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The Iraqi revolution of July 14, 1958: a sociological interpretation

Khayrallah Michael Safar
Atlanta University

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THE IRAQI REVOLUTION OF JULY 14, 1958:
A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF ATLANTA UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

BY
KHAYRALLAH MICHAEL SAFAR

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

ATLANTA, GEORGIA
AUGUST 1963
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CHAPTER I

THE THESIS STATEMENT

I. The general idea of the thesis.

On July 14, 1958, a revolution swept from power the monarchy of King Faisal II of Iraq and declared a republican form of government. What were the reasons for social unrest in Iraqi society? How did collective excitement happen? What was the role of leadership prior to July 1958? What were the characteristics, objectives, and expressions of the acting crowds of 1958? What were the characteristics of Iraqi public opinion? How did esprit de corps develop in Iraq? What were the assets and liabilities of the Kassim regime? What were the reasons behind the "Renaissance" Baath counter revolution on February 9, 1963? Why is another revolution expected in Iraq? This paper will attempt to answer these and many more questions about the Iraqi Revolution.

II. Review of the literature.

This paper is a sociological interpretation of the Iraqi Revolution in terms of Herbert Blumer's thesis on social movement.

In his section, "Collective Behavior," in Robert E. Park's book, An Outline of the Principles of Sociology, and as early as 1939, when the Arabic countries were relatively quiet, Blumer predicted revolutions in these countries. In his discussion of the extent and intensity of so-

---

cial unrest, he said: "It may extend to a larger dispersed population as in the instance of contemporary Moslem unrest." Blumer suggested stages of social movements: "It is possible to delineate stages roughly in the career of a social movement which represents this increasing organization."  

For analysis of the stages of the Iraqi revolution, I shall attempt to rely on the following sources:

A. Herbert Blumer's discussion of Dawson and Gettys' four stages of social movements: (1) the stage of social unrest, (2) the stage of popular excitement, (3) the stage of formalization, and, (4) the stage of institutionalization. He devoted a separate chapter to each stage.

B. Carl A. Dawson and Warner E. Gettys' discussion and analysis of the stages of social movements in their book, *An Introduction to Sociology*. They said that:

> Organized social movements follow a fairly uniform pattern in their natural history though they vary from that pattern in certain details. Practically all of them tend to pass through four definite stages in their development -- the preliminary stage of social unrest, the popular stage of collective excitement, the stage of formal organization, and finally the institutionalization.

C. Pitirim A. Sorokin's analysis of revolution in his book, *The Sociology of Revolution*, discusses the two stages of revolutions:

---

2Ibid., p. 227.

3Ibid., p. 259.

4Ibid.


6Ibid.
...every revolutionary period as a whole inevitably consists of two stages indissolubly connected with one another. "Reaction" is not a phenomenon beyond the limits of revolution, but is an unavoidable part of the revolutionary process itself, its second half. The dictatorship of Robespierre or Lenin... was only the mark of its transition into the second stage -- the stage of "reaction" or "restraint" but not its end. Only when "reaction" is finished, when society enters the period of its normal evolution -- only then revolution may be considered as finished.\(^7\)

Pitirim Sorokin drew the following scheme, to illustrate these stages:

```
\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
  \node (revolutionary) {Revolutionary Period};
  \node (normal1) at (0,0) {Normal Period};
  \node (normal2) at (4,0) {Normal Period};
  \node (stage1) at (-2,2) {1st. Stage};
  \node (stage2) at (2,2) {2nd. Stage (Reaction)};
  \draw (revolutionary) -- (normal1);
  \draw (revolutionary) -- (normal2);
  \draw (normal1) -- (stage1);
  \draw (normal2) -- (stage2);
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}
```

D. Lyford P. Edwards said in his book, *The Natural History of Revolution*, that: "...it takes three generations to develop a revolution."\(^9\)

A more complete synthetic scheme based on the work of Gettys, Blumer, Dawson, Sorokin, and Edwards, will be employed as a frame of


\(^8\)Ibid., p. 8.

reference to analyze the steps of the Iraqi Revolution. This combination is stated briefly in the third section of this paper. The four-stage model is quoted verbatim from an article by Rex D. Hopper, who depended mainly on Blumer's thesis on social movements.

III. A brief exposition of the leading ideas.

After a study of the works of such pioneers as Sorokin, Edwards, Gettys, Dawson and Blumer, Rex D. Hopper has constructed a general typology of revolutionary behavior which was applied to Iraq, drawn in four stages. The contributions of each of these men are stated in the second section of the chapter.

A. The preliminary stage of mass (individual) excitement and unrest.

In this stage, the socio-psychological conditions may be grouped under six headings arranged on a sequential order:

1. General restlessness which manifests itself in:
   a. Wish repression.
   b. Restless behavior of individuals.
   c. Increase in crime, vice, insanity, suicide, agitation and travel.

2. The development of class antagonisms as shown by:
   a. The increase in wealth, intelligence, and power of "repressed groups".

---


11 Blumer, op. cit., p. 224.
b. The development of a condition wherein men of ability are shut out from careers of any consequence.

3. Marked governmental inefficiency.

4. Reform efforts on the part of the government.

5. Cultural drift in the direction of revolutionary change.

6. Spread of socialization of restlessness as evidenced by:
   a. Increased tension, cramp, and irritation.
   b. Increased talk of revolution.
   c. Wandering of attention from one individual, object, or line of action to another.

B. The popular stage of crowd (collective) excitement and unrest.

The socio-psychological conditions in this state could be classified as:

1. The spread of discontent and contagious extension of the several signs of unrest and discontent as manifested in:
   a. Increased activity.
   b. Growing focus of attention.
   c. Heightened state of expectancy.

2. The transfer of allegiance of the intellectuals including:
   a. Wish reformulation.
   b. Loss of faith in their leadership on the part of the repressed classes and the loss of faith in themselves on the part of the leaders.
   c. Spread of rumor and scandal and the development of a literature of exposure.
   d. Emergence of the "good man" fallacy.
   e. Identification of the guilty group, focusing of attention
6.

on it, and the development of an "advertising offensive" against it.

f. Development of an "oppression psychosis."

3. The fabrication of a social myth with these allied characteristics:
   a. Creation of collective illusions, myths, and doctrines.
   b. Emergence of the economic incentive to revolutionary action.
   c. Development of a tentative object of loyalty.

4. The emergence of conflict with the "out-group" and the resultant increase in "in-group" consciousness.

5. The organization of the discontented for the purpose of remedying the threatened or actual breakdown of government.

6. The presentation of revolutionary demands, which if granted, would amount to the abdication of those in power.

C. The formal state of the formulation of issues and formation of publics.

Two major developments occur:

1. The fixation of motives (attitudes) and the definite formulation of aims (values). This major characteristic is paralleled by these developments:
   a. A struggle between the conservative, moderate and radical factions of the revolutionary group: the continuation of the "in-group -- out-group" conflict, and the intensification of class antagonisms.
   b. The moderate faction gains control to the accompaniment of these typical events:
(1) Release of prisoners.
(2) Apparent cooperation of reformers and revolutionists.
(3) Abortive attempts of the radicals to seize power.
(4) Radical-conservative coalition attacks on the reformers.
(5) Evidence of manifest incompetence on the part of the reformers.

c. The reformers are confronted with these typical handicaps:
   (1) Fear of armed invasion.
   (2) Fear of internal rebellion.
   (3) Political inexperience.

d. The desertion of lukewarm supporters.

e. The elimination of the conservative by the reformers.

f. A movement toward the "left" or an "uncontrollable" swing of the masses toward radicalism.

g. The emergence of the typical "perversions."

h. The development of a set of norms formally stated in dogma and formally expressed in rituals, together with a marked increase in the use of shibboleths.

i. The fusion of patriotism and the social myth elevate the radicals to power.

j. The radicals are also confronted with three typical dangers:
   (1) The danger of conservative opposition and foreign invasion or intervention.
   (2) Domestic insurrection.
   (3) Political inexperience.

2. The development of an organizational structure with leaders.
This is accompanied by:

a. The increasing recognition of organizational breakdown and governmental inefficiency.

b. The development of a condition of dual sovereignty.

c. The occurrence of an immediate precipitating factor and the seizure of power by the radicals.

d. The presence of conflict within the ranks of the radicals.

e. The formation of a provisional government.

f. A "lull" between the seizure of power by the radicals and the initiation of the "Reign of Terror."

g. The use of the "Reign of Terror" as a control technique.

D. The Institutional State of Legalization and Social Organization.

The revolution transfer from the formal to the institutional stage may be classified as:

Causal or transitional
resultant or accommodative

1. Causal characteristics:

a. Psychological exhaustion which undermines the emotional foundations of the revolution.

b. Moral let-down and return to old habits (attitudes), including "escape recreation" and the re-emergence of graft, speculation, and corruption become deterrents to continued revolutionary behavior.

c. Great economic distress, amounting almost to chaos, demands a settling down.

2. Resultant characteristics:
a. End of the "Reign of Terror;" granting of amnesty; return of exiles; repression of extremists; and search for scapegoats.
b. Increase in powers of central government, frequently resulting in dictatorship.
c. Social reconstruction along lines of the old social structure, but with the new principles (values) essentially intact.
d. Dilution of the revolutionary ideal: transformation of evangelistic fervor for social change into the desire for conquest; transformation of the "revolutionary sect" into a "political denomination."
e. Re-accommodation of church and state.
f. "Reaction to the reaction" represented by escape recreation.
g. The revolution becomes attitudinally established and develops a permanent organization that is acceptable to the current mores; that is, it is institutionalized.

I shall attempt to use all these headings and sub-headings, where pertinent and relevant, to analyze the Iraqi Revolution.

In the next chapter I shall discuss the historical background of Iraq, as well as its geography, population, ethnic groups, and languages. This discussion is for the purpose of acquainting the reader with some pertinent information about Iraq and its people. An understanding of the dynamics of the revolution of July 14, 1958, requires some background knowledge about Iraqi society structure.
Chapter three is a discussion of the preliminary stage of the revolution: The Preliminary Stage of Mass (individual) Excitement and Unrest.

Chapter four is a discussion of the second stage: The Popular Stage of Crowd (collective) Excitement and Unrest, while Chapter five discusses the third stage: The Formal Stage of the Formation of Issues and Formulation of Publics.

