A study of higher education policies and their implementation by the Nigerian military regimes 1966-1978

Sunday I. Obong

Recommended Citation
http://digitalcommons.auctr.edu/dissertations/3282
A STUDY OF HIGHER EDUCATION POLICIES AND
THEIR IMPLEMENTATION BY THE NIGERIAN
MILITARY REGIMES, 1966-1978

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF ATLANTA UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY
SUNDAY ISONG OBONG

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

ATLANTA, GEORGIA
MAY 1980
ABSTRACT

POLITICAL SCIENCE

Obong, Sunday Isong

B.A., Lincoln University
Pennsylvania, 1969

M.P.A., M.A., Roosevelt
University, 1972

A.M., The University of
Chicago, 1973

A STUDY OF HIGHER EDUCATION POLICIES AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION
BY THE NIGERIAN MILITARY REGIMES, 1966-1978

Adviser: Professor Shelby F. Lewis

Dissertation dated May 1980

This study seeks to establish a basic theory that explains
the policies and practices of civilian and military regimes on
higher education in Nigeria.

Specifically, the study seeks to determine whether or not
the Nigerian military regimes gave top priority to higher educa­
tion through financing, planning and staffing of the universi­
ties system of Nigeria.

The first chapter is designed to set a general guideline
for this research, mainly pointing to various methodological
and theoretical foundations of the research.

Chapter Two throws some light on the development of the
British colonial policies that have influenced the contemporary
behavior of the Nigerian public policy makers. In addition,
it lays a foundation for the subsequent chapters through critical analysis of issues in the historical dynamics of Nigeria.

Chapter Three focuses mainly on the comparative analysis of the general military public policy decrees from 1966 to 1978, regime by regime. The importance of this chapter is the fact that it synthesizes in an orderly manner those major decrees or public policies of the various Nigerian military regimes.

Chapter Four is devoted to the study of a brief history of educational policies and philosophies in Nigeria. It examines the place of the University Education on the list of priorities affected by the Nigerian public policies. An effort is made to assess higher education policies and their implementation.

In Chapter Five, an attempt is made to examine higher education policies under the Nigerian military regimes. Major emphasis is placed on policy orientations rather than technical issues. This section is pertinent and interesting because it is based upon a critical evaluation, as well as an objective assessment of Nigerian higher education policies.

Chapter Six is devoted to the implementation of Nigerian higher education policies under the military regimes. It is in this chapter that the three policy areas--financing, staffing and planning are re-evaluated. Chapter Seven then deals with the evaluation and analysis of the problems and Chapter Eight presents the general summary and conclusions. As a part of the summary and conclusions, the overall implications,
recommendations and contributions are presented.

Thus, based on data available, it seems clear that the Nigerian military regimes developed and implemented an effective national higher education policy and gave financial, planning, and staffing priority to that policy. As a result, there are more equitable educational opportunities across the nation and the quality of education received has improved significantly under the Nigerian military regimes.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................ iv
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ................................... vii
LIST OF TABLES ............................................ viii

Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................... 1
   Statement of the Problem
   Methodology
   Statement of Hypothesis
   Outline of the Dissertation

II. SOCIO-POLITICAL BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE .... 19
   The Development of Socio-Political Structure
   The Amalgamation Proclamation
   The British Colonial Policy
   Post-Independence Policies and Politics

III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF GENERAL MILITARY PUBLIC POLICY DECREES ............................. 48
    Major-General Johnson Thomas Umanakwe
    Aguiyi-Ironsi's Regime: January 16, 1966 through July 31, 1966
    General Yakubu Gowon's Regime: August 1, 1966 through July 29, 1975
    General Murtala Ramat Mohammed's Regime: July 29, 1975 through February 13, 1976
    General Olusegun Obasanjo's Regime: February 13, 1976 through October 1, 1979

IV. PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF NIGERIAN HIGHER EDUCATION ............................................. 81
    Higher Education Policies and Philosophies in Nigeria, 1900-1966
    Background Statement
    Post-Independence Higher Education Policies

V. HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY UNDER THE NIGERIAN MILITARY REGIMES ...................................... 122
    Major-General Johnson Thomas Umunakwe
    Aguiyi-Ironsi's Regime: January 16, 1966 through July 31, 1966
    General Yakubu Gowon's Regime: August 1, 1966 through July 29, 1975
Chapter V continued

General Murtala Ramat Mohammed's Regime:  
July 29, 1975 through February 13, 1976  
General Olusegun Obasanjo's Regime: February  
13, 1976 through October 1, 1979

VI. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION POLICIES  
BY THE NIGERIAN MILITARY REGIMES . . . . . . . 147
Old and New Universities and University  
Colleges  
Backgrounds of Nigerian Universities  
Effect of the Dina Committee  
Policy Implementation--Financing of  
the Universities  
Policy Implementation--Staffing of  
the Universities  
Policy Implementation--Planning of  
the Universities

VII. EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . 196
Testing of the Hypothesis  
Results and Summary

VIII. GENERAL SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Anyone who has been a University student or scholar pursuing an advanced degree, undoubtedly understands the scholarly atmosphere that exists in academia. Notable is the process of undergoing a selective, and at times a rigid course of study designed to earn you the degree of your choice. Furthermore, the ability to subjugate your intellectual curiosity for the purpose of completing what it is that you intend to achieve is one that may be challenging. The final stage is your desire to leave behind in a university library a well written thesis or dissertation which reflects your thoughts or philosophy about the academic and empirical world.

The last stage seems, more often than not, to present substantial difficulty in matters of techniques, methodologies and other formats. However, in spite of these difficulties, a serious student has always approached his work quite diligently and patiently until it is completed. In an effort to come to grips with some of these difficulties,
there is always a handful of members of the university faculty whose support towards the attainment of your overall objective is always very outstanding and such that it is by no means easy to forget.

First, I am most grateful to Dr. Shelby Lewis, the chairperson of this dissertation committee, whose timely support, as well as thorough supervision of my work cannot be fully rewarded. In this particular case, words alone are inadequate to express my gratitude to Dr. Lewis. As for her unlimited advice and personal encouragement towards the attainment of this particular goal, I am also thankful to her.

The second group of participants in this adventure is my family. Without love, patience and concern from Frances, Nse and Eka, it would not have been possible for me to achieve this goal. To them, I reserve my special gratitude for their unique and personal commitments and sacrifices accorded me. It is to them that this dissertation, for whatever it means to them, is dedicated.

It would not be possible to remember everyone who has given me either moral or other types of support toward the completion of this work. Nevertheless, my thanks are extended to the members of my dissertation committee for their
criticisms, suggestions and corrections which I definitely needed to come to grips with a host of materials selected for this work.

Lastly, I must remember the anxiety of Mrs. Tity Isong Obong, my mother whose initial inspiration motivated me to leave Nigeria overseas for further studies. Needless to say that her motherly concern has not only been instrumental to my overall academic success, but also her generous financial backing has even been more rewarding towards my attainment of this goal. Here again, her overall concern is worth more than I can express in these words.

Generally, the Atlanta University Community must also share my appreciation, albeit its moral support. It is this center that has helped to make my dream a reality, one that is leaving a special and lasting impression with my Alma Mater.

LIST OF TABLES

Table
1. Federal Government Scholarships and
   Bursary Awards 1975-6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270

2. Students Enrolled in Universities by Field of
   Study and Level of Course
   (a) Ahmadu Bello University--1974-5 . . . . . . 272
   (b) University of Benin--1974-5 . . . . . . . . 273
   (c) University of Ibadan--1974-5 . . . . . . . . 274
   (d) University of Ife--1974-5 . . . . . . . . . . 275
   (e) University of Lagos--1974-5 . . . . . . . . 276
   (f) University of Nigeria (Nsukka)--1974-5. . . 277

3. Final Examination Results by Institution,
   Faculty and Sex 1974-5. . . . . . . . . . . . . 278
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

One of the major roles of any government is decision making and implementation. Consequently, the ability to transform public issues or concerns into their operational goals or objectives is one of the hallmarks and positive aspects of a good government. Its failure in bringing about consensus within the societal structure may lead to political conflicts, dissensions, and mass violence which may result in the breakdown of constitutional government.

It was Aristotle, a Greek philosopher, often referred to as the father of political science, who wrote that man is a political animal.\(^1\) Although there is considerable disagreement among social scientists concerning the reliability of Aristotelian philosophy about the behavior of man, it is true that throughout history, human societies have organized

---

in pursuit of happiness and protection. Beginning from the traditional social order, mankind has progressed or advanced into well organized societies, such as kingdoms, empires, and modern democracies. In order to maintain law and order within these organized societies, political leaders must, of necessity, engage themselves in the formulation and implementation of public policies. It is within this context that Randall B. Ripley once observed that "all government public policy decisions reflect the ends of that governmental activity."² If we accept Ripley's assumption, it becomes apparent that the success or failure of a particular government depends, to a certain extent upon whether or not such governmental public policies reflect the best interests of the citizenry, and are effectively implemented by the government.

During the past few years, mainly from 1966 to 1978, Nigerian Military Regimes have engaged themselves in the establishment of political control. The regimes maintain that they have also attempted to increase economic and social benefits to the people. These professed efforts must be recognized not only as those which David F. Roth and Frank

L. Wilson fondly described as "an example of policymaking under rulers clearly committed to free enterprise," but as a formal or informal process of coming to grips with the problems of Nigerian society. Quite unlike civilian rule where the decision-making process requires democratic procedures, military regimes make most of their policies by decrees. Funk and Wagnalls define decree as "A formal and authoritative order or decision, as well as a foreordained and eternal purpose."  

This research is designed initially to examine a major area of public policy under the Nigerian Military Regimes between 1966-1978. This area is University Education. I have selected this sector on the basis of its importance as a social indicator in the Nigerian society, and I intend to examine carefully the main public policy components, such as financing, planning, and staffing of the Nigerian universities under the military regimes. In addition, I hope to analyze the premise which assumes that military regimes in Nigeria cannot deal with complex political or governmental problems because they lack some of the


talents which their civilian counterparts possess.\(^5\)

Public policy in this study is defined as a formal order or decision which has the effect of law when it is implemented by the Nigerian Military Regimes. Implementation refers to the process of effecting the goals or objectives of a given public policy.

The ultimate source or arbiter of decision-making under the military regimes in Nigeria is the Supreme Military Council (SMC), with the Federal Executive Council (FEC), forming a subsidiary organ. Structurally, the SMC comprises the head of the Federal Military Government as the Chairman, heads of air force and navy, and the nineteen state governors. On the other hand, the FEC consists of the SMC members, attorney-general, inspector-general of police, and fifteen cabinet department heads.\(^6\) It is this group of decision makers that we refer to as policy makers in this study. While the actual implementation of higher education policies may be handled by the bureaucrats, it is understood however, that they are mandated to follow the guidelines set

---

\(^5\)For more detailed information on the shortcomings of the Nigerian Military Regimes, consult Godwin Matatu's article, "Soap-Box Promises Won't Do," in *Africa* 90 (February 1979): 38-40.

\(^6\)Roth and Wilson, *The Comparative Study*, p. 149.
selected a number of social indicators and from the data he collected from a cross-national survey of Nigerian public opinion, he determined the range of benefits or rewards from the old and new salary scales.

However, in this particular research, it is not necessary that we apply his method of survey technique to reach appropriate conclusions on the subject of this study. Nevertheless, I have drawn from some of his social indicators, particularly those related to higher education. His work must be recognized as a useful foundation for subsequent study of the Nigerian Military Regimes and one that has made a special contribution to this and other research works.

**The Statement of Hypothesis and Methods of Testing**

The hypothesis of this study is that the Nigerian Military Regimes gave top priority to the development of national or unified higher education policies designed to bridge the gap between educational disparities in the northern and southern sections of the country. This priority is demonstrated in part by significant financial investments in this sector compared to other sectors, such as agriculture, health, communication, and industry.

This hypothesis takes into account the role played
by the Nigerian Military Regimes.

This research is preliminary. It is expected to mark the beginning, not the end. For all practical purposes, it is designed to deal with a small portion of Nigerian politics. Consequently, it does not claim to furnish all answers to the often difficult, complex, and dynamic political conditions and problems of Nigeria. Unfortunately, however, there are no easy and straight-forward answers to the changing and recurring problems in the social sciences. Nevertheless, while this work may not prescribe or describe rigidly the rules of the game, it is expected that it will provide scholarly resource materials on Nigerian politics in general, and in particular deal with the understanding of higher education policies and their implementation by the Nigerian Military Regimes during the period specified in this study.

Work on the military has been done by Victor A. Olorunsola who developed a set of criteria to study what he called the "rewards from old and new salary scales." In order for Olorunsola to be able to measure and compare the performances of the civilian and military regimes, he

---

selected a number of social indicators and from the data he collected from a cross-national survey of Nigerian public opinion, he determined the range of benefits or rewards from the old and new salary scales.

However, in this particular research, it is not necessary that we apply his method of survey technique to reach appropriate conclusions on the subject of this study. Nevertheless, I have drawn from some of his social indicators, particularly those related to higher education. His work must be recognized as a useful foundation for subsequent study of the Nigerian Military Regimes and one that has made a special contribution to this and other research works.

The Statement of Hypothesis and Methods of Testing

The hypothesis of this study is that the Nigerian Military Regimes gave top priority to the development of national or unified higher education policies designed to bridge the gap between educational disparities in the northern and southern sections of the country. This priority is demonstrated in part by significant financial investments in this sector compared to other sectors, such as agriculture, health, communication, and industry.

This hypothesis takes into account the role played
by the civilian regime in the area of higher education.

It is to be noted that prior to and after the independence of Nigeria, the civilian government was unable to develop a national education policy because the system of education was not centralized. Each regional government was free to establish its own educational policy based on its available resources. The effect was the development of diverse educational policies and philosophies for the north, east, west, and the mid-west. The problem created by these decentralized educational policies and philosophies was an imbalance in the quality of Nigerian education. The northern region,

---

8 Although some analysts, such as Adebayo Adeledeji date the beginning of civilian politics in Nigeria from 1952, for our particular purpose, we choose to give the said regime the benefit of the doubt by assigning it the period between 1960-1966 which marked the independence era and its potential political role played before the first military coup on January 15, 1966. For detailed arguments on the beginning of civilian politics in Nigeria, see Adebayo Adeledeji, ed., Nigerian Administration and Its Political Setting (London: Hutchinson Educational Ltd., 1968).

9 The beginning of the British colonial regime in Nigeria dates back to the years 1900 through 1960. The independence of Nigeria from colonial rule started on October 1, 1960. It is my contention that it was not until the independence era that Nigerians fully or actively played an important part in Nigerian politics.

10 The British colonial regime divided Nigeria into three main regions for administrative purposes. In 1962, the mid-west region was added during the political tumult of that year in the western region. The mid-west region was created by the civilian government controlled by Nigerians themselves.
which forms the bulk of the Nigerian population suffered the most because of its strong commitments to Islamic culture.¹¹ It is therefore assumed that the decision by the Nigerian Military Regimes to nationalize the Nigerian higher education policy is a function of bridging this gap that existed between the north and south. This study seeks to test the validity of the above assumption.

This study is also designed to test the executive abilities of the military regimes in successfully implementing all of the three higher education policy areas, encompassing financing, staffing, policy planning and implementation. In actual fact, the determination or measurement of the executive abilities of the military regimes in addition to financing is undertaken by comparing the problem of staff shortages during the founding of the University

¹¹The former northern region of Nigeria is predominantly Islamic and because of its Islamic culture, Western education did not penetrate in that region until the latter half of the 20th century. This created unequal higher educational development on the Western model between the north and the rest of the regions which were open to Christianity and Western education.
College in 1948\textsuperscript{12} with that of the present time. At the present time, government scholarships or loan grants have been devised to enable Nigerians to acquire higher education, and this opportunity is regarded in this study as a function of staff development for the national universities of Nigeria. This study will evaluate the significance of this financial assistance by the military regimes, in their effort to increase the level of indigenous staff of the national universities, against its civilian standard.

Finally, the policy planning and implementation of the educational policies requires the analysis of the role of the National Universities Commission,\textsuperscript{13} to which the Nigerian Military Regimes have delegated this responsibility. It is important that we recognize the planning function as

\textsuperscript{12}The first Nigerian institution of higher learning was opened in 1948. The University College, as it was called, was a colonial institution, forming a part of the University of London and predominantly controlled by the British Overseas Universities Commission. As a matter of fact, all examinations were set and graded overseas by the external branch of the University of London. For further reading about the University College, consult Commonwealth Universities Yearbooks 1974-76 (London: The Association of Commonwealth Universities, 1974-76).

\textsuperscript{13}This is a group of Nigerians selected from all academic and professional fields and disciplines by the military regimes to plan and coordinate programs of the national universities. For detailed information on the Commission, see also Commonwealth Universities Yearbooks, 1974-76, in the section dealing with Nigerian universities.
an important factor in institutional development and growth. This policy area is examined critically and compared with that of the civilian regime.

Most of the data used in this research were collected from three main sources, including: primary, which is official or government documents; secondary, which comprises published works dealing with the subject matter; and tertiary, such as the newspapers, magazines, and periodicals. These sources are available in various libraries and newsstands across the United States and Nigeria. While it is understood, however, that some of the textbooks and newspapers on the subject do not address themselves directly to our main concern, care was taken to select or utilize only those materials that will help to explain the problem. The data will be subjected to historical and critical analysis in order to determine the validity of my hypothesis. The analysis will be comparative in that higher education policies in one civilian and four military regimes will be examined in this study.

Quite recently, Margaret Peil addressed herself to what she called the comparative politics of Nigeria.\(^\text{14}\) She

\(^{14}\text{Margaret Peil, Nigerian Politics (London: Cassell and Co., Ltd., 1976).}\)
drew up a series of questions on the military and civilian regimes, thus utilizing a survey technique. The apparent conclusion she reached, as a result of the interviews she conducted to determine the people's attitudes towards the military or civilian policy, was in favor of the military regime. Undoubtedly, one can argue that such a favorable response towards the military regime was highly influenced by the presence of the military in office at that time. Secondly, her survey was rather limited, in the sense that it only covered a cross-sectional segment of the Nigerian population. Her study, in fact, did not appear to have explained the pertinent issues of our present study.

Similarly, John Oyinbo concentrated on the emergence of the Nigerian Civil War and attempted to investigate some of the internal problems that befall Nigeria in her struggles to achieve nationhood. He posed several questions concerning the survival of Nigeria as a nation in the midst of all her internal problems. The question he thought was frequently asked is, "Will Nigeria manage to pull through her present difficulties?" For this question, he compared Nigerian problems with those of other nations and came to believe that "Nigeria still has time on her side which should give an opportunity to watch and learn from the experiences of
others who are treading the painful path of development just ahead or have already reached the dangers of affluence."  

Secondly, he argued convincingly that the future of Nigerian peoples should be much easier than has been and will be the lot of the vast mass of peoples of Asia and most other Africans. He said that resources in Nigeria are sufficient to provide a standard of living well up the scale by world standards. Accordingly, Oyinbo introduced his second question as follows: "Can Nigeria survive as a political entity?" He had no easy answer to this question because, as he put it partially, "the future of the Nigerian peoples cannot possibly be so bright if they fail to become one nationality in the due course of time." He went on to express the feeling that the only solution to Nigerian political instability was to accept the premise of becoming a nationality in the due course of time. Furthermore, he warned that people should not rely on the presumption that civil war, whatever its outcome in terms of national experience, is indicative of a fundamental flaw in nationhood. 

By careful examination of Oyinbo's evaluation of the


\[16\] Ibid., p. 142.
Nigerian political and social problems, it is apparent that he has been tempted to prescribe certain conditions for Nigeria to fulfill before she can reach the state of nationhood, as if becoming a nation is the only contemporary problem that faces that country. However, this is not to deny his premise based on nationality, but the crucial issue is that he did not explain what kind of nationhood he recommended for Nigeria. Could it be a nation built upon the pre-colonial past, or one that could be instituted without reference to the past? Nevertheless, his treatment of the Nigerian Military Regime does not relate to higher education policy in which our present work is interested.

David F. Roth and Frank L. Wilson have made some contributions to Nigerian politics by comparing the political, economic, and social conditions of Nigeria with those of Mexico and apparently concluding that the failure of the Nigerian political parties was a prelude to a military regime, bureaucratic stagnation or both.\(^{17}\) Although they have addressed themselves to important issues, such as the relationship between the formulation of public policy objectives in Nigeria and Mexico, most of their assumptions about Nigerian politics are highly generalized. The initial

\(^{17}\text{Roth and Wilson, } \textit{The Comparative Study}.\)
impression one gets from their assumptions is that of the traditional Western bias about African politics. Theirs is to reinforce that feeling that what is good for the goose is good for the gander, a generalization that has dominated the thoughts of most Western scholars since the turn of the century.18

Roth's and Wilson's analysis, like that of Oyinbo, clearly explains the problem but it does not provide suitable solutions to it. Instead, their assumptions are viewed as one way of attempting to export their Western political model to solve African or Nigerian problems.

On the other hand, Victor A. Olorunsola's work on the Nigerian military regime may be referred to as an initial effort to examine the problem. In his analysis of the problem, Olorunsola developed a number of performance or social indicators, such as labor, transport, industry, social

18Roth's and Wilson's assumptions about the role of political parties in Nigerian politics may be regarded as a continuation of the traditional Western notion that politics cannot survive without parties. So the saying goes, if the political parties fail, that is the end of a constitutional government. James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg have developed a similar theory based on political parties as agents of national integration in Tropical Africa. See Coleman and Rosberg, eds., Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press; London: Cambridge University Press, 1964).
welfare, and education, and effected a comparative study between the old and new salary scales to determine the range of benefits to the people of Nigeria. In addition, he set up some normative criteria based on what he called "an assessment of development performance viewed from the perspectives of the consumer of governmental policies and output."

Thirdly, he also examined the military regime's perception of its own performance in highly comparative and analytic models.

