letter said:

The current situation in the Persian Gulf, brought by Iraq's provoked invasion and subsequent brutal occupation of Kuwait, also threatens the peace. It would, however, greatly enhance the chances for peace if Congress were now to go on record supporting the position adopted by the U.N. Security council on twelve separate occasions. Such an action would underline that the United States stands with the international community and on the side of law and decency; it also would help dispel any belief that may exist in the minds of Iraq's leaders that the United States lacks the necessary unity to act decisively in response to Iraq's continued aggression against Kuwait. Secretary of State Baker is meeting with Iraq's Foreign Minister on January 9. It would have presented the Iraqi government a resolution passed by both houses of Congress supporting the U.N. position and in particular Security Council Resolution 678. As you know, I have frequently stated my desire for such a Resolution. Nevertheless, there is still opportunity for Congress to act to strengthen the prospects for
peace and safeguard this country's vital interests.65

The request of the President satisfied most members of Congress that the President had not usurped their war-making role. In fact, the President requested an authority to begin a military action against Iraq as soon as the U.N. Security Council deadline expired. However, on the anti-war side, many who favored giving economic sanctions more time, senators like Edward Kennedy, strongly opposed the war option and said, "Not a single drop of American blood should be spilled because American automobiles burn too many drops of oil a mile." Congressman Esteban Torres argued that "U.S. soldiers should not die in Kuwait and Iraq so that the multinational oil corporations continue to reap huge profits." Senator Biden criticized Bush's New World Order: "It will always be a matter of the U.S. leading, with Europe and Japan being content to hold our costs." On the other hand, supporters of the president's option, mostly Republicans, argued that the only way to achieve peace is to support strong military pressure on Saddam Hussein and to convince others that Saddam's effort to develop nuclear weapons which will pose a major threat to U.S. interests in the region, and Saddam could not be allowed to do so.66


Congress held three days of sober and considered debate before turning on its Democratic leaders, who favored giving sanctions more time. The Senate proceeded to consider a joint resolution regarding U.S. policy to reverse Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. The debate took directions, one favoring giving economic sanctions more time to hopefully force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. This option was represented by Senator Mitchell and Senator Nunn, called Mitchell-Nunn resolution (S.J. Res.1), which urged the Senators to vote for continuing economic sanction and diplomatic pressure. The second resolution was to authorize the use of U.S. military forces in support for U.N. Security Council Resolution 678. This resolution was represented by Senators Warner and Dole, called the Warner-Dole Resolution (S.J. Res.2). Senator Mitchell's statement urged the Senate to give sanctions more time, saying that "No one will ever be able to answer that question, if we go to war now, no one will ever know if sanctions would have worked, if given a full and fair chance." The Senate voted 53 to 46 against, so the Mitchell-Nunn Resolution (S.J. Res.1) was rejected. The second resolution (S.J. Res.2) or Warner-Dole resolution, authorizing use of U.S. Armed Forces pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 678, was considered and passed. The Senate voted 52 with and 47 against.67

67Ibid., S369; H404.
In addition, the Joint Congressional Resolution (H.J. Res.77) cited as the "Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution," was considered and passed. Both House and Senate on January 12, 1991, voted 250 with and 183 against. This joint resolution authorized the President to use United States armed forces against Iraq.

The joint resolution said in part:

Whereas in the absence of full compliance by Iraq with its resolutions, the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 678 has authorized member states of the United Nations to use all necessary means, after January 15, 1991, to uphold council resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area; and

whereas Iraq has persisted in its illegal occupation of, and brutal aggression against Kuwait:

now, therefore, be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This joint resolution may be cited as the "Authorization for use of military forces against Iraq resolution."

SECTION 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.

(a) AUTHORIZATION - The President is authorized, subject to subsection (b) to use United States Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) in order to achieve implementation of Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677.

(b) REQUIREMENT FOR DETERMINATION THAT USE OF MILITARY FORCES IS NECESSARY - Before exercising the authority granted in subsection(a), the President shall make available to the speaker of the House of Representatives and the president pro tempore of the Senate his determination that:

(1) the United States has used all appropriate diplomatic and other peaceful means to obtain compliance by Iraq with the United Nations
Security Council resolutions cited in subsection (a); and
(2) that these efforts have not been and would not be successful in obtaining such compliance.68

As required by this resolution the President responded in his report to the speaker of the House of Representatives on January 16, 1991, in which he concluded that:

1. The United States has used all appropriate diplomatic and other peaceful means to obtain compliance by Iraq with all U.N. Security Council resolutions, and

2. That those efforts have not been and would not be successful in obtaining such compliance. The president concluded that all diplomatic efforts to achieve a peaceful solution to this crisis has failed. Economic sanction, the president said, "even if sanctions were to continue to be enforced for an additional six to twelve months, economic hardship alone is highly unlikely to compel Saddam to retreat from Kuwait or cause regime-threatening popular discontent in Iraq."

With the passage of the joint congressional resolution, the president was now authorized to use U.S. armed forces against Iraq. Even before the U.N. deadline expired, the president's mind was made up to go to war. On January 14, 1991, one day before the deadline, President Bush signed a National Security Directive committing the U.S. to go to war against Iraq. In his January 14, 1991 statement on signing


the joint resolution authorizing the use of U.S. military forces against Iraq, Bush said in part:

Today I am signing H.J. Res 77, the "authorization for use of military forces against Iraq resolution." By passing H.J. Res 77, the Congress of the United States has expressed its approval of the use of U.S. armed forces consistent with U.N. Security Council Resolution 678. I asked the Congress to support implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 because such action would send the clearest possible message to Saddam Hussein that he must withdraw from Kuwait without condition or delay. I am grateful to those of both political parties who joined in the expression of resolve embodied in this resolution. To all, I emphasize again my conviction that this resolution provides the best hope for peace.\(^70\)

President Bush argued that this resolution provided the best hope for peace while he was preparing for war. For more than five months, the military build up and preparation had no other meaning except war. When he asked why he ordered more troops to the Gulf, he said "I remain hopeful that we can achieve a peaceful solution to this crisis. But if force is required we will have enough power to get the job done."\(^71\) He also said, "I will never-ever-agree to a halfway effort." From the very beginning, President Bush seemed determined to go to war. He drew his conclusion that only the use of armed forces would achieve an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. In his letter to the Congress regarding his


\(^71\)Department of State Dispatch, vol. 1, no. 14, (3 December 1990), 296.
decision to commence military operations against Iraq on January 16, 1991, President Bush said in part:

My determination that appropriate diplomatic and other peaceful means had not and would not compel Iraq to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait and meet the other requirements of the U.N. Security Council and the world community. With great reluctance, I concluded, as did the other coalition leaders, that only the use of armed force would achieve an Iraqi withdrawal together with the other U.N. goals of restoring Kuwait's legitimate government, practicing the lives of our citizens, and re-establishing security and stability in the Persian Gulf region. Consisting with the War Power Resolution, I now inform you that pursuant to my authority as Commander in Chief, I directed U.S. Armed Forces to commence combat operations on January 16, 1991, against Iraqi forces and military targets in Iraq and Kuwait. The Armed Forces of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Canada are participating as well.\(^{72}\)

In fact, with the passage of the congressional approval, and once the U.N. deadline had passed, the war against Iraq began.

*Operation Desert Storm and the Liberation of Kuwait*


The Security Council:


\(^{72}\)U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st sess., 18 January 1991, 1.
Noting that, despite all efforts by the United Nations, Iraq refuses to comply with its obligation to implement resolution 660 (1990) and the above-mentioned subsequent relevant resolutions, in flagrant contempt of the Security Council.

Mindful of its duties and responsibilities under the charter of the United Nations for the maintenance and preservation of international peace and security.

Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions.

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter:

1. Demands that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and decides while maintaining all its decisions, to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of goodwill, to do so;

2. Authorizes member states cooperating with the government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991, fully implements, as set forth in paragraph 1 above, the foregoing resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all
subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area;

3. Requests all states to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken in pursuance of paragraph 2 of the present resolution;

4. Request the states concerned to keep the Security Council regularly informed on the progress of actions undertaken pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the present resolution;

5. Decides to remain seized of the matter.\textsuperscript{73}

With the passage of the U.N. resolution 678 ordering Iraq to leave Kuwait by or before January 15, 1991, no Iraqi withdrawal appeared to begin and flurry of diplomatic activities produced no progress.\textsuperscript{74} While war became more likely, many efforts had been made to find political and peaceful solutions to the crisis within the U.S. and abroad.