The fourth and final stage of the revolution, The Institutional Stage of Legalization and Social Organization, is discussed in Chapter six.
CHAPTER II
INTRODUCTION

1. Geography

The relationship between Iraq's land and the living conditions of its inhabitants is very strong. The economic structure of Iraq has been based on agriculture throughout its history. In the Directory of the Republic of Iraq, M. F. Darwish pointed out that between 1951 and 1960, one of the earliest villages of the prehistoric age was discovered by Professor Ralph Solecki in Shanidar Cave. From this discovery Mr. Darwish concluded that agricultural life in Iraq existed 80,000 to 50,000 years ago. Dr. Hashim Jawad, one of the outstanding Iraqi sociologists, attempted in 1936 to analyze Iraqi society. He mentioned in his book, Introduction to Iraqi Society Structure, that it is quite clear to the student of Iraqi history that the relationship between its land and the economic, social, and political conditions of its inhabitants is closely related. For this reason, it is necessary to take a quick look at the geography of Iraq.

\[12^1\text{M. F. Darwish, et. al., Directory of the Republic of Iraq, (Baghdad, 1960), p. 108.}\]

\[13^1\text{Hashim Jawad, Introduction to Iraqi Society Structure, (Baghdad, 1936), p. 4.}\]
Iraq is located between $48^\circ 45'$ and $38^\circ 45'$ north longitude, and between $29^\circ 15'$ and $38^\circ 25'$ east latitude. The total area of the country is 446,713 square kilometers,\textsuperscript{14} or about as large as the State of California. Iraq is bordered by Turkey from the north, Iran from the east, the Arabic Gulf and Arabia from the south, and Syria and Jordan from the west.\textsuperscript{15}

The weather in Iraq is similar to the weather in the desert. In fact, if Iraq had no rivers, it would be nothing but desert. The weather is characterized by great differences in temperature between day and night and between summer and winter. A few rain showers fall during the winter only. The mountainous region of the country is cool in general, but the rest of the country is hot and dry. The temperature in the summer ranges between $100^\circ$ and $130^\circ$ Fahrenheit. In the winter the temperature is often as low as $25^\circ$ Fahrenheit.\textsuperscript{16}

The northern part of Iraq depends mainly on the winter rains and a few creeks for irrigation. The southern portion of the country depends upon dams across the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, the tributaries of these two rivers, and water canals for irrigation. Table I shows the percentage of water used for irrigation that comes from canals, rainfall, and pumping stations along the rivers.

\textsuperscript{14}One Kilometer = .62 mile or 3,281 feet.

\textsuperscript{15}Darwish, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 53-57.

\textsuperscript{16}Jawad, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 6.
Table I also gives the area in square kilometers that is irrigated by the three methods mentioned.

The terrain of Iraq is divided into three parts; the delta, the hills, and the mountains. Table II gives the percentage and area of land in the various categories.

---

17Darwish, op. cit., p. 75.
TABLE II
IRAQ'S TOPOGRAPHY IN PERCENTAGE AND AREA\textsuperscript{18}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTION</th>
<th>PERCENT</th>
<th>AREA IN Km\textsuperscript{2}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Mountainous area in north and northwest</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>23,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The hills</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>67,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The plateau in the south</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>93,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The desert in the west</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>263,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The plateau in the south consists of an alluvial deposit at the mouth of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. This area is about 300 miles long and 100 miles wide. This strip of land is level and is situated about 150 feet above sea level. The soil is very fertile.

The hills begin just north of the delta and extend up to the Toros mountains. The hills are about 1,000 feet above sea level. The major portion of the hill country is called the "Gazirah" or "Island." The land is dry and poorly developed except in the upper portion of the area where the land is fertile. In the lower part of the hills where the land is poorly developed one can find natural grass scattered about where sheep and cattle can find grazing. Agriculture in the hill country depends upon the winter rains. The main farming products are barley and wheat. There is very little irrigation in that section, and sometimes there is not enough rain to grow the grain.

The mountains are located in the northeastern part of the

\textsuperscript{18}Ibid., p. 64.
country which is called Kurdistan. It contains several chains of mountains some about 14,000 feet above sea level. The valleys between these mountains are fertile areas, but they have not been developed.19

TABLE III

THE LAND OF IRAQ20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land actually used in agriculture:</td>
<td>58,000 Km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest</td>
<td>18,000 Km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountains, deserts, lakes and grass land for cattle grazing:</td>
<td>307,713 Km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land potentially available for agriculture:</td>
<td>63,000Km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As you can see from Table III, less than half of the land which could be used for agriculture is in actual use.

The Tigris and Euphrates Rivers start from the mountains in Kurdistan, flowing through the hills and the delta until they form one river and pour in the Arabic Gulf.

19Jawad, op. cit., pp. 4-6.
20Darwish, op. cit., p. 75.
2. Population

The population of Iraq had never been accurately recorded because the people look with suspicion on governmental action such as taking the population census. They believe that the census is for military draft purposes, or for the collection of taxes. The first attempt to take the population census in Iraq was in 1947. At that time the writer took part in the census. Most of the families did not give the correct information, and some of them refused to cooperate at all. Those who did give some information gave more or less than the actual number of people in their households according to their interpretation of the motives of the government. Dr. Hashim Jawad had a similar view. He adds that some of the nomadic tribes and poor farmers travel all the time, either for the purpose of grazing or for seeking employment in another section of the country. Most of the farmers and nomads have no permanent residence.

The 1957 population census is more dependable, because it was constructed on a more scientific basis and administered according to the best modern procedures. The official population census for the year 1957, however, has not been published to this date. Tables IV and V give a breakdown of the population of Iraq according to the best available population figures. Table IV gives a numerical breakdown of the male and female population. Table V gives a breakdown of population according to residence. In Table V the number of nomads is given as 68,562. This figure is probably an understatement since the constant shifting of the nomadic population makes it extremely difficult to make an accurate tabulation. The number given in the other two categories is probably fairly accurate.
TABLE IV

POPULATION OF IRAQ BY SEX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SEX</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>3,294,073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>3,244,036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,538,109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE V

BREAKDOWN OF POPULATION ACCORDING TO TYPE OF SETTLEMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large Cities</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2,480,102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Towns and Villages</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>3,989,445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomads</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>68,562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>6,538,109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Ethnic Groups and Languages

Man lived in Iraq as early as the Stone Age, and he was in constant contact with other populations and nations throughout its history until modern times. This gave two results:

A. The people of Iraq are a mixture of many races and they have many origins.

B. As a result of the numerous foreign occupations of Iraq, there are still groups who preserve the cultural patterns characteristic

21Ibid., pp. 58-60.

22Ibid.
of their ancestors. Much of the culture of the groups who lived in Iraq during foreign occupations was fused into the greater Kurdish or Arabic culture and became part of it. However, some of the groups have maintained their own unique culture throughout the centuries.23

Usually ethnic groups live in clusters of small villages which are situated apart from the villages of other ethnic groups. In these villages the people speak their indigenous language and practice certain religious, ethical, and cultural patterns which are different from those of the rest of the population. As long as these groups isolate themselves in small villages, they tend to retain most of their own culture. When members of the villages go to large cities such as Baghdad and Basra, they gradually lose their unique customs as well as their language. They start speaking and behaving like Arabs. They usually maintain their religion. For example, Christians in small villages still speak Syrian or Chaldean, but in large cities like Mosul they know no language except Arabic. As is common with many ethnic groups, these people then try to identify themselves with the majority. When they move to large cities they claim that they are Arabs.

The Iraqi population is divided into the following cultural or ethnic religious groups:

(1) Arab Moslems -- The Arab Moslems are the majority group in Iraq. They are divided into two sub-groups; the Shiias and the Sunnis. The former is slightly larger in number. From establishment of the monarchy in 1921 until the present time, the successive Iraqi

23Ibid., p. 421.
cabinets usually contained a Sunni majority. At times only one Shia minister was appointed, and this was done only to keep up the appearance of proportional representation.\(^2\)

(2) The Kurds -- The largest minority are the Kurds, who speak their own language and maintain their own culture. The Kurds are also Moslem Sunnis, but they have no power in the government. They have no political affiliation with the Moslem Sunnis who sit in the cabinet. Occasionally they might have one member represented in the cabinet, but he is powerless. The total number of Kurds is estimated to be about 4.5 millions, but all of them do not live in Iraq. There are Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Iran, and the Soviet Union. The Kurds in Iraq comprise about one-third of the total population. They rebelled against the monarchy from the time it was established in 1921 until it collapsed in 1958.\(^2\) They rebelled because the monarchy tried to make them reject their language and their culture. For example, a child had to learn Arabic in order to go to school.

(3) Christians -- The Christians are the third largest group in Iraq. They are divided into three groups:

a. The Syrian Orthodox who live mainly in the northern part of Iraq, whose culture existed for several centuries throughout the Middle East. All that remains of their culture is concentrated


\(^2\)Ibid., p. 265.
in a few small towns, where they speak the Syrian language. They are a Syrian-speaking population numbering about 12,000. They are religiously affiliated with the Eastern Orthodox Church.

b. The second group is the Syrian Catholic. They are similar in culture to the Syrian Orthodox except in the matter of religion. Their language and customs are the same, but they are a part of the Roman Catholic Church. They number about 25,000 people.

c. The Chaldeans make up the third group of Christians. Their number is about 86,500 people, and they are all that remain of a once dominant culture which existed in northern Iraq.26

(4) Assyrians -- In contrast to other ethnic groups, the Assyrians were newcomers who came from Turkey and Iran during World War I. They settled temporarily in a few villages in Northern Iraq, and were protected by the British Mandatory Authorities, who recruited among them for guard duty on the Royal Air Force air fields and installations. The Assyrians are Nestorian Christians, which is a branch of the Anglican Church.27

To make it easy to control Iraq, the British government used the Assyrians as a cheap weapon to weaken Iraqi nationalist spirit. In 1933, the Assyrians asked for autonomy from the Iraqi government. The Iraqi government responded by sending a punitive expedition, which burned some twenty Assyrian villages, massacring their inhabitants.28

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26 Darwish, op. cit., pp. 419-429.
27 Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 266.
28 Ibid., p. 267.
(5) The Yazidy, or the Devil Worshippers -- According to the 1957 Census, there are 19,000 Yazidis in Iraq. Most of them live in Sinjar. Their religious cults are a mixture of Christianity, Islam, and Zoroastrian. They speak Arabic and worship two powers, good and evil. The good power is symbolized by God who will not attempt to do anything but good, and the evil power is symbolized by the devil. Those who want happiness should worship the devil and ask his approval on their behavior. They reason that God is good and will not harm his children. The devil as the power of evil will bring evil to them unless they worship him.29

(6) The Sibbah -- According to the 1947 Census there are 6,597 Sibbahs in Iraq. They believe that their religious beliefs derive from the teaching of St. John the Baptist. Anthropologists have proven that they still believe and practice much of the Assyrian and Babylonian religion and cult. They worship the stars and believe that the stars direct their religious activities.30

(7) Armenians

(8) Jews

(9) Baha'eyes

(10) Majoos

(11) Zaradasht

(12) Shabak

(13) Sareys

29 Darwish, op. cit., p. 432.

Arabic is the official language of the government, and it is taught in every school in the country. The majority of the people speak Arabic. This is not the classical Arabic of the Koran, but a vernacular having various regional dialects. Every town and village has developed its own dialect. Even though the people speak different dialects, they can understand one another. Some of the small ethnic groups still speak their own language.