However, his work is closer in some respects to this research, but it requires certain modifications for some of his social indicators, particularly those that concern higher education, to be borrowed for our particular concern. The fact that some of his research findings are highly subjective, may be accounted for as a direct result of the nature of the social indicators that he used which are difficult to be reduced to precise measurements. Secondly, his work was not directed to deal with the implementation of public policy, the area in which this research is particularly interested. Notwithstanding that, however, these problems of precise measurements and obscurity with too much reliance on subjective vis-a-vis objective data, as well as dependence upon the public acceptance or rejection of his so-called "equity
of economic development or growth," Olorunsola's work has a better frame of reference to this research than those presented by Peil, Oyinbo, Roth, and Wilson.

The following section is devoted to presenting the outline of the dissertation. The importance of the outline is to enable us to follow the order in which this work is organized. Moreover, each of these chapters requires some explanations of the method with which it is written.

In Chapter One, an attempt is made to introduce and present the nature of the problem. As a point of departure, an attempt is made to explain the sources from which data is collected and utilized for this purpose. Briefly stated, the first chapter is designed to set a general guideline for this research, mainly pointing to various methodological and theoretical foundations of the research.

Chapter Two is designed to investigate the socio-political background of Nigeria. Here an effort is made to analyze the historical conditions of Nigeria from 1900 to 1978. The period between 1900-1978 covers various constitutional, political and social changes ranging from the British colonial period to Nigerian independence and post-independence civilian and military regimes. This chapter throws some light on the development of the British colonial policies
that have influenced the contemporary behavior of the Nigerian public policy makers. In addition, it lays a foundation for the subsequent chapters through critical analysis of issues in the historical dynamics of Nigeria.

Chapter Three focuses mainly on the comparative analysis of the general military public policy decrees from 1966 to 1978, regime by regime. The importance of this chapter is the fact that it synthesizes in an orderly manner those major decrees or public policies of the various Nigerian military regimes.

Chapter Four is devoted to the study of a brief history of educational policies and philosophies in Nigeria. It examines the place of the University Education on the list of priorities affected by the Nigerian public policies. An effort is made to assess higher education policies and their implementation. At the end of this chapter, a critical analysis is made to discern what type of change is particularly made in this sector that is radically different from the usual pattern of colonial education policy. In addition, the three policy areas—financing, staffing and planning of higher education under the military regimes are examined.

In Chapter Five, an attempt is made to examine higher education policies under the Nigerian military regimes.
Major emphasis is placed on policy orientations rather than technical issues. This section is pertinent and interesting because it is based upon a critical evaluation, as well as an objective assessment of Nigerian higher education policies.

Chapter Six is devoted to the implementation of Nigerian higher education policies under the military regimes. It is in this chapter that the three policy areas--financing, staffing and planning are re-evaluated. Chapter Seven then deals with the evaluation and analysis of the problems and Chapter Eight presents the general summary and conclusions. As a part of the summary and conclusions, the overall implications, recommendations and contributions are presented.
CHAPTER II

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND

OF NIGERIA

The development of the socio-political structure of Nigeria is a controversial subject among political analysts. While some students of Nigerian politics trace its origin from the occupation of Nigeria by the British in 1900, others have attempted to extend the period far beyond the 20th century era of Western colonialism and imperialism. According to A. H. M. Kirk-Greene:

Its birth occurred in 1900 when the British government took over the territories of the Niger Coast Protectorate and the Royal Niger Company and the name 'Nigeria' was first used to designate the two Protectorates now established. In 1914 came its baptism, when the legal entity of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria was recognized; and 1960 saw the coming of age, with Nigeria assuming its sovereign and independent membership of the world assembly of nations. Subsequent events may, if the metaphor is to be continued, be looked on as marriage and threatened divorce.1

However, on close examination of Kirk-Greene's analysis, one finds it difficult to think of Nigeria exclusively as a British discovery. Although the above assumption is common among Western scholars, it is hard to believe that the territory now known as Nigeria was virtually unknown until the British occupation in 1900. Even such an author like C. R. Niven, often referred to as the father of the history of Nigeria, fell into a similar bias by observing that before 1900, the area now known as Nigeria was under the British colonial office in Lagos and that such a device did not help the development of Nigeria as a country.  

Arthur N. Cook made similar errors by claiming that southern Nigeria did not develop traditional political institutions, yet the great city of Benin existed in Nigeria. 3 There were highly developed traditional political institutions throughout Nigeria, but they were destroyed ruthlessly at the beginning of 1900 which marked the British colonial rule in Nigeria. 4 Although most of the standard textbooks on Nigerian history contain very little in the way of evidence on the above facts, quite a substantial body of literature provides reference to support the traditional impacts upon

---


the development of modern Nigeria. Writing generally on the subject, Robert W. July recognized the fact that no one should underestimate the importance of oral traditional history which had long been practised in Africa as a means of preserving its past events. He argued, however that:

As with the nations of Europe, so with the people of Africa. Traditional African societies had of course long practiced their own versions of history. Lacking the convenience of written documentation, they had nonetheless the common need of mankind to know who they were and from whence they came. To meet this requirement, they developed the technique of recording their past orally, committing it sometimes to the informal tale told by the evening fire, sometimes to a highly trained professional court linguist whose full-time occupation was to remember to perfection such information as genealogies, legal precedents, particular historical incidents, royal successions or the organization of clans.⁵

Similarly, G. T. Stride and Caroline Ifeka have referred fondly to the existence in West Africa in general and particularly in Nigeria, of the ancient empires and states of Mali, Songhai, Hausa, Kanuri, Oyo, Benin, as well as such traditional groups as the Ibo and Ibibio. Quite naturally, if one may interpret Stride and Ifeka correctly, it becomes apparent, however, that such empires, states and other traditional groups in West Africa had existed long before

the British contact with Nigeria. Accordingly, J. E. Casely Hayford, though writing about the Gold Coast (now Ghana), made it clear that "Native institutions in Africa are as old as the hills." He indicated that before the British contact with Africans, they were a developed people, having their own institutions and the ideas of government.

Similarly, Walter Rodney summarized the matter as follows:

The origins of the empire of Ghana go back to the fifth century A.D., but it reached its peak between the ninth and eleventh centuries. Mali had its prime in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and Songhai in the two subsequent centuries. The three were not in exactly the same location; and the ethnic origin of the three ruling classes was different; but they should be regarded as 'successor states,' following essentially the same line of evolution and growth.

The Amalgamation Proclamation

The next phase of Nigerian structural history after the so-called period of birth in 1900 was the amalgamation of the northern and southern provinces of Nigeria by Lord

---


9 Ibid., p. 56.
Lugard in 1914. Professor K. O. Dike referred to this period of Nigerian history as "a turning point on the work of state-building in Nigeria by the British and marked a great dividing line in the history of Nigeria."\(^{10}\) Contrary to Dike's opinion, the late Sardauna of Sokoto termed it "the mistake of 1914, and one that he was never impressed with. The Sardauna said that if he had the choice, he would have chosen to secede."\(^{11}\) There was also a record of a later threat of secession during the conference held at Ibadan in 1950 to review the Richards Constitution.\(^{12}\) In this case, the Emirs of Katsina and Zaria were prepared to secede unless the northern provinces were granted fifty percent of the seats in the proposed central House of Representatives.

Among the critics of the British colonial system in Nigeria is Peter P. Ekeh, who pointed out that the British colonial system virtually destroyed the old African cultures, traditions and artifacts but did not provide suitable substitutes. In addressing himself directly to the problem in Nigeria, Ekeh argued:


\(^{12}\)Ibid., pp. 131-132.
The Colonial era developed no significant civil centers with which Nigerians could identify. Three apparently civil structures did emerge in the pre-independence period: the Civil Service, the Nigerian police, and the Nigerian army. Of these three, the civil service was regionalized as early as 1954, although attempts to regionalize the police were successfully resisted, mostly by Nigerians from 'minority' areas. The Nigerian army remained federal in structure, with no overt regional control. None of these was a 'melting pot'; indeed, the Civil Service in each of the three regions became the rallying ground for ethnic group politics. The federal Civil Service was not completely insulated, but it was less abused by politicians fending for their ethnic group interests.\(^{13}\)

Closely related to Ekeh's conclusions has been A. A. Nwafor Orizu's reminder that the Western Christian missionaries, as agents of the British colonial system were ruthlessly engaged in exterminating the African traditional cultures in an effort to implant or impose their alien culture, in the name of Christianity, on the people.\(^{14}\) Similarly, Martin Carnoy, one of the critics of cultural imperialism has addressed himself to this problem by simply saying:

Many have stressed the contribution that education made to the Europeanization of Africans and Asians and have argued that Europeanization enabled these backward nations to enter the modern world. But out of context this line of reasoning is beside the point. European education in India and Africa was designed to fit some


\(^{14}\)Orizu, Without Bitterness.
of the people in these areas into roles defined for them by Europeans, and the individuals who took schooling generally profited from assuming these roles—both in status and income. But the intended function of education was to help Europeans transform the local economic and social structure in ways which strengthened European commercial and political control over the regions to meet European needs. The pattern of modernization evolved in this dependent context, and benefited few Indians and Africans.\textsuperscript{15}

One could continue this list endlessly to demonstrate the aim of European interests first in the amalgamation of northern and southern provinces of Nigeria in 1914 and second their objective in the elimination of Nigerian culture and subsequent imposition of theirs on the people. However, the fact that colonial objectives seek to destroy traditional cultures wherever a colonial state exists is very well known and requires no further examples.

**The British Colonial Policy in Nigeria**

In order for us to understand the background of the problem in Nigeria today, it is important to examine critically the nature of British colonial policy. Literature on British colonial policy in Nigeria is abundant and any attempt to cover it within this limited space would be less than wise. However, a brief analysis of a few policies

\textsuperscript{15}Martin Carnoy, *Education as Cultural Imperialism* (New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1974), p. 82.
would be sufficient to explain the nature of the problem.

Okoi Arikpo has noted the problem of unequal size of regions as one aspect of British policy in the 1950's. He argued that:

Nigeria moved from unitary to federal government in 1954 and in the process created numerical majorities on the one hand and minorities on the other. Following the 1954 development, the Ibos, the Yorubas, and the Hausas, each representing the three regional blocs, emerged as a ruling group. The Northern region consisted of nearly three quarters of the area and comprised over one half of the population of the country. The chief group was the Hausa who accounted for about 5 1/2 of the North's 11 1/2 million muslims. The Middle Belt, occupying the southern and eastern half of the region, constituted another 6 million people of diverse tribes, most of whom believed in animism. The Muslim North, on the other hand, had a long tradition of established government, and when Lugard conquered the country in 1900 he retained the existing native authorities or rulers and in addition promised not to interfere with the Islamic religion and customs in return for pledges of loyalty.16

It is Arikpo's thesis that it was the application of this policy that encouraged the institution of conservative islamic culture, designed to resist non-islamic innovations and culture. Furthermore, Arikpo argued that one of the many consequences of the British policy was the apparent importation of southern clerical experts and artisans into the north in spite of their resentment by the northerners, but

---

nevertheless the southerners were indispensable in carrying out colonial bureaucratic functions. In summary, Arikpo concluded that the British policy had reinforced parochialism, isolationism and the feeling of complacency in the north to the extent that the north had lagged a long way behind the other two regions in political and social development. The result of this lagging has, in fact, increased or intensified the northern resentment of the southerners which has created a major political setback in the country.

A study conducted by The Royal Institute of International Affairs in 1960 supported the fact that British policy in Nigeria was designed to perpetuate tribal antagonism among diverse tribal groups. The Report discovered several tendencies of political and social conflicts between the north and south but regretted the apparent failure by the British colonial system to provide suitable solutions. The problem that had emerged as a result of British policy involved continued regional confrontations which brought about repeated constitutional amendments and changes since

17 Ibid.  
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid.  
the turn of the century. The Report further indicated, however, that the north was the prime mover of those changes because it had not been able to keep pace with the rest of the regions due to its "backward-looking policy." However, the Report concluded that in the midst of the regional differences among major tribal groups, such as the Hausa-Fulani in the north, Yoruba in the west, and Ibo in the east, there were also instances of ethnic problems between the majority tribal group and minority groups in each region.²¹

Another study was conducted to determine class consciousness among the Yorubas in 1966 by P. C. Lloyd. His observations were as indicated below:

'Tribalism,' one of the evils cited of contemporary Nigerian society, is, according to most commentators, on the increase. This opprobrious term has several usages; in spite of the growing cosmopolitan nature of the elite, most individuals retain strong ties with the towns of their birth. Their parents and less educated siblings still live at home. Here they plan to return, and thus they currently invest their savings in an imposing house. Ibadan does not seem to offer to the elderly such prestigious positions as they might hold in their own towns.²²

Lloyd argued that not only had tribal differences among the Yorubas been an obstacle to their social and political

²¹Ibid.

interests, but "common interests do not bind the prestigious in distinction from, or opposition to, the masses."\textsuperscript{23} This Report discovered further differences in wealth, social status and political power. "It was estimated that in traditional Yoruba society, social status ranked high in the number of one's wives and children and that some rich traders rose from low to high status."\textsuperscript{24}

As a point of reference, the Yorubas are not an exception under the rule described above. Most of what had been attributed to the Yorubas also applies to other tribal or ethnic groups throughout Nigeria. Unfortunately, colonial administration ruled all parts of Nigeria with reasonable diversity. The regional structure, it must be recalled, left Nigeria with serious social and political imbalance. The introduction of universal suffrage in Nigerian politics created serious fears among the minority citizens of the so-called majority domination. In a sense, these fears were justified in that the majority had constantly used its numerical strength to override the minority aspirations. Chief Anthony Enahoro, speaking on this issue as a minority noted that:

\textsuperscript{23}Ibid. \textsuperscript{24}Ibid.
The leaders of the three 'majority' ethnic groups pursued an increasingly acrimonious policy of regional confrontation, regardless of the true needs and the interests of the people of the country as a whole. They carefully avoided the essential reform of the country's political structure. It is true that there were a secession of crisis—the split within the Action Group and the Western Region Government in 1962, the treason trials of some leaders of that party, the census disputes of 1963, the Federal election of 1964 and the widespread disturbances following large scale irregularities during the Western Region elections of 1965. But these were disputes of a political character, they were not ethnic.25

Not only did Chief Enahoro touch upon most of the key-notes of the problem which universal suffrage brought about in Nigeria, but he made it perfectly clear that the root of the problem was a mixture of both ethnic and political differences. But it can also be argued, however, that while political differences may have occurred, they were often interpreted in ethnic terms. This conclusion has been reached by the author as an eye-witness, as well as a participant in Nigerian politics.26 Further evidence in support of


26 The author was personally involved in Nigerian politics during the civilian regime, 1960-66 prior to coming to the United States for further studies. Moreover, most of the political crises culminating from ethnic confrontations occurred during the civilian regime. The point that I am making here is that political motives during the civilian
the above conclusion may be summarized as follows:

Therefore, under the circumstances stated above, Nigerian problems do not spring altogether from ethnic factors but from purely political reasons. However, what appears to be political problems originates from ethnic and economic background. To prove this statement is to ask the question why was the late Prime Minister of Nigeria assassinated? Was this act political, ethnic or economic? If so, how do we explain why the first coup was a partial one, that is, why the assassination of top level political leaders did not take place on a regional basis? I join with Chief Enahoro in saying that what gave rise to the existing conflict stemmed from ethnic considerations. If the first coup was a political one, it would have been conducted on a regional basis. If the attempt was to wipe off corrupt practices in the former government, the coup would have been directed to the fulfillment of this purpose, in a coherent fashion. The late Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa for whose death we all mourn, to be very specific, was not a corrupt person.27

Closely related to universal suffrage was electoral politics which the colonial administration introduced first, as local governments throughout Nigeria. The electoral system, as it was called created new groups of politicians who were different from the so-called "traditional rulers," in the local governments.28 It was not uncommon for the national regime were often interpreted or translated into ethnic or tribal self-interests, particularly by the politicians of the so-called majority ethnic or tribal groups--the Hausa, Yoruba and Ibo.


28The Traditional Rulers or Local Government functionaries, as they were called, were selected by the British
politicians to look down upon the local government administrators who lived in the country-side since the national or the so-called urban politicians, by implications, felt that their roles were higher than those played by the local authority politicians. The local government functions included, among other things, such roles as settlement of minor disputes, tax collection, maintenance of law and order in the localities, and construction of local highways or roads. On the other hand, the national government was to assume the role as a clearing-house, thus making sure that a system or "welfare" state was established and maintained for the masses. As national politicians, the usual campaign promises centered around the provision of free primary schools, general or public hospitals, more construction of roads or highways across the country, and the opening of more jobs for those who could work. Time and again, these continued but they were never fully implemented and yet these politicians were still in office. Okoi Arikpo reminded these politicians that they had completely

colonial administrators to act on their behalf in discharging local government functions, as noted above. They were intermediaries between the colonial administrators and the village residents. Some of the traditional rulers were selected to act as local judges, clan or village chiefs, court messengers or local police, court clerks, and councilmen. They were responsible to the colonial officer whose duty was to administer the territory assigned to him by the Crown or the British Government.
misunderstood the meaning of the democratic process--its campaign structure, the multi-party or a strong one-party system, the political system, as well as the personality of the politicians--all have important parts to play in a successful government. Arikpo pointed out that "tribalism, nepotism, bribery and corruption were increasingly threatening to defeat all endeavours to establish a just and efficient government."29 However, while a great deal of the blame may be attributed to the Nigerian parliamentary politicians, we must not forget the fact that the masses themselves had contributed to some of the social and political problems that existed during the 1960's. As the argument continued, the new politicians were backed up or supported by the masses. In other words, the masses did not challenge the corrupt practices, instead they were collaborators of corruption by becoming members of the political party or parties or cultural associations that were designed to practise corruption.

In 1950 Balewa, the late Prime Minister of Nigeria, experienced serious difficulty from the northern emirs when he suggested certain political changes to be made in the northern traditional bureaucracy which would have led to

tremendous political consequences in Nigeria. An independent commission was to be formed to examine some of the problems that existed in the northern conservative bureaucracy and make recommendations for some changes. Incidentally, this proposal was not supported by his northern colleagues. As Sklar observed:

His memorable address called for the abolition of the 'Sole Native Authority' (whereby the powers of local government were vested in an emir or chief alone, subject only to the authority of administrative officials) as iniquitous and inconsistent with tradition, and for the introduction of a law requiring the emirs and chiefs to act 'in Council.' Yet Balewa alone seems to have drawn the resentment of conservative emirs, some of whom endeavored without success to prevent his election to the House of Assembly in 1951.  

After examining the socio-political background of Nigeria, there are certain points that require further explanation in order to address such issues with clarity. Most of the socio-political problems of Nigeria today are a product of the late 19th century work of the christian missions. It was in 1886 that the first western christian mission was established at Calabar, the first capital of Nigeria long before Lagos, the present capital, came into being. Since that time, until Nigerian independence in

---

30 Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, pp. 99-100.

31 The first western christian mission was the Church of Scotland Mission. Its headquarters was at Calabar, the
1960, the missionaries developed anti-cultural ideology in Nigeria and succeeded in destroying much of the Nigerian cultural heritage. They also helped the colonial administrators to instill the unfriendly relations among diverse tribes by organizing them into unequal regions.

Post-Independence Policies and Politics in Nigeria

Throughout the preceding section, an attempt was made to analyze the political and social impact of the British colonial system prior to Nigerian independence. It was pointed out that the purpose of British colonial policy in Nigeria was designed to fulfill colonial objectives. It is also important to note initially that such a policy or policies were imposed on the people of Nigeria against their particular political and social interests. The result of alien control of the destiny of Nigerians did not go without strong protests by a new breed of Nigerian politicians. 32

32 These were Nigerians who were educated in Britain and the United States in the 1930's: Chief Obafemi Awolowo (Lawyer), Nnamdi Azikiwe (Political Scientist), Eyo Ita, now deceased (Educationist), and Dr. Udo Udoma (Lawyer), were among the fore-runners of Nigerian independence.
This section will examine Nigerian policies after nominal independence was achieved.

As early as the 1950's, constitutional conferences were scheduled in London to discuss the date of Nigerian independence but actual independence did not materialize until October 1, 1960. However, the Nigerian politicians were determined to press forward through constitutional channels until independence was attained. At the time of independence in 1960, political and social problems in Nigeria were already increased to a point where it became apparent that significant political and social changes would be difficult to attain. Nevertheless, Nigeria emerged from colonial rule to independence without strong leadership. There were politicians or political leaders, as they were called, but none of them was able to bring the federal structure under control. What happened was lack of unity at the center. The regional governments became stronger than the central government. The boundary issues emerged in the local and regional levels as new areas of political concern. When the British colonial system was in control during the pre-independence era, boundary problems were minimized because most of the land areas within metropolitan areas were classified as "Crown Land." What remained in the
peripheries was controlled by individual owners. The fact that what now constitutes "Nigeria" was carved out by European international agreement rather than by the Nigerians themselves was already a serious political problem. Lagos, the capital of Nigeria fell to the Western power in 1861 and became an artificial territory for the promotion and fulfillment of British colonial economic and political interests. The intensity of this problem was further demonstrated during the Berlin Conference of 1884 when the European powers shared among themselves the spheres of interest in Africa. The British had claimed the exclusive right or control of the coastal area and a greater part of the hinterland of what was styled "Nigeria."

The regional boundaries that were created for purposes of the so-called colonial administration have today been the sources of major political and social conflicts in Nigerian politics. In real terms, it was within this interwoven and complex political and social crisis that the British transferred political power to Nigerian leaders.