In the United States, critics argued that economic sanctions should have been given time to work, even if it took a year or more. Senator Sam Nunn criticized the administration's "rush to war." "The President," Nunn said, "must explain why he was in such a hurry." On October 22, Saudi Arabia's defense minister, Prince Sultan Ibn Abdul-Aziz, hinted at a deal with Iraq. Specifically, he said that


\textsuperscript{74}Snow, 187.
through considerations of Arab brotherhood, the Arab states might give Iraq the uninhabited islands, Warba and Bubiyan, that block Iraqi access to the Gulf. On November 8, Egyptian President Mubarak called for a delay in any attack on Iraq, urging that sanctions be given two or three months to work before the allies went to war. Bush rejected all efforts, saying that there would be no compromise on the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and again comparing Hussein to Hitler.75 Actually, President Bush was going the extra mile for war. However, as a final warning from President Bush to Saddam Hussein, Secretary of State James Baker in a January 9th meeting in Geneva, with the Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, gave President Bush's letter for Saddam Hussein which Aziz refused to accept. This was the first--and probably the last--direct high-level contact between the United States and Iraq since the invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. The letter said in part:

We stand today at the brink of war between Iraq and the world. This is a war that began with your invasion of Kuwait, this is a war that can be ended only by Iraq's full and unconditional compliance with U.N. Security Council resolution 678.... There can be no reward for aggression. Nor there be any negotiation.... However by this full compliance, Iraq will gain the opportunity to rejoin the international community. More immediately, the Iraqi military establishment will escape destruction. But unless you withdraw from Kuwait completely and without condition, you will lose more than Kuwait.... Let me state too that the United States will not tolerate the use of chemical or biological weapons or the destruction

75Hilsman, 85-88.
of Kuwait's oil fields and installations. Further, you will be held directly responsible for terrorist actions against any member of the coalition.76

After more than six hours of discussion the meeting came to an end and Secretary of State Baker announced to the press that the meeting had failed.

For the world, despite other peace efforts being made, there appeared to be one last chance left. U.N. Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar went to Baghdad as an effort to convince Saddam Hussein to comply with the U.N. resolutions and to withdraw from Kuwait, but that mission also failed. However, the U.S. Congress has voted the day before to support President Bush's plan for military action to free Kuwait. On the other hand, Washington had already set the precise time for the start of the air war against Iraq: January 17, 2:00 a.m., Baghdad time.77

In fact, with the passage of the congressional resolution, U.S. diplomacy essentially stopped. Even before the deadline expired, Bush had decided to declare war. Once the U.N. deadline had passed, Bush acted swiftly. On January 16, approximately 6:55 p.m. EST (about 2:00 a.m. the next morning in the Gulf area), the sky over Baghdad came ablaze with Iraqi anti-aircraft fire and the thuds and explosions


of American bombs. The air portion of the war had begun. The allied plan of attack was based on a strict separation between two phases, the first is the air assault, and second, the land offensive. The air attack had the following four objectives:

- to attain complete air superiority over the war area;
- to destroy strategic Iraqi targets;
- to isolate the Kuwaiti theater of operations and prevent the Iraqis from supplying and reinforcing their forces there; and
- to cripple the Republican Guard and other ground forces.

The war started with the destruction of the Iraqi air defenses to insure air superiority over Iraq in a systematic and continued effort to go after the long list of strategic targets such as:

- the military and civilian command and control system serving Saddam Hussein;
- the laboratories, R & D institutes, production plants and storage system of the Iraqi nuclear and chemical weapons system and long-range missiles, and
- many key industries, including power plants.

As to the isolation of the Kuwaiti theater of operation, this entailed the systematic attack of air fields, ports,

\[78\text{Snow, 188.}\]
highways and bridges (and southern Iraq is saturated with bridges, for many of which there are no alternatives). Last came the crippling of the Iraqi ground forces, especially the elite Republican Guard in that theater. 79

According to U.S. Air Force reports, over 91,000 tons of bombs were dropped, of which only seven percent were smart bombs. However, only some 25 percent of the conventional (non-guided) bombs hit their target area, while 90 percent of the smart bombs hit theirs. This very high percentage of conventional bombing misses was the outcome of a directive given to the attack pilots not to take unnecessary risk, even if doing so might result in poor hits. This was to be compensated for by the enormous quantity of explosives dropped: 25 percent of hits meant more than 20,000 tons of explosives reaching their targets. 80

There was little doubt that severe damage had been done to Iraq's civilian and military infrastructure of five weeks' continuous systematic and massive waves of American-led allied bombing raids. The only Iraqi little significant resistance during the air campaign was the scud attack on Israel and Saudi Arabia the second day of the war.

In fact, in an effort to drag Israel into active involvement in the war, the Iraqi launched their improved


80Ibid., 32.
version of the Soviet-made scud missile against Israeli targets. Saddam's motive was to destroy the coalition in which several Arab countries played a major role. However, in its desperation to maintain the coalition, the Bush administration launched an extraordinary effort to keep Israel out of the war, and not to retaliate against Iraq's missile attack. Israel refused to say it would not retaliate against Iraq, despite repeated urgings and increasing commitment by Washington to the security of Israel. As Donald Neff put it: "If there was any winner so far, it was Israel, which for the first time in history has finally managed to get U.S. troops to help protect it." This has been a strategic aim of Israel for decades, but not until Bush sent patriot crews to protect Israel from scud attacks had any administration been willing to make such a commitment.\(^1\) For all of that, Israel's position was still unknown. Its only concession was that it would decide on the timing. According to Neff, much was made of Israel's restraint in not launching a preventive attack in the first place, although this was not uncommon in terms of Tel Aviv's usual efforts to increase its support from the United States. It displayed the same restraint in 1973, allowing the Egyptians and the Syrians to fire the first shot, after extracting promises from Washington that such restraint

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would be rewarded. The reward was $2 billion in immediate aid and much more in the months and years ahead. A similar claim to the US Treasury can now be expected. It is likely to be the biggest raid of the war.82

The second phase of the war was the ground war. In fact, the ground offensive was not really needed to liberate Kuwait. After 35 days of massive air attacks, Iraq had broken down and announced its readiness to withdraw from Kuwait. Iraq realized the devastating significance of the American led-allied air superiority over the Iraqi and their troops along the Kuwait-Saudi border. Many attempts had been made by Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait before the ground war, which all had been rejected by the U.S.

On February 21, 1991, in a meeting between Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and Tariq Aziz, Iraq agreed to complete withdrawal from Kuwait in exchange for a ceasefire. Had Washington agreed the war could have been ended, and won, without engaging land forces.83 Another attempt had been made by the Soviet. On February 22, 1991, Aziz and Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh agreed on the basic terms of a peace plan to submit to the Security Council now consisting of eight points:

1. Full and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait;

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82 Ibid., 4.
83 Alpher, 34-35.
2. The withdrawal to begin the day after the allies declare a cease-fire;

3. The withdrawal to take place over a fixed period to be agreed on subsequently;

4. U.N. sanctions on Iraq to be lifted when the withdrawal is two-thirds complete;

5. When the withdrawal is complete all Security Council resolutions to cease to be valid;

6. All POWs to be released immediately after a cease-fire;

7. Withdrawal to be monitored by a neutral U.N. force;

8. Work on the clarification of wording and specific details to continue in communication with the Security Council.

The U.S. responded by totally ignoring the proposal and delivering Iraq an ultimatum--Kuwait to be evacuated within 24 hours or a full-scale ground offensive would be launched. President Gorbachev telephoned Bush and other allied leaders appealing for the peace initiative to be given more time, but to no avail.\(^\text{84}\) There was little doubt, however, that Bush would give Saddam Hussein an opportunity to save his remaining war machines to make sure that Iraq no longer militarily capable to be a threat in the region. That was clear during the last days of the ground war and the way General Schwarzkopf wrote the plan for Desert Storm.

\(^{84}\)Middle East International, 8 March 1991, 7.
Therefore, the Bush administration was determined to go the extra mile to achieve that goal, despite all efforts to avoid the ground war. General Schwarzkopf, in his effort to destroy the Iraqi military equipment said:

By the end of the day, while we'd be able to declare Iraq no longer militarily capable of threatening its neighbors, there would still be a hell of a lot of military equipment moving in the Basra pocket. So here's what I propose, I said. I want the Air Force to keep bombing those convoys backed up at the Euphrates where the bridges are blown. I want to continue the ground attack tomorrow, drive to the sea, and totally destroy everything in our path. That's the way I wrote the plan for Desert Storm, and in one more day we'll be done. 85

With the passing of Bush's ultimatum deadline on February 24, 1991, the allies launched a full-scale ground offensive against Iraqi forces in Kuwait. The Soviet foreign ministry expressed:

Regret that a most real chance for peaceful outcome to the conflict and for the attainment of the aims stipulated in the U.N. Security Council resolutions, without further human casualties and material destruction, has been missed. 86

On February 26, 1991, Saddam Hussein announced Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, under heavy fire from the allied forces, and requests for a cease-fire with the acceptance of all the U.N. resolutions. President Bush responded: "This changes nothing. The allied assault will continue with undiminished intensity. This still fell far short of what is

85Schwarzkopf, 469.

necessary for the shooting to stop." On February 28, 1991, Tariz Aziz told the U.N. Secretary-General that Iraq was ready to "comply with resolution 660 and all U.N. resolutions on Kuwait." President Bush ordered a cease-fire with allied forces in full control of Kuwait and some way inside Iraqi territory, and declared Kuwait liberated. However, President Bush, with the War Powers U.N. resolution 678 remains in force, decided to station allied troops in southern Iraq until Iraq fully complied with his peace terms. On March 3, 1991, he directed General Schwarzkopf to endorse his peace terms at his meeting with the Iraqi senior officers at the Safwan airbase, now under U.S. control in southern Iraq, to be the necessary steps towards a permanent cease-fire agreement.