4. **History**

Iraq has a long history of highly developed early civilizations. These civilizations existed at very early periods because: (1) the fertile soil of the land was conducive to agriculture, (2) the Tigris and the Euphrates Rivers allowed the early development of a complex irrigated agriculture, (3) the people who lived in the area were conscious of using agriculture as a way of life.

M. F. Darwish said the fossil remains of the earliest people who used sickles for agriculture were discovered near a cave on Mount Carmel. These people were called Natufians. Their name referred to the valley in which they lived. The culture of the Natufians existed during the last period of the old Stone Age, and they formed the beginning of an agricultural society in the area now known as Iraq. The same type of sickles were found near Hassonah's Hill which
is near the site of modern Mosul. The discoveries of Professor Ralph Solecki were mentioned earlier. He discovered fossil remains of man who lived as early as 50,000 B.C. in Shanidar Cave on Baradost Mountain. This mountain is near the city of Rawandooz.

In his book, *Iraq*, George L. Harris said that the early development of a complex irrigated agriculture led to an increase in the food supply which caused population growth and the rise of the earliest cities. The city as a new form of social organization followed the food-gathers, the hunters, and small villages of farmers who inhabited the area in the earlier Neolithic Age. Mr. Harris concluded that:

This vocational specialization had originated, or at least perfected, the basic ideas and techniques that marked man's emergence from his pre-historic past: the wheel, the plow, metallurgy, massive architecture, writing, mathematics, complex government, and written codes of law.

In studying the history of Iraq in its golden ages, we notice that economic prosperity was accomplished by the people as a result of employing the rivers to irrigate the largest possible area of its fertile soil. This was accomplished as a result of two factors: (1) the advancements of agricultural machines and their popular usage, and (2) the sharing of farm products by owners and laborers.

31Ibid., pp. 108-111.
33Jawad, op. cit., p. 2.
Here by the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers were developed the high civilizations of the Sumerians (2500 B.C.), the Babylonians (2100 B.C.), the Assyrians (800-700 B.C.), the Chaldeans (616 B.C.), and the Arab Empire (700-1100 A.D.), and many others.34

The Arab Empire was not necessarily the greatest of the civilizations, but it has been the most lasting. The Abbassid Caliphs of the Arab Empire fell to the hands of the Mongol nomads who came from Central Asia. Their leader, Hulagu, conquered Baghdad in the year 1258, destroying all he touched. Most of the inhabitants of Baghdad were massacred. They threw the books of the Baghdad library in the Tigris River. One Arab writer who lived during that time said that the Tigris was turned red and blue for several days.

The Arabic culture survived the destructive occupation of the Mongols as well as many other occupations of the country until the present time when it is the dominant culture of Iraq.

In the year 1638, Turkish forces led by Murad IV stormed Baghdad, beginning an era of Turkish occupation which continued until World War I.35 After about three-hundred years of Turkish occupation, the natives formed habits of obedience to the Turkish rulers. Established ways of acting accompanied by satisfaction was going on.

In 1908 the Turks appointed an Arab Mullah36 called Hussein to

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36 The Mullah in Islam is equal to the pastor in Christianity.
be guardian of the Islamic Holy City of Mecca in Southern Arabia. In 1916, the British encouraged Hussein to turn his people against the Turks with the promise of making Hussein and his sons kings of the Arab Countries. Hussein's sons, Faisal and Abdullah responded enthusiastically and helped the British take over Damascus in 1918. While the fighting was going on in Damascus, Syria, other British forces under Sir Stanley Maude took the City of Baghdad from the Turks in the year 1917.

5. Preliminary Statement

It is the aim of social scientists to be objective, to minimize personal bias, and to be ethically neutral when analyzing human behavior. But I must admit that, because I was born and reared during the Iraqi revolution, I have my love to Iraq, my admiration and respect to certain political groups and leaders, my hate to certain people and groups. I also have my hopes for the future of Iraq and my fear for the safety of my family who reside in Iraq at the present time. In spite of this, I shall try to emancipate myself from all feelings and sentiments to the best of my ability.

The French, American and Russian revolutions have been analyzed numerous times by an army of writers. The Iraqi revolution is still going on and is not over. To my knowledge, however, this is the first attempt to analyze the Iraqi revolution within a sociological frame of reference. In using a sociological frame of reference we have to relate the facts collected on revolutionary behavior to sociological concepts.
Crane Brinton said in *The Anatomy of Revolution*, that:

Actually the scientist cannot work without a conceptual scheme; and though the relation between facts and conceptual schemes is not by any means clear, it is at least clear that a conceptual scheme involves something beside facts, involves, indeed, a working mind.\(^37\)

The Iraqi revolution is not similar to all other revolutions. It is unique in its historical setting, unique in its processes, and unique in its character. But the use of a constructed typology of revolutionary behavior has considerable heuristic value.

CHAPTER III

THE PRELIMINARY STAGE OF MASS (INDIVIDUAL)

EXCITEMENT AND UNREST

In this preliminary stage, the socio-psychological conditions may be grouped under six headings, arranged on a sequential order.

I. General restlessness which manifests itself in three developments.

A. The breakdown of the habit of obedience to governmental authority.

The Turkish occupation of Iraq that had existed for approximately three hundred years had taken a set form. The population had accepted the Turkish occupation and had settled down to obeying the Turkish authorities. Then came the events of World War I. Between January 9, 1917, and March 11, 1917, the British army under the leadership of Sir Stanley Maude had conquered Iraq and driven the Turkish army back to the north.\(^{38}\) This event had disturbed the routine way of life and created an elementary form of collective behavior.

According to Herbert Blumer, spontaneous and elementary collective behavior is aroused when "...conditions of unrest or disturbance in the usual forms of living or routines of life occur."\(^{39}\)

The British conquest of the Turks in Iraq gave the people an impulse or a desire to rid themselves of the British occupation and

\(^{38}\) Darwish, op. cit., p. 219.

have a self-ruling government because: (1) The Arabs saw the Turks and the British fighting over their country while they stood by and watched; (2) the Turks were Moslems, and they shared the same religion with the majority of the population; (3) the Turks also shared many of the folkways and mores of the Arabs; (4) the British army of occupation had nothing in common with the Arabs. Their religion and folkways were completely different. As a result of all these factors, a breakdown of the "habit of obedience" occurred.

The Iraqi people did not transfer their habit of obedience from the Turkish to the British authorities. The British did not have a monopoly of power in Iraq, because, as Peter Amann put it: "The power monopoly of the state depends largely, not on the consent of the governed, but on their habit of obedience whatever its motive." Amann states further that a revolution can be defined as:

...a breakdown, momentary or prolonged, of the state's monopoly of power, usually accompanied by a lessening of the habit of obedience. The sequence of this breakdown varies.

We conclude from the foregoing that the Iraqi revolution started in March, 1917, because the habit of obedience of the Iraqi people to the government was definitely broken at that time.

40Amann defines the state as, "...a political organization exercising, or able to exercise, a monopoly of armed forces, justice and administration over a given area and population."


42Amann, op. cit., p. 38.

The breakdown of the habit of obedience in Iraq was exhibited in dissatisfaction with the British occupation. Herbert Blumer said: "When people have impulses, desires, or dispositions which cannot be satisfied by the existing forms of living, they are in a state of unrest." 43

The experience of seeing the power of the Turks fall to the British caused a general feeling of unrest among the Iraqi people. They had an urgent need to act, to assert their own power, but they felt balked even before they tried to act. 44

C. Restless behavior of the individuals.

From March, 1917, until June 30, 1920, the Iraqi people remained restive under British control. During this three year period the temper of the people was building up to violence. On June 30, 1920, an action occurred which allowed the people to discharge their discomfort and frustrations. There was a skirmish between the British troops and Iraqi people in the small town of Rumaitha, and the first bullets were exchanged. This skirmish was followed by similar reactions all over the country. There were losses on both sides, but the British lost many men and much ammunition. 45 Their losses were so heavy that after about six months Sir Percy Cox, the British governor, asked Abdul Rohman el Nakeeb to establish a temporary government as a step for self-government.

43Blumer, op. cit., p. 171.
44Ibid.
45Darwish, op. cit., p. 220.
II. **The Development of Class Antagonisms.**

A. The origin of the governing class.

The British government began to realize that they could not stay in Iraq as conquerors. They were forced to allow the Iraqi people to think they were self-governing. The British authorities asked many of the natives to accept positions in the new government, but they were careful to select natives who would cooperate with them. Thus was born a new class of people in Iraq - the governing class.

B. The increase in power and wealth of the governing class.

As soon as the governing class accepted their new positions, their bank accounts soared higher and higher. They built huge mansions and began to spend their vacations in Europe. Most of their wealth had come to them illegally. The royal family was relatively poor originally. They resided in Mecca and lived off the proceeds from pilgrims during the season of religious pilgrimages. After the British awarded them the crown, they became wealthy in a very short time. The power of the governing class started to increase gradually as the British placed more trust in them. As the Iraqi governing class gained power, they tried to foster the antagonism of the people against the British officials, but this was a very slow process.