In 1960 when Nigeria became independent, there emerged three major political parties which had strong tribal origins. The Northern Peoples' Congress (N.P.C.), was by far the largest and its membership was open to only people
of Northern origin. The National Council of Nigerian Citizens (N.C.N.C.), was in control of most of Eastern Nigeria and the Action Group (A.G.) was the party of Western Nigeria. Rather than being nation-wide political parties promoting uniquely national interests, the N.P.C. was supported exclusively by the Hausa-Fulani whose conservative ideology was based on the local authority structure in the north, the N.C.N.C. was dominated by the Ibos whose leader claimed unnoticeably that God had created the Ibo tribe to emancipate not only Nigeria in particular but Africa in general, and the A.G. was the party of the Yoruba tribe. Quite naturally, the N.P.C. had grown to control most of the Parliamentary seats because of its relative size in the post-independence Federal Government. In addition, the Prime Minister of the Federation was a northerner and traditionally a member of the N.P.C. Following northern domination, other regions, notably the Eastern and Western regions, had developed a strong anti-northern feeling throughout the period of civilian rule in Nigeria. As we can recall at this point, the British colonial system had created in Nigeria such an imbalance in the regional structure which

continued to place the northern region in a more favorable political condition than the remaining two regions. In a parliamentary government, it is usually the winning party that forms the government, and the leader of such a political party is often appointed the Prime Minister by the King or Queen. Following independence in Nigeria, the legacy of the British Parliamentary structure was maintained, although in the place of the King or Queen the President was substituted. On the whole, the executive powers were vested in the Prime Minister, with the President occupying mainly a ceremonial position, much like the British Queen. In spite of the "illiteracy rate" in the north in terms of Western education, compared to the east and west, it became the ruling group and dominated the period of civilian politics in Nigeria.

In the Eastern Region, the Ibo-controlled N.C.N.C. was unable to keep up with Northern hegemony. However, the N.C.N.C. had managed to share power with the N.P.C. during the 1964 elections. But this marriage of convenience did not reach its honeymoon. Ruth First had this to say about the outcome of the N.P.C.-N.C.N.C. coalition:

The next major battle for power at the centre was fought out during the 1964 Federal elections; principles and rules were, again, not discernible; but antagonisms created in the struggle for power now caused a deep crisis of government at the centre. The NCNC had gone into coalition with the NPC to assert what it had hoped
were its superior political and business talents over
the 'backward' North. Instead, it found itself out-
manoeuvred all along the line. By 1964, indeed, it was
in danger of being displaced as a coalition partner by
Akintola's government in the West, which the NCNC iron-
ically, as the NPC's partner at the centre, had helped
install by parliamentary coup. When the Western section
of the NCNC party organization split off to join Akintola
and help him form a new party, the Nigerian National
Democratic Party or NNDP, the NPC had found its new
federal ally. By the time that the election approached,
therefore, the NPC-NCNC coalition was in shreds. The
lines for battle were drawn in the quarrel over the
census. The great hope of the South was that it had
outstripped the North in population and would automati-
cally get a larger share of the seats in Parliament. 34

In the final analysis, Azikiwe was frustrated with hope
against hopes of being 'able to achieve what he called "my
political ambition." First further indicated that Azikiwe
had already prepared a dawn broadcast that throbbed with
vibrant martyred phrases: "The independence of Nigeria was
like a flame that consumed my political ambition. . . . I would
rather resign, than call upon any person to form a govern-
ment. . . .This should release my conscience from the chains
of power politics. . . ." 35 In the end he announced his
decision to reappoint Balewa as prime minister after all--
"in the interests of national unity." 36 Elsewhere in her
analysis, First observed that "Criticism of the policies

34 Ruth First, Power in Africa (London: Penguin Books,
36 Ibid., p. 155.
pursued by Azikiwe's generation of politicians rumbled among
the younger radicals of the South, but it found no organized
form. 37

Prior to 1951, the Action Group (A.G.), was moving
along hand in hand with the pan-Yoruba cultural movement,
designated as Egbe Omo Oduduwa whose champion was Chief
Obafemi Awolowo. Following some political disagreements
between Nnamdi Azikiwe, the leader of the N.C.N.C. in East
and West, and Awolowo in the 1950's, the Action Group emerged
as a challenge to the Ibo dominated N.C.N.C. Therefore, the
Action Group can rightfully claim its origin from a cultural
association founded upon a traditional belief in a common
ancestor, Oduduwa. The Western regional government was
formed by the members of the Action Group whose objective
was to promote unity among the Yorubas. Quite unlike the
N.P.C. and the N.C.N.C., the Action Group managed to have
penetrated into other regions and captured most of the minor-
ity areas and attempted to make itself a national party dur-
ing the latter part of the 1950's and into the 1960's. How-
ever, the 1960's witnessed a series of national political
crises which caused the general break-down of law and order
throughout the country.

37 Ibid.
Two major political events gave rise to the advent of the Civil War in 1966. First, the party alliances between the N.P.C. and the Nigerian National Democratic Party (N.N.D.P.), which became the Nigerian National Alliance (N.N.A.), headed by the late Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto and Premier of Northern Nigeria; and the N.C.N.C. and Action Group which became the United Progressive Grand Alliance (U.P.G.A.), with M. I. Okpara, former Premier of Eastern Nigeria, as its leader. Each of these alliances had its historical consequences but all ended in tragic results. While the N.P.C.-N.N.D.P. party alliance aimed at the monopoly of national political power, the N.C.N.C.-A.G. alliance was designed to counteract such monopoly through opposition tactics. Although no single cause can be attributed to the outbreak of the Nigerian Civil War in 1966, party crisis was the major one.\textsuperscript{38} Political parties in

\textsuperscript{38}The major problem with Nigerian political parties during the civilian regime (1960-1966), was that they were organized along ethnic or tribal lines. In other words, the root of party politics in Nigeria had its origin from such tribal associations as, the Ibibio State Union, the Ibo State Union, Egbe Omo Oduduwa and the Northern People's Congress whose membership was open only to people of those tribes. When these cultural or tribal associations were converted to political parties following parliamentary system of government and following Nigerian independence era, they created serious political problems because tribal units rather than integrated communities became the
post-independence Nigeria had their notorious history of conflicts from British colonial policy. The recognition of "Regions," by the British colonial administration as political entities gave rise to the formation of political parties corresponding markedly to the regional boundaries of the north, east and west. The Northern People's Congress (N.P.C.), controlled the northern region, the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (N.C.N.C.), controlled most of the eastern region, and the Action Group (A.G.), controlled the western region. According to the British policy in Nigeria before independence, each of these regions was autonomous. Thus, the federal structure was weakened by strong regional governments. At independence, Nigeria inherited the pattern of the British colonial structure without significant changes. The regional power structure became more dominant as each region struggled against one another at the center to control national power.

In 1962, there was a split in the Action Group (A.G.), following ideological disagreements between Chief Obafemi Awolowo, then the Premier of the western region and the

constituencies. Each politician was responsible to his tribe and this created conflicts of interests among tribal units and the politicians stood firm to defend their tribal interests rather than national goals.
Action Group leader and Chief S. L. Akintola, then the deputy leader of the Action Group. The bone of contention between Awolowo and Akintola has sometimes been a subject for debate. Ruth First has noted that the issue was mainly ideological, as well as personal disputes.\textsuperscript{39} Other than that, one could infer, however that Awolowo's abrupt party ideological change from regional to intra-regional commitments, thus capturing most of the so-called minority groups throughout Nigeria may have added to the intensification of the conflict. While Awolowo had decided to extend the Action Group's membership to minority groups in other regions in spite of oppositions from some conservative members of the Action Group and other regions themselves, Akintola who shared the conservative views, was against this move. Secondly, it must be recalled that the N.P.C.-N.C.N.C. party coalition had made Awolowo's Action Group the prime target of opposition and attack by the coalition partners. As First also noted, "The conflict was suddenly carried dramatically from party to government."\textsuperscript{40} The conflict became dramatic at the meeting of the Western House of Assembly when Akintola resigned his membership of the Action Group and organized his splinter group--the Nigerian

\textsuperscript{39}First, \textit{Power in Africa}, p. 151.  \textsuperscript{40}Ibid.
National Democratic Party (N.N.D.P.), and entered into alliance with the national government party, the Northern People's Congress (N.P.C.). Rendered politically powerless as a result of the split and the party crisis that followed, the Action Group radicals and supporters became disillusioned and dissatisfied with the state of the matter, caused social disorders. The immediate result of the problem was the escalation of conflict which called for the federal action of declaring a state of emergency in the western region. Following this action, the Akintola N.N.D.P. which had the support of the national party, the N.P.C., was installed as the government of the west without formal elections. On the other hand, Awolowo and his party members were placed under restriction orders.  

Following the party split and the restriction orders, Awolowo and the remnants of the Action Group leaders were charged with a plot to overthrow the Federal Government of Nigeria. The accused was suspected to have trained some of his party radicals in Ghana in preparation for the overthrow. Lagos, the capital of Nigeria was to be taken by a handful of trained Action Group members one morning by surprise. However, during the trial that ensued, Awolowo's defense argued that in spite of evidence of preparedness in the plot, it

---

41 For details of Awolowo's accusations, trials and conviction, see First's Power in Africa.
was designed to protect the accused against his enemies, the Akintola party functionaries. Whether or not the defense argument was persuasive enough for the existing conditions in Nigeria was in fact a political rather than a legal issue. The trial lasted for nine months at the end of which four out of the twenty-five members brought to trial were found guilty. Chief Awolowo himself was sentenced to ten years in prison. But the motive behind this trial and conviction was popularly understood and interpreted among the critics throughout Nigeria as a political maneuver carefully designed to eliminate or silence the only Opposition Party leader.

Other incidents, such as the 1962-63 census issues, the unhappy alliances among political parties, the 1964 Federal election controversies which were marked by intimidation of party candidates in the north and west, as well as widespread electoral malpractices and corruption were among the preludes that set a tone for the military coup that erupted in 1966. From 1966 to 1978, the military remained in power but in 1979, it returned the government to its civilian counterparts.

In this chapter, I have enumerated and analyzed some of the major political, economic and social problems that are facing Nigeria in her effort to come to grips with the
problem of political instability. I have argued forcefully, however, that the source of the existing conflicts in Nigerian politics is the result of British colonial policy which was imposed on the citizenry. The implication here is that following independence in 1960, Nigerian political leaders have continued, without significant change, the same colonial policy which has tended to intensify rather than solve the existing problem. The third chapter will examine analytically the comparative military public policy decrees, and how the military regimes have dealt with the implementation of these policies.
CHAPTER III

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF GENERAL PUBLIC

POLICY DECREES, 1966-1978

This chapter is an attempt to examine selected major public policies or decrees by the Nigerian Federal Military Government. Public policies or decrees as was noted in the previous chapters include a series of decrees or authoritative orders promulgated by the Federal Military Government of Nigeria. Therefore, public policies or decrees in this chapter shall be used interchangeably to mean the use of the legislative powers of the Federal Military Government (FMG) to make the political, economic and social decisions of Nigeria during the period specified above. Significantly, the ability on the part of the FMG to reach the types of decisions that benefit the people of Nigeria depends upon the existence of a responsible attitude towards the masses. Although the FMG is not elected by the people of Nigeria in the same way that the civilian regime was elected, its policies could be designed to reflect the best interests of the
people. If, however, the FMG fails to recognize the best interests of the people, it is the people's right to demand such recognition in spite of the nature of military rule. Professor Kirk-Greene has noted that "to set a record of Nigeria's critical years, 1966-1970, straight is a task that must await the historian uncommitted in his ideology and unhindered in his researches."¹ As political scientists, it is our task to recognize history not only as a chronological development of events, but as a factor which enables us to synthesize various issues for analysis. While it is our intention to explore aspects of Nigerian public policies, this exercise must be understood simply as deductive inquiry. This means that our concern is in moving from a stated premise to a logical conclusion, or simply stated, from the general to the particular. As an artist, we are interested in painting not only the picture, but creating a particular image from our design, and that image as far as this study is concerned is limited to the public policies of the military regimes on University Education. However, we will first examine general public policy under the Nigerian military regimes.

Several causes gave rise to protest movements in Nigerian University campuses during the regime under General Gowon (August 1, 1966 - July 29, 1975). Once the protest began, it spread across all university campuses. This movement was contrary to some of the popular beliefs that with the vast population of Nigeria, as well as its varied cultural conditions, it is difficult for actions of one section of the country to affect the other. According to Staff Correspondent of *Africa Magazine*, it is not easy to mount a coup successfully "in a vast and varied country like Nigeria where what happens in one place does not necessarily count for the whole country."\(^2\) In a sense, this statement would have been true a few years ago when because of the regional structure, it was difficult for each section to agree with the other. But with the present reorganization of the country,\(^3\) providing some improved transportation or communication system, such a statement no longer applies.

However, even if such a rule was applicable today in Nigeria, it would not affect the students in Nigerian


\(^{3}\)The former regions have been broken into 19 states under the military.
universities where each campus is integrated to the extent that there is an opportunity for information to be disseminated. Aside from the general concerns that motivated this protest, it is generally agreed that the Nigerian students were against certain actions, such as the rapid promotions of most military officers, including General Gowon and later General Mohammed who promoted themselves to full generals.\textsuperscript{4} Such actions even provoked some military officers.\textsuperscript{5} On top of everything else, was Gowon's unilateral declaration that the military was not relinquishing power to civilians on the deadline that was set for 1976. Moreover, it was certain that Nigerian students wanted some improvements in the general administrative and academic areas that were vital to the interests of the nation and to their welfare.\textsuperscript{6} It appeared that the military regimes were reluctant to address themselves to the problems that provoked the students' actions. The students, on the other hand, refused to give up their demands. This deadlock was eventually broken when a number of students was arrested and charged with various acts ranging from intents to obstruct justice to illegal

\textsuperscript{4}"Bloody Friday," pp.12-14.  \textsuperscript{5}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{6}The student demonstrations were motivated by several causes ranging from the compulsory drafts into the National Youth Service to arbitrary retirements and dismissals of young university professors and civil servants.
destruction of public property. During the struggles between the students and the police, cases of deaths of some students were reported. Others were suspended or dismissed from the universities, but the students pressed for either release or readmission of such students.

During the student demonstration, Gowon made a public statement that his regime would not tolerate any undesirable act and behavior of the students. He threatened them with serious disciplinary measures, if any student was found guilty of the destruction of public property. Yet these threats, rather than deterring the students helped to spread the demonstration to all university campuses in Nigeria. In fact, Nigerian students overseas reacted by supporting the demand for improved administrative, academic and social conditions in Nigerian universities.

Added to these changes was the introduction of indigenization policy which stipulated and restricted certain industrial and investment programs to Nigerian citizens. Under the terms of the agreement or decree, all primary industries defined in a particular schedule were to be owned by Nigerians.

---

7 For details of students' reactions to some of Gowon's policies, consult Kirk-Greene's Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria, Vol. I.

8 The Indigenization Decree was promulgated and made effective from April 1, 1974 during Gowon's regime.
In regard to education policy in general, the federal military regimes organized a program of Universal Free Primary Education in September, 1976, and spent over ₦300 million for 150,000 classrooms. Primary and secondary school enrollment was expected to rise from a low of five million to a high of 11.5 million, and from half million to 1.5 million by 1980, respectively. The federal military government took over the payment of salaries of primary school teachers which was previously the responsibility of the state or regional governments.

With regard to higher education, the federal military government assumed the responsibilities for the management and planning of all the thirteen universities in Nigeria. This policy was implemented in 1972 following the Dina Commission Report. The program of higher education like that

---

\(^9\)Nigeria Diary (Maryland Ikeja, Nigeria: King and GeorgePress [1979]), p. 18.

\(^{10}\)The Dina Committee was set up by the Federal Military Government in 1972 during the second military regime (1966-1975), to report on the efficient ways of allocating revenues/funds to universities in Nigeria. It was this committee's suggestions that in order to ensure an efficient management of Nigerian higher education, the federal military government should adopt a policy of financial responsibility. Following its recommendations, the federal military government decreed in August, 1972, to federalize all the existing universities.
of primary education requires a conscious, as well as a determined effort in management and planning. The federal military government recognized the task that lay ahead and delegated the administrative, as well as planning responsibilities of the nation's higher education to the National Universities Commission. The instrument establishing the National Universities Commission was implemented in 1962 by Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the late Prime Minister of Nigeria, to act as a middleman between the universities and the federal government. It came to be a force behind the establishment of functions and priorities for Nigerian universities when it was reorganized by the Nigerian military regime by an edict of 1974.\textsuperscript{11} Today, the commission plays various roles including advisory, administrative, and planning functions. It is in fact the live wire of Nigerian Universities, a current through which power is transmitted to the institutions and a nerve center of higher education in Nigeria. Its full functions are contained in Chapter VI, which among other things, are extended beyond a mere advisory role.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{11} The dimension and responsibility of this Commission were increased by the passage of the 1974 Edict on Nigerian Higher Education.

\textsuperscript{12} The power of the Commission was interpreted purely
The General Ironsi Regime: January 16, Through July, 1966

Following his assumption of power, Ironsi promulgated Decree No. 1 which abolished the Republican Constitution. The next action was a move toward the establishment of the unitary form of government in his Decree No. 34 which seemed to have been the cause of violent uprisings in the North and a pogrom against Ibo sectors of northern cities. On his assumption of power, Ironsi was the highest Nigerian military-ranking officer and according to military order he was the legitimate heir to the so-called corrupt civilian regime. General Ironsi's cabinet, headed by a Supreme Military Council (SMC), included the chiefs of staff of the army (Yakubu Gowon), Navy (Akinwale Wey), and Air Force (George Kurobo), the inspector-general of police (Kam Selem), as intermediary between the former civilian government and the existing universities; namely, Ibadan, Nsukka and Lagos, which the federal government had some parts to play, particularly in financing. Before the commission came into being, the federal and regional governments channelled funds directly to the aforementioned institutions of higher learning. It is, and has been a resemblance of the University Grants Committee of the United Kingdom. However, the National Universities Commission of Nigeria exercises endless institutional powers. It can, for instance recommend to the federal military government some disciplinary measures against the university staff members.

and the four regional military governors (Hassan Katsina, North; Odumegwu Ojukwu, East; Adekunle Fajuyi, West; and David Ejiofor, Midwest). The idea of abolishing the civilian constitution meant that the traditional democratic decision-making procedures typical of most civilian regimes were replaced by military decrees. As a part of the implementation of Decree No. 1, all political activities were banned and subsequently all political appointees were replaced by the military officers. However, nonpolitical offices, such as the public bureaucracy were retained. In actual fact, what emerged was the leadership of the military and administrative regime. The political effect of Decree Number 34 was to put an end to regional governments. According to Ironsi, Nigeria, "shall cease to be a Federation and shall accordingly as from that day be a Republic...all officers...in a civil capacity shall be officers of a single service." This move was misinterpreted throughout the country and particularly in the North as a determined attempt by Ironsi's regime to implement a new policy for Ibo domination of Nigerian politics through a single service

---


15 Ibid.
administration. Whether or not this feeling was shared by all sections of Nigeria cannot be stated here with absolute clarity. However, it should be recalled that strong advocates for separate states during the civilian regime were from the so-called "minority areas" throughout Nigeria. Among them were the areas designated as "COR" states (Calabar, Ogoja and River states), which had struggled for a united states in vain. Another area was the Middle Belt in the former Northern Region which comprised mostly non-Hausa and Fulani tribes. This, one would assume was an opportunity to oppose what was to become the unitary form of government. These fears were further re-inforced by what Stremlau has referred to as a "shock." He argued:

The first shock came when Ironsi broke an agreed moratorium on promotions within the army and announced the promotion of twenty-one officers, eighteen of whom were Ibos. A second point of contention was the failure to bring to trial those responsible for the deaths of senior Northern officers and the Sardauna of Sokoto, while at the same time keeping the popular Yoruba nationalist, Chief Obafemi Owolowo, in prison.\footnote{Ibid.}

A similar argument in support of Stremlau's raison d'etre of the popular opposition to Ironsi's unitary form of government has been advanced by S. K. Panter-Brick as follows:

General Ironsi's budget speech of 31 March gave no assurance that this centralisation of the civilian
administration was to be regarded as an interim arrangement. There was no mention of the committee which was to report on the relative merits of unitary and federal forms of government, no confirmation that a final decision rested with the electorate after full discussion in a constituent assembly, no assurance that a decision by the electorate in favour of some form of federal government would be respected. These omissions inevitably reinforced the impression that the military was irrevocably committed to a unitary form of government, in the belief that this was the popular wish as well as in the best interests of the country. Those who preferred some form of federal government or were undecided or accepted centralisation only in certain conditions resented this apparent attempt to bring about a fait accompli, and the growth of serious opposition to Ironsi's Government can be dated from this time.17

The most notable problem of the first magnitude, according to Panter-Brick came toward the end of May when General Ironsi further made some public statements about certain measures contained in Decrees Numbers 33 and 34. It is necessary to examine these decrees somewhat closely because of the special impacts they have in shaping the destiny or outcome of Nigerian public policy.

**Decree Number 33: Public Order Decree, 1966**

Decree Number 33 was implemented on May 24, 1966. It is often referred to as "Public Order Decree 1966," designed to dissolve eighty-one political associations and

twenty-six tribal and cultural associations. For purposes of coherence, the following constitutes its documentary version:

The formation of any new association 'of three or more persons,' having 'a political cause or objective' identical or similar to that of any of the proscribed associations, was prohibited for the next three years (penalty: not less than five years' imprisonment). No person was to take part in any meeting of such association 'whether or not such meeting takes place in public or in private premises' (penalty: not less than two years' imprisonment). Any unauthorised police officer could enter and search any house, etc., where there was 'reason to believe that a meeting was being held.' The display of signs (flags, insignia, emblems) of any 'political slogan, political name or nick-name' and any procession of three or more persons which in the opinion of (the police), is of a political nature. . .(penalty: not less than three years' imprisonment). 18

II. Decree Number 34: Unification Decree

This Decree came into effect with Decree Number 33. It is often referred to as "Unification Decree," because it was implemented to abolish both the federation and the regional governments that existed before, and set a stage for a unitary form of government. These are the provisions of this Decree:

Under it Nigeria formally ceased to be a Federation and was renamed the 'Republic of Nigeria.' The Federal Military Government became the 'National Military Government,' the Federal Executive Council became

18Ibid., p. 179.
simply the 'Executive Council,' and Lagos the 'capital territory.' The Regions were formally abolished, but the Provinces (the next largest administrative division below the Regions) were grouped into 'the Northern Group of Provinces,' the 'Eastern Group of Provinces,' etc. These Groups correspond exactly with the previous Regions and the four Military Governors continued in office administering the same areas as before. In this respect there was no real change. Even the Regional Constitutions, as suspended and modified by Decree No. 1, remained in force. The Military Governors however lost the power to incur expenditure on their own responsibility without prior consent.

