Party systems: an exploratory study of the impact of the two-party framework on the political attitude and behavior of the electorate in the Nigerian Third Republic

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ABSTRACT

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

EKWUOCHA, JOHN I. B.S., UNIVERSITY OF S.W. LOUISIANA, 1986
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PARTY SYSTEMS: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF
THE TWO-PARTY FRAMEWORK ON THE POLITICAL ATTITUDE
AND BEHAVIOR OF THE ELECTORATE IN THE
NIGERIAN THIRD REPUBLIC

Advisor: Professor Robert Fishman
Dissertation dated December, 1996

The study examines the records of the Nigerian party systems in creating a propitious or volatile political environment for political campaigns and elections. It brings together the literature and cross-sectional survey data on individual and group political attitudes and behavior, and on the effect of the Nigeria party system on political attitudes of the electorate.

Why is party competition in Nigeria strongly associated with ethnic belonging and why is it accompanied with so much violence? This study explores the question by illuminating and probing the motivations and incentives of the party systems, their patterns of political socialization and mobilization, as well as their impact on the electorate. It also approaches the question by focusing on political
culture which defines the context in which changes occur and the style they take.

In the final analysis, the study argues that party identification or loyalty and political behavior are influenced and shaped not just by political culture but also, and perhaps more importantly, by the nature of the party system. It provides cross-sectional data with which to develop or test a causal model of relationships between political structure (such as party system, civic culture of the Nigeria public) on the one hand and variability in the incidence of violence accompanying political campaigns and elections and the variability of the effect of ethnicity and religion on political campaigns and elections.

The findings are compatible with the theories on two-party systems. While the multiplicity of parties in the First and Second Republics had a destabilizing and weakening effect on the political system, the two party framework did not have such an impact. The membership of the two parties in the Third republic cut across ethnic and religious lines and created some political ties that connected individuals and communities in Nigeria and increased their shared interests. All these helped to reduce the incidences of political violence and the effect of ethnicity in political campaigns and voting behavior. They also helped in the resolution or insulation of political conflicts and disputes.

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF CLARK ATLANTA UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY
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DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

During the last three decades a question has been raised concerning the ability of traditional governing parties and the party systems to deal with a range of problems. Another important unresolved question is whether the attitudes of the Nigerian public have a major causal effect on the establishment of favorable democratic behaviors such as voting across ethnic, regional, and religious lines, avoiding the use of violence and intimidation of political opponents as a vital weapon for a successful political campaigns and elections?

This work examines the records of the Nigerian party systems in creating a propitious political environment for political campaigns and elections. In essence, what is the relationship between the party systems and the establishment of democratic attitudes that are favorable to orderly political campaigns and elections in Nigeria? To what extent did the two-party framework reduce the incidence of ethnicity, violence, and inter- and intra-party squabbles that often triggered off riots and destruction of lives and property during election campaigns? In other words, did it succeed in the creation of a more favorable democratic
culture and the resocialization of Nigerians into the new values and norms devoid of divisive, disruptive and centrifugal tendencies?

But why is it that political/constitutional stability and orderly (peaceful) political campaigns and elections are achieved in some countries, in spite of governmental crises, while a mere permission to form political parties in Nigeria constitutes a major threat to its corporate existence. This study approaches this question by focusing on political culture (political values and norms) which defines the context and style in which change takes place.

Nigeria has become a testing ground for different theories of government and politics and a "guinea pig" of social scientists and political philosophers. It is facing a number of serious problems. Some are leftovers from British colonialism in Nigeria, some originated from inter-ethnic transactions before British colonialism. Others are still in the future but looming ever closer. It seems that how the political actors choose to resolve those problems will go a long way in determining whether they will worsen or improve.

Nigeria has been politically shaken to its foundation by the traumatic experiences of the First and Second Republics' party politics and a thirty-month civil war. Violence, political thuggery, the use of state power for assassination and repression of opposition groups became
endemic and corruption and political patronage were ubiquitous. The mistrust and frustrations which had been brewing and building up exploded in the 1962 western regional crisis that polarized the Action Group (A.G.) into two hostile factions and led to a state of emergency and treasonable felony trials and convictions of the A.G. leaders.¹

The federal government (a coalition of Northern People's Congress and the National Congress of Nigerian Citizens) declared a state of emergency in the West when the Awolowo faction of the A.G. had succeeded in deposing Chief Akintola as Premier of the western region.² This precluded the assumption of power by the Awolowo faction and led to the reinstatement of Chief Akintola as premier in control of a new party, the United People's Party (UPP) after six months of selective application of a substantially biased state of emergency rule. At this point, the A.G. was no longer a big political force in Nigeria. K.W. J. Post and Michael Vickers contend that "the crisis not only alienated a large segment of the Nigerian youth and intelligentsia who had been attracted to Awolowo's radical egalitarian appeals,


but it also left the Yoruba feeling victimized as a people."³ The impact of this was clearly seen in party formation and membership in the Second Republic.

Another major crisis which the parties of the First Republic failed to resolve was the 1962 census. The census had become so politicized and the object of bitter political competition in Nigeria because of its primary function in the distribution of revenues and power. The Northern majority in Nigeria politics was heavily threatened by the initial results released in the South after the 1962 census. The East was accused of inflating its population figures, while the North claimed to have discovered eight million more people in a verification exercise within the region. The importance of the census cannot be overemphasized, especially in the 1964 general election, but suffice it to say that there were accusations and counter-accusations among the major political parties and none of them wanted to be outwitted because such outcome would obviously reduce the party's power and strength in inter-party and ethnic negotiations, transactions and political competitions. Similarly, Larry Diamond succinctly points out that "...census had been blatantly established as an instrument of ethnic and regional competition, mass political

mobilization was even more intense and mutual suspicion even
more profound.  

The already tense political situation was exacerbated by both the Northern aristocracy and its political party (NPC) and Eastern Igbos who indicated that they were no longer satisfied with their alliance at the federal level. David J. Murray after evaluating the nature of the political relationship between the NPC and the NCNC at the federal level rightly concludes that "each saw the other as committed to finding a way of excluding the other or establishing a firmer grip over the federal government."

Both the NPC and the NCNC seemed to be fishing in troubled waters and were fighting tooth and nail to establish a strong political base and dependable allies in the western region which had become the sick child of Nigeria. Similarly, "by 1964-1965, the NPC government of the North and the NCNC government of the East were financing and furthering what amounted to a near civil war in their attempt to establish an ally in control of the regional government."

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4Diamond, Linz and Lipset, 41.


6Ibid. For a detailed account of politics in Nigeria during the Nigeria's First Republic see F.A.O. Schwarz Jr., Nigeria--The Tribes, the Nation, or a the Race (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965).
It is important to note that the major political parties, especially the two that formed a coalition at independence in 1960, were only concerned with the well-being of their parties, their members, their interests, and their regions rather than establishing a successful parliamentary democracy and a stable federal republic.

The 1964 general elections made a mockery of parliamentary democracy. The manner in which the elections were manipulated in most parts of the country was, to say the least, despicable. Alexander A. Madiebo condemns the elections and political campaigns of 1964 in very strong terms. "Some political parties were prevented from campaigning in parts of the country only to make it possible for candidates of the ruling party to be returned unopposed." The East boycotted the elections to show its resentment of the manner in which the campaigns and elections were conducted.

Before 1964 elections, alliances and new alignments of political forces which were different from what had prevailed in 1959 had emerged. On March 10, 1964, Chief Akintola's UPP which had flirted with the N.P.C. was committed to good relations and cooperation with the federal

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8Ibid.
government formed a new political grouping called the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) with a small number of maverick members of the NCNC who held seats in the Western Region House of Assembly and Southern People's Congress (SPC). Akintola's N.N.D.P. and the Sardauna's N.P.C. formed an alliance in order to control the federal parliament. In what may be considered an act of desperation, the Awolowo faction of the Action Group, led by Chief Adegbenro, and the N.C.N.C. who were left with no other option consummated a marriage of convenience which gave birth to an alliance named United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). Minority political groups from the North such as the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) and Malam Aminu Kanu's Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) joined UPGA.

The UPGA supporters who had lost trust and confidence in the federal government's ability to conduct free and fair elections were shocked by the October 1965 elections which ended in a fiasco and seemed to attract the attention of the army. They rejected the results and Alhaji Adegbenro, deputy leader of AG and leader of UPGA in the West formed a ten-man "interim government" when Governor Fadatunsi called on Chief Akintola to form a government. Adegbenro was arrested and charged with unlawful assumption of power even

9Ibid., 7.
though he assured the governor that he would pursue his goal constitutionally.

The disorders, looting, lawlessness, brigandage, and the unrest that followed the election in Western Nigeria were monumental and reached such alarming proportions that the federal authorities advised legislators to avoid using road transportation on their way to the federal territory of Lagos.\textsuperscript{10} Ironically, the federal Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, who had declared a state of emergency in 1962 refused to make any concrete effort to resolve the 1965 crisis which was several times bigger than that of 1962. Instead, he insisted that "force can't bring peace to peoples' hearts."\textsuperscript{11} Balewa seemed to be right in this regard because force cannot inculcate the much-desired positive attitude conducive to compromise, accommodation, and national cohesion. Moreover, cohesion by coercion in a multi-ethnic society like Nigeria cannot withstand the test of time. But one may ask why did the federal government refuse to grant the UPGA's requests--declaring a state of emergency in the Western Region and arranging for another election? A state of emergency stood a chance of unseating Sardauna's satellite and ally in the West. Instead, Balewa announced that everything was under control in the West when

\textsuperscript{10}Shurnik, 142.

\textsuperscript{11}Ibid.
there was a complete breakdown of law and order. This paved the way for the army takeover on January 15, 1966.

In 1978, after 12 years of military rule, the military Head of State, General Olusegun Obasanjo lifted the ban on partisan party politics. Immediately after the ban was lifted, many ethnic-based political associations emerged despite the electoral decree that required the establishment of offices in each of at least two-thirds of the states in the federation. This decree was intended to nip the problem of Nigerian party politics in the bud by forestalling and precluding the emergence of ethnic-based political parties which characterized and destroyed the First Republic. In addition, this electoral decree was believed to be an institutional framework through which political parties would acquire a more national character. It performed the function of national integration and nurtured political stability.

Unfortunately, the five and later six registered political parties became the reincarnation of the First Republic's political parties: the National Party of Nigeria (NPN)/NPC; the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN)/Action Group; the National People's Party (NPP)/NCNC, and People's Redemption Party (PRP)/NEPU and each was led, as before by a member of the three dominant ethnic groups Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo. In the final analysis, the same political environment, circumstances, and people were bound to produce
results similar to that of the First Republic. As Chikendu puts it, "In the end Nigerian politics rewound to square one."\textsuperscript{12}

On December 31, 1983, senior ranking military officers overthrew Shagari's government and set the political ball of the Third Republic rolling when the Babangida's administration established a Political Bureau charged with finding a new and viable political order. In his inaugural address, President Babangida asked the Political Bureau to "review the Nigeria's political history and identify the basic problems which had led to our failure in the past and suggest ways of resolving and coping with these problems."\textsuperscript{13}

The Political Bureau, in its report, pointed an accusing finger at Nigeria's party-system and identified it as one of the Achilles heels of Nigeria's politics. It also recommended a two-party system as the panacea for numerous political problems plaguing Nigeria, a socialist ideology upon which the party-system was to be anchored or based, and a new political orientation. Babangida's administration quickly accepted a two-party system and rejected the


\textsuperscript{13}From President Babangida's inaugural address to the Political Bureau, quoted in the \textit{Newswatch} (Nigeria), April 13, 1987, 15.
socialist ideology. The question at this juncture is whether the two-party framework did a better job (more effective) in remolding and reshaping the values and attitudes of both the Nigerian masses and the elites, thereby producing a conducive political environment for stability?

**Statement of the Problem**

This study is an exploration of the relation between a set of events (variables), namely, party systems (number of political parties and the relationships between them) and the pattern of political mobilization and socialization. It examines the effect of the two-party framework on political violence, intimidation of political opponents, ethnicization of politics, and political integration during political campaigns and elections. Moreover, it explores the relative effectiveness of the two-party framework as compared with that of the multi-party system in reducing or eliminating disruptive activities during political campaigns and elections. It raises the question about the impacts of this formula or pattern on the electorate's perception of the two political parties during campaigns and elections in Nigeria. In addition, it evaluates the relationship between the party systems and the development of favorable democratic attitudes.

There is no doubt that the pattern of political mobilization, socialization, and electoral campaigns by the
major parties in the First and Second Republics limited the development of a national party system and the mobilization of the electorate around national issues. Nigeria has multiple social cleavages—by region, religion, language, and to a certain extent, social class. This encouraged the political parties to appeal to specific regional or ethnic interests with hope of electoral success at the regional level and confusion and gridlock at the federal level. In the midst of the confusion, a fragile coalition of parties which would eventually destabilize the political system and bring it to a standstill. Did the two party framework solve this problem?

Therefore, the multiparty system as practiced in the First and Second Republics did not accentuate a national party system that was very critical or essential for the integration of the Nigerian society. Regardless of the constitutional requirements for party formation, it was easy for the transformation of parties into more narrowly defined tools and vehicles for promoting ethnic, religious or regional ambition culminating or leading to a failure in the party system. This reinforces the role of the Nigeria political culture in shaping the political behavior of the political elite class. It will be recalled that Babangida gave aspiring politicians an opportunity in 1988 to form two broad-based parties in the national interest (political stability). Instead they came up with 13 parties with
ethnic affiliation. The Nigerian political culture then supported the idea of appealing and using ethnic sentiments as far as acquisition of political power was concerned.

**Purpose of the Study**

The assumption is that the multi-party system has led to violent political campaigns, destructive polarization, ethnic/religious conflicts, and political instability in Nigeria.

The purpose is to help in the establishment of empirical generalizations (statements that communicate general knowledge) through which a causal model of relationships between party systems, attitudes of the Nigerian electorate, and change in the level of violence, ethnicity, and religion during electoral campaigns and elections in Nigeria can be tested or further explored. In essence, they will help to show the relationships between individual facts or variables.

The study looks into the effects of using two-party framework on the attitudes of the Nigerian electorate towards political campaigns and elections. It is also a simultaneous exploration of how the society is conditioned by the political parties and their pattern of campaign and the parties conditioned by the society.

Another objective is to look into political campaign experiences, institutions, behavior, and processes not necessarily in terms of cause and effect, but the
desirability (utility) or undesirability (futility) in the establishment of a stale political order. It examines the records and patterns of political campaigns during the periods of multipartism and two-party framework in Nigeria in order to predict which party system is more likely to integrate the Nigerian society and produce national political parties. In essence, it will ultimately attempt to evaluate events, trends, and consequences.

The criteria for evaluating the effects of both party systems entail comparing the levels of violence, fragmentation or, polarization of the electorate, ethnicity, integration, trust, religious politics, level of consensus, character, and the pattern of party membership and political campaigns in all the republics.

Significance of this Study

The essence of this study is to see how organizational/constitutional engineering device can positively contribute in solving the chronic pathology of political instability at the time when Africa, like the rest of the world, is seeking to embrace representative democracy. It is necessary to identify relevant kinds of political structures most conducive to promoting stable democracy. Africa had also in the past believed that the best approach to political and socioeconomic development was the one-party system, which was believed to be a centripetal force that would integrate the political community rather than fragment it. The
results of the last three decades have shown that one-party systems in Africa degenerated into the monopoly of political power by an oligarchy. The two-party system is believed by President Babangida to have a high probability of stabilizing political competition and inter-ethnic transactions.

The study sets out to supply the material necessary for comparative considerations relating to the patterns of electoral campaigns, integration, and elections in Nigeria under different party systems. It provides a particularly good opportunity to gather data at a particular point in time (before and after the 1993 presidential election in Nigeria). These data will help to evaluate different party systems in Nigeria. In addition to being timely and relating to a practical political problem in Nigeria, it will attempt to explain what often happens under certain conditions, and this knowledge will be used to choose the ends and means Nigeria prefers especially party systems. In essence, the answers to the questions in this study may be quite valuable in the making of practical decisions.

Finally, the propositions developed in this study will help to make generalizations about political behavior, impact of party systems on Nigerian-type societies, and help to invite the replication and testing of these propositions in other contexts.
In the final analysis, this study will try to identify the social forces at work in Nigerian party politics and to establish the link between them, and chart or predict their course in the new party-system. An understanding of these forces inevitably advances the knowledge of social relations shared by Nigerians. This knowledge is necessary for the political transformation of Nigerian society.

This study cannot be definitive but can be suggestive. Thus, it will be a contribution to the current heated debate regarding the best solution to the Nigerian political quagmire and the impact of the two party framework on the Nigerian political process.

**Operational Definitions**

Words or concepts have become so elastic that they can be stretched up or down to mean different things to different people at different times. Therefore it is necessary in a study like this to operationalize concepts and variables in this work and put them in forms that allow and facilitate some kind of measurement.

**Tribalism**—A discrimination in favor of or against a person or thing based on his/her or its state of origin rather than merit. It is also a strong commitment and loyalty to one's party or ethnic group at the expense of the nation and other groups.

**Federal Character**—This is the idea of distributing, spreading or sharing of national resources among all states
so that each state should receive an equitable number of portions. Similarly, it is the idea that "national amenities should be spread equitably over all states of the federation."\textsuperscript{14}

**Political Stability**--As used in this study refers to continuity of a government until the end of its constitutional tenure, infrequent changes in top public officials, political leadership, absence or low incidence of disruptive events in the system such as political riots, coups, legitimacy problems, intimidation of political opponents, false imprisonment of political dissenters, rigging elections, above all, the maintenance of the same constitutional forms and processes over a long period of time (about ten-fifteen years). This does not preclude effecting minor changes by the appropriate authority or authorities.

**Research Questions**

The main questions guiding the study are the following:

To what extent did the two-party framework, as an agent or instrument of political socialization, succeed in the re-socialization of the Nigerian communities and their leaders

toward a new political culture devoid of divisive, disruptive and centrifugal tendencies?

To what extent did the two-party framework reduce the incidence of ethnicity and primordial loyalties during political campaigns? In other words, to what extent did it bring about the replacement of alignments based on ethnic, religious, and regional affiliation with issue-oriented ones?

To what extent did the two-party framework reduce or contain inter-party squabbles and factional strife within the parties that fueled the passion that touched off riots and destruction of lives and property during election campaigns?

Was the two-party system in Nigeria able to engineer and propagate a consensual political culture in place of a fragmented one?

Finally, to what extent, therefore, did the two-party system promote stability than the multi-party system?

**Theoretical Framework**

As this study searches or looks for facts, events, and explanations that are intertwined and interrelated many theoretical perspectives that help to draw or show relations, build connections, and state linkages come to mind. Political scientists have not reached any agreement on the theoretical approach to be regarded as the best as far as explanatory and predictive strengths are concerned.
In other words, as far as confirmation of the existing hypothesis and the development of new hypotheses are concerned, the search for the most appropriate theoretical approach becomes an endless or at least at preliminary stages toward a solution, or what may be referred to as the "ultimate political science theory" just like Newtonian theory in Physics.

This study uses a political culture approach as a point of departure because it seems to be the most relevant and promising approach in investigating, understanding, and explaining the relationship among variables such as party system, pattern of political campaign, and political culture. The political culture approach shows both the cause and effect of the type of political orientations and to a degree, of behavior. Once the political culture of a given polity is investigated and understood, the unifying and diverging values and beliefs can be conjectured.

Elgin F. Hunt and David C. Colander give an interesting anecdote that depicts the importance of culture to society.\textsuperscript{15} They were taught in high school that electrons, protons, and neutrons made up atoms, atoms made up elements and elements made up matters. As time went on, physicists discovered the existence of smaller particles called building blocks of all

matters. "These building blocks include quarks, leptons, and ghostly particles, bosons, whose existence is assumed by physicists because they need to hold matter together. Quarks and leptons make up matter; bosons hold it together."¹⁶ Culture holds society together the way bosons hold matter. Absence of bosons would lead to the disintegration of quarks and leptons and the world as we know it today would not exist. Society will be subjected to the same fate if that force (culture) that holds it together is destroyed or distorted. The political science bosons equivalent is political culture which was popularized as a concept by Gabriel Almond in his 1956 article, "Comparative Political Systems."¹⁷

As most other concepts in political science, the precise definition of political culture is a controversial one, focusing as it does on the cognitive, affective, and evaluational aspects found in the seminal works of Almond, Verba, and Pye.¹⁸ The concept as Verba explains, does not only apply to events or activities within the political

¹⁶Ibid.


sphere, but to "the system of beliefs about the patterns of political interactions and political institutions." The system of attitudes, beliefs, and ideals is self-reinforcing and comes from a society's history--its traditions, the spirit of its public organizations, the reasoning of its citizens, the style and ethical code of its leaders. "Political culture colors a people's expectations about the realities of politics and instills in them shared ideals as to what their public life might be."

There are many different definitions of political culture. One consensus or rather characteristic that runs through these definitions is the idea that political culture is concerned with the fundamental orientations and beliefs of a people. However, there are disagreements about what exactly constitute the components of these fundamental beliefs. As far as the definition of political culture is concerned, this work focuses on Walter A. Rosenbaum's work, Political Culture and Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils' Toward a General Theory of Action. The three core definitions include:


20Pye, in Pye and Verba, 7.

21Ibid., 9.

components" which Rosenbaum believes are common to all definitions of political culture are orientations toward political structures, orientations toward others in the political system, and orientations toward one's political activities. Parsons and Shils contend that political orientations involve cognitive element which deals with perception, the cathectic (affective) deals with feeling, through which the object is endowed with affective importance, and evaluative component relates to combining and using cognitive and catechetical orientations in making choice and judgment about the object.

Almond and Verba expand the above frame of reference into three types of political orientation:

(1) "cognitive orientation," concerns the knowledge of the political system, the role of the political actors who occupy different structures and institutions, and inputs and outputs of the political system.

(2) "affective orientation," relates to feelings about the political system, its role, political actors, and performance, and

(3) "evaluational orientation," deals with the judgments and opinions about political objects based on the

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23Rosenbaum, 6-7.

24Parsons and Shils, 58-60.
combination of value standards and criteria with knowledge (information) and feeling.\textsuperscript{25}

Jay Stevens and Ndiva Kofele-Kale propose two definitions of political culture based on macro (mass) and micro (individual) levels. On the mass (macro) level, they define it as the "collective orientation of groups of people toward the political system—derived from history and traditions help shape mass political behavior."\textsuperscript{26} On the individual (micro) level, political culture is defined as the "subjective way a person thinks and feels about the symbols, institutions, and rules that constitute the basic and fundamental parts of civic life."\textsuperscript{27} Imbedded in the above definitions of political culture is the assumption that people's political behavior is directly linked to their feelings and beliefs about government and politics. To see how political culture links national history and individual political orientations, see Figure 1.

\textsuperscript{25}James A. Bill and Robert L. Hardgrave Jr., \textit{Comparative Politics: The Quest for Theory} (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America), 87.


\textsuperscript{27}Ibid., 1-2.
The pattern of mass or collective orientations of groups of people also has direct link with the feelings and beliefs of individuals. In essence, a pattern of political orientation that emphasizes division, distinctiveness, or ethnic differences can adversely affect the political attitude of the individuals. A case in point is the pattern of political parties' campaigns in Nigeria's First, Second, and to certain extent, Third Republics. Each political party constantly told and reminded the ethnic group or groups it represented that the other opposing parties belonged to different ethnic groups and they had perfected a master plan to marginalize and deprive other ethnic groups of their rights and fair share of the country's resources. In the process, these political parties and their leaders influence
the feelings and beliefs of individuals in different ethnic
groups in Nigeria.

The violently cruel and ferocious character of the
political campaign was followed by the ostensible
distribution of government positions and national resources
in favor of the ethnic group or groups whose party won the
election. This institutionalized a system of rewards in
which political parties and their leaders perceived
themselves, not as national apparati but as the champions
and vanguards of their ethnic groups in the struggle for
rewards and patronage. The nature of crises emanating from
inter-ethnic transactions in the process of the struggle for
rewards tended to make leaders so rigid and unwilling to
sacrifice any primordial interest for that of the nation.
This tendency exacerbates the tension in the system and
compounds irreconcilable policy postures of the leading
ethnic groups' elites. This accelerated the formation of a
multitude of ethnic based parties and their commitment to
massive changes in favor of their respective ethnic groups,
and increased both the volume and intensity of pressure on
the system. The superordinate/subordinate nature of
Nigerian politics has a negative impact on the relations
among ethnic groups. Minority ethnic based parties regarded
themselves as the subordinates and the resulting antagonism
had an adverse impact on the centrifugal and centripetal
trends in Nigerian political and civil societies.
"As people communicate with each other, mass beliefs become more widely shared and act to reinforce individual political orientations."\textsuperscript{28} A successful foundation of a nation involves the establishment of political institutions and processes for settlement of disputes and authoritative allocation of value (distribution of available resources). The stability of a nation is largely dependent on the legitimacy, to a significant degree, on national integration, and acceptability of those political institutions and processes by the majority of the people or groups that make up that nation. For a nation to endure for any length of time, a large proportion of the population must view the political structure and procedures as legitimate.\textsuperscript{29}

There is no gainsaying that high national integration makes the processes of governance easy. As Stevens and Kofele-Kale rightly observe,

A nation that is highly integrated politically is one in which citizens have a strong sense of identification with the nation and feel that their obligations and loyalty to the nation take precedence over any obligations they may have to

\textsuperscript{28}Ibid., 2.

their social classes, their religion, or other parochial loyalties.\textsuperscript{30}

National integration also indicates that consensus has been attained on wide ranging issues such as civil procedures, appropriate methods of dissent or political opposition, support, and political action, and other issues that are not within the realm of government and politics. Other characteristics of good national integration include minimal occurrence of political violence and the display of sense of loyalty by citizens toward the symbols and officials of the government.\textsuperscript{31} Trust among different groups and in government is also one of the indicators of a well integrated nation.

Conversely, Nigeria furnishes a good example of a country where people owe great allegiance and feel stronger attachment to parochial loyalties other than their nation. There is no love lost among the ethnic groups, political actors from one group are very suspicious of other counterparts from different ethnic groups. These characteristics of Nigerian politics tend to weaken the political processes because people that often feel marginalized are less likely to view the political process as a legitimate means of allocating scarce resources, more likely to reject government decisions that are supposed to be binding upon them, and above all, are more likely to

\textsuperscript{30}Stevens and Kofele-Kale, 3-4.

\textsuperscript{31}Rosenbaum, 52-55.
resort to use of violence as a legitimate method of achieving their parochial goals. "Such psychological orientations may promote feelings of personal alienation from the regime, which may in turn encourage political fragmentation or disintegration."

The Nigeria's chequered history is littered with such sad occurrences and instances which have contributed substantially to instability and may even lead to a final political disintegration of the country should a weak regime come to power and yield to the violence and parochial pressures. To what extent did the application of social engineering, using the two-party system as a major tool, reverse the trends of events in Nigeria by inculcating new national political culture that nurture and paved the way for stability in Nigeria?

Almond and Verba, in their book, *The Civic Culture*, classify political culture into three major types. They conclude that "open and moderate partisanship are essential to a stable democracy. They are the "feeling correlates" of responsible majority and loyal opposition, p. 86. Their analysis classify partisans into four types: (1) the open partisan, who is involved in politics but not so much as to cut oneself off from members of the opposing party; (2) the apathetic partisan, who professed little involvement in politics; (3) the intense partisan, who is emotionally involved in politics to the point of disapproving the marriage across party lines; and (4) parochial partisan, who is concerned about interparty marriage but indifferent about election campaigns. See also p. 85. As the study progresses, the one that applies to Nigerian situation will be determined.
include parochial, subject, and participant political cultures. Parochial political culture's two major characteristics are absence of specialized political roles and little expectations on the part of the members of a parochial political community that noticeable changes in their lives can be achieved or made through politics or by the government. In other words, absence of specialized political role means that the chief, or village head or headman or leader carries out a religious and economic function as well as a political one. In essence, the socio-economic or religious systems are not differentiated from that of political. Since the members of the parochial political community nurture little expectation on their part that major changes in their lives can be achieved through government, they are reluctant to participate in it (government). As Elone Nwabuzor and Martha Mueller put it: "a parochial citizen does not expect anything from the political system; he makes no demands on it."34 According to Almond and Verba, African "tribal" societies exhibited this type of political culture.35

The next type is a subject political culture. The orientation here is basically a passive one. The citizen


35Almond and Verba, p.
knows what is going on in the political system, for example, new welfare eligibility rules, new policy on alcohol sales and consumption, erosion of Miranda warning, coercive measures or tax legislation, but plays no role in the inputs because he or she feels that, even if he/she does, it will be inconsequential and in fact, with no influence.

The last type is a participant political culture which is characterized by a citizenry that has knowledge or is aware of both the inputs and outputs of the government and believes that its own pressure or participation can effect the policies of the government. In essence, political activism seems to be the major political characteristic of the political community whether it is pro- or anti-government.

Nigerian political culture does not perfectly fit in any of the Almond and Verbas types. Instead, it is a mixture of all. The proportions of parochial, subject and participant citizens and attitudes may be determined with the help of the questionnaire as the study progresses. However, it is important to point out that the relative dominance or prevalence of each type determines the kind and character of the political culture.

An average Onitsha urban resident is often aware of government policy on smuggling goods across the border (it used to be the predominant trade of Onitsha urban residents) but feels there is no point to influence it. As Nwabuzor
and Mueller point out that "an urban Nigerian is often well aware of government policies and programmes, but he may equally well feel that there is no point in his trying to influence them."\(^{36}\) However, it will be erroneous to say that subject political culture is relatively prevalence in Nigeria because of the above observations. This trend is fast changing in Nigeria because some Nigerian urban residents formed political associations and sponsored political candidates for different offices when two political parties were introduced in 1989 hoping to achieve favorable policies that would help their respective businesses.

It is also erroneous to say that a parochial political culture is mainly characterized by undifferentiated or unspecialized political roles or that differentiated political systems are not predominantly parochial. It is possible, however, that parochial political culture can be predominant in differentiated political systems if the majority of the population live in rural and remote areas. "People living in remote areas of largely rural nation may have a dim awareness of the national political system, but they may take no part in it and expect nothing from it."\(^{37}\)

\(^{36}\)Nwabuzor and Mueller, 61.

\(^{37}\)Ibid.
It is important to point out here that one of the problems Nigeria encounters is not how to transform its political culture from a predominantly parochial or subject orientation into a predominantly participant one, but how to build a predominant political culture with little or no deviant subcultures. Major ethnic groups in Nigeria exhibit cohesive political cultures of their own that are different from each other and which resist amalgamation into a Nigerian whole.38

Like Almond and Verba,39 this study basically assumes that political culture affects the performance or functioning of the political system and one of the prime objectives of this study is to determine what particular patterns of orientation nurture and promote stability and the extent the two-party framework had gone as a political socialization agent in promoting these patterns of orientation and their impact on the political process. How did Nigerian political subcultures integrate under two political parties?

One of the major weaknesses of the political culture approach besides its ethnocentric character is that its focus is "almost wholly on the input side of the political system--on the determinants of political behavior rather

38Ibid., 64.