III. **The origin and development of circular reaction.**

The temporary government under Abdul Rohman el Nakeeh helped the situation very little, and the tension that had been building up continued. Because of the continuing tension, Sir Winston Churchill was forced to act. On March 9, 1921, he had a conference with his
top military advisers in Cairo. The decision of the meeting was to make Faisal, son of Hussein of Mecca, king of Iraq. Faisal had been in London for some time asking the British government to fulfill its promise to make him king of one of the Arabic countries. Faisal had become more insistent in his demands after he was expelled from Syria.

On June 23, 1921, Faisal entered Baghdad where he was welcomed by the British governor. In the short period of three weeks the temporary government "decided" to make him king of Iraq. An election was conducted by the British authorities, and they claimed that Faisal won ninety-seven percent of the votes.46

Certainly, Faisal I owed his crown to England, and in actual fact the monarchy was a puppet regime in the hands of the British. The Iraqi people realized this, and the breakdown of the habit of obedience to the monarchy continued, as witnessed in the following examples: (a) The Kurds who constituted one-third of the population had abstained from voting as a token of their disapproval at being ruled by an Arab Pro-British king.47 Under the leadership of Shiek Mahmoud the Kurds revolted against the king in 1927 and 1931. (b) The Shiias were rather cool to Faisal. They looked on him as an "imported" Sunni ruler. The Shia hierarchy was anti-British beside being anti-Sunni and ostensibly used passive resistance in Southern Iraq to counter Anglo-Iraqi projects.48

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46Ibid., pp. 220-221.
47Lenzowski, op. cit., p. 265.
48Darwish, op. cit., p. 327.
By 1922 Faisal was so annoyed by their activities that he ordered forty of their religious leaders, or ulama, to be deported to Iran. The Shiias, through their clergy, had strong links with Iran, a pre-dominately Shia country.49 (c) Except for a handful of politicians who accepted the arrangements with England, the Sunnis hated the pro-British king who was "imported" from Saudi Arabia. (d) All minorities, including the Christians, felt that they were ruled by a Moslem-foreigner. The natives who belonged to minority groups had very little power in the government. Key governmental positions and cabinet posts were usually occupied by Moslems. In general, minorities had less access to jobs and business opportunities than the Arab Moslems. The above mentioned conditions of Iraqi groupings made individuals respond to one another and carry on conversations about the government with members of other groups, "interpreting one another's actions or remarks and then reacting on the basis of the interpretation," as Herbert Blumer put it in his explanation of "circular reaction." He further states that:

Responses, consequently, are not made directly to the stimulation, but follow, rather, upon interpretation. Further, they are likely to be different in nature from the stimulating acts, being essentially adjusted to these acts.50

This circular reaction was expressed by a strong national agitation against British forces. It gave the people a common feeling about the pro-British monarchy and was the basis for the acting crowds and mobs which took place in Iraq at a later date.

49 Ibid.
50 Blumer, op. cit., p. 170.
After a year of such agitation the British decided to exercise its control through a treaty with the puppet monarchy regime. Lenczowski reports that such a treaty was concluded on October 10, 1922. Together with four important subsidiary agreements, the treaty confirmed British control of Iraq by giving Britain the right to: (1) appoint "advisers" to the Iraqi government, (2) "assist" the Iraqi Army, (3) protect foreigners, (4) "advise" Iraq on fiscal matters, and (5) "advise" Iraqi people on matters of foreign relations. The words "advisers," "assist," and "advise," were included in the treaty because the British feared a revolt of the Iraqi people. Certainly in practice these "advisers" and "assistants" were British officers who handed down orders to the Iraqi officials. The treaty would have been more honest if it had read, "Orders will be handed down by the British officers." The treaty left no authority to the Iraqi officials. They could not act on the simplest matter without being "advised" first.

IV. The continuing revolution as exhibited by ethnic group insurrections.

In order to exercise more control over the country, the British helped establish the Iraqi Army on one hand and aid some insurrectionist movements against the government on the other. Although the essential duty of the army was to defend Iraq from outside aggression, it was used in fighting any movement or revolt against the corrupt puppet regime. The army was used to suppress a number of insurrections:

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51 Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 270.
A. The First Kurdish Movement of Sheik Mahmoud - 1927.
C. The First Barzani-Kurdish Movement - 1932.
D. The Assyrian Massacre of 1933.
E. The Chasing of Khakil Khoshboy’s group of 1935.
F. The First Euphrates Movement of 1935.
G. The Sinjar Movement of 1935.
I. The Gailani-Nazi Movement of 1941.
J. The Second Barzani Movement of 1943.
K. The Third Barzani Movement of 1945.52

For a period of eighteen years, 1927 - 1945, the Iraqi Army was used against the above mentioned groups to put down an insurrection or an unsuccessful revolt.

V. Marked governmental inefficiency.
A. Inefficient bureaucracy with corrupt officials.

In order to understand the problems during the monarchy, 1921 - 1958, we have to take a quick look at the local governmental system. The present local governmental system was initiated in the year 539 B.C., during the Persian conquest and was changed and developed by the various peoples who occupied Iraq through the years. At the present time Iraq is divided into fourteen districts called Lewah. Each district is divided into smaller divisions called Kadah, and each of the latter contains many Nahiyah. Each Nahiyah contains

52Darwish, op. cit., pp. 326-327.
several villages. In the 14 Lewah there are 60 Kodah, 174 Nahiyah and 9,919 villages and towns. In every Lewah, or district, there are two councils elected by the people to manage its affairs and carry out the orders handed down to them by the Minister of the Interior. With the exception of the members of the two councils in each district, all officials of the local government are appointed by the Minister of the Interior. There is but one law that regulates the duties of all local officials in the country. According to this law, all municipalities in Iraq are managed by one department which is part of the Ministry of Interior. Each municipality has a local board elected by the people of the town to cooperate with the government. It is extremely difficult under such a bureaucratic structure to accomplish any efficiency in the government even if the officials were dedicated and sincere. But in actual practice it was a system of corruption and bribery from the upper bureaucrats of the royal family down to the farrash, the man who cleaned the offices and served tea.

B. The failure of the educational system.

In 1920 Iraq had a high rate of illiteracy among its people. Almost 99% of the people were illiterate. Dr. Hashim Jawad made a study of the number of students attending elementary and secondary schools in Iraq during the period 1920 - 1930.

53 Ibid., pp. 93-95.
TABLE VI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Schools</th>
<th>Number of Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920-1921</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>6,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921-1922</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>15,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922-1923</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>17,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923-1924</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>18,558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924-1925</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>20,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925-1926</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>22,712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926-1927</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>24,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927-1928</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>26,706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928-1929</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>28,103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929-1930</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>30,888</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table VI shows the slow development of elementary school education. They succeeded in having 30,888 students in grammar school after 10 years of monarchy.

TABLE VII

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Schools</th>
<th>Number of Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table VII shows the failure of the monarchy to develop secondary education. In a country of about three million population, and after 10 years of the monarchy, they had less than two thousand students.

### TABLE VIII

TOTAL NUMBER OF STUDENTS WHO GRADUATED BETWEEN 1919-1944.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Total Number of Graduates 1919-1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>College of Law</td>
<td>1,201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College for Secondary School Teachers</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College for Elementary School Teachers  (boys)</td>
<td>2,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College for Elementary School Teachers  (girls)</td>
<td>991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Schools</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture Schools</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Schools (preparatory)</td>
<td>3,669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Schools (middle)</td>
<td>1,571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary Schools</td>
<td>51,847</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9 shows that only 5,500 professionals were graduated from schools in Iraq during a twenty-five year period. This is an extremely low number of graduates in a country of seven million population. The monarchy did not encourage education at a time when there was a great need for it, and economically the country could support massive education. The reason for this paradox was simple: the intellectuals had turned against the monarchy and had heaped bitter attacks on its policy.

VI. Cultural drift in the direction of revolutionary changes.

On the morning of September 8, 1933, it was announced that King Faisal I was dead. His son, Ghazi, inherited the throne. During this period Iraq's ruling oligarchy was divided into two main groups: (1) those who favored British control, and (2) those who opposed any British interference in their government. The pro-British group was headed by former officers of the army such as General Nuri es-Said, General Jafar el-Askari, and Janiel el-Madfai. The anti-British group was more numerous, including such respected personalities as Hikmot Suleiman (very pro-Turkish and brother of powerful Turk General Mahmud Shevket Pasha), Rashid Ali el-Gailani and Kamil el-Chadirchi. This Anti-British group had formed in 1930 the Ikha el-Watani, or National Brotherhood Party, and had opposed the signing of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of that year. This group dominated Iraqi politics from the death of Faisal I in 1933 to 1936.55 In 1931 some educated young men formed a group called Ahali, or Peoples' Party, which began to preach a new philosophy of "populism." It was

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55Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 273.
a mixture of socialism and democracy, advocating radical reforms, freedom of the press, and more governmental control. They published a very popular newspaper called by the same name, Ahali. The Ahali group cooperated with the National Brotherhood Party, and they instituted a military coup led by General Bakir Sidki. They succeeded in overthrowing the pro-British cabinet and ousting its leader, Yasin el-Hashimy. A new cabinet was established under the leadership of Hikmot Suleiman on the same day. The cooperation between the National Brotherhood Party and the Ahali group did not last long. Jafar Abo el-Timan and Kamil el-Chadirchi of the Ahali Party resigned June 19, 1937. They disagreed on certain matters of internal and external policy. This marked a turning point in the Iraqi revolution. The two revolutionary powers were divided among themselves. The future of a revolutionary government depends heavily on the disciplined unity of the rebels prior to their success and also on the extent to which they have been conditioned to accept the decisions of a recognized leadership. That is the reason why Iraq is suffering now from political chaos.56

On August 11, 1937, Bakir Sidki, who led the army coup was assassinated. As a result, the prime minister was forced to resign, and a pro-British government was restored.57

56Ibid., p. 275.
57Ibid., p. 276.
CHAPTER IV

THE POPULAR STAGE OF CROWD (COLLECTIVE)

EXCITEMENT AND UNREST

The socio-psychological conditions in this stage could be classified as follows:

I. The spread of discontent and contagious extension of several signs of unrest and discontent.

A. Collective excitement on Ghazi's death.

King Ghazi was not as weak and obedient to the British as was his father. This fact was known to the Iraqi people. Consequently, he gained some popularity during the six years he was in power. On April 4, 1939, Ghazi met his death. The official statement of Baghdad radio claimed that he died in an automobile accident near Baghdad. Rumors spread over the country that the king was assassinated. It was said that Ghazi was killed by the British with the cooperation of Nuri es-Said and Abdul Ilah, Ghazi's brother-in-law. The British newspapers made matters worse by expressing a feeling of relief at his death. This exciting event caught the attention of the people and aroused their deep concern and interest. As Blumer expressed it:

