Single party and national integration in Africa the case of the MPR in Zaire

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SINGLE PARTY AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA
THE CASE OF THE MPR IN ZAIRE

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ABSTRACT

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SINGLE PARTY AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA
THE CASE OF THE MPR IN ZAIRE

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The aim of this study was to determine whether or not the Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (MPR) as a single political party in Zaire has brought about national integration in the country. The Charter of the Party, herein referred to as the Nsele Manifesto, states that "the MPR intends to restore the state authority and the union of the Zaireans for the sake and the grandeur of the Republic."

Carried out from a historical materialist perspective, the study comes up with three major findings.

First, from a behavioral standpoint the MPR has implemented a vertical integration in Zaire as opposed to horizontal integration. Second, from a materialist viewpoint the MPR, in its relations to the means of production with the environment, has become a major factor in the class structure in Zaire.
Third, the issue of ethnicization of power which, as of late has become one of great interest to social scientists in general and to students of Zairean politics in particular, has been given enough attention in this study. However, this research takes the position that scholars should be cautious in their effort to apprehend the processes of power diffusion on the one hand, and the dialectics of class and ethnicity on the other hand. Indeed, to overemphasize one aspect such as ethnicization of power leads to an obscurantist explanation of a socio-political reality as complex as contemporary African politics dictates. Moreover, for scholars interested in qualitative social change, such an approach fails to comprehend contradictions underlying the political make up of Zaire. Only a thorough analysis of these contradictions can enable one to seize the essential significance concealed behind the party slogan of "MPR=SERVIR."
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABAKO---------Alliance des Bakongo/Congo-Zaïre
ANEZA--------Association Nationale des Entreprises Zairoises/-Zaire
C.C.---------Central Committee of the MPR/Zaire
CELZA--------Culture et Elevages au Zaire/Zaire
CND----------Centre National de Documentation/Zaire
CONAKAT------Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga/Congo
CPP----------Convention People's Party/Ghana
CSLC---------Confédération des Syndicats Libres du Congo/Congo
CVR----------Corps des Volontaires de la République/ Congo-Zaïre
FGTK---------Fédération Générale des Travailleurs Kongolais/Congo
FLNC---------Front de Libération Nationale du Congo/ Zaire
FNLI---------Front National de Libération/Algeria
GECAMINES----Générale des Carrières et des Mines/Zaire
IMF----------International Monetary Fund
JMPR---------Jeunesse du MPR/Congo-Zaïre
MIBA---------Société Minière de Bakwanga/Zaire
MNC----------Mouvement National Congolais/Congo-Zaïre
MPLA---------Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola/Angola

MPR---------Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution/Zaire

NEC---------National Executive Committee/Congo-Zaire

P.B.--------Political Bureau of the MPR/Zaire

PCT--------Parti Congolais du Travail/People's Republic of the Congo

PDCI--------Parti Democratique de la Cote d'Ivoire/Ivory Coast

PDG---------Parti Democratique de Guinee/Conakry

PDG---------President-Delgude General/Zaire

RDR---------Rassemblement pour la Defense de la Republique/France

SCIBELI------Societe Commerciale et Industrielle

Bemba-Litho/Zaire

SCIBEZAIRE---Societe Commerciale et Industrielle

Bemba-Zaire

SCM---------Societe des Cultures Maraicheres/Zaire

SOTRAZ------Societe de Transport du Zaire/Zaire

SOZACOM------Societe Zairoise pour la Commercialisation des Minerais/Zaire

UGEC--------Union Generale des Etudiants Congolais/Congo

UMHK--------Union Miniere du Haut Katanga/Congo

UNAZA-------Universite Nationale du Zaire/Zaire

UNO--------United Nations Organization
UNTZA--------Union Nationale des Travailleurs du Zaire/
Zaire
U.S.---------United States of America
U.S.S.R.------The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics/Russia
UTC----------Union des Travailleurs Congolais/Congo
CHAPTER I

GENERALITIES

1.1 Introduction

The Belgian Congo got its independence in June 1960. A week later, the huge territory that little Belgium had held under rigorous control for eighty years was shaken by territorial secession. Of the six colonial provinces, two seceded, Katanga province first and Kasai second. Other provinces, especially the Lower Congo, manifested the intention to do so, while the Equator was being encouraged to take the same political decision. Territorial disintegration was in process.

As a first result, the newly elected national authorities were confronted with the difficult challenge of ruling the country. National leaders who already disagreed on the fundamental question of nationhood could hardly agree on the procedures that would enable the new state to exercise its national and international prerogatives and responsibilities. While some leaders advocated the preservation of a unitary state, others preferred a confederation or a federation.
In addition to this leadership divergence political parties in the new state had essentially regional and ethnic bases. One could look at them as a kind of organization with a trade union philosophy, i.e., the struggle for acquisition of material gains for loyal members. The unpreparedness of the colonized to assume high functions and to enact laws which could enable the Congolese people to participate meaningfully in the political and economic processes was another factor of disintegration. Congolese leaders and their political parties fostered their personal interests as far as creating new provinces along ethnic lines. From six provinces in June 1960 the number grew to twenty-one provinces by 1965, and the tendency toward new provinces kept growing. Hence, territorial disintegration and political instability became characteristics of the 1960's Congo.

In order to end the tendency toward separatism and secession, and to bring about unity within the national community, the army staged a coup in 1965 and thereafter disbanded all political parties. In 1967, the military regime founded the Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (MPR) with the declared aim of bringing about national integration in the country. The preamble of the MPR manifesto, commonly called the Nsele Manifesto after the
river near which the party town has been built, reads as follows:

The MPR intends to restore the state authority and the union of the Zaireans for the sake and the grandeur of the Republic.¹

1.1.1 Statement of the Problem

The present Zairean political system knew relative quietude for the first twelve years, but was seriously challenged for the first time in 1977 when an important portion of the territory was invaded and occupied by the rebel forces of the Front de Libération Nationale du Congo (FLNC). This military group is an outgrowth of the "Katanga State" forces of the 1960's. It constituted Tshombe's political and military support in Katanga first and in the Congo later; when Tshombe became Prime Minister in 1964, he incorporated these forces into the national army. Once he was ousted by Kasavubu, these forces mutinied in 1966 and 1967. They moved into Angola to fight first for the Portuguese and then for the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Their leader, Nathaniel Mbumba, draws support from the Lunda ethnic group. For eighty days the FLNC forces occupied Dilolo and other surrounding towns, but were finally defeated by the

Moroccan troops with logistical and intelligence support from France and the United States.

Hence, my fundamental research question: "Has the MPR achieved its primary goal of national integration which is the restoration of state authority in the entire country and unification of Zaireans behind the Republic?"

This study attempts to examine whether the MPR has brought about national integration in Zaire. It traces the historical background that led to a strategy of nation-building already attempted by many societies, that is, the single party as an instrument of national integration. The paper discusses the logic of the choice, and finally, the result, if any, of the Zairean single party.

1.1.2 Hypotheses

Hypotheses in any scientific endeavor rely upon variables. According to David Nachmias and Chava Nachmias, quoting Reynolds,

hypotheses are tentative answers to research problems. They are expressed in the form of relationship between independent and dependent variables. They derive deductively from theories, directly from observations, intuitively or from a combination of these.²

In this study, the MPR is the independent variable, while the concept of national integration is the dependent variable. If the MPR is the *explicandi modus* (explanatory concept) of national integration, then it appears that the basic hypothesis here is as follows: the establishment of the MPR has brought about national integration in Zaire.

Like any other single party, the MPR may be a determinant ingredient for national integration at a certain period of nation-building under two major conditions. First, the party should set up a clear and easy framework or procedure that could bring about a certain harmony correlation between the desires of social groups and those expressed and stated in the party statutes. The second *sine qua non* is that a single party should be selective of its external partners. For, historically speaking, there exist some political experiences that demonstrate that the key to genuine national development or nation building lies in isolation from outside influences. Niccolo Machiavelli understood this as early as the sixteenth century when Italy, which was divided into five territorial possessions (Florence, Venice, Milan, Naples and the Papacy), was invaded in 1494 by King Charles VIII, of France, and in 1527 by Spain.3

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In his treatise on statecraft, Machiavelli suggests a series of behavior that should be adopted in order to have a lasting government and a statesman trustful to people. As Jean Claude Willame wrote in 1971 "the Congo/Zaire, by contrast, has been continuously open to outside influences since the beginning of her colonial era" as to imply that an isolation may at times be beneficial to a country under external influences. ⁴

As a matter of historical facts, the isolation of England in the eighteenth century by the Enclosure Movement boosted the unity and development of the Kingdom, and so did the Manilist era for Russia, the Meiji Dynasty for Japan, the Maoist period for China, the Castroist leadership for Cuba. The American territorial integration has been made possible by the isolation of the colonies from outside, mainly from British and French economic and political influences.

1.1.3 Theoretical Framework

The knowledge of social reality and that of political phenomena calls for many approaches. Insofar as political science is concerned, there are those thinkers who value order and stability above other factors and

consequently advocate their researches to the creation of viable authorities in the new nations. Those scholars follow a dominant paradigm that is called structural-functionalism. This school evolved from Sociology (Parsons, 1951, Levy-Strauss, 1957) and Anthropology (Radcliffe-Brown, 1957) and was applied to political science (Easton, 1953 and Almond, 1960). According to this frame of reference, any society can be viewed in terms of a web of highly interdependent activities and expectations. In terms of political processes, the school looks at a political system in terms of an authoritative allocation of values (D. Easton, 1953), or as integration, adaptation, attainment of goals, maintenance, and regulation (D. Almond, 1960). As a result, the survival of the social system is a function of the homeostasis of inputs and outputs, that is the ability of the system to regulate the equilibrium between internal and external factors. Holt believes that structural-functionalism seeks to describe the social system in terms of structures, mechanisms, processes, and functions and to explain why a given structure rather than another contributes to the satisfaction of a given functional requisite at a given time.\textsuperscript{5} The structural-functionalist

approach finds fertile ground in the field of comparative politics because, despite their socio-cultural differences, all political systems of our time possess institutions which perform the same functions under different terminology. This positive side of the approach had been outweighed by critics which view structural-functional analysis as static, descriptive, conservative and deterministic in that it favors the status quo instead of qualitative social change. It is also ethnocentric in terms of its inherent developmental scheme which sees the political, institutional and cultural arrangements of North America and Western European States as the end of the process of political development.

Applied to the 1960's Zaire, the approach fits the image that has been described earlier. The central government, unable to exercise its prerogatives, could not communicate with its subsystems (provinces), and the army that the colonial administration had set up. Those sub-units were splitting away; secession of some provinces and mutiny of the army. As a result of this, the equilibrium of the Zairean social political system was broken. In other words, the integrative function of the system was inoperative and disorder and instability derived therefrom.
One of the goals of independence is to uplift the people's living conditions. The conditions created by the colonial administration were those of economic deprivation and parochial separatism among the colonized people whereas at the same time, Belgians and their allies enjoyed the fruit of the hard labor of the Congolese people. These basic contradictions led to a relationship of conflicts and antagonism which in time would find a solution in the granting of political independence to the colonized. In other words, independence in the Congo was, as elsewhere, part of a universal anti-colonialist movement. All this comes to one theoretical framework which emphasizes the doctrine of progress, hence Marxism.

Marxism implies many connotations. It may be viewed as a body of knowledge comprising Karl Marx's writings and as such it encompasses all aspects of philosophy, science, methodology, ideology, and so forth. Marxism could be identified as a philosophy stated by K. Marx and his followers. Despite confusion among Marxists, the common denominator remains the use of methodology which, at the stage of empirical investigation, is a framework for apprehending, organizing and explaining what goes on in reality. Marxism, write Barbara Chasin and Gerald Chasin, presents a more dynamic analysis which
predicts the sources of change and suggests the direction in which society may move.\textsuperscript{6}

If Marxism is a more dynamic theory as compared to structural functionalism and if it predicts changes of great intensity throughout history, it nevertheless does not bear a ubiquitous tactical application. Marx and Engels had merely emphasized the important role of the working class in the process of overthrowing an industrially advanced capitalist system. The tactic succeeded in 1917 in Russia, but failed in Continental Europe and in the Unites States as well.

The militia-peasantry connection theory or tactical approach brought about social change in a non-advanced capitalist China in 1949. The foco theory has led to the Cuban revolution but failed in other parts of Latin America in emphasizing the importance of small fighting groups with their respective focal headquarters scattered throughout the objective country. The Christian grass-roots (comunidades de base) theory, born from the theology of liberation, led the Sandinistas to power in Nicaragua in 1979 but has been stagnating in El Salvador. In fact this discussion of the Marxian approach and the approaches towards social change does not intend to obscur the

issues of predicting the inevitability of social change and the manner in which this change can take place. Karl Marx, in predicting the possible clash in a class society and in insisting that the clash will continue unless social revolution occurs, was right. So, from a tactical standpoint, the success of revolutionary change in some places and at the same time its failure in other places does not invalidate the scientific validity of Marxism; for, the form of the struggle, i.e., tactical approach in the war against oppression stands as a conjunctural problem and, as such cannot be predicted a century ahead of time. This debate on approaches to social change aims at underlining the inevitability of social change as predicted by Marxism, but at the same time it offers the specificities of each social change.

Society, write Marx and Engels is divided into two parts, substructure and superstructure. The substructure (modes of production) includes the forces of production such as technology. The relations of production are the social interactions including property relations. As the forces of production change, so do these relations that are based upon those forces. Labor, writes Marx, is organized and devised differently according to the instrument it disposes over.\(^7\) However, in less advanced capitalist

\(^7\)Karl Marx, \textit{The Poverty of Philosophy} (Moscow: Foreign Languages, 1965), p. 127.
states, Marx's classical reasoning does not follow the
dialectical process that the owners of property control the
state apparatus. It seems to me that the process has
reversed in the less developed nations (Newly Independent
Nations) and that the holders of the state apparatus muster
their political power to assume both political and economic
power. This empirical observation has led some Marxists to
posit that political power as a superstructural element
becomes a determinant factor rather than substructural
element that is the struggle for national reconstruction is
essentially economical while the predicament is
political.⁸

We could, in general terms, argue that the
superstructural element becomes overwhelmingly important in
determining the nature of class formation in the new
nations of Africa thereby asserting a less determinant role
to substructural element that is a core factor in classical
Marxism. Indeed in the New Nations of Africa including
Zaire, the party in power is the major force in both
political power and economic power; as the holder of state
machine, the party decides on who gets what and when;
wealth distribution, income distribution and economic
struggle for recovery (nationalization) are the party major

⁸This notion has been defended by Amilcar Cabral,
Revolution in Guinea: An African People's Struggle
prerogatives. In Zaire the MPR is the main instrument in the hands of the Zairean state in its production relations with the entire society. In an attempt to study the Zairean society an emphasis on these relations could lead to a better and deeper understanding of what Marx, on the economic front called social classes and which Lenin defines as

a large group of people distinguished by their place in the historically determined system of production, by their relation toward the means of production, by their role in the social organization of labor and therefore by the methods by which they get their share of the social wealth and by the size of this share. Classes are such groups of people who, one of which is capable of appropriating the labor of the others thanks to the difference of their places in the system of social economy. 9

Thinking in radical terms, one would assume that the ruling class or the bourgeoisie in Zaire consists of all those who benefit from the earnings of capital whether it be in the form of profits directly, or in the form of dividends and interests and indirectly from the official position within the party. While Zaire is governed by the MPR, the strings of power are actually held by a much smaller segment of the MPR officials who act as the

dignitaries of the party and perform the political functions necessary to preserve their class interests. Chapter two will discuss these assumptions with regard to the numbers of the MPR major organs. Despite potential differences between the members of the ruling party such as disparities of wealth and economic conflicts and political competition, they continue to rule and operate as a class and are able to develop a working harmony of interest through their mutual benefit in the existence of the MPR regime.

The wealth of the ruling class derives from the capital investments in the form of enterprises and businesses that they own in collaboration with some foreigners. Enterprises expropriated from foreign owners also provide them with wealth accumulation. High wages, salaries and fees (commissions) are some other avenues that provide the Zairean ruling class with more wealth. Hence, the MPR high officials form a class mostly because of their common objective interest in maintaining their source of income and wealth. As a method of inquiry, Marxism seeks to apprehend reality in its dynamism and its complexity. Because the whole and its interdependent and interacting parts cannot be separated no phenomena can be understood in isolation. Without rejecting the classical notion of dogmatic Marxism which tends to mechanically overlook the importance of industrial working class in the process of
social change, I find myself more comfortable with a Marxism which emphasizes the importance of armed struggle, party and people leadership, masses' education and participation in the process of an ongoing revolution. These ideals have been successfully advocated by Amilcar Cabral and implemented in Guinea-Bissau and in other former Portuguese possessions in Africa. Christian Potholm names this group of Marxist thinkers and practitioners "the Marxist modernizers in opposition to dogmatic marxists."\(^{10}\) In order to avoid this kind of confusion, this study has opted for the term Marxian to symbolize the theoretical framework. Richard L. Sklar first used this approach in an essay in which he suggests a radical approach for dealing with the post-colonial world.\(^{11}\) A radical frame of reference in the study of the Zairean current situation is a necessity because the radical approach emphasizes a revolutionary social change which in this writer's view is necessary in Zaire. To justify his choice of a marxian theoretical framework to political analysis in Africa, Sklar writes:

I have rejected the historicist approach to ethical theory, of which Marxism is one

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example. I have suggested that the moral implications of functional analysis are similar to those of historism, which holds that since certain developments are inevitable, the means chosen to accomplish them cannot be condemned on purely ethical ground.¹²

As a consequence, when one seeks to know the current post-colonial world, one can be misled by the structural-functionalist approach which tends to point out the beneficial effects of a stable system (state) upon its own development. In place, the point of departure should be a radical approach which focuses on the concepts of class and class formation. Insofar as Zaire is in perspective, ethnic groups and regional interests are no longer valid categories that can provide scientists with a thorough deep understanding of the present state of affairs in the country. A class analysis approach in the study of Zaire is more likely to show clearly the relationships between the rulers and their allies, local or external. Such a theoretical framework will demonstrate that the Zairean state is not ruled by one ethnic group, but by a social class whose members belong to different ethnic groups and regions as well. It would be absurd if not an aberrant scientific attitude to use terms such as "equatorialization of Zaire" to imply that Zaire is ruled mainly by people

¹²Ibid., p. 9.
from the Equator Province. As Sklar and Wallerstein, I am of the opinion that tribalism, regionalism and lingualism which form cultural pluralisms according to C. Young, are but masks for class struggle and class interests.\textsuperscript{13} They should be viewed as dependent variables rather than primordial political forces in Zaire.\textsuperscript{14}

Like other political parties the MPR is a group of individuals who come from all the parts of Zaire and who, armed with their own ideology, have conquered power and fight every day to perpetuate their domination over society. In this process of domination and control over Zaire, the MPR capitalized on objective conditions such as secession and instability. Nevertheless, as the literature of single parties will reveal, in the process of reinforcing its control and domination over the society, the national bourgeoisie tends to utilize populist concepts that can attract a substantial number of followers. Tackling this problem an African social critic wrote in the sixties that "the single party is the modern form of the

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{13}On Cultural Pluralisms, see Crawford Young, \textit{Politics in the Congo} (Princeton University Press, 1965); and Young, C. \textit{The Politics of Cultural Pluralisms} (Madison: University Press, 1975).
\end{flushright}
dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, unmasked, unpainted, unscrupulous, and cynical."\textsuperscript{15}

1.1.4 Methodology

Methodology is defined as an empirical science. What this means is that methodology finds its way out in empirical research, based on facts and evidence that systematically and logically explain social reality. Hence, the scientific method has been taken to cover two apparently different activities. One of these activities would involve an attempt to discover rules or techniques to be employed in the discovery of theories. The other activity would seek to uncover objectively justifiable principles for the evaluation of rival theories in the light of available evidence.\textsuperscript{16}

While both methodological aspects described by Newton-Smith are appealing, this researcher prefers the second aspect to the first one. The reason of the preference for the evaluative role of a method over other aspects is that this study seeks to assess the extent to which a given institution, namely, the \textit{Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution} has succeeded in integrating the nation. Needless to say any study designed to assess a situation

\textsuperscript{15}Frantz Fanon, \textit{The Wretched of the Earth} (New York: Grove Press, 1963), pp. 171-186.

(or accomplishment) calls for a evaluative method. Thus, I look at methodology as "a way of grasping and explaining reality." 17

To understand social reality which in essence is dynamic, a social scientist could benefit more from a dynamic method than from a method that limits itself to the description and maintenance of the social system. The Marxian framework is based on historical materialism which holds that the social system is a totality, structured into related parts that are in permanent conflict. In the process of this conflictual relation a new and qualitatively superior situation can emerge through clashes. State, class, class struggle, mode of production, and means of production constitute the major categories of (the) Marxian methodology. 18

Theoretically, the Marxian approach assumes that in society, social classes entertain a type of relationship which underlies the fabric of social stratification. There are individuals who own the means of production (bourgeois) and capitalize on those means to control the state apparatus. The social system issued from


this relationship of production shows that the state becomes the battlefield of the class struggle or struggle for the control of political power; therefore, class formation and the maintenance of social classes are inherent to the state nature. The eradication of the state bourgeois structure is the *sine qua non* for the betterment of social conditions. This qualitative social change is conditioned by the consciousness of class that characterizes the conflict between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. In that upward process, the new form of state emerges and appears qualitatively superior to the old quantitative state. 19

From the optimistic view of social progress, one observes that the Zairean state after June 1960, was qualitatively better than the colonial state. By the same token if one keeps in mind that the state is the instrument of domination of one class over other classes, one would also argue that the current Zairean state makes no exception. In order to gauge this assumption, I will refer to the notions of infrastructure and superstructure that hold historical materialism as a global and scientific methodology in dealing with society. It should be made clear here that dialectical materialism and historical

materialism make no serious difference in substance. The terminological difference between the two is that dialectical materialism applies dialectics to the immaterial world of ideas and inanimate things to the extent that they can move, change and develop. Historical materialism as a method roots itself in the historical context of human society,

the course of history which seeks the ultimate cause and the great moving power of all important historic events in the economic development of society, in the changes in the modes of production and exchange, in the consequent division of society into distinct classes, and in the struggles of these classes against each other.\textsuperscript{20}

As social production goes on, a certain antagonism develops between the owners of the means of production (bourgeois) and the producers of the forces of production (laborers).\textsuperscript{21} Bourgeois and proletarians are the main terms of what Marx and Engels call social classes.

Lenin’s definition of social classes is important in tackling the social system in present Zaire. In this process one must look at the nature of the relationship that the state entertains with the party. Historical materialism becomes then the methodological cornerstone


\textsuperscript{21}K. Marx, \textit{Capital}, Vol. II.
because it enables the student of Zairean society to look at those internal forces creating and fostering the contradictions of the social formation in Zaire. At this present state of research, this approach would enhance our knowledge on Zaire, for

just as man's knowledge reflects nature (developing matter) which exists independently of him, so man's social knowledge (philosophical, political) reflects the economic system of society.\textsuperscript{22}

This inquiry is based on a class analysis, class formation (dynamics) for three particular reasons. First, parochial \textit{appartenances} (cultural pluralisms) are permanent characteristics and have not been created by any social formation; they are a cover-up for the class struggle in Zaire that had started in the early years of the Zairean political emancipation process. In the early years of the political emancipation in Zaire, three major tendencies emerged, the unitarist protagonists that the \textit{Mouvement National Congolain} (MNC) represented, the federalist that the \textit{Alliance of Bakongo} (ABAKO) preached and the confederalists that the \textit{Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga} (CONAKAT) defended. Opportunist elements from the first two tendencies came to form a group named "the Binza Group" who, in their struggle

\footnote{Vladimir I. Lenin, cited in Int. Publ. On Hist. Mat., p. 453.}
to control power and further their personal interests, had succeeded in seizing the state apparatus. As a result, the existence of the MPR is the consolidating factor of their control over Zaire. Second, Class analysis in Zaire will reveal the political nature of the social system, whether or not it is a bourgeois democracy or a purely populist and misleading democracy where a small group of individuals, is furthering a system of social deprivation for the majority of Zaireans and of self-fulfillment for the ruling class itself. Third, the use of class analysis will provide us with some insightful explanation of the internal dynamics of the single-party state systems in general and of the MPR in particular. This approach will enable us to look at the process of class formation put in motion by the MPR in Zaire. National integration, though necessary as the objective conditions had forced, becomes another loophole of the Zairean social system.