39Bill and Hardgrave Jr., 115.
than on political behavior as such." Similarly, it uses and emphasizes political culture as an independent variable which affects, shapes, molds or determines the political behavior of the citizens. From analytic standpoint, the way in which political structure and behavior shape the pattern of political culture is frequently ignored.

The political culture approach does not take class into consideration. It seems to be the class interest that determines the behavior of the elites, therefore, it does not precisely explain politics because of its inability to satisfactorily account for elite behavior and why this class emphasizes ethnicity in order to achieve its political goals. However, the fragmentation of political culture in Nigeria makes this approach more attractive than others.

Data Collection

Relevant data was collected from the Clark Atlanta University and Emory University libraries. The books and scholarly journals collected from these universities helped mainly in the introductory part of this study. They did not address any specific research question. Other sources include but are not limited to some of the Nigerian magazines such as *The News, Tell, Newswatch, Concord* and

40Ibid., 115-116.

some newspapers such as the *Daily Times*, the *New Nigeria*, the *Daily Star*, and the *Concord* were used. The *Concord* magazine and newspaper, owned by M.K.O. Abiola, published the results of all the 30 states and the federal capital Territory, Abuja after the June 12, 1993 presidential election in Nigeria. The comments and editorials of these magazines and newspapers helped in the evaluation of the level of political violence, "ethnicization," and regionalization of politics during the electioneering campaigns and election in the aborted Third Republic. The *Report of the Political Bureau* set up by General Babangida was available. It showed the arguments that informed its decision to recommend the two-party system for Nigeria.

This study is primarily based on the data gathered by survey method. The questionnaire contained forty-five closed-ended questions which helped in the researcher's attempt to determine the people's attitude towards the two political parties and political actors. A stratified sample was drawn from Nigeria on semi-regional basis, namely, the North, the West, the East, the Northern and the Southern minorities. Attempts were also made to ensure that no major subgroup in these geographical divisions were left out. Five hundred and twenty questionnaires were returned out of the one thousand, five hundred administered. The questionnaire was structured or closed form and contained questions and alternative answers that were mutually
exclusive to them. At this point, readers desiring a more detailed discussions or information on the methodology of the study are urged to turn to the section titled "Some Methodological Considerations." This section discusses the questionnaire, sample design, the interview schedule, and other pertinent methodological details. It must be stated here that the direct interviews were merely for the validation of the responses of randomly selected respondents from all the groups in the five geo-political divisions.

The writer attended workshops, seminars and lectures that related to party systems and political resocialization in Nigeria. These seminars and lectures took place in Nigerian universities and colleges during Obasanjo's and Babangida's transition programs. The researcher also attended political meetings and campaign rallies in all the regions and collected some documents and copies of these lectures. Finally, the writer observed the pattern of electioneering campaigns in Nigeria and synthesized the experiences with other available resource materials.

Some Research Methodological Considerations

Some aspects of this research project use historical/analytical and exploratory approaches. Historical investigation into the evolution of Nigerian political culture and the competitive and cooperative nature of the Nigeria's First and Second Republics' multipartyism makes this approach indispensable in this study.
Additionally, this dissertation employs a survey research method which involves the construction and administration of questionnaires. Though the two-party system in Nigeria did not operate long enough, a modest attempt was made to measure and evaluate the impacts of the system on the political process and people. Questions that reflect the respondent's attitude, opinion and orientations toward people and political campaigners outside his or her ethnic group, the government, the political parties, and campaigning.

The Type and Selection of the Sample

The sample of respondents in this study was selected on semi-regional basis in Nigeria. Stratified sampling was used in the administration of the questionnaires and interviews. This choice is informed by the nature of the Nigerian population which consists of a number of subgroups or strata that differ in the characteristics being studied. In order to assess the attitude and opinion on certain political issues, the Nigerian population is divided into five groups based, to a large extent, on ethnic/regional affiliations or considerations, namely the North (Hausa/Fulani), the West (Yoruba), the East (Ibo), the Northern (Tiv, Igala, Kanuri) and the Southern (Edo, Efik, Anam, Ijaw) minorities. The population is further subdivided into groups on the basis of age (young and old), gender (males and females), income, religion, and education.
Some of these groups (units) include illiterate farmers in villages, illiterate and literate traders in the rural and the urban areas, civil servants (educated and uneducated) college and university professors and lecturers, and different religious groups. Afterwards, a random (or systematic) sample was drawn within each subgroup. This study is not merely interested in surveying the attitudes of the Nigerian electorate toward campaigners, campaigning, and the political parties, but in comparing attitudes of the young and the old male and female electorates who reside in small regions/ethnic groups with those who live in medium-size and large ones (including urban areas).

The study avoided proportional stratified sampling since the emphasis is also on the type of differences among the groups. In essence, an equal number of samples/respondents were selected from each group regardless of the size of that group in the larger population using a random (or systematic) sampling techniques.

The questionnaire was structured (closed-ended) and contained the questions and alternative answers to them. The answers provided for each question were exhaustive of all possible responses and at the same time mutually exclusive. The information and responses generated were very easy to process, code, and analyze.
Rate of Return

Out of one thousand, five hundred questionnaires, five hundred and twenty responses were returned. The percentage of returns in the questionnaire was good (34.7 percent). However, 62 out of 64 individuals contacted agreed to a direct interview. Therefore, a 96.9 percent rate of return was achieved. There were no broken appointments, and this is amazing especially in Nigeria where appointments for research interviews are not taken seriously. Most interviewees exhibited first-rate cooperation and punctuality. The method of interviewee selection or what determined who was asked to submit to an interview is discussed in the last paragraph of the subtitle "The Interview."

Coding Responses

The response of each question is coded according to a scale ranging from agree (1) and disagree (2) to no opinion (3). In essence, rather than punch an "agree," a "disagree" or "no" response on a computer card (in most cases in calculator), each answer is assigned a number. For example, an agree response is equal to 1, disagree is equal to 2, and no opinion equals 3. After this was done, an appropriate number is punched on the card and calculator.
Statistical Tests

This study did not make use of statistical tests of significance or estimation procedures because the study is exploratory and the sample size seems to be small by statistical standards. However, this does not mean that the findings will be discarded. Perhaps this is why it is more useful to simply state the results in percentage tables, generalize on the basis of them concerning party systems that had operated in Nigeria, invite replication (the repetition of this investigation in exactly the same way) under different conditions. It is necessary to repeat here that casting the net wide is in this case more important than statistical significance since the study is exploratory. Again, tests of significance are inappropriate in this study because they are designed for hypothesis-testing. Finally, the research decision to avoid statistical tests was academic (the nature of the study and the data) and not as a result of considerable disagreement among social scientists over significance testing.

Validation of the Questionnaires

After the responses were obtained by means of the questionnaires, a stratified sample of the respondents were interviewed and their views and opinions on the same topics covered in the questionnaires were obtained. This procedure
was adopted in order to verify whether the instrument is appropriate for measuring what it is intended to measure.

Therefore, the specific purpose of interviews in this study is to cross-validate questionnaires and findings. It helps the researcher in determining how adequately the questionnaire has measured or achieved its objective. However, one may raise the question of the suitability of the interview data as criteria for the validity of responses. The answer to this is to exercise caution. After all, no procedure is fool-proof in social sciences.

The Interview

Although this personal interview (direct) was merely for questionnaire validation, a brief discussion of its procedure is necessary. This study used a schedule-structured interview, with the same question asked of each respondent in the same order. Even though standard ways of rephrasing questions when necessary were developed and used on rare occasions, the substance of the questions remained the same. This technique helped the investigator to compare one respondent with another with some degree of assurance that their responses were elicited by the same stimulus. Moreover, this helps to make sure that any variations that occur between the responses can be attributed to the actual differences between the respondents and not to the variations in the interview or changes in the wording of the questions.
The interviewees were randomly selected from the stratified sample of the entire Nigerian population where the questionnaire respondents were drawn—the North, the West, the East, the Northern and Southern minorities. A half of the interviewees were randomly drawn from all the subgroups within each of the five main groups and the rest were systematically selected from every fifth questionnaire respondent whose identity was revealed in one way or another. All the subgroups in the five groups were equally represented.

It is important to note that there are no significant variations in the responses of both the interviewees and the questionnaire respondents. These comparable responses show that the instrument is effective and useful in evaluating the impact of the two-party framework and in achieving the entire goal or raison d'etre of the survey methods. There are no differences in the responses of different subgroups in each division or region. This shows that people feel or reason according to their geographical location. Gender is an exception.

**Recording Responses**

Since most of the questions were closed-ended, the researcher opted to record responses properly ranging from agree to no opinion. The responses of the two open-ended questions were recorded as nearly verbatim as possible without making the respondents wait for uncomfortably long
periods. The purpose was to obtain the required information in a complete and accurate form, and make the respondents feel as relaxed as possible as well.

Interviewing Conditions

Interviews were held in all the five regions in which the country was divided for the purpose of this study. With the exceptions of few telephone calls and spurious interjections, typical interviews which were held in offices, colleges, bars, homes, market stores and places, were uninterrupted. The desire of the researcher to be more accommodating and to adapt to an interview situation in which the respondent would be most comfortable informed the decision to conduct these interviews under less than desirable conditions. However, it must be quickly added that most of these interviews were held under nearly ideal circumstances with few interruptions, and with no one else present except a translator when it was absolutely necessary. Conditions for these interviews were comparable to that of the questionnaire.

Almost without exception, the respondents were friendly and cooperative regardless of the circumstances. Apart from being generous with their time they also seemed pleased to answer and discuss the questions openly and completely. The mean amount of time spent in the interview was approximately twenty-five minutes and the longest interview was forty-five minutes.
Pretest

The questionnaire and interview schedule were pretested on ten Nigerian visitors in the Atlanta areas. The visitors were drawn from the five regions. This offered the researcher an opportunity for free experimentation with the questionnaire and the interview, exploration of various orders and wordings of the questions, ways of approaching respondents, and methods of recording their answers.

The researcher took two questionnaires and interviews, revised them, took two more, and so forth, until a most satisfactory questionnaire was assembled or developed.

Timing

The questionnaires and interviews were conducted immediately after the presidential election on June 12, 1993. The post-election timing allowed the respondents to reflect a bit on the pattern of political campaigns before and during the presidential election in particular and the level of violence, ethnicity, and political integration throughout the Babangida's transition period. This helped the respondents to recall their experiences and events vividly. Additionally, the respondents were more at their leisure and more relaxed than they would have been during the electioneering campaigns and elections. However, it must be added that the annulment of the June 12 1993, presidential election on June 23, created a tense period
which slightly affected the researcher's traveling schedules and the mood of some interviewees.

Summary

Chapter I discussed the nature of the problem, specific and substantive research questions, construction of social explanations which go beyond telling what happened (descriptive), but why or how it happened. It also dealt with research methodology and strategies for achieving the goal or raison d'etre of the study.

However, an important unresolved question in this chapter is whether the attitudes of the Nigerian public have a major causal effect on the establishment of favorable democratic behavior such as voting across ethnic, regional and religious lines, avoiding the use of political violence and intimidation of political opponents as a vital instrument for electoral success?
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

It is often said that research does not occur in a vacuum. Since researches are built upon the works of others, a review of literature automatically becomes an integral part of the general setting of the problem under investigation.

The Political Bureau simply noted the main arguments of those in favor of the one-party system, namely that (1) it does not dissipate energy, (ii) it provides avenue for dissent without fear, (iii) its African version has attracted respect in most African states, and above all, (iv) it is inexpensive to operate.\(^1\) However, it reasoned that the inherent dictatorial nature or tendencies of the system (one-party system) would make it appear as "an attempt by the military to perpetuate itself in power."\(^2\) The idea of one-party system was thrown overboard because it could not accommodate the diverse socio-economic structures of Nigeria. The Political Bureau's ground for the rejection

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\(^2\)Ibid.
seems to be inadequate. To be precise, it is not convincing since the two-party system it recommended, in the final analysis, is not likely to accommodate this diversity. As C.A. Leads has argued, "if the opinions of the people cannot be adequately expressed through only one party, they cannot be any more adequately expressed through two."³

One of the important questions posed about the political structure in African countries is: "How can you have democracy with a one-party system?" The answers are in variety of forms but they follow two major patterns. They include African defenders that argue it is possible and Western and non-Western critics or antagonists who say it is not possible.

The arguments used by African leaders and protagonists in favor of the one-party system are based on both theoretical, pragmatic, and historical grounds.⁴ Theoretically, protagonists claim that one political party represents the will of all the people and encourages the development of a sense of personal responsibility in government by allowing mass participating in decision-making process. In addition, it claims that "since it doesn't

³Quoted in Chikendu, 5. See also C.A. Leeds, Political Studies (London: Macdonald and Evans, 1975), 128.

represent only the interest of a particular group of economic strata in the populace, it is basically more democratic than the two party system."\(^5\) Madeira Keita puts the point vividly in his article by stating that:

In the present historical situation in Africa there is no need to multiply parties nor to indulge in the luxury of a sterile and fratricidal opposition. Since we were agreed on the essentials and were pursuing the same objectives, was there any reason to remain divided and split into parties that rough one another.\(^6\)

However, on the pragmatic side of the argument, justification for the single-party system is derived from the idea of an urgent need for a strong government to handle the crisis that accompanied independence and wield the nation together.\(^7\) The needs of economic development for the well being of the populace are imperative and evident. Since there is no dispute or argument about the goals, African leaders claim, therefore the political parties representing different points of view are superfluous.\(^8\) It


\(^7\)Emerson, 105.

is important to point out here that people in a particular country can have a consensus of opinion on goals but have bitter disagreement on ways or methods of achieving them.

Finally, from a historical standpoint, it is asserted that in traditional African society, politics was a reflection of the communal interest as a whole and that most African pre-colonial political systems provided methods for limited popular participation in governance and political decision-making. It is claimed that few African rulers, if any, governed as autocrats; they were usually surrounded by councils (sometimes referred to as Council of Ministers or Elders) whose consent must be sought before any important decisions could be made. The Oyo and Benin kingdoms' political organizations in the nineteenth century provide very good cases in point. Hanes Walton Jr. observes that "in many instances, formal provisions were made for an expression of popular opinion concerning the replacement of a chief, or members of his council, who transgressed tribal mores seriously." Alafin of Oyo empire is expected to resign or commit suicide if he is presented with an empty

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10Ibid.

11Walton Jr., 56.
calabash to put his head. This signifies that his authority is no longer recognized.

The proponents of one-party claim that in African culture and traditions, the people sit and talk till they agree.\(^\text{12}\) One anthropologist states that

I have never found it recorded...that the Council of Elders or clan leaders settle important issues by formal votes, with the will of the majority prevailing. Evidently, the idea of basing a group decision on a vote is not as self evident as we usually assume or else it is incompatible with other values in African cultures which are more deeply entrenched.\(^\text{13}\)

The African leaders (protagonists of one-party system) therefore argue that Western-style two or multi-party and parliamentary structure is basically a Western phenomenon which conforms to its (Western) culture and traditions without any roots in African society.\(^\text{14}\) In furtherance of the above idea Julius Nyerere stated that it was imperative, for the promotion of national unity, that the citizens understand the institutions of the government in the new state.\(^\text{15}\)

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\(^{12}\)Nyerere, 1-2.


\(^{15}\)Julius Nyerere, \textit{Africa Report} (July 1962): 5.
On the contrary, Western critics of the one-party system in Africa argue, that it does not promote democracy and has given rise to dictatorships that proscribe the formation and development of an opposition party.\textsuperscript{16} Furthermore they assert that democracy is not possible or viable without a two or multi-party system.\textsuperscript{17} Taking this point further, they argue that opposition parties in Africa, where allowed to exist at all, are denied the opportunity to play its traditional or rightful role as the continuing critic of government policy.\textsuperscript{18} Therefore, be that as it may, they hold single party in Africa responsible for the growing political instability and disorder in Africa. Furthermore, overthrowing the government by force is the avenue through which the dissatisfied, disgruntled, and frustrated citizens can vent their grievances each time the main party fails or refuses to satisfy all sectors of the populace.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{16}Martin Kilson, "Authoritarian and Single Party Tendencies in Africa Politics," \textit{World Politics} (January 1963): 263-294. This article isolates and analyzes five causes of single party rule in Africa. Also see Hanes Walton Jr.

\textsuperscript{17}Ibid. For Herring's argument that democracy cannot survive or thrive without two parties, see Pendleton Herring, \textit{The Politics of Democracy} (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1940).

\textsuperscript{18}Walton Jr., 56.

\textsuperscript{19}Emerson, 142-147.
The observations and arguments of both Western critics and their African counterparts suffer from problems of validity, objectivity, weak methodology, coherent and systematic logic because their approaches are essentially normative, value oriented, and superficial. In addition, both approaches lack some type of general theory which is sine qua non for any meaningful or fundamental understanding of comparative politics. It is obvious that their justifications and approaches leave the problem unresolved and are not even directed to developing some type of general theory of comparative politics in the first place.

Taking the African leaders' argument further, Samuel Decalo in his article, "The Process, Prospects and Constraints of Democratization in Africa" states that the prime rationale for constraining political choice to the day they were forced to concede multipartyism is that competitive politics is an imported luxury neither needed nor affordable in developing countries, that in any case devise other equally democratic structures (notably one-party democracy), more suitable to their unique circumstances.²⁰

Samuel Decalo further pointed out that a multiplicity of political parties merely mirrors, even politicizes, existing social cleavages (ethnic, clan, regional, religious) since these are the most easily mobilizable sources of political support and power in Africa, while countries actually need unity and rapid

development rather than Western-style liberal democracy.21

The former president of Sierra Leone, Siaka Stevens once referred to the multi-party system as "a system of... institutionalized tribal and ethnic quintennial warfare euphemistically known as elections (which) contributes an open invitation to anarchy and disunity."22 As pointed out earlier, Julius Nyerere holds and endorses the above view. To him (Nyerere)

where there is one party, and that party is identified with the nation as a whole, the foundations of democracy are firmer than they can ever be where you have two or more parties, each representing only a section of the community.23

The extent of enthusiasm for the one-party system by some African leaders was dramatized by Zimbabwe's president Robert Mugabe, when he recommended the one-party system for America to an incredulous United States Congress during a state visit in early 1990s.24 This suggestion was made out

21Ibid., 9-10.

22West Africa, April 26, 1982. President Stevens believed that economic and social development in Sierra Leone had been slowed down by political problems and that elimination of the "distraction of multi-party politics would lead to progress." Stevens' All People's Congress (APC) which entered office in 1968 overshadowed the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) and had been a de facto one-party state since the early 1970s.


24Decalo, p. 10.
of his own conviction regarding the strengths of one party system. But what he did not tell the American people was the weaknesses of the system and whether it was in conflict with their political culture that had worked for them successfully since two hundred years ago. The major function of opposition party seems to be a check on arbitrary rule and possibly the replacement of that rule. In discussing "types of party configurations in competitive systems" Joseph La Palombara and Myron Weiner observe that in competitive systems, parties struggle to maintain power in a competitive atmosphere given what is theoretically and legally possible. The "ins" struggle to maintain power while the "outs" struggle to replace them and win power without resorting to violence.

The president of Malawi, Kamuzu Banda dismissed the idea and objective of an opposition party on a false or at least questionable religious premise that "there is no opposition in Heaven. God himself does not want opposition— that is why he chased Satan away. Why should Kamuzu [President Banda] have opposition?" Banda's quasi-


26Ibid.

27Malawi News (Blantyre), December 20, 1964.
theological rationale has collapsed under the present political dispensation in Malawi.

Legitimate programmatic differences of opinion can be accommodated within the single "national" party where all streams of opinion and social groups are represented. And even if a developmental-oriented authoritarian system does ensue, the basis would be laid for a better-endowed future generation that could then partake of the current generations forbidden fruits."\textsuperscript{28}

Decalo observes that Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Felix Houphouet Boigny of Cote d'Ivoire have used the single party system as the means to rule relatively benevolently; more harshly but still responsibly by Kamuzu Banda of Malawi and Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso, and venally loot and plunder it as in the cases of Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and Samuel Doe of Liberia and finally as a camouflage for personal or class tyranny during the reign of Jean-Bedel Bokassa of Central Africa Republic, Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia, and Macias Nguema of Equatorial Guinea.\textsuperscript{29} Chudi P. Uwazurike rightly observes in his article, "Confronting Potential Breakdown in Africa: The Nigerian Re-Democratization Process in Critical Perspective" that the single party system has almost universally "degenerated into a form of oligarchic patrimonialism that was even unknown in pre-colonial

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\textsuperscript{28}Decalo, 10.
\textsuperscript{29}Ibid.
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Africa." This seems to contradict claims made by some African defenders of the single-party system such as Julius Nyerere that it is not only democratic but also congruent with African traditions.

It is important to note here that Julius Nyerere, one of the greatest champions of the one-party system modified his views on political parties in early 1990 when there was hardly any opposition to single party in Tanzania. In January 1990, he pointed out that "Tanzanians should not be dogmatic and think that a single party is God's wish" especially one that "was not close to the people, stagnating, losing vitality, and therefore needing competition...to re-invigorate it." If one of the functions of political party systems is to organize, mobilize and educate the majority of all politically relevant sectors of the population with the aim of nation-building and democracy, the single-party system has achieved little. But a pertinent question may be posed here--has the multi-party system recorded more achievement in Africa? The answer, of course, will not be in the affirmative. This brings another question into focus, namely: which party-


system possesses the greatest chance of achieving the goals of political party? The answer will emerge as the study progresses. But suffice it to say, at this stage that the political party system in Africa is more or less an instrument through which political actors realize their personal goal of acquisition of wealth, prestige, power, and access to the control of state's instrument of violence and political structures. Nzongola-Ntalaja in his article "The African Crisis: The Way Out," correctly observes that "...in reality that party is everywhere a network through which ambitious individuals strive to maximize their access to state resources."32 In fact, since the 1980s most Africans had started to regard one-party polity as a facade for tyranny, dictatorship, above all a catalyst for private enrichment.

Instead of making a positive contribution to the art of democratic governance, the
hegemonic party-State became an autocratic patrimonial state...that whether in military or in civilian guise, whether capitalist or socialist in official ideology seems detached from the vital creative energies of African people and their societies.33


As authors continue to delve into the impact of one-party system on African societies, authoritarianism seems to be the common denominator and feature of most, if not all, one-party states in Africa.

It produced presidential authoritarianism of varying degrees of repression, and defacto domination by whatever ethnic group possesses the Presidency; it has been instrumental in plundering the economy, directly or indirectly; it resulted in disdain for civic and human rights, and with few exceptions has paid minimal attention to agrarian/rural populations; and the guiding party has often to be an atrophied non-entity (Zaire, CAR), a control mechanism (Benin, Congo), a debating society (Malawi, Zambia) or a source of patronage for lesser influentials (Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire, Togo). Presidential family cliques and regional political barons--at times joined by trusted soothsayers (Niger, Benin, Gabon, CAR, Zaire) have often decided policies options priorities.34

The single-party system has often been blamed for permitting a small cabal of influential people to erode and destroy all relics and semblance of accountability, legitimacy, democracy, and justice in all the societies where it operates. The multi-party system is also guilty of similar charges. Nigeria's Second Republic is a case in point.

The Babangida's Political Bureau's reasons for the choice of the two party system are rather scanty and not compelling. It simply points out the main argument of the

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proponents of a multi-party system such as making provision for "freedom of association of groups and individuals in a truly democratic society." The Bureau refuses to draw a sharp distinction between a multi-party system and a two-party system as an exercise in futility arguing that "strictly speaking, a two-party system is a multi-party system." However, its assertion that all favorable arguments for multi-partyism also apply to two-partyism is highly debatable.

The Bureau further notes, whatever the case may be, the 1976 Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) that made a distinction between the two systems and opted for a multi-party system, "did concede that a two-party system would be ideal for Nigeria and hoped that with time a two-party system would emerge." However, the CDC did not support any idea of imposing two-partyism on the country by constitutional legislation. Rather, it would be allowed to emerge through evolution and other historical processes just as it did in most countries that operate the system. It will be pointed out that two-partyism almost emerged in 1983

35Report of the Political Bureau, 126.

36Ibid.

when the progressive forces of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), the Nigerian People's Party (NPP), the People's Redemption Party (PRP), and the Great Nigerian People's Party (GNPP) united to form a political party, the People's Progressive Party (PPP) that would contest that year's general elections and wrestle the political power away from the National Party of Nigeria (NPN). The idea was jettisoned later. The question then why did it fail to materialize? The reason is partly attributable to the leadership tussle between the leader of the UPN, Chief Obafemi Awolowo and that of the NPP, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe. Additionally NPN committed a lot of energy to forestall the emergence of such political force.

Babangida's administration constantly referred to the ideology of left and right. In forming and decreeing the two political parties he said "a little to the right and little to the left." It seems that President Babangida's decision to introduce two party system was informed by Maurice Duverger's ideas in his book, *Political Parties*. This author examines the effects of number of political parties on the political system and writes:

Nonetheless the two-party system seems to correspond to the nature of things, that is to say that political choice usually takes the form of the choice between two alternatives. A duality of parties does not always exist, but almost always there is a duality of tendencies. Every policy implies a choice between two kinds of solutions: the so-called compromise solutions lean one way or the other. This is equivalent to saying that center does not exist in politics. There may be
well be a center party, but there is no center tendency, no spot at which the moderates of opposed tendencies meet: moderates of the right and moderates of the left.\textsuperscript{38}

It can be deduced that Duverger's ideas in the above statements presuppose that competition is already ideological, hence he speaks of parties in the sense of "right" or "left." Is it appropriate to view the choice of parties in terms of "right" or "left" in the Nigerian society where the main distinction or tendency is between Christian, Muslim and traditional religions and the major ethnic groups that are differently motivated on the one hand, and minority groups that are conscious of other ideas? This does not thoroughly address the Nigerian situation. However, this may apply to the societies, such as the United States of America and Britain where there is an appreciable size of informed middle class population on whom much of the political activities devolve. This condition does not exist or at least is not as developed as the societies mentioned above, therefore it seems to be a square peg in a round hole.

Moreover, Duverger's universalization and assertion that "every policy implies a choice between two kinds of solution" obviously involves the logical fallacy of excluding the "middle" or "center." This seems to view the world as a black or white issue when in fact, especially in Nigeria, it is not all black or white and other possibilities are excluded. As Nwokeji points out "even if ideology was to dominate politics, there can still be genuine centerists, i.e. people who have choices clearly different from the right or left." 39 Aaron B. Wildavsky writes a list of nine points of logical difficulties with Duverger's theory in Political Parties. 40

It is necessary to look at one example of the fallacious problems in Duverger's method from Aaron Wildavsky since Nigeria is a single-ballot simple-majority country. He points out that the cases of Sweden and Denmark where the dualism is not in existence or does not happen is treated by Duverger as "deviations" from the general law. 41 From Duverger's so-called general law, Nigeria would seem to be one of the exceptions since its First and Second

39 Nwokeji, 16.


41 Nwokeji, 16.
Republics could not produce two party system or dual tendency. Rather it multiplied the tendencies to form more political parties despite stringent conditions put in place to forestall such occurrence. "Duverger even saw the same party could be different in idea in different areas of the same country." The above vitiated Duverger's proposition badly and he queries: "How can a state in which the national ideology differs in the same parties in different localities convert back into the same uniform ideology nationally? There seems to exist a strange problem here."

Furthermore, it seems that where two ideologically opposed political parties exist and no third "centrist" possibility is permitted could nurture conditions for "centrifugal" political drives and destroy the conditions for "centripetal" tendency. According to Giovanni Sartori's typology, the availability of centrist parties to hold loyalties of centrists compel parties to the extremes of right and left to moderate their policies to increase their chances of catching these centrists within their camp.

\[\text{62}\]

\[\text{42Ibid.}\]
\[\text{43Ibid.}\]
\[\text{44Ibid.}\]
On the other hand, the absence of centrist party or its possibility makes it unnecessary for the two "left" and "right" political parties to care about or look for centrists since everyone must choose between "Red" (Socialist-Communist) or "blue" (Capitalist-Conservative). The argument that centrist party produces a moderating influence on the political competition, while its absence in the political system renders moderation unnecessary and extreme tendencies more attractive. This submission is informed by reasonings in Satori's analysis of "Polarised Pluralisms."\(^{46}\) Two ideological poles without a center can polarize the society that even the moderate citizen has no way out and this appears to be a matter of great concern.

Before the imposition of the two-party system in 1989, the apparent impossibility of crystalizing public opinion on the various national issues into only two parties cast some doubt about the prospects and efficacy of the two-party system in Nigeria. However, the fear and doubt were removed after the registration of party members and local government elections in August and December, 1990, respectively, in the then twenty-one states of the federation and Federal Capital Territory. The two political parties appeared to be very strong in representing all the ethnic groups, regions or states, and religions. For electoral strengths of the two

\(^{46}\)Ibid.
strengths of the two political parties (See Table 2). The President, Ibrahim Babangida who was so excited over the results of the 1990 local government elections (according to him), said that they had proved that the Nigerian dream of establishing a stable democratic order was realizable.47

TABLE 1

CLAIMED PARTY MEMBERSHIP IN THE 21 STATES AND FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY, 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>N.R.C.</th>
<th>S.D.P.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Akwa Ibom</td>
<td>148,669</td>
<td>99,257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anambra</td>
<td>472,140</td>
<td>472,862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauchi</td>
<td>243,772</td>
<td>141,189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bendel</td>
<td>234,345</td>
<td>215,644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benue</td>
<td>185,052</td>
<td>179,639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borno</td>
<td>184,603</td>
<td>217,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross River</td>
<td>96,088</td>
<td>80,624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gongola</td>
<td>199,387</td>
<td>207,517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imo</td>
<td>461,786</td>
<td>454,404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaduna</td>
<td>186,701</td>
<td>196,672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>220,073</td>
<td>282,133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katsina</td>
<td>163,400</td>
<td>159,336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwara</td>
<td>100,146</td>
<td>122,044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>274,539</td>
<td>285,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>111,073</td>
<td>98,938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogun</td>
<td>169,229</td>
<td>179,948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ondo</td>
<td>274,870</td>
<td>297,302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oyo</td>
<td>368,947</td>
<td>411,247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>205,011</td>
<td>210,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivers</td>
<td>133,678</td>
<td>136,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sokoto</td>
<td>501,308</td>
<td>232,344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F.C.T., Abuja</td>
<td>22,002</td>
<td>15,535</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total        4,956,819       4,696,056

Source: Daily Times, August 11, 1990, 1-2

47Daily Times (Nigeria), December 14, 1990, 1.
TABLE 2

LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTION RESULTS IN
THE 21 STATES AND FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY, 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>N.R.C.</th>
<th>S.D.P.</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chairmen</td>
<td>Councillors</td>
<td>Chairmen</td>
<td>Councillors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akwa Ibom</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anambra</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauchi</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bendel</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benue</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borno</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross River</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gongola</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imo</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaduna</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katsina</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwara</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogun</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ondo</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oyo</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivers</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sokoto</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F.C.T., Abuja</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 206 2,562 231 2,934

To Giovanni Sartori a "dichotomous Gestalt" (using the model essentially based on paired alternatives: Left-Right, majority-opposition, movement-status-quo, and the like) is no longer adequate to account for the case of extreme pluralism. He uses another model and employs terms such as bipolar, multipolar with an illustrative table (see Table 3 below).