The federal and regional public services were unified into a single 'National Public Service.' Control over the most senior posts was centralised. The power to appoint and dismiss 'persons to hold or act in the office of permanent secretary to any department of government of the Republic or any other office of equivalent rank in the National Public Service was vested in the Supreme Military Council.' The National Public Service Commission was to be consulted before any such appointments were made. The power to appoint, promote, dismiss, and discipline in respect to all other administrative posts was vested in the National Public Service Commission. This power was delegated except for the most senior posts (those carrying an initial salary of £2,292 or more) to Provincial Public Service Commissions.

The power to appoint the members of the Police Service Commission was vested in the Head of the National Military Government (under Decree No. 1 it has been vested in the Federal Executive Council).

The National Public Service Commission had no powers over (i) police appointments which lay with the Police Service Commission; (ii) appointment of ambassadors which lay with the Government itself; (iii) Directors of Audit, other than their initial appointment; (iv) judicial appointments. The Constitution (suspension and modification) No. 6 Decree added the post of 'court registrar.' This decree, made on 2 June, but having retrospective effect from 20 May, enabled the Government to fill a particular vacancy in the North;
the rumours of this impending appointment contributed to the riots of 29 May.\textsuperscript{19}

After examining the details of the Decrees promulgated during Ironsi's regime, one is faced with the problem of attempting to reconcile facts from non-facts. For instance, if in fact by abolishing the Regions (Decree No. 34), there was no real change, as Panter-Brick indicated, in the administrative functions of Provinces, one is likely to ask why such policy implementation was entertained. Critics of Ironsi's regime have tended to argue, however, that Ironsi failed to foresee some of the apparent contradictions that guided his decision making. For instance, Panter-Brick expected him to have pointed out in his budget speech on March 31, 1966 that the unitary policy was to be regarded as an interim arrangement.\textsuperscript{20} Stremlau, in his apparent conclusions became critical of the fact that the problem lay in Ironsi's failure to bring to trial those who were responsible for the tragic assassinations of northern officers and particularly the Sardauna of Sokoto, the northern political, as well as religious leader. Furthermore, Stremlau could not understand why Ironsi failed to exercise his powers of executive clemency by ordering Chief Awolowo (then serving a

\textsuperscript{19}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 179-80.  \textsuperscript{20}\textit{Ibid.}
ten-year prison term since the civilian regime), out of prison or give a general amnesty to those key political or national figures connected with the so-called treason trial and conviction following the 1962 party conflicts in the Western Region.\textsuperscript{21} Other critics, like Bennett and Kirk-Greene styled Ironsi's regime simply as "his unilateral attempt to bring about a unitary form of government by decree, an attempt which, by its very lack of success, merely reinforced the divisions institutionalised by colonial rule in 1954, 1914 and as far back as 1899.\textsuperscript{22} They argued further that in spite of Ironsi's perception that the federal structure had encouraged regional-based political parties, thus favoring a Northern-based government at the center, Ironsi failed to grasp that the beneficiaries of those structures were likely to fight, and fight determinedly to preserve them.\textsuperscript{23}

These criticisms are just as contradictory as trying to keep up with the trend of events that established Nigerian public policy during the military era. During an

\textsuperscript{21}Stremlau, \textit{International Politics}.


\textsuperscript{23}Ibid.
emergency period, such as the Nigerian crisis of 1966, it has not always been easy for decision makers to come to grips or establish rapport with real solutions to the problems. Yet, critics did not take into account the urgency with which Ironsi's regime was undertaken and the speed at which it sought to reach an optimum decision satisfactory to all segments of the people. Another way of addressing the problem which most analysts have not taken pains to find out is the general behavior of the military itself. Military regimes are guided by a forced type of discipline toward centralized command. Unlike the constitutional democracies which reach decisions through various channels of communication such as the legislative, executive, judicial and of course public opinion, military regimes govern by decrees and often impose their will on the people they govern. In Nigeria, this was demonstrated by Decree Number 33 which banned all political activities, including the freedom of speech. One other factor must be mentioned in understanding the behavior of the Nigerian military regimes. Often times, the problem is lack of common political ideology that exists between the military and civilian regimes. The military often regard itself as being free from corrupt practices and blames its civilian counterpart as indulging in bribery and
corruption. Ruth First has opened a serious attack on both regimes by saying first that in Africa's new states, it has been said, the national goals of civilian policy-makers (the politicians), the bureaucracy and the army are substantially the same: stability and order, national unity and rapid modernization. 24 Then she went on to argue:

Politicians in Nigeria failed to reach these goals; bureaucracy and army failed even more abysmally. The Nigerian army reflected within itself all the divisions, tensions, contradictions and crises of Nigerian society. The army was distinct only in possessing the instruments of violence. This made it possible for army men to topple an unproductive government, but not to govern productively in its place; to go to war but not to negotiate a peace. If the armed men of Africa's military governments have an ultimate achievement, it was this wretched war. The men under arms, when they were afflicted by crisis, resorted to the only weapons that they have been trained to use, and went into battle. Coup, counter-coup, civilian massacre and war: has there anywhere else been so rapid and gruesome a sequence? 25

It is in consideration to the above premise that Panter-Brick re-echoed bluntly that General Ironsi undoubtedly was caught in this kind of dilemma and that merely underlined the folly of centralizing the administration in advance of some agreement on the prior constitutional issues. 26


25 Ibid.

The July, 1966 coup, often referred to as the counter-coup by historians of the Nigerian Civil War, took a heavy toll of "200 Ibo officers and men, including General Ironsi who had come to Ibadan to address the conference of traditional rulers." It was in all practical purposes a premeditated coup, but like that of 15 January, the precise political objectives of those who organized it still remain obscure; one can, in the present state of knowledge, merely record the resort to violence and its consequences. However, the general explanation was that the Northern troops reacted to various social stimuli ranging from concerns about their future professional interests to the apparent fears of Ibo domination, or an eventual transfer of Ibo heartland to the North. Whatever may have been the cause of this second coup that was initiated by northern soldiers, it is not necessary to crack our brains over this since lack of knowledge of the cause does not change our basic objective.

After Ironsi's regime came to an end in July, 1966, a gap was created in the military leadership that needed to be filled in spite of lack of a suitable successor.

---

27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid.
Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon was not the next in the rank of seniority, but he was supported by most members of the Supreme Military Council as one who would bring back order and stability in the Nigerian army. But why was Gowon the object of this task? By African tradition, Gowon was not a suitable candidate for the position but by historic circumstance, he seemed to have been the only link between the dominant forces of the North and South. In Africa, tradition dictates that the line of succession in society or government rest on seniority or rank. In Gowon's case, that particular tradition seemed to have given way to other criteria. Coming from a minority tribe of Angas people of the Plateau area in the North, it would have been difficult for Gowon to gain the support of the army under normal conditions. Yet, both fortune and goodwill transcended the usual tradition and acceptable norms. In spite of Lt. Colonel Ojukwu's objections, Gowon succeeded Ironsi as the Head of State and the Supreme Commander of the Nigerian Armed Forces.

III. Decree Number 59: Policy of Unification Decree Reversed

On his assumption of power in August, 1966, Gowon was quick to abolish the Unification Decree and restore the
Federal system of Government by Decree Number 59. He also moved swiftly to convene an Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference whose representatives were drawn from the four Regions to consider a suitable form of government for Nigeria. Although the Conference was unable to reach any significant decision, it managed to discuss some of the basic political problems that confronted the country.

The restoration of the Federation reversed for the most part some of the conflicts that were overwhelmingly working against the Ironsi regime. The Regional governments, their public services and Commissions were reinstated but the power to appoint members of the Police Service Commission was retained by the Head of the Federal Military Government. In addition, Decree Number 1 was re-enacted with powers resting with the Federal Military Government.\(^{29}\)

**IV. Decree Number 14: Public Policy on the Creation of States**

The necessity to break the Regional monolith was carried out during the break-away of Biafra and the Civil War that ensued. One of the major reasons given for the creation of States was that it was an important strategy to weaken the military power of Biafra. For this purpose, Decree Number 14

\(^{29}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 180.}\)
was implemented on May 27, 1967 and henceforth twelve States were carved out of Regional blocs. In the Northern bloc, there were: Kano, North Central, North Eastern, North Western, Benue-Plateau, and Kwara States; in the Eastern bloc: East Central, South Eastern, and Rivers; the Mid-West became the Mid-Western, and the West, the Western States; Lagos was made a State as well as a capital.

V. Decree Number 15: Allocation of Pool Account to States

Decree Number 15 was designed to allocate public finance to State governments. According to Panter-Brick, this was done arbitrarily and that each of the six States created out of the Northern Region was to receive one-sixth of the amount previously paid to the Region. This gave them each a seven percent share of the Pool. On the other hand, the three States created out of the Eastern Region shared the amount previously paid to that Region in unequal proportions (roughly 5: 2: 2). This gave the East Central State 17.5 percent of the Pool. Lagos was given a two percent share, at the expense of the West.30

In summarizing the above, the Gowon regime has been assessed by Bennett and Kirk-Greene as follows:

30Ibid., p. 183.
Gowon, Ironsi's successor, in his very first address to the nation, made within 48 hours of his coming to power, offered Nigeria another constitutional about-turn. Ironsi's move towards a unitary government was to be reversed and a federal system restored. 'The basis of trust and confidence in a unitary system of government,' Gowon declared, 'has not been able to stand the test of time'.

In those anxious days of 1966 the new leader displayed little of the indecision sadly characteristic of later days. On August 8, he announced plans for military disengagement. Though no time-table was yet stated, all Decrees entailing 'extreme centralisation' were to be rescinded and an Advisory Committee, charged with making recommendations 'as to the form of constitution best suited to Nigeria' was to pave the way for Constitutional Review Assembly, whose recommendations would be submitted to a referendum. Accordingly, on August 31, Ironsi's Decree 34 was revoked by Decree 59, 'taking back the Republic to the position it was prior to May 24, 1966', and in early September delegates from the four Regions met in what came to be called the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference.

A return to a federal-type administrative structure had been declared, but the reality of the next eight months was a more of free-for-all. The Regions, speaking through both military and civilian leaders, negotiated the terms for continued association, while Gowon endeavoured to assert the remnants of Federal authority. The open-ended nature of the negotiations can be seen in the set of alternatives which Gowon set before the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference in September 1966.31

While it is not uncommon to criticize the leadership of a particular regime, credits must sometimes be given to a leader or leaders whose personal expediency may have contributed to some of the social, economic and political changes in a society. According to Max Weber, some leaders

31 Bennett and Kirk-Greene, "Back to the Barracks," p. 16.
are born and in his classification, they are referred to as charismatic, while others attain greatness by unique circumstances, and therefore such leaders are made. Perhaps, Gowon belonged to the latter yet he managed to have made certain imprints in the overall array of Nigerian public policies. Like Ironsi, Gowon embraced the leadership of the military at a time when his presence was needed to calm the divisive tendencies within the rank-and-file of the armed forces and in particular to provide order and stability to the social system in a war-torn country. His performance, however, must be examined objectively. The fact that he managed to create twelve States within a short time (August, 1966—July, 1975); doing what had taken the civilian regime fourteen years (1952-1966), without significant success, deserves mention. Keith Panter-Brick had much to say concerning Gowon's performance:

No less striking are the consequences of creating nineteen states (Gowon's were twelve—Italics mine), each with considerable financial resources. It is a structure which makes for a more diffuse correlation between units of government and ethnic or cultural solidarities. . . But the breakup of the four regions into twelve states in 1967 and the further sub-division

---

32 Adebayo Adedeji, ed. Nigerian Administration and Its Political Setting (London, 1968), dates Civilian politics in Nigeria from 1952. He argued that it was the beginning of an active politics by Nigerians.
into nineteen states in 1976 acted like a kaleidoscope. The particular pattern of cultural solidarity that had been able to express itself politically through the regional governments has been scattered. . . . This does not mean an end to ethnicity in politics, only that the large-scale regional identifications which threatened Nigerian unity in the past are no longer so sharply focused through governmental institutions. 33

When in his Christmas message of 1967, Gowon reemphasized his objective to end domination by any particular ethnic group, he did so with a view to equalizing opportunities for all Nigerians. Furthermore, the goals that he set for the subsequent years were even more dramatic. He had intended to preserve:

The territorial integrity of this promising country. . . for now and for posterity. We ensure the equality of each ethnic group in this country and equal status and opportunity for all our citizens. We establish and strengthen the new administrative structure so that no state can dominate the country. To create internal conditions of stability and freedom of movement of persons and goods necessary for the most rapid Economic and Social development of the country. And to win the respect of the outside world for ourselves and for the African and his capacity to order his own affairs. 34

While Gowon's regime in fact may deserve certain credits for the implementation of a number of major public policies of which the creation of States predominated, the regime failed to have fulfilled one of its major promises of handing over

33Panter-Brick, Soldiers and Oil, p. 4.
the government to civilians in 1976. After assuring the general public and particularly the politicians for a change of hand, the regime resorted to what Tai Solarin, a columnist with the Nigerian *Daily Times* referred to as an opportunity "to pull out a new trick to save the nation within two years or the next two hundred years." It was this type of disappointment that created a gap for political unrest and mass confusion and which apparently led to the obvious loss of public confidence. Gowon may have had some good intentions for trying to prolong the military rule but such exercise was rather futile especially when there were already rising expectations throughout the country. Most Nigerians, both in the military and within the civilian population began to think that the military regime was in fact pulling its tricks as Tai Solarin first indicated. Gowon's speech on October 1, 1974 was taken for granted as there was every reason to believe that his regime was only for a while. He made it very clear that:

Four years ago when I gave 1976 as the target date for returning the country to normal constitutional government, both myself and the military hierarchy believed that by that date, especially after a bloody civil war for which there had been a great deal of human and material sacrifice and from which we had expected

---

that every Nigerian would have learnt a lesson, there would have developed an atmosphere of sufficient stability.

We had thought that genuine demonstration of moderation and self-control in pursuing sectional ends in the overall interest of Nigerians. Regrettably, from all the information at our disposal, from the general attitude, utterances, and manoeuvres of some individual groups and from some publications during the past few months, it is clear that those who aspire to lead the nation on the return to civilian rule have not learnt any lesson from our past experience.

In spite of the existence of a state of emergency which has so far precluded political activity, there has already emerged a high degree of sectional politicking, intemperate utterances and writings which were deliberately designed to whip up ill feelings within the country to the benefit of the political aspirations of a few. There is no doubt that it would not take them long to return to the old cut-throat politics that once led this nation into serious crisis. We are convinced that this is not what the honest people of this country want.36

Gowon's speech, like most major speeches or national addresses, invoked both sympathy and support in Nigeria. Those who supported it were mainly members of the armed forces who hailed it as a new era of military reign. Those who were against it were among the politicians and the general public who saw the move as a serious threat and as an opportunity for another coup; this time perhaps it would be the coup of the "older mayors." Sure enough, it was the latter that prevailed.

36 Ibid., pp. 22-23.
The era of Murtala Mohammed's regime was short-lived but it is said to have been one of the most "revolutionary," in terms of certain changes that were left unaccomplished during Gowon's regime. His regime was popular for cleaning up the mess both in the military and in the social structure. He "removed Gowon, all officers of the rank of General, the twelve State Governors and most of the Federal and State Commissioners."\(^{37}\) He did not deviate too much from the general guidelines that Gowon had already initiated. For instance, the issue of handing over the government to civilians was formulated by Gowon but he merely promulgated it for October 1, 1979. Another policy which Murtala implemented was the creation of more States, thus increasing the number from twelve to nineteen in 1976. Furthermore, two other Committees were summoned to examine the possibilities of transferring the nation's capital of Lagos to a more central location than its present site, and a Constitutional Draft Committee to write a new constitution in preparation for civilian rule in 1979. The work of re-organization of local governments and convening of indirect

\(^{37}\) Ibid., p. 24.
elections of the Constituent Assembly was undertaken.

As it was noted previously, Mohammed was unable to carry out all of the policies he had anticipated due to his untimely death. The Dimka Coup, named after B. S. Dimka, a northern soldier who initiated and carried it out put an end to Mohammed's life. He was succeeded by Olusegun Obasanjo, a Yoruba who was Chief of Defense Staff during Mohammed's regime.

**The Olusegun Obasanjo Regime: February, 1976 - October 1, 1979**

General Olusegun Obasanjo made it clear on his assumption of power soon after Mohammed's death on February 13, 1976 that there was going to be no change in policy and that the Government was still Mohammed's team. Briefly stated, M. J. Dent was quick to point out:

After Mohammed's death, Obasanjo succeeded to the leadership of the Federal Military Government. . . The new Head of State was at pains to assure Nigerians that there would be no change in policy, that the Government was still Mohammed's team and that much of the inspiration for the achievements of the Mohammed Period had come from their collective enterprise. . .

In the interests of the integrity of their own corporation and in the fulfillment of their corrective duty to the nation, the Obasanjo Government has carried

---

on with the task of handing power back to an elected civilian authority. Local government elections were duly held in December 1976, and draft constitution published for general discussion and preparations begun for the election of the constituent assembly. The draft constitution contains no provision whatever for military participation in government except for the presence of the heads of the Armed Services on the National Defense Council, a normal feature of any civil constitution.  

Elsewhere, Dent noted however that Obasanjo "is a more intellectual and more cautious leader than Mohammed but appears to have stuck to the same policy."  

This means that the vital role of Obasanjo's regime could be analyzed within the context of his merely carrying out most of the public policies that were formulated by his predecessors. To take Dent's argument at its face value is to have the impression that Obasanjo is a puppet of his own regime. It is also possible to assume that Obasanjo has learned from the past experiences of his military colleagues and therefore may have chosen to steer middle of the road policies. Another explanation which is derived from historical circumstance may be that the Nigerian masses like the American people before the 1950's have grown more anti-militaristic than ever before. Walter Millis in his *Arms and Men* (New York, 1958), has expressed his ideas about the danger of armed forces and according to Carl Lutrin and Allen Settle:

\[39\text{Ibid.}, \text{pp. 131-32.} \quad 40\text{Ibid.}\]
Until 1953 the United States could be characterized as a nation of strongly antimilitaristic sentiment. America's founding fathers, well versed in contemporary political history and the history of militarism in ancient Greece, Rome, and Italian City-States, believed that democracy and militarism could not coexist comfortably. As Englishmen, they were acutely aware of the excesses of Oliver Cromwell's seventeenth-century New Model Army; as eighteenth-century Americans, their antimilitary attitudes were exacerbated by their interaction with the British occupation forces, composed, according to historian Walter Millis of '...sweepings of jails, ginmills, and poorhouses, oafs from the farm beguiled into taking the King's shilling.'

Furthermore, the argument continued: "A standing army, however necessary it may be, is always dangerous to the liberties of the people." Similar arguments appeared in the Federalist Papers, often credited to Alexander Hamilton, that although a large standing army in time of Peace had ever been considered dangerous to the liberties of a country, yet only a few troops, under certain circumstances, were not only safe, but indispensably necessary; fortunately for them, their situation required but few. Late President Dwight Eisenhower, as a general of the United States Army expressed with skepticism:

This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in American experience.

---


42 Ibid., p. 13.

43 Ibid.
The total influence—economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every Statehouse, every office in the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are involved, so is the very structure of our society.44

All of these citations though related to the United States army, relate to the Nigerian army and the problems it has created or may be creating during the implementation of its proposed reorganization policy. By the same token, Ian Campbell has warned that:

Obasanjo's government has yet to admit that the programme of reorganisation, which remains a very contentious issue within the army, cannot be completed in the time originally allowed. But if this were to prove the case, a cruel delimma might arise: whether it would be better to postpone civilian rule once again until the task has been completed or to acknowledge that it had become, almost by default, a responsibility of the incoming civilian government, with all the risks that this might then entail for future civil-military relations.45

Therefore, the problem facing Obasanjo's regime for the remaining portion of 1979 was how to reorganize the army without further violence. Taking the optimist's position, one would argue that it was more rational for the military leadership to reorganize the existing army rather than postpone this task.

44 Ibid., p. 15.

until the civilian regime. This is not to say that this task was too great or too little for the civilian government to handle, since experience has shown that countries, such as the United States had reorganized armies through Congressional or other legislative authorities, making it possible for the civilian authorities to invoke the eighteenth-century American ideal which by Congressional authority permitted a small standing army for only national defense.

Lutrin and Settle observed:

During peacetime a small standing army was permitted. In 1794 Congress authorized an army of ninety privates and proportional officers, not to exceed the rank of captain to guard the stores at West Point and Fort Pitt. But so great was antimilitary sentiment that Jefferson, during his presidency (1801-09), planned to place the sea-going navy in reserve and to cut the army, while the latter was frequently unable to meet even its authorized level.46

However, the role of the civilian government in maintaining a small standing army is not entirely new. The Nigerian First Republic managed to have exercised a rather significant influence until it gave sufficient reason for the army to seize power in 1966. On the other hand, the Nigerian army itself must be willing to play the traditional military role of national defense against outside enemies. The new

46 Lutrin and Settle, American Public Administration, p. 13.
Constitution, was expected to map out various governmental powers with which individuals or groups may be vested for a successful constitutional government.