To empirically establish this Zairean social dynamics under the MPR rule, we need to bring in some concrete data. Those, we intend to draw from some key positions of the MPR and the state. For example, the MPR Presidency and the State Presidency, the MPR Central Committee, the MPR Political Bureau. Who are the individuals holding those key positions? What are their relations with the economic structure? Do they hold businesses due to their official positions? What are the
motives of the 1973 party decision to expropriate all foreign owners of small and middle size businesses and to give those businesses to Zaireans? The process is known as Zaireanization. Even though this economic measure had a disastrous outcome on the Zairean economy, it has been seen as a mechanism thanks to which the Zairean single-party system intends to promote social mobility in this country. Besides, some empirical data on income distribution in Zaire will be used to compare the salary gap between the MPR/state officials and the working class. It must be noted that the data came primarily from government publications (documents).

High income, control of wealth-producing enterprises, superior education and high-status positions or political occupations appear to be the basic criteria of class dynamics in Zairean society. Individuals who hold these positions come from all the Zairean strata (army, bureaucracy, businesses and intelligentsia) as Sklar assumes that "power, wealth and opportunity for personal achievement" generate the creation of social classes.\(^{23}\)

Unfortunately, in a country where leaders care less about their memoirs which could constitute useful primary sources for scientific investigation, researchers are

doomed to materials such as daily cables and correspondence, to casual statements made to close friends and relatives during private ceremonies or conversations. This kind of confidential statements by the regime's insiders do have some authenticating character on the facts. Zaireans pay a lot of attention to these private sources and call them radio-trottoir news. A serious research on Zaire would not neglect such sources.

1.2 Operational Concepts and Literature Review

The basic Concepts of this study are political party, national integration, and state. The following discussion focuses on them.

In Politics in the Congo, Crawford Young writes:

> The primary challenge to students of Congolese politics remains the basic task of providing a conceptual framework adequate to order the mass of disparate data available.\(^\text{24}\)

Jean Claude Willame and Georges N. Nzongola have been the first students of the Zairean politics to respond to Young's appeal. Both Willame and Nzongola take opposite directions in their respective analyses of the Congolese society.

In Patrimonialism and Political Change in the Congo, Willame uses the Weberian concept of patrimonialism as a

\(^{24}\)Young, Politics in the Congo, p. 807.
framework to analyze and explain the social change in that country. Patrimonialism is defined here as

a system of rule incorporating three fundamental and related elements of appropriation of public offices as the elite's prime source of status, prestige and reward; political and territorial fragmentation through the development of relationships based on primordial and personal loyalties; and the use of private armies, militias, and mercenaries as chief instruments of rule.\textsuperscript{25}

Willame concludes in his study that the Congolese/Zaïrean state in the sixties was organized in such a patrimonialistic manner that holders of public offices considered their positions as legitimate and personal properties. This conclusion has provided Zaïrean scholarship with a better understanding of the phenomenon of patrimonialization which was taking shape.

Despite this positive contribution, Willame's patrimonial approach fails to perform its scientific task without reference to individuals, tribes and regions, though the author recognizes that his tribal and regional categories serve only as an object of class analysis rather than an obstacle to national integration.

In "The Bourgeoisie and Revolution in the Congo," Nzongola bases his approach on historical materialism in

\textsuperscript{25}Willame, \textit{Patrimonialism and Political Change in the Congo}, p. 2.
order to look at the social change in process in the Congo. Recognizing the uneasiness of the Marxist concept of social classes in the Congo, Nzongola found out that considering the process of the means of production and that of distribution there was a process leading to social stratification such as bourgeoisie, petite-bourgeoisie and proletariat. However, the criteria of classes remain ambiguous insofar as the author sticks to the concepts of mode of production, class interests, class consciousness, and class struggle. One cannot put the blame on Nzongola for being unspecific on the distinction criteria of class in the Congo and for dismissing unconsciously the notion of foreign bourgeoisie in a country that has been incorporated into the international capital for nearly a century. Nzongola's analysis has provided more understanding of the Congolese situation, and remains of valid utilization today.

The appropriation of public offices by public servants which Willame has indicated in his analysis should be put into the mechanism of class formation and the rising contradiction between the interests of public servants and those of the people. The MPR appropriation of political power under the claim of building a homogenous Zairean

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nation should be put in the context of class struggle. In this process a conflicting phenomenon has resulted. The reason? Ake answers:

This contradiction between economic power and political power becomes a further interesting development as the new rulers try to use the only tool they have, political power, to create an economic base in order to consolidate their economic power.27

Some recent studies on the Zairean state have been published. The State-Society Struggle by Thomas M. Callaghy has attempted in a comparative perspective to discuss the nature of current Zairean politics and society. The study is another major contribution to the Zairean scholarship. Combining historical, comparative and organizational theory (Weberian sociology) as frames of reference, Callaghy comes to the conclusion that the Zairean state, in this early stage of nationhood is an absolutist, patrimonial-bureaucratic state as were the European states in the seventeenth century and as authoritarian as the Latin American states. This conclusion calls for no honest objection. However, applying the historical, Weberian and contemporary perspectives to the description of the Zairean state may ignore social forces involved in the political and

 economical processes. We do not share the belief that the present Zairean state resembles seventeenth century Europe and the Latin American states even though there are many similar factors between them and Zaire.

Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, are clear on this issue of comparing the African states with early European states or the Latin American ones. They write:

Colonial authoritarianism was exercised through an autonomous, impersonal bureaucracy. The African authoritarian state was not distinctive from its colonial predecessor, it also differed from authoritarian states in other regions. It bore little resemblance to the Latin American bureaucratic-authoritarian model, with its technocratic, statist project of capitalist construction under bureaucratic direction with military tutelage.28

As of these days, a major breakthrough of class approach to the Zairean politics has been brought in the work by Michael Schatzberg. In Politics and Class in Zaire, Schatzberg uses variables such as education, economic wealth and party position in Lisala, Equator to come to the conclusion that in the Lisala District, evidence shows a clear emergence of social classes and so the conclusion remains valid for the whole country under the MPR rule.

Schatzberg's framework has kept itself off from the psychologism that Callaghy has emphasized in his work on the state-society relationships in Zaire. Callaghy has so associated his comprehensive effort with Mobutu that an observer would term his work as a political pamphlet written by and for political reason (i.e., Mobutu's opponents). Psychologism, as meant here, is the tendency by social scientists in their analysis to put more emphasis on individuals, primary/primordial loyalties (tribes and regions) than on the relationship of production within which those categories perform their peripheral roles. Zairean psychologists often do not know that someone other than Mobutu, within the same context, would have acted the same way. The Binza Group as a coalition of class interests could have succeeded in implementing its programs under another member. The Binza Group, according to Crawford Young, was sponsored by the United States Central Intelligence Agency, and included the following major names: Mobutu, Kasavubu, Ndele and Kandolo.29

1.2.1 Party Literature

The term party takes its existence from the Latin pars meaning part, section or group. Applied to community or society, it implies the division of community or society into groups, hence social groups or social classes.

29Young, Politics in the Congo, pp. 379-80.
Viewed in these terms, social groups or social classes are as old as our world.

However, parties as social organizations with specific goals (R. Michels, M. Ostrogorski) came into being in the nineteenth century even though they were less organized than today.

Before 1850, contends Duverger, no country in the world except the United States knew political parties; there were trends of opinion, popular clubs, philosophical societies, and parliamentary groups, but no real political parties. But, how do we explain the fact that today parties exist in all countries of the world, pluralist and totalitarian alike? Duverger answers the question:

On the whole the development of parties seem bound up with that of democracy, that is to say with the extension of popular suffrage and parliamentary prerogatives.\(^30\)

Realizing the narrowness of his answer on the subject matter, Duverger goes further to look at parties in terms of ideology, social foundations, structure, organization, participation, and strategy. He concludes that all these aspects must be taken into account in making a complete analysis of any political party.\(^31\) This position stems


from the idea that a party was originally created as the means to achieve political power. Hence, party is an association whose main goal is the acquisition and exercise of power.

The Anglo-American literature on the subject goes from vague definition to more elaborate ones. Edmund Burke conceives of a party as "a body of men united for promoting their joint endeavors, the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed."\(^{32}\) This definition with national interest as a fundamental basis nurtures a confusion and vagueness. One has no clear idea of what national interest is and what features it comprises. Hence, we cannot rely on Burke's view of party in this study. James Madison's definition of party with relation to power seems to make a step forward when, together with others, considers a party as

> A number of citizens united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.\(^{33}\)

Here, it is assumed that without politics it would not be easy to refer adequately to party, that political party is


a power's creation. Put otherwise, political party finds its foundation or raison d'être in the power structure. Consequently, despite its limits, the following definition offered by Lawson of political party transcends others without being complete because it limits itself to the functions that political parties perform in society. Lawson defines a political party as

An organized group of individuals, which calls itself a party, which seeks power for the purpose of influencing or determining public policy in accordance with the wishes of its members, and which performs one or more of the following:

formulating public issues, nominating candidates for public office, securing their election and enforcing their adherence after election to the program of the group. 34

Within the American society, Lawson's political party definition marks a positive step. However, it limits the essence of political parties to power and exercise while it minimizes the foundations, i.e., the material and historical conditions that can favor a party's existence and survival. Furthermore, Lawson rejects the ideological element that characterizes political parties of the modern world. In so neglecting this factor, Lawson's definition down plays the class interests and class struggle within

34 Lawson, Political Parties and Democracy in the United States, p. 18.
political parties and between political parties on the same territory as on different states. In addition, Lawson's definition of a political party tends to suggest that associations such as trade unions, secret and or scientific societies, religious groups, are also political parties. Indeed, those are pressure groups which sometimes have no clear-cut ideology. Are we to consider multinational corporations that operate worldwide, and sometimes play important political roles in their host countries mostly developing nations, as political parties? I doubt it seriously.

In Political Parties, A Behavioral Analysis, Samuel J. Eldersveld considers a party as a social group or an organizational system of interpersonal relationships, which attracts and recruits activists and followers in order to participate in the decision-making process.

While the author recognizes that in the American political system the party is a career channel he surprisingly denies that it is a tool in the hands of the ruling class and cannot be an instrument of class formation. In his words,

theories of the ruling class, or of oligarchy disguise more reality about the party than they disclose. The party is an open structure ... willing to provide mobility and access for social
categories into major operational and decisional centers of the structure.\textsuperscript{35}

By admitting the social mobility that the party provides to its members, Eldersveld implicitly recognizes its role in shaping the rank that its members may occupy. In a long run these members will share a common interest which destines them to that ruling class category. Eldersveld's mystification of the party's role is understandable in light of the American social perennial behavioral illusion which regards the concept of class analysis as unapplicable. Eldersveld's theoretical framework of the study of the parties is rooted in more general behavioral theories, especially modern organizational theory and the games theory. The theory of games has been developed by mathematicians as an approach to analyzing the dynamics of competition among a set of players for scarce resources. As such, its extension (application) to competitive party systems remains a pure suggestion so that its usefulness for the analysis of party systems has not been proved. Furthermore, its hypothetical application to parties becomes more and more difficult. However, considering parties as a tool for struggle to control power and implement goals set forth by a particular social group, the

game theory may not be as one-sided as the behavioral approach.

On the same ground as structural functionalist analysis Sigmund Neumann defines a party as "the key instrument of modern authoritarianism." Nevertheless, a more elaborate definition of political party by the Anglo-American writings is offered by Professor Ray whose view coincides with that of Duverger. As early as 1913, that is many years before Duverger's work, Ray defined a political party as follows:

a political party is a durable organization of individuals, or groups of individuals, fluctuating in personnel and numbers, united by common principles or a common policy, and having for its immediate end the control of the government through the carrying of elections and the possession of office.37

After the foregoing brief survey of the Western nations' notion of party, let us explore other avenues, particularly the Marxist literature on party.

Marx and Engels did not elaborate extensively on the concept of party. They briefly and broadly conceive of a party as the organization of the proletarians into class, which forms the union of the exploited and oppressed


who have no means of production of their own, but sell their labor-power in order to live. \(^{38}\)

Lenin is the first Marxist to have laid down consistent thoughts on a party, like Roberto Michels and Maurice Duverger for the western nations. Like Marx, Lenin emphasizes the social foundations. He puts the important accent on class consciousness. Lenin believes that a party cannot be understood outside of class interests because a party is the manifestation of class interests and social consciousness. Hence, a party is the expression of social classes in the class struggle or political struggle. In 1905, Lenin defined a party as the union of the class consciousness, advanced fighters for the emancipation of the working class. He wrote:

> The party is the sum of organizations connected into one. It is the organization of the working class divided up into a network of various local and special central and general organizations.\(^ {39}\)

Lenin clearly recognizes hitherto that a bourgeois party exists as the logical representation of the bourgeois class that the proletarian party must oppose and dismantle. Mao Tse Tung moves from the classical Marxist

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concept of a revolutionary party as a purely working class vanguard to include peasants and any section of any social forces that fight side by side with the proletariat in order to eliminate the existing bourgeois system. Looking at the fundamental level, he wrote in September 1922, that to carry out the Chinese revolution there must be a good political party allied with all classes, particularly the proletariat and the peasantry; a revolutionary party is the guide of the masses, and no revolution ever succeeds when the revolutionary party leads it astray.  

Having analyzed the Chinese society in 1922 Mao came to conclude that China's industrial proletariat was too small in size because China was an essentially agricultural nation, where the majority of people live in the countryside. Mao recognized the existence of five social classes in China: the landlord and comprador, the middle class, the petty bourgeoisie, the proletariat and the lumpen-proletariat. The last four classes have, to some degree, an enthusiasm toward a revolutionary change. In these conditions, it is tactically and strategically a good thing to pay attention to them and bring them within the party ideology and programs if the Chinese Communist

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Party advocates a revolution. Amilcar Cabral joins Mao's position. He looks at a party, in the struggle for social change as a disciplinary, educational and cultural channel that will bring about a revolutionary solution (end) to the violent exploitation of the colonized and oppressed people of Guinea. Without pretending to lay down a new definition of party, I consider it as a group of individuals, concerned principally with political struggle and who seek power in order to acquire it as a means toward the implementation of their ideology and programs. Interestingly enough, those individuals tend, in their class struggle, to regard their own interests as those of the community or society at large.

**Party Morphology**

Generally speaking, there exists a variety of party systems. In the western nations, emphasis has been put on pluralism as to suggest that those nations base their political system on the notion of the heterogeneity of opinions, that these opinions can be canalized differently, that several and various parties coexist and periodically compete in electoral procedures to acquire and

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41 Ibid., pp. 51-59.

exercise political power. This multiplicity of political parties appear to me to represent a contradictory understanding of the basic idea behind the notion that society is made up of various and different interests that can be harmonized without clash. Because historically we have not witnessed that unless we use harmony and/or compromise interchangeably to reinforce the confusion. How could one be convinced on that ground that the United States, with its two-party system, represents the western type of pluralism as its counterpart in the United Kingdom?

This above point may appear irrelevant, but it essentially raises the question about the harmony of interests in the western nations. The two-party system in both the United States and the United Kingdom by no means implies harmony of interests in those two societies and so the existence of several parties in France, Belgium and Italy do imply diversity of interests in those European states.

Briefly, party morphology in our modern time sets forth two different forms of party systems, the pluralist system and a one-party system, or, as in this study, the single-party system.

The pluralist party systems are usually found in the western societies which legally tolerate the existence of at least two parties on the political arena. Those different and various parties can, through legal and
constitutional procedures, compete for acquisition and exercise of power to implement their respective programs. In societies with two parties that alternate political power periodically, we speak of bipartism. The United States and the United Kingdom, as said earlier, represent this type of party system but at the same time they express some skepticism vis-a-vis minor parties with less favorable ideology. The activities of the communist party of the United States are kept so much under control that the party can hardly function, perform and grow in size. The U.S. Communist Party has no access to the media, to publicity like the Republican Party and the Democratic Party.

By the same token, societies that allow several parties with clear-cut ideologies to compete and acquire political power have been termed pluralist and multipartist. France, Italy, Belgium in Europe are the most fertile grounds for these types of parties. The Anglo-American bipartism and the European multipartism look at themselves as pluralist societies. The term pluralism connots a plurality of power centers. It assumes that power is dispersed throughout the society instead of being concentrated within some class, individuals, organization or elite. Robert Dahl defines a pluralist society as the one where "instead of a single class center of sovereign power, there must be multiple centers of power none of
which is or can be wholly sovereign.\textsuperscript{43} Between the two
subsystems of party – bipartism and multipartism – a midway
system could perform. It is what is called a dominant
party system. According to Duverger, a party is dominant
if it displays the following characteristics:

It must clearly outdistance its rivals
over an extended period of time; it must
identify with the nation as a whole,
i.e., its doctrines, ideas, and even its
style coinciding with those of the
times.\textsuperscript{44}

However if such a party abhors a political dialogue within
the society by closing the door to opposition criticisms,
it may, over a long period of time, control the major
institutions (parliament, executive and judiciary) and
become a single party system.

Despite the depth of Duverger's analysis, I do
believe that the dominant party system is a straight
forward road toward a one-party system. France, under
Charles De Gaulle's Rassemblement pour la Défense de la
République (RDR) was a dominant party system that tended to
lead to a one-party system even this has never been the
case.

\textsuperscript{43}Robert Dahl, Pluralist Democracy in the United
States: Conflicts and Consent (Chicago: R. McNally,

\textsuperscript{44}Duverger, Party Politics and Pressure Groups, p. 36.
The Convention People's Party in Ghana, under Kwame N'Krumah was at first a dominant party which, once in power outlawed other rival parties establishing a one-party system. The Indian People's Congress Party could not be denied that tendency either. Nonetheless, by the virtue of the inherent contradictions that emerge from any social formation, the French and Ghanian political systems have been unable to prevent their internal contradictions from altering their societies. As a result, May 1968 paralyzed France and led to the 1969 refusal by the French to accept the political regionalization submitted to referendum by De Gaulle. These social disturbances put a precipitous end to the reign of a French Second World War hero. The contradictions created by the CPP political folly (imposition of the CPP as the only legal party in Ghana, the imprisonment of opponents, the attempt to demote the chieftancy previously recognized) jeopardized N'Krumah's political future and the CPP rule. Consequently, N'Krumah was ousted and the CPP banned for good. The scope of the current Indian society is less bright than the fifteen years that followed independence day in 1947 by virtue of the contradictions that have derived from the mode of production or the relations of production laid down by the almost single-party rule of the Congress Party. For nearly forty years Nehru's party and family have been associated with the Indian political life so much so that religious
and ethnic rivalries Hindou-Sikh have become the social manifestations of those social contradictions to the extent of reinforcing them. I have expanded on the dominant party a little bit because the social contradictions that derive from it are similar to those from the one-party system or single party. This latter is the focal point of the next discussion within the African context.

1.2.2 Single Party in Africa

Twenty-seven years after the advent of independence in Africa, the single party system has become a paradigm in the political arena although with quite a few exceptions (Kenya, Senegal, Morocco). However, the trend toward the single party started in the early period of the struggle for African emancipation. Gwendolyn Carter argues that "the single party in developing states is an outgrowth of the mobilization of persons and groups in the preindependence period."45 To substantiate her point, Carter cites the case of the former British territories where the existence of a cohesive political party under a dominant leader was a sine qua non for the transfer of political power from colonial masters to local authorities. In the former French colonies, as in the former Belgian Congo, Carter's assumption may not necessarily be refuted because in both French and Belgian

possessions, emphasis was put on a majority party which means a party in position to control the major political institutions (parliament, executive and judiciary) in order to rule effectively. In this regard, Austin reports that the Governor of the Gold Coast, Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, who freed N'Krumah from the jail and named him the leader of local government, justified his decision as follows:

N'Krumah and his party had the mass of the people behind them and there was no other party with appreciable public support to which we could turn.46

In the former Belgian Congo the Belgian authorities could not refuse to ask Lumumba to form the first government of the Congo. Despite their effort to undermine Lumumba's popular support, Belgians found themselves confronted with a de facto situation that Lumumba was the leader of the Congolese majority.

In the long run, such a dominant party will use its relatively institutional control to outpower its opponents and become a de facto single party. This section aims at demonstrating that trend.

We owe the first major work on African political parties to Thomas Hodgkin. In his study on the subject matter, Hodgkin uses seven criteria to identify and categorize political parties in Africa. Those criteria are

membership, structure, discipline, leadership, financial sources, techniques and ideology. From the analysis it appears to Hodgkin that in the early sixties, there existed two kinds of parties, the mass parties and the elite parties.

Mass parties, according to Hodgkin, seek to enroll the mass of the population as members and supporters. They attempt to impose their own new type of structure upon society. They have organized channels of communication between the central nucleus of leading personalities and the mass of voters to whom they look for support. Mass parties, continues the author are serious about discipline so that they do not hesitate to suspend, expel or demote those in positions of authority within the party hierarchy for deviationist reasons. The main sources of the mass parties come from the contributions of the members and supporters, from donations and fund raising activities initiated and organized by the party. The mass parties leadership is manufactured by the party; it is generated from the party militantship. 47

Elite parties consist essentially of a nucleus of persons enjoying status and authorities within the existing social order (chieftancies, religious elite). The elite parties reflect the structure of society as it

is. There are no organized channels of communication between the leadership and the supporters who vote for the party by loyalty to the traditional and religious chieftancies because of the lack of internal discipline. They rely upon gifts from wealthy individual patrons, from corporate bodies or from the administration for their financial resources. Hodgkin concludes his analysis on both forms of political parties in Africa by asserting that in the internal struggle for power which develops during the period of decolonization, elite parties tend to lose ground to mass parties.\footnote{Ibid.}

In that context the Party Démocratique de Guinée (PDG), Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI), Convention People's Party (CPP) and the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) were mass parties for Guinea, Ivory Coast, Ghana and the Congo, respectively. Inversely, Alliance des Bakongo (ABAKO), the Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga (CONAKAT) in the Congo, and the Northern People's Congress (NPC) in Nigeria, were elite parties. As we can see, Hodgkin's party distinction is fundamental and help understand the nature of the early African political parties. One observation could be made here which is the ideological importance of parties has

\footnote{Ibid., p. 70.}
been somehow minimized in Hodgkin's analysis. Even though the author has pointed out independence achievement and democratic ideals as the core objectives of the African parties, he has not discussed the role of ideology in shaping theoretically the African parties actions. Ruth Schachter also joined Hodgkin in his endeavor to study the African parties. She subscribes to the dichotomous aspect of the African parties and labels her categorization mass parties and cadre/patron parties. Mass parties claim to represent all the people, tend to have either institutional or personal leadership, are strongly articulated, relatively disciplined, use organization as a weapon, are led by more educated men, legitimize formal structures of government and integrate the population into a nation. Patron/cadre parties have personal leadership, are weakly articulated, comparatively undisciplined, have little direct membership participation, tend to be based on native authorities, do not integrate the population.\(^{50}\)

The conclusion that could be drawn from Hodgkin's and Schacter's categorization is that during the struggle for political emancipation in Africa, there was a general tendency toward a bipartism in terms of theoretical framework; however, after independence the tendency came

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to be that of either a dominant party or a single party. The last paradigm became the focal point in the study of African politics.

Immanuel Wallerstein endorsed the theme in his general discussion of the African political arena in 1961 and wrote that

Almost everywhere, the trend after independence has been in one of two directions: toward a one-party state with consequent stability or toward a breakdown of the party system with consequent instability and a tendency for the army to play a growing role. 51

Wallerstein goes further and concludes:

The choice has not been between one-party and multi-party states; it has been between one-party states and either anarchy or military regimes or various combinations of the two. 52

When one reads the foregoing conclusion, one may be shocked by the true character of the statement. Twenty-six years after the publication of the book, Wallerstein's conclusion has been proven by empirical facts throughout Africa with few exceptions. The single party has become the modus administrandi in almost every African State.