**TABLE 3**

**TYPES OF EUROPEAN PARTY SYSTEMS AND CRITERIA OF ANALYSIS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Systems</th>
<th>Poles</th>
<th>Polarity</th>
<th>Drives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Simple Pluralism</td>
<td>bipolar</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>centripetal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate Pluralism</td>
<td>bipolar</td>
<td>small</td>
<td>centripetal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme Pluralism</td>
<td>multipolar</td>
<td>polarized</td>
<td>centrifugal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Bipolar means that the actual working of the party system pivots around two poles (no matter whether the parties are two, three, or four); for in this case the system has no "center," no center pole. By multipolar I mean that the party system pivots upon more than two poles,

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for in this case the system has a center.49 In essence, the poles and the distance between them are of paramount importance. The system has a polarity when the spectrum of political opinion is crystalized into two extremes (left and right) that are literally "two poles apart." In such a situation, the political system is confronted with "polarized" party system. This is contrary to Duverger's use of "polarization." To him (Duverger) it means "bipolar."50 Sartori views and uses "polarized" as an indicator of distance between the poles and further narrows it down as an indicator of a

situation of lack of basic consensus in which the distribution of opinions covers the maximum conceivable distance and that the term does not necessarily imply that the cleavage is particularly intense for the intensity of the cleavage may decrease and the cleavage (i.e., the distance between the poles) remain: there is no necessary synchronism between the two occurrences.51

49Ibid., 117.


51Sartori, "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism," p. 117. Sartori also employs "polarity" and "polarized" to mean the idea of two things that are symmetrically opposed or have opposite properties--implying an idea of either strong opposition or extreme distance. These qualities and properties do not belong to two-party systems which are bipolar but not polarized.

Consensus at the level of government (or authorities) is not basic consensus. Basic consensus is the congruence of basic orientations such as values and attitudes at the level of regime and/or of the political community.
The drives of the polity must be taken into consideration when analyzing party systems from this angle. From Sartori's analysis, the bipolar systems are centripetal and converge toward the center while multipolar are centrifugal with a center pole but no centrality and centripetal drive. "If a polity, besides lacking centrality, also displays centrifugal trend--i.e., a process which is one of the growing radicalization--then we may say that polarization prevails over depolarization."52 In essence, centripetal drive in a political system generates moderate politics while immoderate or extremist politics is a reflection of the prevalence of centrifugal drives. In analyzing party systems, Sartori focuses on the number of poles, the distance between their poles, and the centripetal or centrifugal drives that emanate from their interactions. Therefore, bipolar and multipolar tend to show how many are the "pivotal points of the system."53 "Polarity" and "polarized" are used as indicators of strong distance; and "polarization" and "depolarization" are defined dynamically to mean a centrifugal process towards disruption of basic


52Sartori, Ibid.

53Ibid.
consensus and vice versa, a centripetal process toward reunification of basic "consensus."

Using reasonings in Satori's analysis of extreme pluralism one may argue that Nigeria's First and even Second Republics qualify as multipolarized systems with centrifugal drives and extreme pluralism. It is obvious that over the course of time, centrifugal drives and forces have dominated and as a matter of fact, prevailed over the centripetal ones.

Many scholars in political science have written much in support of the argument that number of the parties in a polity determines the stability of that system. At prima facie level, it seems that the most successful and effective democratic governments have until recently had two-party systems. As J.A. Corry points out in *Elements of Democratic Government*, "The multiplicity of parties had a weakening effect on the democracies of continental Europe and it is not at all clear that democratic government will work permanently where there are numerous parties of roughly equal strength."\(^54\) Ferdinand A. Hermans' proposition of a simple causal linear relationship between electoral systems and the number of parties seems to constitute a sweeping

generalization. He seems to ignore or overlook the so-called deviant cases of Sweden and Norway in his proposition that election by proportional representation causes instability. To take this point further, Mayer puts it this way:

Simply stated, any of the commonly used forms of proportional representation causes a multi-party system which in turn causes political instability in a parliamentary democracy. When the extent of such instability reaches some unspecified level, the political process becomes immobilized and unable in Almondian terminology, to convert demands into outputs. The resulting unrelieved stress on the system is likely to bring about the replacement of that system with one that is able to act.

If the electoral system could substantially lead to a success or failure of a democratic government, instability in Nigeria will be under control through social engineering and manipulations. However, instability in Nigeria involves more than that. The complex social cultural, and historical factors are relatively less susceptible to conscious change.

In essence, the proposition that proportional representation causes multiparty systems which, in turn cause instability seems to withstand prima facie scrutiny on

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56 Ibid., 217.

57 Mayer, 120-121.
a logical level. However, on empirical level the relationships between number of parties and electoral system on one hand and the stability and the number of parties on the other starts to bump into methodological difficulty. It is true that examples such as Weimar Germany, pre-war Italy, and Third and Fourth French Republics support the relationship but other successful democracies in Europe, with multi-party system such as Denmark, Sweden, and Norway are not accounted for. Other examples or "exceptions," to borrow Duverger's word, exist in Europe. Moreover, it should be noted that an increase in the number of parties is not necessarily a result of proportional representation. While the number of parties has remained stable and manageable (only five parties) since the introduction of proportional representation in Sweden, Canada that uses Anglo-American electoral system has had four to five important national political parties.

To Leslie Lipson, the two-party system in Britain is not a product or function of specific procedural arrangements or institutions but as a result of broader socio-economic tendencies that cannot be consciously designed or engineered.\(^{58}\) However, Professor Robert Fishman

observed in one of the seminars that "in Britain, the Social Democrats/Liberal coalition would do far better in getting representation in the House of Commons under P.R." In essence, P.R. would assist the coalition in turning its votes into more parliamentary seats.

Historically...reinforcing socioeconomic and religious cleavages tended to bifurcate into dichotomous alternatives. Thus, rather than causing the two-party alignment, the plurality electoral system reflects a tendency toward a dichotomous cleavage that already existed in British society.60

The above view is anchored on the already existing dichotomous alignment on issues in Britain such as Cavaliers versus Roundheads, monarch versus aristocracy, aristocracy versus middle class, Anglicans versus dissenters before the electoral system was institutionalized. While this dichotomy in Britain, it would seem, strengthens Duverger's idea of dualism, it is illogical to say that it was a consequence or a function of the electoral system which came after fact.

It seems that the degree of compromise necessary to aggregate the diverse interests of a nation into two parties is a function of social, cultural, and historical circumstances. If there exist minority interests that are so intensely felt that they demand minority representation, interests that are discriminated against by a plurality system, then it is possible that either

59Robert Fishman, "Views on Electoral Systems and Party Systems." This is his comment on the subject in the Political Science Seminar Series (Atlanta: Clark Alanta University, 1994).

60Mayer, 221.
the electoral system or the political system will undergo substantial changes in response to the stress generated by such repressed demands.  

The pertinent question at this juncture is whether a political system with more than two segmental and intensely felt cleavages would necessarily give rise to two-party system if a plurality system is imposed or introduced? The social, cultural and historical circumstances seem, to a large extent, to be responsible for the provision of the degree of compromise or consensus necessary or required to aggregate the diverse interests of a nation into two political parties or two channels of political communication. Although Nigeria had used a plurality system since independence its political system did neither aggregate the diverse interests of its citizen into two political parties nor crystalize their opinions into two. Rather, it produced many antagonistic political parties in defiance of the stringent measures and conditions put in place to forestall such ugly development. However, as pointed out earlier, efforts that were made to form two political parties for electoral competition in 1965 and 1983 did not yield any meaningful results that endured for some time. In essence, the electoral system did not determine the number of political parties.

\[61\text{Ibid.}\]
After studying Norway, Harry Eckstein asserts that the presence of strongly felt segmental cleavages that are so resistant to aggregation that any particular party that wants to reach a wide and diverse audience becomes one of the weakest parties.62 One views with reservation and doubt the ability of an electoral system alone to force these cleavages to aggregate into two ideological amorphous parties. Hermans finds it comfortable and reasonable to reach an inference that proportional representation allows and even nurtures existing cleavages in a society to the extent that they are expressed in party system and will not lead to development of more cleavages than already in existence.63 Mayer concludes that "a proportional system will faithfully reflect the existing cleavages, while a plurality system will encourage a greater aggregation of existing cleavages."64

Proportionality tends to radicalize parties.65

Under a plurality system a party must aggregate a diverse body of followers to achieve any electoral success, the party must moderate its platform to

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63Ferdinand Hermans, "Democracy or Anarchy," The Review of Politics (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame, 1938), 15.

64Mayer, 222.

65Ibid.
appeal to this wider audience. However under the proportional system a party is not faced with this necessity. On contrary, such party is encouraged to emphasize the small differences between it and those parties ideologically adjacent to it."\(^{66}\)

In a similar vein, Anthony Downs' reasoning:

attributes this tendency to the fact that since parties cannot move ideologically past one another nor attract votes from an adjacent party on one side without losing just as many votes to the party on the other side, their rational self-interests lie in more completely mobilizing their own faithful but narrow group of adherents.\(^{67}\)

Logically, parties in proportional system are not forced to aggregate diverse interests or points of view, therefore, are more likely to keep their ideology pure and rigid.

The proposition that elections by proportional representation causes instability is anchored, to a great extent on the assumption that it (proportionality) leads to proliferation of number of political parties to such an extent that no party can get a majority. The support of a stable majority in the lower house of legislature is the basis of a stable parliamentary system of government. In Nigeria's First Republic, no party obtained the required majority to form the government. For pragmatic reasons, the NPC and the NCNC formed a coalition government in order to secure the majority in the parliament. This "marriage of

\(^{66}\)Ibid., 222-223.

"convenience" was so fragile that a crack developed in the alliance soon after its formation. The intra-party crisis within AG in 1962 and subsequent massive defection of AG parliamentarians offered NPC a good opportunity to obtain the absolute majority in the Federal House. This reduced the importance of NCNC because NPC had no use anymore of its coalition partner, the NCNC. To cut a long story short, the majority in a parliament is a sine qua non of stability in parliamentary system of government. It is rightly observed that:

A stable parliamentary government clearly requires the support of a stable majority in the lower house of legislature inasmuch as the cabinet only continues to govern at the sufferance of such majority. Such majority must be sufficiently disciplined to insulate the prime minister or premier and his cabinet (thereafter referred to as the government) from accountability to the shifting day-to-day currents of public opinion, thus affording them the discretion inherent in the function of governing.68

The experience of Nigeria has shown that a government formed by coalition of relatively autonomous political parties was not always capable of securing or insuring the majority support on which the government relied upon in order to remain stable. From issue to issue, coalition partners changed their allegiance and support. In essence, support on which government depends in order to remain stable or even successful in the business of interest

68 Mayer, 223.
articulation and aggregation, policy formulation and execution is more reliable when one political party controls a majority of seats in the legislature. This seems to imply that there is a relationship between a government formed by one political party that has secured a legislative majority or dominated by a party that won a near majority in the legislature and political stability in a parliamentary system of government. If such relationship is empirically tested and validated, the logic of two-party system would obviously apply. However, this does not always mean that political stability is guaranteed in two-party system devoid of coalition or where one political party obtained legislative majority. A case in point is Austria that practiced largely a two-party system in its first Republic (1919-1934) and failed to maintain political stability.

Moreover, political stability can equally exist in a multi-party system that has a coalition of political parties of relatively equal strength and importance in government. To avoid contradiction and ensure clarity of direction, this work will regard political stability in such a situation as an exception rather than the rule. Cases in point are Germany (1966-1969) and post-war Austria. In Germany, a successful coalition existed from late 1966 until 1969 between the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and Social Democrats (SPD) which represented eighty to ninety percent of German electorate. Similarly, Austria has been governed
since 1947 by a coalition of Austrian Peoples Party and the Socialists (SPO), which represent eighty-three to eighty-nine percent of Austrian electorate.

The tendency for a stable coalition is stronger when coalition parties are relatively equal in strength and importance. This is so because it reduces the tendency and temptation to label one coalition partner junior. Naturally, unequal treatment tends to generate friction and conflicts.

The important question at this juncture is not whether obtaining a legislative majority enhances political stability but whether the right type of political attitudes that allow the political party leadership to play by the rule are in existence in Nigeria-type political system where political parties are regarded as the vanguards of different ethnic groups and not as instruments of national integration and unity. Therefore, it is difficult to say whether Nigeria's First Republic would have been more stable if NPC or any other political party had obtained a legislative majority.

It is worthwhile to state here that the multi-party system as practiced in Nigeria during the period [1960-1966] was responsible for the inability of the political parties to obtain legislative majority. There is no empirical evidence that multipartyism or proportionality precludes the possibility that one political party may, as a matter of
fact, secure a legislative majority in a general election. To be precise, in Sweden and Norway, the Social Democratic Party and Labor Party respectively have won such legislative majorities on several occasions.

It appears reasonable to tentatively infer that compromises among large numbers of parties of relatively weak but relatively equal strength will be more unstable than coalitions among fewer strong parties or coalitions dominated by one party. This is a long way from stating with Hermans that proportional representation inexorably creates instability. 69

It will be pointed out that Switzerland, which is governed by a coalition of numerous small political parties, without any dominant one portrays Switzerland as an exception to the above proposition. Disagreement over how to process divisive issues tend to weaken such cabinet in multi-party system. Although fundamental differences may manifest themselves in different forms, suffice it to say tentatively or that it is likely that smaller nations have relatively fewer divisive issues to process than bigger nations. Therefore, smaller number of such issues to process offers them the opportunity to be relatively stable with the luxury of less efficient political structures. 70 However, reverse is the case in Nigeria where such divisive issues are so numerous and deep-rooted in the hearts of Nigeria's

69Ibid., 224.

70While multipartyism is often associated with instability, two-partyism is regarded as a better and more efficient system.
Constitution Drafting Committee members. The sharing issue disrupted the proceedings of the CDC in 1977 and the weakness of multiparty legislature manifested itself in paralysis and disagreement over how to process the divisive issue of revenue allocation formulae. The issue of the national question still pester pus and wound in the Nigeria's body-politic.

Multi-party system in Nigeria, especially in the First Republic when ethnic based political parties did not aim at winning a majority. Because their main concern was to seek and win the greatest electoral support from their limited bases, they always accentuated the cleavages and interests which made them different from other groups in the society. This negated the party's function as an instrument of national integration and nation-building. In this type of situation, the role of a political party as a representative of a particular group is set apart from the role of integration of that group into the body-politic which requires an emphasis on the similarities with other groups and commitment to them.71

As Seymour Martin Lipset, a professor of Sociology at Harvard University puts it:

---

The small size of many parties and the absence of a need in most multi-party systems for compromise at the electoral level enhances the ideological content of the conflict. This divisiveness encouraged by a multi-party system is perpetuated by a tendency of most parties to attack most virulently those with whom they have most in common and with whom they compete for a similar vote. Thus magnifying the differences between them.\textsuperscript{72}

As far as multipartism is concerned in Nigeria, Lipset's statement above is a square peg in a square hole, even though one does not need the knowledge of an expert in sociology or political science to know it. The names of the political parties in First and Second Republic give a vivid picture of their goals and aspirations. For example, names like the Northern People's Congress, the Northern Elements Progressive Union, and the United Middle Belt Congress say their objective loud and clear.

On the contrary, he asserts that

the two-party system helps to maintain the commitment of the entire electorate to the system itself, rather than to particular party, since it enables the discontented elector to impute responsibility to the governing majority rather than to the regime and to devote his efforts to the quite legitimate task of replacing the incumbents by their traditional opponents.... The two party system works best where it is based on an elaborate, cross-cutting solidarity structure,

in which men and groups are pulled in different
directions by their diverse roles and interests.\textsuperscript{73}

However, there are conditions that can hinder the operation
of two-partyism or at least, make it less conducive for the
preservation of democratic order and stability than a multi-
party system. Rather than integrate the society, the two-
party system may intensify and magnify internal conflict if
the solidarity structure is polarized by religion, race, class, and the political lines follow those of social
cleavages.\textsuperscript{74} The above proposition is debatable since such
conditions exist in Nigeria, yet election results and the
attitude of the electorate on election day did show those
danger signals that always accompanied elections in the
First and Second Republics. Even the conflicts in the
national and state assemblies that led to the impeachment of
their speakers had nothing to do with cleavages. The two
political parties did not appear to openly or officially
represent any cultural or ethnic unit or cleavage as
predicted by pundits.

Lipset attributes the failure of first Austrian
Republic to a two-party system and notes that

the first Austrian republic was largely a two-
party system, but one which was divided along the
interrelated lines of religion, class, and region. The parties represented two almost completely
separate cultural units and the Civil War which

\textsuperscript{73}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{74}Ibid., 107.
followed was a nearly inevitable consequence of the system.\textsuperscript{75}

In a similar vein, he asserts that Italy in the 1950s contained conditions that were not conducive to democratic order because the lines of division between Christian Democrats and the left Socialist-Communist opposition are more likely to decimate consensus than enhance it.\textsuperscript{76}

Similarly, Gwendolen M. Carter observes that South Africa's political parties, the Afrikaner Nationalists and English United Party that are largely based on two ethnic groups are destructive of national unity and democratic norms.\textsuperscript{77}

In general, where the class struggle is superimposed upon a conflict between religion and atheism, or between different ethnic groups--wherever opposing groups see elections as a fight between good and evil, so that conversion from one political ideology to another is almost impossible--a two-party system is more destructive of

\textsuperscript{75}Ibid. See also Charles Gulick, \textit{Austria: From Habsburg to Hitler} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1948).

\textsuperscript{76}Ibid.

political stability than one in which center parties can mediate between extreme opponents.78

Legitimacy is very important for party government, national unity and democratic norms. Opposition parties tend to be more constructive when they accord a certain degree of legitimacy to the political party in power. Similarly, the party in power must also be willing to regard or at least view the other party as an acceptable alternative government. Political parties under a two-party system are more likely, because of their number to accord each other a required degree of legitimacy and are more likely to see each other as an acceptable alternative government than their counterparts in multiparty system. Logically, then, one may argue strongly that the two-party system nurtures good conditions for a more stable and effective democratic polity than a multi-party one.

Political parties and their leaders have been bitterly criticized for different reasons since their inception by different political leaders in different political systems at different periods. Yet all their criticisms share common characteristics and themes which were most cogently and eloquently expressed by the first United States of America's president Washington when he warned of "the baneful effects of the Spirit of Party" in the American-type political

78Lipset, 107.
system. A political party, as far as George Washington is concerned,

serves always to distract the Public Councils, and enfeebles the Public administration. It agitates the community with ill-founded jealousies and false alarms, kindles the animosity of one part against another, foments occasionally riot and insurrection. It opens the doors to foreign influence and corruption, which finds a facilitated access to the Government itself through the channels of party passions. Thus the policy and will of one country are subjected to the policy and will of another.79

As far as major charges levelled against political parties in Nigeria today are concerned, Washington's remarks and claims are perfectly in order. Political parties in Nigeria's First, Second, and even "still-birth" Third Republics pitted groups against one another and this split the society against itself, sowed and nurtured seeds of discord and magnified minor conflicts that could have been easily insulated and absolved. As Ayub Khan observes political parties "divide and confuse the people."80

Moreover, they have promoted and elevated corruption and administrative inefficiency to virtuous status. Parties do not only encourage political weakness and instability they make the state very vulnerable to the penetration of foreign powers and influence. As one leader in modernizing country


80Ibid.
once said, "if freedom is given to party development, at least one party will become the instrument of the CIA."81

Although above criticisms and observations are fair characterizations of Nigerian political parties but they seem to betray their objectives and the circumstances surrounding their historical origin especially in early phases of political party development and nationalism. In 1933, Dr. James Churchill Vaughan, Ernest Sisei Ikoli, Samuel A. Akinsanya (Odemo of Ishara) bought Professor Eyo Ita's ideas and formed the Lagos Youth Movement (LYM) and changed its name in 1937 to Nigeria Youth Movement and stated its mission to be

the development of a united nation out of the conglomeration of the people who inhabit Nigeria. It shall be our endeavor to encourage the fullest play of all such forces as will serve to promote understanding and a sense of common nationality among the different elements in the country. We will combat vigorously all such tendencies as would jeopardize the unifying process.82

In essence, the early phases of political party activities were aimed at eliminating colonialism and unifying different groups in Nigeria. However, the extent of their accomplishments in this regard is debatable.

Contrary to George Washington's charges against parties, Samuel P. Huntington asserts that there are less arguments against parties than arguments against weak

81Ibid.
82Ojiako, 12.
parties and that corruption, division, instability, and susceptibility to outside influence are features, characteristics, and symptoms of weak party system.83 This does not in any way mean absence of corruption and other banes. Rather,

parties may indeed furnish incentives to corruption, but the development of a strong party substitutes an institutionalized public interest for fragmented private ones. In their early stages of development parties appear as factions and seemingly exacerbate conflict and disunion, but as they develop strength parties become the buckle which binds one social force to another and which creates a basis for loyalty and identity transcending more parochial groupings.84

Again, he (Huntington) argues that

by regularizing the procedures for leadership succession and for the assimilation of new groups into the political system, parties provide the basis for stability and orderly change rather than for instability.85

The reasoning seems to suggest that weak parties may not only be susceptible to foreign powers but may indeed become their tools and instruments, while strong political parties furnish, to a large extent, the institutional mechanisms or devices and defenses that shield and insulate the political system against such external forces. To him,

83Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), 405.

84Ibid.

85Ibid.
the evils attributed to party are, in reality, the attributes of a disorganized and fragmented politics of clique and faction which prevails when parties are nonexistent or still very weak. Their cure lies in political organization; and in a modernizing state political organization means party organization.86

Strong political parties seem to be a very big asset to political systems. A quick glance at the history of Nigeria reveals that military dictators assumed the mantle of leadership and outlawed political parties only when they had become weakened or fragmented. Inter-party and intra-party conflicts fragmented Nigerian society and paralyzed the Nigerian republics, especially the First Republic. President Shagari, Second Republic President, was gripped by the fear of inter-party conflicts and lack of cooperation among political parties. In calling for the cooperation of legislators, he said, among other things that the First Republic collapsed "largely as a result of the incongenial atmosphere engendered by the uncompromising stance adopted by the political parties of the First Republic."87 He therefore urged the legislators to subjugate their "political and other differences to the unrelenting pursuit of peace, unity and progress of our northerland.88

86Ibid., 406.
88Ibid.
It will be noted here that it is very fashionable for Nigerian party leaders to say one thing and do the opposite. After the controversial NPN victory in 1979, President Shagari invited other political parties to join what may be called an all-party coalition. While the Unity Party of Nigeria, the Great Nigerian People's Party, and the People's Redemption Party declined, the Nigeria People's Party accepted the offer. Ladipo Ademokelun claims that the National Party of Nigeria made the offer because it was in search of "consensus politics."\(^{89}\) The Nigerian experience of political party coalitions, namely NPC/NCNC (1959-64), the NPC/UPP (1964-66), and the NPN/NPP (1979-82) were all grand designs and pragmatic moves to gain power, legitimacy, gain a firmer hold on power, and weaken other political parties. The coalition period that most agreed with Ademoleku's thesis of search for consensus politics is the NPN/NPP (1979-82) era. However, subsequent utterances of NPN leaders manifested the NPN's ulterior motives of weakening or even destroying other party or parties. Nwokeji points out that Shagari's statement that he preferred a development in which his party grew progressively stronger while others grew progressively weaker makes it seem as if the proposed consensus was a veil behind which the autonomy of the other

parties could be held in check. Certainly, neither the NPN, nor other parties behaved like consensus political parties during the 1983 election.\textsuperscript{90}

The political behavior of party leaders in government tends to exacerbate inter-party and intra-party conflicts. In essence, the intimidation of political parties by the party in power is very destructive to the political system because it sends the danger and warning signals to other parties that access to legitimate means of power acquisition is only granted to party in power. To be precise, the suppression of political parties increases the fragility of civilian regimes in Nigeria, especially when processes of modernization are progressing. When the political party in power intimidates and blocks the access to the legitimate means of gaining political power and other opportunity structures of the society, the oppressed opposition parties are likely to resort to violence and other extra-legal means. This means that the rate of deviant and disruptive political behavior is higher in situations where opponents have little chance of achieving their political ambitions through legitimate means and when other conforming opportunities are not available. As Huntington points out

\begin{quote}
the more hostile a government is toward political parties in a modernizing society, however, the greater the probably future instability of that society. Military coups are far more frequent in
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{90}Nwokeji, 11.
no-party states than in any other type of political system. A partyless regime is a conservative regime; an antiparty regime is a reactionary regime.\footnote{91}

Generally speaking, it is true that the character and nature of relationship among political parties impact the susceptibility of political system to military intervention and level of stability but it is important to note that, as the events in Nigeria have shown, the stability of Nigeria is, to a certain degree, dependent on the strength of the political parties. The strength of the party is measured here by the extent it has attained in the institutionalization of mass support across ethnic and regional lines. Therefore, the strength of political parties must reflect the degree of such support and the scope of institutionalization. A quick look at some relatively stable modernizing societies will reveal the importance of, at least, one strong party in a political system (see Table 4).

\footnote{91}Huntington, 407-408. See also Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, rev. and enl. ed. (New York: Free Press, 1968), Chapters 6 and 7. Merton explains that the discrepancy between what people want and what they can get develops and translates into social pressures that lead to deviance.
The modernizing countries which achieve high levels of actual and presumptive political stability possess at least one strong political party. Congress, Neo-Destour, Acción Democrática, Partido Revolucionario Institucional, Mapai, Partido Popular Democratico, Republican People's Party, Tanu: each was at one time a model of effective political organization in a modernizing society.92

To strengthen and lend credence to the thesis that the stability of a modernizing political system is dependent on the strength of its political parties, Huntington notes that:

92Ibid., 408.
the differences in political stability between India and Pakistan in the 1950s were measured by the differences in organizational strength between the Congress Party and the Moslem League. The differences in political stability between North and South Vietnam during the decade after Geneva were measured by the differences in organizational strength between the Lao Dong Party, on the one hand, and the Dai Viet, VNQDD, and Can Lao on the other hand. The differences in Arab World between Tunisia, on the one hand, and the eastern Mediterranean, on the other, were in large measure the difference between the broad scope and high institutionalization of Neo-Destour and the high institutionalization but narrow scope of the Ba'ath.93

The incidence of military involvement in the politics of Turkey and Mexico seemed to decline when they (Turkey and Mexico) developed strong political parties. A quick look at each political situation in which the Nigerian army took over power from the civilian will reveal a decline in party strength and mass support, and the fragmentation of the leadership characterized by proliferation of political splinter groups, leadership tussle, and large scale intra- and inter-party conflicts. This type of political situation had always provided the opportunity for the army to say "let us nip the problem in the bud and sanitize, revamp the economy, and rescue the down-trodden masses." The most recent case in point was the period after the nullification of the June 12 election in Nigeria. The leadership of the parties was fragmented and cliques that developed within the parties (some opposed and some supported the annulment of

93Ibid.
June 12 election) weakened the parties and their "grass-root" support.

During the 1992 presidential nomination exercise, the leadership of the parties was in such disarray that most "losing" candidates came together and begged President Babangida to intervene and nullify the results of the nomination. In the SDP, twenty-two out of the twenty-three presidential candidates were not ready to accept the results. President Babangida's intervention and subsequent nullification of the result and postponement of the hand-over date was, in essence, a reflection of the wishes of the majority of the presidential candidates and the deterioration which they engineered. The weakness of the political parties always diminish their ability to challenge the armed forces and the police. The refusal of some senators and members of the House of Representatives to vacate the National Assembly building could not be regarded as an adequate challenge that would have aborted the November 17, 1993 coup led by General Sani Abacha.

Samuel Huntington has strongly argued that

the decline in party strength, the fragmentation of leadership, the evaporation of mass support, the decay of organizational structure, the shift of political leaders from party to bureaucracy, the rise of personalism, all herald the moment when colonels occupy the capitol.94

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94Ibid., 409.
To him, military coups are not responsible for the destruction of political parties, rather "they ratify the deterioration which has already occurred."95 Another case in point was the decline in Juan Bosch's party strength after the elections in which he emerged as a president. The party, which started to disintegrate immediately after the election, could not offer any resistance or challenge to the armed forces and policy. Additionally, Edwin Lieuwen in his book, General vs. Presidents, observes that most of the PRD leaders, it seems, had become bureaucrats, occupying themselves with technical and administrative functions essential to the reform program.96

Political systems without strong political parties are less likely to control and contain social forces which are capable of generating symptoms of political instability such as violence and rioting than political systems with strong political parties.

After World War II, most modernizing societies, with the exception of the communist ones, lacked both strong party systems and strong political parties. With major exceptions of several Latin American parties and the Congress Party in India, most other political parties could

95Ibid.

not demonstrate any real adaptability and institutionalization because they were not only too young but also were then led by their founders who more often than not claimed both the ownership and leadership. This seemed to be responsible for the inabilities of the parties to perform and attract followers on a nationwide basis especially in Nigeria.

The ability of political parties to survive their founders or charismatic leaders who first led or brought them to power is one of the principal ways of measuring their institutional strength. The institutional strength of a party can also be measured by its ability to survive or withstand desertion of the principal members and their opposition. A case in point was Mapai after the desertion and active opposition of Ben Gurion. Therefore, the Mapai's institutional strength at that point, could be measured by the fact that it survived and withstood the desertion and active opposition of Ben Gurion. This was a classical case where a political party was stronger than its leader.