In becoming preoccupied with this event and stirred by its excitatory character, an individual is already likely to lose some of his ordinary self-control and to be dominated by the exciting object. Further,

58Darwish, op. cit., p. 224.
this kind of experience, by arousing impulses and feelings, establishes a condition of tension which in turn, presses the individual on to action. Thus, a number of people stimulated by the same exciting event are disposed by that very fact to behave like a crowd.\textsuperscript{59} Iraqi individuals lost their ordinary critical understanding and self-control. They entered into rapport with members of other crowds and became infused with the collective excitement which dominated them. They were aroused by the belief that the king had been assassinated, the British expression of relief at his death, and, worst of all, the British action in making Abdul Ilah the regent of Iraq. Abdul Ilah was the maternal uncle of the infant king, Faisal II, and he was to assume the power of the king until Faisal II reached eighteen years of age. Abdul Ilah's cruelty and blind obedience to the British was well known.\textsuperscript{60}

The Iraqi people were aroused to the point of wanting to kill the British. "Yes, kill them," they said to themselves, "and let Iraq rest in peace!" These murderous impulses were aroused in the Iraqis by their sympathetic sharing of collective excitement. Under such conditions, a mob formed in the town of Mosul, and a member of the mob shouted: "And now to the British Consulate!" Of course the rest of the crowd answered: "Yes, to the British Consulate!" On their way to the consulate, one member of the mob shouted: "Death to the imperialists!" The mob found the British Consul, Mr. Monckton and killed him. They then proceeded to destroy everything in the building.

\textsuperscript{59}Blumer, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 179.

\textsuperscript{60}Darwish, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 224.
Similar mobs arose all over the country, but fortunately no one else was killed. It is important to realize that the crowd would not have reacted to a milder suggestion. They were aroused to the point of murder, and they would have ignored any suggestion that was not in line with the aroused impulse.

B. The Iraqis as a mass.

The plot to kill King Ghazi was a well-kept secret. Rashid Ali el-Gailani reported in his autobiography that the Minister of Finance, Rustam Haydar, was the only man who knew about the plot between the British and Nuri es-Said. After the British Consul was assassinated in Mosul, and mobs began to appear over the country, the plotters became afraid that Haydar would reveal the plot. They paid a man to kill the Minister of Finance so that he could not publish what he knew. After Haydar's assassination, a special military court was established to pass a light sentence on the assassin.  

King Ghazi's death and the ensuing events created a shared excitement about national events, or, in other words, it created a mass.

The Iraqi people turned into one big mass because of the following reasons derived from Blumer's conception of a mass:

1. They came from all walks of life: Christians, Shiias, Yazides, Sunnis, Kurds, etc.
2. They were an anonymous group.
3. They were physically separated from one another.

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61 Ibid., p. 225.
62 Ibid.
example: the Kurdish community in the northeast, the Shiias in the south, and the Christians in the northern villages.

(4) They were not organized and, therefore, were not able to act as a unity.°

The mass excitement in 1940 had a wholesome effect on the people in one respect. It focused the attention of the people on national issues, and many ethnic group differences were forgotten. These areas of national interest were not defined by any rules or regulations. Every individual was highly interested in the "puppet" monarchy and the British action in Iraq, but at the same time they were puzzled by what they saw. They looked with suspicion on any governmental action. Iraqi officials published very short and vague statements about the government or any government action. They referred to the British Embassy in Iraq in ambiguous symbols such as, "John's father" or "the mayor of the western side," interpreting any British action in a vague and confused way. At this stage there was no established leadership. Iraqis were merely an aggregate of individuals who shared common feelings, thus they were homogeneous.

As time passed the Anti-British and anti-monarchy sentiments kept building up. Added to this was the effect of Nazi propaganda and the Nazi success in the early days of World War II.

C. The Nazi Coup d'état.

Rashid Ali el-Gailani who was hostile to the British, in cooperation with a group of four colonels known as the "Golden Square,"°

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°They were Salah el-Dean, Kamil Shabih, Fahmi el-Saied, and Mohammed Salam. These four men, as well as Gailani, were pro-Nazi in their sentiments.
plotted a coup d'etat. On April 12, 1941, they executed their plan and ended the pro-British government by discharging the regent, Abdul Ilah, from all his duties and appointing a new man, Sharif Sharaf, in his place. Rashid Ali el-Gailani headed a new cabinet called, "The Government for National Defense."65

Abdul Ilah, Nuri es-Said, the royal family, and the majority of the cabinet members escaped to Jordan. Suddenly Iraq turned into one large crowd. Mobs marched in every town and village in the country asking the new government to, "kick the British out!" Volunteers of students, workers, and white-collar employees joined the army. Toward the end of April a British-Indian military force landed in Basra, a southern port. This provoked Iraqi opposition, and fighting began on May 1, 1941. Iraqi artillery surrounded the British air base at Habbaniya while other forces kept watch on the grounds of the British Embassy in Baghdad, where the British colony found refuge. Rashid Ali and his associates hoped to secure Axis military assistance, but Germany was not prepared to divert any substantial military aid to Iraq due to their expected attack on Greece. Britain rushed additional troops from Palestine to restore Habbaniya and fought a bloody battle at Falluja. With cooperation from Basra-based troops they entered Baghdad at the end of May. Rashid Ali escaped to Iran with the rest of the rebel leaders, and the British forces restored the monarchy.66

D. "Al Wathbah," The Uprising.

January 15, 1948, a treaty was signed at Portsmouth, England,

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65Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 273.

66Ibid.
by the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, and the Prime Minis-
ter of Iraq, Salih Jabir. The treaty was to revise the Anglo-Iraqi
Treaty of 1930. The London Times reported that Mr. Bevin said:

This treaty is the beginning of a new series of
treaties, regularizing and expressing the friend-
ship between this country and the Arabic world.
Great Britain prizes that friendship and I am
sure the Arabic world equally prizes it.67

However, Majid Kadduri states in his book, Independent Iraq, that:

Before the text of the treaty was made public in
Baghdad, demonstrations took place almost daily since
the Iraqi Foreign Minister stated on 3 January that
negotiations were in progress for signing a new Treaty
of Alliance between Britain and Iraq.68

Mobs were organized by students of various colleges and high schools
and were joined by popular mobs when the treaty was released to the
Iraqi daily papers on January 16, 1948.69 These mobs were demanding:

(1) The resignation of Salih Jabir and dissolution of the
Parliament.

(2) New elections.

(3) Repudiation of the treaty.

(4) More freedom for individuals and groups.

The popular mobs reached a high pitch when the Prime Minister, Salih
Jabir, returned from England and broadcast a statement to the nation
defending his position before the Iraqi public.70

I took part in the student demonstrations in my home town of


69The Arabic text in, Sawt al Ahali, Baghdad, January 16, 1948.

70Ibid., p. 272.
Mosul. These student groups used to start from the largest preparatory school in the town. Usually the demonstration would be planned the previous night, but sometimes they would be spontaneous. For instance, during a regular class period, a student would stand up suddenly and shout, "Yaskoot, Nuri es-Said Ya!" ("Down with Nuri es-Said!"). The rest of the students would answer, "Yaskoot!" ("Down!"). The students would carry the initiator on their shoulders out of the classroom. The other classes would join the first group and they would continue out to the yard. A short meeting would be held, with two or three students making speeches against the Prime Minister.

The students would march through the city past the other schools, gaining new marchers as they went. According to the size of the group, either one or two of them would read poetry or make impromptu speeches while passing through the streets. After the students from the several schools were assembled, they would march through the market place. There the students would be joined by a crowd of citizens. By that time the assemblage would be quite large, and they would continue the march to the governor's house.

The excitement would build up to a fever pitch on these marches. One person would usually be carried on the shoulders of some of the boys, and he would call the Prime Minister a traitor to the nation. He would enumerate the demands of the students and end by asking for the execution of Salih Jabir.

Some incidents occurred between the police and the students, but there was no bloodshed at that time. On one occasion, a crowd of students, workers, and opposition party members, composed of
Istiklal, Al watani’el Democracy, and the Communist Party marched to the police headquarters in Mosul. They destroyed the front section of the building. They accomplished this without bloodshed, for the police ran from the station. For about a week all policemen were afraid to go out of their homes in their uniforms. If they ventured from their homes, heavy stones would be thrown on them from the projecting windows of the houses, killing or injuring them severely.

In Baghdad, a mob of high school and college students were surrounded by the police on January 27, 1948, near Al Ma'moon bridge. Orders were handed down from Salih Jabir to the general head of the police department, Abd al-Aziz’l Qassab, to shoot down the students. The number of dead is unknown, but Sawt al-Ahali listed twenty-one youngsters who were killed and hundreds who were injured. As a result, Iraq was boiling with anger and hatred for the monarchy.

This clash, which happened for the first time in Iraq's recent history, was called by the Iraqi people: "The Battle of the Bridge," (Ma'raket'l Jesir”), and the movement was called "The Uprising", ("Al Wathbah").

Salih Jabir presented his resignation on the same day of the "Battle of the Bridge," January 27, 1948, and a new cabinet was formed. This was an attempt to answer some of the popular demands, but the people of Iraq vowed never to recognize the monarchy.

II. The transfer of allegiance of the intellectuals.

After the Nazi coup d'etat in 1941, it was clear to every Iraqi that the monarchy was protected by the British army of occupa-

tion in Iraq. Mr. Lenczowski reports that the majority of Iraq's intelligentsia were estranged from the regime, with which they associated all the evils of corruption, subservience to Western imperialism, and isolation from the mainstream of Arab thought and policies.\footnote{Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 298} Iraq's intelligentsia were organized into the following groups:

A. The Istiklal - Independence Party.

The Istiklal Party was established April 20, 1946, and was headed by Mohammed Mahdi Kubba, Faik el-Samieraie, and Seddick Shanshal. They advocated a moderate socialist platform. They stood for complete emancipation from, and severance of links with Britain. They advocated an abrogation of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 and the policy of neutralism in the East-West conflict. This party consisted of members and supporters of the secret Baath Party.\footnote{Ibid.} It was originated by a Syrian Arab Christian named Michel Aflak, who strongly advocated Arab Unity, moderate socialism, and neutrality between the east and west. The Baath Party was not officially a part of the Istiklal Party, but they had similar platforms. Many of the members of the Istiklal Party also belonged to the Baath Party.\footnote{Ibid., p. 299.}

Aflak is worshipped by his followers; but, contrary to other Arab national leaders, no crowds have ever shouted his name, chanted his name or paraded his picture. This is true even until the present time when he controls the party in Syria and Iraq. Although he
controls the government through his position in the Baath Party, Aflak has never held an official post in the government.