The history of the single party in Africa takes off from Guinea. After the Guinean people backed


52Ibid., p. 96.
Sékou Touré and refused to join the French Community by opting for independence with the Parti Démocratique de Guinée (PDG) in September 1958, the Guinean leaders quickly capitalized on the popular support to establish a one-party state. The concern here was the achievement of national unity in Guinea. Sékou Touré stated:

From the ward and the village to the territorial level ... and the regions, the current unity has arisen to regroup all good wills, all healthy energies, all the men and women whose rise to consciousness and courageous action is at the basis of the radiance of our party.53

The PDG considered itself as the supreme organ, occupying a role that is higher place than the government itself. In its hands were concentrated political, technical, economic and judicial powers, because, argued the Guinean authorities

All our people are mobilized in the ranks of the PDG: that is to say that the common will derives not from the summit but from a basis of the popular will. Authority rests not with the government, but with the people.54

Besides the above legitimizing character of the Guinean party within Guinea, the PDG considered itself as a vast "movement for African emancipation whose mission it is to

54 Ibid., p. 118.
gather all Africans of good will under the banner of anticolonialism and progress."  

As a PanAfricanist, Sékou Touré believed in African unity. He held the view that in Africa, without political unity, colonialism will be defeated with difficulty, because it will seep into the cleavages that exist among Africans by exploiting internal contradictions (cultural pluralisms) of our societies, jeopardizing and increasingly postponing their disappearance.  

In his attempt to impose the Convention People's Party as the sole party in Ghana, N'Krumah, like Sékou Touré condemns the internal contradictions which have survived the colonial period and in many cases, have been stimulated by colonial authorities. These internal contradictions constitute an obstruction, a nuisance, a source of weakness to the emergence of viable states in Africa. Hence, N'Krumah pleads that

we must insist that in Ghana, in the higher reaches of our national life, there should be no reference to Fantes, Ashantis, Ewes, Gas, Dagombas, 'strangers' and so further; but we should call ourselves Ghanians.

55Ibid., p. 375.
56Ibid.
57Thomas Hodgkin, pp. 69-72.
Like Sékou Touré who considers the PDG as the founder of the Guinean nation, N'Krumah affirms that the CPP is a powerful force, it is the unifying force that guides and pilots the nation and is the nerve center of the positive operations in the struggle for African irredentism. Its supremacy cannot be challenged. The CPP is Ghana and Ghana is the CPP.  

Nevertheless, besides the concerns for unity, what are the other reasons for embracing the single party in Africa? To answer this question, we must go back to basic discussion of single parties as laid down by many social scientists.

The first major study on single parties goes back to 1936 with the publication by Mihail Manoilesco of Le Parti Unique. Two positions on single party have been pointed out. Two basic reasons justify the protagonists' position. According to them, the single party is both an elite and a bond. For the apologists of the system, the single party must create new elites in order to unite and shape the political leaders against the masses whose increasing role in public affairs threatens the traditional authorities and national unity. By forming

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a new ruling (elite) class, the party instructs them and makes them fulfill their tasks which consist of containing the masses growing role. Hence, the political, administrative and economic leaders are selected from the party which controls the entire state apparatus. In a way, the party has become the major (if not only) link between the State and the people thanks to a direct and permanent control over every aspect of societal life. Through the party cells and sections, the government can be aware of and shape public opinion. The government orders are transmitted downwards to the masses who may not be sure whether their voices are genuinely reported to the top. However, the channels of communication set up by the party enable both rulers and ruled to hear each other's messages. It seems that the type of the apology on the single party was a common recipe in the Nazi Germany and Italy. In other word, the single party rhetoric seems to be that of Fascists and conservatives. This leads us to the opinions held by the antagonists of the single party.

Like their counterparts, the opponents of the single party have a twofold argument. They look at the single party as a tool for class formation and an instrument for departicipation.

The leader of a single party regime capitalizes on it to strengthen his personal power. He uses the party structure to create his own ruling class
which is bound to him by the particular favors it enjoys: material advantages, monopoly of administrative posts, more power than the common citizenry. Loyalty to the dictator and paying court to all levels of the hierarchy becomes the core criteria of the selection of the ruling class rather than personal merit and aptitude for command/competence. Once selected the party official becomes the party leader's eye; he becomes a spy and informer for the regime. Fanon once denounced in one of his raged words the single party as the instrument of African bourgeoisie and of class formation. Hence, the leader and his aids arrogate to themselves government powers to dominate the entire society.

As a mechanism of the mass de-participation, the single party often mystifies the concept of democracy by an iron party discipline and the leader-worship, by chanting the party slogans all day and year around. The contact is established in the downward direction because the core business of the party is to spread the dictator's orders and to ensure government propaganda. The continuous and permanent this process the longer the single party regime. Therefore, the protagonists of the single party arbitrarily measure national stability by the lengthy life of their party system. How do the proponents' arguments and those expressed by the antagonists fit into the African context?
After the pioneer work on African parties by Carter and Hodgkin, some social scientists from Africa and Europe began to study the single party phenomenon as it was spreading throughout the continent. Analyzing the causes of political instabilities in Africa and particularly in the troubled Congo, Jean Buchmann came to the following conclusion:

Democracy in Africa cannot get along with an opposition like in Europe where it is object of genuine competition among several parties. In Africa opposition is a hindrance to progress and modernization.60

As an instructor at Lovanium University, Buchmann witnessed the agony of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the early years of independence. As an occasional advisor to the Congolese early leaders, Buchmann was mostly concerned about stability and progress (modernization) for the new republic. Hence, to Buchmann opposition has a negative role in Africa, and its suppression through the single party system was a necessary condition for progress. Writing in the same vein as Buchmann, George Balandier looks at the single party in Africa as a genuine instrument of modernization. According to him

in order to modernize the traditional societies, the single party accomplishes several functions, it defines the emerging state, it directs the national economy, it organizes and reshapes social structures. 61

Balandier and Buchmann, as many other modernization theoreticians may have reason as to see single party play a dynamic role in building nations. Some historical cases could corroborate their position. Under a communist single party the Soviet Union has quickly moved from a relatively backward capitalist state in 1917 to a relatively advanced and strong country in less than a century compared with the United States. However, several factors distant the Soviet Union from the general trend of single party in Africa with no consistent social and economic planning. The Nazi Germany under the National Socialist Party pulled Germany out of economic and social chaos and made it a strong and stable state as to play a regional and international role. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under the leadership of Mao Tse Tung has built China as a united and respected nation. Cuba, under Castro, is no longer a divided and begging state as before 1959. Turkey under Kemal Ataturk became a strong and stable country. However, all this does

not prove necessarily that social progress was a common success for all the social classes.

In a descriptive study of fifteen former French colonies in Africa, Ahmed Mahiou maintains that the general acceptance of the single party in Africa is a logical evolution of the struggle for emancipation which should be associated with progress, stability and continuity after independence. 62

Dimitriu G. Lavroff reinforces the foregoing opinion and assumes in a surprisingly Darwinist manner that Black Africa is not Europe and the parties system existing in Africa are artificial and fragile constructions. Black Africa believes to have found its own path in the single party. 63

Lavroff's position is groundless and ahistorical for it implies that the single party is a Black Africa's creation and that it alone will solve Black Africa's problems. As pointed out earlier, the single party system was introduced in Africa in the same manner as the multi-party system. In this case, one should know that practice is an empirical phenomenon that always precedes theory. Fed up with the


multi-party failures, Black African leaders had no choice but to try the other experience (I. Wallerstein). And it is a historical and scientific distortion to pretend that the single party is an African creation. As it will be analyzed, the single party has been an option as to create a viable national entity for most African nations after their political emancipation and the threat of territorial disintegration.

1.2.3 National Integration and State

The concept of (national) integration goes back to the notion of survival for social communities throughout mankind's history. People of common descent can ensure their existence and that of their entire community by uniting their efforts and actions towards common goals generally the betterment and the progress of all members. Individuals who belong to the community and fight for its betterment and maintenance consider themselves as in-group members. Those who can pose a threat to them are viewed as out-group members. This categorical thinking has led small communities in precolonial time to possess a bellicose behavior vis-a-vis each other. And so emerged the notion of primitive nationalism which aimed, during old times, at preserving by any necessary means the existence

and survival of one's community at the expense of the other. Wars among nations (communities) were justified by that feeling of maintenance, preservation and today of social progress.

While identification with one's small and immediate community was a factor in the precolonial time nationalisms, identification with a political community dominates nationalisms today as to look at it first as a center for an effective control over the use of violence, second as a center of a decision-making and third as the dominant focus of identification for the citizenry. As used here, the concept of a political community refers to what is commonly called the state.

The State finds its essence in a political power, a geographically determined territory and human groupings. The process through which all three components are utilized to maintain and preserve social interaction among the members is integration. The notion of state will be discussed later in this section. Applied to large political communities, integration is

_a process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings, are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the preexisting national states._

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65 Ernest B. Haas, _The Uniting of Europe_ (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 16.
Duverger defines integration as "the establishment of a closer interdependence between parts of a living organism or between the members of a society." Before continuing this discussion further, it must be pointed out that the notions of state and integration are not only important but also strongly interrelated. They both aim at the same goal: legitimacy of the nation-state. This notion started in the 16th century and became more apparent in Europe in the 18th century. Back then, Machiavelli, struck by the invasion and subjugation of Italy by foreign powers, coined the concept of "raison of state" which he regarded as a distinctive logic of survival and the security concerns that emerged as the object of the prince's statecraft.

In a geometrical reasoning, Hobbes portrays the state as a mortal God, Leviathan, constituted by its subjects who are willing to surrender their individual sovereignty to its powerful authority in order to escape from a brutish and brief existence. Like Machiavelli, Hobbes assumes, in his spatial approach, that man is naturally brutal, aggressive and egoistic, and resembles a machine whose engine rests upon the desire for power and the fear of death. The social contract that binds man to the Leviathan guaranties him protection from the

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(Souverain) Leviathan who has the monopoly of the use of the hitherto legal force (violence) to maintain peace for all. Hobbes has a pessimistic view of man in his conceptualization of the state building.\footnote{Thomas Hobbes, \textit{Leviathan} (New York: Collier Book, 1962).}

Jean-Jacques Rousseau's view of the Civil Society looked upon man as the major force. He believes that man is born free and sane, but society corrupts him. Rousseau opposes force in the integration process. For him social and political integration is a function of social equilibrium which derives from a social contract. Through this, each individual renounces his rights for the sake of the collectivity so that withstanding the equal conditions for everyone, no individual member can jeopardize those conditions. In other words, the equilibrium between the loss and the individual's benefits is the linkage between all the members of the social body which gives birth to society.\footnote{Jean Jacques Rousseau, \textit{The Social Contract} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 180-184.}

Needless to say, Rousseau presents an optimistic view of man contrarily to Hobbes. Consequently the Hobbesian notion of integration is a synonymous with order and regulation, while the Rousseauian concept means
community. The notion of integration seems today to stick to the two positions expressed by Hobbes (force) and by Rousseau (equilibrium). In his definition, which was introduced earlier, Haas joins Hobbes and admits that integration comes only after a new center of activities and jurisdiction commands activities in preexisting national loyalties. Duverger subscribes to the Rousseanian notion and poses that integration is the result of interdependent equilibrium between parts of society.

For Etzioni, integration is the more inclusive term: all that are integrated are also interdependent, but not all that are interdependent are integrated. Etzioni not only endorses both the pessimistic and the optimistic views on integration, but emphasizes the level of efficiency of the legal use of force by the new body and the effectiveness of interdependence between parts. The level of integration may be high or low depending on the use of force and the effectiveness of interdependence. The fact that the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are both parts of the United Nations system does not imply that both countries are

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integrated. Credit must be given to Etzioni on this observation because within a particular country several and separate groups can live under a common political system without interacting effectively. In Zimbabwe the Tsona and Matabele are ruled by ZAPU-Patriotic Front, but do not interact effectively as they would like to because of a power struggle between their leaders.

In Africa, the notion of national integration is linked to that of the state which in the present case has been gravitating around the concepts of force and equilibrium. For Wallerstein, the notion of integration of a country can be assured in the long run only if the majority of the citizens begin to accept the state as the legitimate holder of force and authority, the rightful locus of legislation and social decision.\(^71\) Claude Ake goes in the same direction and writes that

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\text{political integration is a progressive development among members of a political system of a deep and unambiguous sense of identity with the state and other members of the civic body.}\(^72\)
\]

The identity with the state and other members of the civic body notwithstanding, we ought to look at national integration as a mechanism which examines


how to build a coherent political society from a multiplicity of traditional societies, how to increase cultural homogeneity and value consensus, and how to elicit from the individual deference and devotion to the claim of the state. 73

J. S. Coleman and D. G. Rosberg define national integration as

a broad subsuming process, whose two major dimensions are: (1) political integration which refers to the progressive bridging of the elite class gap on the vertical plane in the course of developing an integrated political process and a participant political community and (2) territorial integration, which refers to the progressive reduction of cultural and regional tensions and discontinues on the horizontal plane in the process of creating a homogenous territorial political community. 74

The question for African states is to create viable authorities in the existing boundaries delineated by colonization. Richard L. Sklar holds that national integration is an expansive concept which implies the creation of durable bonds of unity within a state. He writes that insofar as national integration contemplates the creation of higher loyalties that supersede parochial loyalties to subnational communities, tribes, language


groups, or regions, it is a universally acclaimed goal of the African renaissance. 75

As a goal, national integration would not, according to Sklar, hold a conservative stand; because the concept is different from the notion of nation building which may make a fetish of national sovereignty to the detriment of supranational integration. I do not agree with Sklar on his distinction between national integration and nation building. Skeletally put, national integration resembles state building in that it is also the struggle for legitimation of a state both internally and internationally or regionally. It would be an illusion to speak of supranational integration without viable, national loyalties. Most supranational entities have failed because of a lack of viable authorities at the level of national entities and other related factors such as economic, ideological and cultural. The United Arab Republic 1958-1961, the Federation of the West Indies, 1958-1962, the East African Community, 1966-1978, are clear cases of unsuccessful supranational entities. My disagreement with Sklar's position has no consequence on his valid approach on the subject matter. Sklar has been the first scholar

from the Western nations to suggest a radical approach to the study of national integration.

Earlier, it was put that the notion of national integration is bound to the notion of state which is the arena for political processes. Max Weber and his followers in the Western nations consider the state as "a human community that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory." 76

Beyond the Weberian minimalist concept of state based on the use of legal repression, those who believe in harmony of class interests want to build a harmonious state because, they argue, society is made up of various social groups whose interests are different but not conflicting, so the role of the state consists in bringing together those interests for the commonwealth. Theodore Hamerow writes that the protagonists of the neutral state want the harmony of classes, not the subjugation of one by the other, not the subjugation of the opponent to reform, but also his good will for it. 77 Furthermore, they believe that the state's whole sphere is the making of all special


activities working together for one general end: its own welfare, or the public good. 78

Marx and his disciples reject the common belief that the state is a neutral body. They maintain that the state is an institution that legitimates and protects the propertied class. In The Origins of the Family, State and Private Property, Engels traces the historical development of the state and writes that the state arises simultaneously with the development of social classes

the state is a product of society at a certain stage of development which is clef into irreconcilable antagonisms. It becomes necessary to have a power seemingly standing above society to alleviate the conflict and keep within the bounds of order. And this power, arisen out of society, but placing itself from it is the state. 79

Lenin conceives of the state on the one side as a special organization of force, violence, and capitalist exploitation. Under such system, it is the instrument of the bankers and industrialists for the exploitation of the oppressed class. On the other side, Lenin believes that the abolition of the bourgeois state must be replaced by a state wherein the exploited class or the proletariat has


control over the state apparatus in its endeavor to establish a socialist state. Lenin goes on to point out that only under communism, when no exploiting class would exist, would no special apparatus of suppression be necessary and that with the development of society from capitalism to communism, would the state begin to wither away. 80 So Lenin considers the state as a temporary useful machinery in the hands of the exploited class in its effort to go from a bourgeois state to a communist state. Lenin's conciliatory stand vis-a-vis the notion of state which contradicts the one proposed by Marx and Engels has been a matter of debate after the triumph of the revolution in Russia and the establishment of socialist system in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe on the one hand and after most colonial empires gained their political independence in the aftermath of World War II and sought to act as internal and external actor on the other hand. Ralph Miliband, and Nicos Poulantzas, Theda Skocpol and Alan Wolfe perceive the state as an epiphenomenal instrument of class dictatorship. It seems that those social critics have been influenced by Milovan Djilas.

Having surveyed the reign of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union and witnessed the phenomenon in

80 For more, see Vladimir I. Lenin, The State and Revolution (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1958).
Yugoslavia, Djilas came to conclude that a new exploiting class was emerging from the system of proletarian dictatorship; that this new ruling class does not have a private property basis as Marx and Engels had argued. The basis of the new ruling class is the state property, so much so that the ruling class was and still is a state capitalist state. Djilas continues and holds that the party makes the class, but the class grows as a result and uses the party as a basis. The class grows stronger while the party grows weaker. 81

Miliband, in *The State in Capitalist Society*, agrees that the state is ruled by an elite with old school, family, and ideological ties with the capitalist class. 82 Poulantzas, in a structuralist view holds that the state is a condensation of class dynamics with ideological instances which regroup dominated classes as individual citizens collectively considered as a nation. 83

Theda Skocpol, in *States and Social Revolutions*, offers an insightful image of modern state. She transcends the notion of socioeconomic struggle and poses that

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structurally the state is a set of administrative, policing and military organizations headed and coordinated by an executive authority. 84

Alan Wolfe presents another notion of the modern state. He perceives the state as a machinery weakened by its own contradictions of accumulation and legitimation and unable to find solutions to a growing, demanding working class which abhors the contradictions between rationality and irrationality; these are the striking and stagnant characteristics of the modern capitalist state. 85

In Zaire, the notion of the state is associated with that of a crushing force or Bula Matari, meaning he who crushes all resistance. 86 This expression symbolizes the coercive and paternalist colonial state in the Belgian Congo, now Zaire.

However, back to our discussion, we should look at national integration as a dynamic process that aims at bringing closer different social groupings within the

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84 For more information see Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 20-32.


same geographical area called state in order to create a spirit of togetherness, sharing values and wealth and total participation in public affairs. From the perspective of qualitative social change that we advocate and that must take place in this process, the term national integration implies the integration of the people within the framework of the political and socio-economic structure of which the Zairean state is but the geographic and physical umbrella. It also implies the breaking of barriers between classes, ethnic groups and a meaningful participation on the part of the people at all levels of the society. This I term horizontal integration, while the coercive and pessimistic view on integration is labeled vertical integration. The latter mostly refers to the consolidation of political power from the top hierarchy to the bottom of the political structure. Both horizontal and vertical integrations are interrelated, but by deemphasizing the second aspect, and promoting the first aspect, there is a hope to get to the goal. The variables I will rely on to tackle the Zairean vertical integration are borrowed from Ake's theory of political integration. They are authoritarian, consensual, identific, and paternal. Ake goes from the position that

the political system drive for integration maximizes its chances for achieving high degree of integration and remaining stable in spite of the short run destabilizing effects of the drive
for integration if it is authoritarian, consensual, identic and paternal.  

In our attempt to gauge the vertical integration, we will rely on the political economy of the Zairean state under the MPR; this will reveal who owns the means of production/property; who holds the business, trade, agro-industrial activities. How the control of this comes about, or what channel provides the average to the class formation. The development of solidarities among the citizens and their mutual physical contact will be analyzed to see whether a horizontal integration has taken place.

Depending on the circumstances, the principal (or major) goal of national integration is unity within a state. This unity stands for unity of authority, unity of national appartenance, unity of political values and mostly unity of action. The claim of national unity does not eliminate the existence of division within African societies. Those divisions that the Western scholars call healthy pluralisms are what Sékou Touré regarded as internal contradictions to be solved through the party channels in order to reinforce the nation by eliminating the sequels of the regional spirit and all racist tendencies. Hence, using Guinea, Senegal, Mali, Ivory

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87Ake, "Political Integration and Political Stability," p. 486.

88S. Touré, Expérience Guinéenne et Unité Africaine, p. 258.
Coast and Ghana as empirical ground for his analysis of the party state in West Africa, Aristide Zolberg suggests that despite their tendency toward authoritarianism the five states have created a political order that could be credited to their respective dominant party or single party. Clearly put, the single party with its limitations has created a center of authority that has been legitimized by law and fact. The political institutional order that the single party has created through the elimination of various oppositions is a fundamental prerequisite for the achievement of unity or oneness. 89

These general features of vertical integration have been the basic themes in the writings of authors who believe in elite and superman theories. The central focus of these theories is that men are not as rational as the commonly accepted assumption. In order to get them to go along with the elite's will, they must be coerced. From these pessimistic theories of humanity derives the idea of progress of society.

Though Wallerstein does not subscribe to the elitist theories, he urges the early African leaders to go for (single) parties and heroes to achieve internal unity. He argues that

Most African nations do not have long histories as nationalities. Their nationhood has been created in the crucible of a revolutionary struggle against a colonial power. The unity of the nation was forged in the fight against the external enemy.90

Consequently, the hero or a charismatic leader concept is introduced as a prerequisite towards national unity and national integration. But the hero needs a party in order to play effectively his key role of forging the nationhood and the national pride. The role of the hero is first of all to be readily available, easily understood, symbol of the new nation, someone to incarnate in his person its values and aspirations. He legitimizes the state by ordaining obedience to its norms out of loyalty to his person. This is what people usually mean when they speak of the charismatic authority of these leaders.91

Wallerstein probably had national heroes in mind or charismatic leaders committed to the defense and furtherment of masses' aspirations/expectations. He cites N'Krumah, Sékou Touré, Modibo Keita, Nyerere, and Perhat Abbas who are different from Fulbert Youlou, Houphouet Boigny, and Senghor. The problem with Wallerstein's well intended theory of hero and charismatic leadership is that


91Ibid., p. 99.
its quick and steady spreading in Africa has unfortunately led to the acceleration of class formation throughout the continent. As this study will demonstrate in the last chapter, the practice has led to what Djilas singles out as the emergence of a new class.

1.2.4 Significance and Organization of the Study

This study goes from the position that although economic structures determine and shape social formation, superstructural elements of which political parties have come to play an important role, as a major force in class structure in contemporary Africa. As of the MPR, the single ruling party in Zaire, national integraton as a noble goal toward statehood bears a class connotation when analyzed in a radical approach. Such is the context in which this analysis is conducted.

This study has not been conducted without problems. These concern the primary source materials such as party statutes, constitutions, and interviews with the Zairean political aristocracy.

Due to the unpredictable reactions that the party reserves to the ruling class, one may not conduct resourceful and reliable interviews with the Zairean politicians. In addition, these politicians live in permanent fear of discretionary dismissal from the party leader and founder whom the party empowers to do so if circumstances require. Consequently, the data one gathers
today could be outdated and less valid the next morning. Added to this political mobility is the lack of interest by the ruling class in preserving history of national institutions. Zairean politicians care less about writing memoirs that could have been of vital needs for social researchers; only when they declare themselves opponents after their eventual dismissal from the party apparatus that they resort to political pamphlets against the regime. In this case, political scientists must be cautious of their interpretation of political phenomena in motion.

In this study we have attempted to use data from all the available avenues without alienating our scientific objectivity. However, most recent official documents have not been explored because of distance and time factors that academic timing allows us. We are conscious of those lacunae and must be solely responsible.

The study carries four chapters and a conclusion. The first chapter has, in the first section laid down the research question and its methodological evolution. In the second section, operational concepts have been discussed while the literature review has focused on party morphology and national integration and state in Africa. Insofar as national integration is concerned, two major forms of integration, vertical and horizontal, were pointed out and are central to the third chapter. The second chapter
focuses on the MPR, the Zairean ruling party, the circumstances of its foundation, its ideology of authentic nationalism and the major organs through which it has gained national and international recognition as the legitimate holder of political power. Chapter 3 deals with vertical integration, which is the struggle for the bearer of national sovereignty to be respected and obeyed throughout the state. The last chapter looks at the political economy of vertical integration; who owns the means and forces of production? The MPR as the sole ruling party and bearer of Zairean sovereignty decides on who gets what and when. It is here that our analysis of social dynamics in Zaire shows that the MPR, as a superstructural element has played a determinant role in shaping class structure in contemporary Zaire. A general conclusion assesses the role of single party in determining class formation in Africa and in Zaire particularly.
CHAPTER II

THE MOUVEMENT POPULAIRE DE LA REVOLUTION (MPR)

The MPR as a political party draws its existence from both objective and subjective historical conditions. Objective conditions stem from factual circumstances that make an event happen. They may also be met in a case but without necessarily leading to the occurrence of the event. A casual circumstance can generate an event; in this case, we speak of subjective conditions. Both objective and subjective conditions interact to the extent to be mutually inclusive at times. For example, the territorial disintegration, the absence of state authority, social disenchantment have been some of the objective conditions that had led to the Zairean army to stage a coup but power struggle between the Head of State Kasavubu and his Heads of Government Lumumba and Tschombe was the subjective condition of both coups in 1960 and 1965.