Conversely, Munoz Marin of Puerto Rico who had wanted to promote the institutional growth of PPD consciously chose making public utterances that were capable of strengthening the party. This was in contrast to what Ben Gurion did in Israel. Marin also retired from the leadership of the PPD. The New York Times quotes him as saying:

the election was a beginning.... I've begun to prove that the island can get along without me. The people will get used to the idea of an institutionalized party and they will learn to
work with Sanchez just as they have worked with me.97

In contrast, weak political parties are often dependent on their leaders for success and longevity. While the deaths of Patel and Gandhi did not give any deadly blow to the success and longevity of Congress Party, the deaths of Senanayake in Sri Lanka (Ceylon), of Jinnah and Ali Khan in Pakistan, and of Aung San in Burma hastened the disintegration of their political parties. Similarly, the imprisonment of Obafemi Awolowo and the death of Aminu Kano in Nigeria in 1963 and 1982 respectively had such effect on their political parties. However, it will be pointed out here that Barkin Zuwo narrowly won the 1983 gubernatorial election in 1983 under PRP in Kano state that was supposed to be PRP stronghold. On the other hand, the adaptability of the Congress Party was reflected in its changing leadership from Banerjea and Besant to Gokhale and Tifak to Gandhi and Nehru. Similarly, the shift in leadership from Calles to Cardenas set the National Revolutionary Party on the road to successful institutionalization, signaled by its subsequent change in name to the Institutional Revolutionary Party.98


98Huntington, 609. He includes the depth and complexity of party organization as shown by linkages between the party and socio-economic organizations such as peasant associations and labor unions. Such linkages broaden the appeal and bolster the organization of the major political parties. The countries where such linkages can be found include: Tunisia, Morocco, Venezuela, India, Israel, Mexico, Jamaica, Peru and Chile. To him, another aspect of party strength relates to the extent power seekers and political activists identify
A negative correlation seems to exist between the strength of political parties (independent variable) and political stability and the susceptibility of the political system to disruptive activity such as military intervention (dependent variable). It is so because a rise or an increase in the strength of party \( A \) is accompanied by a decrease in political instability \( B \) or \( A \) (strength) is inversely proportional to \( B \) (instability or military coup) which means that when the quantity and quality (values) of \( A \) increase, that of \( B \) will go in opposite direction. This can be mathematically represented by law of inverse variation: \( A \propto \frac{1}{B} \) which is the

with the party and the degree to which they regard the party as an instrument through which other ends can be achieved. However, it should be noted Huntington's second aspect of party strength, that is, party's organizational complexity and depth as revealed by the linkages between the party and socio-economic organizations are weak attributes of party strength. By his standard, major Nigerian political parties met that requirement. William J. Foltz makes this observation about nationalist party in most African countries: The party "was generally well organized. The conditions of the political struggle and dedication of the top elite to the party as the prime instrument of political change led the elite to give the major portion of their energies and resources to building a solid, responsive organization capable of disciplined action in response to directives from the top and able to ferret out and exploit feelings of dissatisfaction among the masses for political ends." See William J. Foltz, "Building the Newest Nations: Short-Run Strategies and Long-Run Problems," in Karl W. Deutsh and William J. Foltz (eds.), Nation-Building (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), 121. However, an argument can be made that dominant political parties were weakened after independence by competing demands on organizational resources.
same thing as $A$ is equal to $K$ where $k$ is constant. Assuming values are assigned to political parties according to their strength ranging from high to low levels as follow:

1. High level strength (HLS) = 16
2. Middle level strength (MLS) = 10
3. Low level strength (LLS) = 4

$A$ represents the three levels and 4 is the value of $K$ which is constant. The values .25, .4, and 1 represent high, moderate, and low incidence of instability respectively.

Therefore $A \propto \frac{1}{B}$

$$A = \frac{K}{B}$$

$$\text{HLS} = 16 = \frac{4}{B}$$

$$16B = 4$$

$$B = \frac{4}{16} = \frac{1}{4} = .25$$

$$\text{MLS} = 10 = \frac{4}{B}$$

$$10B = 4$$

$$B = \frac{4}{10} = \frac{2}{5} = .4$$

$$\text{LLS} = 4 = \frac{4}{B}$$

$$B = \frac{4}{4} = 1$$

From the above, one can deduce that as the strength of parties decreases, the incidence of political instability
increases. HLS gives .25, MLS gives .4, and LLS gives 1.

Although Samuel Huntington does not quantify his variables with the type of precision that makes measurement and evaluation more accurate, his analysis and examples above suggest there is a strong relationship between the variables (strong political parties and political stability), therefore, it should be very close to -1.0 (negative correlation). However, negative correlation should never be taken as a proof of cause-and-effect relationship because another meticulous or conscientious researcher may look for other variables such as world opinion or attitudes toward democracy, dictatorship, and military intervention in the relationship. It may turn out that the unfavorable world opinion and attitude toward military regimes which in turn affect the willingness of the military to intervene in the governance even when the political parties are not strong to present any meaningful challenge and resistance to the police and armed forces. Since this affects the rate at which military intervene in politics, the cause-and-effect relationship between independent variable .A (strength of political parties) and dependent variable .B (instability and military intervention in politics) when variable .C (world opinion and attitude against military intervention) is introduced may no longer reach -1.0.
It should be pointed out that in a unipolar world, the whole idea of a causal relationship between strong party and political stability, however valuable it may be for understanding past politics has only a limited predictive value. After all, human behavior is so complex that it is always difficult to pinpoint cause and effect precisely. However, it may still be used or proposed as a useful tool or guide for the analysis of earlier modernizing societies. Suffice it to say, that at the very least, the growing understanding of the political process should admonish political historians, that particular elections or stability must be understood in terms of their place in a gradually fluctuating balance of party strength, pattern of party identifications, and the focus of attention on the processes by which party identifications are molded and by which they are changed during realignment phases or stages, the impact of world opinion or attitude and the level of economic development or the rate at which the regimes help meet the aspirations of the entire population.

One important aspect of democracy is popular participation—a cornerstone of democracy. To be precise, participation is an essential and indispensable element of democratic politics even though it has to be combined with representation because decision makers will, by necessity always be few. Nevertheless, through representation and citizen participation in the political process, the diverse
views of political community can and do become inputs into
the decision-making machinery. Moderate diffusion of power
in a political community is also necessary for
representation and citizen's participation in a modern
democratic political setting. Therefore, party-systems
should aspire to expand the citizen political participation
and recognize and accept new groups.

It has been observed that:

a strong political party system has the
capability, first, to expand participation through
the system and thus to preempt or to divert anomic
or revolutionary political activity, and second,
to moderate and channel the participation of newly
mobilized groups in such a manner as not to
disrupt the system.99

In essence, any party system that provides avenues,
procedures and institutionalized organizations for the
assimilation and accommodation of new groups into the system
can be regarded as strong. In terms of political
development, the strength and adaptability of the party
system count rather than the number of parties and the
precondition or prerequisite of political stability is the
capability of party system in assimilating the new social
forces which arose as a result of modernization processes.100

99 Huntington, 412.

100 Ibid., 412-413. Huntington also measures the
adaptability of a party system with the average age of its
constituent parties. This means that the higher the average
age of the parties, presumably the more institutionalized
and stable the party system is. Generally, under a multiparty
system, the average age of the principal parties is lower
It should be stated clearly here that assimilation that is not accompanied with equal access to the opportunity structures of the party or society is bound to decimate the strength and adaptability of the party system rather than enhance them. A party system may accept or admit new social groups or forces but systematically or subtly deny them the access to vital opportunity structures of the society. Therefore, it is not entirely true that party systems capability in assimilating new social forces and groups is the precondition for political stability.

It is now clear, by Huntington's viewpoint, measurement and evaluation that what counts is the strength and adaptability of the system rather than the number of political parties in modernizing societies. This brings an important question of possible relationships, if any, between party strength and number of political parties in modernizing societies into focus. Huntington's table shows that weak and strong parties may exist in different party system on global basis and Table 4 is a good illustration.\textsuperscript{101} In essence, a minimal relationship seems to exist between party number and party strength.

Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor's Table on party stability and party number (see Table 5) apparently confirms

\textsuperscript{101}Ibid., 421.
the impressionistic classification of Table 4 above by showing the impact of the party number on party stability.\textsuperscript{102} The political dispensation and military coups that accompanied some African states immediately after their independence in 1960s appear to weaken their tables and their validity because of the absence of unstable one-party systems.

Although, at least at this stage, there is no visible and obvious evidence of important correlation between party number and party strength, the result may change when another variable (degree of modernization) is introduced. While any number of party may be compatible with strong parties at high levels of modernization, one-party systems may be weak or strong at lower levels of modernization and multiparty systems are invariably weak.\textsuperscript{103} Banks and Textor table depicts eleven stable multiparty systems such as Israel and ten Western European countries and Costa Rica and Italy are the two moderately stable multiparty systems. One country each from the Middle East and Africa, nine from Latin America, and two from Asia represent the thirteen unstable multiparty systems. This shows that multiparty systems do not produce political stability in any


\textsuperscript{103}Huntington, 421-422.
modernizing societies with the questionable exception of Israel.

All the tables tend to point in one direction: that one-party systems tend to be more stable in modernizing societies than pluralistic party systems and that multiparty systems are much more susceptible to military intervention in modernizing societies with one party or with two parties (see Tables 5 and 6).¹⁰⁴

### TABLE 5

**POLITICAL STABILITY AND PARTY NUMBER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Parties</th>
<th>Degree of Stability</th>
<th>Stable</th>
<th>Moderately Stable</th>
<th>Unstable</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One party</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant party</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-and-a half party</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two party</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiparty</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


¹⁰⁴Ibid., 422.
TABLE 6
SUCCESSFUL COUPS IN MODERNIZING COUNTRIES:
1945 OR DATE OF INDEPENDENCE THROUGH 1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System Type</th>
<th>Number of Countries</th>
<th>Countries with Coups</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One-party systems</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant-party systems</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-party systems</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiparty systems</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The figures in Table 6 also tend to confirm the inverse relationship between number of parties and political stability even though a one-party system is no guarantee against a military intervention. See also Table 7.

It should be noted that the stability of a one-party system sometimes is traced to its origins rather than its character.

It is usually the product of nationalist or revolutionary struggle which stimulates extensive mobilization and institutionalization. Once the struggle is won, however, the strong party which emerges creates a one-party system, which in turn, removes or eliminates the conditions for its own success. The continuing stability of the system thus depends upon its inheritance from the past.\(^{105}\)

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\(^{105}\)Ibid., 424.
TABLE 7

COUPS AND COUP ATTEMPTS IN MODERNIZING COUNTRIES SINCE INDEPENDENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Countries</th>
<th>Countries with Coups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-party</td>
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<tr>
<td>One-party dominant</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-party</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiparty</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No effective parties</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As the struggle for power intensifies and prolongs, the ideological commitment becomes deeper and this increases the political stability of the one party system which is subsequently created. Revolution tends to produce a more stable one-party system that is derived from a prolonged nationalist movement and struggle and is more stable than the one produced by nationalist struggles movements that are brief and easy. As Huntington puts it, "in general, indeed, the longer a nationalist party fought for independence, the

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\(^{106}\)Ibid.
longer it was able to enjoy the power that came with independence."¹⁰⁷ TANU and its predecessor had a 32-year history when Tanganyika became independent, the Congress Party was 62 years only when India became independent, Mapai was 18 years old when the state of Israel was created, and these parties were able to enjoy some vitality years after independence. On the contrary, as Emerson has pointed out that many African countries got their independence so easily and that were "cheated of their revolution."¹⁰⁸ In essence, it means that they (Africans) were denied the benefits that accrue from revolution.

The political party, as one of the agents, of political socialization, is supposed to play a vital role in promoting national integration especially in a Nigerian-type society where many diverse ethnic and religious groups were brought together by British colonialism and the difficulty has been to find a means of binding them together to form a cohesive nation. In these circumstances, the nationalist parties that were formed to wrestle power away from the colonial masters would have logically provided good leadership in merging the discordant elements into a coherent whole with a predominant political culture with little or no deviant subcultures, while preserving for each sufficient autonomy

¹⁰⁷Ibid.
¹⁰⁸Ibid.
to satisfy certain cultural aspirations. Unfortunately, Nigerian political parties especially in the First and Second Republics failed in this respect and served instead as the vanguards for their ethnic groups.

Rupert Emerson points out that:

on several counts the task of African parties in promoting national integration in particular is both more difficult and more necessary than it would be in any other major part of the world. Achieving independence with a lower and less stable level of national integration within the existing political units than is generally to be found elsewhere, all the African countries south of the Sahara area in grave need of forces which can actively promote their unit. In a number of these countries, political parties have played a central and invaluable role in speeding and consolidating the processes of political integration, although it must also be recorded that in some instances parties have impeded rather than advanced integration, notably where their guiding star was tribalism rather than nationalism—a term whose specific meaning is always to be examined with a skeptical eye in the African context.110

The intractable problems of ethnicity and ethnic politics are the most evident and omnipresent divisive forces in Nigeria. Even though some Nigerian leaders use them as instruments for achieving individual political ambition, they are still regarded as a double threat to the kind of nation they seek to build. Additionally,

109Ibid., 425.

where the new dominant elites want to modernize their societies in order to establish nations on terms of equality with those of the advanced world, the pressures of tribalism and of the chiefs tend to be in the direction of a defense and perpetuation of the traditional order.\textsuperscript{111}

When the above situation is understood, the political behavior and electoral outcomes in Africa can be easily conjectured. After surveying the African elections in detail, W.J.M. Mackenzie concludes that all African political parties tend to become "tribal" parties and that "if tribalism is the enemy, elections are partly responsible for encouraging it."\textsuperscript{112} Taking this point further, Donald L. Horowitz contends that various generations of party systems in Africa starting from independence to date have tended to reflect the pressures towards the ethnicization, regionalization, and patrimonialization of power.\textsuperscript{113} The net result, with a few exceptions has been that political parties have generally been fragile, shallow, and weak, subsequently prone to factionalization; and even where parties have elicited greater popular involvement, they have tended to reflect ethnic and regional

\textsuperscript{111}Nigeria seeks a national integration which rests upon the continuing and basic fact of ethnic diversity or what is often referred to as "unity in diversity."


particularities too closely to provide a fresh, cross cutting basis for political conflict.\textsuperscript{114}

In Nigeria's situation, these tendencies have been exacerbated by rash military interventions which started on January 15, 1966. As things are, one does not need an expert in social sciences to know that such coups and counter-coups have considerably depreciated and squandered the political infra-structure leading to redemocratization.\textsuperscript{115} The method of recruitment into such regime reflects narrow ethnic, regional, and religious constituencies. This exacerbates the primordial cleavages and jeopardizes the social bases of the emerging democratic process.\textsuperscript{116} How will the problem of ethnicization of power, party and politics be solved? Can truly multi-ethnic political parties ever emerged in Nigeria? What happened in Nigeria during the short period two-partyism was practiced shows that the above goals are probably realizable if the army is patient enough

\textsuperscript{114}Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, 19.


to allow the process of political evolution to take its full
course.

In a similar vein Diamond has rightly observed that
Nigeria's Second Republic, and even to a limited degree,
First Republic had started gradually to evolve truly multi-
etnic political organizations through the process of
bargaining and haggling between and within political parties
when military intervention terminated the process and
progress.117 To appropriate Claude Ake's argument in a
different although in related context the relationship
between democracy and party plurality on the one hand and
existence of deep cultural and social cleavages on the other
is not necessarily antithetical:

the whole question of democracy implies precisely
the assumption of differences to be negotiated, to
be conciliated, to be moved into phases of higher
synthesis. If democracy means anything at all, as
a form of relationship that is precisely what it
means. If there is social pluralism, that is in
fact an argument for a democratic form of
governance.118

See a brief discussion on the political evolution process of
multi-ethnic political party in the Second Republic.

117Larry Diamond, "Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict," The
127.

118Claude Ake, "The Case for Democracy" in African
Governance in the 1990s (Atlanta: The Carter Center, 1990),
4.
As stated earlier, the extent of disillusionment with party politics was so great that the former head of state, Murtala Mohammed charged the CDC with the responsibility of finding a means to form a government without political parties. Nigerian party politics is in a profound dilemma. It may be difficult for democracy to flourish without political parties but it is becoming more difficult for government to function well in Nigeria in presence of ethnic-based parties because of their inability to get along well. Lucian W. Pye has rightly pointed out that "historically the introduction of political parties has seemingly created as many problems as it has solved."

In his determination, according to former Nigerian president, General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, to leave for posterity a New Nigeria of his dream, decreed into existence two "grassroot-oriented" political parties under the legal auspices of Decree 27 of 1989. The creation of the two parties SDP and NRC in place of thirteen disqualified by the AFRC attracted mixed reactions from Nigerians of all walks of life, including a number of knowledgable critics who maintained that such action (creation of two parties) could

119 Report of the Constitution Drafting Committee, xiii.

jeopardize the overall search for sustainable democracy
during the transition and beyond.\(^{121}\) Fearing the negative
impact of extreme social engineering, Richard Joseph of
Emory University, an expert in Nigeria government and
politics, says that:

the twists and turns that President Babangida has
introduced during his five years in office have
left most observers unwilling to affirm that the
new two-party, fostered from above, has a
realistic chance of succeeding. Extreme political
engineering in Nigeria by a military junta is
beginning to raise doubts about whether it can
eventually lead to the creation of a stable and
democratic political system.\(^{122}\)

While many non-partisan critics viewed it as a welcome
development and political innovation that could help put a
final stop to money politics and open fraternization between
newbreed and banned oldbreed politicians, others saw the
government action as nothing but an experiment that was
doomed to fail because of certain obvious handicaps that
would attend to its implementation.\(^{123}\) Many oldbreed
politicians predicated their opinion that the experiment

\(^{121}\)Odia Ofeimun, "Democracy by Fiat," *West Africa*
(London) (December 18-24, 1989): 2091-3. See also Anthony A.
Akinola, "A Critique of Nigeria's Proposed Two-Party
System," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, no. 27 (March

\(^{122}\)Richard Joseph, "The Challenge of Democratization in
Africa," in *African Governance in the 1990s* (Atlanta: The
Carter Center, 1990), 18.

\(^{123}\)Mike Ebonugwo, "Democracy According to IBB," *Platform*
would spell a dangerous trend in North-South politics on the conviction that the creation of two parties would further widen the North-South dichotomy as each region would be tempted to pledge allegiance to one of the parties.\textsuperscript{124} It is pertinent to note at this juncture that the composition and inter-ethnic make-up of these two political parties allayed the fears of the above critics even though some still say that NRC was dominated by the Northern oligarchy. A quick look at the results of the elections held between 1990 and 1993 (see Table 2 and other appropriate tables) will not show any significant official web of ethnicity. Another question to be asked here is: how did political parties and elections differ in the Third Republic from those of the First and Second Republics, and what differences are important?

The second Nigerian party system was not only unique in its origins, but also in its national comprehensiveness and balance, and its creator introduced the fatal flaws that brought about its early disruptions and demise.

\textit{Summary}

This chapter has surveyed literature on party systems. The proponents and the opponents (critics) have strong arguments to support or defend their respective views. The chapter has also given the analysis of the merits and

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.
demerits of their various views. Many critics of multiparty system have faulted it for increasing the tendency toward ideological polarization and instability. However, many recent studies downplay it. The Nigerian situation and evidence support the original ideological polarization and demonization of political opponents during political campaigns and elections.
CHAPTER III

A REVIEW OF THE FORMATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
POLITICAL PARTIES IN NIGERIA (1923-1993)

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the formation and the development of pre- and post-independence political parties in Nigeria. It examines the patterns of party competition in Nigerian regions and states to determine whether politics was conducted on a one-, two- or multi-party basis. It conducts a methodical investigation of when, how, and under what circumstances party formation or development occurred in each region or state, together with a description and appraisal of the nature of the party and the response of the electorate to party appeals. Finally, it also inquires into what each party stood for.

Finding or providing answers to two broad questions has been the usual concern and the preoccupation of the historical investigations of the Nigerian political parties. These questions include what doctrines, ideologies (if any), or programs did each party espouse? And what interests, classes, ethnic groups, or sections were most strongly represented in the composition of each party? What is the relationship between party constituencies and the party
itself? How much control did the party leadership have over its elements? There will be no detailed discussions on party organization, the overall pattern of interest aggregation, and the character of the key players.

The political parties in the First and the Second Republics which were generally ethnic based, fragile, weak and shallow were looked upon as tools or instruments of ethnic chauvinism, intimidation, and domination. The pre-independence party such as the NCNC would have been an exception to this rule or characterization but it could not resist the pressures to join other parties in ethnicization, regionalization, and patrimonialization of power and leadership. All these limited their capabilities to integrate the components of Nigerian society. Each party espoused and propagated its ethnic ethoes, hatred and agendas at the expense of the national ones. The leaders and owners of these parties stamped them with their personal biases and prejudices rather than with any grand (meaningful) national ideological visions. All these were reflected in their political campaign patterns which degenerated into ethnic confrontations and emerged as the exact anti-thesis of political integration and stability. This culture of violence and hate attracted the army that overthrows the civilian regimes.

The above characterization or the character of the parties in Nigeria prior to the introduction of the two
party framework in 1989 is primarily determined by interest they served, their real and professed aims and principles, the size and nature of their membership and relationship, the main sources of their voters and other political support, their main sources of money (funding), and administrative machinery and internal bureaucracy that ran them.

This study admits that its perspective on the Nigerian political parties is unconventional and may well be confusing or disappointing to those who perceive political parties in terms of doctrines or constituent groups. This study basically agrees and shares Professor Maurice Duverger's view and the understanding that American parties are above all electoral machines, engaged in nominating and electing candidates, rather than, as Edmund Burke put it, "a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavors the national interest upon some particular principle which they all agreed...."1 This work agrees to a degree that the structures and nature of the Nigerian political parties were profoundly influenced by the constitutional, legal and cultural environment within which they evolved but it has to be noted here that political actors (men and women), not documents, form and make political parties operate

effectively or decline drastically. Constitutions are just the means through which political and civil communities and societies order their affairs and direct their efforts towards self-perpetuation or self-preservation and are not ends in themselves.

The first Nigerian political party, Nigerian Democratic Party (NNDP) which had its origin in The Clifford's Constitution, entered upon a stage of arrested development as a result of the formation of the Lagos Youth Movement in 1938. By 1939 it had disintegrated and gave way to a more viable dynamic, and radical political association. It will be noted that one of the striking characteristics of the 1922 Clifford constitution was the allocation of four of the forty-six seats to the Nigerians resident in Lagos and Calabar. In essence the creation of this political party on June 24, 1923 by Herbert Macaulay and his associates was necessitated by this provision. The party confined its activities to Lagos only and its main function was to organize elections and contest for elections into the Legislative Council's seats and into the Lagos Town Council.

Between 1929 and 1934, the political consciousness of the Lagos elite was aroused by the controversial colonial education policy which was perceived by the Nigerian intelligensia and professionals as a ploy to impart and bestow inferior education on Nigerians in order to keep and make them suitable only for inferior government posts and
prolong the European domination. While the NNDP was very critical of the British officials, regarded as "political usurpers," by the beginning of the 1930s, the more ambitious and radical youths in the party had become impatient and worried about the exceedingly slow pace the party and its old members were taking. One of the complaints of the members was that the activities of the party showed a lot of "chronic conservatism" and they labeled its old members as "compromisers" and British stooges.

However, one has to bear in mind that the financial and human resources at the disposal of the party could not have possibly allowed the party to perform above certain levels. Therefore, there was no justification for such characterization. Additionally, there was no empirical evidence that British officials penetrated or bought over the leadership of the party. The party was only being realistic and pragmatic in its approach. Therefore, it was improbable and unlikely to be true or to have happened as alleged. Abiola refers to the youths' complaints as "far-fetched and somehow unfounded." Awolowo asserts that the


\[\text{Abiola, 195.}\]
best of its time was consumed in fighting for the enhancement of the status of the Oba of Lagos.\footnote{Awolowo, 114.}

The establishment in 1934 of a youth movement (the Lagos Youth Movement, renamed Nigerian Youth Movement in 1936), which was partly social and partly political was the consequence of the youth's complaints. However, Maduagwu seems to disagree and asserts that "to propagate their own idea on education policy, some young Nigerians, mainly students and graduates of King's College Lagos formed the Lagos Youth Movement in 1934 and in 1936 was renamed the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM)."\footnote{Maduagwu,}

The establishment of the NYM contributed in no small measure to the demise of the first political party (NNDP) in Nigeria. It will be recalled that NYM became the major political rivalry to Macaulay's NNDP immediately after its formation in 1934. It broke the monopoly of NNDP in the election into the Legislative Council and Lagos Town Council since its inception in 1923 by winning all the elective seats (three) in 1938.

The Movement seemed to meet most of the requirements put in place during the Second and Third Nigerian Republics in order to avoid the establishment of ethnic-based political parties. In other words, it seemed to reflect the
federal character. It is interesting to point out at this juncture that even though the executive membership of the Movement was predominantly Yoruba, its branches were established throughout Nigerian urban areas such as Ibadan, Ijebu Ode, Warri, Benin City in the West, Aba, Enugu, Port Harcourt and Calabar in the East, and among southern settlers in Jos, Kaduna, Zaria and Kano in the North.\(^6\)

Awolowo points out that the Nigerian Youth Movement was the first nationalist organization ever to make real efforts to bring within its fold all the nationalists and politically conscious elements in Nigeria. The imperishable impact which this Movement made on political thought in Nigeria has never been fully appreciated. Since 1945, when the Richards Constitution was introduced, the speed with which Nigeria has sali ed forth to its political destination is so fast....\(^7\)

There is no doubt from the discussion so far that the NYM was more Nigerian in scope and support, and the matters it had handled were more national in all respects than the Macaulay's Party. Awolowo further notes that "in content, the aims and objects of the Democratic Party were Nigerian National; but territorially and in its membership, the party was in no way Nigerian or National."\(^8\) By the end of 1938 the NYM had a national membership of about 10,000 with about

\(^6\)Coleman, 225.

\(^7\)Awolowo, 113.

\(^8\)Ibid.
twenty branches all over Nigeria. This strengthens the claim that it was a national movement.

The Nigerian Youth Charter and Constitution embodies the official program of the NYM and emphasizes the theme of inter-ethnic cooperation and national unity. The main aim of the NYM is the development of a united nation out of the conglomeration of peoples who inhabit Nigeria. It shall be our endeavor to encourage the fullest play of all such forces as will serve to promote complete understanding and a sense of common nationalism among different elements in the country. We will combat vigorously all such tendencies as would jeopardize the unifying process. While pursuing this great principle with consistency as its chief aim, the movement declares itself, in its short range policy, as a constructive critic of the Government as at present constituted. That criticism it offers in the spirit of constitutional opposition....

The Youth Charter was divided into three sections, namely, the Political Charter, the Economic Charter, and the Cultural and Social Charter. The political section of the charter describes the goal of its political activities as

...complete autonomy within the British Empire,... a position of equal partnership with other member states of British Commonwealth...and complete independence in the local management of our affairs.... Our movement accepts the principle of trusteeship as the basis of cooperation with the British government in Nigeria.10

9Quoted in Awolowo, 121. See also Nigerian Youth Movement, Youth Charter and Constitution and Rules (Lagos: n.d.), 15 ff. And Coleman, 225.

10Ibid.
The inter-ethnic membership of the NYM was personified by Nnamdi Azikiwe who returned and joined the political band-wagon of the nationalists. He added a lot of propensity to the activities of the old members. Unfortunately Azikiwe who had become so popular among the growing community of the non-Yoruba settlers in Lagos, especially the Igbo, was alleged to be one of the political actors and factors that contributed to the demise of the NYM.¹¹

Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (Or Zik, as he is popularly known) founded his own newspaper, the West African Pilot in 1937 after he returned from Ghana where he had worked as the editor of a daily newspaper, the African Morning Post. The leadership of the NYM established an "official journal of the NYM," the Daily Service in 1938 with Ernest Ikoli as the publisher and editor and H.O. Davies as the business manager. The West African Pilot, which was essentially a commercial venture, better produced and better run, and enjoyed much wider circulation than its predecessors and forerunners the Nigerian Daily Telegraph, and the Lagos Daily News. Zik allegedly regarded the establishment of the Daily Service as a move to undermine his business venture.¹² Azikiwe's enthusiasm for the Movement reportedly "cooled"

¹¹Maduagwu, 7.
¹²Maduagwu, 8.
following the establishment of the Daily Service.\textsuperscript{13} His critics alleged that "he bitterly resented the competition that adversely affected his own journalistic enterprises. In an editorial Ikoli rejected the suggestion and accused Azikiwe of being a megalomaniac."\textsuperscript{14}

The accusations and counter-accusations generated a lot of disagreements among the leaders of the NYM that were never resolved. He (Zik) resigned from the executive committee of the NYM on the grounds of "preoccupation with business affairs" and broke entirely with the NYM in 1941.\textsuperscript{15}

The circumstance that furnished Zik with the pretext for the withdrawal of his membership from the NYM arose when its founding President, K. A. Abayomi resigned from the Lagos Executive Council as a result of his appointment to the Governor's Executive Council. The vacancy created by Abayomi's resignation precipitated and intensified the struggle within the movement's leadership over the selection of his successor. The major contestants were the founding fathers of the NYM, Ernest Ikoli (Ijaw) and Samuel Akinsanya (Ijebu Yoruba), the President and the Vice-President respectively. The party supported and endorsed Ikoli but Zik and Akinsanya opposed him. The selection of Ikoli was

\textsuperscript{13}Coleman, 227.
\textsuperscript{14}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15}Ibid.
not acceptable to Zik and Akinsanya who charged that the party's support of Ikoli was a "manifestation of tribal prejudice against Ijebus and Igbos." They further maintained that the dominant group of Lagos Yoruba were discriminating against an Ijebu Yoruba (Akinsanya). The question at this juncture is whether manifest ethnic consideration was possible in this movement that was given credit for providing a unique platform for the unification of all the diverse primordial groups in Nigeria? It is true that the movement embraced diverse ethnic groups in Nigeria but it is a more fundamental truth that there has been a propensity and a tendency on the part of the Lagos elite to despise or look down on their brethren from the provinces. However, it was rather preposterous and ridiculous on the part of Zik and Akinsanya to suggest that the party's support for Ikoli was anchored on ethnic considerations. It will be recalled that Ikoli was supported by another prominent Ijebu-Yoruba, Obafemi Awolowa, then Secretary of the Ibadan branch of the movement. On the issue of prejudice against the Ijebu Yoruba, Coleman comments that

Because of certain historical factors Yorubas were prejudiced against the Ijebu Yoruba. The Ijebu had never come completely under the old Yoruba Kingdom centered at Oyo. During most of the

16Ibid.

17Maduagwu, 8.
nineteenth century the Ijebu controlled the main trade routes into the interior, and they had acquired the reputation of being the jews of Yorubaland.... Yoruba from Oyo, Ibadan, and the Egba Kingdom tended to look down upon or dislike the Ijebu.\textsuperscript{18}

Although it is very difficult to determine whether Zik deserted the party because of ethnic antagonisms and hatred or as a result of normal power tussle among political actors and aspirants to political power or because he was not satisfied or comfortable with the role he was playing in the political game, suffice it to say that the resentment he exhibited when the NYM \textit{Daily Service} appeared to compete and challenge his own newspaper is sufficient to reach a conclusion that he quit the NYM because of his journalistic enterprises rather than the issue of ethnicity. Maduagwu opines that perhaps "when Zik saw that his chances to rise to the top in a Yoruba-dominated NYM was slim, he looked for other avenues to achieve his political ambition."\textsuperscript{19} Perhaps the leadership vacuum among the Igbo in Lagos attracted Zik's attention and compelled him to withdraw from the universalist and non-ethnic views he had espoused.\textsuperscript{20}

Awolowo observes that the fact that in the leadership of Nigerian Youth Movement there were more Yorubas than those

\textsuperscript{18}Coleman, 228.

\textsuperscript{19}Maduagwu, 9.

\textsuperscript{20}Ibid. For Zik's universalist views and thoughts of Africa see Coleman, 222.
belonging to the other ethnic groups was an accident; and it was in fact not noticed as a strange or undesirable phenomenon until 1941.\textsuperscript{21}

Coleman, who seems to hold a slightly different view on the issue, asserts that

Akinsanya crisis was the first major manifestation of a tribal tension that affected all subsequent efforts to achieve unity. From the beginning the mass membership of the Youth Movement was predominantly Yoruba in origin.\textsuperscript{22}

It will be erroneous for anyone to assign this label to the NYM on the basis of its membership. The most important thing to consider is the distribution of Nigerian educated elites. A quick glance at this will reveal that the Yorubas, particularly the Lagos Yoruba, had the benefit of western education due to their geographical location and their early contacts with the Europeans. This factor gave them an edge over other groups who were and are still struggling to catch up. Therefore, their dominant membership position role did not necessarily translate into ethnicity as Coleman seems to suggest. In essence, ethnic factor did not play any significant role, as far as the NYM was concerned. It only looked like an ethnic-based party after Zik had withdrawn with his lieutenants. In fact, to say that the NYM was the maiden attempt at a genuinely multi-ethnic or national party in Nigeria will be an

\textsuperscript{21}Awolowo, 132.