Aflak lives in a small, cramped, Damascus apartment with a frayed carpet, cheap furniture, and clothes drying on a balcony washline. The son of a nationalist-minded shopkeeper, Aflak passionately embraced the ideal of Arab unity even as a Damascus schoolboy. His education at the Sorbonne in Paris, where he graduated with honors in history, was financed by a successful uncle who had emigrated to Brazil. After a brief teaching career at a Damascus school, Aflak resigned in 1942 to devote his life to politics and his personal creation, the Baath Party.

Aflak appealed to the people through his writings which overflowed with such sentiments as: "Nationalism is love before everything else;"75 and "A new page is open, the page of those who walk with naked souls as if they were in their own bedroom." The more he talked about wahda Arabiya, (Arab unity), the more influence he gained among the people. His influence extended even to the ranks of the leaders of the Arabic countries. The Baath slogan, " Unity, Freedom, Socialism," was blandly appropriated by many Arab leaders.

The party was revolutionary in nature. Aflak defined revolution as, "...that powerful psychic current, that mandatory struggle, without which the reawakening of a nation cannot be understood."76

When they came to power, the Istiklal Party was full of the Baath supporters, but the Baath had its own secret organization, and

up until the mid-1950's, there were very few Baathists in Iraq.\textsuperscript{77} The monarchy was not as harsh in treating the members of the Baath and Istiklal Parties as they were with other political parties because: (1) They had moderate, and sometimes conservative stands on political issues; (2) They opposed Nuri es-Said, but not the monarchy. (3) They did not have a large following; (4) The leaders of Istiklal did not hesitate to accept cabinet, or other high governmental positions for the price of turning against their own party. In fact, Nuri es-Said's party was full of ex-members of the Istiklal Party. The leaders of both parties used to be arrested after every riot, but they would be released unharmed after a few weeks when the mobs had quieted down.\textsuperscript{78}

\textbf{B. The National Democratic Party.}

The National Democratic Party grew out of an organization called the \textit{Ahali} which was established in 1931, by a group of educated young men. As was mentioned earlier, the \textit{Ahali} group continued to operate until April 20, 1946, when the government permitted them to establish the National Democratic Party. Their influential newspaper, \textit{Ahali}, was widely read throughout the Middle East. The Party was headed by the well-respected popular leader and intellectual called Kamil el-Chadirchi. He was one of the originators of the \textit{Ahali} group, on which he spent most of his family's wealth. His editorials in the \textit{Ahali} were the dominant subject of conversation among students, intelligentsia, and urban proletariat. The publication of the \textit{Ahali} was suspended time and time again by the government.

\textsuperscript{77}Ibid., pp. 24-25.

\textsuperscript{78}Darwish, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 275.
The second personality and Vice-Chairman of the National Democratic Party was a millionaire from Mosul, Mohammed Hadid by name, an economist who disagreed with Kamil and took advantage of his position in the Party to augment his own wealth. This was especially true when he became Minister of Finance during the Kassim Regime, 1958-1963.

This group of leftist intellectuals attacked Western imperialism in the newspaper, Ahali. They thought that the monarchy was a cheap tool in the hands of the West, to be used by the West to further its own interests in Iraq. They advocated positive neutrality in the cold war between East and West, but they did not hesitate to applaud the Soviet Union on many occasions. They advocated socialism as a solution for domestic problems and steadily campaigned for restoration of the democratic process, social justice, and emancipation from Western imperialism in both the political and economic field.\(^79\) The Communist Party, which was organized in 1941, operated illegally in Iraq, but some of its members were interested in the National Democratic Party. The Communist published a paper called, Al-Kaidah. In it they opposed and criticized every political group. They demanded a Republic maintaining close ties with the U.S.S.R. The Communist Party was led by Yousef Salman Yousef who was called Comrade Fahid. He and three other party leaders were hanged on February 14, 1949.\(^80\)

Since communism had been outlawed in Iraq, the secret police

\(^{79}\)Lenczowski, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 275.

\(^{80}\)See \textit{Az-Zaman}, February 15, 1949, for the text of the death sentence.
kept the members of the party under surveillance. They were often imprisoned in the Negrat'1 Salman, a medieval-type prison. Here they were subjected to the most inhumane treatment ever known in the twentieth century. Some of them had their fingernails pulled out or their hair burned. Others would be tied upside down in a dirty toilet, and, in addition to this, they would be whipped. Some prisoners were given injections of bacteria to cause tuberculosis of the bone. The prisoners were tortured in most inhumane fashion, but they were left just enough strength to survive. Reports of these inhumane punishments were published in the Abali. Consequently, it created a very strong and violent hatred for Nuri es-Said and the monarchy.81

We notice from the above discussion that the revolutionary power blocks were divided among themselves, each having played a role in revolutionary behavior, each having had a certain number of followers, and each opposed to the rest of the revolutionary power blocks. The Baath, for example, was very strongly opposed to the National Democratic and the Communist Parties and disagreed with the Istiklal Party on different matters. So did every other power block. This was dangerous because, as Amann put it:

The future of an insurrectionary government depends heavily on the disciplined unity of the rebels prior to their success and on the extent to which they have been conditioned to accept the decisions of a recognized leadership.82

This split opposition of the power blocks posed a dangerous threat to the future authority of the new government to be established in 1958.

81Khadduri, op. cit., p. 271.

82Amann, op. cit., p. 41.
Borrowing the term from Amann, I referred to each of these political groups as a "power block" because each of them was too strong to be suppressed by ordinary police action. They had usurped military, administrative, and judicial powers traditionally held by the monarchy.83

III. The presentation of revolutionary demands which, if granted, would have amounted to the abdication of those in power.

Around the end of 1951, the opposition to the pro-British Prime Minister, Nuri es-Said consisted of the following political groupings:

(1) The Istiklal Party.
(2) The National Democratic Party.
(3) Independent politicians who hated and opposed Nuri es-Said personally.

The above three groups had formed a political unity called, "The United Popular Front" for purposes of inter-party cooperation.84 Both the Istiklal and National Democratic Parties kept their organization and followers separate. The United Popular Front published a widely read newspaper called The Popular Front.85

On October 28, 1952, the United Popular Front presented a note to the Regent, Abdul Ilah, signed by the popular leaders of the Front. This note was nothing more than a statement of revolutionary demands. If the monarchy had granted these demands, such action would have amounted to its abdication. These revolutionary demands were published in every newspaper in the country, asking for the following:

83Ibid.
84Ibid., p. 274.
85Ibid.
(1) Universal direct suffrage.
(2) Purge of the Administration.
(3) Limitation of land ownership.
(4) Disarmament of the tribes.
(5) Lowering of prices on consumer goods.
(6) Revision of the constitution in order to abolish the royal power to dissolve Parliament and demand resignations from cabinet members.
(7) Peremptory abrogation of the Treaty of 1930 with Britain.
(8) Rejection of the Western-sponsored regional defense plan.86

The regent's reply was very unsatisfactory. He refused to even consider any of their demands. The editors of The Popular Front published his reply the next day with a very severe criticism. The members of the United Popular Front redoubled their efforts to obtain reforms. They threatened to boycott the forthcoming elections unless the electoral law was amended to provide for direct elections.87 The demands of the United Popular Front had the support of the majority of the people, and they had hoped to see the demands accomplished. The regent's curt refusal created a feeling among the people that there was an urgent need to act.

The students of the colleges in Baghdad went on strike, and a committee was established in each college to prevent the entrance of students to the college buildings. This tended to build tension and collective excitement went very high. The government attempted to

86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
break up the strike. On November 22, 1952, a student in the College of Pharmacy and Chemistry was sent as an emissary of the government to break up the strike. He asked the strike committee to let him enter the school to attend class. An argument started between the student and the strike committee. The student pulled out a pistol and started to shoot into the group of unarmed men, injuring some of them. Within a very short time the riot had spread all over Baghdad. Large mobs initiated an attack on Nuri es-Said's headquarters, the United States Information Office, and other government offices. Local police failed to prevent the attacks of the mobs.88 These riots were symptomatic of the political situation in Iraq.

Urban intelligentsia were united with the poor in a rebellious struggle against the government and foreign influences. Faced with an untenable situation, the cabinet resigned on the first day of the demonstrations. On November 23, 1952, the regent asked General Nuri el-Din Mahmud, the army chief of staff, to form a cabinet. Mahmud's first act was to proclaim martial law, close the schools, and arrest the leaders of the Istiklal, National Democrats, and Communist Parties. After having applied these repressive measures, General Mahmud broadcast his cabinet's decision to implement a number of reforms. In practice, none of these reforms were carried out. The Premier banned publication of twenty-eight newspapers including the publications belonging to any political party.89

88Mohammed el-Obta, The Man of the Street in Baghdad, (Baghdad, 1962), p. 120.

89Ibid., pp. 120-125.
CHAPTER V

THE FORMAL STAGE OF THE FORMATION OF PUBLICS AND FORMULATION OF ISSUES

From the discussion of the Iraqi political parties, we noticed that each of the power blocks had fixed attitudes and motives. Each had interpreted its own philosophy into the Iraqi framework, and from it each block had developed its aim, and transferred it to values. Each power block had its organizational structure, and finally each had its own leadership.

It was mentioned earlier that the Iraqi people had reached the condition of being a mass. The next step in this development is the formation of publics. Borrowing from Blumer's definition of publics, the Iraqi people were:

1. Confronted with the issue of government.
2. The opposing power blocks or parties were divided in their opinions as to how to solve the national problems.
3. These power blocks were engaged in discussions over the issues of the government.90

The Iraqi people were aroused by an appeal to a sentiment which was common to them. They then began to mill and develop rapport. Their expressions were in a form of public sentiment and not public opinion.