Whether those conditions have played a more or less important role in the Zairean post colonial history or not, other factors have contributed to the agony of the Zairean state. The colonial legacy had left the country with a coercive and centralized administration coupled with a

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racial policy of segregation which granted political and economic rights to foreign entrepreneurs (Belgians and their European allies) while it denied Zaireans the same rights. As a result, those foreign companies grew big and played an important role in shaping the Congolese nationalism and later on the course of events after independence as well.

In Katanga, the Union Minière du Haut Katanga fully backed Moise Tschombe who had proclaimed a Katanga State, distinct from the Congo. In Kasai, Kalondji who self-crowned King of the province got most of his support from the local Diamond Company, namely the Forminière. More importantly, the colonial administration in so doing, shaped the character of the Congolese political and economic society as well as of the course of events that followed the triumph of Congolese nationalism. In other words, the Country's political and economic make up represents a colonial legacy. The international element comes as the intrigues among foreign powers had surfaced in an attempt to control a potentially and strategically rich country.

From the Zairean perspective, matters got worse after independence when the new leaders who owed their primary allegiance to their ethnic and/or regional organizations failed to put the national interest before their own or that of their region or ethnic group. Thomas Remy Kanza
has captured these elements and set them into two categories. The first category comprises what he terms as permanent characteristics (geographical location, ethnic groups, natural resources). The second category contains the temporary characteristics (political power and leadership). Kanza's operational concepts in analyzing the Zairean society coincide with what we have called objective and subjective conditions. What interest this analysis is Kanza's position vis-à-vis the second category. Indeed Kanza asserts that the solution to the crisis situation in 1960 was not to be expected from the masses. Rather, a leadership change was a must. As defendable as this viewpoint may appear, what if the leadership changes without any structural social change? Evidently if such a leadership decides to break away from its petty bourgeois tendency, commit a class suicide for the betterment of the masses, that could do. But what if the new leadership goes the opposite way? For as demonstrated by Mao Tse Tung and the Chinese people during the revolution, "leadership and masses are to the revolutionaries what water is for the fishes."

The MPR in this context was founded in 1967 in order to provide the state with a strong leadership and restore the

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conditions of a prosperous country. The aftermath of the 1965 coup showed a quasi popular support from the masses who, for five years could not enjoy the proceeds of independence. For five years politicians were divided on every thing but their personal interests. The junta seized the popular support opportunity to set ground for their would-be political party. A small group of sympathizers and cheerleaders was created in the spring 1966, and was named Corps of Volunteers for the Republic (CVR). The group quickly grew in size and so did its political and psychological role. Its members attended every popular gathering called on by the junta who eventually relied on it in order to spread the new regime political ideology. A year later, the CVR gave birth to the MPR. The MPR manifesto, named the Nsele Manifesto was published on May 20, 1967 by the Chief of Staff and Head of State, General Joseph Désiré Mobutu.

The Nsele Manifesto states the MPR goals as follows: to restore the state authority and the union of Zaireans for the safe and the grandeur of the republic; to free Zaireans from serfdom, to guarantee their well-being and to set up a truly social and democratic Republic. To implement its goals, the MPR had to undertake major structural changes on both ideological and political

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\(^{93}\)See The Nsele Manifesto, p. 8.
grounds. On the ideological level, new ideas about the Zairean nationhood were being formulated the end result of which came to be known as Zairean Authentic Nationalism. It has been demonstrated that three variables combine to justify the essence of a party. The three variables are power, ideology and interests. Of these three related variables, ideology plays a determinant role. It is the driving force for the ruling party in its endeavor to bring in the largest followers as it attempts to gain control over the entire community. For this reason, we need to discuss in depth the Zairean Authentic Nationalism.

Like any -ism the Zairean Authentic Nationalism belongs to the category of ideologies. It embodies practices and theory that justify the relations of production among Zaireans. Hence, this ideology ought to be analyzed according to the production relations under which Zaireans produce, live and interact economically, politically and socially. As Marx and Engels put it,

the way in which men produce their means of subsistence depends first of all on the nature of the actual means of subsistence they find in existence and have to reproduce. This mode of production is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life. 94

The production of the means of existence forges a social division of labor which then leads to social classes. In society where the system is a *modus vivendi*, it is clear that the distribution of labor will stem from the dominant mode of production. In a class society, social inequality is more likely to occur and create deprivation of the dominated classes. Within this socio-cultural environment, ideology acts as a double sword blade. Either the dominant class uses its own ideology to implement and reinforce its domination or to uplift the dominated classes, that is to say, the society as a whole. In some cases, when the dominant classes in a revolutionary compromise committed a class suicide by abandoning their own ideology thereby adopting a mass ideology efforts are made to eradicate exploitation in order to create a more egalitarian community. Nationalism then stands from this ambiguous position. Guided or oriented by a state apparatus like in Zaire, MPR nationalism and rule respond to the first type of ideology. As such, MPR is incapable to serve as a weapon in dismantling a system of exploitation inherited from the colonial days. This type of nationalism can hardly become the refuge and court of appeal of exploited and dominated classes whose interest can only be served through a struggle for national liberation.
Amilcar Cabral offers a clear definition of national liberation when he writes that

national liberation is the rejection by oppressed people of the negation of their historical process through imperialist domination and their return to history through the destruction of this domination.\(^95\)

Furthermore, from a Marxian perspective the state-oriented nationalism is but a bourgeois invention because it is of course true of every nation that insistence upon nationality is now to be found only among the bourgeoisie and their writers.\(^96\)

The evidence of the foregoing position showed up in Zaire when the dissatisfied class of évolués failed to gain equal share of social and material advantages that the colonial administration granted to Belgian colonial agents. The évolués were Congolese individuals who had the opportunity to attend schools. Their diploma constituted a safe way to serve as auxiliaries in public sector and in private enterprises. Local tradesmen and farmers with a certain high standard of material acquisition could also apply for the évolués status which was not automatic by virtue of literacy or material acquisition. The évolués statutes stated that any colonized could apply for and get

\(^{95}\text{Amilcar Cabral, in Ahmed Sékou Touré, Revolution in Guinea (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1965), p. 102.}\)

\(^{96}\text{K. Marx and F. Engels, p. 518.}\)
social recognition as a civilized individual. Once the applicant was granted this status, he was no longer under the custom laws. These were considered as laws for uncivilized people. Having confessed his attachment to European culture and civilization, an évolué did in return enjoy some of the civil rights previously reserved to white only. Along with this status came the privileges of shopping, eating and dancing in the white areas. Theatres and good schools were open to them and their children. He could also buy and consume imported goods in department stores and supermarkets once reserved to whites only. As Frantz Fanon once wrote, those évolués had the obligation to show their attachment to the European culture and civilization by speaking "perfectly" the colonizer's language. On the other side, the many Zaireans without education and wealth acquisition were denied these advantages.

Despite these privileges the évolués soon realized their equivalent condition to be an évolué was nothing but an illusion. In order to better their condition they mobilized the masses behind them in the name of independence or self-determination. At this juncture, the struggle for independence was first a petty bourgeois initiative. Since 1960, this social class has been vying to consolidate its class interests and exert effective control over the country's wealth and political life. The
ideology of Authentic Nationalism emerges as a modus 
justificandi of that domination because 
all means for the development of production transform themselves into means of domination over and exploitation of the producers. 97

The historical process suggested here is the subjugation of the dominated Zairean people and their productive forces to foreign elements and their local allies. This resulted in the loss by Zaireans of the control over their own resources, destiny and culture. In this context does the Zairean Authentic Nationalism stand for the struggle to regain the Zaireans' historical personality and their role as actors responsible for their own future? It is interesting to note during the entire colonial period many an African raised his/her voice against the depersonalizing and debilitating impact of colonialism on colonized people.

Known as acculturation or assimilation, the process had the lethal effect of negating African culture in favor of Europe's "superior" culture. Consequently, the colonized came to believe that "to be civilized means to be white, to act and think according to the maxims of white culture and, in order to achieve civilized morality, it is essential that the black, the dark, the negro, [the Zairean] vanish

from the African consciousness." A Congolese writer endorsed Fanon's position in 1967 in denouncing the alienation of his people as a terrible disease because, as wrote Fanon, even more terrible than the colonization of a country is the colonization of the mind. Mabika Kalanda attacks this disease in his work entitled *La Remise en Question: Base de la Décolonisation Mentale*. In this book, the author summarizes the views most commonly expressed by European sociologists and psychologists to obscure the African consciousness. These reasons may be presented as follows:

1. Africans have a total and blind dependence on their environment; as a result, they prefer to live and act collectively.

2. Africans enjoy everything without restriction except for those who are Muslims.

3. Africans have no idea of property, order, perfection (aesthetics).

4. Africans waste their time to shake everybody's hands with whom they easily and superficially socialize.

5. Africans are more emotional than analytical and skeptical.

---

6. Africans live in a permanent fear of mysterious forces (elders, metaphysics). 99

To Europeans and Belgians (in particular), it was a duty to assimilate the colonized people by teaching them how to speak the civilized language, how to be mentally white in a black (Zairean) body. Mabika Kalanda rejects the afore mentioned points because they distort the real African culture. He calls for a reshuffling and revitalization of African culture. The first and important step toward that goal is the questioning of the European attitudes on African cultural values. This is the essence of Remise en Question.

Zairean Authentic Nationalism is an ideology or in latu sensu, a political philosophy; and as such it is to bring a specific order into the total life of its society. Cecil Wright Mills considers it as a driving force "in terms of which certain institutions and practices are justified and others attacked." 100

Ideology can also stand for moral theory and practice for an existing order that it serves. Kwame N'Krumah looks at ideology in a global sense when he holds that


100 C. Wright Mills, "Ideals and Ideologies," The Marxist, p. 12.
the ideology of a society is total. It embraces the whole life of a people, and manifests itself in their class-structure, history, literature, art, religion. 101

N'Krumah moves further to plead for an African ideology which would stand in contrast to the dehumanizing ideology of exploitation, capitalism. He calls for a remise en question, an African renaissance which will emphasize a corrective and positive image of African history [and culture] that should be written as the history of our society, not as the story of European adventurers. 102

When presented in this way, African history and culture can thus become a pointer at the ideology which should guide and direct African reconstruction. 103

The African philosophical conscientism as proposed then by N'Krumah is nothing more or less than the ideology of oppressed and exploited people that Fanon has defended and that we presented as a second alternative meaning to nationalism. Would the Zairean Authentic Nationalism join this category of ideologies?

On the surface, this intellectual effort to build an elaborate corps of ideas to justify the total

102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
reconstruction of African society according to the desiderata of African masses, Authentic Nationalism or Authenticity can be viewed as a positive move. Yet, without a culture that advocates social change it appears illusory to uproot the oppressive and violent culture that colonization has implemented in Zaire. Amilcar Cabral is right when he perceives culture as a solid weapon that leads to the eradication of exploitation, to national liberation. Culture can also revitalize the national clan for a national development. Cabral argues that

At any moment, depending on internal and external factors determining the evolution of the society in question, cultural resistance may take new forms (political, economic, armed) in order fully to contest [foreign] domination.104

To address the "Authenticity" question one may refer to it as an attempt to preserve the Zairean cultural patrimony from vanishing. This heritage encompasses the past, the present, and the future of the people in terms of history and cultural values. The coloniser had negated this heritage and alienated the Zairean past and values. As a result the Zairean society lives with a corruption which is a pure "decay and degradation that dissolves the bonds

---

104Amilcar Cabral, in Return to the Source: Selected Speeches of Amilcar Cabral, p. 40.
uniting the members of a collectivity." Moral regeneration by the study of history and values becomes as remarked Banerjea for the Indian nationalist movement in later nineteenth century, the last consolation left to a fallen and degraded people. The consequence of the loss of this patrimony holds Anthony Smith is the loss of identity, self-oblivion, the end of authenticity, which erods and corrupts the community, dividing and weakening the members and tempting them into cultural imitation and political dependence.

The above probably applies to the 1960's Zaire only during the struggle for self-determination. However, after independence the reasoning no longer holds as power passed over to Zaireans. The enemy for Zaireans was actually the new ruling group who found itself unable to accomplish anything whatsoever. Regionalism, ethnic interests and confessional difference became their means of self-expression. Greed to acquire property and privilege in order to control and dominate the Zairean society as did the former masters encouraged the national


107 A. Smith, p. 118.
leaders to reinforce division among Zaireans. As Marx and Engels pointed out,

with the division of labor is given simultaneously the distribution and indeed the unequal distribution both quantitative and qualitative, of labor and its products, hence property.108

Moreover, as the division of labor leads to the contradiction between the interests of individuals depending on their respective position within the system of production, exploitation of one class by another will ensue. The ruling class who at this particular juncture holds the dominant and privilege position can capitalize on that position and expropriate the producers of the work. In a situation where that ruling class has not consolidated its control over the entire society, challenge from within its own structure and from outside environment is unavoidable. The dissatisfied stratum of the power structure will undertake to overthrow the system. The outside environment (people) offers a source of ingredients that the dissatisfied fraction uses in its effort to dismantle the existing system. This theory explains the tumultuous situation in Zaire after independence and the subsequent nationalist struggle. Nonetheless, it does not shed any new light over the commonly held view that popular masses cannot stand

against their exploitation without a leadership to guide their materialization. For in every society based on exploitation, inequality and injustice automatic mass rebellion and open resistance are not to be expected. Popular anger may result from that system and lead to a temporary violent situation. The popular anger of course puts a hallmark on the process but without a mob leader (demagogue) it may remain fruitless. Badiou's popular masses theory appears to join another theory according to which the wider the gap between the expectations and the needs, the more likely the occurrence of a revolution.

Without idealizing leadership, we believe that the évolutés in Zaire capitalized on the January 4, 1959 popular anger to bring a sense of class consciousness in Zaire. Clearly, the January 4, 1959 events marked a turning point in the Zairean struggle for self-determination because it had forced Belgian colonial authority to negotiate with Zaireans and set the independence day on June 30, 1960.

In any struggle for social change there ought to be a revolutionary nucleus which often happens to be bourgeois.


in nature. Both Marx and Engels have demonstrated that
theory in their respective analyses of class struggle in
France and Germany.\textsuperscript{111}

In addition, the revolutionary nucleus must be able to
organize itself as it mobilizes the popular masses.
Countries in Latin America and Africa have
institutionalized the exploitation of masses who crawl in
poverty and yet are not challenged by popular masses with
no organization.

The version of the ruling class in Zaire is that
Authentic Nationalism/Authenticity is a genuine
self-examination of the past which incited Zaireans to act
and produce. In this respect foreign ideologies have no
meaning nor do they respond to Zairean social realities.
They should be excluded from the Zairean socio-cultural
ambit. A party ideologue defines authenticity as

\begin{quote}
\textit{an anti-ideological stand. We reject
any doctrine with the pretention to be
ubiquitously applicable. We want to be
responsible for our own history by
appealing to our existence and
action.}\textsuperscript{112}
\end{quote}

When one examines the afore mentioned explanation, one
gets astonished by the parallelism between that view and

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{111}Karl Marx, \textit{The Eighteen Brumaire of Louis
Bonaparte} (New York: International Publishers [n.d.]),
pp. 13-25.

\textsuperscript{112}Madorandele Tanzi (Prosper), "Zairean Authentic
Nationalism," \textit{Mouvement Populair}\textit{é de la Révolution.
Kinshasa: Zaire GOVT. 1972, pp. 140-154.}
\end{flushright}
the Hegelian one. Indeed Hegel and his followers understood social reality only by reducing it into religious categories where God is the causality to every event. Consequently, their position on men's life is that "conceptions, thoughts, ideas exist independently from consciousness and that men's relationships, their doings, their chains, and their limitations derive from their consciousness." Furthermore, this Hegelian view reveals the ambiguous nature of Authentic Nationalism. Otherwise, how would self-conscious or self-examination reject all ideologies and at the same time be authentic without alienating itself to another ideology? Madrandele Tanzi answers the question in a warning:

it might become corrupt and an excellent tool to uphold an indefensible alterego cult.114

It is this alterego cult that pushes any social group to enlist and preserve its interests, hence the MPR organs can point out the mechanisms of implementing its interests. The MPR organs are the major channels for the party to communicate with the society. In its early years, the party relied on two major organs, the Political Bureau (P.B.) and the National Executive Committee (NEC).

113K. Marx and F. Engels, The German Ideology, pp. 16-17.

114Madrandele Tanzi, p. 114.
While the Political Bureau conceived the general policy, the NEC had responsibility to execute the daily task as decided upon by the P.B.

Following a constitutional amendment in December 1970, the MPR became the supreme institution to which all traditional state institutions (executive, legislature, judiciary) were subordinated. In 1974 another constitutional amendment intervened to recognize the MPR as the unique institution with the consequence that the legislative, the executive and the judiciary branches were incorporated into the party. Finally, the 1978 constitutional amendment established Mobutism as the party doctrine and the MPR as the national community. As of today, the major organs of the MPR are the Central Committee, the P.B., the Secretariat, and the party youth, JMPR. Even though the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary branches are known as other party organs, they tend to play a less decisive role in the political processes. Their members are selected by the MPR President, the C.C. or the P.B. and they must report to their patrons all the time. For that practical reason, I look at them as peripheral organs; whereas the C.C. and the P.B. are the core/main organs, the MPR Presidency is the Supreme organ.

The following charts and data give a general picture of the MPR core organs. They also include an organ that
plays important roles in implementing the party's directives in the countryside, the governorship.

The party Congress which meets every five years to discuss the MPR items is said to be above all other organs. The truth is that this organ's resolutions do not have automatic and compulsory execution as they should have. That is why despite its claimed high ranking, we consider the MPR Congress as a purely peripheral organ.

Table 2.1
Graph Representing the MPR Major Organs

I. SUPREME ORGAN

The MPR President Founder
The MPR President

II. CORE ORGANS

Central Committee
Political Bureau
Secretariat
Party Youth (JMPR)

III. PERIPHERAL ORGANS

Legislative Council
Executive Council
Judiciary Council
Governorship
Congress
Table 2.2

The Central Committee Members as of Spring 1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names</th>
<th>Regional Origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Apindia Monga Mapindia</td>
<td>Equateur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Bandele Atundu (Mrs.)</td>
<td>Equateur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Bangala Ottowangama</td>
<td>Equateur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Bapa-Banze Mudiangombe</td>
<td>Bas-Zaïre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Biere Mabano</td>
<td>Kivu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Boboliko Lokonga</td>
<td>Bandundu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Bolya Ifekwa Lobokete</td>
<td>Equateur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Bomboko Lokumba</td>
<td>Equateur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Derikoye Tita Avungara</td>
<td>Haut-Zaïre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Djona Mbitina</td>
<td>Equateur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Drabua Tanzi (Mrs.)</td>
<td>Haut-Zaïre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Elebe Ma-Ekonzo</td>
<td>Equateur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Elongo Alimasi</td>
<td>Equateur</td>
</tr>
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<td>14. Eluki Monga Aundu</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Engulu Baanga</td>
<td>Equateur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Epee Gamboa</td>
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<tr>
<td>17. Gambembo Fumu</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>20. Kabaidi Wa Kabaidi</td>
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<td>22. Kakule Mbangingana</td>
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<td>23. Kalala Ilunga</td>
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<td>27. Kamanda Wa-Kamanda</td>
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<td>28. Kande Djambulate</td>
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<td>43. Mafuta Kizola</td>
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### Names

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* Kengo wa Dondo is commonly listed as from Equator. Indeed his claimed Equatorian origin is the result of his mother's second marriage with a man from Equator. His mother, from Kivu region, had him from her first marriage with a Belgian from whom he inherited his first name Léon Lobitsh. Like Muhunga and Omotua, whose regions are not specified, I put all three in "other" category.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
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<th>Percentage</th>
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Table 2.4

Political Bureau Members as of Spring 1986

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<tr>
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<td>2. Bapa-Banza Mudiangombe</td>
<td>Bas Zaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Boboliko Lokonga</td>
<td>Bandundu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Eluki Monga Aundu (Army Officer)</td>
<td>Equateur</td>
</tr>
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<td>5. Kalala Ilunga</td>
<td>Kasai Oriental</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Kasongo Mukundji</td>
<td>Kasai Oriental</td>
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<td>Other</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Kikontwe Tumbwe</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>10. Lubamba Lumbu</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Mpinda Kasenda</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Nzuzi wa Mbombo</td>
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<tr>
<td>13. Rwakabuba Shinga</td>
<td>Kivu</td>
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<tr>
<td>14. Singa Boyenge (Army Officer)</td>
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</table>

Table 2.5

**Political Bureau Regional Representativeness**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bandundu</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bas-Zaïre</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Équateur</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haut Zaïre</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasai Occidental</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasai Oriental</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kivu</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaba</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>99.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.6

List of Governors as of Spring 1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Home Region</th>
<th>Region of Appointment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Bangala Basila</td>
<td>Haut Zaire</td>
<td>Kasai Occidental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Army Officer)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Duga Kugbetoro</td>
<td>Haut Zaire</td>
<td>Shaba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Makolo Djibikilay</td>
<td>Kasai Occ.</td>
<td>Bas-Zaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Mananga</td>
<td>Bas-Zaire</td>
<td>Kasai Oriental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Mwando Nsimba</td>
<td>Bas-Zaire</td>
<td>Kivu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Sambia</td>
<td>Equateur</td>
<td>Bandundu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Salumu Amisi</td>
<td>Kivu</td>
<td>Haut Zaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Pambia</td>
<td>Shaba</td>
<td>Equateur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Tshimbombo Mukuna</td>
<td>Kasai Oriental</td>
<td>Kinshasa City*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Kinshasa City is an autonomous entity with the same statute as other eight national regions.

Source: From data collected in Spring 1986.
Table 2.7

Gubernatorial Regional Representativeness
as of Spring 1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Home Region</th>
<th>Region of Appointment</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bandundu</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>00.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bas-Zaïre</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equateur</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haut Zaïre</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasai Occ.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasai Orient.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kivu</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaba</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>00.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>99.99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: From data collected in Spring 1986.
Table 2.8

**Cumulative National Representativeness**

(as of Spring 1986)

(Executive and Legislative Bodies Not Included)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Central Committee</th>
<th>Political Bureau</th>
<th>Governorship</th>
<th>Cumulative Nat. Repr.</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bandundu</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bas-Zaïre</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equateur</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haut Zaïre</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasai Occidental</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasai Oriental</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kivu</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaba</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>80</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
<td><strong>103</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The margin of error is 4 percent with regard to four unspecified individuals.
2.1 Cumulative National Representativeness

There is no qualitative measure to gauge the level of representativeness of individuals into their state apparatus. However, institutions like Legislature, Executive and Judiciary carry with them some importantly evaluative role in creating, performing and preserving political unity. In the case of Zaire, members of the Executive body hardly keep their seat for long because in general, annual or frequent reshuffle by the MPR President drops some state commissioners (ministers) and brings in some new faces for the sake of political performance. Depending on circumstances, one or two regions may be more represented in the government than others. Hence regional representation and national representation as well cannot be sufficiently measured with regard to the Executive body. Inversely, inasmuch as all the Members of the National Assembly are elected in their respective regions according to the size of their populations, the legislative body presents some valid argument in evaluating national representation. By the same token, it would be democratically unreasonable to see a less populated region be more represented than the more populated ones in the National Assembly. Nevertheless, because of the Zairean National Assembly's peripheral role in the decision-making process, we prefer to center the debate on the issue of national representativeness on the
core organs of the party, the Central Committee and the Political Bureau which both overshadow the Congress, the Permanent Secretariat and the Executive Committee. The governorship has been considered too because of its basic role to diffuse and implement the party's decisions and to reinforce the state control over the countryside. Also, regional governors are the party presidents at that level and comply with the party decisions to maintain the party supremacy; within the context of the state they have a minimal freedom of action and decision that local realities dictate.