Now that we have examined selected public policy decrees under the military regimes, we will look at the Nigerian educational system as a backdrop for our analysis of military policy on higher education in Nigeria.
CHAPTER IV

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF NIGERIAN HIGHER EDUCATION

In contrast to most advanced nations, such as Britain and the United States whose higher education is designed initially to support national ideology and technological needs, Nigerian higher education still follows the pattern left by the British colonial system. This problem was recently discussed by S. J. Cookey, a Nigerian Chief Federal Advisor on Education during the annual conference of the principals of Nigerian secondary schools. Cookey criticized the misconceptions of colonial education and opened an attack on parents, students, and principals who continued to regard education simply as a means of getting into the job market without any sense of values or standards, character training, as well as civic responsibilities which an educated Nigerian should possess. The colonial education, he said, had done so much in the past to impede the nation's
advancement. He went on to emphasize the fact that one major aspect of Nigeria's post-war reconstruction program was to comprehensively reform and reorganize the plan designed for the nation's educational system with a view to giving appropriate attention to citizenship and character training of the nation's youths. More importantly, he continued, the proposed reforms would not only equip school leavers to earn a living, but would also develop in Nigerian youths a sense of standards, character training, a sense of values and a practical understanding of the civic responsibilities expected of them.

The above criticisms and proposals for educational reforms explain the problem of Nigerian education in general, and higher education in particular. It was upon this foundation that the British colonial system inaugurated the University College, Ibadan, in 1948. Like all colonial institutions elsewhere in the world, the University College was a show-case, carefully designed to create conditions of social hierarchy that would not condescend to minimum requirements for admission. Yet, the same institution that


2Ibid.
denied admission to many Nigerians in order to maintain its status quo will absorb Nigerian graduates who went abroad and returned fully qualified as lecturers, assistant professors, associate and even full professors. In Marxist terms, this is indeed a perfect contradiction. How do we explain this contradiction that has pervaded the policy of Nigerian higher education? The theory of cultural imperialism is perhaps the only appropriate explanation of this problem. Martin Carnoy, one of the critics of cultural imperialism writes:

British colonial policies...were designed to control politically...and to keep its people economically dependent on Britain. In the early days of British rule, when conditions could turn against the conquerors at any time and the purpose of occupation was mercantile, educational policy centered on the pacification of native elites...gave native elites their native colleges under British control. When capitalists began to gain control of the British government at home and to change the role...the educational system changed as well (for the subject people - italics mine), to become consumers of British goods and to become more capitalistic required a reconstructed educational system based on British values and norms.

---

3The point of contradiction here can be explained by examining the attitude of the University College toward its admission policy. Usually the Nigerian students who were denied admission by the University College on grounds of its so-called high standard crossed overseas where admission was granted and successfully finished their degree programs. On their return to Nigeria, the University College hired them as lecturers.

Carnoy continued the argument by noting that many had stressed the contribution that colonial education made to the Europeanization of Africans and Asians and have argued that Europeanization enabled these backward nations to enter the modern world, but out of context such line of reasoning, European education in Africa was designed to fit some of the people in these areas into roles defined for them by Europeans. The fact that the intended function of colonial education was to help Europeans transform the local economic and social structure in ways which strengthened their commercial and political control over the region to meet their needs was implicit, he concluded.

With a slightly different argument or concern, M. Zymelman questioned curiously the interplay between technology and available knowledge and education of the labor force. He asked, "Do the present technology and available knowledge demand ever-increasing technical skill and education of the labor force?" In this particular case, Zymelman was addressing himself to the relationship between education and national development. He tended to have

---

supported the fact that education should be designed carefully to suit manpower needs of a nation. More practically, education in itself without an objective national labor force taken into consideration may become anti-thesis to a nation’s development. Implicit in this argument is the unemployment problem that an unplanned or unstructured education may cause a nation that is trying to develop economically, socially, and politically. One may at this particular point cite India in the sub-continent as an example of a country whose poorly developed colonial educational system caused mass unemployment of university graduates in post-independence India. This was a clear manifestation of the failure of colonial education as it was also of the colonial educators in India who objected to changes in the nation’s educational policy.

Many have argued that what took place in India may happen in Nigeria and that it is just a matter of time. This argument is both plausible and threatening, yet, it is based upon an empirical observation. There are similar factors to explain this problem. First, India like Nigeria underwent a period of British colonialism and following an era of nationalist agitation and opposition to colonial rule gained independence, though under different historical and
cultural circumstances. Second, following independence, both countries developed systems of education similar to their colonial predecessors, thus they inherited colonial educational policies and patterns which were not designed to support their national objectives. Third, each of the two countries still maintains educational planners, as well as developers, the majority of whom are indigenous colonial educators who either continue to object to "radical" change or simply effect types of changes that are commensurate to the colonial standards from which they are products. In Frantz Fanon's popular terminology, these remnants of colonial educators are in fact not the captains of the industry but businessmen. Fanon wrote:

The national bourgeoisie of underdeveloped countries is not engaged in production, nor in invention, nor building, nor labor, it is completely canalized into activities of the intermediary type. Its innermost vocation seems to be to keep in the running and to be part of the racket. The psychology of the national bourgeoisie is that of the businessman, not that of a captain of industry; and it is only too true that the greed of the settlers and the system of embargo set up by colonialism have hardly left them any other choice.\footnote{Frantz Fanon, \textit{The Wretched of the Earth} (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1963), pp. 149-50.}

Elsewhere, Fanon continued his argument that "The national economy of the period of independence is not set
on a new footing. The intensity of the problem is explained by its continued neocolonial policy and interest in Nigerian universities where still a greater number of the faculty, as well as staff members comprises expatriates or neocolonialists. Therefore, in an objective appraisal of the situation, the Nigerian institutions of higher learning are still dominated by neocolonial policy. This is particularly true in virtually all northern universities because of the "Northernization" policy.

The question whether or not there are curricular reforms in contemporary higher education in Nigeria must be explained within the scope of the existing institutions of

---

9Ibid., pp. 151-52.

10Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p. 327f; The policy of "Northernization" was proclaimed in 1954 and implemented with vigor in early 1958 when the northern government discharged over 100 clerks of non-northern origin from the regional civil service and 600 non-northern daily paid workers from the Public Works Department. The dismissed Southern clerks were replaced by northern graduates of clerical training colleges. Subsequently, the government offered to pay gratuities to dismissed workers with 5 years' job longevity. Daily Times, January 19, and 25, 1958; West African Pilot, September 10, 1958. In August 1958, the Premier of the north told the House of Assembly that a total of 2,148 southerners had been dismissed from the northern public service since January 1954, and that only 24 southerners remained in the senior echelon of the permanent establishment. Daily Service, August 5, 1958.
higher learning. Philip Foster, writing on the problems of educational development in the new states of Africa claimed that educational progress in the new states of middle Africa over the decade following the 1961 Addis Ababa conference gives cause for both satisfaction over past achievement and also doubt as to the course that future educational strategies must take; he also added that higher education has now entered a period of accelerated outputs: starting from a low base of one student per five hundred in the relevant age cohort in 1960 university enrolments registered an almost seven-fold increase rising from a little over 16,000 to approximately 114,000 over the decade.¹¹ Foster was addressing himself particularly to progress in higher education in Africa, south of the Sahara. His observation on the course of future strategies of African education is what is of special importance here. The problem of strategy like that of curriculum can be dealt with in historical, as well as cultural terms.

**Historical and Cultural Factors**

Long before the arrival of European missionaries in

---

the late 19th century, and the colonial system that followed, Africans had developed their educational system based on their cultural backgrounds.¹² Such educational systems were virtually destroyed by both missionaries and the colonialists who forced their Western culture on Africans. Nwafor Orizu has various documentary sources about the destructive activities of both the missionaries and the subsequent colonial system in Africa. It is Orizu's thesis that the Western Christian missionaries were the agents of the British colonial system in helping to exterminate the African traditional cultures in order to force their alien culture on the indigenous people. Furthermore, Orizu argued that these missionaries used the name of Christianity to deceive the Africans in order to get them to abandon their rich cultural heritage for the Western culture.¹³ A similar observation was made by Peter P. Ekeh concerning the negative role of the British colonial system in Nigeria. Ekeh indicated that the old African cultures were destroyed by the British colonial system, but they failed to provide suitable

¹²For details of the development of early African civilization, consult the following sources: Hayford, Gold Coast Native; Orizu, Without Bitterness.

¹³Orizu, Without Bitterness.
substitutes for them. 14

Quite naturally, today's higher education in Nigeria is an adulterated or illicit form of European higher education. It is, in fact to be very specific, a product of 19th century European missionaries and their colonial administrations. The first institution of higher learning in Nigeria set a pattern of curricular development for other institutions of learning until recently. It was not uncommon to study European constitutions and history in a Nigerian university instead of the Nigerian constitution or history. In terms of religious knowledge, Nigerian students were exposed to Christianity in the schools rather than the traditional religion which missionaries attempted to destroy. Very little effort was demonstrated to plan higher education curricular activities to reflect a traditional orientation. Some Western scholars often times criticize Africans for being confused by this colonial legacy that was handed down to them and which they made no attempt to either change or modify to suit the existing conditions.

Foster claimed that "The assertion that the colonial powers made no effort to tailor content to the African scene is, of course, an exaggeration; substantial efforts in this

direction were made in several areas, though well-meaning efforts were often open to African accusations that they were attempts to provide inferior alternatives to metropolitan curricula."\(^{15}\) He went on to say that:

But curricular controversies in Africa have a bearing on a much wider range of social and political issues. Schools are not only expected to contribute to national integration but also to diffuse 'modern' knowledge while at the same time cultivating a reverence for and attachment to African traditions and culture. The observer is often struck by the Janus-like quality of the debate; curricular ideologues frequently seem unaware of the incompatibility of many of the objectives that they set for the schools. Yet it does not require great reflection to see that a curriculum whose principal goal is, for example, the maximization of the economic contribution of education might look very different from one whose primary task is the inculcation of 'traditional values.' Moreover, although schools everywhere can make measurable contributions to cognitive knowledge, their role in influencing attitudes, sentiments and dispositions is more equivocal. Thus, in the absence of hard data, curricular issues in Africa (as elsewhere) lend themselves to ex cathedra statements and inflated expectations.\(^{16}\)

However, Foster missed the point by thinking that African educational curricula should not emphasize tradition and culture above anything else. There are serious contradictions in Foster's observations too. The fact that he commits himself by saying that due to the absence of "hard data, curricular issues in Africa lend themselves to ex cathedra

\(^{15}\)Foster, "Problems of Educational Development," p. 66.

\(^{16}\)Ibid., pp. 65-66.
statements and inflated expectations,"^{17} demonstrates that he pleads for lack of adequate information to enable him to make an objective assessment on the issue.

After all, no one expects a strict "revolutionary" change in the curriculum of higher education in Africa in general, or Nigeria in particular without the personal initiatives of Africans or Nigerians themselves. There are various problems, however, which slow the move toward this change. First, not all Nigerian educators are willing to accept this change either as a necessary sacrifice or as a factor in the development of national goals. Second, most Nigerian educators maintain opposing educational philosophies that create problems for a coordinated curricular development in Nigerian higher education. There are those, for instance, who still support the elitist policy of higher education that was designed by the British colonial system for its benefit without exploring its effect on national development or objectives. Conversely, those who would like to see certain changes brought about in the curricula are infinitely small and who may be victimized by the system or members of the old school, if they strongly advocate such radical changes. The third problem is concerned with the continued

\(^{17}\text{Ibid.} \)
infiltration of the ex-colonial or expatriate staff into the Nigerian institutions of higher learning. These neo-colonial scholars of Nigerian institutions help to perpetuate the problem and render the possibility for change unthinkable. The neo-colonial philosophy of education in Nigeria is a continued application of metropolitan methods and curricula which contrast markedly with the Nigerian norms and culture.

The problem of colonial policy was already undertaken, but it is important to recall that while the British missionaries introduced reading, writing, and arithmetic (often referred to as the "Three Rs"), in elementary schools, they did so with all intents and purposes to enable Nigerians to be able to read the Bible and understand the English language that marked the beginning of cultural imperialism. According to Nigeria Handbook, 1975-76, the beginning of "reading, writing, and arithmetic indicated the three pillars on which the instruction in religious matters rested."\(^{18}\) Subsequently, "As far as higher education was concerned, the curriculum of the missionary-owned Fourah Bay College in Sierra Leone, the only West African institution of higher learning open to British West African colonies, was firmly centered in theology, classics and the arts, and

'it took little or no account of the technical needs and the culture of the indigenous peoples.'\textsuperscript{19} This type of policy and curriculum development were implemented in the southern Nigerian schools where much of the cultural damage was done. Whereas, in the northern part of the country where Islamic religion predominates, Christian missionaries were advised by the colonial administration to stay out of that part of the country.\textsuperscript{20} But why did this uneven development take place? It should be recalled that Lugard, the so-called hero of the conquest and amalgamation of northern and southern Nigeria went into a special pact with the northern emirs (traditional leaders), to preserve their tradition and culture on the latter's subjection to colonial rule. This of course was an implementation of the policy of divide and rule which also gave rise to the policy of indirect rule that Lugard formally implemented in Nigeria following his amalgamation proclamation in 1914. It was on this foundation that the north retained its culture and tradition of which Islam is the major part. By the system of indirect rule or native administration as it was also called, the emirs were used as intermediaries between the British administrators and the masses in matters relating to tax collection, maintenance of

\textsuperscript{19}Ibid. \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{20}Ibid., p. 122.
law and order, as well as simple adjudication. Yet, as *Nigeria Handbook* also indicated, "The regime itself failed to provide any form of secular education for the masses. The gradual introduction of western type of education in the South and its neglect in the North accentuated the differences in outlook between the two parts of the country."\(^{21}\)

Even in the Higher College of Yaba, founded in 1934, whose curriculum of instruction was to include "science education and training of a professional type including medicine and engineering to a few Nigerians, the courses were kept below university level and did not provide for full degree or professional status. The number of students was severely limited to the needs of the government and the diploma granted was recognized only by the Nigerian Government."\(^{22}\)

**Curricular Problems of Nigerian Higher Education During the Civilian Regime, 1960-1966**

Popular opinion in Nigeria or throughout the world would have expected a "radical" change in curricular development in Nigerian higher education following independence in 1960. But that was not the case. While the reasons for lack of this change at times are as diverse as the cultural

\(^{21}\)Ibid. \(^{22}\)Ibid., p. 123.
diversity of Nigeria itself, it should be understood, however, that the period of independence under civilian rule lasted for only six years (1960-1966), and left little or no room for real changes to be made in the nation's educational system. In addition, the Federal Government had little control over education below the university level, as this was the constitutional responsibility of the regions. As a result of this lack of direct control over elementary and secondary schools by the federal government, there were diverse educational policies and philosophies among the regional governments. This increasing diversity did not encourage a uniform standard of education in Nigeria. Each regional bloc developed its own curriculum independently and formulated its own philosophy of education. While the Western region had begun its free primary education successfully during the independence movement, such an effort did not work in the East and both the Mid-West and the North had none at all. The regions, as it was noted previously, were so unevenly structured that some had both economic and political advantage over others. For instance, the northern region constituted about two-thirds of the population of the rest of the country and had political, though few economic advantages

\[23\text{Ibid.}\]
over other regions. Accordingly, both the eastern and western regions had both political and economic advantage while the mid-west as a new-comer and the smallest was among the disadvantaged. This was the condition in which the British colonial administrators left Nigeria at independence, a condition that gave rise to anti-tribal sentiments and rendered the federal government a potential battle-ground for regional confrontations between north and south, and also east and west.

In terms of curricular development, higher education during the six years of independence did not gather momentum. In fact, the University College, Ibadan, the only shadow institution of higher learning at that time was controlled and dominated by expatriate faculty and staff members. In 1962 when the college broke off ties with the University of

24 The mid-west region was created in 1963, following the party conflicts of crises in the western region in 1962. Political analysts hold that the decision to create the mid-west region at that time was aimed at breaking the camel's back. Chief Awolowo and his Action Group were the targets of this act. The objective was to weaken the Action Group's power as a potential opposition party in Nigerian civilian politics of the early 1960's.

25 That is, if we accept the fact that the Yaba Higher College, founded in 1934 offered courses that were below university level and did not provide for full degree or professional status. Although there is no available data on the degree of dominance by foreign or expatriate faculty and staff members in Nigerian universities, it is popularly
London, its conservative mode was still maintained and no real change was anticipated in its orientation towards a new curriculum. There were few attempts to adapt its curriculum to suit the needs of the environment in which it operated.

However, the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, founded in 1962 on the model of American Land Grant Colleges and Universities managed to break the ribbon of this conservatism and initiated some changes in its curriculum. Among its curricular changes were opportunities to offer courses in African studies, music and dance, curricular areas that were virtually ignored during the conservative era of the University College. The effort made by the University of Nigeria, Nsukka must be recognized, however minimal it may be, in breaking the traditional colonial and neocolonial concepts of curriculum of higher education designed to maintain the status quo. The University of Nigeria, Nsukka, also deserves an additional credit in its effort to open up what might be regarded as a "revolutionary era" in the diversification of the curriculum of Nigerian higher education.

known, however, that they still play a significant role in most of our universities, particularly in highly technical areas.

26 This is to say that Nsukka University began the study of African-related disciplines in conjunction with other areas of study. See Commonwealth Universities Yearbooks, 1964-79.
The newer institutions like Ife, Lagos and a number of others now follow Nsukka's groundbreaking innovation, although there is reason to rebut, however, that a greater part of this curriculum still emphasizes varying notions of Western curricular orientations.

Some Curricular Changes in Nigerian Higher Education During Military Regimes, 1966-1978

In recent years, however, the Federal Government has, as a result of the work of the Nigeria Educational Research Council, the Joint Consultative Committee on Education, introduced a more uniform system of education throughout the country through curriculum development, examinations and inspection.27

The above statement is not only convincing, but it attests to the fact that there are certain developmental efforts to tailor the Nigerian educational system to suit the curricular needs of the country. Whether or not this assessment can be tested for its practical applications, there are signs of some moderate changes towards a greater awareness than what existed before. The fact that the Military Government took over the management and financial responsibilities of education from the elementary to university levels may have encouraged certain curricular changes and developments to accord with the country's technical and technological, as well

as cultural needs. But, how were these policies administered? On this question, section (b) of the main functions of the National Universities Commission, a core of high-ranking experts and industrious citizens throughout Nigeria, charged with the responsibilities for the planning, staffing, and other services in Nigerian higher education is of particular significance. It is the duty of this commission "to prepare or execute the periodic master plans for the balanced and coordinated development of universities in Nigeria and such plans shall include the general programmes to be pursued by the universities in order to ensure that they are fully adequate to national needs and objectives, recommendation for the opening of new universities, faculties and such other related matters." It is also the commission's responsibility "to review periodically the terms and conditions of service of the personnel engaged in the universities and make recommendations to the Federal Military Regime." These and other executive responsibilities of this body, if properly executed could bring about changes in the overall planning, staffing, financing, as well as curricular developments in Nigerian universities system. Since it is also this commission that acts as a liaison between the Federal Military Government and the universities system, its powers
extend beyond mere intermediary and encompass both executive and administrative capacities. Like most delegated powers, the commission was empowered to discharge or exercise such vital functions that are necessary for effective management of Nigerian universities.

In modern forms of administration, it is often assumed that the control of financial affairs is a function of effective management and coordination of administrative process. If this is the case, the important problem that confronted the commission was how to cooperate with the Federal Military Government in the sharing of responsibilities. For instance, what policy changes should be made to provide an opportunity for the commission to participate in major decisions affecting the Nigerian universities system must be entertained. Under the administrative arrangement, it was the Federal Military Government that controlled the financial affairs of Nigerian universities. This means that the commission was authorized to act under the guidelines of the Federal Military Government and this raised a second problem in regard to responsibility and accountability. It is true that the commission was responsible and accountable to the Federal Military Government but the question is whether or not both political or military functions can be effectively
integrated with the administrative goals.\textsuperscript{28}

The preceding discussion of the relationship between the political or military authority and professional administrators brings us to another theory dealing with the bases of administrative decision making. This theory assumes that administrators are typically influenced by their positions and characters in reaching major decisions that are vital to the best interests of the institutions or organizations which they administer. In the first case, the administrator's power of decision making is a function of the number of choices he is likely to make in a particular decision. Secondly, his personal influence is a major factor in the type of responses that he expects from his subordinates. It is also important to stress that other factors influence decision making, one of which is the political climate where such decisions are made. In Nigerian situation, we are dealing with military regimes whose

\textsuperscript{28}That is, if we admit the theory that in any large-scale organization, conflict is inevitable between professional and political authority. We do not rule out possible conflicts of interests in the authoritarian political context of Nigerian Military Regimes, especially when decisions made on a professional or technical experience run counter to the expectations of political or military interests. An example of this type of conflict existed during the mass retirements and dismissals of more than 10,000 public officials including the army and police during late Murtala
pattern of behavior is explained quite simply by Ruth First as "reflecting within itself all the divisions, tensions, contradictions and crises of Nigerian society."

Whether or not this description fits the behavior of Nigerian military regimes is a matter that must be dealt with in another context.

As far as the National Universities Commission of Nigeria is concerned, its formal authority was defined by the existing political conditions of Nigeria. Because of rapid changes in the leadership of the Nigerian political system, it is too early to effectively and meaningfully evaluate the important role of this commission. Nevertheless, at the present time, the commission has demonstrated a high level of administrative responsibility to the development of higher education in Nigeria. Moreover, it is indigenous to the unique educational problems of Nigeria since independence.


30 The overall assessment of the Nigerian Military Regimes is dealt with in subsequent chapters.

31 In less than twelve years, leadership in Nigeria has changed more than four times.
in 1960. Needless to say that its frame of reference is, as its official instrument provides, applicable to the type of responsibilities that the Nigerian military regimes had delegated to the National Universities Commission and the expectations that the former required of the latter under the circumstances. It is true that political executives, for our particular concern the military officials, experience difficulties trying to manage the complex institutional categories for which they are in theory responsible.\textsuperscript{32} This explains the reason behind the choice of a group of experts whose educational, as well as professional experience entitles them to discharge the functions necessary for the development of national educational goals.