Finally, Iraqi foreign minister Tariz Aziz, in a letter to the President of the Council and the U.N. Secretary-General, declared Iraq's willingness to "fulfill its obligation." The Security Council adopted resolution 686 on 2 March 1991 which in fact endorses President Bush's peace terms.

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87 Ibid., 7.
89 See Schwarzkopf, 481-91.
Conclusion

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 evoked a strong response from most of the world, especially the United States and its allies. First of all, the U.S. initiated U.N. economic sanctions of unprecedented severity, and the second was it declared war against Iraq. Both of these two responses had broad support. President Bush undoubtedly managed to get domestic and international support for his stand against Iraq. Twenty-nine countries actively participated in the war against Iraq. Nobody, however, disputed the fact that most of the burden was carried by the United States.

The war against Iraq could not have been mounted without the cooperation of some external factors. The first factor was the Soviet Union. From the onset of the crisis, Moscow sided firmly with the United States, first in seeking a political solution, and then in support of military action. Moscow's response to the crisis demonstrated Iraq's ignorance of the post-Cold War world. Saddam failed to comprehend that what now mattered most to Moscow were its domestic concerns.

The second factor was the cooperation of the Arab States. Without Saudi consent for the United States and later, other allied forces to operate from Saudi territory, the military operation against Iraq would not have been possible. Two other major Arab states, Syria and Egypt, had
taken an anti-Iraq, pro-coalition stance. The land, sea, and sky of the Arab states were available for the U.S. and its allies to use in action against Iraq.

The third factor was the support of the United Nations. The United Nations had never reacted to a crisis with such a posture of leadership and support as it did during the Gulf crisis. To act under the umbrella of formal U.N. Security Council resolutions made it much easier for the U.S.-led coalition to move ahead than would otherwise have been the case. All coalition members noted with satisfaction that the relevant Security Council resolutions—13 resolutions since August 2, 1990 until March 2, 1991—were passed unanimously, and that the veto was not used in a single instance.

The outcome of the war was an absolute victory of the U.S.-led coalition and a crushing defeat for Iraq. The fact remains that the Gulf war was truly an electronic war. The sight of cruise missiles and smart bombs roaming to their destination with pinpoint accuracy created a widespread impression of uneven match between a high-tech power and a poor, ill-equipped and Third World army. While the war represented a military victory of an advanced society over a developing one, the outcome was by no means a foregone conclusion. There was never any doubt that the coalitions would prevail, but an Iraqi strategy which imposed high battlefield costs on coalition forces and led to a
protracted campaign offered Saddam some prospect of a much more favorable cease-fire as well as post-war reputation.

The victory of a U.S.-led coalition over Iraq was less complete than it might otherwise have been. Saddam Hussein managed to retain power despite the ravages the war had brought to his country. Actually, with Saddam still in power, President Bush's decision to end the war continued to be questioned, by the press and the rival politicians. Even in defeat, Saddam managed to create headaches for the United States and the international community by refusing to cooperate fully with the weapons inspectors sent to Iraq under the terms of the cease-fire agreement and U.N. Resolution 686.
CHAPTER VI
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE U.S. INTERVENTION IN THE GULF WAR

Introduction

The Bush administration claimed the U.S. fought Iraq because Saddam Hussein was a ruthless tyrant who carried out an unjust invasion of Kuwait. It is apparent that the U.S. intervention in the Middle East had nothing to do with its stated aims of opposing tyranny and expansionism. This fact is obvious from a study of the recent history of the U.S.'s relationship with Iraq. Prior to the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq was a close ally of the United States.¹

The U.S. intervention in the Gulf war was not a sudden or abrupt action. It was a well planned and well thought out decision on the part of U.S. policy makers, based purely on U.S. self-interests. Andre Gunder Frank made the following remark regarding the U.S. intervention in the Gulf war:

The violation of international law through the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq under the Presidency of Saddam Hussein is beyond dispute. However, the allegation that the Gulf war was to protect the "principle" of world order, international law and the charter of the United Nations from lawless might-is-right violation is a lie. Many similar aggressions and violations of


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both the UN charter and UN resolution have gone without any such responses or often even without any notice. . . . The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan merited condemnation and opposition, albeit of course not by the Security Council but certainly no counter invasion of the Soviet Union. The Iraqi invasion of Iran received but did not merit, defacto political and even military support by the same coalition of allies, which then waged war against Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.\(^2\)

Some of the very same states who allied themselves in a coalition to liberate Kuwait from aggression still maintain their military occupation of foreign territories. Israel invaded and still occupies the Golan Heights, West Bank and the Gaza Strip in violation of U.N. resolution 242. Israel also invaded Lebanon and still exercises de facto military control over Southern Lebanon. When America invaded Panama, no actions were taken and no Security Council resolutions were passed or even proposed to protect President Bush's new world order from his own violation of the sovereignty of Panama. On the contrary, President Bush received only endorsements and outright support for his violation of international law and human rights in Panama.\(^3\)

There were four key factors which caused the Gulf War. The most prominent factor was global oil pricing and consumption. The second factor was the security of Israel. The third factor was the U.S. plan to secure and maintain a permanent military base in the Gulf. And finally, through

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\(^3\)Ibid., 268.
the U.S. intervention in the Gulf, the United States wanted to provide world leadership in the post Cold War scenario under the banner of New World Order. This chapter will focus on these four key factors and the roles they played in the U.S. intervention in the Gulf War.

Oil Factor

Oil is obviously the primary issue for U.S. intervention in the Gulf war. Regarding the dependence of the U.S., as well as Japan and other western nations on Middle East energy resources, President Bush states:

Vital issues of principle are at stake. Saddam Hussein is literally trying to wipe a country off the face of the earth. We do not exaggerate when we say Saddam Hussein will fail, vital economic interests are at risk as well. Iraq itself controls some 10 percent of the world's proven oil reserves. Iraq plus Kuwait controls twice that. An Iraq permitted to swallow Kuwait would have the economic and military power, as well as the arrogance, to intimidate and coerce its neighbors—neighbors who control the lion's share of the world's remaining oil reserves. We cannot permit a resource so vital to be dominated by one so ruthless. And we won't.

Other U.S. officials, Secretary of State James Baker and Secretary of Defense Richard D. Cheney, share these same views regarding the energy issue. Baker's address

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4Brenner, 128.

before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on October 29, 1990, states:

Just consider the consequences. If the entire world were to be thrust into a deep recession by an Iraq stranglehold on Gulf energy resources, American industry, farmers, and small businesses would be hit especially hard. So would the democratic reformers of Eastern Europe. So would the other emerging democracies—in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. All would suffer profound setbacks in their ability to deliver the economic growth needed to sustain confidence in the democratic process. 6

Richard Cheney, in his October 30, 1990 address before the Pittsburgh World Affairs Council, also referred to the importance of Iraq's control over the Gulf and to the fact that it owns two-thirds of the world's known reserves of oil. 7

One of the most important commodities in the industrial world today, and maybe for years to come, is oil and its assured supply at reasonable prices as an important element for economic growth and development. For the United States, Iraq's control of almost 40 percent of the world's oil reserves and the control over OPEC, would have given Saddam Hussein dominant power over oil pricing, which would be of primary concern in plans for economic growth in Western Europe and Japan. Oil was the driving force behind U.S. policy in the Gulf. According to Thomas L. Friedman, American policy on the Gulf comes down

6Ibid., 235-37.
7Ibid., 529.
to this: troops have been sent to retain control of oil in the hands of Saudi Arabia, so prices will remain low. Friedman said that a cartoon in the Boston Globe had it right. The vital interest at stake may be to make the world safe for gas guzzlers. The principle the United States holds dear is eighteen miles per gallon. In fact, oil availability and the price of oil introduced the major elements of U.S. interest in the Gulf. Since 1973, when Saudi Arabia used an oil boycott to try to force Washington to change its policies toward Israel, every American President has said that the Gulf is of vital economic and strategic interest to the United States and its allies. President Reagan, for example, speaking to reporters in the White House on May 29, 1987, said:

I want to speak this afternoon on the vital interests of the American people, vital interests that are at stake in the Persian Gulf area. It may be easy for some, after a near record 54-month economic recovery, to forget just how critical the Persian Gulf is to our national security. But I think everyone in this room and everyone hearing my voice now can remember the woeful impact of the Middle East Oil Crisis of a few years ago, the endless, demoralizing gas lines, the shortages, the rationing, the escalating energy prices, the double-digit inflation, and the enormous dislocation that shook our economy to its foundations.  

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8Thomas L. Friedman's remark is cited in Roger Hilsman, George Bush vs. Saddam Hussein (Calif.: Lyford Books, 1992), 50.