Hence, tackling the question of national representiveness, chart 2.8 shows that as of June 1986 Equator Region comes first with 20.39 percent; Kasai Occidental and Kasai Oriental follow with 13.59 percent and 12.62 percent, respectively; Bas-Zaïre is next with 11.65 percent; Shaba comes with 10.68 percent while Bandundu and Haut Zaïre have 9.70 percent each. Kivu is last with 7.76 percent. The percentage of the unidentified is 3.88. Equatorians display a relatively good size in the Central Committee (18). In the Political Bureau they share the number with Kasai Occidental, Kasai Oriental, Kivu and Shaba (2). Bas-Zaïre and Haut Zaïre lead all regions in gubernatorial position (2), but Bandundu has no representative at that position.
The first conclusion to draw from the foregoing data is that putting aside primordial and parochial assumptions, it appears too simplistic to speak of the equatorianization of Zaire because there exists no general majority of Equatorians over the major organs. The second conclusion is that the equatorian dominance over the state stands statistically low. This apparent dominance seems to be justified only by the sole fact that the MPR President who originates from Equator is the alpha and the omega of political and economic power in Zaire. As long as he maintains an active role in all spheres he will always be looked at first as an Equatorian and then as a President, that is the essence of politics in African societies. That perception would apply to someone from another region had he become Head of State. Another inference to make stems from the fact that as any modern nation, Zaire did not escape the cruelty of history which

115c. Young, "Zaire: The Unending Crisis," Foreign Affairs. (Fall 1978), pp. 167-185;


-109-

provides any nation in gestation to go through succession of crises (civil war, secession, lack of strong power to command respect and obedience from within and without). To our knowledge, most modern nation-states of Europe, Asia and America had undergone that process with their own political nucleus. Politicians from Equator and Bas-Zaie appear to have been the nucleus of power in Zaire with a relatively high number of Equatorians though the two regions are not the most populous ones in the country. Because of their political influence in the early years of the political emancipation of Zaire and also because of their common lingua franca lingala which tends to be instantly learned and spoken all over the country, the populations from the eastern regions (Kivu and Shaba or easterners) label them Bangala-Mukongo in an indiscriminate manner. Bangala-Bakongo or the Westerners may be considered as the core nationality for the policy of national integration. Despite their bloody confrontation in Leopoldville during the struggle for political emancipation, both Bangala and Bakongo considered themselves as heirs of the Zaiean independence fathers. The last observation about the undocumented equatorianization of Zaire is that there exists no Equatorian standard culture that has been made compulsory for all Zaieans; unlike the Russification of the U.S.S.R. which was made possible by imposing Russian as a second
compulsory language in schools all over the Union and mostly in Central Asia. Due to the intense use of Lingala by the ruling class and other social sections (the administration, the musicians, the army, the party) and its general acceptance all over the country, the lingalanization of Zaire could provide interesting field for cultural research.

But, if one looks carefully at the MPR Central Committee where Equatorians' number is high without dominating and when one undertakes to understand the nature, the composition, and the functions of this core organ, one could come out with another observation that this organ functions only as a federal body (Senate) within the framework of a unitary and centralized political system, though its members are not regionally and equally elected. To fill the vacuum that the party Congress creates after its convention every five years, the Central Committee helps awaken militants' attention in its noisy periodical meetings. Besides the political Bureau which also meets on a monthly basis, the Permanent Secretariat that handles the party's daily business, and the Executive Committee that oversees the implementation of the party decisions, render dysfunctional the Central

Committee's existence. So, the containment of former and close aides and that of a new emerging social class within the party ranks might have dictated the creation of the noisy and anachronic organ.
CHAPTER III

THE MPR AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION

From the literature review on national integration, two major forms of integration have emerged: vertical integration and horizontal integration. While the latter is the development of social mechanisms that bring together people of various cultural values to share wealth and power under an accepted and acceptable authority the former is an internal struggle for the holder of power to get recognition and obedience from the citizenry regardless of any form of social solidarities. This chapter focuses on the mechanisms which have enabled the MPR to gain power and to operate in every segment of the society for two decades. This chapter comprises four sections. The first section discusses the takeover of the traditional state institutions by the party. The second section deals with the incorporation of the working class by the party, the third section focuses on some changes undergone by religious institutions and their schools. The last section concerns students' organizations.
3.1 The MPR and the State Apparatus

With 250 and 233 parties participating in the 1960 and 1965 elections under mostly regional and ethnic lines and threatening to secede from central government if their leaders had lost, the new regime's first move was to disband all the political parties. However, the constitution issued in 1967 had implicitly limited in its article 4 the number of political parties to two.

Pleased with the relative peace time of its first five years and cognizant of the popular support it had enjoyed the new regime made another move as to show its determination to fight against ethnic and regional loyalties. On December 23, 1970, a constitutional amendment was passed and it stipulated the following:

- The MPR is the sole Party in the Republic of Zaire.
- The MPR is the supreme institution of the Republic. It is represented by its President.
- All other institutions are subordinated to the MPR. 117

The general atmosphere during this period has been described as one of acceptance by people who had not been able to enjoy the Independence and who had lived under

social turmoil encouraged by ethnicity and regional support.

Young and Turner think that "almost everyone was against tribalism, even though nearly everyone had of necessity to use it as a social and political resource. The authoritarian edicts proclaiming national integration came unilaterally and met with general assent in early years."

For the new regime, the MPR must be from now on the only channel of national participation if national integration was to be reached. In Hodgkin's terminology discussed in the first chapter, the MPR's basic goal puts it in the category of mass political organizations (parties). Yet, in creating a mass political party devoted to achieving national integration, the new regime sought to establish its constitutional legitimacy first as the sole holder of political power and finally as the sole defender of national sovereignty. Consequently, in 1974 a new constitution replaced the 1967 one and made it clear that the MPR was the single party for a single nation committed to national unity. The constitution read that the MPR is the Zairean nation politically organized. It results from this singularization of the MPR as the sole and unique party that all traditional branches of

118C. Young and T. Turner, p. 149.
government (executive, legislature and judiciary) must operate according to the MPR guidelines and ideology, namely "Mobutism." The most important move that bestows a practical superiority of the MPR over all other institutions remains the fact that the party flag became the country's flag in 1971 when the country's name changed from Congo to Zaire. The old blue flag stripped with yellow and red lone star gave place to the MPR green flag with a yellow circle within which a burning torch symbolizes revolutionary change that the new regime intended to undertake.

At the national level, the institutionalization of the MPR did not pose any problem insofar as the Head of State was also the chairman of the party. As a matter of fact, the founder of the party was already the Head of State. However, at the provincial level, a dual power existed and caused a power struggle. On the one hand, there was a Provincial President elected by the local assembly, but who represented the Head of State. On the other hand, an MPR regional president named by the National Executive Committee of the party was in charge of animating the MPR activities and implementing its policies. On many occasions both the Provincial President and the MPR regional president came to a serious power conflict. The question of who ranked higher within the
Party's hierarchy rose from time to time. The MPR publication makes mention of that dualism as follows:

In certain cases the Governor did not want to let any freedom of action to the provincial MPR president, feeling that any act taken by the latter could only reduce his own authority and hinder the proper functioning of the province. In other cases, the provincial MPR president wanted to take over all the prerogatives of the Governor of the Province.\footnote{118}

This dualism in the early going of the Party's hegemonic rule stems from the imbalance of political and administrative power between provinces and the central government in the 1960's. Indeed, with a weak central government and a strong provincial power structure during the first Republic (corresponding to the first five years of independence) the state central authority had no effective control over the provinces. Those were autonomous entities functioning under the guidance of their locally elected governmental institutions such as a president, a council of ministers, and an assembly. The new regime sought to stop this trend of high politicization of a country which could lead to separatist tendencies.

The conflict between the provincial president or governor and the MPR provincial president was

unavoidable. As an elected official operating in his own constituency, the Provincial President's official role and responsibilities, and his positions have presence over those of an appointee that is, the MPR regional executive who, to make matters worse, was an outsider, someone with little or no knowledge of local issues. However, in order to solve this conflict, provinces were depoliticized; they became administrative units, their presidents, now governors or regional commissioners, were to be nominated/appointed by the MPR national president to whom they were accountable. Those regional commissioners were first rotated frequently and usually appointed outside their home provinces; secondly, they were also victims of the discretionary power of the MPR national president who could dismiss them at any time. *Ipso facto* they served as the embodiment of the MPR and the representatives of the Central authority in the provinces. Furthermore, provincial parties and assemblies were dismantled and all lower-echelon administrative agents were to be appointed by the central government. It results from the struggle for regional legitimacy of the MPR that the regional authorities were the loser and the MPR regional appointee (president) was the winner, all for the legitimation of the party.

What happened to the state basic institutions such as executive, legislative and judiciary branches? With the
1970 constitutional amendment making the MPR and its President the holder of national sovereignty and the 1974 constitution stipulating in article 26 that the MPR is the Zairean nation politically organized, the MPR President has become the cornerstone of the Zairean political system. He is the alpha and the omega of the Zairean political power. He constitutionally presides over the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. He appoints all the members of the executive and the judiciary whom he can dismiss at all times and replace by others. Even though the members of the legislature are elected their candidacies are first submitted to the Political Bureau and the Central Committee of the party. These two organs are headed by the MPR President. The Political Bureau was once powerful organ was appointed by the MPR President. By the mid-seventies, two-thirds of its members were elected and the remaining third was appointed by the MPR President. The Central Committee initiated and created in the summer of 1980 to include former dignitaries of the party and the representatives of a new growing and sophisticated class comprises members who are named by the MPR President. This latest organ has inherited the prerogatives previously held by the Political Bureau such as the formulation of policies, and the making of decisions which affect the entire country. The executive branch, now an MPR organ has the mission of implementing
the party's decisions made by the Politburo while the legislative branch also an MPR organ has the mission of approving the party's decisions. In addition, the legislative branch has the responsibility of monitoring the execution and implementation of the party decisions. So, the MPR, through cooptation practices throughout the state apparatuses and regional administration, has succeeded in legitimating itself as a national Party, a tool for mass mobilization and national integration. In this respect, Young and Turner remind us that

the Zairean party was not to be a vehicle for mass mobilization to confront colonialism and seize power; rather, it had to be an instrument for legitimation and consolidation of an existing regime.120

Not withstanding a judgment, we must point out that the MPR in its effort to build a unified nation has mustered what we discussed in the early chapter as the strategy of charismatic and heroic theory. Wallerstein has clearly described it in these terms:

the charismatic justification (do it because I, your leader, say so) can be seen as a way of transition, an interim measure which gets people to observe the requirements of the nation out of loyalty to the leader while they (or their children) learn to do it for its own sake. In short, the hero helps to bridge the gap to a modern state.121

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120C. Young and T. Turner, p. 217.
121E. Wallerstein, p. 99.
David Apter adopts the same procedure in arguing that "for political institutional transfer to take place, many institutions and usages that were critically important for maintaining the indigenous socio-cultural system have to be substantially modified or abandoned." 122 In the case of Ghana Apter concludes that Nkrumah fulfilled this idea in an accurate manner for he drew his charisma from the chieftancy with whom he identified himself, albeit through new social structures; as a traditional chief in modern state structures, N'Krumah played the role of what Apter calls a symbolic referent, an integrational integer, a sanctional source in accordance with which the new state had to be organized. 123

The theory of charisma and hero developed by Max Weber appears to contain some ambiguous chevauchements because of some historical circumstances which may concur and determine the nature of a leadership. However, as a temporary tool leading to the well being, the consolidation and preservation of an entire community, the theory does have some positive outcome. Claude Ake supports this and believes that "even though the appeal of the charismatic leader may be limited, the fact that it

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123 D. Apter, pp. 304-305.
cuts across class and tribal lines makes it a useful integrative tool."\textsuperscript{124}

In the light of what the MPR has done to the state structure in concentrating all the political power in the hands of its national president, no one could doubt that the party had espoused the theory of charismatic hero (leader) with one single source of authority in a state threatened by divisions and secessions. The new political structure that supersedes the state apparatus and helps generate an unchallenged leadership fits our theory of vertical integration. By clothing the MPR national president with all the major attributes of the state, the party showed its determination to lay down a new political order which resembles a space mission control with one mission control in Kinshasa giving instructions to Kisangani Center in Haut Zaire over a space mission program. All the instructions given by the main control center in Kinshasa Space Center must be followed in order to reach the assigned objectives; failure to comply with these instructions could result in the failure of the whole mission. Nonetheless, a local technical circumstance such as weather conditions and human resources, if ignored or bypassed by Kinshasa Space

\textsuperscript{124}Claude Ake, \textit{A Theory of Political Integration}, p. 59.
Center, can result in the failure of the mission in Kisangani Space Center. This illustration suggests that a vertical integration, despite its positive impact on creating an acceptable and accepted authority, can also jeopardize the chances for the same authority to succeed in pursuing and implementing a goal no matter how, noble it may be, if that actual authority ignores some genuinely local specificities.

With an absolute political power in his hands, the MPR President could wield various mechanisms to get obedience and recognition throughout the country. Besides the discretionary power to coopt his aides at all levels, the MPR president displays his absolutist authority to the entire society through an administrative procedure called unity of command. Because the MPR has become the emanation of the Zairean people, it holds their loyalty and ties them to the Zairean state; and through the principle of unity of command, the party integrates the nation and enables the integrative mechanism to be accomplished administratively. This means that the principle of unity of command compels any section of the Zairean administration which, in the respect of the party institutionalization bears the role of executing the party dictates, to report to the immediate hierarchial authority and that copies of any administrative correspondence be sent up to the relevant territorial authority. For
example, as the state is administratively divided into regions, subregions, zones and collectivities, a collectivity chief, who at the same time is legally the party chief, cannot deal with the subregion commissioner without the consent of his zone commissioner. Had he ever attempted to bypass this administrative procedure for any justified reasons, he could be blamed and may lose his position. This principle applies to all the state agencies under the party ideology of unity of decision-making and execution.

The principle of unity of command reinforces the party domination over the state apparatus, it consolidates the domination of central authority over the regional units. The principle also works for the recognition of the party leader as a hero and a national figure who can keep the nation unified and hold it tightly together until the majority of the citizens begin to internalize a degree of loyalty to the state which will allow the government to take this for granted.125

The problem though remains that by saturating the MPR president politically, absolutely and powerfully, the MPR president has ended up considering the political power and its exercise in Zaire as a personal property. Callaghy recognizes this phenomenon, but argues that

Mobutu is not solely interested in his own personal power; he is interested in creating a strong, stable state that will outlast him. He is engaged in a search for sovereignty vis-a-vis both internal and external groups, and maintenance and consolidation of internal political order and control are key elements of this search.\textsuperscript{126}

Even though a charismatic leader/hero should set up a new political order, what assurance can there be that the new order will survive once he disappears from the political scene? If this theory is valid regardless of both the objective and subjective conditions, why should Ghana, under N'Krumah face social tensions to the extent that the Redemptor of Ghana was ousted in 1966? If the MPR president had restored state authority and respect, why should there be tensions mounting against him and his regime? It is premature to address these questions at this juncture. Suffice it to say that the charismatic or heroic theory in nation building stands on weak and shaky ground.

After supplanting the traditional state institutions and posing itself as the sole and legal party, how did the MPR deal with other social forces such as the working class, the religious and educational institutions and students' organizations?

\textsuperscript{126}Thomas M. Callaghy, p. 165.
3.2 The Working Class

The history of the working class in Zaire goes back to the colonial period, mostly in the fifties when some unions and parties were permitted to emerge. The most active were the Union des Travailleurs Congolais (UTC) dominated and supported by the Catholic Church, the Fédération Générale des Travailleurs Kongolais (FGTK) of socialist inspiration and the Confédération des Syndicats Libres du Congo (CSLC) supported by civil servants and teachers. These major unions never had a common agenda; for they were ideologically divided and during the struggle for independence they did not emerge as major force of opposition against colonialism as was the case in Ghana under N'Krumah, in Guinea under Sékou Touré and in the Congo[Brazzaville]. They continued to be as divided as the political parties after the Belgian colony got independence. For this particular reason, some anti labor unionist within the MPR went as far as to consider the labor unions as ineffective as the political parties. They called for their dismantlement and for a new labor union which would respond to the party ideology of unity of action and decision. Consequently, when the party manifesto was issued in May 1967, labor unionists were the only individuals to be surprised by the Party's decision which read as follows:
the union must no longer be merely a force of confrontation, but an organ of support for government policy. It must be a communication link between the working class and the state. It expresses the decision and wishes of the workers, and in return it informs them of the decisions taken for their well-being and the improvement of their living conditions. Hence the dialogue between the State and the working class becomes a reality.\textsuperscript{127}

Complying with the party ideology the three former independent and competing trade unions merged into one single union. The new union initiated and supported by the state became the \textit{Union Nationale des Travailleurs Congolais}, today UNTZA. In order to effectively control the new union, the MPR coopted the former three bosses of the defunct UTC, FGTK and CSLC within its rank.

Bo-Boliko, the former UTC leader became a member of the MPR political bureau from 1968 to 1980 and head of the new union. He also became President of the monocameral national assembly, and exercised the functions of the Executive Coordinator (a Prime Minister Post with no effective power) from January 1980 to August 1980 when he was replaced by Ngunza. Kithima, the former FGTK boss was the first MPR general secretary; he entered the party Political Bureau, became a very powerful and influential element in the party and the government. Bintu, a CSLL

\footnote{\textit{The Nsele Manifesto}, p. 19.}
renegade was Labor Minister for five years. All these unionists have become shamefully wealthy at the expense of the members of their old unions.

This late observation casts a serious doubt on what has been said or written about labor unions in general and in Africa in particular in their fight to improve the working conditions and to win an equitable treatment for their members. The fact of the matter is that Union leaders are, in the final analysis the main beneficiaries. In colonial times the unions never challenged the system as to dismantle it. They accommodated it well as long as the colonial administration could compromise with them in guaranteeing equal rights and privileges to Africans for equal work as was the case in French Africa under the Lamine Gueye Law of June 1950.\(^{128}\) This law raised the standard of living of thousands of African civil servants concentrated in the major cities of West Africa and Equatorial Africa as well. But the labor and produce of Africans living in the countryside paid for these wages and fringe benefits. As Pfefferman puts it,

\[
\text{African working classes in the cities increased their militancy while enjoying what constituted an incentive}
\]

\(^{128}\)For more on this law, see Lamine Gueye, *Itinéraire Africain*, (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1966).
to maintain the basic political and economic structure. Markovitz so pointedly notes that

In their campaign, the unions never challenged the legitimacy of the colonial order; they never demanded independence or even self-government. Instead, they cried out for equal rights as Frenchmen. They claimed as their aim the goals of the French civilization promised in the slogan of the French Revolution, Liberty, Equality and Fraternity.

N’Krumah rejects the self-interested image given to African labor movements during colonialism. He asserts that workers’ strikes had helped awake not only workers’ consciousness, but mass feeling took a sharp direction as to get rid of foreign exploitation. In *Class Struggle in Africa*, he writes that

African workers played an important role in national liberation struggles. By strike action they succeeded in disrupting economic life and caused great embarrassment to the colonial administration. There were general strikes in Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana and Guinea in the years leading up to independence.

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From the liberation viewpoint, N'Krumah's assessment of labor movement gets a high credit; in Ghana and Guinea particularly, N'Krumah and Sékou Touré relied heavily on urban workers as weapons to dismantle the colonial rule. However, in terms of the assigned goals, both the nationalists and unionists had some difficulties to communicate. While the former were for total freedom, the latter were primarily concerned with bread-and-butter issues as the Lamine Gueye Law had shown.

This striking and shocking image of labor movements during colonial rules in Africa tends to subsist after independence when the unionists adopt an accommodating attitude toward the new political systems as long as their interests are promoted and protected.

In the case of Zaire, the working class wage policies will be the ones initiated by the MPR. The workers consequently must abandon their traditional and confrontational policies that hamper not only the unity of government action but basically the unity of a Zairean human and political community. Hence according to the party unnecessary strikes that workers usually wave against their leadership to gain privileges are no longer allowed by the party statutes and laws. Negotiation, dialogue and mediation (arbitration) are the mechanisms that the party urges the Zairean workers to capitalize on in their fight for social and working conditions. As one
can observe the traditional role of the working class in these circumstances has been curved to the extent that the UNTZA leadership is urged "to stray from its syndical role and to align itself with the MPR authorities to prevent certain movements of social agitation."\(^{132}\)

3.3 Churches and Educational System

Many religious and syncretic groups exist in Zaire. This section intends to give a sketchy scope of the state-religious groups relationships. The main religious groups are Catholic, Protestant, Kimbanguist, and Muslim. The Catholic church claims to comprise 50 percent of the Zairean [Christian] population as members, the Protestant community may claim 20 percent. Kimbanguism, founded in 1920's by Simon Kimbangu grows in size as the small Muslim community does. However, due to the nature of the relationship between the Catholic church and the state, we have opted to base this brief section on the Catholic church which we refer to as the Church.

The importance of the churches in Zaire goes back to the colonial era. The main reason is that christianization, as the core value of the European civilization was the church's responsibility. Consequently, Belgium relied heavily on religious

institutions to get recognition throughout the population. During this period the major religious groups were Catholic and Protestant. But, the Catholic church's importance increased to the point of rivaling that of the administration and the concessionary companies. This high profile of the Catholic church emanates from King Leopold's desire to enlist support in the annexation struggle at the Berlin Conference in 1884. In that context, the Belgian monarch signed an agreement with the Vatican in 1906 which gave the Belgian Catholic missions subsidies and large portions of land to be economically exploited. The Catholic church took advantage of the agreement and could hold rubber plantations, and some small industries. Pagans who were sometimes forced to the religious stations to become christians constituted the bulk of a free labor force in missionaries' agro-industries. Clearly, the Catholic church was generating and accumulating capitals like the state and the big concessionary companies. But the Catholic importance overwhelmingly grew with another agreement, known as the Convention of Jonghe of 1925-26 by which the Belgian government provided most subsidies to the Belgian Roman Catholic missions. The impact of this accord is

that by 1930 there were already as many Belgian missionaries as administrators forcing the Protestant church to charge that the administration was "completely dominated by the Catholic church."\textsuperscript{134} The accumulating role of the Catholic church helped boost her influence in building schools, nurseries in the entire colony so that by the time of independence this section of the colonial institutions had conquered all the country and her activists outnumbered the "10,000 Belgian civil servants."\textsuperscript{135} It is believed that at the end of colonial era, the Catholics maintained 669 mission posts, manned by nearly 6,000 European missionaries. The clergy was seconded by nearly 500 African priests and 25,566 catechists, offering rudimentary religious instruction in the villages.\textsuperscript{136}

At this stage, when one tackles the question of what is known as the colonial "holy trinity" of the church, the administration, and the concessionary companies, one ought to refer to the Catholic church.

After independence, while the leadership of the Catholic church was being zaireanized, the nature of the


relationships between church and state remained one of collaboration until the seventies when Authenticity first and Mobutism later, were proclaimed the official Zairean ideology and Christian names were to be dropped for Zairean and African ones. It is reported that during this period the Zairean effectives of the Catholic church counted one cardinal, 27 bishops, 587 priests, 394 brothers, 115 nuns, and 11,746 catechists who all were seconded by foreign priests, brothers and sisters numbering 2,774,286 and 3,078, respectively.\textsuperscript{137}

Her role in educational facilities also increased as it did in health facilities. Any Catholic post had large schools for boys and girls, at least one nursery headed by some qualified physicians and nuns.

To illustrate the importance of the Catholic church in education, Adelman points out that in 1974 Catholic schools enrolled 61.7 percent of Zaire's primary pupils and 42.1 percent of its secondary students.\textsuperscript{138}

Added to that is the Lovanium University, founded in 1954 by the Belgian clergy as the extension of its metropolitan


\textsuperscript{138}K. L. Adelman, p. 112.
Louvain in Belgium. This influence also confirmed itself in the Zairean leadership during the struggle for independence and after June 1960. Nearly all the political leaders came from Catholic schools. From Lumumba to Mobutu and Mulele, all the major Zairean leaders are the Catholic products. Kasavubu, the first President and Head of the State, was in a Catholic Seminary; he refused to be ordained priest and opted for public affair life. We must remember that all the provisional government members that Mobutu set up after his first coup d'Etat in September 1960 were the products of the Louvanium University. All this Catholic influence has created a common belief and myth among the population that all the Catholic "commodities" are the best. Consequently, most people trusted Catholic institutions and parents urged their children to attend Catholic schools for better education and allegedly golden job opportunities. In rural areas, road construction and maintenance and other related community development activities were developed by the church personnel such as brothers, while priests and catechists emphasized moral and sane behavior, and the nuns were in schools and nurseries helping people. So, from cities to countryside, the Catholic church became a social force for social progress. This role made the church not only a trustful ally, but also a competitor to the state; and in such a
delicate situation, tensions are unavoidable and conflicts often occur. The Zairean state, under the MPR could not escape this sociological law.