\textsuperscript{32}It is a well-known administrative theory that those who hold political positions, for example, members of the legislature, are in theory responsible for the exercise of administrative duties which are normally executed by administrators or administrative assistants. Most politicians are not trained or properly equipped to handle complex administrative management of political, social or educational institutions or programs. However, political executives have a vital role in setting the main goals within the administrative hierarchy. They, in practice, control the purse, make laws or formulate public policies which directly or indirectly affect the administrative functions. On the other hand, the actual implementation of public policies falls within the administrative functions. While the military regimes in Nigeria provide funds for the National Universities, the implementation of programs is the responsibility of the Commission which has the technical know-how of such educational programs.
In the previous chapter, an attempt was made to establish the general public policy orientation of Nigeria during the military regimes. The importance of making a general survey of Nigerian public policies has dual purposes for the present chapter. First, it enables us to understand the overall thrust of public policies in Nigeria during the period specified for this study. This knowledge then helps us to see the various changes that took place and why they occurred. Second, the general understanding of the problem is sine qua non for the study of a particular problem. The second reason is derived from deductive theory that supports the knowledge of a general principle leading up to the study of a particular segment of the problem. Nevertheless, by the application of deductive reasoning or method, there is reason to argue that the second approach is relevant to this analysis.

This section is designed to deal with the problems

---

33 The theory of deductive reasoning begins from stated premises to logical conclusions. This logic of reasoning from the general principles to the particular conclusions is challenged by an opposite theory known as inductive reasoning that supports knowledge of the particular principles before the general ones.
and prospects of higher education in Nigeria. But, in order to fully understand the implications of these problems of higher education in contemporary Nigeria, a knowledge of the background to the Nigerian higher education policies or the British colonial education policies is important. Therefore, this section is divided into two parts as follows: (1) The background of Nigerian education policies or British colonial education policies, and (2) The civilian or post-independence education policies and philosophies.

These divisions are necessary in order to lay the foundation for analysis to the present and subsequent chapters. Since each of the above sections differs in some cases and are similar in others, this is to provide an opportunity for a comparative analysis of issues which have influenced the overall development of Nigerian higher education policies and philosophies up to the present time. Not only is it possible for us to follow the trends of development, but it provides us with the nature of the problems and conflicts that evolved from the institution of colonial education, as well as separate development policies of Nigerian higher education. The second phase is to point out the fact that with the coming of independence in the 1960's, there was little or no change in this colonial legacy by the
Nigerian educators themselves. This means, however, that the pattern of British colonial higher education policies still remained throughout the greater part of the post-independence era. Finally, the third section examines the role of the military regimes in promoting what might be referred to as land-mark higher education policies through appropriate financing, staffing, and planning.

I. Background of Nigerian Educational Policies or British Colonial Education Policies

No analysis of the development of higher education in Nigeria is complete without first examining the British colonial education policy. The latter has made a tremendous impact on the former. Most analysts of Nigerian educational development often attribute the advent of a Nigerian educational system to the work of Western evangelical activity. This is true only if we are referring to the establishment of Western education from the elementary to secondary levels. However, the present analysis will not consider other levels than the university.

From the beginning of British colonialism in 1900 up to the 1930's, British colonial policy on Nigerian higher education was minimal. The primary objective rested in the British interest to produce elite Nigerian educators to serve
its metropolitan economic empire.\textsuperscript{34} In spite of the British emphasis on promoting an education policy that was to prepare Nigerians professionally equipped to assume both administrative and leadership roles, the real issue was quite contrary. The 1925 Memorandum on education policy emphasized the necessity to promote higher education which "must include the raising up of capable, trustworthy, public-spirited leaders of the people, belonging to their own race,"\textsuperscript{35} but such policy of elevating the Nigerian higher educational system was never fully implemented. In 1936, the Advisory Committee on African Education expressed its concern about higher education and warned that it was more expensive to send Africans to European and American institutions of higher learning to study rather than open such institutional opportunities in Africa where costs of study could be minimized. The committee discovered that it was less expensive to train Africans at home rather than abroad and that courses in the faculty of medicine, engineering, agriculture,

\textsuperscript{34} The reason behind the elitist education during the colonial system in Nigeria was to deny the educational opportunities as much as possible to Nigerians, as higher education might entitle them for better jobs and other chances of social mobility.

veterinary science, commerce and other related areas be introduced locally in higher education institutions. The committee's effort did not materialize. In 1926, the African Students Union had petitioned the Secretary of State for the Colonies for an award of two annual government scholarships to Africans, one of which was to be tenable in an African university, and the other in the United Kingdom. At the same time, plans were being made to establish higher educational institutions in Nigeria for the first time.

In 1930, the first higher educational institution was established in Nigeria. This was a shadow medical school and four years later Yaba Higher College was formally opened. In spite of this "revolutionary" success, the faculties of this institution could only admit a handful of students who had been anxious for years to take advantage of higher education. Furthermore, admission to Yaba Higher College was restricted by the British colonial administration. For instance, the enrollment figure for 1934 was 18 "and in the following ten-year period the highest entry figure for one year was 36, whereas about 150 candidates applied for admission each year."^{36}

---

^{36} Ibid. Most qualified Nigerians were refused admission into Yaba Higher College because the British educational policy in Nigeria was designed to discourage advancement by Nigerians.
During the later part of the 1930's, the Nigerian government decided to change its attitude towards education abroad. This change was a direct result of the negative attitude of the British colonial system toward higher education in Nigeria. Confronted with the lack of opportunities for obtaining higher education at home, the government developed a scholarship scheme for advanced studies abroad. Towards the end of World War II, a total of 69 students were sponsored overseas in various institutions of higher learning. Not only did the British colonial system discourage this new adventure, but it refused certain jobs to the Nigerian graduates upon their return from abroad. Frederick Schwarz referred to this issue in his analysis of the problem:

Those who have led the new Nigeria, moreover, are those who (often after education in Great Britain or America, and usually living in changing urban centers) acquired strong weapons from their rulers—a strengthened belief in individual freedom and national self-determination. It was they who were chilled and then angered by the cold hand of racial prejudice as white men less worthy than they got better jobs and more pay in their own country. The new leaders were those Nigerians from all groups who had entered the modern world, who had participated in the cash economy, who had partaken of Western education. Once they had done so, their resentment of alien tutorial rule was inevitable. And it was an inevitable consequence of the British presence that these Nigerians would
acquire those strong ideological weapons and enter the modern world.\textsuperscript{37}

Elsewhere, Schwarz noted that the British colonial administrators definitely developed "the distaste... for the educated African with whom they had come in contact elsewhere in Nigeria. He pointed out a particular incident related to Joyce Cary's youthful experiences as a district officer in Northern Nigeria and deplored his typical contempt for black intellectuals. In one of his novels, he indicated that Northern Nigeria was a paradise because it was without "the hybrids we see in the coast towns."\textsuperscript{38}

Similarly, Eme O. Awa, commenting on this subject, indicated that "it was the educational policy of the country more than anything else which helped to create a cleavage between north and south in intellectual and psychological orientation."\textsuperscript{39} He argued that in spite of Sir Frederick Lugard's contention that education should make an individual useful, sympathetic, and stimulating in his relationship with

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{37} Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Nigeria: The Tribes, The Nation, or The Race (Cambridge: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1965), p. 29.
\item \textsuperscript{38} Ibid., p. 34.
\end{itemize}
his community, he designed a separate and unequal educational policy or philosophy for tropical races which was based upon social order.  However, it was particularly the fault of the British colonial office in London to have sent such a man as Lugard to undertake the administrative responsibility of Nigeria. Lugard was a professional soldier who had no basic training in the art of administration and possessed little or no formal intellectual knowledge to permit appreciation for formulating and implementing higher educational policy for Nigerians.

In support of this position, I. F. Nicolson, a British civil servant who retired from the public service of Nigeria in 1962, had a similar opinion about Lugard. Nicolson observed:

Of the major, ineluctable decision of the first importance taken at the start the most fateful of all was Chamberlain's choice of Lugard for the North. Given the practical necessity for separate administrations at the beginning, the rational course would have been the choice of an experienced utilitarian civil administrator who could have run comfortably in harness with his colleagues. Instead, a frontier soldier was chosen with a history of mental imbalance, of political intrigue, and of bloodshed, a man whose footsteps 'had never been dogged by peace,' and one who had always found it difficult to run in harness with others. This was a political decision, not an administrative one. It was almost a guarantee that there would be a widening and

40 Ibid.
deepening of existing differences in the new country. . . . Many of the endemic present problems of Nigerian government seem now to flow directly from Lugard's own characteristic decisions.\textsuperscript{41}

Judging from the above observations and, according to Nicolson, "Lugard was not so much an administrator as a militarist unfortunately chosen for tasks which required men and skill of a very different kind; the joker in the pack, if not the villain of the piece."\textsuperscript{42} He concluded by saying quite naturally so that "the sixty years of British colonial rule in Nigeria must be judged a failure."\textsuperscript{43}

II. Post-Independence Higher Educational Policy

Basil Davidson, writing fondly about the coming of independence to most African states and the type of new attitudes, modernization, and educational policy that emerged indicated:

Cries of excitement varied in strength and sincerity, but the overall impression one retains of those sunsets when the imperial flags came down, and the banners of nationhood climbed to mastheads lit with flares and fireworks, stays firm and clear. Independence spelt renewal, the flinging down of racist barriers, the fraught emotion of swaying crowds, dancing, drumming, for whom


\textsuperscript{42}Ibid., p. 305

\textsuperscript{43}Ibid., p. 310.
their own ideas, beliefs, and abilities could now be clothed in a new respect and value. . . . Literacy and book-learning being the key to modernization, all the nationalist movements had called for more and better education. . . . Even in Nigeria, where some secondary schools and a higher college of education had long existed, colonial racism had frowned on any plan to produce 'intellectuals', and denied senior postings even to those who had gone to Britain for the 'golden fleece' of a university degree and duly come back with it.44

Aside from the feeling of independence and its concomitant values, there are other feelings, as Davidson pointed out:

"Whatever doubts were present, it was everywhere accepted that real progress could be made only when Africans had regained political responsibility and for this elementary need, no price could then appear excessive."45

At independence, Nigeria managed to have had a small foundation of higher education built mainly around the "cult image" of Ibadan University. Its university college produced 190 first degrees in 1948-49 when the college achieved the status of a university; forty of these were in the arts, twenty-nine in medicine, 121 in science. Independence brought expansion.46 In 1958-59 the Ibadan total rose to 1,005 degrees. With higher degrees now added, and


46 Ibid., p. 286.
including diplomas comparable to first degrees, the total for 1958-59 stood at 3,661 and other Nigerian universities were now in the field. Few of the new states could do half as well.  

The study of post-independence higher educational policy in Nigeria must take into account that improvements in higher education were the prima facie objectives of Nigerian public policy. The new intellectual thinking of most Nigerians hammered forcefully on the development of higher educational opportunities for the contemporary Nigeria. If there was doubt that the opportunity for development of higher education during the British colonial rule was thwarted that doubt helped to promote the desire to increase the number of universities in Nigeria.

The usual problem that emerged at Ibadan was its stringent admission policy. For instance, in 1948 the overall enrollment at Ibadan was 210 while the number of Nigerian students abroad was 550, and similarly, when the enrollment at Ibadan reached 400, the number of Nigerian students studying overseas was 2,000. In addition, the University College was a little more than a storehouse for London University. Virtually, all examinations and degrees until 1962 were

---

47 Ibid.
administered and awarded from London. The college curriculum was patterned very rigidly to conform with that of London University and provided no room for possible changes. Each academic year witnessed a greater number of well qualified Nigerian students arbitrarily turned down for admission because the institution, as it was noted previously, was initially designed to serve the metropolitan economic interests of the British colonial system. Partly because of this colonial institutional attitude and partly because of the tarnished and discriminatory relationship between the British and Nigerians at that time, there was a greater number of Nigerians, qualified but rejected for admission at home who developed anti-colonial sentiments and whose alternative was a temporary break with the system that discouraged them from having educational opportunities at home and abroad.

In 1959 the federal government acting unilaterally appointed a commission and charged it with the responsibility of investigating the post-secondary and higher education needs in Nigeria for the next twenty years, 1960-80. This

was known as the Ashby Commission, commonly known because it was Sir Eric Ashby, a British expert on university education who was the director of the commission. After a series of interviews both in London and Nigeria, the commission observed that the structure of education in Nigeria beginning from the elementary grades to higher levels was unbalanced. It regretted that in spite of the tremendous progress the country had made during the past decade, there were about 80,000 teachers whose backgrounds did not prepare them adequately for the tasks they were performing. Approximately three-quarters of these teachers were not trained and of those who received the training about two-thirds had no secondary education. This meant that roughly 90 percent of the primary school teachers were not adequately trained for their jobs. The commission also discovered a lack of correlation between primary and secondary schools in the sense that there were many primary school children who were ill-prepared and were not likely to be absorbed by the limited number of secondary schools. Aside from these weaknesses, the commission expressed the absolute neglect of the study of such technical fields as agriculture, veterinary science and other related fields. One other criticism was the existence of differential educational policies for the north and south which the commission noted demonstrated a serious
imbalance under the circumstances. Above all, the commission recalled the Harbison report on the manpower needs of Nigeria between 1960 and 1970. Harbison calculated that Nigeria needed 31,200 senior level administrative and management personnel, 20,000 were to have university education or comparable qualifications. Furthermore, Harbison recommended that the Nigerian universities would have to produce 2,000 graduates per year between 1960-1970, coupled with about 5,400 intermediate or middle-level manpower services. In spite of this, he concluded that the services of foreign experts would still be needed but that the margin would be reduced by 1970.

On the basis of these and other considerations, the Ashby Commission completed its report in 1960 and recommended that there should be a general upgrading of Nigerians who were in the service by encouraging them to pursue advanced study. Secondly, a system of post-secondary education was to be designed in such a way that it would provide expansion to satisfy the target need of 1980. On primary, secondary, commercial, technical and university education, the report

49 The Harbison Commission was set up following Nigerian independence in 1960 to determine the manpower needs of Nigeria between 1960 and 1970. For details of this report, consult Commonwealth Universities Yearbooks, 1975-76 (London).
recommended that the federal government should provide financial assistance to the already existing University of Nigeria at Nsukka, open one new university in the north utilizing the site of the Nigeria College, and establish another university in Lagos to serve the metropolitan day and evening classes. The report also recommended that certain curricular and admission changes be made at Ibadan University and that in general all the Nigerian universities should demonstrate greater flexibility and diversity in their degree programs which were to include education, engineering, medicine, law, agriculture, and other technical areas. It recommended a National Universities Commission be set up as a governing body of all the Nigerian universities with powers extending to matters of finance, staffing and planning.  

Although the federal government of Nigeria accepted these recommendations, it did not feel that Harbison's estimate of manpower needs for Nigeria in 1970 was adequate. It argued that there was more room or opportunity for

---

50 This Commission was directed by Sir Eric Ashby, the master of Clark College, London, and following his recommendations, a National Universities Commission was set up to govern Nigerian universities by the late Prime Minister of Nigeria, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa in 1962. Since then, the Commission has been the governing body of Nigerian universities, with slight modifications during the military regimes (1966-79).
progress in Nigeria than the Harbison report suggested. The Ashby report recommended four universities for Nigeria, but the federal government decided to make it five. Consequently, Ife, Lagos, and Zaria were added to Ibadan and Nsukka that had existed before. Of the 7,500 student enrollment which the commission recommended for all the universities during the 1970's, the federal government opted for 10,000 for that period. At the beginning of the civil war in 1966, the Nigerian universities had a total enrollment of 8,800 and in 1972 that number was increased to 18,000 and more than 25,000 students registered in Nigerian universities during the 1973-74 academic year.\footnote{Sources: \textit{Nigeria Diary}, 1979, pp. 10-12; \textit{Nigeria Handbook}, 1975-76, p. 125.}

By a careful examination, it is apparent that the enrollment in Nigerian universities in 1966 exceeded the target that was recommended by the Ashby Commission for 1970 (8,800 as opposed to 7,500). The record was even more dramatic in 1972 and 1973-74 academic years (18,000 and 25,000, respectively).\footnote{Ibid.} However, it is hard to say at this point what other changes in enrollment would have occurred if the civilian government was not interrupted by the Civil War in 1966. Nevertheless, there was a substantial increase
in the student enrollments in 1966 beyond reasonable doubts. There is no doubt that by 1970 the trend would have been encouraging.
CHAPTER V

NIGERIAN HIGHER EDUCATION POLICIES UNDER
THE MILITARY REGIMES, 1966-1978

It is hard to deny the idea that military regimes now control both political and public policy issues in most African states. What is not difficult to believe, on the other hand, is the fact that prior to independence and during the period of post-independence civilian governments, the African army was least popular in political affairs. Yet today, military rule like one-party states has become a common vocabulary in African literature. In each of these African states, the manner in which military intervention takes place is similar to the spread of one party regimes across the continent.

In recent years, the previous notion that the economic factor was the foremost in explaining the problem of military coups in Africa has almost always been debated. Scholars have begun to explain the problem in many other ways, using the new approaches that have emerged. Nowadays, the
emphasis has ranged from economic, political, social, cultural, psychological, sociological, and international sources. Fred R. von der Mehden has noted, however, that "the situations that evoke military intervention in politics are remarkably similar, whether the dominant component of change is the transition from colonialism to nationalism, or the awakening of widespread desires for a new ordering of economic and social institutions, or a combination of these."\footnote{Fred R. von der Mehden, \textit{Politics of the Developing Nations} (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 98.}

While Mehden's thesis may be generally applicable to this theory, its universal explanation is less persuasive and has more limited scope to address itself to particular situations. The frequency of military regimes in Africa, generally, and Nigeria, particularly, may be explained in various theoretical models, yet, we are concerned here with a particular reference to Nigeria. Robert Collis blamed this frequency on the corrupt politicians. He argued that "In Nigeria, in the regional governments and in the Federal Government, many of the politicians were indescribably corrupt. What happened in the Western Region happened to some
extent in all the other regions with only local differences." He noted that in the East he was taken around Enugu by an Ibo doctor friend and shown the Ministers' houses on which tens of thousands of pounds of the poor peoples' money had been spent while poverty and want were everywhere and the real living wage for the working man was below subsistence. In the north the Ministers' establishments were even more elaborate having wives' quarters (for four) in separate buildings behind, connected to the main palatial house by a long covered passage. In the new mid-west region created in 1963, some of the politicians immediately started embezzlement on a gigantic scale, one supposes so as to make up for the lost time, as the mid-west was started later than the other regions. Others, like Martin Lissak have sought to develop a different model derived from the elite theory and colonial past and the modernization crises. He argued, "The army intervenes because other elites are absent, impotent or weak; the army then seizes the opportunity, improvises and expands its role to carry out the

---


3Ibid.


5Ibid., p. 138.
burden created by a modernization crisis." Frank Riggs carried the argument much further by simply resorting to developmental theory. He argued that at times there may be sharp differences in the levels of technical or technological development between sectors of society in such a way that the bureaucratic apparatus becomes technically or technologically more competent than the policy-making organs (executives and parties), then a displacement of functions will occur and render inter-bureaucratic struggle a primary form of politics. But when the political arena is shifted to the bureaucracy, a shift marked by the growing power of military officers in conflict with civilian officials, the consequences are usually ominous for political stability. Riggs' uneven developmental theory relates very well to the problem of uneven educational policy that was developed for northern and southern Nigeria by the British colonial system. The northern educational system was patterned structurally to conform with Muslim religious and social systems, whereas, the southern model

---


was designed to follow the Western pattern. At Nigerian independence in 1960, north was far behind and unable to meet up with some of the basic manpower requirements, skill and technical training of Western education. The conflict that developed in the circumstances created a situation in which the north resorted to a backward-looking policy and unwilling to accept independence as a national pride. As a result of this uneven partnership, the north developed an anti-southern slogan which contributed to the outbreak of the Nigerian civil war of 1966. Aside from the immediate problem of conflict that may emerge, it is generally an acceptable administrative belief that important political and administrative decisions can be reached much faster and efficiently by an expert than his amateur counterpart, thus saving time and energy that are necessary for public services. Another version of developmental theory is illustrated by C. S. Whitaker which stresses the "disrhythmic pattern of change arising from different tradition, different economic and educational penetration." The attempt here is to stress the

---

8 The problem of uneven development of Western education between north and south of Nigeria during the British colonial system was already noted in Chapter II of this work.

variety of responses to modernization and to reject the idea of a homogeneous response. 10 In consequence, such a traditional cum developmental approach which Almond, Rostow, and Parsons had long since emphasized as the central issue has itself been rejected. The problem is more intricate than it appears and requires more than a single theory to analyze it than our forerunners expected.

James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg have already noted the theory that is related to one-party states. They argued that the general theory that supports the emergence of one-party states in Africa is similar to one that creates the military regimes. This theory provides that one-party states develop in societies in which traditional authority has been seriously weakened and one-party states tend to develop in post-traditional societies as a consequence of the rapid break-down of existing patterns of social and political authority. Furthermore, in analyzing the emergence of single-party systems in terms of the general problems of political and economic mobilization, they suggested the

10 Most Western scholars have, since the turn of the century, emphasized the traditional or developmental approach as a prerequisite for military intervention in African politics. This one-sided model is becoming overtaken by several other models, such as, "disrhythmic process of political change," that Whitaker has emphasized and international involvement as well, among others.
possibility that these problems may even overcome the parties and that one result, among others, could be the rise of military regime. 11

In the Nigerian situation, military intervention was the result of a combination of unmitigated regionalism, party rivalries, economic problems, apathy and despair from both internal and external forces. Chief Anthony Enahoro, for instance, attributed the main cause of the Nigerian crisis to the acute regionalism which developed in Nigerian politics from the late 1940's. He argued that the problem began with the introduction of the representative form of government in the 1940's when the British and unfortunately Nigerians themselves began to speak in terms of separatism vis-a-vis unity among various but particularly the three sections into which Nigeria was structurally divided. 12 Nigeria became independent in 1960 with a weak political framework comprising three large regional blocs. The northern region by far, was the largest of the three and had three-fourths of the country's total land mass and more than


12 Chief Anthony Enahoro, "Paths to a Just and Lasting Solution," A speech delivered at the Nigerian Peace Talks at Kampala, Uganda, 1968, p. 3.
one-half of its population. Each of these regions had a dominant tribal unit—the Hausa in the north, the Ibo in the east, and the Yoruba in the west. In each of these regions also were various minority groups whose aspirations were repressed or ignored by the dominant tribal groups. These minorities repeatedly clamoured for separate states or regional autonomy within the Nigerian Federation but their requests were constantly turned down by the dominant tribal power structures.