\textsuperscript{22}Coleman, 227-8.
accurate characterization. Hence, this paper agreed with Sklar's observation that

Azikiwe's defection virtually destroyed the multi-tribal character of Lagos section of the Nigerian Youth Movement as most of the Igbos and many of the Ijebu Yorubas turned to the NNDP. His break with the Yoruba elites set the stage for the political fusion of the Igbo and Yoruba masses of Lagos, which took organizational form in 1944.23

The Formation of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC)

It has been stated earlier that Azikiwe (a dynamic Igbo) strengthened and revitalized the Nigerian Youth Movement when he returned to Nigeria after his studies in America and a short stay in Ghana. As pointed out earlier, the NYM won the Lagos Town Council and Legislative Council elections in 1938 defeating the Macaulay's Nigerian National Democratic Party. This ended the political monopoly of NNDP in Nigeria.

However, in 1941, while NYM was enjoying the greatest support from the majority of Nigerians, Azikiwe and almost all the Igbo members in Lagos who constituted the voting strength of the party and many Ijebu-Yoruba deserted the NYM over the selection of an opponent to a vacant legislative council seat and joined the Macaulay's NNPD. This incident, in the meantime, virtually rendered the NYM in Lagos

23Sklar, 55.
moribund, and only continued in Ibadan under the leadership of Chief Obafemi Awolowo who kept the flag of the Ibadan branch of NYM flying until the birth of the Action Group.

Zik seized the initiative of the nationalist struggle for independence to organize the Nigerian Reconstruction Group (a small study group of fourteen people predominantly non-Yoruba) with the objective of forging and building a united front among all the partisan political groups, in order to fight for independence. Zik led a delegation of West African Press to London in 1943, under the auspices of the British Council. The purpose of this was to request the Secretary of State for colonies to initiate a fifteen-year program for independence in West Africa. The activities of the Nigerian Youth, under the umbrella of the Nigerian Union of Students, were actively supported by Zik and his newspaper, the *West African Pilot*. One of the moves it (the Nigerian Union of Students) initiated culminated in the inauguration of what eventually became NCNC on August 26, 1944. Perhaps it is more appropriate to say that Azikiwe and Macaulay founded the NCNC on the initiative of the

24 The incident was very disastrous because Dr. Abayomi, the president, resigned and joined the governor's Executive Council in 1943, H.O. Davies who accepted government appointment as a marketing officer withdrew from the party, Akinsanya went home to become his village chief, and "others" as Coleman puts it "drifted away through indifferece or dissatisfaction, or were otherwise distracted by wartime changes." See Coleman, 228.

25 Sklar, 56. See also Coleman, 262.
Nigerian Union of Students. Prior to this, the students had taken the initiative to canvass for the establishment of a political party during the crisis that arose as a result of the expulsion of some boys from King's College who were protesting against the use of their college facilities by the British soldiers. Many organizations (over forty) such as political parties, ethnic unions, professional associations, literary associations, religious groups, social clubs, and women organizations were represented at the inauguration of the NCNC. The NYM was invited for this conference that was intended to organize a national council to weld the heterogeneous masses of Nigeria into a solid block. Unfortunately, it (the NYM) declined to send its representatives. The conspicuous absence of the NYM at the inauguration of the NCNC was attributed to the fact that the NYM leadership was still nursing some grievances for Zik. The affiliation of the Macaulay's NNDP to the NCNC gave the impression and as a matter of fact convinced the NYM leadership that the formation of the National Council was a strategy and grand design by Zik and Macaulay to seize or hijack the control of the nationalist movement. Whether the

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26 The NCNC was inaugurated at conference summoned by Azikiwe and some Nigerian Youths on August 26, 1944, held in Glover Memorial Hall, Lagos.

27 Olawole, 242.

28 Sklar, 57.
NYM was right or not may not be given a fair hearing at this juncture, but suffice it to say that the election of Macaulay and Zik as the President and the General Secretary seems to support and justify the fears and allegation of the NYM leadership. Provisional officers for the NCNC that were elected at the third meeting declined to serve. The final list of officers included Herbert Macaulay, president; Nnamdi Azikiwe, general secretary; Oyeshile Omage, financial secretary; Dr. Abu Bakr Olorun-Nimbe, treasurer; L. A. Onojobi and A. Ogedegbe, auditors; and E.A. Akerele and Ladipo Odunsi, legal advisers.29

The conference adopted among other things, a resolution to the effect that the members were binding themselves together to form the Nigerian Council "For the realization of our ultimate goal of self-government within the British Empire."30 The NCNC was strongly in support of religious toleration and freedom of worship according to conscience.

The NCNC's membership was by association and until 1952, membership was restricted to organizations only. Interestingly, it had about eighty-seven associations affiliated to it by 1945. It will be observed that three Cameroonian groups joined the party and this was what


30Coleman, 264.
informed the party's decision to adopt the title, National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon and it remained so until the excision of the latter from Nigeria. After this, it (NCNC) reverted to National Council of Nigerian Citizens. Others included two trade unions, two political parties (Democratic Party and Young Democrats), four literary societies (for example, the Youths' Literary Improvement Circle), eight professional associations (for example the National Herbal Institute of Medicine and the Society of Native Therapeutists), eleven social clubs (for example, Zik's Athletic Club and Merry Rose Club), and one hundred and one "tribal unions (for example, the Ibo Union and the Ijebu National Union).31 The largest trade union in Nigeria, the Nigerian Union of Teachers (NUT), held aloof.

Considering the wide-range of organizations and ethnic unions that affiliated to the NCNC at its early years of existence, it could be adjudged to be nationalistic and trans-ethnic in character. The question now is how and why did it degenerate into an Igbo party?

Maduagwu notes that the deterioration of the NCNC into an Igbo party was, as a matter of fact, "a very long and perhaps unplanned process" and he traces its remote cause to the death of the party's first National President, Herbert

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31*African Affairs*, 44. (October 1945), 165. This listing is slightly different from others. See also Coleman, 264-5.
Macaulay. He felt sick in Kano in 1946 while the NCNC (he led with two other leaders Zik and Michael Imoudu) was on nationwide (pan-Nigerian) tour in order to obtain mandates from different groups and Nigerians. This was designed to facilitate the presentation of their counter proposals to the Richard's Constitution and demanding the abrogation of the "obnoxious Ordinances" contained therein. Due to the sickness, he (Macaulay) returned to Lagos immediately and urged the NCNC to continue the tour before he died at the age of eighty-two. As expected, the party had obtained a lot of written mandates before the conclusion of the tour (24 in the North, 48 in the West, 81 in the East, and it also raised the sum of £13,500.

Zik succeeded Macaulay as the National President of the NCNC when a fresh election was conducted to fill the vacant post. The national delegation to London comprising the NCNC representatives and other selected eminent personalities from across the country were led by Zik in June, 1947. This Zik-led delegation to the Secretary of State for

32Maduagwu, 11.
33Sklar, 59.
34Sklar, 61.
35Coleman, 293. The delegation which was indeed national included Zik (Ibo) Adeleke Adedoyin (Ijebu Yoruba), Dr. Abu Bakr Olorun-Nimbe (Ilorin Yoruba), Mallam Bukar Dipcharima (Hausa), Chief Nyong Essien (Ibibio), P.M. Kale (Bakweri Cameroonian), and Mrs. Funmilayo Ransome-Kuti (Yoruba).
Colonies was rebuffed by the latter. After rejecting their proposal, the Secretary advised them to return to Nigeria and cooperate with the Governor in order to make his Constitution operational. Although this delegation was not given a warm reception by the Secretary, it received critical, favorable and reflective comments from the British Press. Reflecting on this visit, the influential *Economist* endeavored to depict a lesson to be learned or drawn from it: "But could not more be done in associating the colonial people more directly with the responsibilities of government?.... If intelligent Africans could be given more responsibility than they are at present, some counter-weight of Zikism might be provided.... Could not there be less of the...outward symbols of the British raj than irritate the sensitive, educated Africans as much as they impress the illiterates."36

Unfortunately, controversy erupted in London between the members of the delegation. The two NCNC officials, the General Secretary (Adeleke Adedoyin) and the Treasurer (Dr. A.B. Olorun-Nimbe) alleged that Zik had single-handedly drafted the memorandum and the proposals submitted in London and had gone beyond what the delegation had anticipated. This controversy continued and degenerated into such a

degree that the Treasurer and the General Secretary, along with the Vice-President of the NCNC, M.A.O. Williams, were excised from the First Annual Assembly (Convention) of the party, held in April 1948 in Kaduna.

Consequently, the controversial memoranda was adopted, with amendments as the "NCNC Freedom Charter," at the Kaduna Convention. In addition, Zik was re-elected as the National President of the party for a three-year tenure and was given the power to appoint all the other officers of the party.37

This Kaduna convention seemed to mark the attainment of the apogee of the NCNC's greatness as a national movement in the nationalist struggle for independence. Zik alluded to this in his presidential address in the convention (April, 1948) when he maintained that the founders dream of unifying various sections (elements) of the Nigerian society, "by crystallizing and articulating their aspirations, and by preparing the nation for the struggle for emancipation" had been successfully accomplished.38 However, for three years (1948-1951), the NCNC as a national organization that had earlier attracted members and associations all over the country without regard to ethnic group, gender, creed, age

37Maduagwu, 12.
38See Coleman, 295.
or religion, was said to have become, as Coleman puts it, "virtually moribund."\textsuperscript{39} In the meantime, its name and objectives were kept alive only in the person and activities of Nnamdi Azikiwe and in the pages of his newspapers. When NCNC was reactivated in 1951, it was in response to a completely new situation.\textsuperscript{40}

This study cannot be more constructive and positive about the period in Nigerian politics than to characterize it as a transition period. The NCNC shed its national outlook and centripetal tendencies and started to wear an ethnic emblem with centrifugal propensities as soon as Awolowo fashioned a political party (Action Group) out of the remnants of NYM and the Egbe Omo Oduduwa. In essence, when they (NYM and Egbe Omo Oduduna) materialized or metamorphosed into Action Group on March 21, 1951, the delicate Igbo Yoruba composition of the NCNC was effectively destroyed. The two leaders were pitted against each other in the elections of 1951 under the Macpherson Constitution. The AG adopted and evoked ethnic sentiments in its election campaigns as a matter of policy--"any support for the NCNC by the Yoruba was support for the Igbo domination of Yoruba and Nigeria."\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{39}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{40}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{41}Quoted in Maduagwu, 15.
The Formation of Action Group (AG)

The Action Group was established as a response to what its leaders, especially Awolowo, perceived as Igbo domination of the West. They foresaw the likelihood that Igbo-led NCNC might come to power in the Western House of Assembly if nothing was done to forestall it. In pursuit of this objective, Awolowo initiated series of secret meetings that eventually led to the development of the AG. For all intents and purposes, AG was designed to serve as a Western Regional political organization.

The important question at this juncture is why did Awolowo decide to confine his political ambition to his ethnic group in the West rather than seeking political cooperation with Zik and other nationalists outside his (Awo) base? Perhaps he (Awo) had not forgiven Zik deserting and crippling the NYM. This seems to be far from his motive because he could have ignored Zik and embraced other individuals and organizations Zik did not belong or control. Probably he (Awo) was afraid that the Yoruba would be in subordinate positions or be playing a subordinate role in a Yorubian-Igbo party.

Awolowo and AG's ethnic politics was not only a retrogression of the national character ideal and approach pursued by the earlier political parties but also molded a destructive and dysfunctional political culture in Nigeria. In other words, it contributed immensely in the
regionalization and ethnicization of the Nigerian political parties which polarized the body-politic.

The most influential foundation member apart from Awolowo (president) was Barrister Bode Thomas (General Secretary) and other members of the executive were Anthony Enahoro and S.L. Akintola.

The Foundation of the Northern People's Congress (NPC)

The formation of the Northern People's Congress (NPC) could be traced to some cultural organizations formed in the North in the mid-forties by a number of Western-educated Northerners who had been awakened and stimulated by the political activities in the South. Dr. R.A.B. Dikko (the first medical officer of northern origin) and Mallam D.A. Ragih formed what was supposed to be cultural organizations in Zaria and Kaduna respectively but they later metamorphosed and materialized into a political party (Northern People's Congress) on October 1, 1950.

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42 Bode Thomas was the first person to advocate regionalized political parties in Nigeria in 1947, according to Zik who additionally claimed that Thomas had proposed the establishment of regional political parties to "deal exclusively with matters affecting their respective zones. The bodies may join at the top to form a council for Nigeria which will be competent to tackle any matter that will affect the country generally." Quoted in Sklar, 103.

43 For details see Sklar, 106.

44 Jamiyyar Mutanen arewa A Yau (The Association of Northern People Today) was the name of Ragih group while the Dikko group was called Jam'iyyar Jama' ar Arewa (first
The founders of NPC advised and urged notable sons of the region to form NPC branches throughout the North. The Sokoto Youth Circle was among the groups that agreed to affiliate to NPC. Over 3,000 delegates attended the inaugural meeting held at Kaduna on June 26, 1949, where Dr. R.A.B. Dikko was elected the first President.

Intriguingly, the NPC viewed itself initially as a social and cultural organization or a movement and its objectives as stated by the President was to combat "ignorance, idleness and injustice" in the northern region. The NPC leadership was not disposed at this time to affiliate with the NCNC, but it seemed to have been especially inspired by the Egbe Omo Oduduwa. Animu Kanu, who was subsequently ejected from the Congress, attended the first annual convention of the NPC held in Kano from December 25-27, 1949. It will be noted that NPC at this time was still a cultural organization not a political party.

The first formally declared political party in the North, the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) was formed by a group of radical youth in Kanu in August 1950. Some of its influential foundation members were Maitama

translated as Northern Nigerian Congress but subsequently as Northern People's Congress). See Sklar, 91.

45Sklar, 93, note 15.
Sule, who later decamped and took the membership of the NPC, and M. Bello Ijumu, who later established a minority party in the Middle Belt. Aminu Kanu, who gave an unflinging support to NEPU, later resigned (before he was dismissed) to join NEPU as Vice-President.⁴⁶

The original intention of NEPU was to be the political wing of NPC with little or no knowledge of the fact that the Northern conservatives were not willing to accept NEPU's radicalism. The NPC conservatives were so uncomfortable that they adopted a resolution at Jos convention to the effect that no NEPU member was eligible for NPC membership. Consequently, NEPU broke with NPC.

By the time NPC announced its political metamorphosis and conversion into a political party on October 1, 1950, in preparation for the 1951 regional election envisaged by the Macpherson Constitution, it had established 65 branches and attracted over 6,000 members including the Sarduana of Sokoto, Sir Ahmadu Bello, who later became the undisputed leader and the premier of the Northern Region, and Hon. Abubakar Tafawa Balewa.⁴⁷ Like its counterpart in the West, the NPC was not a national party, rather it was established as a political structure through which regional mobilization

⁴⁶Aminu Kanu was a government employee (the Principal of GTTC in Sokoto) and could not therefore join NEPU immediately.

⁴⁷Maduagwu, 21.
and integration could be realized in the North. As stated in its motto: "One North, One People irrespective of religion, rank or tribe." Due to constraints, other minority political parties in the First Republic will not be discussed and were part of the political equation that diverged, stressed and pulled the Republic apart.

Reflection on the Political Parties in the Second Republic (1979-1983)

It is true that a successful operation of best constitutions and political institutions including political parties are, to a large extent, dependent on the ability and the willingness of the men (political class and actors) who operate them, but it is a more fundamental truth that choices of political institutions and frameworks matter a lot in that they (institutions) establish the context and environment in which the political activities, especially policy-making, occur. Moreover, they create incentives and disincentives for political class and actors, shape the identities of both the actors and citizenry, and can enhance or hinder the development and construction of democratic regimes. As far as choices of political institutions are concerned, especially during transition to democracy, none is more important than the party system. This is followed

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by the system of government: presidential, semipresidential, parliamentary, or some hybrid. The two competitive transition to civilian rule in Nigeria offered the Nigerian military greater opportunities to design or redesign the political institutions and reshape the political values and norms of the Nigerian society.

Rather than strictly addressing the problems or strengths of multi-party system in the First Republic, the political designers of the Second Republic were obsessed with how to win the 1979 elections and carve new political dominion for themselves. They completely failed or refused to pay genuine attention to the fact that multiparty presidential democracies have a particularly poor performance record. Although it is not within the scope of this study to examine why presidentialism compounds the difficulties caused by multipartism, giving a fair hearing to it become unavoidable when the study discusses why multipartism exacerbates the problems of presidentialism in a multi-ethnic society like Nigeria.

Everyone was allowed to form a party if the conditions were satisfied and an election of an independent candidate was allowed during the First Republic. Although anyone could still be said to be legally entitled to form a party in the Second Republic, more stringent constitutional conditions applied. In Second Republic, election as an independent candidate was abolished by section 201 of the
1979 Constitution which limited the conduct of certain political activities to the membership of registered political parties. The above section stipulates that "No association other than a political party shall canvass for votes for any candidate at any election...." In addition, section 202 provides that "No association by whatever name called shall function as a political party except under the conditions provided thereunder." When the Federal Election Commission (FEDECO), responsible for all national elections and recognition of political parties was established as a federal non-partisan organ in 1976, it was given the force of law by Decree no. 73 of December 29, 1977. The Decree spelled out, among other things, the guidelines for the formation of political parties. Decree no. 32 of 1978 effected some amendment on the earlier Electoral Decree to the extent that the demanding guidelines for the formation of political parties were revolutionary when compared with that of the First Republic. For example, an association could only be recognized as a political party if: "its name, emblem or motto has no ethnic connotation, and does not give the appearance that the association's activities are confined to

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49See Nigeria Constitution, (Nigeria, 1979), Section 201.

50Ibid., Section 202.
a part only of the geographical area of Nigeria."\(^5\)

Additionally, the composition of the executive committee of
the governing body of the party must reflect the federal
character of Nigeria. This Section 79 requirement is met
only if the members of that body come from at least two-
thirds of all the states of Nigeria. The same stringent
condition applied to the election of the president.\(^5\)

The question at this juncture is whether this
demographic set-up or geographical spread is the ultimate
panacea to the Nigerian endemic problem? Another important
question is whether the changes, the stringent conditions,
and restrictions motivated by the failings of the First
Republic were the much-needed solutions for the Second
Republic to endure? Unfortunately, none of the answers to
the above questions is in affirmative because the emergence
of more than fifty political associations immediately the
ban on the political party activities was lifted in mid-
September, 1978, and what happened during the political
campaigns and the elections in 1979 were indicative that a
solution is still elusive.

\(^5\)Nigerian Electoral Degree No. 32 of 1978, Section
79(c).

\(^5\)To be elected into the office of the president, the
candidate must not only get the highest votes over all the
other candidates, but also in at least each of two-thirds of
all the states in the Federation and obtain at least twenty-
five percent of the votes cast in the presidential election.
See the 1979 Constitution, Section 203.
The FEDECO's deadline for the parties to submit their application for registration came on December 18, 1978, and brought all this euphoria on the part of the founders of political associations to an abrupt end. Only thirty-five out of the announced fifty-three parties actually collected registration forms from FEDECO and only nineteen processed and submitted the completed forms.

On December 22, 1978, Chief Michael Ani, the FEDECO chairman, announced that only five political parties that met the stipulated conditions were recognized and permitted to contest the 1979 elections. These were the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), whose flag-bearer for the 1979 and 1983 presidential elections was Alhaji Shehu Shagari, the Nigerian People's Party (NPP), whose flag-bearer for 1979 and 1983 presidential elections was Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the Great Nigerian Peoples Party was headed by Athaji Waziri Ibrahim, the People's Redemption Party was under the leadership of Mallam Aminu Kano, and the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) was led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo.

One can say without fear of being proven wrong that the proliferation of political parties was a veritable resurrection of the usual pattern of party politics characterized by centrifugal and conflictual political culture and definitive evidence of the fact that Nigerians were still indomitable, unyielding, and indefatigable political creatures despite the constitutional engineering
to forestall a replication of the First Republic's ugly episodes.

The FEDECO's decision to register and recognize only five parties out of more than fifty political associations seemed to be a landmark in the Nigerian political history because it reduced the number of parties which had they been allowed to continue, obviously would have complicated and confused voters' choice and perhaps would have exploded the centrifugal tendencies (both latent and manifest) in monumental proportions. Additionally, they (parties) would have hopelessly fragmented the fledgling political culture which had not recovered from the First Republic's trauma. This would have led to a political paralysis of monumental proportions that would be capable of truncating the Second Republic before it even took off.

The five political parties that emerged were mere reincarnation of the political parties in the postcolonial Nigerian state but NPN broadened its support base, unlike NPC in the First Republic. Political actors who belonged to parties of other ethnic groups were often seen as "traitors" to their ethnic groups, and therefore deserved punishment. However, William D. Graf observes that "This collection of elitist groups, coupled with the party's trans-ethnic mass appeal, distinguished the NPN from all the remaining parties
with their centralized, personalized leaderships and limited ethno-regional support base."\(^{53}\)

The former supporters of banned Action Group constituted the bulk of the UPN's membership and former AG members and Awo's colleagues who abandoned him were those who had disagreed with him on certain issues. Other AG members who opted for NPN were those who belonged to Akintola's faction of the AG, (NNDP). It should be noted here that the new-found NPN supporters in the West, of which R. Afani-Kayde is a good case in point, has started working in close collaboration with the NPC prior to the 1966 military intervention. Unfortunately, UPN was unable to penetrate significantly beyond the Western boundaries. William Graf attributes this weakness to UPN's Yorubacentricity, domination of its leadership by the Yorubas, and the widespread anti-Awo feelings in other parts of the country.\(^{54}\)

The nucleus of what later became NPP and GNPP was the tendentially progressive initially comprising Club 19, the Progressives of Eastern Nigeria and Lagos and the Waziri's NCUS.\(^{55}\) Graf observes that "a coalition of minorities could

\(^{53}\)Graf, 80.

\(^{54}\)Graf, 82.

counter traditional Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba dn Igbo domination of political life. The predominant thinking within its major founding group, the Club 19 (an assemblage of mainly anti-Sharia MCAs, former NCNC politicians and other notables in the South and East), was that a coalition of minorities could not only constitute a parliamentary majority but would be the guarantor of the survival of the liberal democracy in Nigeria, since they could not form a homogeneous ethnic bloc-party and would necessarily have to operate on the basis of continuous intra-party compromises and a balancing out process.\textsuperscript{56} Two members of the the CA, Soloman Lar and Paul Unongo, were the leading figures of Club 19 which had its base in Benue and Plateau states. This seems to be the reincarnation of the old minority party of the Middle Belt (UMBC) in the First Republic except that its former leading member Joseph Tarka had then joined his former political opponents in the far North. While R.B.K. Okafor and M.T. Mbu were among members of the defunct NCNC, Adeniran Ogunsanya, Olu Akinosile, and T.D.S. Benson (all former NCNC members) were the core members of the Lagos Progressives.

The issue of the party's presidential candidate split the party (NPP) leading to the birth of GNPP, led by Waziri.

\textsuperscript{56}Graf, 82.
The roots of NPN are traceable to the National Movement of Nigeria founded by the people of the core Northern states. Oyediran seems to suggest that the founders of NMN, of whom were all members of CA might have been brought together by the Sharia controversy in the CA.\textsuperscript{57} It is interesting to observe that Amino Kano and S.G. Ikoku had associated with the National Movement at its formative stages before they withdrew on ideological grounds.\textsuperscript{58}

The radical group and its leading members, Abubakar Rimi and Balarabe Musa offered Aminu Kanu the leadership of their organization which later became PRP. This offer was made after he (Aminu Kanu) has broken rank with the National Movement and he then brought with him S.G. Ikoku into the PRP.\textsuperscript{59}

The question to ask at this juncture is: would the Nigerian political culture reproduce the First Republic's patterns of party formation and leadership in the Second Republic despite the stringent electoral laws and constitutional provisions on the formation of political parties? The answer is almost certainly yes, because the

\textsuperscript{57}Oyediran, 56.

\textsuperscript{58}Although some of Aminu Kanu's admirers claim that he withdrew on ideological grounds, some people attribute his withdrawal to his inability to get a position in the movement commensurate with his status. He was given the post of Publicity Secretary. See Maduagwu, 31.

\textsuperscript{59}Oyediran, 60.
Changes affected were not revolutionary enough to reverse the centrifugal tendencies such as personalization of leadership and destructive ethnicization of politics in the Nigerian political culture. In essence, the fundamental practices, attitudes, values, and norms remained unchanged and provided an important part of the internal setting in which ethnic group leaders make political interactions and transactions. It must be noted that because it (political culture) is a general phenomenon, it does not usually create a specific political decision or policy. Instead it is apt to exert political pressure or allow ethnic groups' leaders to move or not to move in a given direction. In this sense, political culture was very important in the establishment of the character of politics in the Second Republic and gave it a historical consistency. At logical level, it follows then, that by looking for pattern of claims, ethnic transactions, actions and reactions, one can begin to understand the Nigerian past, current and, perhaps future political trends.

The impact of electoral engineering in the Second Republic was not tangible even though it forced the founders of parties to find means of satisfying the minimum legal requirements for the formation of political parties rather than pursuing the ideals of forming truly national or ideological political parties. Therefore, it would not be too simplistic an analysis to say that NPN, NPP, GNPP, PRP,
and UPN were mere "incarnates" of First Republic's political parties. In essence, these parties were the products of functional convergence of social forces such as ethnicity, sectional and to a certain degree, religious sentiments. Consequently, the presence of these parties' organizational efforts were hardly felt outside their regions of origin (See Tables 1-6).

The personalization rather than institutionalization of parties and lack of intensive organizational efforts on a nationwide basis as demonstrated in the foregoing analysis are linked functionally with pattern of public attitudes and behavior. In Nigeria, the memory of the political campaign violence and the roles played by the key political parties are still fresh and will linger. The two-party framework seemed to reverse the dangerous and destructive trends in our political culture. A quick look at Tables 1-6 show that National Assembly business was conducted on multi-party basis while that of the state was on one-party basis with few exceptions.

Ethnicity and Parties: Hindrance in Positive National Mobilization, Socialization and Homogenization of a Heterogeneity of Values and Consciousness in Nigeria

It is obvious that there were no fundamental attitude changes based on patterns of political mobilization and socialization or on a program of political education in the first and second republic.
Certainly, ethnicity has been a negative factor in the genuine political mobilization of different "nationalities" in Nigeria and shift them from parochial loyalties to a Nigerian national one. The pre-1989 parties embodied and indeed promoted ethnic rivalry by exploiting regional sentiments, tendencies, and constantly reminding the voters that it was between "us" and "them." From a historical perspective, Omo Omoruyi observes in the Sunday Observer that progressively the peoples of Nigeria were divided into Northerners, Westerners, and Easterners, and it became impossible for anybody to participate in politics outside area in which he was born. An Efik resident in Ibadan had to go home to stand for an election. Between 1951 and 1959 it was more attractive for any ambitious politician to be at the region instead of being at the center.60

In a similar vein, Eskor Toyo notes that "Nigeria is a nation but we have Yoruba Hausa, Ijaw, etc. nationalities. These nationalities are usually called ethnic groups although the Ijesha in the Yoruba nationality, for instance, are also ethnic group."61 In agreeing with Toyo, Obaro Ikime notes that "The ethnic problem in Nigeria is indeed the national question...in the name of which all sorts of crimes

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60 Sunday Observer, March 1, 1978.

have been perpetuated against the nation." However, Okwudiba Nnoli adds a note of caution when he argues that ethnicity may be only an intrusive factor that has developed through socialization over time (colonial and post-colonial). Furthermore, Nnoli emphasizes that this ethnic ideology in itself needs to be explained. It cannot therefore be made an independent variable. Several dangers attend an attempt to explain the ethnic phenomenon in Africa. First, it may succeed in keeping ethnic sentiments aflame by bringing it to the forefront of the consciousness of the reading population.... Most important of all is the tendency of such an analysis to overexaggerate the importance of ethnicity in African politics and to encourage the diversion of research efforts away from other and more important variables.

The level of ethnic consciousness injected into the Nigerian political system seems to be an end-product of the political parties' activities. The Nigerian ethnic-based parties tend to convince the masses to belong to the parties that represent their ethnic group. However, it must be noted here that some aspects of ethnic consciousness have deep historical roots in pre-colonial schisms.

62See Obaro Ikimi, "Toward Understanding the National Question," a key not address at the above (see note 61), Abuja Conference, 1986.

63Nnoli, 9.

64Ibid.

65Parties also whip up sub-ethnic sentiments. For example NPP or NPN can tell Oyo people that "Oyo people do not want an Ijebu person" Statement like this is found in different ethnic groups and other parties.
Like class, ethnicity is not a satisfactory explanation of politics in Nigeria in particular and Africa in general. However, ethnicity is more noticeable in Nigeria politics. The question now will be: why no party has successfully confronted ethnic consciousness with "class consciousness?"

Part of the answer is the low level of industrialization and active unionization of workers. This has given ethnic politics an opportunity to escalate or widen the level of false consciousness among the people. Some Marxists may disagree. As Amikar Cabral notes,

You may be surprised to know that we consider the contradictions between the tribes as a secondary one.... Our struggle for national liberation and the work done by our party have shown that this contradiction is really not important; the Portuguese counted on it a lot, but as soon as we organized the liberation struggle properly the contradictions between the tribes proved to be a feeble secondary contradiction.66

There is no doubt that ethnicity is a very big burden as far as national mobilization is concerned. In addition, Nwabuzor’s empirical study has since confirmed that differences exist among the way ethnic groups perceive things.67 IN his investigation in the Camerouns, he measured ethnic value distances and confirmed that in ethnically


heterogeneous societies, different ethnic groups manifest different value preferences at least on certain issues in national bargaining. This is also applicable to Nigeria.

The question now is whether the mobilization efforts of the parties, especially in First and Second Republics, were positive enough to homogenize these heterogeneity of primordial nationalities so that Nigeria would become the object of the greatest loyalty among a substantial portion of her population? To put it in another way: did they succeed in the homogenization of a heterogeneity of values and consciousness? The answer is no. For a detailed analysis of how ethnicity intrudes into the Nigerian political process, see Richard A. Joseph. A quick look at election results (See Appendices 1-5) will reveal the intensity of this problem.

Another important factor that deserves mentioning here is religion. In spite of the adoption religious freedom as a fundamental human right in Nigeria, it still intrudes into Nigerian political process. A substantial number of people in Nigerian population still has more loyalty to their religion than the country. Sheik Mahmud Gumis immoderate utterance in 1987 that the North would secede if a non-

68 Ibid.

Muslim won an election to rule Nigeria seems to strengthen the above statement. However, it becomes problematic when one wants to determine the percentage of the population or the public opinion he represents.