As indicated earlier, the conflict between the state and the church in Zaire has two justifications. One is political and another one purely ideological. The political dimension is due to the main goal pursued by the new regime, i.e., restoration of the state authority and legitimacy over the entire community. The ideological aspect of the state church conflict is in the government position that the church teaches to followers and mostly students foreign doctrines or ideologies which defy the party's own ideology. Furthermore, the church viewed the state as dictatorial. When authenticity was proclaimed and the Christian names were to be dropped, the church reacted not only against it, but also rejected the governmental decision in December 1971 to establish the party youth branch JMPR in the seminaries. The measure was already in application in all schools. Furthermore, Catholic schools in general and Lovanium University were the most reluctant to accommodate the government policies like the Protestant University in Kisangani and the state university in Lubumbashi. With the Lovanium students' riot in June 1969, and the death of their comrades, followed by another clash in June 1971 during which the armed forces invested the campus and sent all its
occupants to a two-year military service, the state decided to implement its policy of effective control and supremacy over the Church. Lovanium University was disbanded. All former denominational universities merged into one single university, namely, the Université Nationale du Zaire (UNAZA) under the state and party organization. This national university has lived for less than fifteen years. However, the motive here was obvious: to suppress the church's influence. Interestingly enough, other religious groups accommodated the government policy so well that the party in return paid more attention to them, giving them more subsidies than ever. In one of her early attacks on the MPR's authentic ideology, the Catholic Church weekly magazine considered authenticity as a backward and obscuring philosophy, an anti-material. It wrote:

It is not by resuscitating a discredited philosophy that we will win the battle of the modern world. 139

In retaliation, the government suspended the magazine. It also put an end to the religious broadcasts, it dissolved all the youth movements sponsored by religious groups; it nationalized the educational system. The church realized its harassment when the party put an end to the celebration of all the holidays such as Christmas,

139Afrique Chrétienne, Jan. 11, 1972.
Passover, (All Saints-Day) La Toussaint and the Assumption. Those christian holidays were also public holidays since the colonial period (state-church connection). Religious artifacts such as pictures of Pope, Virgin Mary, and that of living dignitaries of the church were banned from public places and displayed only in the interior of the churches. The church finally was forced to comply with a striking reality, that of an authoritarian party committed to the total control of its environment. Even though the chief Catholic prelate would declare that the party leadership enjoys "a fascination with the triumphant and superficial, and a hunger for the lavish," he would not refuse to live in the sumptuous residence built for him by the state on University Avenue and his own bishops would welcome the party cell (JMPR) in their seminaries on the condition that their party links pass through the church hierarchy.140 Even though the church has been given back some of her previous prerogatives and attributes, it no longer displays the same influence as before; her traditional image has suffered and the youngsters today look differently at her role, unlike their parents who may still pay attention to religious activities.

Young Zaireans today do not pay as much attention to the church activities as did their parents two decades ago. It would be less excessive to argue that their low attitude toward religious activities is one of the outcomes of the State-Church conflict in the early seventies.

Before closing this discussion, two questions must be addressed: (1) why was the Catholic church the focal point of the MPR attack in its struggle to control key social groups, and (2) what has happened to students who attended Catholic and other schools?

The answer to the first question was entirely given when we discussed the historical development of the religious groups in Zaire. However, one last idea could emerge and it is that as a traditional ally of the establishment the catholic church wants to be involved in any public action. This freedom of action was denied so the church found itself on the defensive and had to act; second, a new alliance between the state and other religious groups in a new and changing (revolutionary) wave could shift the balance of power among religious groups; third, the Catholic church was anxious to see her membership decrease and the Pope's first visit to Zaire helped ameliorate not only the last image, but also reconcile two good allies, the state on the one hand and the Zairean Catholic community on the other hand.
3.4 Students' Organizations

To address the second question, we must view it through the student's role and behavior in general in the process of social transformation.

Indeed, students' role in social transformation in general and in nations where there exists a delayed development has been judged by most observers as important. Without a turbulent student body in Cuba to mold workers' consciousness and public opinion Castro's revolution would have been a dream. Without the students' movement at Kent State University in Ohio that set the anti-Vietnam war tone, Americans would not have thought twice about a so-called freedom war in the Far East where thousands of American soldiers died. The freedom of speech and that of association makes it easy for students to constitute a quasi autonomous group in any community regardless of the nature of the political system.

However, as Julius Nyerere argues, "the type of educational system created by a state determines the nature of the society molded by its leaders, one would tend to believe that the assumed social changing role of students is not universally axiomatic." At times, students protest against the established authority to seek personal gain rather than posing the quest for a social restructuring. David Hapgood believes that in the case of
Africa, African students are bourgeois in ambition and radical in strategy. He writes the following:

African students are radical. This is the conventional assumption.... But when the students are looked at in African terms, the radicalism of most of them dissipates in hot air. The proclaimed Marxist-Leninist is, in his behavior supremely bourgeois. 141

In the early years of African independence, Jean Pierre Ndiaye, a Senegalese sociologist, surveyed African students in Paris. After collecting and analyzing the answers of African students in Paris on the meaning of independence, he discovered a dichotomous position which categorizes his survey. He found that two views separate students on the issue. He labels one view as static and another dynamic. 142 While the first group is concerned with recognition and reconversion of dignity, the second group posed the issue of independence in terms of a commitment to an integral development through self-awakening, self-reliance, and permanent auto-defense of social and common wealth. Ndiaye's survey reveals a dubious character of African students as Hapgood has

described, because they seek an increase in privileges and believe in rule by the educated elite.

In the case of Zaire, student organizations have suffered from the foregoing image. Since Lovanium University was the first educational institution of high caliber, most student organizations emerged from the "inspired hill" as the university was nicknamed. It must be kept in mind that the educational system in place had the task to train people who should be a model to the entire society. Only highly intelligent youngsters were allowed to enter the few secondary schools that existed; besides their intellectual aptitude, those youngsters had to come from relatively wealthy traditional chieftancies or from the évoluté families. Clearly the school system was bourgeois in orientation. No wonder the students through their training are prepared to accept gracefully a standard of living that sets them aside from the majority of the population, but also convinces them that they are entitled to those benefits. This conviction had probably pushed students at Lovanium University in 1964 to ask the shaky government to improve their material conditions. And one remembers that the country at that time was in serious trouble politically and economically. The rebellion was shaking the new state and the economy was falling apart; the government was unable to pay civil servants, the teachers, and every major sector resorted to
strike. How could the most radical-sounding groups behave in such a self-interested manner? David Finlay answers that even those who believe that universities are open to youth from all social strata recognize that this does not mean students identify with the common man. 143

It may not be excessive to argue that students consider the university degree as a passport to bourgeois status. Consequently any means could be manipulate for that goal.

When the army took over in Zaire, students' organizations supported the coup. When the new regime declared its so-called economic war against the vested interests held by the concessionary companies and decided to nationalize the Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK) today Gecamines, students were delighted. But when the MPR decided that the students, as the most radical sounding groups join the party youth in order to visualize - if not carry out - the party decisions, the same radical students rebuffed and stood against this particular party revolutionary tactic and intention.

Surprisingly, the General Union of Congolese Students (UGEC) had, in a resolution, called upon the new regime to opt for scientific socialism as ideology at that

period. Though the government had not yet reacted, students who claimed to be committed to scientific socialism could have welcomed the party Youth so as to become an influential faction within the party structure. The sole acceptable explanation for the student's tactical failure remains that their radicalism is a pure rhetoric. Never had the Zairean student body laid down a coherent and revolutionary agenda which the state could rely on and perform. Even if the new government had endorsed scientific socialism as put forward by UGEC, there was no guarantee for the government that students would have volunteered to vacate their classrooms and join the countryside to convert villagers to their ideology.

As we witnessed in 1969 the bloody clash between the Lovanium students and the army that had claimed a dozen of death among students had as motives the amelioration of living standard on campus and the increase of the monthly scholarship that the government was paying to students. As a senior in 1976 we personally escorted the Lubumbashi students in Shaba from campus to the Governor's office to ask for the improvement of social conditions, housing, and foods quality on campus. The result of that peaceful march was that during the last two months of the school

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year the MPR President's office poured huge quantities of high quality foods (meat, rice, milk) to the Lubumbashi campus. Students who then ate three times a day characterized the circumstantial foods excess as a presidential scandal. In January 1980 we observed in Kinshasa students throwing rocks at cars and preventing school officials to enter their respective institutions (the Kinshasa University and the Teachers' Training Institute) or Institut Pédagogue National (IPN). Again, the first reason of their vandalistic behavior was the increase of their monthly scholarship that was never paid on time. The local newspaper reported that in their memorandum to the MPR President students also pleaded for a second political party which the MPR President had flatly refused in his New Year address. We failed in our attempt to get a copy of the student's memo in order to verify the government's position. However, the obvious consequences of the student's image indicates that it has become a modus vivendi for students to embrace the streets in order to get their share of national resources.

Each time this has occurred the government has also attempted to bring in some limited positive change. Jean Claude Willame correctly summarizes the Zairean students' behavior.
The students worry a great deal about their future careers, hoping for employment from a regime with almost absolute powers.

As the students move through their university years, gaining the experience needed to leave their peers, their increasing uneasiness about the future causes them to abandon radical opinions.145

After the JMPR was forced on all the universities and other institutions of higher learning, it became clear that the MPR was on the verge of winning the battle against the student body. The party put in motion its cooptation policies and most students who headed the JMPR on the university campuses and colleges got jobs with the party or the government as soon as they graduated. In most cases, students will be touring government offices brandishing their JMPR background as militancy became one of the main criteria. For example, on the old Lubumbashi campus in 1976 it was obvious that the JMPR Committee wanted to make sure all the members obtained jobs after graduation. Consequently, every time the Head of State and MPR President, a minister, an MPR high official from Kinshasa arrived for a visit, the Committee will fight hard to meet with that official and put on the table a list of demands for the members. Sometimes, the

Secrétaire Dirigeant (S.D.) or the JMPR leader on campus and other schools) will select among his committee those members who are close to him when together they have to meet the high MPR official. This practice gave birth to two groups of the JMPR committee members. Those who were loyal and close to the S.D. were called Permanent Members and those who opposed the JMPR leader's aristocratic tendencies were labeled non-permanent members. After the senior members of the committee graduated, they all rushed with their resumés in Kinshasa, two were recruited by the then Centre National de Documentation (CND), the secret service, two joined the UNTZA, one ran for a seat in the National Assembly, his constituency was Mbuji Mayi. Only three opted for career in academia. Interestingly enough, most seniors in the Zairean schools spent their time discussing a "piston," meaning dignitary among the political leaders, who will be able to successfully recommend a new graduate to any high job position. It is obvious that students rely heavily on political connection in their attempt to get a job instead of considering their training ability. Once more, this casual example confirms the contradiction within the student population as rhetorically they talk radicalisms and pragmatically they are concerned about their own interests which actually coincide with those of the ruling class. This observation may lead us to assume that the MPR regime has taken
advantage of the students' own contradictions as it did with the working class; in so-doing it chose to coopt the student leadership and brought it into its rank. Makanda Kabobi, a former MPR Political Bureau member whose name has been given to the party ideological institute was very outspoken against the party activities on the University campus, while he was one of the student leaders. After graduation, he abruptly joined the party, became the youngest Political Bureau member and was in charge of the MPR Civic Course on Lovanium campus in 1971. He died two years later of a mysterious disease. Nlandu Bakatujika, who in 1975 was a JMPR leader on Lubumbashi campus, was soon recruited in the secret service after his graduation.

The most disturbing case in 1976 concerned the most vocal senior in political science. In his senior year this student proclaimed himself a Marxist-Leninist. A class discussion or public debate among students had to follow his Marxist line if one hated to be labeled reactionary. This student gained popularity on the university campus, but mostly among the faculty staff too. His B.A. thesis was so critical of the MPR ideology that the Dean of the School, believing to help him, suggested that he choose another topic. His faculty supporters and himself accused the Dean of being reactionary and an MPR mole on the campus. The Sociology
Department allowed him to graduate magna cum laude. After graduation, he hurried to see Kithima, the highest MPR official in charge of party activities from his region. He was immediately hired as the first advisor and chief of staff of the MPR Executive Secretariat. Later on his "piston" fired him for mismanagement of MPR funds. It may be objected that the party coopted a potentially turbulent element in order to stop his activities and then discredit him. Without rejecting this hypothesis, we ought to question the student's meaning of radicalism within the context of social transformation.

It is therefore fair to assert that most students joined the JMPR for simple opportunistic reasons. Inversely, it can be said that the MPR has capitalized on student's quest for personal aggrandizment to gain control over this social group. After the effective incorporation of student bodies, which came by the mid-seventies, and that of the clergy and the working classes, the MPR could now enjoy its vertical control over the state. The insertion of the army into the MPR, initially considered a neutral and apolitical group, had no reaction from its members who usually considered the MPR regime as their creation and whose survival depended upon their total control of the State.

Before closing this chapter, we must sum up the nature of the Zairean vertical integration. In his
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treatment of political integration and political
stability, Ake outlines four basic related variables which
were discussed in the first chapter. They are
authoritarianism, paternalism, identity and consensualism.

Authoritarianism

A state is authoritarian if the government's power is
large, concentrated and easily mobilized, and if the
government manifests a determination and ability to use
this power to carry out its policies. The discussion
shown how the MPR regime has struggled to establish its
control over Zaire. All the means that enhance a
government's power, such as the army, the police force,
civil service, the mass media had been entrusted into the
MPR hands for effective purpose. The division of power
gives strong power to the central government and less to
local/regional governments, unlike during the first five
years. The inflation of political power (multiplicity of
center of power) has been stopped by the MPR. All
political power has been concentrated in the MPR
president's hands who many a time has displayed
determination and quickness to act decisively for the sake
of national unity. The entire country, under the MPR
authoritarian rule, has come to know a certain sense of

146C. Ake, p. 53. p. 102.
forced respect to the public authority, representing a strong central government.

In the name of preserving national unity, the Zairean Armed Forces (ZAF) or the army has a coercive and limitless power all over the state probably because they look at the MPR rule as their creation. The mentality has compelled the MPR President to declare that any Zaireans, whether they like it or not, are by birth members of the party. The constitution has thereto agreed. The army relies on this constitutional and compulsory membership of Zaireans to exert a sort of spying power all over the citizenry.

With respect to that power the army does not hesitate to arrest and keep in custody any suspects in the so-called operational zones. These designate the portions of the national territory where social and political unrests are common and force the army to intervene in order to prevent and punish crimes of violence whether of political or other nature. Once involved in operational zones the army is known for its "acts of violence or brutality against civilians, reprisal killings, confiscation of property, illegal and unauthorized detention involving threats or torture." 147 Those

coercive acts aim at the existence and the survival of the authoritarian rule of the party.

**Paternal**

A political system dominated by a political ruling class that is willing and able to lead is paternal. In colonial times, a system of domination of colonies by a few colonial agents was created to maintain a dependence relationship between rulers and ruled. In the Belgian Congo the system was referred to as paternalist doctrine which the General Governor expressed in this short sentence: *Dominer pour servir* (dominate in order to serve).\(^{148}\) The doctrine implies that colonialized people could not make it on their own, they had to rely on Europeans for their advancement. The doctrine overshadowed the church and administration so much so that most colonized people in the Belgian Congo often addressed European missionaries and administrators with deferential terms such as "my father, my mother."\(^{149}\)

In the case of new states, it is said that the new leaders must not only concentrate power in their hands, they must also father the transformation of their


societies, they must induce the people to accept new norms, new goals, new motivations; they must supply the initiative for realizing that political culture. Inevitably, continues Ake, politics takes on a paternalistic tone. This new paternalism context implies an oligarchic concentration of initiative and willing ability to lead.

The Zairean party has wielded this paternalistic network in its structure by making the MPR President the father of the Zairean nation to which an authentic ideology has been instilled and serves as a driving force for both the ruling class and their followers in their daily life. This paternalistic pattern between the rulers and ruled has generated the clientelism which shapes social relations with the frequent use of words "patron and patronne" replacing the old father and mother.

Identity

With the advent of independence and the elimination of the common enemy, the colonizer, the identity between the ruling class and the population, tends to wither away. To avoid alienating the governed, the ruling class must lay down a flow of communication with the masses. Besides, the communication network the rulers must create historical and national symbols that seal their
relationship to the entire society, and make their followers accept the legitimacy of their power.

From this theoretical view, the MPR has attempted and created some identifiable images around Lumumba as national hero, symbol of national freedom and economic independence. Nevertheless, the problem with the identifiable variable is the tendency for the ruling class to fall victim of the cult of personality which may in the long run, generate a feeling of distrust among both the ruling class and the population; especially if there exists a general feeling that the ruling class is using those identifiable symbols to enjoy an unduly large share of the economic rewards of the system. This issue is the concern of the next chapter and will be fully discussed as we go from the position that both economic structure and political structure are interrelated and interact at all times.

Consensual

According to Ake, a political system is consensual if the political class is solidary and if the hegemony of the political class is not threatened by a counter-elite. To succeed in maintaining their hegemony, the rulers co-opt into their rank everyone who controls an important base of power; in other words, the ruling class uses the corporatist technique to co-opt and

150 C. Ake, p. 111.
its membership. As stated early in this study, the Zairean ruling class is a coalition of leaders of the major social professional and ethnic groups. This coalition has been reinforced and induced by a strong quasi charismatic leader/hero and an ideology that command the loyalty of that ruling class.

In coopting its members from various regions, professions and ethnic groups, the MPR projects the image of representing the Zairean people as a whole. This image coupled with its paternalistic behavior, and finally with its identifiable symbols tend to enhance the party's claim to popular loyalty and power. As long as the MPR decisions are generally respected and accepted, the consensual behavior of the ruling class tends to refrain itself from strong disincentives that create factions and lead to division and disintegration.

One last word on the four variables in a study which pretends to keep itself off from the liberal approach. Because of the immediate need to control the society, Zaire and other African states lean heavily on authoritarianism, paternalism, identity, consensualism, and coercion. These perverse aspects alienate the economic dimension of the society and generate sharply

151 T. Callaghy, pp. 175-417.
striking and ongoing contradictions between vertical integration and horizontal integration as the following chapter intends to demonstrate.
CHAPTER IV

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION

Basing his analysis on a liberal approach and concluding on "the Policy of National Integration in Zaire," Wyatt Mac Gaffey writes that

in the name of national integration and the abolition of pluralism, the homogenization of family law, the judicial system, local administration, and land tenure clearly favours a division of the country into two classes with divergent resources and interests.\textsuperscript{152}

Joining Mac Gaffey is Thomas Callaghy who, in his study that combines both historical and comparative approaches concludes that

the Zairean absolutist state does maintain basic order, but at a very high cost. It brutally exploits the population, weakens or destroys liberty, local autonomy, intermediary authorities and associations, and community spirit. Moreover, it creates inequality, fosters dependence on the state, and prevents incremental

political change. In short, it creates a gap between state and society.\textsuperscript{153} Young and Turner share that position when they describe one of the mixed impact of policies of national integration in dealing with ethnic and regional loyalties as successive in preventing "open ethnic mobilization and confrontation, and in having some effect on the strenuous efforts to build affective attachments to Zaire as a nation-state"\textsuperscript{154} Whether this national integration as discussed in the previous chapter lasts or not, a major question rises as to know and understand the nature of the relations between the state and the means of production, the infrastructure, how the MPR policies of national/vertical integration has impacted the entire society and how the Zairean people see it. The aim of this chapter is to discuss the social dynamics that the MPR policies of national integration have generated and the prospect of change, if any, in the interest of the most desherited forces of these policies.

Once one discusses the Zairean social dynamics, one is confronted with a delicate use of terminology. The most common of the terms in the Zairean scholarship is

\begin{footnotes}
\item[153] Thomas M. Callaghy, p. 418.
\item[154] Young and Turner, p. 156.
\end{footnotes}
class. As of today, the use of this term in the Zairean studies is the most confusing; however, depending on the perceived perspective one could bring some clarity to the subject matter.

We owe the first serious study on social classes in Zaire to Christian Comeliau who, in 1965 published a study which showed the interaction between economic functions and political power.

Comeliau begins from the premise that in the newly independent state where the state, the concessionnaires and the missions had worked together in the development of merchant capitalism, these activities came to stratify the society on the basis of education and monetary income. The consequence of this social development was the creation of a petty bourgeoisie (sous-bourgeoisie) which comprised teachers, journalists, clerks, army seargents and traders. Based on their incorporation into the money economy and the degree of their participation in these economic activities, Comeliau's eight groups form the Zairean society and are foreign bourgeoisie, bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, traders, urban working class, rural wage earners, unemployed, and peasants.\footnote{Christian Comeliau. \textit{Fonctions Economiques et Pouvoir Politique} (Kinshasa: Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales, 1965), p. 74.}
Interestingly, after independence and with the continued participation of those social groups in economic activities, social relations among those groups are also economically shaped to the extent to picture interpersonnal relations. Nzongola takes off from that empirical observation and poses that in post-colonial Zaire, five terms are used consciously or unconsciously by the society. Those terms are "chômeurs, intellectuels, commerçants, villageois, and travailleurs," meaning unemployed, intellectuals, traders, peasants and workers. Clearly, a pure economical determinant has shaped the mode of social relations among Zaireans. When one has no economic activity which is conducive to profits or when one is not engaged in an economic process that makes him dependable on wage earnings, one is automatically called chômeur. This is not a simple economism that some scholars would attack as a weak ground of radical approach; for everyone is daily identified according to the production relationship with the social system. Besides, classical Marxism focussing on the ownership and non-ownership of the means of production must be transcended when dealing with the post-colonial societies. In this respect, Nzongola believes that for

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classical Marxian economic importance to be theoretically useful "it must include production, distribution, circulation and consumption of goods and services."\textsuperscript{157}

For Nzongola, even though the five words do not translate a clear class consciousness as either a class-in-itself whose members share a common or similar mode of life, or a class-for-itself whose members are conscious of their interests and politically organize themselves to defend them, they could be theoretically described as follows: national bourgeoisie (politicians, bureaucrats, wealthy traders), petty bourgeoisie (clerks, teachers, soldiers), working class (cash crop farmers) and lumpen proletariat (marginalized adults and youngsters).

Tackling the issue of class formation in Zaire, Young and Turner conceive a class as "a social aggregate within the polity, defined by its common role, function, and status within a socioeconomic setting primarily bounded by the nation-state, but influenced by the external arena."\textsuperscript{158} Evidently, Young's effort to define class in both national and international contexts marks a straightforward step in terms of the national and international aspect of class struggle. However, the problem with Young's view of class is his long lasting

\textsuperscript{157}Nzongola, G.N., p. 515.

\textsuperscript{158}Young and Turner, p. 101.
tendency to associate class notion with ethnicity and to suggest that both concepts partially are explanatory categories in the essence of sociopolitical change.\textsuperscript{159} As I had argued earlier and at the end of this research, ethnicity and regional loyalties are purely dependent variables in the current Zairean society. During the struggle for political emancipation these variables played an important role in shaking and paralyzing the colonial system, and in so doing they became a core variable. The January 4, 1959 riot in Leopoldville which gave the tone for the Zairean independence was essentially a boycott called upon by an essentially ethnic organization ABAKO. The cultural pluralisms continued to play that role soon after independence because the struggle for political power among different and inconsistent parties had reached a zenith. This high political struggle has been partially brought down by an authoritarian system for the purpose of a vertical integration, and so the importance of ethnic and regional categories has suffered from that. Young himself and many other social scientists have implicitly conceded this as we pointed out earlier in this chapter and elsewhere in this study. Young considers the current Zairean society as ruled by a politico-commercial class. Inasmuch as this class takes its roots from political

\textsuperscript{159}Young, p. 162.
system in place to further its accumulative role in economy through trade and commercial activity, Young is partially right, but since members of this class can fall in disgrace any time as long as the political power holder decides, their economic activities are not guaranteed to generate revenues and more income for them. Here too, Young's categorization of the ruling class in Zaire can be vulnerable. Additionally, in his Zairean class conceptualization Young tends to associate status groups and professional positions with class position. To be sure both status and class position are interrelated, but different, for we cannot comprehend Young's position that high ranking military officers, university staff and top managers in private enterprises constitute a fraction of a politico-commercial class (pp. 121-122). Those status groups are the recruiting fields for the national bourgeoisie. This point will be substantiated when we discuss some of the economic measures that the Zairean state has undertaken. An other word has been used to designate the Zairean ruling class. In his treatise on Zaire, Callaghy opts for the term political aristocracy. The author writes:

the ruling group in Zaire is a political aristocracy because its basic values, its power, and its economic base result from its relationship to the state. I prefer the term political aristocracy rather than the more common national
bourgeoisie, bureaucratic bourgeoisie, or politico-commercial bourgeoisie, because, in its historical sense, bourgeoisie connotes a productive social class which the African ruling class is not. It certainly is not in Zaire.\textsuperscript{160}

Callaghy is right for the same reason Young was. However, what one may fail to understand remains the essence of the question of why the Zairean political aristocracy has been struggling to have control over the Zairean means of production by attempting to nationalize the economy? Is it because this class wants to be able to generate and accumulate more revenues? Nzongola in 1982 wrote that

the class in charge of the Zairean state today is a bourgeoisie that is still incapable of establishing an independent economic base for itself but whose political power enables it to enhance its role in the country's economy.\textsuperscript{161}

Also, since the traditional rulers have been to some degree integrated in the post-colonial political system, they yield their actual social and political position (status) as an accumulation tool for economic benefits. At this particular juncture, traditional rulers may constitute a part of the petty bourgeoisie. In the Ubangui District where the climate favors coffee

\textsuperscript{160}Callaghy, p. 185.