The next wave of incidents that attracted military intervention was the 1962 party crisis in the western region. The personal antagonisms that typified Nigerian party politics in the 1960's have already been discussed in the preceding chapters but it is important to recall that on close examination of other issues, the party conflicts sparked up the military intervention and subsequent crisis that erupted. Prior to this crisis, it must also be recalled that the treason trials and conviction of Action Group leaders, particularly Chief Awolowo and his lieutenants worsened the arguments for peace. The census issue remained yet unsolved coupled with the fraudulent nature of the 1964 federal elections. How much more was needed to break down law and order in Nigeria was any one's guess.
Towards the end of 1965, however, as a result of the cumulative effect of these conflicts, peace gave way to violence which in such a delicate situation, the military intervened on 15th January, 1966. Thereafter, the constitutional democracy that Nigeria once inherited as a legacy of the British colonial system formally disappeared and power was taken over by the military regime. Soon after the military take-over, an Ad Hoc Committee was convened on September 12, 1966, to consider the future of Nigeria.

Among the items agreed upon, except by the eastern delegation, by the Ad Hoc Constitutional Committee to be retained on the Concurrent Legislative List was Higher Education, that is to say, institutions and other bodies offering courses or conducting examinations of a university, technological or of a professional character, other than the institutions referred to in Item 17 of Part I of this Schedule. By Concurrent Legislative List, we are referring to the list of public items, roles, institutions and organizations which is to be jointly supported or managed by the federal and state governments. This includes among others, industrial development, parks, arms and ammunition, census, certain

---

categories of higher education and labor. The eastern delegation alone suggested that since the existing source of conflict originated in part from the provisions of the Concurrent List, it should be nullified or transferred to read Regional subjects.

On the other hand, no unanimous agreement was reached on the rights of the following higher educational institutions, that is to say--the University of Ibadan; the University College Teaching Hospital at Ibadan; University of Lagos; the Lagos University Teaching Hospital; the West African Institute of Social and Economic Research; the Pharmacy School of Yaba; the Forestry School at Ibadan; the Veterinary School at Vom.\(^\text{14}\) The north, west, mid-west, and Lagos, however, proposed that the above institutions be listed as exclusive to the federal government and that conscious effort be made to ensure that both staff and student population in these institutions were integrated. Contrary to the majority opinion, however, the eastern delegation proposed that such provisions should be deleted.\(^\text{15}\) By the Exclusive Legislative List, we are referring to the list of public items, roles, institutions, and organizations which is to be exclusively supported or managed by the federal government.

\(^{14}\text{Ibid., p. 239.}\) \(^{15}\text{Ibid.}\)
After about one month of deliberations on the constitutional issues of Nigeria by the Constitutional Conference Committee, its progress report was submitted to the Supreme Commander of the Nigerian Armed Forces, Yakubu Gowon, on September 30, 1966. Within this time, there was a report of the disturbances in the north which continued while the committee went on recess for three weeks. Gowon addressed the committee, informed the members about the disturbances in Kano and promised to bring the situation under control. He appealed to the delegates from the east:

To our Eastern friends, for God's sake, please don't lose hope. Let us try and see what we can do to mend up what has happened. Give me a chance and I am quite convinced I will be able to do something very shortly.

Well, I am very sorry to come and leave you departing with such a sad note. It is the realities of our days. As we are alive today, we can contribute to the future success of this country. Let us now go back and see what we can do. It is not a question of three weeks' rest but three weeks of determined action to see what we can do to salvage the country. As far as I am concerned, except for these very few dissident elements, I think I can assure you that the others are all loyal and I can really carry out a lot of work of reconstruction. So may God help us in this new rededication. Thank you very much.16

---

16 Ibid., p. 256; Originally quoted from the text, "The Struggle for One Nigeria," pp. 40-42.
Higher Education Policies During the
Military Regimes

The Ironsi Regime, January 16, through July 29, 1966

In the order of succession, Ironsi's regime took over the administration of Nigerian universities from its civilian counterpart. On January 16, 1966, Ironsi assumed power as the head of the Federal Military Government, following the end of the first Republic on January 15. He formed the first military government by establishing the Supreme Military Council comprising the four military governors. Former civilian governors were appointed as political advisers and each Region retained its own separate civil service and judiciary. This means that each of the four regions was directly under the federal military regime, but it was permitted to maintain its civilian administration.

The new head of state indicated that his government's policy was to put a stop to tribalism and activities which encouraged such sentiments. It was the task of the federal military regime to make Nigeria "a united nation," and in

17 Panter-Brick, Nigerian Politics, p. 16.

18 Daily Times, January 29, 1966. For more detailed information on the seizure of political power from the civilian administration by the military regimes, see Ojiako's 13 Years of Military Rule, 1966-79, pp. 1-29.
doing so, he promised that merit system would be the criterion for public employment. He stressed that in the past, there were conflicts of interests which arose from the struggles to acquire official positions in most of the federal institutions and organizations. These he said were the evils of the civilian rule and that his government would see to it that industrial development "is coordinated to avoid wasteful duplication of industrial projects."\(^{19}\) Referring to the universities, he indicated that "these institutions of higher learning would be reorientated to serve the genuine interest of our people."\(^{20}\)

During the civilian rule, it should be recalled, there were five universities—Ibadan, the oldest; Nsukka, Ife, Ahmadu Bello and Lagos. Of these five, both Ibadan and Lagos were designated federal institutions, while Nsukka, Ife and Ahmadu Bello were run by the former eastern, western and northern regional governments, and partly supported by the federal government. At the end of the First Republic on January 15, 1966 by an army coup, these institutions automatically passed into the hands of the Nigerian Military regime.

General Ironsi was quick to summon a committee to

\(^{19}\text{Ibid.}\) \(^{20}\text{Ibid.}\)
investigate and report to the federal military government some of the administrative and institutional changes. But, it takes time for decisions based on committee to arrive at the executive table. Some of these committee meetings were delayed due to oppositions to Ironsi's policy of unitary form of government for Nigeria. Accordingly, Ironsi was faced with the problem of an acceptable budget that would finance the federal and regional public services and institutions combined. Several events were quick to happen. For instance, some military officials were personally opposed to Ironsi's unitary policy. Others were in favor of a strong central government with weak regional blocs while many more were in support of confederation.

The masses throughout Nigeria were the unlucky victims of this confusion. The fact that they were not consulted on these changes that were to affect them directly increased the weight of their problems. Most of the changes --social, institutional and administrative were channeled through either decrees or committee reports. At this particular time, the universities managed to survive with the previous year's budget, although there were also talks of

---

21 For further information on General Ironsi's procedure of his assumption of power, consult Ojiako's *13 Years of Military Rule, 1966-79*, pp. 1-29
formulating a single national budget to replace the former separate federal and regional arrangements. One problem gave rise to many others and what emerged was a diversity of opinions by the press, the committees, and to a lesser extent the masses, without any coordinated or constituted policy.

On May 24, 1966, Ironsi faced with opposition from left and right, took a last minute decision to issue decrees Numbers 33 and 34 both of which reinforced his previous degree number 1. Decree Number 33, as noted previously, dissolved organizational structures, notably political parties, as well as cultural associations, while Decree Number 34 changed the Federal Military Government to National Military Government, reorganized the regions as groups of provinces, and unified the public service. These abrupt changes without sufficient consultation sparked rebellion and intense crisis in the north which actively opposed the unitary policy. With mounting tensions and demonstrations in the north and across the nation, Ironsi was deposed by an assassin's bullet following mutiny by northern troops on July 29, 1966.
The Gowon Regime, August 1, 1966 through July 29, 1975

It was during Gowon's administration that major higher education policies were promulgated, although his regime was beset with a bloody civil war that interrupted some of the progressive institutional policies of this regime. General Ironsi was criticized for failing to coordinate decisively most of the public policies on administration, education, agriculture, constitution, and other services. Gowon learnt a lesson from his predecessor and reversed most of Ironsi's policies. By Decree Number 59, he restored the federal system of government and appointed an Ad Hoc Constitutional Committee to study the form of future civilian government and submit its report to the federal military regime. He released the political prisoners—among them were Chiefs Awolowo and Enahoro.

Following the Dina Committee report, a new policy of financing, staffing and planning the Nigerian higher

22 Critics like Ruth First claimed that it was stupid and provocative for Ironsi to appoint civil servants to tackle on their own the most taxing problems facing the country before the regime had formulated an overall policy of reform and the main outlines of a new political structure. See First's Power in Africa, pp. 310-11.

23 The political prisoners were civilians who were in jail since the civilian regime, as well as those who were detained by the military during the crisis.
education was implemented by the federal military regime in 1972. Gowon's regime was also instrumental in promoting huge scholarship and loan schemes for higher education in Nigeria. During his administration, the number of students in Nigerian universities and abroad increased beyond any that existed before. The majority of the students received either scholarships or loans.

Clearly, the military higher education policy covers a wide range of objectives as follows:

As outlined in the 3rd. National Development Plan, 'Nigeria continues to recognize education as a very powerful instrument for social change in a process of dynamic nation-building.' Government commitment is 'the creation in the country of an educational system capable of ensuring that every citizen is given full opportunity to develop his intellectual and working capacities for his own benefit and that of his community.' Government identifies six national objectives as follows:-

(a) to expand facilities for education aimed at equalising individual access to education throughout the country;

(b) to reform the content of general education to make it more responsive to the socio-economic needs of the country;

(c) to consolidate and develop the nation's system of higher education in response to the economy's manpower needs;

(d) to streamline and strengthen the machinery for educational development in the country;

(e) to rationalize the financing of education with a view to making the educational system more adequate and efficient; and

(f) to make an impact in the area of technological education so as to meet the growing needs of the
According to the Nigerian Handbook, "Achievement in the field of education during the Second National Development Plan Period (1970-74) have been remarkable. . . . University enrolment increased from 14,500 in 1971 to about 25,000 in 1974." Furthermore, the report indicates that the consolidation of the six existing universities and the establishment of four new universities to be located at Sokoto, Maiduguri, Calabar, and Jos under Federal Government leadership and control were among the current educational objectives and policies. There would also be university campuses at Port Harcourt and Ilorin which would be affiliated to existing universities pending their development into full-fledged status and that total expenditure in the educational sector during the plan period would be more than N 2.5 billion.

In the general appraisal of General Gowon's regime in terms of the promotion of Nigerian higher education policies, it is evident that his regime lay a foundation stone on which subsequent higher education policies rested. No one would


25Ibid.

26Ibid.

27Ibid., pp. 126-27.
deny that Gowon's regime opened a new era in the development of new policies designed to rationalize the financing, planning and staffing of higher education in Nigeria. Never before in Nigeria has a government promoted such "revolutionary" higher education policies towards making higher education accessible to the rich and poor alike. His regime marked the beginning of almost free higher education in Nigeria. Nigerian university students did not have to pay tuition fees and the Federal Military Government provided other incentives to university students to assure them that "The trend of government policy was clearly in the direction of free education at all levels as soon as it was practicable."  

During this period, university student enrolments increased to a maximum of 53,000 and at the same time, the Federal Military Government was already operating with full financial support of thirteen universities in the country.  

In addition, to providing full financial support to the thirteen universities in the country, plans were executed to implement, for the first time in Nigeria, central agencies for the monitoring of admission procedures for the university system. The Joint Admissions and Matriculations Board (JAMB) is at present carrying out this responsibility, while the

---

29 Ibid.
National Universities Commission is actively supplying the necessary planning, staffing and other management functions to the university system.

The Mohammed Regime, August, 1975 through February, 1976

Mohammed did not complete a whole year from the time of his assumption of power to when he was assassinated during the Dimka coup of February, 1976. However, his regime marked the most "revolutionary" period of Nigerian military regimes. In spite of General Gowon's achievements, critics are often of the opinion that he failed to have checked corrupt practices in the army and in the civilian bureaucracy. His wavering attitudes and leniency towards law enforcement may have contributed to the bloodless coup that ousted him from office, after more than nine years of service to the country.

Mohammed's overall policies were designed to clean up the messes that were ignored or overlooked by Gowon's regime. Consequently, he purged both army and civilian personnel and mobilized sufficient effort to revitalize the military and civilian bureaucracies. His regime was noted for action and

---

30 Ojiako, Military Rule, pp. 84-88.
promptness in all aspects of Nigerian public policy.\textsuperscript{31}

The 3rd National Development Plan (1975-1980), fell directly under his regime, although he was unable to complete the period. He was instrumental in the development of higher education policies, such as "a uniform system of education throughout the country through curriculum development, examinations and inspection, through the work of the Nigeria Educational Research Council, the Joint Consultative Committee on Education and the National Council on Education."\textsuperscript{32} His higher education policy aimed at "not only the improvement of standards, but also the establishment of new universities, departments and courses and the expansion of existing facilities so that student intake can continue to reflect the increasing demand for higher level man-power in the country.\textsuperscript{33} In order to achieve this objective, he supported the development of federal higher education policy designed

\textsuperscript{31}Ibid., pp. 89-135.

\textsuperscript{32}Ibid., p. 123. The role of the Joint Consultative Committee on Education is to monitor the educational development in Nigeria among other things. The Educational Research Council is charged with the responsibility of conducting research on the Nigerian educational system while the National Council on Education helps to develop certain improvements on the standard of Nigerian education.

\textsuperscript{33}Ibid., p. 125.
to promote manpower requirements of Nigeria. The Federal Military Government financed, staffed, and planned thirteen institutions of higher learning throughout the country.

The Obasanjo Regime, February, 1976 through October 1, 1979

General Obasanjo succeeded Mohammed on the latter's assassination in February, 1976. He made it clear that he would not make changes in Mohammed's overall policy but would carry them out to the best of his ability. Some of the current National educational objectives and policies include:

With regard to University education, it is intended to more than double the present enrolment during the Plan period from about 25,000 to over 53,000. Already the Federal Government has taken over all the 13 universities in the country. In prosecuting the university programme, care will be taken to ensure that the pattern of enrolment accords with the manpower needs of the nation and to this end, a University Entrance Committee known as the Joint Admissions and Matriculations Board has been set up. The trend of government policy is clearly in the direction of free education at all levels as soon as practicable.\(^{34}\)

In his 1978-79 Budget Speech, Obasanjo reiterated his government's policy on higher education. He stated as follows:

I will want to reiterate the Federal Military Government policy on students loan in our institutions of higher learning. In recognition of the fact that there are genuine indigent students, state governments have been asked to take on the responsibility for assisting . . . students through loans, bursary awards and scholarships. The state governments are closer to the homes and families of such students and they can best ascertain their needs. Some financial assistance has been provided to encourage state governments in shouldering this responsibility for their needy students. . . 

Special attention will continue to be paid to high-level manpower which this Administration believes is an essential ingredient of national development. To this end, and in spite of tight budget the existing policy of free tuition in our universities will continue.\textsuperscript{35}

Obasanjo also reminded the public that the accented Capital Budget for the 1978-79 financial year was ₦ 6.7 billion and that as of then, the total capital expenditure approved by the Supreme Military Council stood at ₦ 5.2 billion of which ₦ 3.3 billion or approximately 63 percent would be disbursed in the directly productive sectors such as agriculture, industry, transportation, and so on.\textsuperscript{36} He warned Nigerians, however, that there was no salvation without sacrifice and that all have to make the sacrifice rather than inherit the illusion of wanting to be like Europe or America without making the necessary sacrifice and without going through some


\textsuperscript{36}Ibid.
of the routes that those settled societies had gone through. It was inconceivable for any society to develop without pains, he added, and he encouraged all to embark on the greatest care and economy in expenditure by all public institutions, and a return to sanity in the interest of the national economy. 37

In terms of other policy areas, Obasanjo's regime continued in the footsteps of its predecessors towards a return to civilian rule in October, 1979. Both primary and national or constituent elections were conducted in July, 1979, before the handing over of political power to civilians in October. Already, the military governors of state governments had given way to a group of civilian administrators or commissioners who were experimenting with constitutional democracy prior to the constituent elections and the subsequent transfer of power to civilians.

In summary, Nigeria is witnessing some major public policy changes and innovations in her higher education. There are changes in the curricula, faculties, and the overall academic orientations. These are demonstrated by the

37 Ibid., pp. 23-24.
diversity in the areas of study or specialization, the significant increase in the number of indigenous faculty and staff, and the range of choices from among the National University system.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{38}In spite of lack of statistical data on the exact percentage of indigenous faculty and staff members of the National universities of Nigeria, the report provided from the Third National Development Plan, 1975-80 indicated a dramatic educational policy designed to "expand facilities for education aimed at equalizing individual access to education throughout the country and to consolidate and develop the nation's system of higher education in response to manpower needs." Already the Federal Government has taken over all the 13 universities in the country. In prosecuting the university programme, care will be taken to ensure that the pattern of enrolment accords with the manpower needs of the nation and to this end, a University Entrance Committee known as the Joint Admissions and Matriculations Board has been set up. The trend of government policy is clearly in the direction of free education at all levels as soon as practicable. Similarly, another report from other sources also emphasized: "In recent years, however, the Federal Government has...introduced a more uniform system of education throughout the country through curriculum development, examinations and inspection."

CHAPTER VI

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION POLICIES

BY THE NIGERIAN MILITARY REGIMES

The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria states that:

The Government shall endeavour to ensure that there are equal and adequate educational opportunities at all levels to the people within the area of its authority. The Federal Government shall take all possible steps to ensure that the educational opportunities available at all levels to persons in any area or part of the Federation are equal to those in any other area or part of the Federation. The Government shall promote science and technology to enable Nigeria to develop its own independent individual capabilities.

The Government shall strive to eradicate illiteracy. To this end, subject to the availability of resources, the Government shall provide — (a) Free compulsory and Universal Primary Education; (b) Free Secondary Education; (c) Free University Education; and (d) Free Adult Literacy programme.¹

Similarly, in its enumeration of functions, roles, and responsibilities of the Federal Government, the Constitution

provides that "University education and such professional, technological, technical or vocational education as may be designated by the National Assembly,"\(^2\) shall fall within Federal authority or the Exclusive Legislative List. Thirdly, the Federal Government shall "prescribe minimum standards of education at all levels."\(^3\) The Nigerian Constitution was formulated under three military regimes. Gowon first appointed the Ad Hoc Constitutional Committee in 1966 to make recommendations to the Federal Military Government which would in turn submit the document for final approval to the Constituent Assembly. However, the Constitutional Conferences and Reviews continued during Mohammed's regime and the Constitution was completed during Obasanjo's regime.

The Constitution provides equal rights in education and recognizes the right of the Federal Government to "prescribe minimum standards of education" for the country. In addition, the national government has both executive and administrative authority over the Nigerian universities. Finally, the Federal Government guarantees free university


\(^3\)Ibid.
education to its citizens "subject to the availability of resources." According to Victor A. Olorunsola:

The FMG amended the Nigerian constitution to transfer higher education from the 'Concurrent Legislative List' to the 'ExCLUSIVE Federal List.' Other levels of education were transferred to the 'Concurrent Legislative List.' The 1970-74 revised federal allocation for capital expenditure on education was an approximately ₦360 million. University enrolment rose from under 10,000 to 20,000 in 1975. Even more dramatic was the plan of the University of Lagos to take in 10,000 students in 1975 alone - almost double the student enrolment at the University of Ibadan prior to the military regime. The number of Nigerian medical schools had also increased from two to five during military rule.⁴

Olorunsola noted that in some quarters, there was the belief that "the government had the resources to introduce free university education."⁵ This was the greatest and the most impressive higher education policy ever made in Nigeria. This is demonstrated by the student enrolment targets in each of these universities as shown below:⁶


⁵Ibid.

### Student Enrollment Targets in 1973; 1979-80

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Universities</th>
<th>Founding Date</th>
<th>Enrollment 1973</th>
<th>Enrollment 1979-80</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University of Ibadan</td>
<td>1948--Established 1962</td>
<td>4,618</td>
<td>8,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Nigeria</td>
<td>1960 (Statute of Incorporation 1955 by Eastern regional Gov't.)</td>
<td>4,677</td>
<td>8,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Ife</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>4,005</td>
<td>7,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmadu Bello University</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>5,828</td>
<td>9,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Lagos</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>3,400</td>
<td>7,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Benin</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>3,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Calabar</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Maiduguri</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Jos</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1,206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Sokoto</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University College of Kano (Now Bayero University College)</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1,958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University College of Ilorin</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University College of Port Harcourt</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total:** 23,173 \[53,000\] (Approx.)

Source: *A Survey of U.S. Business Opportunities*, p. 73.

### New Universities and University Colleges

It is still not very clear as to why the Nigerian military regimes decreed the establishment of four new universities and three university colleges on October 1, 1975.\(^7\)

---

The universities included Calabar, Jos, Maiduguri and Sokoto, and the university colleges of Ilorin, Kano and Port Harcourt. Although there is nothing strange about the establishment of more universities, it is of interest to investigate the reasons behind the army's attitude toward higher education.

During the colonial period, the argument was between Nigerians who were interested in changing the social structure at that time and the colonial administrators whose interest was against higher educational attainment by the indigenous people. At independence, there were small changes in the field of higher education but they were not as significant as they were during the military regimes. It is true that in 1960 Nsukka University was opened as the first autonomous institution of higher learning in Nigeria.