Although it has been stated earlier that ethnicity is the highest destabilizing factor in Nigerian politics, it must be noted here that the cleavages on which many, if not all, of the Nigerian political parties and party systems are based presume the dominant salience of the traditional materialist values. This appears to make the dominance of class the primary basis of political conflict. What vitiates the presumed primacy of class is the method with which the Nigerian political actors adopt to achieve access to the political structures and scarce resources of the Nigerian society. This method (ethnicization of politics) works to the majority of them to the extent that both their manifest or stated goal (access to the opportunity structures of the society) and latent or unstated goal (block the development of class consciousness and enhance the development of what Karl Marx calls false consciousness). To a very great extent, this presumption is especially true for the pre-independence and post-independence (First and Second Republics) political parties, whose fortunes depend on their ability to mobilize the support of their ethnic groups (clientele).
Hence, to the extent that materialist or meaningful class-based parties or issues do not structure the Nigerian political conflict, their vast potential clientele will only be available for mobilization by ethnic-based parties. This process of mobilization socializes people to ethnic loyalty, political values, attitudes, and norms that do not promote national integration and stability. So, instead of removing the dysfunctional and centrifugal aspects of primordial loyalties, it magnifies and strengthens them at the expense of genuine nation building.

Undoubtedly, political parties have throughout the history of Nigerian government and politics stood for division, conflict, and opposition within the body politic. Etymologically speaking, the word "party" is derived from "part." Lipset and Rokkan observe that since party "first appeared in political discourse in the late Middle Ages has always retained this reference to one set of elements in competition or in controversy with another set of elements within some unified whole."70 They further assert that whatever the structure of the polity, parties have served as essential agencies of mobilization and as such have helped to integrate local communities into the nation or the broader federation. This was true of the earlier competitive party systems,

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and it is eminently true of the single party nations of the post-colonial era.\textsuperscript{71}

Their analysis of parties in the new nations of twentieth century show that parties represented the first successful efforts to pull Africans out of their local community and state and to give them roles in the national polity.\textsuperscript{72} Similarly Ruth Schachter has demonstrated how the African leaders have used their single-party organizations to "awaken a wider national sense of community" and establish ties of communication and cooperation across regional, local and ethnic populations.\textsuperscript{73}

However, these views do not run parallel to the realities of the First and Second Republics' party politics as far as performance of this function or the integrative function of parties is concerned. It was difficult for the parties to perform this function because of lack of willingness and genuine commitment to cut across existing cleavages in order to create common fronts with potential "enemies" and opponents. This was particularly true at the early stage of embryonic party formations around cultural and ethnic cliques despite the fact that the need for broad

\textsuperscript{71}Ibid., 3-4

\textsuperscript{72}Ibid., 4. See also W. Chambers, \textit{Parties in a New Nation} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 80.

alliance and national character became more pronounced with the introduction of stiff constitutional requirements.

In the final analysis, ethnic-based political parties in the First and Second Republics were destabilizing agents rather than instruments of national integration. They reinforced a latent feeling of ethnic identification rather than national, increased the "social distance" between the federating units, above all, they sharpened and magnified non-antagonistic differences among different ethnic groups. Their inability to attract members as well as voters outside their ethnic base has been an important indicator of their failure both as mass organizations and instruments of social change. Only parties can link leaders and masses of different ethnic groups in almost constant contact but Nigerian parties under multiparty system did not achieve it. Moreover, political parties offer an opportunity for binding together forces such as ideology (especially national) charisma, accountability to an increasingly larger constituency, and organization that are capable of establishing a viable political culture. Again, the Nigerian political parties did not only fail to do this but went as far as elevating, glorifying and popularizing ethnicization of politics. No Nigerian political party, especially in the First Republic, adopted an ideology that was in tune with a viable democratic political culture. Every politician in Nigeria preferred to speak in the name
of either East, West and North or the Igbo, Yoruba and Hausa/Fulani.

Babangida's Shortcut Methods to the Formation of Two Political Parties (NRC and SDP) in Nigeria

A brief explanation of the trends in the Nigerian politics prior to October 1989 when Babangida surpassed his record of unpredictability and unorthodoxy and announced that the two political parties would be formed by fiat is necessary in order to have clearly in mind the political culture and context within which the two parties were decreed. Regrettably, it must be remembered that since December 31, 1983, when the military overthrew the Shagari-led civilian government, the political culture still produces political associations and class that have not undergone major "revolutions" in leadership style, structure, and program. Personalized party politics was still on the political scene, but it seemed to be modified by a slightly greater accentuation on organizational politics. There was resurgence of an "old-style" First and Second Republic-style factionalism that was based on a combination of personalities, geographical, ethnic and religious differences and patronage. The expectation was that its replacement with a "new style" factionalism would gradually occur.

It will be recalled that politicians and public officers of the Second Republic were banned under Decree 25
of 1987 which was a modification of the 1986 Decree which placed a blanket ban on all former public office holders. While some of them were banned for life, others were just banned from participating in politics during transition program. Additionally, a fine of N250,000 (two hundred fifty thousand naira or five-year prison term would be imposed on the violators) Babangida who viewed his administration as playing a role of a "corrective regime" ignored the legal action against his decisions and pressures to abrogate the Decree.

On May 3, 1989, he (Babangida) unveiled the 1989 constitution and lifted the ban on political activities. He enjoined all Nigerians to "move out as from today to join others and enlist the support of like-minded people in the formation of political associations."

Some of the stringent conditions these associations were required to meet before applying to NEC for registration as political parties include stating clearly and concisely their positions on the following issues: a viable, popular and genuinely democratic political system; socio-economic and political rights/freedoms; human rights;

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75 Ibid., 123-24.

76 Quoted in Ibid.
the relationship between the economy and politics; the rural population in Nigerian politics, rural community development, women, labor, youth, traditional rulers, the armed forces in Nigeria politics, political parties, their funding, formation, and administration, elections and electoral processes, statism, nationality and citizenship, creation of states, revenue allocation, the media, bureaucracy, external relations, the evolution of a national language, ethnicity and corruption in society/politics.77

The sudden proliferation of ethnic-based political associations (forerunners of political parties) which accompanied the Babangida's lifting of ban on politics on May 3, 1989, showed undoubtedly that the past survived into present and that the political culture had remained the same or at most, slightly modified as a result of the electoral requirements and social engineering. The sheer number and permutations of these political associations established a measure of difficulties involved in the creation of national consensus out of the multiplicity of religious, ethnic and sectional particularisms in Nigeria. While some of the so-called political associations had an ephemeral existence, many continued to spring up from all nooks and crannies. This showed that the cycle of conflictual political culture was not yet broken.

77*The Guardian* (Lagos), October 9, 1989.
One week after the ban was lifted, twenty-three political associations had advertised in different national dailies and by the end of one month, the number had quadrupled. Some of them are:

Abuja Unity Front (AUF)
All Nigerian People's Party (ANPP)
All People's Party (APP)
Association for National Progress (ANP)
Black But Beautiful Party (BBB)
Brotherhood of Nigeria (BN)
Civil Democracy Party (CDP)
Democratic Party of Nigeria (DPN)
Democratic People's Congress (DPC)
Federal Republican Party (FRP)
Federal Solidarity Party (FSP)
Freedom Solidarity Party (FSP)
Ideal Party of Nigeria (IPN)
Liberal Convention (LC)
Liberal Movement (LM)
Loyalists Movement of Nigeria (LMN)
Movement of Nationalists and Dynamos (Monad)
National Development Party (NDP)
National Union Party (NUP)
New Era Movement (NEM)
New Generation Party (NGP)
New Liberal Movement (NLM)
New Progressive Party (NPP)
New Vanguard (NV)
Nigeria Corrective Party (NCP)
Nigeria Emancipation Party (NEP)
Nigerian Labour Party (NLP)
Nigerian National Congress (NNC)
Nigerian Socialist Party (NSP)
Nigerian Youth Congress (NYC)
Oriental Progressive Party (OPP)
People's Alliance Party (PAP)
People's Convention Party (PCP)
People's Front of Nigeria (PFN)
People's Improvement Party (PIP)
People's Liberation Party (PLP)
People's Party of Nigeria (PPN)
People's Patriotic Party (PPP)
People's Solidarity Party (PSP)
People's Welfare Party (PWP)
Popular Democratic Alliance (PDA)
Realistic Democratic Movement (RDM)
Reformers Party of Nigeria (RPN)
Republican Party of Nigeria (RPN)
Okoroji puts the number at eighty-eight and notes that this created the impression that the Nigerian class was "enjoying the exciting times provided by this singular act of the government." Nevertheless, Babangida was convinced that this would not last. "The government warned that they would police the new political parties because they did not want those politicians of the Second Republic who were banned, the so-called old breed, from participating in the new dispensation. They were supposed to be "political virgins" not tainted with the wrongs of the previous political experiments and who would be willing to serve their people in an altruistic manner without expecting to enrich themselves." In other words, Babangida did not want old wine in a new bag. Instead, he seemed to be searching for "new breeds" with angelic qualities who, in his own words, "would not let down the country and would help lay the foundation for the Third Republic." 

In the end, out of the 88 political associations, only 13 managed to scale through the stipulated hurdles and pay

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78 Okoroji, 124.
79 Ibid.
80 Quoted in Ibid.
the NEC-imposed registration fee (fifty thousand naira). They are: All Nigeria's People's Party (ANPP), Ideal People's Party (IPP), Liberal Convention (LC), National Unity Party (NUP), Nigerian Labour Party (NLP), Nigerian National Congress (NNC), Nigerian People's Welfare Party (NPWP), Patriotic Nigerian Party (PNP), People's Front of Nigeria (PFN), People's Patriotic Party (PPP), People's Solidarity Party (PSP), Republican Party of Nigeria (RPN), and United Nigeria Democratic Party (UNDP).

Thereafter, the NEC engaged in verification exercise to ascertain the genuineness of these associations' membership and the geographical spread of their branches. During an interview with one of the members of the ten-man team set up to go around the country and verify the associations' membership sizes and organizational strengths and spread said that all the thirteen political associations exaggerated their claims in all respects.\(^1\)

The NEC's report to the Government called attention to the political association's fraudulent practices and characterized the situation as "disturbing signposts for party politics and political leadership in the Third Republic."\(^2\) It noted that

\(^1\)An interview with Obiukwu on June 4, 1993. He told the researcher that all the 13 associations failed to meet the requirements for NEC's recognition as political parties and that they forged signatures and misrepresented facts.

\(^2\)Quoted in Oyeleye Oyediran and Adigun Agbaje, 225.
all the associations made deliberate false claims...from the inclusion of false, including ghost names and addresses on membership lists, to the affixture of somebody else's picture on the membership and belonging to another person; to the padding of names from voters' register; and to the offering of various forms of corrupt inducements to people so that they can pose as members of associations for verification purposes.  

This report accentuated the dangers and disastrous consequences of the negative factionalism which had started to rear their ugly heads so early in the life of the associations, serving as a sad reminder the politics of the First and Second Republics was still in existence.

In virtually every state, our researchers were confronted with conflicting claims by various factions of one association or the other...[that] reflect intra-association leadership power tussles...[and] also betray a view of politics as a do-or-die battlefield where stakes are high and where the winner takes all and the loser loses all. The implication of this view of politics are so grave that one cannot but discern in it portends of the destructive consequences of the politics of intolerance and victimization that sounded the death knell of our previous experiments in democratic government. Another dimension of this factionalism is that it reflects the personalization of politics at a time when in order to shed the heritage of politics under the First and Second Republics emphasis is being placed by government on issue-oriented party politics.  

Perhaps, all this will go a long way in explaining the Babangida's decision not only to deny registration to any of

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84Ibid.
the 13 associations but also to take initiative by establishing two new political parties on October 7, 1989. The government decision to disqualify all the 13 associations was based on the fact that all the 13 association (approved by the NEC) were surrogates of the banned or disqualified politicians" and in the words of Babangida, "we will not serve our people yesterday's food in glittering new dishes.... When I say that my administration opted for a new political culture, we mean new leadership not old political wolves in new breed sheepskins.85

In view of this it was apparent that the stage was set for the most innovative? daring? and conspirational? democratic experiment in Nigeria (perhaps in black Africa) by a military government.

During the announcement that established the NRC and SDP, he (Babangida) repeatedly cited aspects of the all-powerful NECs report which concluded that all of them (associations vying for registration as parties) had failed to meet the criteria laid down for registration as political party.86 His involvement in the business of party formation was also informed according to him, by the fact that "we do not believe that the old political structures which failed us in the past should form, or be allowed to form, the basis

85Quoted in Okoroji, 125.

86Quoted in Oyeleye Oyediran and Adigun Agbaje, 213. See also The Guardian (Lagos), October 9, 1989, 4.
for our new electoral competition, if we are serious about creating a new social order."

Unfortunately, in Nigeria one is faced with a situation which exemplifies very well the French saying: Le plus ça change, le plus c'est la même chose (meaning the more things change, the more they remain the same). IN 1989 people though that the consensus the political bureau reached in connection with party system, drastic changes in electoral laws, lessons of history, and Babangida's Mass Mobilization for Social Justice, Economic Recovery and Self-Reliance (MAMSE) had created a conducive environment to reduce ethnicization and proliferation of political parties and "politics as usual." yet, the dimensions of politics were alarming. In fact, whether the number of political associations in 1989 drastically exceeded those of First and Second Republics or not, one had expected the Babangidas two-party framework to compel people to form party on Burkean principle or fashion. Edmund Burk's idea of a political party is that of "a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavors the national interest upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed." Whether this view is universally shared or not,

87 ibid.

88 Quoted in Nnmdi Azikiwe, "The Development of Political Parties in Nigeria," in Zik: A Selection From the Speeches
it presupposes that party members have a commonly agreed principle or ideology which holds them together and which they have decided to enunciate and promote. However, in a country with the size and diversity of Nigeria, it would be very difficult, if not well-nigh impossible, for only two parties to represent the diverse opinions that are bound to exist on key national issues. However, if this argument is followed to its logical conclusion, it would mean that hundreds of political parties would be needed in Nigeria in order to cater for as many diverse interests. There must therefore be a limit to the number of parties that can usefully operate in a country in order to aggregate the interests of the population.89

The political bureau recognized that there must be a limit to the number of parties but warned that two party system was not necessarily fool-proof even when tampered with. In essence, it is not a guarantee for political stability, given Nigerians' expertise and penchant for bastardizing any well-intentioned political formula.

Babangida's Decision on Party Formation:
Fears, Hopes and Opportunities

Judging from Babangida's numerous broadcasts to the nation, he seems to be moved by the concern to create a new platform for the emergence of a new political elite and political culture. As he put it in his farewell broadcast of Nnamdi Azikiwe (Cambridge: At University Press, 1961), 302-303.

89Chikendu, 12.
to the nation on August 27, 1993. "Our concern has been for the country that can cope with the dynamics of our plural and complex society in a nation that is undergoing the process of rapid development."90 President Babangida outlined his administration's hopes and reasoning for his shortcut methods to party formation by recalling that "When government endorsed the recommendation of the Political Bureau that a two-party system would best guarantee a stable democratic order for Nigeria, it was in the sincere hope and belief that Nigerians would embark upon the process of forming political associations on the basis of philosophies, policies, issues and programs. Sadly, our expectations were not to be realized this time--the prevailing attitude appeared to be that every Nigerian wanted to be a "founder" and no one wanted to be a "joiner." Everyone wanted to be a leader of a party, or a close associate of the leader--every "founder" cornered the political association to himself and his small circle of friends and associates, and proceeded to prescribe closed shop "admission rules" that were guaranteed to subordinate joiners.91 The Babangida regime did not stop at just imposing what is fondly called "grassroot democratic" two-party panacea. It closely monitored and

90 Today (Kaduna, Nigeria), August 29-September 4, 1993, 5.

91 The Guardian (Lagos), October 9, 1989, p. 4.
supervised the erection, installation of the necessary administrative and "programmatic" infrastructure.

Babangida was aware of the role and consequences of the rich in founding and funding of the earlier political parties and was bent on eliminating the stranglehold of the rich on parties. The negative influence of the rich on parties in Nigeria is so strong that it restricts the free actions that are capable of institutionalizing and developing the parties. In essence, it helps to personalize party and its leadership, thereby creating patron-client relationship in which "authoritative" allocation of positions and values is dominated by patron-client networks. To nip this problem in the bud and prevent affluent politicians from gaining undue advantages, especially during the early stage, he provided funds and other logistics to the two new parties.

Obviously, as far as Babangida was concerned, this was not a political prescription for disaster, but a blueprint to ensure that the new parties had no links with previous political experiments. The implementation of his blueprint involved a step-wise progression from the local to the national level which was based on one-man, one-vote with accentuation on the encouragement of community spirit,
establishment of solid organizational structures, and participant political culture at the local level.  

In summation, the Babangida regime's decision to undertake the gigantic and unprecedented step in the establishment of the two parties for the Third Republic would:

(I) furnish a grassroots foundation for the development of the two authorized parties and a mass platform for their emerging leadership as well;

(ii) provide equal rights and access to the opportunity, structures of the political process to all Nigerians that wish to participate without regard to their religion, wealth, professional endeavors, and political backgrounds;

(iii) place less emphasize on the role of money in politics;

(iv) diminish the element of violence in election to its barest minimum;

(v) impede the re-enactment and development of political alliances that characterized the First and Second Republics in order to allow Nigerians to operate within the new political structures;

(vi) provide the environment that ensures the emergence and development of a more dedicated and genuine leadership

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92Ibid., October 10, 1989, 6.
cadre that would not be a mere proxy for old political warlords;

(vii) create strong institutional structures to sustain future governments and stand a test of time and a political system that would be operated according to the letter and spirit of the new Nigerian constitution.⁹³

While the SDP was presumed to be leftist party (left of center) or a little to the left, the NRC was presumed to be rightist part (right of center or little to the right). Both of them had centerist tendencies and also generally endorsed the Babangida administration's major policy thrusts such as structural adjustment.⁹⁴ The outlines of the constitutions and programs of the two parties were written by the military regime with the advice of NEC and a number of political scientists within and outside the Presidential Advisory Council (Babangida's extra-ministerial think-tank. However, they had "proviso that they would later be free, at least within limits, to add flesh to the documents."⁹⁵

⁹³Ibid., 15. See also Oyeleye Oyediran and Adigun Agbaje, 227.


⁹⁵Oyeleye Oyediran and Adigun Agbaje, 228.
Basically, this work is of the view that the political leaning of both parties is incorporeal and irrelevant because the constitutions of both parties were written by the government with virtually the same modus operandi. In essence, it will be an accurate characterization if one says that the 29-page constitutions of the two parties are virtually similar in all regards. It is observed that "the only relevant comparison is that between tweedledee and tweedledum."\textsuperscript{96}

The government of Babangida constructed party offices in all local government headquarters, state capitals, and Abuja the new Federal capital territory and appointed secretaries at all levels. Later, it supervised their replacement by elected officials. The Center for Democratic Studies, established in 1989, organized training programs for party officials at every stage of the Babangida's transition program. The purpose of the training program was to seek out and identify sources and types of anti-democratic attitudes, beliefs and behavior in Nigerians and devise measures to correct them through our educational, bureaucratic and political institutions.\textsuperscript{97}

It seems to be difficult to measure and evaluate the extent of Babangida's genuine commitment to a new viable

\textsuperscript{96}Okoroji, 125.

\textsuperscript{97}The Guardian (Lagos) October 1, 1989, 6.
democratic culture in Nigeria but the high level of the government's involvement and investment in these "political developments" furnishes an indication of its positive commitment to lay the foundations which are capable of sustaining democracy in the Third Republic. However, any value assigned to his level of commitment to democratization, founding a suitable institutional framework, and a viable political culture is adversely vitiated as a result of his actions and inactions at the tail end of his transition program.

The Babangida's idea or process of party formation and development from the above has been criticized and referred to as "extreme political engineering,"98 or "the tendency for the state to over-control politics."99 This implies that the SDP and NRC are hardly more than "misconceived clones of Dodan Barracks"100 which offer essentially the same ideological leaning or outlook. In essence, the de jure two-party framework is therefore a de facto one-party solution that is unlikely to mobilize or excite mass participation in the political process. Additionally, the


means adopted by the Babangida-led military regime for party formation raises doubts in the mind of Richard Joseph about its suitability and whether "it can eventually lead to the creation of a stable and democratic political system." \[101\] Apart from legal actions instituted against the decision (formation of political parties) by some Nigerians, Uwazurike maintains that it was likely to be a cog in the wheel of the overall search for endurable and sustainable democracy during the transition period and thereafter. \[102\] In a similar vein, it is opined that "the approach betrays a lack of faith in the people by making it difficult for them to learn the democratic rules of trial and error, and by creating institutions not properly anchored by people empowerment." \[103\]

Initially, the critics nicknamed the two parties "Northern" Republican Conversation (NRC) and the Southern Democratic Party (SDP). However, as time went on, especially after the publication of their membership and the December 1990, election results, these nicknames became round pegs in square holes. These were early indicators of success and viability of the two-party framework. They (the election results and the membership of the parties) proved


\[102\]Uwazurike, 65-66.

\[103\]Oyediran and Agbaje, 228.
some critics wrong and allayed their fears vis-a-vis crystallization and degeneration into North/South dichotomy. To be precise, the parties became the first genuine Nigerian political parties to cut across regional, ethnic and religious groups.

It will be noted that the traces of the 13 previous political groupings influence were evident in the two ready-made parties but were not enough to hijack regionalize, theocratize, personalize, ethnicize, or paralyze the parties. In this sense, Babangida's aim of establishing the two parties is accomplished. However, a dissenting view claims that "activists" in both the Nigeria National Congress (NNC) and the Republic Party of Nigeria (RPN) appear to have become dominant in the NRC, while leaders of the People's Solidarity Party and the People's Front of Nigeria (PFN) have surfaced in the SDP. In short, the pattern of voting and the membership statistics so far available suggest that elements of subsisting interests and old ties now reincarnated are to be found in NRC and SDP, thereby defeating at least to some extent, Babangida's aim of creating two entirely new political organizations.104 If one looks at the spate of violence and destructive factionalism witnessed in inter- and intra-party interactions which rocked the First and Second Republics,

104 Ibid, 233.
one can rightly conclude that positive and desirable political results were achieved.

Finally, the critics argument that the military regime involvement in the formation of party is bound to trigger off mass apathy is, to say the least, weak and unjustified. The level of apathy recorded could be attributed to the biting "socio-economic conditions created partly by structural adjustment program and other twists and turns Babangida introduced during his eight year tenure. In essence, the two officially sponsored parties will be exonerated. It is true that they made some mistakes but they were not fundamental enough, to create mass apathy or diminish the potentials of the two-party framework.

Summary

This chapter surveys the party systems and the party formation and development in the colonial, post colonial, and Babangida eras. It reviews the relationship among the parties and regions/states, the leadership and control of the parties, and the overall pattern of political campaigns. It is the conclusion of the study that all the parties prior to Babangida's two-party experiment were ethnic based, shallow (weak), and fragile. They are also viewed as tools and media through which the minority ethnic groups were dominated, intimidated, and marginalized. The activities and political campaign patterns shaped and reshaped the Nigerian political culture. The First Republic which lasted
from 1963-1966, in many respects resembled the Second. To be precise, the politics of the Second only rarely departed from the First as a result of constitutional engineering. The two parties that operated in the Third Republic had the same ethnic composition.
CHAPTER IV

THE ANALYSES OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE

Responses

One of the methods this study adopts involves the construction and administration of questionnaires. More than 98 percent of the data for determining the impact of the two-party framework are based on responses obtained from the questionnaires.

Coding Categories

Twenty-nine key questions from the questionnaire are selected for testing the propositions and answering the research questions. The response of each respondent for each question is coded according to a scale ranging from agree (1), disagree (2), to no opinion (3) or remain the same (4). The last question is open-ended, designed to get the detailed views and opinions of the respondents on most of the variables. Variable 1 (V1) is the impact of two-party framework on ethnic politics in Nigeria. Variable 2 (V2) is on religious politics; Variable 3 (V3) is on violence; Variable 4 (V4) is on consensus and coalition building, and Variable 5 (V5) is on patriotism. The questions on the questionnaire are represented on the Tables.
8-15 with their numbers. For example, Q12 represents question number 12 on the questionnaire. Respondents whose ages range from 20 years to 49 years are classified as young while 50 years and above as old.

Results

Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, 1989-1993 (V1)

On the statement that the two-party framework has helped to improve inter-ethnic relations in Nigeria (V1, Q12), 90 percent of the respondents agree, 2 percent disagree, 5.5 percent do not have any opinion, 2.5 percent say they remain the same (see Table 8). The thirty-percent that agree are young males (28 years-49 years), while 22 percent are old men (50 years and above). The young and old male respondents that disagree are .1 and .2 percent respectively.

The young and old female respondents who agree are 20 and 18 percent respectively while the negative responses are .7 and 1 percent. The figures are substantial as far as supporting the idea or notion that the two-party framework improved interethnic relations. Additionally, these tend to suggest that age and gender make a difference (see Table 8). The younger generation's greater affirmative responses seem to suggest that they are more receptive to attitudinal changes, new values, ideas, and social engineering.

There is no significant difference in the responses of the five regions surveyed on V1, Q12. While the positive
## TABLE 8

### DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES IN THE ETHNIC POLITICS CATEGORIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Politics</th>
<th>% Males who agree (20-49 yrs)</th>
<th>% Males who disagree (20-49 yrs)</th>
<th>% Males who agree (50 +)</th>
<th>% Males who disagree (50 +)</th>
<th>% Females who agree (20-49 yrs)</th>
<th>% Females who disagree (20-49 yrs)</th>
<th>% Females who agree (50 +)</th>
<th>% Females who disagree (50 +)</th>
<th>% of M-F no opinion</th>
<th>Total %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
<th>Remain the same %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The two-party framework has helped in improving inter-ethnic relations and understanding in Nigeria. Q12</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would you support the Nigerian government if it headed by somebody from another ethnic group? Q42</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>18.15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have the two parties (SDP and NRC) played a more active role in reducing or minimizing the problem of ethnicity in Nigerian politics today than the political parties in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s? Q13</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The two parties (SDP and NRC) are ethnic-based as in the First and the Second Republics. Q35</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The political parties in the First and Second Republics were more ethnic-based, parochial, and divisive than the parties (SDP and NRC) in the Third Republic. Q25</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You would trust the government headed by somebody from another ethnic group. Q43</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The number of the political parties made you vote for a politician from a particular ethnic group you had never voted for in the First and Second Republics. Q17</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would more political parties do a better job in the Third Republic. Q16</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The two-party framework reshaped your political behavior. Q18</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The two-party framework has made the job of handling ethnic demands and interests easier than when Nigeria had many parties. Q24</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The two-party system has changed the way people look at political parties. Q40</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
responses of the West, the Northern and Southern minorities are in the 17 percent range, that of the North and the East are 18 percent (see Table 9). The table shows that .3 percent of the North, .5 percent of the West, .3 percent of the East, .4 percent of the Northern, and .5 percent of the Southern minorities disagree (see Table 9).

On VI, Q42 (see Table 8), 79 percent of the respondents agree that they would support the Nigerian government, even if it is headed by somebody from another ethnic group. The 18 and 15 percent of young and old males agree respectively and only 1 percent of young and 3 percent of old males disagree. Out of the 79 percent that agree, 25.3 percent are young females and 20.7 are old females. The total percentage of males who disagree is 4 (1 percent young and 3 percent old). On the female side, 3 percent disagree (.8 percent are young and 2.2 percent are old). The 14 percent of all the respondents do not have any opinion. Out of the 7 percent that disagree 2.5 percent are from the North, 3.1 percent from the West, .5 percent from the East, .9 and .2 percent from the Southern and the Northern minorities respectively. The 14.2 percent of all the positive responses are from the North, 13.1 from the West, 17.8 from the East, and 15.9 and 18 percent are from the Northern and Southern minorities respectively.

These results suggest that the East and the Southern minorities are the most willing sections of the country as
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Politics</th>
<th>NORTH</th>
<th>WEST</th>
<th>EAST</th>
<th>NORTHERN MINORITIES</th>
<th>SOUTHERN MINORITIES</th>
<th>Total No</th>
<th>Opinion</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The two-party framework has helped in improving inter-ethnic relations and understanding in Nigeria. Q12</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>18.7</td>
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<td>Would you support the Nigerian government if it is headed by someone from another ethnic group? Q42</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have the two parties (SDP and NRC) played more active role in reducing or mitigating the problem of ethnicity in Nigerian politics today than the political parties in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s? Q13</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>The two parties (SDP and NRC) are ethnic-based in the First and the Second Republic. Q35</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>.8</td>
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<td>The political parties in the First and Second Republics were more ethnic-based, parochial, and divisive than the parties (SDP and NRC) in the Third Republic? Q25</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>You would vote for the government headed by someone from another ethnic group. Q43</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
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<td>The number of the political parties makes it difficult to vote for a politician from a particular ethnic group you had never voted for in the First and Second Republics. Q17</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
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<td>Would more political parties do a better job in the Third Republic. Q16</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
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<td>The two-party framework reshaped your political behavior. Q18</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>The two-party framework has made the job of handling ethnic demands and interests easier than when Nigeria had many parties. Q34</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>The two-party system has changed the way people look at political parties? Q40</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
far as supporting the Nigerian government even if it is
headed by somebody from another ethnic group. The reasons
for this are found in their culture and there is no dispute
that culture has implication for political behavior.
According to anthropologists Florence Kluckhohn and Fred
Strodtbeck, all cultures can be compared in terms of a few
basic questions such as (1) does a culture teach men a total
submission to their environment, to master it, or to work
along with it? (2) Are human relations, primarily lineal or
hierarchical (in terms of superiors and subordinates,
fathers and sons) or collateral (in terms of equals and
colleagues, brothers and sisters)? (3) What is the dominant
orientation of the culture, in other words, is it oriented
mainly toward the past, the present, or the future?¹

Any culture that teaches its members to submit to their
environment is likely to produce people who submit to their
rulers and leaders and may not be comfortable when
confronted with the task of ruling themselves. People who
are used to working along with their environment in a
"constant two-way communication" may not favor decisions by
unanimity and compromise. Karl Deutsch observes that

¹Florence R. Kluckhohn and Fred Strodtbeck, Variations
See also Karl W. Deutsch, Politics and Government: How
People Decide their Fate.
people taught to master nature will resort more readily to power and manipulation. They will seek quick decisions overriding all doubts and obstacles, disregarding the needs of dissenting opinions, minorities, and the less obvious consequences of their action. Such masters of nature will win many triumphs in technology and politics, but in their rush ahead they may leave a trail of neglected vital problems such as eroded soil, polluted air, careless wars, and ill-treated minorities. Those who have learned to work with nature--learning from her--may learn from their dialogue with nature the art of working through dialogues with their fellow men.\(^2\)

Another important factor that affects and shapes people's attitudes toward political reforms, economic growth, how to meet the needs of old and young relates to people's perception of the relative importance of the past, the present, and the future.

A culture looking more to the past than to either the present or the future may be better in preserving monuments than in accelerating innovations. It may enact laws for old-age pensions many years before expanding large-scale public higher education for the young.\(^3\)

The East and the Southern minorities are not submissive to their environment and tend to regard their members as equals. (Their members are not divided into superiors and subordinates and their societies are not hierarchically divided in superiors/subordinates.) They are the most likely groups to make and accept political reforms and new ideas.