\textsuperscript{161}Nzongola, N. Class Struggle and National Liberation in Africa (Roxboro, Mass.: Omenana, 1982), p. 47.
plantations, it is a commonality to see traditional chiefs, independent farmers and politicians (the MPR officials) compete for land ownership. In this Equatorian district many traditional rulers who have been confirmed by the MPR as the party agents, have capitalized on their political role to attempt to move from a symbolic chief of unity to an economic agent. Ganga in Bobadi, Gbongolo in Bodangabo, Zabo in Karawa, Nukon in Bodua have all called upon their ruled villagers to work large coffee plantations for them and to build "official houses" that are indeed for those chiefs and their families. As the coffee plantations have become successful economic activities initially controlled by independent farmers and some foreigners, the traditional chiefs fear that their political power will wither away with this continuous development of economic accumulation. It is time for them to be actively involved in this form of primitive accumulation.

For my part, five classes still dominate the Zairean post colonial society. They are the emerging national bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, the working class, the marginalized and the unemployed and the rural proletariat.

National bourgeoisie. As of today, the Zairean national bourgeoisie is a widely open category. It comprises politicians who control the party apparatus and manipulate it to further and protect their interests. The
segment is made up of the MPR officials, the army high
officers from Major to General. Independent traders and
merchants who own some agro-industrial businesses, banks
and who have been regrouped in the national association of
business (ANEZA) are part of the national bourgeoisie.
Petty bourgeoisie is the section of individuals who have
no control whatsoever over the production forces but who
are currently involved in earning their living through the
services they pay to public and private businesses.
University graduates who by virtue of education have
joined the party and earn high income either within the
party regime or in large state firms belong to this social
faction. The problem with them is that they do not own
the means of production such as land, machines, techniques
or capitals but they help the owners of those means in
improving and generating more funds which also have
incremental effect on their income; their survival is a
function of the existing system which they support. As
Comeliau had realized, the integration of these
individuals into money economy granted them an active role
in economy but made them more dependent on the economic
system and on the political system as well. Civil
servants, teachers, and soldiers from Adjutant to Captain
belong to this fraction of social class.
The Working Class

The working class in Zaire differs from the petty bourgeoisie by its skillful workmanship. It cannot expect to reach the summit of the management which conceptualizes the general and technical policies that apply to the entire body. Even though the workers may have organizations representing them, they are at the same time subject to manipulation by their leadership. Not having a unified position, the working class' lack of class consciousness denies any possibility of radical change. Life conditions for the working class are those of uncertainty because their only source of earnings, i.e., wages are low, irregularly paid and stagnant. These economic conditions are important in any attempt to understand social dynamics in Zaire, though the working class, lacking a class consciousness at this present moment is small in size. With the industrialization and the development of agro-industries, this portion of the Zairean society is taking shape, mostly in urban areas such as Kinshasa and Lubumbashi. But realistically, we must recognize to some extent that "the absence of large-scale industry and the relatively low skill and
educational standards of the workers retard class consciousness in Zaire. 162

However, this lack of workers' consciousness derives more from their lack of education than from their number because a high number of workers in a country does not necessarily lead them to a revolutionary social role. European countries and Latin American states provide us with some cases. Rather, the role assumed by the leadership of a working class could, in conscientising them (workers) play a determinant role in a qualitatively social change.

The Marginalized and Unemployed

A marginalized individual has no means of subsistence. He is usually a creation of regional or ethnic solidarity in urban areas because a relative in town has called on him/her to come and look for a better opportunity. But having found no job and with no training skill or a sufficient energy for a manual work, the person becomes hopeless. The future for him/her is blank. The more accurate term for this social faction is déclassés. They abandon the countryside for the urban areas which swallow their large numbers. Violence, larceny and social disturbances are their common dexterity.

The unemployed is a previously employed individual who for administrative, economic, political, and personal reasons has lost his/her job. The unemployed may possess a technical skill or the experience for a future job application; but as the job market goes down, the hope for a much better world also vanishes. For this particular reason, he/she may be categorized in the same class with a marginalized. The common word that broadly describes both the marginalized and the unemployed in Zaire is chômeurs. It is unquestionable that as the most frustrated social strata, both the marginalized and the unemployed constitute a recruiting ground for a major social change. As Fanon argues hereafter, the Belgian administration was aware of the potential social threat that this strata could trigger. It attempted without major success to send them back to the countryside. He writes that

In the Congo, draconian measures were taken from 1951 onward to send back to the countryside the young hooligans who were disturbing the social order.\(^{163}\)

The rural proletariat comprises the peasants who, in Zaire are associated with villagers who daily farm their portions of land. They live on cash crops from their small size plantations, they sell their agricultural

surplus in order to make money. During colonization, peasants or villagers were subjected to forced agricultural activities such as rice, cotton, maize and palm oil. Those products provided them with some financial means to buy goods for their basic needs. After independence, the voluntary farming that was introduced could not enable them to meet entirely their needs and the lack of accessible roads from urban centers to villages reinforces their isolation from highly economic activities and health facilities. As a result, their social conditions have become worse than ever. They are the very victims of the socio-economic imbalance like the working class, the marginalized and the unemployed.

The following discussion focusses on the main mechanism through which the Zairean ruling class, after vertical integration has used to strengthen and shape the above social formation.

Political aristocracy (Callaghy), politico-commercial class (Young) or politico-commercial bourgeoisie (Shatzberg), the Zairean ruling class or the national bourgeoisie has been attempting to effectively control the productive forces in order to strengthen its position vis-a-vis internal competitors and external as well. Many phases have characterized this process. The most important phases that interests this study are the Bakajika Law and the Zaireanization.
The Bakajika Law

Once the rising national bourgeoisie realized its failure in the early years of independence to control the productive forces, it resorted to politically pollute the social climate by creating small provinces along tribal alliance. The country saw its six provinces enlarged to twenty-one in order to satisfy the politicians' whims. However, this institutional inflation did not satisfy the hungry and greedy politicians because the multiplication of provinces did not, in the long run, yield the dividend that the politicians had anticipated. To decide on the creation of new and autonomous entities was one thing, but to provide those entities with viable institutions and economic resources was another thing. And for predacious politicians whose sole resources came from an inept central government there was no future at all because the economic structure of the state was paralyzed. Politicians at this time were like kings who would daily parade their kingdoms without having foods for their palaces and their subjects. The political and social turmoil created after independence had forced foreign minority bourgeoisie (Comelieau) to abandon their properties and leave the country; most of these properties were plantation and agro-industries. In the meantime, the army which took over power disbanded all previous
provinces and the national parliament; curtailed the political and economic power that those regional and central institutions enjoyed.

Facing an unemployment and an uncertain future, politicians concerted and laid down a law which could enable them to take over "large tracts of land and abandoned plantations" that "were still legally in the hands of foreigners." Bakajika was the deputy who proposed that law which also bears his name. Bakajika and his peer parliamentarians wanted to be given abandoned plantations and other agro-industries so that at the end of their terms, they would be economically secure. The rising national bourgeoisie at that period was convinced of the necessity to control the rural area through agricultural sector of the economy. This trend has been directly or indirectly reinforced by laws passed in 1971, 1972 and 1973 that declare that the soil and the sub-soil of Zaire as well as their natural products, belong to the state. If the policy of the Second Republic was to abolish private property and to make land available to individuals as long as their occupancy is productive in a capitalist sense, as the mentioned laws reveal, who were

and are the beneficiaries of this apparent radical land policy and other economic measures?

Zaireanization

One of the most vocal and radical economic measures under the MPR rule in Zaire has been the Zaireanization, though the nationalization of the Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK) in 1966-67 had stirred up polemics at internal and external levels.

In his annual address to the National Assembly on November 30, 1973, the MPR President announced what appeared to be a historic turning point in the quest for economic independence in the Nsele Manifesto: "Economic independence is the essential goal toward which all efforts of the nation must be directed."165

Zaireanization could be seen as an attempt by the national bourgeoisie to solve the obvious contradiction between the goal set by the MPR regime and the striking reality (continuous domination of the national economy by a foreign bourgeoisie). On the one hand the MPR regime was proclaiming its determination to bring about economic happiness to the state because there is no independence without economic independence. On the other hand, commerce, plantations, small industries, construction firms, transportation, and property-holding enterprises

were controlled by foreigners such as Portuguese, Greeks, Italians, Jews, and Pakistanis. Before 1973, an estimated number of 38,000 West African traders who held and ran businesses throughout the country were expelled *manu militari*. Their expropriate assets passed later into the hands of the national bourgeoisie. 166 And so did most Zaireanized enterprises. To the question of who got what from the Zaireanization, the following answer is offered:

For the most part, they [Zairean owners] were the members of the political-administrative bourgeoisie, high government officials or their "stand-in" friends or relatives. Among the largest acquereurs in Lubumbashi, for example, were the regional commissioner and his five closest collaborators, a pattern that seems to have been followed in other regions as well. 167

Indeed the self-service pattern of the ruling class appears to have dominated the distribution process of the loot all over the country. In the Equator region, the lion share was held by the MPR President, followed by the then Interior Minister Engulu who, according to C. Young


scooped up thirty-five plantations totalling 35,727 hectares. 168

Schatzberg reports that "the agro-industrial firms of Ceque, Compagnie Hevea, Busira Lomani, Sobol, Schoofs, Macodibe, Maurice, Verbuyt, and Socobe became overnight Engulu's agricultural empire in the region. 169 It is surprising that the MPR officials' interests prevailed in the distribution while the party slogan calling for altruistic service disappeared. One common and official assumption to explain the self-interest was that Zaireanization came earlier than expected because skillful and experienced nationals to take over and run the nationalized units were very few. Instead, politicians could fill in the vacuum. But, as of today, history may not hide its course in castigating them for managerial failure. However, before implementing the Zaireanization measures, an ordinance-law No. 74/019 of January 1974 was promulgated by the President of the Republic to transfer to the state the property of agricultural and agro-industrial enterprises, quarries, brickyards, and large commercial units previously owned by foreign individuals or corporate entities.

168C. Young, p. 338.
169Schatzburg, M.G., pp. 136-137.
As of 1973, three major agro-industrial companies controlled the Equatorial districts of Mongala and Ubangui. They were Huileries du Zaire, Société des Cultures Maraîchères au Zaire (SCM Bangala), and Culture et Élevages au Zaire (CELZA). With the Zairianization, these major agro-industries went to the MPR President to join many others around the country to form a new CELZA empire which provides the new owners with enormous resources. (Table 4.6) In the meantime, the less important plantations previously owned by independent foreign farmers were given to Parliamentarians and other high officials. Unfortunately, those officials had no managerial experience and skills to successfully run their acquired properties. As a result, they went bankrupt and then acquired properties followed the process. This does not mean that acquired properties by top officials had succeeded in their normal functions. To correct momentarily the managerial disaster, ill-managed acquired properties were given to some independent and successful Zairian holders of wholesale and retail shops and farms. In the Mongala and Ubangui districts, that process had enabled Mr. Bemba Saolona to takeover the then dying acquired properties and to turn them into an efficient productive and prosperous personal agro-industrial empire known today as SCIBE ZAIRE.
Mr. Bemba, a respected and successful businessman, did not acquire anything during the Zaireanization. He was an independent and hard-working wholesale shop holder. His exceptional managerial skills convinced Mr. Litho Moboti, who had everything through the regime, to take him as a partner in his business. They established a company named the Société Industrielle et Commerciale Bemba Litho (SCIBELI). Litho's prodigal and ostentatious nature sharply contradicts Bemba's cautious one. The latter preferred to go on his own with the Société Commerciale et Industrielle Bemba (SCIBEZAIRE) which has proved itself as a far success in Zaire and earned its owner the MPR President's respect. Mr. Bemba has been once elected by his Zairean peers president of the National Association of the Zairean Enterprises (ANEZA). Due to his contribution to the Zairean economy and to his close ties to the political regime, Mr. Bemba has a bright future in the country.  

In the Shaba Region where David Gould gathered important raw data on the distribution process of the Zaireanized enterprises, the major beneficiaries were members of the national bourgeoisie or the MPR rulers. (See Tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3) It was reported that during

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the distribution, the regional commissioner grabbed four large units for himself and these acquired enterprises provided him with a monthly sum of $100,000 whereas his monthly salary was $2,000.

Despite their taste for urban enterprises, members of the national bourgeoisie took advantage of the new economic order and hurried to take over agricultural sectors in the countryside as initially suggested and approved by the Bakajika law. After a plenary session of the MPR Political Bureau, the Council of Ministers and the National Assembly, late in December 1973, three major decisions were made. First, the largest agro-industrial and commercial units would become state owned and headed by Délégué(s) Généraux. Second, the major plantations, ranches, and large commercial businesses would go to top politicians, i.e., members of the MPR major organs. Third, the smaller stores could be allocated to local notables who indeed were the party officials at the local level. Army officers, judges, functionaries, ambassadors, and members of the regional administration were excluded for integrity reason. On this ethical ground, it is surprising that the members of the army who took over power in 1965 to clean the political and social atmosphere are believed to be less upright than politicians so as to be left out of the pelf. However, this restriction has not been effective because the MPR president encourages
most of his collaborators to participate in economic independence.

I do not prevent my collaborators from having, outside their functions, lucrative activities. I even encourage them. But they cannot use these as a pretext for not correctly fulfilling their responsibilities. As long as they clearly carry out their activities, I can only support them. Otherwise, for example, a legislator who has only his parliamentary duties would be unemployed at the end of his term. 171

Consequently, Zaireanization had laid down a new social order in Zaire by which the means of production have been put into the hands of a ruling class in search of its infrastructural base. This situation makes it uneasy for the national bourgeoisie to strengthen its position, hence its failure to manage the "MPR manna."

The retrocession or the return of some economic enterprises to former owners was the only ultimatum from a capitalist viewpoint. But the land has been for the last few years under the MPR officials' control and provides them with substantial resources. With the exception of the MPR President who owns large plantations in seven of the country's eight regions, most members of the national bourgeoisie own plantations in their respective regions. Three sampling tables show here below how the Zairean

national bourgeoisie takes its roots from political power. Bumba, Gemena and Lubumbashi are the three cities where empirical data have been gathered from.

In Bumba, of twelve acquired units, seven are owned by party officials ranking from collectivity chief to deputy. (See Table 4.1) Two businesses are owned by what Schatzberg lists as unknown. Party militancy and political connection being important factors in Zaire, we may assume that the two unknown owners must have had some political clout to send them on the business adventure. Even in Kinshasa merchants had to have a recommendation from a highly influential personality in order to get their slice of the cake. Briefly, in Bumba's district only, political or party affiliation played a determinant role in the acquisition of nationalized properties. This theory holds true in the cases of Gemena and Lubumbashi.

In Gemena, Table 4.2 shows that politicians acquired seven of the eleven Zairianized businesses, they so represent 63.6 percent of the beneficiaries. Unfortunately, they all went bankrupt. The political appartenance also had dictated the tone in Lubumbashi as Gould has demonstrated that politicians edged the businessmen by one percent (35.4% vs. 34.4%). (See Table 4.3).
Table 4.1

Effects of Zaireanization in Bumba, Equator Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Business Acquired</th>
<th>Acquirer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Commerce, rice mill, saw mill, gas station</td>
<td>Deputy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Commerce</td>
<td>Deputy (alternate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Commerce and Food Store</td>
<td>Deputy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Commerce and Coffee Factory</td>
<td>Kinshasa merchant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Commerce and Radio Repair</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Commerce</td>
<td>Ass. Regional MPR (Animateur)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Commerce and Agricultural Trade</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garage and Butcher Shop</td>
<td>JMPR Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Commerce</td>
<td>Collectivity Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Commerce</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Commerce and Food Store</td>
<td>Party Bureaucrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Commerce</td>
<td>Army General</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2

Effects of Zaireanization in Gemena, Equator Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Type of Business</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Bureau Member</td>
<td>Plantation</td>
<td>Bankrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Bureau Member</td>
<td>General Commerce, Food Store</td>
<td>Bankrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politician's Wife</td>
<td>General Commerce, retail</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy</td>
<td>General Commerce</td>
<td>Bankrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy</td>
<td>General Commerce</td>
<td>Bankrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy</td>
<td>General Commerce</td>
<td>Bankrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy</td>
<td>General Commerce, Coffee Plantation</td>
<td>Bankrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Officer</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPR Regionals</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>General Commerce</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Personal data gathered in Fall 1976 while teaching at Elifya Institute in Gemena.
Table 4.3
Effects of Zaïrenization in Lubumbashi, Shaba Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Beneficiaries</th>
<th>Businesses Acquired</th>
<th>% Businesses Acquired</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politicians</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessmen</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Servants</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.1 Income Distribution

Before closing this chapter, we need to briefly discuss the wage policy in Zaire because wage as source of income plays an important role in shaping the social relations among individuals. A high income is always a source of prestige in society, while a low income breeds a low standing in most societies. Income also tends to nurture social inequality. This is no exception for Zaire where there exists two kinds of income. The formal income and the informal income. By formal income, we think of the income as stated on paper and as respected by employers. An informal income is all the kinds of financial and material advantage one can get from extramuros activities since the cumulation of job positions is not officially common in the country, especially when dealing with the non ruling class. However, it is not unusual to see individuals who seat in two or three different major organs of the party be paid for those positions. Besides this, lucrative activities gendered by political positions have provided the ruling class with more resources to the extent to have a highly incremental impact on their income. These occult revenues from irregular economic activities by the ruling class might have led to "embezzlement, fraud, theft and illicit economic ventures of all kinds, including widespread
smuggling and export-import swindles.\textsuperscript{172} They have given birth to a popular expression namely, \textit{Kobeta mabanga*}. This informal income greed has had such a serious impact on members of the ruling class and the party civil servants that each year faces lawsuits for mismanagement of public funds.

For example in 1981 and 1982, 35 top public servants had been brought to justice for mismanagement and embezzlement of public funds; in January 1983, 120 public servants and businessmen were scrutinized by state prosecutor for embezzlement.\textsuperscript{173} In February 1983, the Belgian media reported that

\begin{quote}
Since Mr. Kengo has been heading the government, 55 high public servants and 14 businessmen have been the object of spectacular prosecutions. In the meantime, 154 individuals, mostly businessmen, are at large and wanted by the law.\textsuperscript{174}
\end{quote}

The Head of the Zairean government, known for his tough stand against illegal and criminal activities, has been

\textsuperscript{172}Callaghy, T., p. 189.

\textsuperscript{*} \textit{Kobeta mabanga}: Breaking rocks, implies the hard working one ought to perform any how in order to make it.

\textsuperscript{173}\textit{La Libre Belgique}, 99, No. 335 (Lundi 20 Décembre 1982).


\textsuperscript{174}\textit{La Libre Belgique}, Vendredi 4 Février 1983 (our translation).
tough against public servants who use corruption and embezzlement as a survival loophole in a highly stratified society. As someone may concede, if the Zairean authority must be encouraged to clean the entire society, it ought to begin with the roots of the problem and not to limit itself to shallow and noisy prosecutions. No single party official with a seat in the major party organs (Central Committee, Political Bureau) has been the object of a genuine public prosecution while most of the country's wealth is held by the very barons of the party. So it becomes just a matter of a general laissez-faire that periodical series of lawsuits and prosecutions can silence public and international opinion. This could explain why public officials of low level are usually subject to public denunciation once involved in illegal or occult economic activities. Their low formal income forces them to be at the mercy of temptation. Indeed, by the mid seventies, the average wage for a college graduate was Z.120 in public sector and Z.450 in private sector with a legal minimum of Z.12 per month for a clerk. By 1978, 67.9 percent of public personnel earned less than Z100 and 8.4 had a monthly salary of two hundred zaires (Z200).175

In the eighties, wages, salaries and index prices are so disarticulated that one wonders how people manage to support and feed themselves and their families. Without reliable sources, Muteba Tshitenge assumes that "between 1969 and 1980 prices of goods have increased from Z.100 to Z.3294 while wages have gone from Z.100 to Z.329.\(^{176}\) Table 4.4 below pinpoints the striking gap between wages and prices in Kinshasa from 1960 to 1980.

On the question of corruption in public administration in Zaire, Gould holds that the process of class formation on both national and international levels has generated and reinforced the phenomenon because it provides the international bourgeoisie with reliable local allies.\(^{177}\) While the international bourgeoisie through the MNCs helps develop the phenomenon of corruption to the extent of undermining the integral progress of the host societies, it would be dogmatic to infer that underdevelopment is mostly caused by external


Table 4.4

Wages and Prices Evolution in Kinshasa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Nominal Wage in the Private Sector</th>
<th>Real Wage in the Private Sector</th>
<th>Nominal Earnings in the Public Sector</th>
<th>Real Earnings in the Public Sector</th>
<th>Retail Prices in Kinshasa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>974</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>1,455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1,131</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1,760</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>3,827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>47,075</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Development is a multifaceted concept which requires a minimal sine qua non of consciousness and unselfishness on the part of those who rule the society. A society which consciously eliminates this prerequisite from its daily life is doomed to corrosive international influences. Political science has credited Machiavelli for having diagnosed the phenomenon early in the 16th century Italy.

Concerning the top officials' salary in Zaire, no official figures exist. The United Nations Statistical Yearbook in its latest edition, has no data. However, based on public opinion as expressed through rumors, it is generally believed that as of 1982, MPR officials earnings amount to the following:

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178 This scheme is the core of dependentistas who see underdevelopment in categorical terms such as center-periphery with the assumption that the periphery cannot develop and is underdeveloped because of the nature of the economic relations between the center and the periphery that negatively affect the latter.

179. UN Statistical Yearbook, 1983.
Table 4.5
Salaries of Top Officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organ</th>
<th>Setting-in Allowance (Z)</th>
<th>Monthly Salary (Z)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Committee</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Bureau</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executif Conseil (Govern.)</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Generals</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region Governors</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub Region Commissioner</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zone Commissioner</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the IMF constraints on the Zairean currency impose a chronic and annual devaluation, the currency purchasing power tends to fall drastically so that the above figures may be a serious underestimation of the reality. When the Political Bureau used to be the main organ and the decision-making body, its members enjoyed prestige, status and material benefits. Young believes that while the salary of members varied over the years, it has been as high as $6,000 per month, not to mention free housing servants, and vehicles, representational allowances, and invaluable openings for mercantile activity.180

Today, the Central Committee that initially had 120 members has absorbed the attributes once devolved upon the Political Bureau. As of January 23, 1985, a

180Young, p. 193.
presidential ordinance #85-048 cuts the appointed membership to eighty. 181

4.2 The Presidential Fortune

No one, including even the MPR President, will ever know the real size of the MPR President's fortune. The Presidential wealth can be divided into three categories: agro-industries, real estate, banking, and commercial institutions.

The agro-industries are combined and absorbed by the CELZA as the result of the Zaireanization measure. The CELZA empire was incorporated on July 1974. The exclusive shareholders are the MPR President and his wife with a relatively small capital of Z.750,000. 182 The CELZA empire comprises twenty-two large agro-industrial units of which fourteen are the offspring of the November 30, 1973 economic decision. The empire controls today the private agricultural sector in the entire country as the statutes of the company stipulate. Table 4.6 below pinpoints the major agricultural units of the presidential agro-industries.