9Wells, 428.
Listening to American officials speaking publicly about U.S. interests in the Gulf, one can quickly understand that oil is of the most significance. According to Thomas Friedman, these interests can be divided into three broad categories, each of which is worthy of scrutiny. The first category is the price of oil. A drastic increase in the price of oil would almost surely tip all western economies into recession. The second is who controls the oil. The third is the need to uphold the integrity of national boundaries so that predatory regional powers will not simply begin devouring their neighbors.\textsuperscript{10}

It is in America's best interest that control of oil be in the hands of countries loyal to U.S. policy. Washington would like control to be in Saudi hands because, unlike Iraq, Saudi Arabia's leaders have historically been more responsive to American interests and staunchly anti-Soviet. President Bush cannot say that out loud, though, because it would embarrass the Saudi monarchy.

The final vital interests at stake, U.S. administration officials would say, would be the stability of the post-Cold War world. If President Hussein gets away with taking over Kuwait by force, then another regional power might be

tempted to use similar means to advance their interests in their corners of the world.\textsuperscript{11}

Since the late 1970s, the U.S. has made clear its determination to exercise overall influence in the Gulf, laying down the parameters for all political forces in the region through the so-called Carter doctrine.\textsuperscript{12} According to Zbigniew Brezezinski, the architect of the doctrine, U.S. interests were threefold. First was guardianship of the oil industry with all its political, economic and military ramifications; Second was keeping the USSR out of the Middle East. Third was protecting the moderate states in the region, which could be toppled by local upheavals as happened in Khomeni's ascendancy in Iran.\textsuperscript{13} These three interests form a hierarchy of U.S. concerns, at the apex of which is oil. Viewed as a purely commercial matter, oil interests could fit easily with the liberal objective of removing Iraq from Kuwait.

Regarding the U.S. oil interest in the Gulf, Stephen Zunes pointed out that two years after the Gulf war, both supporters and detractors acknowledged that despite the

\textsuperscript{11}\textit{Ibid.}, 205.


Bush administration's rhetoric about international law and human rights, the war was essentially over oil.\textsuperscript{14} It is estimated that 97 percent of the world's oil is found outside the United States. At least 60 percent of the world's oil comes from eight Gulf states. If these probable reserves were counted, the total is probably closer to 85 percent. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait have particularly promising unexplored reserves.\textsuperscript{15} In the 1980s, the Persian Gulf countries remained the principal sources of imported oil and are highly likely to retain this preferred status in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{16} (See Table 9) Regarding U.S. oil interests in the Gulf, Peter Gowan wrote:

Gulf oil provides a very large international market for important sectors of advanced capitalist industry (construction, engineering, military equipment and so forth). This is overwhelmingly a state market since the revenues are in the hands of the ruling dynasties. Therefore, the power that exercises a dominant political influence upon the Sheikhdoms in effect governs the market. Second, oil revenues become great lakes of rentier capital, the flow of which, influenced critically by political factors, is vital for the entire structure of global finance capital and Banking interests. And thirdly, oil money talks politics directly, through the uses to which it is put.

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., 106.
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This is the case for instance, right across the world especially the Islamic world with Saudi money, which cements regime after regime, from Pakistan to Morocco. And the passages of that money are ultimately controlled by the power which defends the Saudis—the USA.\textsuperscript{17} 

The U.S. and the West, generally, would not countenance a hostile state monopolizing a region's oil. For such monopoly would constitute a powerful political weapon.\textsuperscript{18} If the regime of Saddam Hussein had controlled the flow of much of the Gulf oil, dozens of countries around the world would have had a simple choice between two world politico-economic authorities. On one side is the IMF, the World Bank, and official American-controlled institutions governing the world economy. On the other side is Baghdad, the undoubtedly unofficial but equally efficacious center for capital and loans. This division would directly threaten U.S. interests. In fact, the U.S. economy would clearly be vulnerable if a significant portion of the Middle East oil were controlled by another country.\textsuperscript{19}

Another major U.S. interest is that the control of oil supplies to both Japan and the countries of Western Europe has always served the U.S. as a crucial political bargaining tool in relations with the Middle East countries. Western Europe and Japan are often more reliant upon Middle East oil

\textsuperscript{17}Gowan, 22.

\textsuperscript{18}Brenner, 129.

\textsuperscript{19}Gowan, 22.
than the United States and would undoubtedly increase their independence if their sources were not under the protection of the latter. This would be especially true if the Middle East were under the control of a regime that is not dependent on the U.S. for its protection; for example, those of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the small Gulf Emirates.  

These oil factors—the revenue market, capital, and control of the allies supplies—make direct political suzerainty over the region by the United States essential. To shore up its own political position in the Gulf and that of its favorite regimes like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, it was necessary for the U.S. to demonstrate its supremacy over Iraq. Regarding U.S.-Saudi relations, Stephen Zunes wrote:

In the past years the United States has increased its oil imports from Saudi Arabia from 165,000 bpd to 1.6 billion bpd totaling one quarter of all U.S. oil imports while simultaneously dramatically increasing arms sales to the kingdom. It appears that the proposal of Saudi oil minister Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani 20 years ago has come to fruition: the United States would guarantee Saudi Security in return for cheap oil.  

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20Ibid., 22.

21Zunes, 106. Actually in order to meet the increasing western demand for oil, the Saudi announced plans to raise their production capacity to 10 million barrel a day by 1994, bidding to replace the former Soviet Republics as the world’s largest producer. Soviet production was steadily sinking toward the 10 million barrel level. See The Middle East, 8th edition (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1995), 163.
In the final analysis it is clear that the U.S. intervention in the Persian Gulf was primarily for its oil economic interest:

In fact, neither the United States nor Britain was desperate for the Gulf's oil resources at the time of the crisis. What they really needed was the profits from oil production which tend to flow back to American and British economies (by way of) treasury securities...imports of American manufactured goods, construction companies, arms, etc.\footnote{22}

Washington's vital interest in the Gulf war was very well portrayed by Thomas L. Friedman. He wrote:

The United States has not sent troops to the Saudi desert to preserve democratic principles. The Saudi monarchy is a feudal regime that does not even allow women to drive cars. Surely it is not American policy to make the world safe for feudalism. This is about money, about protecting governments loyal to America and punishing those that are not, and about who will set the price of oil.\footnote{23}

\textit{The Israel Factor}

Israel has always held a very special position among the policy makers of the United States. A number of factors account for the depth of Israel's relationship with the United States. These include: the U.S. commitment to the idea of Jewish statehood in the wake of the Nazi genocide, the importance of Israel to the American Jewish community, and the role of Israel as a strategic ally. These factors,

\footnote{22}Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael, \textit{The Gulf War and the New World Order} (Gainesville, University of Florida, 1994), 198.

\footnote{23}Friedman, 203.
among others, provide solid sustenance for the relationship between Israel and the United States. 24

In the wake of the Nazi genocide, the U.S. government was confronted by the urgent need to examine the Jewish issues, the fate of the Jewish survivors in Europe, and the Jewish determination to establish an independent Jewish state in Palestine. However, during the 1930s, the Jewish question had been one on the British agenda in the Middle East. The British who controlled the area were caught by its endorsement in 1917 of the Zionist aim of a Jewish National Home (given in the Balfour Declaration of November 1917) and its maintenance of strategic and economic interests in the Arab world. Britain's desire to be on good terms with the oil-producing Arab states and to retain bases in the Arab world, with the approach of war in Europe, forced Britain to reconcile its pledges to the Jews. In 1939 Britain adopted the White Paper Policy, which severely restricted the number of Jewish immigrants to Palestine—later under British mandate—a policy which strongly condemned and was opposed by the Zionist movement. 25

Because of the terms dictated by the White Paper, the Jews switched their main effort to the United States. As Peter Calvocoressi has put it:


After the 1939 White Paper, Zionists switched their main effort from Britain to the United States, abandoning their hope of achieving their aims by persuasion in London in favor of an actively anti-British policy to be financed (after the war) with American money. During the war, political effectiveness of Zionism was greatly enhanced in the United States and the Zionist cause was embraced by the two most powerful Americans of the forties, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman.26

The American involvement in Zionism set the United States and Britain in opposition to each other. The prime American concern was to persuade Britain to admit 100,000 Jews, who had survived the Nazi genocide, to Palestine as generously and quickly as possible.27

In 1942, the major world Zionist organizations met in New York at the Biltmore Hotel and called for the creation of a Jewish state in the entire area of the British mandate in Palestine. In 1946, with the extent of the devastation of the European Jewry, several Zionist groups engaged in a struggle for support in America and Europe for the establishment of a Jewish state in the Middle East. Later in the year, the Zionists endorsed a form of partition that was termed a "viable Jewish state in an adequate area of Palestine."28

26Ibid., 289.

27Ibid., 290.

During these critical years, the Truman administration increased its support to the Jewish cause. Truman repeatedly intervened to assist the Zionist leaders who were working for the creation of Israel. According to Stephen Green, President Truman pressured Britain to accept more refugees in Palestine, supported the original U.N. partition plan, appointed an ambassador to Tel Aviv who was strongly predisposed to favor Israel against Arabs, and arranged the export-import bank loan and a temporary credit, in response to a Jewish agency request for the same. As the end of the British mandate approached, Truman publicly appealed to the Arab nations not to attack the new Jewish state.\(^{29}\)

The creation of a Jewish homeland in the Middle East as a legal and diplomatic entity took place in a remarkably short period of time and with strong, warm support from the United States. Immediately after David Ben Gurion's announcement of the creation of the state of Israel in May 1948, President Truman extended de facto recognition to the Jewish state.\(^{30}\) After the Ben Gurion declaration and the beginning of open hostilities over Palestine, the U.S. delegation at the U.N. repeatedly took Israel's side in disputes over successive armistice line disputes that gave the Jewish state larger portions of Arab Palestinian land.