\(^2\)Deutsch, 206.
It is important to note that in most post-independence elections in Nigeria, the political parties from other parts of the country had scored their highest votes outside their ethnic bases among the Southern minorities and the Eastern region.

On whether the two parties (SDP and NRC) have played a more active role in reducing or minimizing the problem of ethnicity in Nigeria today than the political parties in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and 1980s (V1, Q13), 90 percent of all the respondents agree and only 4.5 percent disagree. Out of the 48.8 percent of males that agree, 28 percent are young and 20.8 percent are old. On the women side, out of the 41.2, 23 are young and 18.2 are old. While .1 of young and .2 of old males disagree, 1 percent and 3.2 percent of old females disagree and a total of 2.2 percent do not have any opinion. The distribution of affirmative responses are 18 percent for the North, 13.2 percent for the West, 19.2 percent for the East, 19.3 percent and 20.1 percent for the Northern and the Southern minorities respectively. Negative responses are: 8 percent for the North, 2.9 percent for the West, .3 percent for the East, .4 percent and .1 percent for the Northern and Southern minorities respectively.

As far as age and gender are concerned, Table 8 shows a very substantial difference in the responses of men and women and a clear break between the generations under and

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3Ibid., 207.
over 49 years. Traditionally, Nigerian women seem to be very strong and rigid in their primordial loyalty. Therefore, their responses which show some change of direction and attitude are not readily fathomable. However, there are two possible explanations. First, the Nigerian women who were more traumatized and victimized by the violence of ethnic politics of the First and Second Republics became more receptive to any political innovation and social engineering that de-emphasized ethnicity and deplored electioneering violence. Perhaps another explanation of their political behavior is that the level of their education and political awareness had risen under the two-party framework from what it was during the multi-party systems. Essentially, this has not only helped them to measure, evaluate, and understand or recognize the relative success of the Third Republic elections, but has exposed the fatal weakness in the multi-party system. In the final analysis, it is necessary to point out here that since the Third Republic did not last long, any judgment that the Nigerian women who were the most ardent or loyal supporters of ethnic political parties and their politics and traditional values have shed off their primordial sentiments and conservative traditional values will be erroneous or premature.

On whether the two parties (SDP and NRC) were ethnic-based as in the First and Second Republics (V1, Q35), only 7
percent agree and 79 percent disagree. The .6 percent of all the positive responses are young men, 1 percent are old men, 2.4 percent are young women, and 3 percent are old women. Out of the 79 percent of the respondents who disagree, 25.1 percent are young men, 20.9 percent old men, 19 percent are young women, and 14 percent are old women.

The positive responses from regions are—the North 1.6 percent, the West 2.9 percent, the East 1.1 percent, Northern and Southern minorities .8 percent and .6 percent respectively. These figures tend to suggest that more people in the West view the SDP and NRC as ethnic based parties. This opinion or view is perhaps informed by the fact that the majority of People's Solidarity Party (PSP) members which was regarded as a Yoruba party joined the SDP immediately Babangida created it in 1989.

The question on whether the number of parties has made the electorates vote for a politician from a particular ethnic group they had never voted for in the First and Second Republics (V1, Q17) attract 65 percent of positive responses. The 21 percent of these responses are young males, 14 percent are old males, 19 percent are young females, and 11 percent are old females. Figures on the negative side are 3 percent young males, 5 percent old males, 5 percent young females, and 8 percent old females. The 14 percent of respondents do not have any opinion.
Out of the 65 percent of respondents who agree that a smaller number of parties has made them vote for a politician from a particular ethnic group they had never or would never have voted for in the First and Second Republics. 12.2 percent are the Northerners, 8.3 percent are the Westerners, 15.7 percent are the Easterners, 14.7 and 14.1 percent are the Northern and the Southern minorities respectively. The 21 percent that disagree are as follows: 4.2 percent are from the North, 5.1 percent from the West, 3.1 percent from the East, 3.7 and 4.9 percent from the Northern and the Southern minorities respectively. The positive responses above (V1, Q17) show that the West is the most unwilling region to vote for politicians from other ethnic groups. In view of this, it becomes ironical that the region which had almost succeeded in electing Azikiwe, an Ibo, as its premier in 1951 turns out to be the most ethnic conscious in voting. The data seem to suggest that the East, the Northern and Southern minorities are the most receptive of the reforms.

Inter-ethnic trust is very important for democracy, because it has an impact on the process of interest articulation and other inter-ethnic transactions. A high level of inter-ethnic trust makes the job of interest articulation easier. In the Nigerian-type two-party framework, a great deal of interest articulation took place within the two parties rather than through coalition of
parties. The survey findings show that inter-ethnic trust was high during the Third Republic than the preceding two republics.

Surprisingly, the 79 percent of the respondents agree that they would trust a government headed by somebody from another ethnic group (V1, Q43). Twenty-six point two percent are young males, 19.8 percent are old males, 20 percent and 13 percent are young and old females respectively. Out of the 7 percent that disagree, .7 percent are young men, 1.9 percent are old men, 1.2 percent are young women, and 3.2 percent are old women.

Out of the 79 percent that agree, 18.5 percent are Northerners, 17.1 percent are Westerners, 19.8 percent are Easterners, 19.3 percent and 20.3 percent are Northern and Southern minorities respectively. The 7 percent that disagree include: 1.6 percent from the North, 2.1 percent from the West, 1.4 percent from the East, 1.1 percent and .8 percent from the Northern and Southern minorities respectively.

On V1, Q16, the respondents disagree overwhelmingly. To be precise, 90 percent disagree with the idea that more political parties would have done a better job in the Third Republic. Table 2 contains a breakdown of party-system preferences by age cohorts. It shows a clear break between the generation under and over 49. While 28 percent and 22 percent of males and females respectively under 50 disagree
that more political parties would have done a better job, only 23.5 percent and 18.5 percent of males and females of older age cohorts disagree. Although the idea that younger age cohorts are more receptive to social engineering has been expressed elsewhere (at the beginning of this chapter), suffice it to add that V1, Q16 shows more strength among the younger voters than among the older ones who had been socialized into the traditional values and norms established by the multi-partism before the contraption of the two-party framework by Babangida. Out of the 2 percent that agree with V1, Q16, .1 percent are young males, .5 percent are old males, .2 percent are young females and 1.2 percent are old females. Six percent of both men and women do not have any opinion.

Tables 8 and 9 which give a breakdown of the responses by gender, age, cohorts, and regions have made the pattern clear. The pattern of response distribution is now becoming familiar: the North and the West are more traditional than other regions of the country. However, in V1, Q16, the column for regional distribution of responses does not show any significant differences in both negative and positive responses in all the regions.

On whether two-party framework has reshaped the political behavior of the electorate V1, Q18), 25 percent of the young males, 20 percent of the old males, 22 percent of the young females and 18 percent of the old females agree.
Only 1 percent of the young males, 1.9 percent of the old males, 2 percent of the young females, and 3.1 percent of the old females disagree.

The regional distribution column for V1, Q18 (see Table 2) shows that 17.2 percent of the North, 15.2 percent of the West, 17.1 percent of the East, 17.6 percent and 17.8 percent of the Northern and the Southern minorities respectively disagree. Thirty percent do not have any opinion.

The positive responses of people from the West are 2 percent lower than the national average of the people from the other four regions of the country. This is contrary to the opinions of the majority of the people of Southern Nigeria that the North is the most traditional and conservative of the regions. Other figures so far tend to suggest that the West is the most ethnic conscious as far as voting is concerned.

Fifty-eight percent of the respondents agree that the two-party framework makes the task of handling ethnic demands and interests easier than when Nigeria had many parties (V1, Q34). Nineteen percent are young males, 11 percent are old males, 18 percent are young females, and 10 percent are old females. Out of the 12 percent that disagree, 1.8 percent are young men, 3.9 percent are old men, 2 percent are young women, and 4.3 percent are old women. The percentages of the respondents that agree are:
North 11.8, West 10.4, East 11.6, Northern and Southern minorities 11.9 and 12.2 respectively. Out of the 12 percent that disagree, 2.5 percent are the Northerners, 3.1 percent are the Westerners, 2.3 are the Easterners and 2.2 percent and 1.9 percent are the Northern and the Southern minorities respectively.

As shown on the table, 24 percent of the young males, 21 percent of the old males, 21 percent of the young females and 19 percent of the old females agree that the two-party framework has changed the way people look at political parties. These figures are very substantial when they are compared with 1.1 percent of young males, 1.9 percent of the old males, 2.3 percent of the young females, and 2.7 percent of the old females who disagree. The regional distribution of responses shows that 17.1 percent of the Northerners, 14.4 of the Westerners, 17.8 percent of the Easterners, 17.5 percent and 18.2 percent of the Northern and Southern minorities respectively agree while 2.5 percent of the Northerners, 3.1 percent of the Westerners, 2.3 percent of the Easterners, 2.1 percent and 1.9 percent of the Northern and Southern minorities respectively disagree.

As has been shown in the aforementioned analyses, the overwhelming positive and favorable responses to Babangida's mechanical contrivance (two-party framework) support the proponents of the two-partyism and discredit the argument for reintroduction of multi-party system into the Nigerian
constitution by the Constitutional National Conference. In essence, the data on VI, especially VI, Qs 18 and 40, show that political structures such as political parties and party systems play an important role in the dissemination of political information reflecting political values and norms. These values and norms, whether widely shared or not, can be desirable or undesirable depending on the orientation of the party leadership and the type of party system. It (the party system) creates incentives and disincentives for both the electorates and the political actors, shapes their identity, and creates the context in which interest articulation and policy-making take place. Therefore, it affects the pattern of political mobilization and socialization which in turn helps in the construction (creation) or destruction of democratic regimes.

The party configuration created by the two-party framework places Nigeria in Sartoris category of "moderate pluralism" in which "competition remains centripetal," which is conducive to moderate politics and which in its operation is essentially bipolar.4

4Giovani Sartiori, Parties and Party System: A Framework for Analysis, VI (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 178-79. See also Table 3 of Chapter II.
Religious Politics (V2, Os 10, 21, 20 and 36)

On V2, Q10, only 1.7 percent of the young males, 2.3 percent of the old males, 2.6 percent of the young females and 4.4 of the old females agree that two political parties (SDP and NRC) emphasized religious sentiments as was the case in the First and Second Republics in Nigeria (Table 10). These figures are somewhat negligible when compared with 2.1 percent of the young males, 23 percent of the old males, 12 percent of the young females and 14 percent of the old females that disagree. The percent of no opinion is 18.

The regional distribution of responses shows that 3.1 percent of the North, 2.6 percent of the West, 1.7 percent of the East, 2.1 percent and 1.5 percent of the Northern and the Southern minorities respectively agree while 13.2 percent, 15.1 percent, 14.2 percent, and 14.9 percent of the North, the West, East, the Northern and the Southern minorities respectively disagree (see Table 11). These figures tend to suggest that the two-party framework has reduced the destructive and negative role religion played in the First and Second Republics' politics. Additionally, the East and Southern minorities appear to be the most liberal regions as far as religion and politics are concerned. However, it will be misleading to conclude that the two-party framework has woven a web of religious tolerance in Nigerian politics since the framework did not last long enough.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Politics</th>
<th>% Males who agree (20-49 yrs)</th>
<th>% Males who agree (50+)</th>
<th>% Males who disagree (20-49 yrs)</th>
<th>% Males who disagree (50+)</th>
<th>% Females who agree (20-49 yrs)</th>
<th>% Females who agree (50+)</th>
<th>% Females who disagree (20-49 yrs)</th>
<th>% Females who disagree (50+)</th>
<th>% of M-F no opinion</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do you think that the two political parties (SDP and NRC) emphasize religious sentiments as was the case in the First and the Second Republics? Q10</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>71</td>
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<td>Have your religious leaders ever invited a candidate or a politician to your church, mosque or other to campaign? Q21</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If your religion supports a candidate for an election, would you vote for that candidate? Q19</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>40</td>
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<tr>
<td>You would vote for that candidate even if the other competing candidate is more qualified. Q20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>87</td>
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<tr>
<td>The two parties have degenerated into Christian/Moslem affair. Q36</td>
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<td>2.2</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>Religious Politics</td>
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<td>EAST</td>
<td>NORTHERN MINORITIES</td>
<td>SOUTHERN MINORITIES</td>
<td>Total No Opinion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Agree +</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>15.1</td>
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<td>1.5</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Disagree -</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree +</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree -</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Have your religious leaders ever invited a candidate or a politician to your church, mosque or other to campaign? Q21</td>
<td>Agree +</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree -</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree +</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree -</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>If your religion supports a candidate for an election, would you vote for that candidate? Q19</td>
<td>Agree +</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>8.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disagree -</td>
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<td>7.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
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<td>8.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agree +</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
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<td>8.2</td>
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<td>7.3</td>
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<td>8.9</td>
<td>.1</td>
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<td>9.1</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>You would vote for that candidate even if the other competing candidate is more qualified. Q20</td>
<td>Agree +</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree -</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree +</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree -</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The two parties have degenerated into Christian/Muslim affair. Q36</td>
<td>Agree +</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree -</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree +</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree -</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree +</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree -</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
On V2, Q21, 2.9 percent of the young males, 3.1 percent of the old males, 3.8 percent of the young females, and 4.2 percent of the old females agree that their religious leaders have at one time or another invited a candidate or a politician to their church, mosque, or other to campaign. On the contrary, 15.1 percent of the young males, 14.9 percent of old males, 19.4 percent of young females, and 21.6 percent of old females disagree. The 15 percent of both males and females do not have any opinion.

Out of the 14 percent of all the respondents that agree, 4.1 percent are Northerners, 3.9 percent are Westerners, 1.8 percent are Easterners, 2.6 percent and 1.6 percent are Northern and Southern minorities respectively. Conversely, 13.3 percent of the North, 13.6 percent of the West, 14.8 percent of the East, 14.2 percent and 14.9 percent of the Northern and the Southern minorities respectively disagree that their religious leaders have ever invited a candidate or a politician to their church, mosque or other to campaign. The results show a deviation from the practice that was in vogue in the First and Second Republics' political campaigns. This is a very big stride and a positive development in Nigerian politics.

On V2, Q19, 51 percent agree to support and vote for a candidate if their religion supports that candidate for an election. Out of these, 7.4 percent are young males, 14.6 percent are old males, 9 percent are young females, and 20
percent are old females. The distribution of the 40 percent that disagree is 17 percent young males, 9 percent old males, 9.1 percent young females, and 4.9 percent old females. Nine percent do not have an opinion.

The affirmative responses according to the regions are: the North 11.4 percent, the West 11.1 percent, the East 9.3 percent, 10.1 percent and 9.1 percent for the Northern and the Southern minorities respectively. A significant percentage disagree. Out of the 40 percent that disagree, 7.1 percent are Northerners, 7.3 percent are Westerners, 8.9 are Easterners, 8.2 percent and 8.3 percent are Northern and Southern minorities respectively.

On V2, Q20, only 5 percent of the respondents agree that they would vote for a candidate endorsed by religious group to which they belong even if other competing candidates are more qualified. A breakdown of the figure shows that .5 percent are young males, 1.4 percent are old males, .8 percent are young females, and 2.3 percent are old females. On the other hand, out of the significant 87 percent that disagree, 28.1 percent are young males, 15 percent are old males, 26 percent are young females, and 17.9 are old females. Eight percent do not have an opinion.

The regional distribution of the responses shows that 1.2 percent of the North, 1.1 percent of the West, .9 percent of the East, 1 percent of the Northern and .8 percent of Southern minorities agree while the significant
percentages of negative responses are 16.8 percent for the North, 17.2 percent for the West, 17.9 percent for the East, 17.3 percent and 17.8 for the Northern and the Southern minorities respectively.

The significant number of negative responses to V2, Q19 and V2, Q20 and the low percentage of no opinion imply a growing degree of political consciousness, and voter independence among diversified groups in Nigeria. The fact that a substantial percentage of the respondents would not vote for the candidate endorsed by the religious groups to which one belongs if the other competing candidate is more qualified is a step in the right direction. If these new political values endure and continue to be widely shared by a cross section of the Nigerian population, they will go a long way in fostering or entrenching moderation and creating an encouraging degree of political maturity and freedom of choice in Nigerian politics.

On V2, Q36, only 8 percent agree and 72 percent disagree that the two parties degenerated into Christian versus Muslim affairs. Out of the 8 percent, young males make up 1.2 percent, old males 2.2 percent, young females 1.7, and old females 2.9. On the other hand, 26.9 percent of the young men, 17.1 percent of the old men, 16.8 percent of the young women, and 10.2 percent of the old women disagree.
The geographical distribution shows that 1.4 percent of the North, 1.9 percent of the West, 1.5 percent of the East, 1.8 percent and 1.4 percent of the Northern and the Southern minorities respectively agree that the two parties have degenerated and dichotomized into Christian versus Muslim affairs. However, 72 percent disagree. Out of these, 14.7 percent are Northerners, 14.1 are Westerners, 14.4 percent are Easterners, 14.7 percent and 14.1 percent are Northern and Southern minorities respectively.

So far, the survey responses here consistently contradicted a pervasive belief that religion and ethnicity would dichotomize the parties. To them (respondents), the parties' support did not run along ethnic and religious lines. The responses for V2, Q19 and V2, Q20 show that the Nigerian electorate is now ready to support and vote for the person they think is best qualified regardless of his or her religion. Nigerian attitudes towards political parties and politics have been frequently criticized by democratic observers as deficient in political tolerance. It will be recalled that the two-party framework was consciously adopted in light of tumultuous democratic experience in the First and Second Republics. In essence, it was established to accomplish what the multi-partyism had failed to achieve. Judging from the above two tables, the two-party framework has not failed to achieve its expected potentialities such as promoting tolerance for religious and ethnic differences.
On Violence and Politics in Nigeria (V3)

On V3, Q22, 83 percent of all the respondents agree that political violence, thuggery, and intimidation were not rampant in the Third Republic elections. Out of these, 24 percent are young males, 20 percent are old males, 22 percent are young females, and 17 percent are old females (see Table 12). Only 7 percent disagree out of which 1.2 percent are young males, 1.8 percent are old males, 1.6 percent are young females and 2.4 percent are old females. Ten percent of all the respondents do not have an opinion. There is a significant difference in the positive responses of both young and old females. A possible explanation is that the old females who were so traumatized by the political violence of the First and Second Republics could no longer differentiate between "friendly" political parties' campaign vans and buses that made announcements and actual political violence on the streets and towns. Therefore, they became so frightened and scared at the slightest political debates or noisy verbal confrontations among political opponents.

The regional distribution of positive responses shows that 17.8 percent of the North, 13.2 percent of the West, 18 percent of the East, 16 percent and 18 percent of the Northern and Southern minorities respectively agree,
TABLE 12
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES IN THE CATEGORIES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Violence V3</th>
<th>% Males who agree (20-49 yrs)</th>
<th>% Males who agree (50+)</th>
<th>% Males who disagree (20-49 yrs)</th>
<th>% Males who disagree (50+)</th>
<th>% Females who agree (20-49 yrs)</th>
<th>% Females who agree (50+)</th>
<th>% Females who disagree (20-49 yrs)</th>
<th>% Females who disagree (50+)</th>
<th>% of M-F no opinion</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political violence, thuggery, and intimidation are not rampant in the Third Republic.</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The introduction of the two political parties has helped to reduce the above violence.</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The formation of more political parties in Nigeria will increase political violence, thuggery, and intimidation of political opponents.</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you feel safer during the political campaigns and elections in the Third Republic than you did in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s?</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians campaign in states other than their states of origin with little or no molestation today than in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The present two-party framework has minimized the inter- and intra-squabbles that caused a lot of problems in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
while 1.5 percent of the North, 2.1 percent of the West, .7 percent of the East, 1.2 percent and .9 percent of the Northern and Southern minorities respectively disagree (see Table 13). This shows that when juxtaposed with the scale of political violence in the previous republics, especially the First Republic, it becomes empirically justified to reach the inference that the two-party framework was a success.

On whether it is right to say that the introduction of the two-party framework has helped to reduce the incidence of political violence, intimidation, and thuggery (V3, Q23), 76 percent agree. Out of these, 22 percent are young men, 18 percent are old men, 20 percent young women, and 10 percent old women. The breakdown of the 12 percent that disagree shows the 2.1 percent are young men, 2.9 percent are old men, 3 percent are young women while 4 percent are old women. Twelve percent of all the respondents have not formed any opinion on whether the two political parties were responsible for the reduction of political violence, thuggery and the intimidation of political opponents. However, logical and empirical images and reasonings permit favorable inferences or high probability that two-party framework was responsible. In other words, it is possible to draw a reasonable inference based on probability that the reduction of these incidences of political violence is attributable to the two-party experiment.
### TABLE 13
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES IN THE CATEGORIES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Violence V3</th>
<th>NORTH</th>
<th>WEST</th>
<th>EAST</th>
<th>NORTHERN MINORITIES</th>
<th>SOUTHERN MINORITIES</th>
<th>Total No Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political violence, thuggery, and intimidation are not rampant in the Third Republic. Q22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The introduction of the two political parties has helped to reduce the above political violence. Q23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The formation of more political parties in Nigeria will increase political violence, thuggery, and intimidation of political opponents. Q24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you feel safer during the political campaigns and elections in the Third Republic than you did in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s? Q31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians campaign in states other than their states of origin with little or no molestation today than in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Q32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The present two-party framework has minimized the inter- and intra-squabbles that caused a lot of problems in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s? Q33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Out of 76 percent that agree, 14.9 percent are from the North, 14.1 percent are from the West, 15.8 percent are from the East, 15.1 percent and 16.1 percent are from the Northern and the Southern minorities respectively while 2.7 percent of the North, 3.2 percent of the West, 1.9 percent of the East, 2.3 percent and 1.5 percent of the Northern and the Eastern minorities respectively disagree.

On V3, Q24, 69 percent of the respondents agree that the existence of more political parties in Nigeria will increase political violence, thuggery and intimidation of political opponents. Twenty-one percent of the young men, 16 percent of the old men, 19 percent of the young women, and 13 percent of the old women agree, while 5.1 percent of the young men, 6.9 percent of the old men, 5 percent of the young women and 7 percent of old women disagree. Six percent do not have any opinion.

The table on violence (V3) shows 80 percent of the respondents agree that they felt safer during the political campaigns and elections in the Third Republic than they did in the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s (V3, Q31). A breakdown of the responses shows noticeable differences between gender and age cohorts. The twenty-five percent of the positive responses are from the young men, 18 percent are from the old men, 22 percent are from the young women, and 15 percent are from the old women. Out of the 12 percent that disagree, 2 percent are young men, 3 percent are old men,
3.1 percent are young women, 4.9 percent are old women while 8 percent of all do not have any opinion. There is no significant difference in the responses of the regions. Out of the 80 percent that agree, 16.1 percent are Northerners, 15.9 percent are Westerners, 15.9 percent are Easterners, 16.2 percent and 15.8 percent are Northern and Southern minorities respectively, while 2.3 percent of the North, 2.8 percent of the West, 2.5 of the East, 2.2 percent and 2.4 percent of the Northern and the Southern minorities respectively disagree.

When one compares the degree of violence during political campaigns in the First and Second Republics to that of the Third Republic one will not hesitate to conclude or observe that the level of violence is much less in the Third Republic, an improvement of about "90 percent." This approaches the kind of elections one would observe in the liberal democracies of the First World. This success is attributed to the two-party framework which brought different groups together, causing a change in attitudes, and fostering mutual trust among the citizens (masses and elites). The striking truth about ethnic-based parties in Nigeria is that, except at a somewhat superficial level, their leaders had encouraged and urged their supporters to use violence against their political opponents during political campaigns. Consequently, typical Nigerians, both the elites and the masses, were likely to react violently to
opponents' point of view and when the opponents went to campaign in the ethnic or religious groups they did not belong. The two-party framework changed this pattern of campaign behavior and replaced it with civilized debates. There is no doubt that the emerging attitudes and behavior in the Third Republic would have generally contributed to the maintenance and growth of a more stable democracy than what had obtained in the previous Republics.

The percentage of positive responses is even higher than that of V3, Q31, when asked whether politicians campaigned in states other than their states of origin with little or no molestation in the Third Republic than in First and Second Republics (V3, Q32). Out of the 82 percent that agree, 24.9 percent and 20.1 percent are young and old male age cohorts respectively, while the females, young and old show 19.6 percent and 17.4 percent respectively. On the other hand, a breakdown of the 9 percent of the respondents that disagree shows that 1.4 percent are young males, 2 percent are old males, and 2.5 percent and 3.1 percent are young and old females respectively. Nine percent do not have an opinion.

The regional distribution of the 82 percent of positive responses shows that 16.3 percent are Northerners, 16.1 percent are Westerners, 16.5 percent are Easterners, 16.5 percent and 16.6 percent are Northern and Southern minorities respectively. Out of the 9 percent that
disagree, 1.8 percent are Northerners, 1.9 percent are Westerners, 1.8 percent are Easterners, 1.8 percent and 1.7 percent are Northern and Southern minorities respectively. This column of the table shows a strong showing for the West which has consistently nursed some reservations about the salutary political development the two-partyism has occasioned in Nigeria. A strong score in both positive and negative responses by the West almost reverse the familiar pattern so far. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that although the West scored a relatively heavy point on this question (V3, Q32), its strength here is not greater than that of other regions.

On V3, Q38, 75 percent agree that the two-party framework has minimized the inter- and intra-party squabbles that caused a lot of problems in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. While 22 percent of young men, 17 percent of old men, 20 percent of young women, and 16 percent of old women agree, 1.7 percent of young men, 2.3 percent of old men, 2.1 percent of young women and 2.9 percent of old women disagree. Fifteen percent do not have any opinion. Out of the 75 percent of the positive responses, 15.1 percent are from the North, 12.5 percent from the West, 15 percent are from the East, 15.4 percent and 16.1 percent are from the Northern and the Southern minorities respectively. A breakdown of the 10 percent negative responses gives 1.8 percent, 2.9 percent, 1.9 percent, 1.8 percent, 1.6 percent
to the North, the West, the East, the Northern and the Southern minorities respectively.

Although the West has the lowest percentage of positive responses (12.5 percent) when compared with other regions, it signifies a significant stride in Nigeria's search for a suitable party system for political stability. It will be noted that the level of political violence was so high in the West during the First and Second Republics that it earned the notorious nickname, "the sick child of the country." However, the whole picture was different in the Third Republic. Political violence was at its lowest ebb in Nigeria during the Third Republic.

Consensus and Coalition Building

On consensus and coalition building the results are strongly in favor of the two-party framework. On V4, Q28, 70 percent of the respondents agree that the presence of only two parties makes reaching consensus easier, 10 percent disagree while a large proportion of the respondents (20 percent) do not have any opinion (see Table 14 for a breakdown of the figures). Consensus is very important in interest aggregation and stability of any democratic political system. The regional distribution table gives 14.1 percent of the positive responses to the North, 10.6 percent to the West, 14.4 to the East, 15.1 percent and 15.8 percent to the Northern and Southern minorities respectively. On the other hand, 2.1 percent of the
TABLE 14

DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES IN THE CATEGORIES OF CONSENSUS AND COALITION BUILDING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consensus and Coalition Building V4</th>
<th>% Males who agree (20-49 yrs) +</th>
<th>% Males who agree (50+) +</th>
<th>% Males who disagree (20-49 yrs) -</th>
<th>% Males who disagree (50+) -</th>
<th>% Females who agree (20-49 yrs) +</th>
<th>% Females who agree (50+) +</th>
<th>% Females who disagree (20-49 yrs) -</th>
<th>% Females who disagree (50+) -</th>
<th>% of M-F no opinion</th>
<th>Total %</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The presence of only two parties makes reaching consensus easier. Q28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition governments as in Nigeria's First and Second Republics were fragile. Q29</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The existence of only two parties has reduced the chances of a coalition government. Q30</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The greater the intensity of disagreement among the political parties, the greater the threat to the Nigerian stability. Q39</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The two-party system offers a stronger medium through which ethnic conflicts are resolved than the multi-party system in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Q37</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
negative responses go to the North, 3.4 percent to the West, 1.9 percent to the East, 1.4 percent and 1.2 percent to the Northern and Southern minorities respectively.

On V4, Q29, 60 percent of all the respondent agree that coalition governments in Nigeria's First and Second Republics were fragile and dicey. Only 5 percent disagree and a substantial percentage (35 percent) does not have any opinion. The table shows that 12.1 percent of the North, 12.2 percent of the West, 11.9 percent of the East, 12.2 percent and 11.6 percent of the Northern and the Southern minorities respectively agree, while .8 percent of the North, .9 percent of the West, 1.3 percent of the East, .9 percent and 1.1 percent of the Northern and Southern minorities respectively disagree (see Table 15). Perhaps the explanation of the high positive responses from the West on V4, Qs29 and 30 could be traced to the fact that the West had opposed and criticized the coalition government at the federal level between the East and the North. On the other hand, the score of the East is not a surprise to close watchers of party politic in Nigeria. Since the East seemed to be the greatest beneficiary (at least at prima facie level) of the coalition government, it is more likely to defend and rationalize it.

Eighty-four percent of the respondents agree that the greater the intensity of disagreement among political parties, the greater the threat to Nigerian stability (V4,
**TABLE 15**

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES IN THE CATEGORIES OF CONSENSUS AND COALITION BUILDING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consentus and Coalition Building V4</th>
<th>NORTH</th>
<th>WEST</th>
<th>EAST</th>
<th>NORTHERN MINORITIES</th>
<th>SOUTHERN MINORITIES</th>
<th>Total No Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q39). A breakdown of the positive responses shows that young males score 24.1 percent, old males 20.9 percent, young females 22 percent, and old females 17 percent. On the other hand, only 6 percent of the respondents disagree, out of which .8 percent are young males, 1.6 percent are old males, 1.2 percent are young females, and 2.4 percent are old females. Ten percent do not have any opinion. The regional distribution for positive responses gives the North 16.9 percent, the West 16.7 percent, the East 16.6 percent, the Northern and the Southern minorities 17 percent and 16.8 percent respectively. Out of the 6 percent that disagree, 1.2 percent are Northerners, 1.1 percent are Westerners, 1.1 are Easterners, 1.4 percent and 1.2 percent are Northern and Southern minorities respectively.

Seventy percent agree that the two-party framework offers a stronger medium through which ethnic conflicts are resolved than the multi-party system in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s (V4, Q37). A breakdown of the responses shows that young males score 21 percent, old males 15 percent, young females 19.8 percent, and old females 14.2 percent, while 2.2 percent of young males, 3.8 percent of the old males, 3.3 percent of the young females, and 4.7 of the old females disagree. Sixteen percent do not have any opinion. The positive responses for the regions show that the North has 14.2 percent, the West 14.1, the East 14.3 percent, the Northern and the Southern minorities 13.6 percent and 13.8
percent respectively, while 2.6 percent of Northerners, 2.5 percent of Westerners, 2.7 percent of Easterners, 3.1 percent and 3.1 percent of Northern and Southern minorities respectively disagree.