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Table 4.6

The CELZA Empire

1. Société des Plantations d'Ipabata, Zone Walungu, Kivu.
2. Plantations de Combo, Zone de Walungu, Kivu.
3. Domaine de Fatale (Plantations Vandéen Gysel and Van Overpeche), Zone de Rutshuru, Kivu.
5. AGRI-UELE, Haut Zaire.
6. ILUBANGI, Equateur
7. Sociétés des Grands Elévages du Bas-Zaire, Bas Zaire.
10. Socodia, Isiro, Haut Zaire.
12. Vanos et Cie, Isiro, Haut Zaire
15. Plantations (SCM) BANGALA, Equateur.
17. Mopila, Isangi, Haut Zaire.
18. Lipton-Zaire, Goma, Kivu.
19. Sozagal, Kinshasa.
20. J.V.L. Mushie, Bandundu.
Table 4.6 Continued

21. Torrefaction V.D.W., Kinshasa


Sources: Art. 5 of CELZA Statutes in Monguya, p. 221.
The President's Real Estate

The opportunistic Zairean opposition in its attempt to make headlines in Europe reported that the Zairean President has holdings in Africa, Europe, and the United States. While these sensational allegations remain undocumented, some reliable sources have offered the following information about the president's real estate.\textsuperscript{183}

1. Chateau Procourt à Eghezee, Namur, Belgium.
2. Le 49-51, Avenue du Prince d'Orange, Ukkel, Belgium.
3. Le 384, Avenue Brugmann, Ukkel, Belgium.
5. Le 51, Av. Maréchal-Ney, Ukkel, Belgium.

Other holdings are estimated as follows:

1. Residence and estate in Switzerland near Lausanne \hspace{1cm} $3,750,000$
2. Chateau at Namur, Belgium \hspace{1cm} $1,625,000$
3. Villa at Rode-St. Genese \hspace{1cm} $875,000$
4. Estate and Football Field of S.A. Royale Belge \hspace{1cm} $1,500,000$
5. Ten-Story building, Bld. Reyes, Brussels \hspace{1cm} $2,000,000$
6. Building on Bld. Lambertmont, Brussels \hspace{1cm} $1,000,000$
7. Other properties in Belgium \hspace{1cm} $12,500,000$

\textsuperscript{183}Africa-Asia, \#252 (November 9, 1981), pp. 26-27.
8. Residence in Paris, Av. Foch, France $ 750,000
9. Residence at Nice, France $ 1,250,000
10. Residence at Venice, Italy $ 625,000
11. Chateau in Spain $ 1,250,000
12. Building in Bangui, Central African Republic $ 250,000
13. Villa at Abidjan, Ivory Coast $ 500,000
14. Funds on deposit in Swiss Banks $125,000,000\textsuperscript{184}

The President's banking and commercial connections

Beside the many agro-industries and real estate, the president's connections with some banks and commercial institutions foster the president's wealth accumulation. The MPR president is the largest shareholder in the Banque de Kinshasa. He has acquired some indirect interests in the Zairean operations of ITT-Bell, Fiat, Gulf, Pan Am, Renault, Peugeot, Volkswagen, and Unilever.\textsuperscript{185} The state owned mining companies, GECAMINES, MIBA and SOZACOM, are under the direct tutelage of the MPR Presidency who can at will divert their proceeds towards projects believed to be of "national interests." During the early years of democratic liberalization, a parliamentary commission

\textsuperscript{184}Young, p. 179.

\textsuperscript{185}Ibid.
found that from 1977 to 1980 $150 million had been
withdrawn from the Bank of Zaire through GECAMINES and
SOZACOM for private use. Asked on national TV by the
Parliamentary Commission of inquiry to justify this
amount, the then General Delegate at SOZACOM could save
his public embarrassment by pretending that the amount
was used to cover the costs of a black market of cobalt
which had enhanced the Zairean government to buy hundreds
of French buses for public use (SOTRAZ). These few cases
show one of the many ways the MPR Presidency proceeds
with its wealth accumulation.
CONCLUSION

National integration is everywhere a question of degree; it is a dynamic process that aims at bringing closer different social and cultural groupings within the same geographical area in order to create a spirit of togetherness, values and wealth sharing, and participation. It supposes the creation and the preservation of mechanisms that further social solidarities. Physical contact, communication, mobilization for shared experiences, and identification with a new social order to which people assimilate themselves have been considered first hand measurement concepts of national integration. Claude Ake has considered four variables that can be empirically tested in analyzing the nature of political integration in Africa.

With respect to a one party state, this study has attempted to test the theory of political integration in Zaire. It has demonstrated the mechanisms that the Zairean MPR has used to create and dominate a viable political system. For those interested in Zairean politics since June 1960, the MPR domination has resulted
in a general feeling of political unity among Zaireans. Political competitions and participation have been those decided on and kept in control by the party, the center, not those coming from regional loyalties, the periphery, unlike during the first five years of independence. Travelling or moving from a region to another for political, professional or economic reasons, attending schools anywhere in the country and creating a collective and national feeling around national symbols may not be valuable, valid and scientific criteria of integral integration, but those constitute a series of factors of furthering political unity that any modern nation-state strives for. Zaire under the MPR has been struggling for twenty years to get these ingredients.

Nonetheless, political unity or vertical integration such as the one the MPR has established in Zaire in order to perform and last must emphasize a high level of socio-economic integration for an integral social progress, especially in an immense country like Zaire. The last chapter has showed that there has been a keen imbalance between the political unity and the socio-economic integration as far as popular masses are concerned. Socio-economic integration notwithstanding for the masses, the MPR President after been sworn in for the third term in December 1984 declared that communicational infrastructure, public health, energy development and
telecommunication will be the priorities for his third term so as to facilitate the economic development of rural areas. This could be seen as a step toward demodernizing crowded cities like Kinshasa, Lubumbashi and Kananga which have become a problem for unemployed who, in an potential popular riot, could play an important role. Whether this economic policy will succeed remains to be seen. Furthermore, during the same inaugural address, the MPR President announced an administrative decentralization for the entire country in order to let the regions and other territorial entities become autonomous and independent economic unities, from which the development of the entire country will be launched. Indeed, the administrative decentralization was already in motion in 1982 when the then Commissioner for Territorial Administration, Dr. Vunduawe initiated and convinced the MPR President to proceed with that experience. Consequently, regional assemblies, urban counsels, and zonal counsels were instituted all over the state by the Ordinance Law No. 82-006 which according to Vunduawe "endows our country with an administratively decentralized regime." As


interesting as the idea sounds, one must not be misled by it; for the decentralization, far from being a restructuration of the MPR rule, is a restructuring policy for the MPR rule; in other words, it stands as a homeostatic measure for the current system. In that regard, political integration contains some camouflage in one way or another; because like Duverger puts it when the state is in the hands of the privileged classes, they use it primarily in their own interests and secondarily in the public interest; the proportion of camouflage increases, that of integration decreases. When the state falls into the hands of the previously dominated and exploited classes, the latter act in the general interest by acting in their own interest--trying to eliminate domination and exploitation. The amount of camouflage decreases, and the amount of integration increases, at least until those who were formerly exploited become exploiters in their turn.\textsuperscript{189}

This dialectical reasoning that Duverger borrows from Marxian frame of reference suggests that in order for them to succeed in integration task, the ruling classes must destroy their own exploitation or commit class suicide in Cabral's words. This is the real challenge that the MPR rulers face. Have they, after the vertical integration, succeeded in eliminating domination and exploitation over the masses so as that the degree of integration can

\textsuperscript{189}M. Duverger, \textit{The Study of Politics}, p. 239.
increase or have they been furthering the chance for
disintegration by increasing the level of camouflage? The
discussion of the political economy of vertical
integration has demonstrated that with respect to
integration the amount of camouflage has been as high as
the result of contradictions embodied in the MPR social
formation.

Djilas for the Communist nations and Shivji for
Tanzania have analyzed this phenomenon of class formation
within the single party system. Their common conclusion
is that the more bureaucratized the party, the high risk
of the emergence of a new class whose members muster their
party positions and bureaucratic decisions to generate and
further their own interests that become antagonistic to
those of the masses. Hence the party creates social
classes.\textsuperscript{190}

The knowledge of this social formation can go through
many approaches. This study has attempted to base its
approach on the Marxian literature in order to explain the
Zairean current state of affairs. Thus far, two
tendencies have dominated the study of Zairean politics.

\textsuperscript{190} Milovan Djilas, \textit{The New Class: An Analysis of}
\textit{the Communist System}, pp. 149-156.

Issa G. Shivji. \textit{Class Struggles in Tanzania}
(Dar-es-Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1975),
pp. 149-156.
The first tendency, represented by Crawford Young, the first Anglo-American scholar of the Zairean society, is termed as a liberal while the second tendency, represented by Nzongola-Ntalaja is labeled radical.

For Crawford Young, the current Zaire is, in Crozier's terms a stalemate society (*société bloquée*) dominated by corruption and mismanagement.\(^1\)\(^9\)\(^1\) This is caused by the absolute power of the MPR and the inefficient rule of the MPR President and his close friends from Equatorian Region. As Crozier puts it for the French public servants, "their conception of authority as an absolute cannot be shared, discussed, or compromised."\(^1\)\(^9\)\(^2\) Not only Young's approach is defective for being essentially annecdotal, but it centers its substance mostly on the controversial concept of cultural pluralism. Young tends to believe that tribes, regions, and lingualism have formed an important role in the Zairean politics. By the same token, he points out that there are at least 200 different dialects in the country which, in such a situation, would make it difficult for a highly centralized state to survive despite its repressive machinery. Furthermore, Young and

\(^1\)\(^9\)\(^1\) Crawford Young, "Zaire, the Unending Crisis," *Foreign Affairs*, No. 57, 1, (Fall 1978), pp. 169-185.

his disciples imply that once the Equatiorian clique of incompetent rulers is wiped out, the Zairean problem will wither away. That viewpoint is not less than utopia. Young also suggests through his liberal approach of cultural pluralism that the Zairean state could be better off if every single tribe could be awarded political decision-making, in other words, the future of Zaire dwells on the borrowing from the South African policy of bantustanization. How different is this approach from the 1960's Congolese politics of macro-tribal provincialization which had led to 21 provinces and social disintegration? Does this approach help solve the Zairean crisis?

Unfortunately, Young's frame of reference has attracted some interest while it has confused some scholars. Thomas Turner has endorsed the pluro-cultural approach. In his analysis of the subject matter he undertakes to attack what he calls the clique of Bana Mayi (Equatorians) who are the center of the decision-making in Zaire.193

Perhaps misled by Young's cultural pluralist approach, Makidi surprises in assessing that the most obvious lesson of the opposition and political tendencies in the Congo (Zaire) is

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193 Turner Thomas, "Clouds of Smoke" in Guy Gran (ed.), pp. 69-84.
the undeniable presence of a neo-colonial, militarized, bureaucratized, tribalized, equatorianized, centralized and oppressive state. Indeed, the neo-colonial, militarized, bureaucratized, centralized, and oppressive features of the Zairean state are not questionable; but its tribalized and equatorianized characteristics must be established at the present state of affairs. Chapter Two has failed in that task; additionally, the use of the plu-ro-culturalist approach to the Zairean politics remains as defective as it poses itself as a value judgment. This is the most serious challenge to the Zairean scholarship if it stands for a bright and promising social change on the behalf of the victims of a predatory system.

The second tendency represented by N. Nzongola not only searches the explanation of the Zairean society through internal dynamics as does the liberal approach, but it focuses its position on the interaction between those internal forces and the external world. Without being essentially dependentist in character as D. J. Gould has successfully demonstrated in his many writings on Zaire, Nzongola holds that in a peripheral capitalist

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state like Zaire, the understanding of social reality must take off from both the internal and the external factors that class interest promotes at any time.\textsuperscript{195} The merit of this radical approach resides in the fact that it refrains from the liberal unilinear view on human society and adheres to the Marxian position of social change taking place through the circumstantial and historical breakthrough that internal contradictions cause. The radical approach does not associate the imbalance between politics and society in Zaire with a particular people nor does it consider it as a state of mind imposed on Zaire by a sole region. Class interest at the national level and on the international network must play a core role in determining the nature of the Zairean state. Why should Belgium, France, Morocco, and the United States rush to help the Zairean state to expel the invaders from the portion of land they had occupied in 1977 and 1978? Not because Belgians, French, Moroccans and Americans are tribes from the Zaire's Equatorian region who must fight for the survival of their political power and hegemony, but simply because the interest of those external forces

match the interest of the Zairean ruling class. Why should an angry Mongwandi (the MPR President's ethnic group), grab the microphone from a party official and ask him to shut up at a party popular rally in Binga, Equator, and castigate the MPR President for being insensitive to people's social conditions as Shatzberg has reported? \(^{196}\)

With this in mind, how can one foresee a future in Zaire? Several remedies are possible. From within the political system, a pure evolutionary process à la Somoza or à la Papa Doc is not to be excluded after the MPR President's physical disparition. At this particular moment he can rule the MPR state as long as he is alive according to the party statutes and to Zaire's constitution. Having invested his two elder sons in the army and in the government, the MPR President could, in the advent of a voluntary retreat from politics, push one of them to his personal seat; the ruling class who would prefer to preserve its vested interests would be the last to reject such an alternative. Such a change would benefit them while the material and social conditions of the masses would not change and improve. Nobody must think that the MPR President could make such a historic mistake as to resign from office in favor of his progeny. But it is also erroneous for anyone to believe that the

\(^{196}\) Schatzberg, M., pp. 164-165.
ruling class would do nothing to convince the MPR
President to act differently; because in an absolutist
political system, anything can happen to preserve it from
collapsing. A military intervention has been another
thought of alternative. Since the army was absorbed by
the party in the early seventies, its discipline has been
the party discipline, its leadership has been frequently
rotating or changing so that job and/or position security
has become the major concern after lucrative economic
activities. Even if such an option had to occur, military
leadership would not agree on anything fundamental, they
would resort to fighting each other, this would result to
the disintegration of armed forces and the consequences
may be worse than the first five years of independence.
And so the stalemate has crystallized itself in Zaire.

Nonetheless, as the socio economic integration or the
horizontal integration has failed and the stratification
gap between the ruling class and the masses increases,
social inequality would trigger the masses' furor and lead
to an indescribably mob violence like in January 1959.
Such an event would in return bring an official use of
force. But as long as the roots of the social
disturbances will not be uprooted, that pattern of social
and general behavior may go on and result into a general
breakdown of the system. Nicaragua under Somoza, Iran
under the Shah, and Haiti under Baby Doc are the recent
cases in this century. The dangerous development of political system in the peripherally capitalist states in Africa and in Zaire make scholars think that Karl Marx was not dogmatic in affirming that history repeats itself. With regard to this premonition, Africa of the 21st Century may offer to the world a lot of historical events. Peasants, unemployed and the working classes all united behind a nationalist and committed proletariat could make the change. But the social deprivation has so corroded the Zairean masses that everyone at this present moment is concerned with the rockbreaking or the struggle for the survival. Consequently, social change of a popular nature in Zaire is to be excluded for this century because external, economic and military support, coupled with a well organized, centralized power will survive any attempt to destabilize a state whose strategic and geopolitical position for the Western nations lies beyond limit. Once in 1982 the Western nations, concerned about rescheduling the Zairean external debts and internal turmoil, urged the MPR President to proceed with and bring about socio-economic integration and reform, had to face a cruel reality in this manner:

I am conscious that I can no longer get rid of you, but you too know that you need me. Your request exceeds the little money I receive from the U.S.A.,
the IMF and the World Bank put together
... I talk to you about politics and
Western security (interests). Your
reaction is on economy, debts. I
cannot accept that. 197

This tough stand vis-a-vis the regime's external allies
has produced a common reaction or phenomenon from within
and without the state: accommodation. Zaireans and
foreign allies must adjust their position to that of the
existing system. The party machinery has come into motion
for that purpose and successfully did it. Popular
insurrection as a means of a structural change is unlikely
to occur at this period because peasants, unemployed and
working class are disorganized. Even the student body
that once had a militant attitude in the early years of
independence and the MPR existence has lost its militant
radicalism. Kasongo Ngoyi and other social researchers
found in 1975 that Zairean students in Kisangani City, the
heartland of Lumumbism had mitigating feelings towards
African leaders known for their affiliation with external
powers. After Zaire, Senegal, Congo, Tanzania, Zambia,
and Ivory Coast were the five African countries students
esteemed most. Senegal and Ivory Coast are well known for
their close ties with their former colonial power, France;
the Congo and Tanzania claim Marxism-Leninism and African

socialism as their respective political ideologies. Zambia has a mystifying ideology called humanism. The three most admired African leaders by Zairean students were Kwame N'Krumah, Leopold S. Senghor and F. Houphouet Boigny.\(^{198}\) Any student of African society credits N'Krumah for his restless struggle for the political emancipation and the unity of Africa. N'Krumah remains the only African leader and theoretician to capture African intellectuals' mind. Senghor basically owes his second place to his role in literature where he has written many poems, novels and philosophical essays beside his twenty years' presidency in Senegal. Houphouet Boigny, the oldest head of state in Africa at that time, has been associated with the development of capitalism in the Ivory Coast that many observers had lauded as the Ivorian miracle in the seventies. It results from these observations that student bodies lack of militantism and radicalism and their flirtation with capitalism further delays the prospect of a social change based on a proletariat ideology.

Zairean scholarship must also be involved in the prospect of a qualitative social change. As Ilunga Kabongo puts it, "all Zairean scholars, wherever they

are, have the greatest responsibility to contributing to the explanation and the understanding of the Zairean situation. At home, they must abandon their self-imposed censorship for whatever reasons." Abroad, they must rid themselves of anachronic dogmatism and base their scientific endeavor on consistent data; furthermore, Zairean scholars living abroad have to put aside the perennial and unjustified idea that there's no freedom for scientific inquiry and that their work would be censured. Such an opinion would not be discussed in the sixties and seventies when the regime was struggling for recognition. However, after its control over the country, the MPR regime deals with its intellectual critics in two ways, either the MPR coopts them or it simply ignores them and puts them into "the non-existence zone" as Ilunga Kabongo has found out in his analysis of the Zairean crisis. Sometimes, the MPR regime exhorts scholars through its research and information Office (Bureau Conseil Recherche et Diffusion: BCRD) to do research. Like any concerned Zairean, I believe that any qualitative social change in Zaire must be the collective effort of those strata who believe that they are dissatisfied with

the MPR rule that has created a sharp gap between the rulers and the ruled for, to paraphrase Djilas, the MPR has made the class which grows as a result of and uses the MPR as a basis. This class grows stronger while the MPR grows weaker; this is the inescapable fate of every single party in power. The MPR President has come to the same conclusion when he wrote that "the Zairean bourgeoisie wants to get rich without working; it wants to consume without producing, it wants to rule without being controlled." 200

The theory of vertical integration in Zaire as established by this study could be, with some limitations, expanded to most African states. Equipped with the popular ideology of national unity against colonialism and exploitation, the PDG succeeded in building in Guinea a viable political community among various ethnic groups such as Mandinka, Fulani, Soussou, Kissi. Even though in the early eighties President Sékou Touré had begun to publicly denounce ethnic politics, it was much a pattern of class struggle between him and his potential adversaries whom he had for most of the time physically

eliminated. His denouncement stemmed less from a fear of losing what he had built - the Guinean nation - than from losing his own political power.\textsuperscript{201}

For more than a decade the Republic of Benin, formerly Dahomey that used to herald coup d'état each year due to ethnic politics has seen its high ethnic politics reduced by the Benin People's Revolutionary Party which claims to eradicate regional and tribal loyalties politics in favor of a united nation. The National Liberation Front (FLN) had brought Arabs and Berbers to independence in Algeria and thereafter to an Algerian viable nation. The Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast (PDCI) has created and maintained an Ivorian nation composed of Agni, Ashanti, Kroumen, Mandinka, Senoufo, Dan, Gourou. In the People's Republic of the Congo, the Congolese Workers' Party (PCT) has managed since 1970 to reduce the ethnic politics between the Southerners (Bakongo) and the Northerners (Bangala) and to revitalize the ideology of nationalism and internationalism proletariat among Congolese. Unfortunately, in all this nation-building task political success does not mean necessarily social betterment for the members of the political communities. Like Zaire,

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\textsuperscript{201}For more on mass arrests, torture and extrajudicial executions, see Amnesty International USA, \textit{Human Rights Violations in the Popular and Revolutionary Republic of Guinea}. New York: Amnesty International, 1982, pp. 1-16.
most African states that have reached vertical integration face the same and striking reality: wealth imbalance between the holders of the political machinery and those who are passive receivers of orders from the Party. As of the early eighties the per capita incomes for Zaire, Guinea, Benin, Algeria, Ivory Coast, and the Congo were $150, $120, $120; $420; and $380, respectively.\textsuperscript{203}

However, in countries like Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria, Sudan and Senegal where ethnic and religious politics plays an important role in political processes, our theory of vertical integration under a single party faces serious challenge. This by no means implies that in the single party states pluralist politics has no significance and that only class does. Indeed we had discussed this issue and taken the clear position that in peripheral capitalist state [of Africa] class concept at the national level plays a core role in shaping social formation. Nonetheless, in so shaping society through class struggle national leaders stick with tribalism and regionalism as a cover up or tactic to be officially recognized first as true representatives of tribal and regional loyalties and later as authentic and legitimate members of the new emerging bourgeoisie.

\textsuperscript{203}Rubin, L. \textit{et al.}, pp. 306-308.
Once this primordial affinity entrenches itself into the political process to benefit the ruling class, its feedback importance for the masses grows weak without disappearing unless unpredictable circumstances threaten the existing order. For this particular reason this study has termed cultural pluralisms as permanent characteristics as opposed to circumstantial ones.

In addition, ethnicity, regionalism and race do not offer a clear and long lasting perspective of social change for the social masses. They indeed adhere to the existing paradigms that the leadership condones.

The foregoing position applies to Zaire under the MPR rule and the simplistic assumption that Zaire has been equatorianized. Equally, the general idea that the current and outlawed Zairean Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social (UDPS) is a Luba movement opposing Mobutu has no solid foundation. The fact that the core members come from Luba region and so must the movement be termed alienates cultural pluralisms to the basic contradictions as generated by the MPR mechanisms. How could one then explain that Lihau Monga (Marcel) the former Supreme Court President and principal architect of the 1967 Constitution is today one of the most vocal members of the UDPS? Lihau Monga comes from the Equator region like President Mobutu. As of today UDPS members
and sympathizers are all over Zaire. Simply put, tribal
and regional interests remain an alarming cry and last
emotional means for members of opposing groups (classes in
their class struggle). Bossassi Epole, Bolya Kodya and
Lumbu Maloba referred to in 1986 by Amnesty International
as the UDPS leaders are not from the Luba Region. 204

Economic imbalance among the ruling class and masses
is not the sole immediate outcome of the new political
order. Masses' inability to be involved in the decision
making process appears to be the most common consequence
of the new political order in African States. As in the
case of Zaire under the MPR rule, the party structure
displays such an authoritarian and centralized network
that democratic ideals and procedures affirmed in the
party manifesto and public gatherings stem from rhetoric
rather than from facts. How can one otherwise address the
1977 climate that once was termed liberalization period
because, as the Head of State conceded that the "MPR
President Founder is not a magician" to know and decide on
everything. 205 In addition, the general attitude
holding that ethnic and regional groups constitute
barriers to national unity and hence must be fought

204 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Report 1986 (London:

205 Mobutu, S.S. "Discours du 1er Juillet 1977 à
Nsele après les événements du Sudouest Shaba."
against by all means has no solid foundation. This selfish reasoning aims at securing a status quo for those who rule and deny democratic ideals to the masses.

The existence of 250 various ethnic groups in Zaire is by no means an obstacle to the national unity. The truth of the matter involves the issue of a systematic idea which identifies the roots of the social imbalance and decides upon the action to be undertaken in order to eradicate the situation with the involvement of all the social groups.

The multitude of ethnic groups in the Soviet Union and China has not prevented both countries from being respectively ones of the modern solid nation-states. Imperial Russia, relatively underdeveloped country in 1917 is today a world power. China, from a quasi-colonial status in 1940's has brought some spectacular technical achievements for Chinese. The country has entered the contemporary race for nuclear weaponry with its explosion of nuclear devices. If human society can learn from historical hacienda for the betterment of mankind, Africans must note that socialist management is one of the most possible ways "to achieve sufficient power to forge unity, promote economic development, and free the nation from manipulative, exploitative forces." 206

206 Rubin, L., p. 198.
In defining and directing people's action toward self-reliance and self-production, socialism must free local entities from too centralized bureaucratic procedures and empower them to be autonomous under the mainstream of fundamental philosophy. Furthermore, central organs must provide those autonomous and regional entities with all kinds of support. Once those various and regional entities are guaranteed of this local power as to decide for themselves on issues that directly affect them without fear of central authority, national unity has a great chance to last and bring about social justice.
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III. Official Documents and Unpublished Articles

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