\(^{29}\)Ibid., 26.

In 1949 the Truman State Department began to lobby hard for U.N. membership for Israel, which was granted in May of that year. 31

The importance of the American Jewish community is another contribution to the relationship between Israel and the United States. A strong consensus of concern arose between American Jews and their fellow Americans for the fate of the Jewish people in the Middle East. This concern became a point of U.S. national interest in reaction to the Nazi genocide of the Jews in World War II. This factor had its influence on the domestic political processes in the U.S. and created increasing commitment to the security of Israel. 32 Regarding this commitment, Seyom Brown, in his analysis of the idea of national interests as the sum of domestic interest, states that:

According to this view, the domestic political process provides legitimacy to foreign commitments and policies that might otherwise be rejected as unwarranted by vital national interests (meaning usually geopolitical) imperative. An outstanding example is the continued support provided by the United States to the security of Israel even in the face of serious geopolitical considerations that might argue for a decisive tilt toward the Arab side in the Arab-Israeli conflict. . . . Were it not for the electoral cult of the Jewish community, and its members' influence in various interest groups in the life of the country, the chances that its moral appeals for continued U.S. support of Israeli security would be reduced. 33

31 Green, 26.


33 Brown, 7-8.
Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the U.S. policy makers realized that a strong Iraq in the Middle East would ultimately threaten Israel's security. Because of its commitment for the security of Israel, the United States quickly intervened in the Gulf war.³⁴

Israel's role as a strategic ally to the U.S. became more certain during the Cold War. The U.S. has always traditionally defined its interests in the Middle East in terms of the containment of the Soviet expansion. These containment policies/doctrines have been considered by the U.S. administrations as tools of explanations to the U.S. foreign policy objectives in the Middle East. To carry out these objectives, the U.S. had to develop a strong, positive relationship with Israel as the strategic ally for the United States in the region. The idea is that, by arming and supporting Israel, the U.S. strategic interest will be enhanced.³⁵

It is commonly argued that Israel promotes American interests in the Middle East by acting as a barrier against Soviet penetration, by maintaining regional stability through its absolute military superiority, and by ensuring the survival of pro-American Arab regimes.³⁶ Israel is not

³⁴Ibid., 51.
³⁵Rubenberg, 2.
³⁶Ibid.
without strategic value to the United States. Because of its strategic interest, the United States has provided its solid commitment to the security of Israel since its emergence in 1948. Regarding the U.S. commitment to the security of Israel, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, in his remarks before the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) on March 23, 1993, said:

Since its independence the state of Israel has been confronted with war, with terrorism, with scud missiles and now with the even deadlier threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. No one in the area should have to live this way. It is precisely for these reasons that the United States is unshakably committed to Israel's security.37

The Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait represented a change in the balance of power in the Gulf region and hence in the Middle East as a whole. Certainly as a major adversary of Israel, any Iraqi expansionist move would threaten American interests.38

When the war between Iraq and Iran ended in 1988, Iraq emerged as a regional military power with offensive capabilities, particularly the weapons of mass destruction. Iraq was willing to challenge Israel's hegemony and military supremacy in the Middle East, which would represent a change in the balance of power in the region. Certainly it was in


Israel's interest to destroy Iraq's military capabilities and weapons of mass destruction. This is the same step the United States took in forcing Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and later, under the guide of the U.N.'s resolutions, in requiring the elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. To insure Israel's supremacy and to keep its security intact, the United States quickly and strongly responded to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

Apart from this, Israel protects the U.S. interests in the Middle East better than any other country in the region, despite U.S. strong relations with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. More accurately, no other country in the Middle East is equally trusted by America. Israel has successfully prevented victories by radical nationalist movements in the region. It has kept Syria, for many years an ally of the former Soviet Union, in check. Israel's frequent wars have provided battlefield testing grounds for U.S. arms. Israel acted as a conduit for U.S. arms to regimes and movements too unpopular in the United States to openly grant direct military assistance, such as South Africa, Iran, Guatemala, and the Nicaraguan Contras. Israel's military advisers have assisted the Contras, the Salvadoran military Junta, and foreign occupation forces in Namibia and Western Sahara. Their secret services provided the United States with intelligence gathering and covert operations.39

39Stephen Zunes, "The Roots of U.S. Middle East Policy and the Need for Alternatives," in Building Peace in the
In addition to all these considerations, Israel is a country which was born under the support of the U.S., and to which the U.S. is pledge-bound to insure its security. So naturally the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was genuinely considered by the U.S. as a serious threat to the security of Israel. Other than the oil interest, the Israel factor also helped the U.S. policy makers to act quickly so that the secure and defensible borders of Israel could be insured. The security of Israel was improved by weakening of Iraq during the Gulf war and the conclusion of peace agreements between Israel, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Jordan.

Securing Permanent U.S. Military Base in the Gulf

The third important factor for U.S. intervention in the Gulf war was to secure a permanent military base in the Gulf. U.S. military involvement in other nations has always been defined by the policy makers in the United States for the purpose of safeguarding American national interest. Defending nations from external, and perhaps internal aggression, protecting American economic interests, and preserving American influence in the affairs of other


40 Ibid., 180.

states, are all reasons why policy makers invest military resources abroad and why they might use force to protect such interests.42 The American military bases in Western Europe and Japan, the military aid to Israel in the Middle East, and the military involvement in Central America are a few examples of the U.S. military involvement abroad.43

American military involvement in an area which holds such potential is defined as: (1) an established American military presence, defined as a U.S. military base, (2) the furnishing of military aid to some states or organization, or (3) a prior use of force.44 Regarding the establishment of permanent American military bases abroad, James Meernik wrote:

The first, and perhaps most important indicator of U.S. involvement, is the establishment of a permanent American military base. Not only does such a military presence signify an especially close relationship between the host country and the United States, it also demonstrates that the United States is necessarily involved should any aggression against the host country take place. This trip-wire function ensures that U.S. credibility and interest are always and obviously at stake in any matters that threaten the stability of the host country or the U.S. presence.45


43 Ibid.


America's intentions to establish permanent military bases in the Gulf appears to have started long before the Gulf war. During the 1970s, the U.S. increased its military aid to what it considered moderate Middle Eastern regimes, such as the Shah of Iran, in order to strengthen the presence of their armed forces and keep the Soviets out of the Gulf region. Following a review of Middle East policy in 1977, President Carter signed PRM-10 (Presidential Review Memo) authorizing American forces to deal with Third World problems generally but specifically citing the need for focusing attention on the Persian Gulf. Carter's Secretary of Defense persuaded the U.S. military to adopt a Plan for Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) under which a combined force for the Middle East would be created and a desert warfare center opened at Fort Irwin, California. As a result, several U.S. military exercises were held. In 1980 the United States and Egypt staged the first "bright star" military exercise in the Egyptian desert. Egypt and Oman became host countries for U.S. activities in the Gulf region.

Following the overthrow of the Shah of Iran in 1979, and the subsequent anti-American regime there, the United States decided to have Saudi Arabia as the stable U.S.

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47Ibid., 53.
client in the Gulf area in order to continue its protectors policy in the Gulf. President Reagan adopted the Carter Doctrine, which had declared the Gulf a "vital" U.S. interest. Carter's plans called for a U.S. Rapid Deployment Force for the Middle East and, during 1981, increased military assistance to Saudi Arabia. The Reagan administration also adopted a policy of "strategic consensus" with Saudi Arabia. This policy developed a plan to create facilities in Saudi Arabia and pre-position U.S. equipment "over the horizon" in order to react quickly to any Gulf Crisis. Reagan also created the central command for the Middle East for the same reason.48

Finally, the United States developed "facilities" to be used by aircraft and ships belonging to the U.S. as well as Saudi Arabia. No American flags flew at these facilities, but military exercises were held for their use in a crisis. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers supervised and planned 20 billion dollars worth of military construction, including military cities, in Saudi Arabia. Although the U.S. only sold the Saudis material for construction of an infrastructure and for non-lethal supplies, these facilities enabled them in the fall of 1990 to operate in Desert Shield, and later Desert Storm, much more rapidly than would otherwise have been possible.49

48Ibid., 54.

49Ibid., 55.
The U.S. military presence in the Gulf continued even after the war. The location of U.S. military personnel, the Air Force, heavy offensive weaponry, and the Navy are greater than anyone anticipated. To this day troops are still stationed in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States. The United Arab Emirate (UAE) constitutes the largest liberty port for U.S. sailors in the world; the U.S. admiral headquarters in Bahrain oversees more than 18,000 sailors. All of this has led to the establishment of what is, in fact, the beginning of a permanent military presence in the Gulf.50

The Gulf war was the stepping stone that led to a military base in the Middle East. On November 8, 1990, President Bush announced a military force build-up to provide an offensive option, termed Operation Desert Storm, to force Iraq out of Kuwait.51 The United States deployed more than 500,000 troops, 1800 aircraft and approximately 100 ships, which was the longest U.S. overseas commitment since the Vietnam war.

Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, after consulting with the Saudi King Fahad, U.S. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney in early August 1990, sent American troops to Saudi soil to protect the kingdom of Saudi


Arabia against any further advance by the Iraqi army. This deployment was termed Operation Desert Shield. Additional infantry and heavy weaponry later reinforced these original rapid deployment troops, outfitted with light, mostly defensive weaponry.

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were the largest donors for maintaining U.S. military deployment in the Gulf. One of the biggest U.S. military deployments in the history of the Middle East was certainly the first step towards its ultimate objective of establishing a permanent military base in the Middle East. The U.S. military presence is deemed so permanent that many Saudis now complain that Washington's reluctance to topple the Saddam Hussein regime in Baghdad reflects Washington's interest in preserving Saudi dependence on U.S. protection.

Since the days of the Gulf war, the U.S. has maintained a large military base in Saudi Arabia, thus tilting the regional balance of power in favor of the U.S. The U.S. administration has applied the labels of George F. Kennan's strategy and pursuing a policy of dual containment toward Iran and Iraq. The essence of the strategy is to isolate and sufficiently pressure the regimes in Tehran and Baghdad.

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52Ibid.

hoping that such containment will produce either internal revolt and a change in regime or a fundamental transformation of the regimes from within.54 The enormous military advantage the U.S. enjoys vis-a-vis Iraq and Iran and a strong U.S. military base in Saudi Arabia, nearest to both Iran and Iraq, helps implement this policy of dual containment.

However, the U.S. long-term plan for a permanent military base in Saudi Arabia became evident during a statement of U.S. Secretary of State, James Baker, while testifying in Congress in September, 1990. He sketched a possible future collective security organization for the Middle East and suggested the U.S. might be able to station troops permanently in the region.55 Fredrick Eilts believes that the United States should continue to maintain its small Mideast naval force in the Gulf and seek access to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other military facilities such as those in Bahrein and Oman.56 In fact, the establishment of a U.S. permanent base in the Middle East was not a new idea. Robert Tucker, a highly regarded Middle East expert at Johns Hopkins University in 1975, envisioned:


56Ibid., 22.
As long as Saddam Hussein rules Iraq, Saudi Arabia will feel threatened and the free flow of reasonably priced oil will be in jeopardy. To defend both, the U.S. with or without international assistance should consider establishing a permanent presence in the Kingdom.57

It is also claimed that such a U.S. presence was supported by senior Saudi officials and in large measure, the bill for such an operation should be borne by the Saudis, the Kuwaitis, and also by Europe and Japan, whose dependence on Middle Eastern oil dwarfs that of the U.S.58 Despite the fact that a permanent U.S. presence in the Middle East would offend much of the Arab world, that Washington would be criticized for establishing a colonial protectorate, and that they were ignoring future reactions from the Arab world, the U.S. established a military base in Saudi Arabia (which is funded by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries). This base was created in order to ensure access to oil in the Middle East, to contain both Iran and Iraq, and to defend the security of Israel.59

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the successful U.S.-led military operation against Iraq, the United States emerged with unprecedented standing in the Gulf. Former national security adviser Zbigview Brezezinski described the region as unambiguously an American sphere of

58Ibid., 18.
59Ibid., 20.
influence which gave the U.S. administration an opportunity to create a security system, which would serve U.S. interest.

Since the Gulf war, the U.S. administration has been planning to introduce a unipolar security system, under which the United States as the sole super power will guarantee the security of its Gulf allies in exchange for the Gulf nations' political, financial and infrastructural support. Although this type of security system does not necessarily require the presence of a large, permanent ground force in the region, the United States will need to have sufficient military equipment stored and positioned in these allied countries so it can build up its forces rapidly and move in to pre-empt or repel a threat whenever necessary.

It appears that the U.S. intervention in the Persian Gulf war can be regarded as one of the reasons for securing a permanent military base and building a security system in the region in which the U.S. will take responsibility for the security of its allies. In return, these allies will provide political, financial and infrastructural support,

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61 Ibid., 516.

such as is currently being done by oil rich Arab countries, like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Post Cold War Syndrome: U.S. Quest for World Leadership

The Pentagon policy planners, in their February 1992 report, set detailed plans for budgetary planning for the rest of the century. In these documents, the Gulf war was characterized as a defining event in U.S. global leadership and its aftermath as a new international environment. The *New York Times*, in its editorial of March 10, 1992, wrote:

> America retained its position as the one and only unrivaled super power . . . we will retain the preeminent responsibility . . . for addressing those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends or which could seriously unsettle international relations.⁶³

In fact, during the post-Cold War period, the main reason for being of the United States was to emerge as the sole global super power. To achieve this end, the United States carried out the Gulf war. This is expressed clearly in two repeated themes of President Bush: the New World order and the Vietnam syndrome. Both signaled global motivations for the war.

With regards to the Vietnam syndrome, the U.S. had to demonstrate that it was no longer just a nuclear-super state with feet of clay when it came to fighting a conventional

war against an enemy. It had to show the will and military capacity on the ground as well as in the air to withstand a substantial conventional force. In order to achieve this, the U.S. first needed to annihilate by air Iraq forces in and around Kuwait in order to fight well on the ground with an army that had been rebuilt following the Vietnam debacle. The outcome, a triumph for all wings of U.S. conventional forces, was to make America's main power asset and its military capacity once again central to world politics. In order to achieve the New World order or establish U.S. leadership in the world, the Pentagon policy makers did not support U.S. activities as the world's policeman, but rather suggested that the American interest would determine U.S. involvement in international affairs.

In the post-Cold War era the United States' main objectives were: To prevent the re-emergence of a new rival in one of the republics of the former Soviet, or in the Persian Gulf, namely Iraq or Iran, and To prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. In order to do this, the U.S. had to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing

64 Gowan, 22.

65 Ibid.

potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests.\textsuperscript{67}

In the Middle East the post-Cold War U.S. objective is to remain the predominant outside power in the region and preserve access to the region's oil by the U.S., Japan and the west. Therefore, "It remains fundamentally important to prevent a hegemony or alignment of powers from dominating the regions."\textsuperscript{68} While rationalizing the unipolar world leadership of the U.S., Howard J. Wiarda pointed out:

One cannot conceive of a united European defense policy without the United States; the Russian aid program would surely collapse without the United States; and in Asia the United States is seen as the balancing force keeping China, Japan, and the two Koreas away politically from each other's throats. The peace process in the Middle East has no chance of success without the United States; Latin America's development would remain retarded without the United States; and humanitarian assistance in Africa would surely dry up if the United States were not involved; and so on. It is clear that both U.S. interests and the world's interests demand that we remain a major player in that world.\textsuperscript{69}

In order to consolidate U.S. world leadership in the post-Cold War era, Wiarda suggested several things:

\textsuperscript{67}Enid Hill, "The New World Order and the Gulf War," in Ismael and Ismael, 202.

\textsuperscript{68}Ibid., 203.

1. The United States must continue to be involved in global issues and problems.

The United States cannot ignore the next of the world's problem (poverty, drugs, hunger, malnutrition, disease, and the environment). Economically too, the U.S. is closely interdependent with other nations.

2. The United States must continue to lead.

The United States is too powerful. Only the United States has multifaceted power (political, economic, military, naval) to serve as a world leader. Only the United States can hold alliance together, provide sufficient stimulus for widespread economic development, deliver large scale assistance, and by its example and policies, stimulate democracy and human rights.\textsuperscript{70}

3. While the United States must continue to lead, it must also seek to increase the effectiveness of international organizations and multilateral capabilities.

In this context, not only the United Nations but such other regional organizations, as NATO, European Community, the Organization of American States, Organization of African Unity, ASEAN as well as new or revived mutual defense arrangement for Southeast Asia should be kept in American mind. U.S. cooperation with such agencies should not be for cooperation's sake alone. Instead these agencies need to be strengthened as problem solving mechanisms that help advance

\textsuperscript{70}Ibid., 229.
the principles and interests, for which the United States and its friends and allies stand.

4. The United States must strengthen its domestic economic base.

In order to be strong abroad and to carry out an effective foreign policy, America must have to be strong at home. Many opinion surveys show that, while the American people want to concentrate on the domestic economy, they also recognize the global interdependence of today's economic forces.

5. While the United States needs to make a compelling case for economic internationalism, it also needs to make the case for political and strategic internationalism.

This statement implies that the U.S. needs to build domestic constituencies to help support U.S. international policies where U.S. interests are affected. America needs to demonstrate for example, why a policy in favor of democracy and human rights is not only morally right but also advances U.S. interests. In fact, democratic regimes are much easier for the U.S. to work with.

6. While displaying a strong international position, the United States needs to set realistic limits as its goals.

The United States needs to bring the goals of her foreign policy into line with the more restricted means available to achieve those goals.
7. Lastly, Wiarda suggested that, in order to establish world leadership, U.S. foreign policy needs to be consistent and coherent.