The last two or three years which preceded the revolution of 1958 were relatively quiet, at least outwardly. The tension of the

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90Blumer, op. cit., p. 189.
people was building up to an outbreak, but it was as if the fires of revolution were smoldering beneath the surface.
CHAPTER VI

THE INSTITUTIONAL STAGE OF LEGALIZATION AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

On July 14, 1958, the Iraqi revolution was transferred from the formal to the institutional stage as follows:

I. The psychological exhaustion which undermines the emotional foundation of revolution.

By 6:00 am, July 14, 1958, Baghdad radio was trumpeting: "Citizens of Baghdad, the monarchy is dead! The Republic is here!"91 Those who were up at that early hour were shocked to hear the news on the radio. The news created a state of confusion among the people. They turned the speakers of their radios as high as they could. They were shouting and crying: "Wake up, wake up! We are free! It is a republic!"92 The people ran into the streets in their night clothes. Teenagers shouted: "Long live our republic: to hell with Nuri es-Said, Abdul Ilah, and the monarchy!" They then started marching in the streets.93 Asked to describe their feelings at that moment, some Iraqi students failed to find words to express their feelings. They kept repeating that it was a happy moment: the happiest moment of their lives. On that morning the people of Iraq were drunk with pleasure, and the

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91Obta, op. cit., p. 198.
92Ibid., p. 279.
93Ibid.
whole population turned into a single mob.

Up at dawn to leave for a Baghdad Pact meeting in Istanbul, King Faisal II was still in his underwear shaving when the soldiers broke past the guards at the gates of the royal palace. Outside, a mob of people had already set the pillared white building ablaze, and smoke drove the twenty-three year old king down into the courtyard where the soldiers and crowds were waiting. Crown Prince Abdul Ilah ordered the palace guard to open fire and reached for his own pistol. Guns blazed on both sides, and Faisal II was dead. The crown prince fell wounded nearby.

While the king's body was treated with respect, Abdul Ilah lived to feel the full revenge of the people. They tied him to an army jeep and dragged him, while still alive, in the streets of Baghdad. After he was dead they cut his body in pieces and hanged the pieces in front of the building which housed the Ministry of Defense. They allowed the pieces of Abdul Ilah's body to hang for two days in the same spot where he used to hang his enemies.94

The man who was directly responsible for the coup was Brigadier General Abdul Karim Kassim, the leader of the Twentieth Brigade. His next in command was Colonel Abdul Salam Aref. The plan which was executed on the morning of July 14, 1958, had been born in a secret meeting between these two men in Geneva, Switzerland, several months earlier.

Later that same morning Baghdad radio broadcast the following announcement:

94 *News Week*, July 28, 1958, p. 25.
With the aid of God Almighty and the support of the people and the Armed forces, we have liberated the country from the domination of a corrupt group which was installed by imperialism to lull the people. The Army is yours. It has already achieved your wish and got rid of tyrants who played with the rights of the people. It is your duty to support it. Victory can be achieved only through the organization of the army, and by defending it against imperialist conspiracies. We appeal to the people to inform the authorities of all traitors and corrupt persons so that we may get rid of them. We ask you to be united in an effort to destroy those criminals and to rid the country of their evils.

We call on you to be calm and to uphold discipline, unity, and cooperation in the interests of the country. Be confident that we shall continue to work for you. Power will be given to a government inspired by the people. There will be an Iraqi republic which will preserve Iraqi unity, maintain brotherly ties with other Arab countries, and treaties which are in the interests of the country and will carry out the principles of the Bandung Conference and the United Nations Charter. A council of sovereignty will carry out presidential duties until there is a general plebiscite.

The Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.95

Answering a Newsweek reporter on July 28, 1958, General Abdul Karim Kassim, the leader of the Twentieth Brigade who marched through Baghdad late on the night of July 13, 1958, said:

Only two men knew when the zero hour arrived-I and my friend, Col. Abdel [sic] Salam Mohammed Aref. ...Many men throughout the entire army were involved. So when Baghdad fell, all the rest of the country came in with it, since each member knew exactly what his assignment was in the over-all plan. ...on that day (July 14), we had them all in one place, Premier Nuri es-Said and the royal family, so we chose that moment to finish everything.96

95Middle Eastern Affairs, IX, August-September, 1958, p. 293.

96News Week, August 4, 1958, p. 25.
Life magazine reports that:

The events of July 14, 1958, did not shock just the Iraqi people or the Arabs, but the whole world. The American, British, and Russian cabinets, and the United Nations Security Council all had emergency meetings. In the United States, the Congress had a secret joint session upon an urgent request from President Eisenhower. As a result, the marines were ordered to land in Lebanon immediately.97

The British Cabinet met in an emergency session, confirming that the British Embassy in Baghdad had been ransacked and set on fire. They decided to land troops in Jordan immediately.98 Soviet Premier Nikita Khruschev proposed an immediate Summit Conference of all the major powers of the world, i.e., Britain, United States, France, Russia, and India, including D. Hammarskjöld, the Secretary General of the United Nations. Khrushchev thought that Great Britain and the United States were threatening world peace by sending troops to the Middle East. In this connection he said: "The decision of peace or war depends on you....(The Soviet Union has) ballistic rockets of all varieties, including intercontinental."99 It is odd that Mr. Khruschev would invite all the Western powers and India to talk, and probably gamble with Iraq's future, without asking Iraq's consent. The Soviet Union supported the new regime in Iraq because it destroyed a pro-western monarchy. The new regime in Iraq was not Communist, however.

The American television networks cut their regular programs to broadcast the most dramatic response to the crises which developed in the halls of the United Nations. The United Nations Security

98Middle Eastern Affairs, IX, August-September, 1958, p. 293.
99Ibid.
Council debated. Opposing lines were swiftly drawn. U. S. delegate Henry Cabot Lodge declared that the Marines would withdraw as soon as United Nations forces replaced them. Russia's Arkady Sobolev demanded that the West, "...cease its armed intervention," but at the end, all three United Nations resolutions; American, Soviet, and Swedish, were beaten. The Security Council was in familiar deadlock. The debates actually accomplished nothing. After a few months British and United States troops were voluntarily withdrawn from the Middle East.

II. The reasons for the success of the July 14, 1958, Revolution.

The reasons for the success of the revolution of July 14, 1958, could be summarized as follows:

(1) The quick and flashy speed of its accomplishments.

(2) The complete secrecy of the plan.

(3) The response and support of the people during the first hours of the morning of July 14, 1958.

(4) The monarchy had no support from the people. In fact, the people were wildly expressing their pleasure at its downfall.

III. The revolutionary leadership.

Abdul Karim Kassim was born in Baghdad in 1914. After a teaching career of one year he enrolled on September, 1932, in the Military School. Throughout his military training and service, he was well known for his courage and honesty.

Within a few days after July 14, 1958, the revolution entered a new and dangerous phase. Kassim's picture started to appear on the


walls of many of the buildings in the country. Everyday he would visit a different place and make a "historical" speech. Newspapers started publishing his picture daily on almost every page of the paper. They spoke of him as a savior, a saint, the prophet, semi-heavenly, and dozens of such names. In addition to this, his official title was: His Excellency, The Leader, The Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Abdul Karim Kassim. In other words, Kassim was worshipped by the people. This by itself changed Kassim's image of himself, and he started to reevaluate himself.

His new image of himself was derived from what he thought the people thought about him. Perhaps that is one of the strongest factors in making him a dictator.

From the very first day of the Iraqi revolution it was obvious that the leader, General Kassim, intended to include in his government those elements that had been persecuted by the monarchy. He took into his government Fuad el-Rikabi (Baath Party) and Seddick Shanshal (Istiklal Party) from the right, and Dr. Ibrahim Kubbah (pro-Communist but not a member of the Communist Party) and Mohammed Haded (National Democratic Party) from the left. By balancing right and left, Kassim hoped to be able to achieve economic and political independence within a short time. He soon realized, however, that his hopes would not materialize. As was mentioned earlier, the various power blocks were in disagreement with each other.

These power blocks were too strong to be suppressed by ordinary police action because each of them had usurped some measure of military, administrative, judicial and popular power. What has been happening in Iraq from July, 1958, up to the present time is that each
power block has been trying to destroy the others by any means possible. The result is the political chaos which exists in Iraq at the present time. Stability under such circumstances is impossible. The following examples are partial proof for this assumption. In September, 1958, Kassim discovered that his deputy, Abdul Salam Aref, was planning to overthrow him.\(^{102}\) From the beginning of the revolution, Aref had displayed unwavering loyalty to the President of Egypt, Gamel Abdul Nasser. In December, 1959, he discovered that Rashid Ali el-Gailani was plotting a pro-Nasser coup in Iraq. Gailani had led a pro-Nazi coup in Iraq in 1941. He had fled from Iraq to escape a death penalty, but he returned to Iraq after being assured that the death penalty had been annulled.\(^{103}\)

Following his discovery of these two attempts to establish a pro-Nasser regime in Iraq, Kassim began to reduce the influence of the pro-Egypt members of his cabinet. He finally forced the resignation of the Baath and Istiklal Ministers on February 7, 1959. Then in March, 1959, Mohammed el-Shawaf, an officer in the Army, staged a pro-Baath revolt against him, but the revolt was not successful.

In the meantime the Communist had gained a greater following. Their influence increased to such an extent that on June 28, 1959, they sent a petition to Kassim signed by statesmen, scientists, and top civil servants, demanding their inclusion in the government. While the Premier did not respond to this demand, he nevertheless named on July 13, 1959, the eve of the first anniversary of the revo-


\(^{103}\) Ibid.
olution, two ardent pro-Communist ministers to his Cabinet: Dr. Nazihah el-Dulaimi, as Minister of Municipal Affairs (the first Arab woman to hold a ministerial post), and Auni Yousef, as Minister of Labor.

During the celebration of the first anniversary of the revolution, the Communists made a fatal mistake: They organized a massacre of their opponents, especially among the Turkmen in the Kirkuk area. Kassim reacted firmly. He disbanded the People's Resistance Organization, a semi-military group under Communists influence and ordered the discharge of the Communist Committees for the Defense of the Republic, which existed in every governmental office. Kassim was now fighting on two fronts — against the extreme right and against the extreme left. This encouraged the Baath Party to make an attempt on his life, which almost succeeded.