Taking a cursory look at the statistics, conclusion could therefore be safely drawn that propensity of democratic growth and stability was higher in the Third Republic than what had obtained in the First and Second Republics. To be precise, these favorable responses for the Babangida's two-party framework are seals of approval. The responses show a drastic reduction in political violence, regional/ethnic politics, religious politics, inter- and intra-party antagonisms.
CHAPTER V


Before delving into analysis of the differences and the performance of the party systems in Nigeria, it is necessary to point out that the circumstances under which parties were founded and funded in the First, the Second, and the Third Republics were not identical. However, the political culture remained fundamentally the same except for minor changes occasioned by constitutional tinkering and social engineering. When juxtaposed with the parties in the First and Second Republics, the SDP and the NRC of the Third Republic were unique in their origin, national comprehensiveness and balance and they seemed to avoid the fatal flaws that shook and disrupted the previous two republics.

The emergence of the SDP and the NRC was neither a result of the cleavage within the Constituent Assembly nor from any polarization of attitudes and values on specific public issues.\(^1\) Contrary to the perceptions of some critics, the SDP and the NRC cannot be characterized as

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\(^1\)In essence, the party foundation and membership were neither conditioned by sectional interests nor by explicit doctrinal issues but rather by the contest for presidency and other available political positions.
solely representing a revival of a new form of the pre-existing party alignment or as a reincarnation of the parties of the previous republics.

In view of this, it becomes somewhat ironical to see chances of electoral success at all levels rather than ethnic and religious considerations playing an important role in determining party alignments and identification.\(^2\) Irony or no irony, the important thing is that it was a positive sign and the net result was that successive electoral contests between various candidates had started to create the party system and the political culture that had remarkably reduced ethnic and regional bias. Moreover, the SDP and the NRC were competitive and balanced in most states and regions throughout the transition period (1989-1993). Curiously, these Babangida contrivances (SDP and NRC) were the first in the political history of Nigeria to be truly national in scope. Whether the particular circumstances associated with their creation made them seem "artificial" or resemble government parastatals or not, the important thing is that they were peculiar and produced a balanced party system in nearly every region and state. Consequently, the de facto "one-party" regions that existed

\(^2\)It has been observed elsewhere that in the Nigeria-type political culture, strong regional sentiments and ethnic consciousness shape the values and the behavior of the electorate.
in the First and Second Republics became a thing of the past.

The period 1989-1993 was too short for any meaningful analysis of the question of institutionalization of the parties. Suffice it to say that the absence of personalization of the parties and the nation-wide organizational efforts of the parties were linked functionally with the patterns of public attitudes and behavior in the Nigerian transition period. More precisely, the SDP and the NRC played the role of surrogates for the society in the establishment of a viable and "modern" (consensual) political culture. It would be premature to assert that the political culture has gone into a period of arrested development as a result of the annulment of the June 12, 1993, presidential election.

The analysis of the sample survey and voting statistics shows that political party affiliation and the voting behavior of both the elite and the masses changed fundamentally in the Third Republic. The transformation of cleavages was also significant. Experience has shown that the proliferation of political parties in the previous Republics undoubtedly led to the politically dysfunctional pattern of mobilization and polarization of the electorate along ethnic/regional and religious lines. Consequently, this pattern created the attitude and electoral behavior that strained the political system. However, the survey
data in this study show that the two-party framework has brought about a positive transformation of the political orientations with little strain on the political process. It is undoubtedly true and obvious that the two-party political resocialization of the citizenry of Nigeria has had greater positive effects than the consequences of long-term exposure to the multiparty system. Therefore, party systems and their pattern of political socialization, mobilization, campaign, and party organization are the key variables in molding and maintaining political attitudes and opinions.

In essence, the existence of only two national political parties created an incentive for the political elite class to abandon any ambition of forming narrow-based or ethnic-based parties. When they (political elites) came together in the two parties (SDP and NRC), it became very difficult for them to appeal to ethnic sentiments. Moreover, it created some political ties that connected individuals and communities and increased their shared interests. All these combined to limit the severity of overt conflict, and enhance the resolution of political disputes or conflicts.

Ultimately this affected the political cultural values and norms, which in turn affected Nigerian political attitudes. All these translated into a positive political
behavior. This process can be shown or represented in a simple diagram:

Two Partyism

Membership cuts across ethnic and religious lines and creates some political ties that connect individuals and communities. These ties promote shared interests and the settlement of disputes.

New political cultural values and norms

It shapes actors identity and creates new incentives

Development of political behavior which produced a conducive environment in which the last political campaigns and elections occurred

Fig. 2. Stages of Behavioral Process of Two Partyism

The survey data show that Nigerian ethnic relations were at their best during the electioneering campaigns and elections in the Third Republic. In the First and the
Second Republics, some political parties had no branches in almost half of the country. The branches of the SDP and the NRC in the Third Republic were established in all parts of the country. The parties and the political elite class deliberately sought and extended their apparatus and activities to areas and regions where they previously lacked support. In addition, they attracted members and voters across ethnic lines. In essence, the Twin-Devil (ethnicity or ethnic chauvinism and party politics) that had emerged as the exact antithesis of political integration and stability were not as centrifugal and destructive as they used to be.

There were no sizable differences between the two parties in terms of ethnic composition and major source of financial support. The effect of this kind of ethnic composition was a reduction in cut-throat competition and the use of ethnic epithet among the leaders of ethnic groups. This was so because the opportunity to float new political party was completely blocked. Consequently, any differences among the leaders were submerged and the electorates in different ethnic groups were easily rallied together. The two-party experiment was able to contain the kind of disagreement that led to the formation of splinter groups and ethnic-based political parties in the First and Second Republics. This does not mean that personal ambition or minor quarrels among certain ethnic group leaders were nonexistent.
The analysis of the survey responses indicates that there is little doubt in the minds of the respondents that the two-party framework helped in improving inter ethnic relations and minimizing the effects of ethnicity on party formation and support in elections [see chapter 5, VI Qs 42 and 13]. This brought about a change in the nature of political campaigning which in turn affected values, norms, and consequently the pattern of voting.

However, an important factor that can challenge or even weaken the achievements of the two-party framework stems from the fact that the two party experiment came at the time when the threat to individual freedom and the interest of the civilian political class was very obvious and enormous. Perhaps that was what caused or forced the civilian elite class to play by the rules in order to ease out the military. The former (civilian elite) was aware that the latter (military) was looking for the slightest excuse to tighten its grip on power.

Whatever happens, this study has produced some data with which to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the Babangida's version of two-partyism. Moreover, the analysis will enable the critics or the opponents of the two party experiment to think about two-party politics qualitatively in terms of what it has offered the electorate rather than quantitatively represented by proliferation of parties and splinter groups (spoilers) that ethnic leaders were able to
organize. It has been observed elsewhere that the two-party arrangement emerged as a unifying force among Nigerians of all economic, political and religious persuasions and had also forged an unprecedented link between Muslims, Christians, and other religious believers.

In summation, the two-party experiment seemed to be a powerful weapon that set the ball of destroying ethnic politics rolling. To be precise, the experiment began to reinforce the process of undermining the ethnic orientation to politics. The logic here is that since no ethnic group in Nigeria is large enough to form a political party that is viable enough to win power at the center on its own, politicians of different ethnic groups are forced to abandon their ethnic biases and play the "national card" under the two-party arrangement. Raph Uwechue observes that "If we allow more than two parties, you can be sure that each of the first three parties will be dominated by Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba, which will bring us back to tribally-based political parties. This is what the two-party system effectively eliminated."³ He concludes by saying that "the two-party arrangement was the most fundamental achievement in our search for national unity and political stability since independence."⁴ Jibril Aminu, a former minister of

³Quoted in Tell (Nigeria), September 11, 1995, p. 23.
⁴Ibid.
Religion and Politics

Judging from the survey responses, one may reach the conclusion that the two-party framework succeeded in bringing Christians and Muslims together. The survey data indicate that 71 percent of the respondents disagree with the idea that the two political parties have religious affiliations and reflect religious sentiments as was the case in the First and the Second Republics. Additionally, a comparable percentage (72 percent) disagree that the two political parties degenerated into a Christian/Muslim affair. This tends to suggest that the two-party framework was not a good forum for Christian crusaders and jihadis to express or execute their religious agenda. The fact that Abiola, the presumed winner of the June 12, 1993, presidential election received overwhelming support from Christian voters regardless of his decision to select Kingibe, a Muslim as his running mate. This shows that bipartisanship helped to produce or was in the process of evolving a culture of religious tolerance. The survey evidence consistently points to a pervasive belief that religion was hardly considered essential or relevant by the Nigerian public, especially the elite class. For example, the survey

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5The Difficult Combination," Comparative Political Studies 26, no. 2 (July 1993): 198-228.
results indicate that 87 percent of the respondents agree that they would vote for the people they think are the best regardless of what religion they belong to. In sum, the two-party framework reflected the criss-crossing of the fundamental religious-ideological and social cleavages of Nigerian society. In other words, the experiment fostered criss-crossing affiliations and loyalties and militated against religious bigotry.

The findings of this study demonstrate that the high level of variation in religious and political tolerance in the First, Second, and Third Republics was, to some extent, unrelated to the historical experiences and biases of the respondents. The implication is that the events and the activities of the parties during the Babangida's transition program were the primary determinants of religious and political tolerance. In essence, this study is again suggesting that this tolerance was a function of resocialization to democratic values and norms during the period of democratization under the two-partyism.

Political Violence

Political campaigns and elections in the First and Second Republics were marred by widespread violence. Thugs were recruited to intimidate political opponents and the electorate. Some prominent politicians formed and supported quasi-military organizations which made life insecure for the people in general. The political campaign periods in
Nigeria before the advent of the two-partyism were comparable to the state of nature as described by political philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes. Parties and their supporters on campaign trails were attacked by opposition parties and their supporters. These threatening conditions of violence and chaos were directly or indirectly created by the party leaders' campaign rhetoric and speeches that appealed to ethnic and religious sentiments.

All these seemed to change in the Third Republic. There was no widespread political violence and destruction of lives and property. Survey evidence indicates that 83 percent of the respondents believe that political violence, thuggery, and intimidation of political opponents were not rampant in the Third Republic as in the previous Republics. Additionally, 76 percent agree that the two-party framework was responsible for the decrease in such acts of violence. The existence of more political parties, according to 69 percent of the respondents, will increase political violence, thuggery, and the intimidation of political opponents. On people's safety during political campaigns and elections, 80 percent of the people polled agreed that they felt safer in the Third Republic.

The two-party framework also minimized the inter- and intra-party squabbles that contributed to the demise of the previous Republics. The two-party framework in Nigeria blocked the proliferation of political parties and forced
factions and groups to negotiate issues. This helped to resolve inter- and intra-party conflicts that would have erupted and escalated into political violence. It will be recalled that the crisis in the West began partially as personal disagreement between the two major political actors in the West, Awolowo and Akintola. The multi-party system provided the opportunity for Akintola to form his own party instead of settling his differences with Awolowo. This intensified the conflict rather than insulate it. In order to win and control power, both actors resorted to readily available tools—violence and intimidation of political opponents. However, under the two-party framework, large-scale physical violence had somehow been avoided.

The coalition governments in the Nigerian First and Second Republics were fragile, dicey and more often than not the disputes that erupted and metamorphosed into administrative paralysis. The two-party framework reduced the need for a coalition government to its barest minimum. The multi-party system in Nigeria, especially under a presidential system of government furnished the conditions for the formation of coalitions and the incentives for breaking them as well. Oftentimes, the party leaders generally felt the need to distance themselves from the president in office, especially when the next presidential elections appeared on the horizon. The party leaders had the unsatisfactory option of remaining silent partners in
the governing coalition. However, they were hesitant to take this line of action because they feared that while the president would reap the benefits of the coalition government, they would lose their own identity and share blame for any mistakes the government might make. In Nigeria, the coalition partners feared that Shagari would enjoy the benefits while they would bear the brunt of the electoral costs usually associated with incumbency. It must be pointed out here that this logic does not strictly apply to a multiparty cabinet system where the composition of the government is determined by party strength in elections.

Survey evidence shows that 70 percent of the respondents agree that the operation of only the two parties makes reaching consensus easier. The importance of consensus in interest articulation for the stability of Nigeria is not in dispute. Judging by this high percentage of affirmative responses, one may be tempted to say that the two-party experiment would have achieved one of its goals of creating a consensual political culture.

It must be noted here that the findings of this study do not suggest the absence of strained relations among the diverse groups in Nigeria. The restriction placed on the number of parties forced moderation and flexibility down the throats of the politicians. This made reaching a consensus and the inclusion of different groups in the party organization easier. This may have succeeded in pacifying
certain ethnic and religious groups and lessened the rage that often fuel rebellion and instability.

If one looks at how the hitherto traditional party factions and affiliations were challenged by the emergence of multi-ethnic, political campaigning in the Third Republic, one will conclude that the viability of multi-party system is at stake. The institutionalization of the parties as opposed to personalization and the scope of the organizational efforts of the parties as demonstrated in the foregoing analyses are linked functionally with the patterns of social engineering, public attitudes and behaviors.

This chapter will be concluded by reiterating that the SDP and the NRC were particularly effective in overriding ethnic and regional loyalties and in mobilizing disparate groups into two national parties. In essence, they cut across ethnic and religious cleavages in a fashion that had not been witnessed in the political history of Nigeria. Perhaps this is attributable to the fact that it was very difficult for one or the other of the two parties to portray or present itself as the champion of an ethnic group or regional/sectional interests and win or wield any significant power at the center. Public security improved during the Third Republic's electioneering campaigns. The findings demonstrate that variation in political tolerance in the Nigerian Republics is related, to a large extent, to the pattern of political campaigns, socialization and
mobilization. In essence, this study is suggesting that political tolerance in the Third Republic resulted from resocialization to democratic values during the democratization exercise under the two-party framework introduced by Babangida.

Summary

Lijphart may disagree with the assertion that multipartism was the fatal flaw that introduced the pattern of destructive political campaign and the political culture that emphasized what divides Nigerians rather than what unites them. Inevitably, these two things undermined democracy in Nigeria in the First and the Second Republics. In the Third Republic, the parties (SDP and NRC) were moderate and centerist and the political system and culture benefitted from it. However, the ability of the parties to offer a clear choice between alternative programs was reduced. Their programs were both close to the political center and very similar in major respects.

The previous chapters have found strong links and relationships between party systems, pattern of political socialization, and culture, on the one hand, and the political culture and political behavior on the other.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

It is now obvious that the traditional stability of electoral behavior which underscores ethnicity was shaken by the local and national elections in the Third Republic. In other words, the traditional electoral behavior which reflected ethnicity as a significant variable in influencing party affiliation and voting was undermined in the Third Republic. As for the impact of the two-party system, the data and the present analyses yielded or generated two major findings, both meriting further examination. The first finding concerns the extension of the process of voting across regional/ethnic and religious lines. The choices of voters were based primarily on the quality of the candidate and issues involved. Although the period under study was short, the amount of variance explained remains high and the pattern of effect for the several indicators of instability were not significantly enhanced when the activities of the SDP and the NRC were taken into account.

The analysis and the findings would challenge the prevailing wisdom of the Constitutional Conference instituted by Gen. Abacha that the number of parties does not matter much as far as the determination of prospects for
a stable democracy in Nigeria is concerned. Conversely, the finding lends credence to the views of numerous scholars (such as Duverger, 1954, pp. 206-280, Hermens, 1941, and others) who argued that two-party systems were more favorable to democracy than multiparty systems that tended to create unstable democracies. Duverger and other proponents of two-party systems (see literature review) were impressed with the success and stability of democracies in Britain and the United States and its breakdown in Germany and Italy during and shortly after the World War II. They seem to ignore the fact that there are some consensual multiparty system (generally with limited number of parties) that seem to be successful. However, the particularly significant contribution of Lijphart (1968, 1977, 1984) changed the tide of discussion. In sharp contrast to Duverger's argument on "dualism" and party systems, Lijphart noted in 1968, 1977 and 1984 that many multiparty democracies had achieved stability for a long period of time in smaller European democracies (countries) such as Sweden and Denmark.\(^1\) Furthermore, he argued that multiparty systems could be more propitious in promoting stable

democracy in plural societies with sharp cultural, ethnic, religious, or linguistic cleavages. Significant minorities might be permanent "outs" in a two-party system, thereby creating a situation that could reduce their willingness to abide by the rules of the game. On the contrary, a multiparty system could help these minorities attain meaningful representation and participate in coalition governments.

This study has certainly not resolved this issue. However, the findings do not support Lijphart's argument at all. In fact, they widen the academic or theoretical distance between Duverger and Lijphart. The indicators and the survey data suggest that multipartyism in Nigeria was centrifugal and destabilizing, while the two-party framework is centripetal and stabilizing. This conclusion is very easy to reach by taking a critical look at the aggregate data. However, it must be noted and conceded that most recent analysts, such as Sani & Sartori (1983)\(^3\), as well as Sanders & Herman (1977) have sided with Lijphart.\(^4\) One could argue that the validity of Lijphart's position depends

\(^2\)Ibid.


\(^4\)A. Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems."
on the existence of a relatively homogeneous political culture.

There is no doubt that political crises, the activities and influence or rhetorics of major political actors play a major role in molding the attitude individuals have toward their nation and their fellow citizens. If one looks at the inferences individuals in Nigeria drew from them in all the Republics so far about their fellow citizens, one can conclude that party politics and events in the Third Republic were more likely to create cohesion and make Nigerians share a common sense of community. In essence, the events in the First and the Second Republics were so divisive that various groups were socialized to distrust each other. Since political events in the Third Republic (especially the pattern of political campaigning) were not as divisive as the previous Republics, groups learned to trust one another. Probably this became a prime source of the Nigerian political culture characterized by a high level of a sense of integration among various groups.

Therefore, one can make a generalization anchored on the survey data that there is an inverse relationship between the number of parties and the level/sense of national identity. An increase in parties tends to

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5While national identity deals with the extent the individuals believe they belong to Nigeria, the vertical and horizontal identifications refer to the degree and sense of attachment to the Nigeria state and the sense of integration Nigerians have among themselves respectively.
decrease national consciousness and integration. The multiparty system tends to destroy or limit the development of national political parties. It also creates opportunities for politicians to form ethnic based political parties, thereby forcing the would-be national figures to recede to their ethnic cocoons resort to ethnicity as a trump card in order to secure the maximum votes and support of their ethnic group. In such dispensation, any party that fails to play by the "rule" (ethnic politics) loses as soon as another ethnic-based party emerges from that group.

The reason for the above pattern is informed by the particular logic and experience of Nigerian political culture and thinking. Nigerians associate a party with a cause or causes (ethnic chauvinism and domination). Therefore, parties are conceived and built as the vehicle for ethnic purpose (ethnic domination). To live up to these expectations, it is natural for Nigerians to join or form ethnic-based parties. Politicians float new parties and coin new names for parties as new political ideas evolve out of the general body of their political thought which is embedded or woven in the web of the political culture. Consequently, parties can only live, grow and die with the causes which they were designed and created to bear or promote.

Prior to President Babangida's involvement in the formation of the SDP and the NRC in 1989, the most prominent
characteristic of the Nigerian political system was that it
was a multiple party rather than a two-party system. It
will be noted here that the political history of Nigeria
since 1950 is liberally strewn and littered with the
wreckage of attempts to found and develop two broad-based
parties in order to win elections or govern more
effectively. Nevertheless, none of them had ever survived
very long or functionally succeeded. All these boil down to
one thing: that heritage shapes the Nigerian political
system. This heritage and its impacts have been very
negative and destructive in the Nigerian search for
political stability. Fortunately, Babangida's contraption
seems to reverse or reform that heritage. To be precise, he
(Babangida) coined the precept that a political party not
only can be but in fact should go beyond a particular case
and be more durable and institutionalized. However, events
after the annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential
election, make it very problematic to say that Babangida,
through social engineering had perfected or attempted to
perfect a party framework which would have lived or
continued irrespective of the fate of its founder and causes
(reasons for founding it). In other words it is difficult
to say that this experiment would have succeeded in its
quest of institutionalizing democracy and political
stability, irrespective of its author and reasons for
adopting or performing the two party experiment.
The study has addressed the question of the relevance of attitudes and political behavior of the general public for the establishment of a stable democracy in Nigeria. A causal model of relationships between political structure (party systems and their pattern of socialization and mobilization), civic culture attitudes of the Nigerian public and changes in the level of violence, the effect of ethnicity, and religion on political campaigns could be tested in a similar study with cross-sectional data. The utility of this model relates to the fact that it permits inferences about the possibility of reciprocal or unidirectional causation between the party systems, political culture, and stability.

The findings show that the two-party framework has significant impact on change in the level of violence, ethnicity, and religion on political campaigns. The public attitudes which affected political behavior during political campaigns appears clearly to have had a positive effect on the two parties' pattern of political socialization and mobilization. In essence, the political culture approach should be refined and re-formulated to reflect the ideas of reciprocal causation. This means that political culture tends to have an effect on party systems and that party systems tend to have an effect on political culture. Therefore, one can hypothesize that political culture not
only influences the party system but can be influenced in turn by the output and performance of the system.

Compared with the party politics of the First and Second Republics, it is clear that Nigerian political culture underwent a significant degree of reformation. The SDP and the NRC emphasized the symbols and tactics that appealed to as wide a range of voters as possible and discouraged social conflict and political mobilization along ethnic, religious and regional lines. There was no campaign slogan like "One North, One People." This study has shown that the ethnic factor or commitment of the two parties is negligible under the two-party experiment. This fact convinced the bulk of the voters to vote for parties on non-ethnic basis. In essence, the two parties' campaign appeals shaped the character and the political culture of the Third Republic. The effects of the two party framework and its pattern of political campaign appeals were reflected on the attitude and the electoral behavior of the electorate. This strengthens the view that there is a reciprocal model of relationship between political culture and political structure. This supports Verba's idea that "Political culture forms an important link between the events of politics and the behavior of individuals in reaction to those events; for, although the political behavior of individuals and groups is of course affected by acts of government officials, wars, election campaigns, and the
like, it is even more affected by the meanings that are assigned those events by observers."

**Theoretical Implications**

Although this work does not claim to be a perfect attempt to unite theory and data in analysis of political development or stability, it tends to demonstrate the basic macro- and microscopic relationships between political culture and political institutions. The findings and results of this research have relevance for the refinement of political culture approach to the study of politics, which has tended to be unidirectional. The researcher believes that there is a reciprocal relationship between political culture, behavior, and structures. If political culture affects the choices of political institutions and behavior and vice versa, then certain aspects of the political culture model should be reformulated in order to permit inferences about the possibility of unidirectional or reciprocal causation between civic culture attitude, behavior, structures and democratic stability. Almond and Verba's (1963) proposed theory which was further elaborated by Inglehart maintains that success or viability of democratic institutions is affected by attitudes such as the belief that other citizens are basically trustworthy, belief

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6Pye and Verba, 516.

in one's ability to influence political decisions and affection for the political system. These could be the product or a function of institutional arrangements or engineering. Finally, political culture can fragment party systems and party systems can fragment political culture. One may question the relevance of the quest for theoretical refinement since the sample came only from one country which is not representative of all cases. If one follows this line of thought, it becomes necessary to add that the conclusion at this stage might be premature. However, the generalizations and interpretations upon the findings of this inquiry are stated in ideal-type form, to facilitate further rigorous empirical testing.
## APPENDIX A

### SENATE ELECTION

<table>
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<tr>
<th>State</th>
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<th>NPN</th>
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APPENDIX B

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (THE 1979 GENERAL ELECTIONS)

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<th>NPN</th>
<th>PRP</th>
<th>NPP</th>
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<td>--</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<td>22</td>
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Percent  
100  9.6  24.7  37.4  10.9  17.4

### APPENDIX C

#### STATE ASSEMBLY (THE 1979 GENERAL ELECTIONS)

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| Total     | 1347  | 157  | 333 | 487 | 144 | 226 |

| Percent   | 100   | 11.7 | 24.7| 36.1| 10.7| 16.8|

APPENDIX D

STATE GOVERNORS (THE 1979 GENERAL ELECTIONS)

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<td>UPN</td>
<td>Prof. Ambrose Alli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>NPN</td>
<td>Mr. Aper Aku</td>
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<td>GNPP</td>
<td>Alhaji Mohammed Goni</td>
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<td>NPN</td>
<td>Dr. Clement Isong</td>
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<td>Alhaji A. Barde</td>
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<tr>
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<td>NPP</td>
<td>Mr. Samuel Mbakwe</td>
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<td>PRP</td>
<td>Alhaji Balarabe Musa</td>
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<td>PRP</td>
<td>Alhaji Abubakar Rimi</td>
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<td>NPN</td>
<td>Alhaji Adamu Atta</td>
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<td>Alhaji Awwal Ibrahim</td>
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<td>UPN</td>
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<td>UPN</td>
<td>Mr. Michael Ajasin</td>
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<td>Mr. Bola Ige</td>
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## APPENDIX E

### PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (THE 1979 GENERAL ELECTIONS)

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<th>Obafemi Awolowo UPN % Votes Rec'd</th>
<th>Shehu Shagari NPN % Votes Rec'd</th>
<th>Aminu Kano PRP % Votes Rec'd</th>
<th>Nnamdi Azikiwe NPP % Votes Rec'd</th>
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**Percent**

|   | 10.0 | 29.2 | 33.8 | 10.3 | 16.7 |

APPENDIX F

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. What is your age? (a) Below 20 yrs. (b) 20-29 yrs. (c) 30-39 yrs. (d) 40-49 yrs. (e) 50 yrs. and above.

2. Sex: (a) Male (b) Female.

3. What is your marital status? (a) Single (b) Married (c) Others.

4. What is your income per annum? (a) less than N10,000 (b) N11,000-N19,000 (c) N20,000-N29,000 (d) N30-60,000 (e) N61,000 and above.

5. Level of education: (a) Elementary / Standard 1 - 6 (b) 1-4 yrs. of secondary school (c) Secondary school graduate (d) Some University education (e) University graduate (f) Post-graduate degree (g) Professional degree. Specify ____________________________

6. What is your occupation? ____________________________

7. What is your religion? (a) Moslem (b) Christianity (c) Others (Please Specify) ____________________________

8. What is your region? (a) North (b) West (c) East (d) Middle Belt (e) Southern Minorities (f) Your ethnic group is ____________________________


10. Do you think the two political parties (SDP and NRC) in Nigeria emphasize religious sentiments as was the case in the 1st and 2nd Republics? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Don’t know. You can make additional objective comments below. ____________________________

11. How would you describe the effect of allowing only two parties in Nigeria? (a) It brings different ethnic groups together (b) It improves ethnic relations (c) It makes ethnic relations worse (d) a and b.

12. Two-party system in Nigeria has helped a lot in improving inter-ethnic relations and understanding. (a) agree (b) disagree (c) No opinion.
13. The two political parties play a more active role in reducing or minimizing the problem of ethnicity in Nigerian politics today than the political parties in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s (a) Yes  (b) No  (c) No opinion  (d) The same.

14. Religion and ethnicity are more important in Nigerian politics today than in the First and Second Republics  (a) Yes  (b) No  (c) The same.

15. What is responsible for diminishing influence of religion and ethnicity in Politics? (a) Party-system and education  (b) Maturity of the people and education (c) Lack of interest in Nigerian politics  (d) a and b (e) Money  (f) No opinion.

16. More parties (4-7) would do a better job in the Third Republic. (a) Yes  (b) No  (c) No opinion.

17. The number of political parties has made you vote for a politician from a particular ethnic group you had never voted for in 1st and 2nd Republics. (a) Yes  (b) No  (c) No opinion.

18. The two-party system has reshaped your political behavior. (a) Yes  (b) No  (c) No opinion

19. If your religion supports a candidate for an election would you vote for that candidate?  (a) Yes  (b) No  (c) Don't know.

20. Would you vote for that candidate even if the other competing candidate is more qualified?  (a) Yes  (b) No.

21. Did your religious leaders ever invite a candidate or a politician to the church or mosque to campaign?  (a) Yes  (b) No  (c) Don't know.

22. Political violence, thuggery, intimidation, and lack of trust are not rampant in the 3rd Republic.  (a) Agree  (b) Disagree  (c) No opinion.

23. Is it right to say that the introduction of two political parties has helped to reduce the above incidences of violence?  (a) Agree  (b) Disagree  (c) No opinion.

24. The formation of more political parties in Nigeria will increase political violence, thuggery, and assassination of political opponents?  (a) Agree  (b) Disagree  (c) No opinion.

25. The political parties in 1st and 2nd Republics were more ethnic based, parochial, and divisive than the two political parties in the 3rd Republic.  (a) Agree (b) Disagree  (c) No opinion.

26. Respect should be shown to the Nigerian flag.  (a) Agree  (b) Disagree  (c) No opinion.

27. Allegiance should be shown or pledged to Nigerian State rather than ethnic group.  (a) Agree  (b) Disagree  (c) No opinion.
28. Presence of only two parties makes reaching consensus easier.
   (a) Agree  (b) Disagree  (c) No opinion.

29. Coalition governments as in Nigeria's 1st and 2nd Republics were fragile.
   (a) Agree  (b) Disagree  (c) No opinion.

30. Existence of only two parties has reduced the chances of a coalition government.
   (a) Agree  (b) Disagree  (c) No opinion.

31. Do you feel safer during political campaigns and elections in the 3rd Republic (in
    the past 3 years) than you did in 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s?
   (a) Yes  (b) No  (c) Don't know.

32. Do politicians campaign in states other than their state of origin with little or no
    molestation today than in 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s?
   (a) Yes  (b) No  (c) No opinion.

33. Do you think your behavior can influence government and vice versa?
   (a) Yes  (b) No  (c) No opinion.

Please make any comment concerning the two party system, the new political culture and
stability.

34. The present two party framework makes the job of handling ethnic demands and
    interests easier than when Nigeria had many parties.  (a) Agree  (b) Disagree
    (c) No opinion.

35. Are the two parties ethnic based as in the 1st and 2nd Republics?
   (a) Yes  (b) No  (c) No opinion.

36. The two parties have degenerated into Christian/Moslem affair.
   (a) Yes  (b) No  (c) No opinion.

37. The two-party system offers a stronger medium through which ethnic conflicts are
    resolved than the multi-party system in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.
   (a) Yes  (b) No  (c) No opinion.

38. The present two-party system has minimized the inter-party and intra-party
    squabbles that caused a lot of problems in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.
   (a) Agree  (b) Disagree  (c) No opinion.

39. The greater the intensity of the disagreement among political parties, the greater
    the threat to Nigerian stability.  (a) Yes  (b) No  (c) No opinion.

40. Do you think that the two-party system has changed the way people look at political
    parties?  (a) Yes  (b) No  (c) No opinion.

41. Make some comments on the two-party experiment.
42. Would you support Nigerian government if it is headed by somebody from another ethnic group? (a) Yes (b) No (c) No opinion.

43. Would you trust government headed by somebody from another ethnic group? (a) Yes (b) No (c) No opinion.

44. Do you have confidence and trust in the Nigerian government especially the civilian government as far as the provision of socio-economic amenities are concerned? (a) Yes (b) No

45. Do you take positions on political issues? (a) Yes (b) No (c) No opinion.

Thank you for the time you have spared to fill out this questionnaire.

Please make your comments on extra paper regarding how two-party system can promote or hamper Nigeria's political stability.
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