Foreign policy need not be 100 percent consistent in order to be effective; but it does require some consistency and constancy. Sudden or frequent changes of direction are upsetting to the allies of the U.S. At the same time coherence in foreign policy requires a set of clear strategies to reach stated goals. It is not enough to set forth some idealistic, often romantic, principles for foreign policy. What is also required is a realistic road map of how to achieve the goals stated.

In the final analysis, one very important consequence of the U.S. intervention in the Gulf war was the establishment of U.S. unipolar leadership over the world. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the unipolar world system led by the United States came to the surface. The U.S. crushing military defeat to Iraq in the Middle East consolidated U.S. leadership over the world. Through the Gulf war, the U.S. quest for world leadership in the post-Cold War environment has been partially fulfilled.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION

The Middle East remains probably the most unstable region of all regions of the world. This reality is reflected in many potentially explosive conditions: the Arab-Israeli conflict—the Middle East problem--; the dormant civil war in Lebanon; the Iraq-Iran war; the Palestinian intifada (uprising) in the occupied West Bank and Gaza; the unrest caused by the revival of political Islam; the continued foreign interference in the internal affairs of the region; and finally, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the subsequent United States-led war against Iraq and its aftermath.

More importantly, the Middle East region is the most important source of energy and is strategically critical for world peace and economic stability. It contains some of the world's most important waterways, such as the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal, and occupies a central location between Europe, Africa, and Asia.

For many reasons, historical, ideological, economic, and diplomatic, Americans have been, in one way or another, influenced by the regional and international consequences of
the events in the Middle East. In recent years, the nature of United States-Middle East relations have been critically highlighted by many events and crises in the region: the American hostage crisis in Iran in 1979, the destruction of the U.S. Marines headquarters in Lebanon, the Iran-Contra affair, the Tanker War during the Iraq-Iran war, the United States bombing of Libya, and finally the 1990-1991 Gulf war.

U.S. engagement in the Middle East has been far from smooth. However, the foreign policy of any nation is based on real and changing national interests rather than any unchangeable abstract principles. There is always a large gap between propaganda and actual policy. The United States is no exception here, and therefore understanding its real policy in the Middle East requires more than a single case study. The most important fact about U.S. policy in the Middle East is that it tends to pursue a number of overlapping, conflicting, or inconsistent economic, political, and strategic interests. The mix of U.S. interests in the Middle East has changed over time.

Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, the U.S. policy in the Middle East was shaped according to the needs and requirements of the United States. Prior to World War II, official U.S. interests in the Middle East was mainly limited to the defense of commercial interests, principally oil. The Cold War generated greater strategic significance in the Middle East. It created requirements for access to
military facilities in the region, alliance formation on the part of the United States, and transfer by Washington of military supplies to strategic friends and allies. During the period responding to national interests, the United States established Israel which marked the beginning of extensive U.S. political, economic, and military involvement in the Middle East.

Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. interest demanded four major objectives in the Middle East:

1. Containing Soviet influence in the Middle East,
2. Assuring uninterrupted flow of the region's oil to the West and Japan at low, stable prices and recycling the petro-dollars in the interest of the U.S. economy,
3. Protecting the security of Israel and assuring its military superiority in the region,
4. Ensuring U.S. arms trade in the Middle East.

However, at a more specific level, U.S. policy objectives in the Middle East over the past several decades, until the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, may be identified as primary and secondary ones. The primary concern was to contain Soviet influence in the region. The secondary interests of the U.S. in the Middle East may include:

1. Ensuring the free flow of the region's oil to the U.S. and to Western Europe and Japan, and petro-dollars to the West,
2. Defending the security of Israel, and

3. Preserving the status-quo politics in the Middle East as represented by the so-called "moderate" and pro-American conservative government in the Middle East.

It should be noted that this list of U.S. interests and policy objectives in the Middle East does not imply a hierarchy of significance, or a degree of importance to the policy makers in the United States. These interests have been treated differently from one administration to another, depending on the policy maker and the circumstances of the time. However, during the Cold War, there was no doubt among the policy makers over whether the United States should attempt to limit Soviet influence in the Middle East. It was widely accepted within the policy makers that if the Soviet gained control over the region's resources, it would pose a serious threat to the economic well being of the United States and its allies in Western Europe and Japan. Therefore, the policy to contain the Soviet was the prime objective of the policy makers in the United States during the Cold War.

Since World War II, various U.S. administrations have adopted means and ways attempting to oppose Soviet influence in the region. Confrontation has been one of the means adopted by the Truman administration in 1946 to oppose the Russian presence in Iran after the war. In 1973 during the October War between the Arabs and Israel, the Nixon
administration put United States forces on a high alert around the world in reaction to the Soviet attempt to deploy Soviet military into Egypt during the war.

In response to the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Carter threatened to use "any means necessary, including military forces" to avoid any attempt by the Soviet to gain control of the Persian Gulf region. During the 1980-1988 Iraq-Iran war, the Reagan administration's decision to reflag Kuwait oil tankers was primarily motivated by its desire both to sustain the flow of the region's oil to the West and Japan at a stable price, and to exclude the Soviet from the strategically located Persian Gulf.

To widen the containment line in the Middle East, the United States, in addition to the confrontation policy, has adopted three other means of containment which include: alliance buildup, superpower cooperation, and political and economic development. However, during the 1990s, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of Cold War politics, containment of Soviet influence ceased to be a politico-military objective. The post-Cold War environment has raised a vital question that, during the Cold War, the United States intervened widely in the Third World in general and in the Middle East in particular. Now in the post-Cold War era, will the United States continue this policy? Should it?
While the collapse of the Soviet Union removed the major cause for U.S. involvement in the Middle East, Iran's truculent behavior and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 provide a more hostile environment to the U.S. interests in the region. The invasion and occupation of oil rich Kuwait by Iraq on August 2, 1990, set in motion a crisis that would remain at the forefront of the international agenda for quite some time. This crisis exclusively threatened the U.S. interest in the Middle East.

Responding to the invasion by pulling together an international coalition authorized by the United Nations Security Council to oppose Iraq from Kuwait, the U.S. initiated U.N. economic sanctions of unprecedented severity. The second response was the war decision against Iraq. Both of these responses had broad support. More importantly, the Soviet Union supported U.S. efforts to oppose Iraq, first by rejecting the invasion, and second by not using its veto power in the Security Council and its support for all U.N. resolutions against Iraq. Despite the sharply changed Soviet behavior, there was a residual fear that the shift might be reversible. American policy makers began to warn in general terms of threats to U.S. interests which might be posed by increasingly better-armed regional powers such as Iraq. Therefore, the U.S. response to the crisis was indeed motivated by the fact that U.S. interests in the region has been threatened by the invasion of Kuwait,
and by the possibility of further Iraqi moves against Saudi Arabia which would put U.S. interests in the region in serious jeopardy.

To deter Iraqi moves against Saudi Arabia, U.S. military forces were quickly deployed to the area. In November 1990, a buildup of offensive forces began. Despite Bush's claim that the U.S. mission was offensive, and in the midst of all diplomatic attempts to prevent a war, President Bush was determined to eject Iraq from Kuwait by force. In January 1991, the campaign to eject Iraq from Kuwait commenced. Following several weeks of systematic and massive air attacks, formidable and highly mobile ground forces defeated the Iraqi army on February 28, 1991.

The key political objectives of ejecting the Iraqi army from Kuwait, and restoring the so-called legitimate government of Kuwait, were accomplished quickly and with remarkably low coalition casualties. Undoubtedly, it was an absolute military victory of the U.S.-led coalition and crushing defeat for Iraq.

The fact remains that the Gulf War was truly an electronic war. The sight of cruise missiles and smart bombs roaming to their destination with pinpoint accuracy created a widespread impression of an uneven match with a high tech super power--the United States and its European allies--and many other countries, including the Arabs, versus a poor Third world army. Therefore, it should be indicated that
America's victory in the Gulf War was not a unilateral one. Success depended heavily upon the cooperation of others, whether in the form of support in the United Nations Security Council, especially by the Soviet Union, or by many other means like participation in the economic blockade, the contribution of troops, and diplomatic support, the willingness of Saudi Arabia to allow the use of its territory and air bases by the U.S.-led coalition forces, the financial pledges from the allied states, especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and finally, the division among the Arab states regarding the issue. All of these factors contributed to the outcome of the Gulf war. While the war clearly represented a military victory of an advanced country over a developing one, the outcome was by no means a foregone conclusion.

United States interests in the Middle East, as elsewhere, are determined on the basis of strategic considerations and access to resources and markets. As a superpower, the United States has used a variety of means to achieve its interests in the Middle East. These means have included both peaceful and violent ones. The Gulf war was the best example for the use of military forces by the U.S. to protect its interests in the region. By defeating Iraq, the U.S. has further secured its interests in the Middle East.
Before U.S. interests in the Middle East can be defined as the factors that motivated the U.S. to go to war against Iraq in 1990-1991, it should be noted that, according to the theory of national interest, the pursuit of national interest can be defined as a policy or policies designed to promote and protect interests of a particular period of time, as contested with differentiated interests of individuals, groups, or sub-groups, or the interests of mankind as a whole. National interest can also be described as the perceived needs and desires of a sovereign state in relation to other sovereign states which constitute its external environment. As national interests of a state are reflected both in domestic and external policies, shifts and changes in domestic coalitions and in international relations may require a redefinition of national interests by a nation-state. Political, economic, and technological changes also redistribute power both at domestic and international levels, which may likewise compel nation-states to redefine their national interests.