IV. The assets and liabilities of the Kassim regime.

A. The liabilities.

Throughout the Kassim regime, July 14, 1953 to February 8, 1963, power blocks have made every attempt to destroy each other. Their means of destruction include street fighting, massacres, and assassinations. The police are powerless to stop such actions. There is every reason to believe that this situation will continue, probably for many years. As Charles A. Ellwood suggests in his book, The Psychology of Human Society, a sudden and violent attack on the old social order may result in a general breakdown in the habits of obedience to the government in a large part of the population. Ellwood says that:

Now, there is always a tendency in an individual to reversion to simple, animal-like activities following the complete breakdown of a habit. This tendency becomes
much more pronounced if the breakdown of the old habit is accompanied by violence.\textsuperscript{104}

Pitirim Sorokin postulated a thesis that the return to normal after a revolution takes as much time as the build-up to the revolution.\textsuperscript{105}

According to Lyford P. Edwards, "...it takes three generations to develop a revolution."\textsuperscript{106} In the light of what Ellwood, Sorokin, and Edwards have said, we get a sad picture of the situation in Iraq. Iraq will probably not return to normal for at least forty years.

On the morning of July 14, 1958, the people of Iraq were lifted into a state of near ecstasy at their belief that, with the monarchy dead, they would no longer have to live in fear. This hope has not come to pass. For example, the people in Iraq are afraid to write almost any news to their relatives in other countries for fear of government reprisals.

B. The assets.

Even under such conditions of instability, the Kassim regime succeeded in making gains in several areas.

1. Industrial advancements.

Kathleen M. Langley headed a study tracing the growth of industry in Iraq up until 1962, and published it in a book entitled, The Industrialization of Iraq.\textsuperscript{107} She expressed that the reasons for the failure of the Nuri es-Said regime to promote modern industry was undoubtedly


\textsuperscript{105}Sorokin, op. cit., p. 8.

\textsuperscript{106}Edwards, op. cit., p. 17.

one of the reasons for the wide support given to the leaders of the revolution. She reached the conclusion that:

...much had been done to lay the foundation for Iraq's industrial development, and carefully conceived plans for the country's rapid industrial growth were underway when impatience, frustration, and intolerance prevailed in the summer of 1958.108

Building a handful of industrial plants does not benefit the country at all unless the people learn how to run them and markets can be found for their products. The monarchy failed to establish any industry. It lacked the basis not only for modern industry, but for national cohesion. The building up of the country's governmental administration and social overhead capital and the modernization of its agriculture were therefore prerequisite to the growth of industry in Iraq.109

The Ministry of Industry published a pamphlet in 1961, which claimed that new industries which had been built since July, 1958, had produced the following products:

(a) 470,500,000 kilowatt hours of electricity
(b) 33,421 tons of sugar
(c) 250,208 tons of cement
(d) 767,479 gross of cigarettes
(e) 76,700 yards of cloth
(f) 7,000 kilograms of surgical cotton. 6,480 dozens of surgical bandages110

108ibid., p. 1.
109ibid.
This rapid industrial advancement was accomplished in a period of less than three years with the aid of Russian technicians and loans. After the Baath Party overthrew the Kassim regime, February 8, 1963, the Russian technicians left the country, and I assume that all of these factories are not in operation now. If this assumption is correct, Iraq will be heavily burdened financially to pay back the loans with most of the factories idle.

2. Educational accomplishments.

Three years after Kassim came into power, the Ministry of Education published a pamphlet\textsuperscript{111} giving the growth in education during the Kassim regime. All information and figures in this section are taken from that pamphlet. Table IX shows the percentage of increase in schools, teachers, and students during the first three years of the Kassim regime.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Percentage of Increase in Number of Schools, Teachers, and Students During the Period July 14, 1958 to July 14, 1962.}
\begin{tabular}{lccc}
\hline
& Schools & Teachers & Students \\
\hline
Primary Schools & 92 & 117 & 99 \\
Secondary Schools & 66 & 73 & 119 \\
Technical Schools and Colleges & 24 & 103 & 82 \\
Total & 88 & 109 & 102 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{111}Our Revolution in Education, Ministry of Education Publication, July 14, 1962, Baghdad.
The national budget for education rose from 14,452,354 dinars\textsuperscript{112} in 1957, to 29,750,000 dinars in 1962. This was an increase of 106 percent.

During the last year of the monarchy, fifty percent of the nation's boys were not attending school. By 1962, this number had been reduced to nine percent. As for the girls, the percentage not attending school fell from eighty-three to sixty-five during the same period.

3. Agricultural achievements.

During the monarchy a limited number of landlords controlled all of the land in Iraq, and the farmers lived in extreme poverty. They lived in mud huts and ate barley and dates mainly. The system of land-holding made near-slaves out of the people.

Kassim enacted an agrarian reform law as one of the first reforms he put into effect. According to this law, land ownership was limited. Small plots of land were distributed to the poor farmers, and Kassim also helped the people to obtain agricultural machinery.

While it is true that the Kassim regime had its liabilities, still he did much good for Iraq. The majority of the Iraqi people were desperately poor, and they were the people who benefited from his reforms.

\textsuperscript{112}One dinar equals $2.80.
CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this study was to analyze the uncompleted Iraqi revolution, using Rex D. Hopper's four stages of revolutionary behavior, Herbert Blumer's analysis of social movements, and Peter Amann's article on revolution.

In analyzing the Iraqi Revolution of July 14, 1958, I have reached the conclusion that the revolution actually began in 1917, when the British army, under the leadership of Sir Stanley Maude, drove the Turks out of Iraq. At that time the Turks had been occupying Iraq for approximately three hundred years. The Iraqi people were accustomed to obeying the Turkish authorities, but the British conquest of the Turks broke the habit of obedience to the Turkish government. Until this date the habit of obedience to governmental authority has not been re-established, therefore the state's monopoly of power has not been restored. The Iraqi revolution will not be completed until these two goals are reached, and this state of stability may not be reached for two additional generations.

The small, seemingly insignificant uprisings which occurred throughout the years from 1917 to 1958, were symptoms of the unrest and dissatisfaction of the people of Iraq. An outbreak such as the July 14, 1958, revolution was bound to occur. It only needed a strong leader with popular support. The people would have been willing to sup-
port almost anyone who would strike at the hated monarchy. The Iraqi people had suffered long under the regime of the monarchy which was dominated by the British. On the morning of July 14, 1958, they were wild with joy that a leader had appeared to emancipate them. They hailed Kassim as a deliverer.

History will record the deeds of Kassim in a more objective way than we are able to do today. Was he a tyrant as the Baathist officers declared, or a deliverer? It is certain that he did much good for Iraq by providing better education, promoting more industry, improving agricultural conditions, and building better housing for the Iraqi people. In spite of these advancements, however, the people still lived in fear. Of what real value is more food on the table if the people are too fearful to eat?

Instead of being an end to the revolution which had been in progress since 1917, the July 14, 1958, coup d'état was just another phase in the reactionary stage. What progress the Kassim regime was making toward the completion of the Iraqi revolution was annulled by the Baath counter-revolution on February 8, 1963.

I believe that Iraq has now reached the highest peak of reaction, as exhibited in street fighting, the Kurdish revolt, attempted revolts by other groups, and military executions. How long this reactionary stage will last cannot be determined. It is certain to continue until such time as the people reach a state of exhaustion; then it will start to decline gradually.
ADDENDUM

In August, 1962, in a conference with Dr. Tilman C. Cothran, I chose the Iraqi revolution of July 14, 1953, as the subject of my thesis. At that time I made the statement that another revolution was expected in Iraq. I was halfway through with my research when the expected revolution became a fact.

I. The Baath Counter-Revolution.

On February 8, 1963, junior Baathist officers of the armed forces staged a successful coup d'etat against Premier Kassim and claimed that they had "destroyed the tyrant." Their planes and tanks demolished Kassim's Defense Ministry in Baghdad, where the Premier lived under heavy guard.113

Kassim was captured by the rabble in his Defense Ministry stronghold on the next day of the coup and was executed by a firing squad after a drumhead court martial.114 The Atlanta Journal reports that an eyewitness estimated about 1,500 persons were killed in the initial day of the revolt. No official figures were released.115 Tehran radio said rebel forces and pro-Kassim troops clashed in the area around Amarah, a city 20 miles southeast of Baghdad. A clandestine radio transmitter in the Amarah area called on Iraqis to take arms against the new regime.

114 Ibid., p. 3.
Another broadcast said that Communist groups in Al-Azamiyah, a Shiia city north of Baghdad on the east bank of the Tigris River fought a heavy battle on Friday, February 15, a week later. In Baghdad, shooting was heard on both sides of the Tigris River. Iraqi troops and heavily armed civilians who called themselves "National Guardsmen" hunted down Communists and pro-Kassim elements a week later. After about two weeks, the Baath government in Iraq claimed that everything was under their control and had quieted down.

II. The Kurdish Revolt.

Before Kassim's death, the Kurds were fighting the government for the right to set up an autonomous state in the north. After the Baath Party took over on February 8, 1963, the Kurds began negotiating with them, but the talks broke off and an ultimatum of twenty-four hours expired at 6:00 am, Monday, June 10, 1963. On the second day, Baghdad radio broadcast that army units inflicted heavy casualties on the Kurdish forces. The Egyptian newspaper Al-Akhbar said: "250 Kurdish rebels have been killed and 21 captured in the first day of the fighting." To the present, the Kurdish problem has not been solved. The Soviet Union has indicated its sympathy for the Kurds.

III. The failure of two plots.

A. The Istiklal - Nasser plot.

After three months of negotiations with President Nasser of Egypt, the Baath Party representing Syria and Iraq signed a communique declaring their proposal for a tripartite United Arab Republic effective

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September 27, 1963, but Radio Baghdad broadcast on Saturday, May 25, 1963, that the revolutionary command had wrecked a plot to "split the Army, provoke an economic crisis, alienate confidence in the government and organize massacres in the country." The plotters were members of the pro-Istiklal Party including Mohammed Seddick Shanshal. All Istiklal members and Nasser supporters were arrested.

B. The Communist plot.

On July 3, 1963, the government announced that its troops and police crushed an attempted Communist coup at the Rashid army camp near Baghdad. Earlier, many Communist were sentenced to death for resisting the Baath government.

And so it goes in Iraq: one uprising follows closely on another. When will it end? When will the people find relief from this unsettled state of affairs? No one knows for certain, but it will be many years.

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119 Ibid.
APPENDIX I

MAPS
THE MIDDLE EAST

123Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 280.
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