Indeed, every nation-state's ultimate objective is to achieve its national interests. U.S. policy in the Middle East was no exception here. It was always motivated by its needs and desires to achieve its national interests. Obviously the U.S. intervention in the Gulf war indicated that it was carried out to serve its national interests.
Four basic interests of nation-states and four levels of interest have been suggested by Donald E. Nuechterlein as national needs which form the underpinning of national foreign policy. The four fundamental interests are:

1. Defense interest,
2. Economic interest,
3. World order interest, and
4. Ideological interest (see Chapter II).

The order in which these four basic interests have been placed does not suggest any priority of one over another. However, it may be argued that unless a nation-state is able to defend its territory and citizens, either by its own defense forces or in alliance with a major power, or both, none of the other three interests is likely to matter.

Identification of the basic national interests involved in foreign crisis is only the first step in determining foreign policy. The next step is to assess correctly the intensity of that interest on the stakes that the policy makers of a country and its leadership believes are involved.

To analyze better the differing degrees of interests that a government perceives to be involved in given international events, Nuechterlein has categorized four degrees of intensities as follows:

1. Survival issues,
2. Vital issues,
3. Major issues, and
4. Peripheral issues.

The national-interest matrix, suggested by Nuechterlein as a research tool in foreign policy analysis, can be used in this study to find out how the Bush administration viewed U.S. interests in the Middle East-Persian Gulf-region in reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990.

To illustrate how the national interest matrix can be used as a research tool, Nuechterlein has explained the Suez crisis of 1956. Because of the abrupt nationalization of the Suez Canal by President Nasser in 1956, the Eden government in Britain decided to use force against Egypt.

The Eden government decided that Britain's economic interests were so endangered by the potential closure of the canal that it could not compromise with Nasser. Therefore, the British economic interest in the canal was, in Eden's view, so great that the issue was a vital one which had to be met with force since Nasser refused to negotiate suitable guarantees on the use of the canal.

Similarly, President Bush decided that U.S. economic interests were endangered by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the possibility that Iraq might gain control over Saudi Arabia's oil resources. This would give Iraq the opportunity to control over one-third of the world's oil reserves, which the United States would not allow Saddam Hussein to do and
so could not compromise with him. An immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait was demanded and a large number of military forces were deployed in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the U.S. economic interest was, in Bush's view, so great that the U.S. would use military force if Saddam Hussein refused to withdraw from Kuwait. Although, like Nasser, Saddam Hussein was seen as a threat to western oriented governments in the Middle East and, more importantly, to Israel as a challenged regional power (world order interest), he was clearly following an anti-democratic course at home (ideological interest). Like Eden, President Bush probably saw the world-order interest as vital and the ideological interest at least as major. He therefore decided not to compromise with Saddam Hussein and chose the use of force to deal with him.

The conclusion drawn is that during the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis, the United States saw its interest in the Middle East as follows:

1. Economic well-being, vital.
2. Favorable world order, vital.
3. Promotion of value (ideological), major.
4. Defense of homeland, peripheral.

Therefore, Nuechterlein's national interest matrix can be used to explain how the U.S. viewed its interest in the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis and can conclude that force was a likely course of action.
It is apparent that the U.S. policy in the Middle East in general, and in the 1990-1991 Gulf war in particular, continued to be dictated by the theory of national interest. As this writing has supported, national interest was the driving force behind the U.S. intervention in the Gulf. Therefore, the war decision was dominated by the following factors, which were also considered as the major U.S. interest in the region. These factors were:

1. The oil factor. In a real sense the war was essentially over oil. About 60 percent of the world's oil comes from eight Gulf states, more than 15 times what the United States produces; indeed if the probable reserves are counted, the total percentage is closer to 85 percent. If the regime of Saddam Hussein had controlled the flow of the Gulf oil, or controlled more of a share in OPEC, which meant control the price of oil, this would directly threaten the U.S. interests. The U.S. economy would clearly be vulnerable if a significant portion of the Middle East oil were controlled by an unfriendly regime, and the petro-dollars investment in the United States will be severely damaged. Another major U.S. interest is that the control of oil supplies to both Japan and the countries of Western Europe has always served the U.S. at a crucial political level in relations with the Middle East countries. So, to secure the free access to Middle Eastern oil, the United States had to become directly involved in the war.
2. To secure the existence of Israel, the political and strategic ally of the United States. Politically, Israel emerged at the direct sponsorship of the United States. Apart from the ethnic bondage of American Jews with Israeli Jewish community, Washington is highly sympathetic to the Israeli cause. Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and the emergence of Iraq as a regional military power, the U.S. policy maker and the American Israeli supporters, understood that a strong Iraq in the Middle East would ultimately challenge the Israeli military superiority in the region and threaten Israel's security. So naturally to protect the security of Israel, the United States moved to destroy the Iraqi military power and quickly intervened in the Gulf War. The U.S. perceives a moral, political and strategic obligation to keep the security of Israel intact.

3. The third important factor behind the U.S. intervention in the Gulf was to establish a permanent military base in the Gulf region, which was the long term goal of the United States for ensuring the so-called collective security in the region. The U.S. policy planners spent much time and money to establish a permanent military base in the region, especially in Saudi Arabia. The orders were to protect the U.S. interest, namely oil, in the region in case of a Soviet threat or any other regional threat, like the case of Iraq, so that the free flow of oil can be ensured. The U.S. administration had also been planning to
introduce a unipolar security system, under which the United States as the only superpower, would ensure the security of its Gulf allies in exchange of their political, financial and infrastructural support. The Gulf War gave the United States the opportunity to create and maintain a permanent military base in the Gulf, further securing its interest in the region.

4. The fourth factor for U.S. intervention in the Gulf War was the aspiration of the United States to emerge as the sole, global superpower. In the post-Cold War era, the first objective of the United States was to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival and to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region where resources could, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power.

The post-Cold War U.S. objectives in the Middle East are: to remain the predominant outside power in the region, and to preserve U.S. and western access to the region's oil. To consolidate U.S. world leadership in the post-Cold War era, the Gulf War was carried out to this end.

Actually, the United States has traditionally defined its national interest in the Middle East in terms of the containment of Soviet expansion. The containment doctrine has been pursued as a means of accomplishing the following:

• preventing a shift in the global balance of power,
• ensuring the security and western freedom of access to the region's oil supplies,
• assuring access to the region's markets for American manufactured goods,
• securing the environment for American investment opportunities, and
• assuring the continued flow of petro-dollars investment into the United States market.

To realize the objectives of containment, the United States had to develop strong, positive relationships with the favored Arab states of the Middle East. The United States also had to promote the stability of a region where war and instability invited the Soviet, threatened the security of the free flow of the region's oil, and endangered American commercial interests.

It is commonly argued that Israel promotes American interests in the Middle East by acting as a barrier against Soviet penetration; maintaining regional stability through its military superiority, and by ensuring the survival of pro-American Arab regimes. However, the linkage of Israel with the definition of American national interest in the Middle East have made the Arabs susceptible to the Soviet influence. Support for Israel, after all, has given the Soviet Union the opportunity to intrude itself deeply into the Middle East. It has put at risk U.S. access to oil resources of the Persian Gulf. The best example for this was
the 1973 Arab oil embargo. In direct response to the U.S. alliance with Israel and to Israeli aggression, several Arab states turned toward Moscow for arms and forged alliances with the Soviet to maximize their own security. The U.S.-Israeli relationship, in and of itself, has impeded the efforts of the United States to further the stability of pro-American governments throughout the Middle East. This relationship has led to a hostile environment concerning American interests in the region, which in the end, led to direct involvement and military intervention by the United States to protect its national interest in an unstable Middle East.

In the final analysis, despite its widely increased military presence and success in the region, the result is a relatively unfavorable U.S. economic and political influence in the Middle East. The Cold War ideology, which saw the Middle East in terms of the East-West gains and the Soviet threat, no longer exists and need to be replaced by a more productive policy. As the collapse of the Soviet Union and the departure of communism were necessary for political and economic freedom to be developed in Eastern Europe, imperialism, along with its client states in the Middle East, must be ended for more political and economic development, more political freedom and true democracy in which the United States can play a major role, as it does in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. The United States did not send
American troops to the Middle East to defend freedom and democracy. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, after all, are feudal monarchies. In fact, the war was about oil, about who would set the price of oil, and about protecting governments loyal to the United States and punishing those who are not. Indeed, a majority of Arabs would welcome a United States presence if the U.S. treated Arab countries the same way it does to Israel and other Eastern European countries, that is, by encouraging economic and political freedom and independence. In so doing, the United States will have won not only the Gulf war, but also the trust and confidence of the Arab people.
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