---

8 There have been many arguments to support or disapprove the motives on the part of the Gowon regime to embark upon the opening of four new universities and three university colleges at a time when the Nigerian crude oil boom was declining. One school of thought has suggested that the move was designed to silence mass discontent and violence during the turbulent time of inflation and economic chaos. The other school has argued on the contrary that the decision was politically motivated and that it was a part of military strategy and policy implementation. However, none has explained the issue more clearly. The two schools of thought cited above comprised two groups of Nigerian students in the United States who took up the issue during a meeting of Nigerian Students in America held on October 27, 1976 in the City of Atlanta, Georgia.
followed by the Ahmadu Bello, and Ife in 1962. In 1966, when the Civil War broke out, there were five Nigerian universities, including the University College at Ibadan. This effort may rightly be attributed to the civilian regime that spearheaded the innovation of these institutions of higher learning.

One of the motives that may have influenced the military regimes to establish seven new universities could be explained in the theory that gave rise to the creation of more states. The situation that necessitated the immediate action on the creation of states has been noted in the previous chapters. But, it is important to recall that the necessity to win new friends may have contributed to the advent of Decree Number 14 which was implemented by the creation of twelve states in 1967. The federal military's strategy was to weaken the military power of its enemy (the Republic of Biafra) in the civil war that had erupted.\(^9\) A secondary factor was perhaps to satisfy the wishes or demand of the minority tribes throughout the country.

\(^9\)As one of the strategies for dealing with the Confederate army during the American Civil War (1861-65), President Abraham Lincoln divided the Carolinas into North and South and that action was one of the contributing factors for the defeat of the southern enemies. Among other reasons, it might be suggested, the objective was to weaken the strength of the Confederates in the struggle.
Similarly, the establishment of more universities in Nigeria was necessary to decentralize, in the most part, the conservative and dominant status of the University College at Ibadan. The second reason may have been that the military was under immense pressure from the few intellectuals who dominated the scene in Nigerian universities. It is to be remembered that the Nigerian intellectuals inherited the colonial way of life and did nothing to change some of the stringent and conservative admission standards that the British maintained at Ibadan University. The result of this attitude witnessed an exodus of Nigerian students abroad, instead of taking advantage of the available institution at home. In this juncture, the military may have acted as reformers of the old institutional order or structure. Above all, one is likely to argue that the history of higher education in Nigeria goes back many years beginning with the colonial past through independence and post-independence era. A thorough investigation of its origin can throw some light on the attitude and prospect of the Nigerian military regimes for the development of higher education as a pride. Needless at this point to dwell on the importance of higher education as a factor in intellectual development, but the real value can be expressed quite cogently in the ability to understand
the world of universe. Victor G. Onushkin has summarized some of the necessities or importance of the university education as follows:

The former role of the university as a somewhat isolated repository of knowledge available to a relatively elite few is changing as the result of pressure from many sectors of society. A university education is now considered to be more of a right than a privilege. The current view is that any student with ability and ambition should be provided with the opportunity to avail himself of a university education. However, due to cost and entrance requirements, the majority of those enrolled still come from the upper and middle classes. Nevertheless, education in the United States is considered a dynamic force and preservation. As such, a college education today is felt to be a necessity, while only a few years ago a high school education was considered sufficient.\textsuperscript{10}

One final statement must be made concerning the attitude of Nigerian intellectuals. Until the civil war (1966-1970), the Nigerian intellectuals, as well as the University College of Ibadan were just as conservative as the British colonial administrators who planted this seed in them. Even today, in spite of the present changes made possible by the military regimes, this conservative arrogance or intellectual climate still exists among Nigerians particularly those who consider themselves academic members of the old school or claim to have completed at Ibadan, London or Oxford University.

Background of Nigerian Universities

The Nigerian universities are products of both state and national governments. Beginning from 1948, the University College of Ibadan, it must be recalled, was a branch of London University until 1962 when it broke off ties with London. Prior to 1962, the University College awarded its students external degrees from London University. Most of the early higher education needs of Nigeria were referred to Ibadan as the only center of intellectual excellence. As a result of its conservative admission policy, the college was subjected to heavy criticisms by new breed of Nigerians whose concept of university education was drastically different from those of the so-called "Ivy Leagues." They began to question why London should impose its academic model on Nigerian students.

In 1955, the Eastern Regional Government decided to establish a new university that would be less conservative and able to offer both vocational and academic degrees or disciplines to serve the country's cultural, industrial, and administrative interests. The University of Nigeria, Nsukka was opened in 1960 to serve these needs.\(^\text{11}\) Like most American

colleges and universities, the University of Nigeria, Nsukka was to develop new ideas and curricula into Nigerian higher education. Its first class of students graduated in 1963, about three years before the civil war that delayed its forward-looking educational policy. Soon after the civil war in 1970, the University opened its doors to students once again. In 1973, the University was taken over by the national government, mainly as a result of the effect of the war that caused the dissolution of regions in favor of the creation of states. It was the first Nigerian university to grant its own degrees and was administered overwhelmingly by indigenous citizens. However, its teaching staff included both foreign and Nigerian faculty members. The student population was 2,900 in 1970 and 4,154 in 1973-74 academic year, an increase that superseded that of Ibadan within its first five years of existence. Just before the civil war, its branch campus was established at Enugu.\[12\]

\[12\] The main campus of the University of Nigeria was located at Nsukka. Later on, its branch campus was opened at Enugu, not too long a distance from its main campus, in 1961. The University was jointly financed by the former regional and federal governments. No branch campus of this University was thought of elsewhere other than in the Ibo-heartland areas until 1975 when the military regimes decreed the establishment of four more universities across the country, one of which was the University of Calabar in Cross River state with its initial intake of 156 students.
The Ahmadu Bello University at Zaria was opened in 1962 on the site of Nigeria College of Arts and Sciences. It was named after the late Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto who was its first chancellor. The University was necessary to encourage integration of higher education in the north and south. Its faculties now include, among others, medicine, agriculture, education, chemistry and biochemistry, business administration, mechanical and electrical engineering, government, and mathematics. The student population in 1962 was 426 and 6,865 in 1973-74 academic year.\(^{13}\)

Aside from the University College at Ibadan which belonged to the federal government of Nigeria, the University of Ife was initiated by the Western Regional Government in 1960, as a regional institution like the University of Nigeria, Nsukka in the former Eastern Region. In 1962, the University was formally opened with the policy of "opening its doors to students from all parts of the federation and the world." Ife was begun at the site of the Nigerian College of Arts, Science and Technology until its present location at Ile-Ife was completed. The University now has the faculties of medicine, agriculture, arts, economics, social sciences, law, education, pharmacy, and pure science. In

\(^{13}\)Commonwealth Universities Yearbook 1976, Vol. I.
addition, there are institutes of administration, African studies, education, physical education, agricultural research and training, demographic research and training, and drug research units. Its student body in 1962 was 244 and 5,041 in 1973-74 academic year. The total academic and administrative staff was 80 in 1962 and 571 in 1973-74.  

The university was taken over by the federal military government in the 1975 edict.

The University of Lagos opened its doors to the first class of students in 1962. It must be recalled that the Ashby Commission of 1959 had recommended an urban university to be built at Lagos in order to serve the dual needs of day and evening programs. Its faculties now include day and evening law school, engineering, medicine, science, arts and education, among others. The student body in 1962 was 131 and 3,400 in 1973-74.  

It was in 1968 that its college of medicine which prior to that year was functioning independently became a part of the university's governing board—senate and council by the 1975 federal military government's edict.

By an edict of 1970, the Mid-West Institute of Technology was established with its initial faculties of medicine

\[14\text{Ibid.}\] \[15\text{Ibid.}\]
engineering, science and pharmacy. In 1972, the Institute of Technology was transformed to the University of Benin. Its initial enrolment of 110 in 1970 increased to 710 in 1973-74, and a similar increase in its staff members from 33 in 1970 to 208 in 1973-74. The University of Benin was included as one of the federal universities by an edict of 1975.  

Subsequently, on October 1, 1975, the federal military government, acting on its own initiatives decreed the opening of four more universities and three additional university colleges. These four universities are now located at Calabar in Cross River State, Jos in Plateau State, Maiduguri in North-Eastern State, and Sokoto in North-Western State, and the university colleges are located at Ilorin in Kwara State, Kano in Kano State, and Port Harcourt in Rivers State.

The Effect of the Dina Committee

It is difficult to think of the establishment and maintenance of a university system without considering the means of running it. Thanks to the crude oil revenue from which Nigeria derives the bulk of its national income which

\[16\text{Ibid.}\]
enables her to finance the national universities.

In 1973, as noted previously, the East Central and the Cross River States appealed to the federal military government to release them of the burden of financing the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. Prior to that year, the national government was financing the institution with 30 percent of its expenditures. The problem was increased, however, by the aftermath of war. This request was supported by the National Universities Commission and approved by the federal military government. Thereafter, the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, became the federal institution in the same status as Ibadan and the University of Lagos.

In 1966, as a follow-up to the Ashby Commission's recommendations, suggestions were made to establish a Universities Authority, a quasi-legal body which would coordinate the executive, as well as the administrative functions of the five universities in the country. The idea was to attempt to establish a central agency rather than the duplication and overlapping of interests by organizing each in different university campuses, or clearly speaking, the aim was to minimize cost while maximizing efficiency in running these five universities.¹⁷ Before matters were discussed and

¹⁷Economically, it would cost less to provide a
decisions reached, the first military regime was swept away by the second, and the proposal was not implemented.

During the second military regime (1966-75), the federal military government set up a committee to examine the revenue allocation to universities. This was known as the Dina Committee which suggested to the federal military government that "all universities in Nigeria should be financed one hundred per cent by the federal government."\(^\text{18}\)

By implementation of the Dina Committee report, the federal military government decreed in August, 1972, that "all the Nigerian universities would be federalised and that higher education would now be the sole responsibility of the federal government, but that the existing state or regional universities would retain their character and status."\(^\text{19}\) The military higher education policy, like other major public policies of its time, must be examined in general as a determined effort to decentralize the opportunity for higher

centralized agency to co-ordinate programs and manage all the national universities than it would be to attempt to provide each institution or university with its separate co-ordinating and managing agency. Aside from this economic cost concept, the former approach is likely to enhance efficiency through group bargaining process than the latter.


\(^{19}\) Ibid.
education which was previously an elitist control. The num-
ber of Nigerian universities and the enrolment targets for
the 1980's bear clear evidence that the military has pro-
moted the utmost cause for higher education in Nigeria.
Even more significant is its assumption of responsibility
for the overall financing, planning, and staffing of the na-
tional universities.

Policy Implementation--Financing of
the National Universities

Whenever it is necessary for a government, private
institution or organization to assume the overall responsi-
bility for financing all or parts of its social institutions,
the conditions and means are usually established. The amount
of resources available to the government or private organiza-
tion may govern the objectives and potential role it is
likely to play under the circumstances. Its ability to
implement one or more policies on public programs is usually
a function of several factors and at least one of these, that
is financing is implicit in the means.

From 1948 to 1952, the University College at Ibadan
was a joint venture between the British colonial administra-
tion and what was ironically called the Nigerian government.
The institution was controlled almost exclusively by the
British colonial government which supplied the means. The institution's curriculum, staffing and planning were British and there was no consideration given to the development of an educational policy that would incorporate the cultural interest of Nigerians whom the institution was serving. The issue of financing the University College was always debated in the British Parliament and this was not without some serious implications. Most conservative members of the British Parliament were constantly opposed to the idea of assuming this financial responsibility. They found nothing to convince them of the need for a commitment to an institution that was presumably to serve Nigerian interests. The Liberals, on the other hand, argued to the contrary. They saw in Ibadan University College a model of London University and Nigeria as a member of the British commonwealth. The University College, though located in Nigeria was serving the metropolitan interests of the British colonial system. Based upon these views, the Liberals saw the need to vote annual expenditures for the University College.

Following the withdrawal of the so-called Colonial Development and Welfare Fund in London which supported the University College prior to Nigerian independence, other sources were considered, such as the United Nations' Agency
for International Development Fund, the Carnegie Corporation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the British Ministry of Overseas Development, the United Kingdom's Nuffield Foundation, and West German as well as the Netherlands Foundations. But the bulk of financing of the University College was the responsibility of the Nigerian Government since sources noted above constituted mainly financial assistance.  

At independence when the number of Nigerian universities increased to five, "the burden" of total commitment to financing these universities emerged. The University College and the University of Lagos directly benefited from the federal government's total support while Nsukka, Ahmadu Bello, and Ife were supported by the Regional governments.

The change in financing the Nigerian universities was brought about by the National Universities Commission. In 1964, the Commission proposed partial financial support (50 per cent), for the three regional universities and full support (100 per cent), for the two existing federal universities

---

20 Although statistics on the above subject are not available, it is understood, however, that the University College was financed mainly from the funds derived on the colonial exploitation of the natural resources of Nigeria. Major sources were gold, coal, tin, silver, as well as vegetable sources like cocoa and palm oil.
by the federal government. However, this proposal was approved with some modifications. The federal government accepted its total commitment to Ibadan and Lagos but agreed to support the three regional institutions in the following proportions: Ahmadu Bello, 50 per cent; Nsukka and Ife, 30 per cent each. This new policy was quickly implemented by the National Universities Commission with effect from 1964 and continued into 1966 when the civil war interrupted. This policy was amended in 1967 by the federal military regime and the new arrangement was as follows:

**Federal Support to Nigerian Universities, 1967**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Amt. of Federal Support (Per Cent)</th>
<th>Amt. of Regional Support (Per Cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ibadan</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nsukka (from 1973)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ife</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmadu Bello</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin (from 1970)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Commonwealth Universities Yearbook, 1974–78.*

Thus, the federal military government has assumed the full responsibility of financing the presently existing

---

21 *Commonwealth Universities Yearbook, 1974.*


thirteen national universities in the country, which in addition to the above include Universities of Calabar, Maiduguri, Jos, Sokoto, and University Colleges of Kano, Ilorin and Port Harcourt. This means that currently this new plan has received full implementation.\(^{24}\)

Total Ranking of Per Cent Allocation of Revenue in Selected Economic and Institutional Sectors—3rd National Development Plan 1975-80\(^{25}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectors</th>
<th>Amount of Revenue Allocation (₦)</th>
<th>Per Cent Allocation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>₦7.0 billion</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>₦2.5 billion</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture (a)</td>
<td>₦2.2 billion</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>₦1.7 billion</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication (P&amp;T)</td>
<td>₦1.3 billion</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry (b)</td>
<td>₦1.000 billion</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>₦15.0 billion</td>
<td>100.0 (Approx.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Nigeria Diary 1979*.

\(^{24}\)Commonwealth Universities Yearbook 1976, p. 1763.

\(^{25}\)The sectors and the amounts of total allocation were extracted from the 1979 *Nigeria Diary*, pp. 9-18. Note that the total investment undertaken by the Federal and State Governments (there are presently 19 states), as well as the private sector in the 3rd National Development Plan in various sectors of the economy was about ₦42 billion. During this period, the federal government has placed priorities on transportation, education, agriculture, health, communication and industry.

\(^{26}\)Although the figure does not show how much was
This priority status which the Nigerian Military Regimes have given to education in general, and higher education in particular, can be explained by both historical and theoretical models. Taking the historical approach, it must be recalled that the military was least recognized in Nigerian politics from the beginning of parliamentary system of government in the 1950's to the attainment of independence and beyond in 1960 through 1966. During the colonial regime (1900-1960), all major political and military decisions were reached by colonial administrators through hierarchical procedures. The military had no voice in most of the policies that were formulated. It was regarded as a "defense mechanism" that was ordered from without to spring to action during crisis situations.

Ruth First has noted that the Nigerian army under colonial regime demonstrated a glaring discrimination in various aspects of social life. Notably, she said, "a Nigerian soldier of whatever rank had to stand to attention even to a British sergeant and he had to salute White civilians."\(^{27}\) From the formation of the West African

allocated to higher education, it is estimated that more than one-half might be reasonable to assume.

\(^{27}\)First, *Power in Africa*, p. 80.
Frontier Force in 1897 until the outbreak of the Second World War, Nigerian soldiers were not allowed to wear shoes on parade or ordinary duties except on long marches. "African feet," she said, "were supposedly hardened enough not to need shoes."  

General Emile Jannsens, the Belgian commander of Force Publique in the Belgian Congo (now Zaire), once asked, "Who was sent into the Force Publique?" His answer was "The least promising individuals, the pupils who had been expelled from school, the refuse of the nation. Although not related to this particular analysis of Nigerian army, Jannsens' arrogance explains the attitudes of colonial administrators towards African soldiers. In Nigeria, similar attitudes prevailed in spite of the arguments that Nigerian soldiers were better treated by the British colonial forces.

---

28 The West African Frontier Force was a contingent of military force that was formed by Lord Lugard to embrace the four West African British colonies—Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra-Leone and Gambia, for defense purposes.

29 First, Power in Africa, p. 78.

30 Ibid.

31 Ruth First has argued that nowhere was the army used more ruthlessly as the tool of colonial coercion than in the Belgian Congo. She said that the Belgians, unlike the French, the British and the Portuguese, sent no metropolitan troops for the colonial contingent. See First, Power in Africa, p. 78.
administrators than did the Belgians to the Congolese (now Zairians).

One would have expected at independence when Nigerians assumed full decision-making powers that the Nigerian army would have a favorable position within the political system. That expectation was contrary to popular belief in Nigeria. The Nigerian army continued to be regarded as an "underdog" in the Nigerian social system. It was expected to remain in the barracks until called upon to play its traditional role of national defense in an event of emergencies. Therefore, in order to prove to the Nigerian public that the military regime could do just as well as its civilian counterparts in formulating and implementing public policies, in spite of the former's short-comings in many respects, the Nigerian military regimes embarked upon a great deal of higher education policies designed to enhance equalization of higher education opportunities throughout the country.

Theoretically, the general impressions one gets about the military involvements in political affairs have always been that it has violated its traditional code of ethics. This is not to say that the author supports military intervention in political affairs. Traditionally, however, the
military possesses the type of training and preparedness for defense purposes in the same way that politicians are either indoctrinated or trained in the art of politics. Each can function more efficiently in its own area of expertise than its amateur counterpart. This means that the military is expected to play purely "corrective" role in an event of its intervention in politics. One of the weaknesses of Gowon's regime, according to Nigerian Tribune's commentary, was that it had over-stayed its welcome. A military regime, it indicated, should be a transitional government and its tenure of office should be short and effective. For, their very training and temperament, soldiers do not possess the qualities of politicians.  

Furthermore, the commentary pointed out that the art of government is purely practical politics, and that it was best left for those who have the necessary training, public confidence, temperament, experience, ability and the stomach for it.  

Being aware of the skepticisms of the public about the military participation in politics, the Nigerian military regimes managed to exercise the traditional role, as well as political functions. Their political functions are demonstrated practically in their orientations toward full

---

\(^{33}\)Ibid.
implementation of higher education policies, particularly in financing, planning and staffing of the thirteen universities in the country. The Nigerian Military Regimes have broken the higher education barrier that once confronted both the colonial regime (1900-1960), and the civilian regime that followed (1960-1966). The regimes have also changed the traditional elitist concept of higher education that also prevailed during the British colonial period through the independence era in Nigeria. Above all, the military has successfully devised higher education policies designed to bridge the gap of educational imbalance between the north and south. This effort is demonstrated by providing about one-half of the thirteen universities in Nigeria for the northern states.\(^{34}\) It is expected that once this apparent gap has been closed, the conflict of interests that once attempted to split the national unity may be solved once and for all. The equalization of opportunity in higher education in Nigeria is likely to become a civilizing force in the promotion of internal relations among various states of the nation.

\(^{34}\)These are: Ahmadu Bello University, University of Sokoto, University of Jos, University of Maiduguri, and University Colleges of Kano and Ilorin.
Policy Implementation---Staffing of the National Universities

The decision to establish many universities in a country like Nigeria is much simpler than that of providing them with trained faculty members and staff who are able to coordinate the institutional curriculum and administration. Training of teachers takes many years and consumes a great deal of national income. In effect, the decision to establish universities constitutes a short-term projection, while the supply or training of manpower for these universities requires long-term planning. As it is noted, "staffing was the most difficult problem at the initial stages of growth of higher education in Nigeria, particularly the recruitment of the academic staff."35 This is the problem that has continued till the present time. In an effort to establish a university, certain objectives, such as the formation of initial committees to examine the trends of institutional success may be considered short-term and can be implemented within a reasonable time. Such short-term objectives are often easily attained without a heavy financial commitment. Other objectives may require a much longer time, space and financial commitments that poor governments, private or public

35 Commonwealth Universities Yearbook, 1974, p. 1713.
organizations may find themselves unable to fulfill. Institutions of higher learning today are finding it more difficult than ever before to meet some of their institutional requirements. One of these is indigenous manpower to replace the dependence on foreign staff. This problem is related to Nigeria today with her increasing number of universities without substantial reservoir of highly trained personnel. Shortage of staff began at the foundation of the University College in 1948. The British policy, of course, supported the recruitment of qualified staff members overseas through the international University Council for Higher Education in the Colonies in London. The practice continued through independence and post-independence era. The number of expatriate staff in Nigerian universities increased and this trend has continued into the 1970's in spite of the effort by some Nigerians to shoulder the burden of higher education themselves. Virtually all Nigerian universities

---

36For further information on the staff shortage during the initial stage of the University College, see Commonwealth Universities Yearbook, 1974, pp. 1713-20; Ibid.

37Ibid.

38There is still a good number of expatriate staff or faculty members in all Nigerian universities. However, this number no longer poses a real problem since all expatriate staff members are hired on short-term contracts, usually tenable for one year. As Nigerians qualify for positions
engage in the recruitment of foreign staff to serve in various capacities throughout the institutions.

Beginning from World War II, African universities depended almost entirely on the services of the inter-University Council for staff recruitments. The formal practice was for the agency to recruit British staff and in most cases offer them heavy or super-annuity allowances and other attractive incentives so as to induce them to come out to Africa to bear the black man's burden. The need for expertise in various specialized areas like medicine, engineering, and other sciences has created a continuous dependence on foreigners, in spite of the government's Nigerianization policy. Accordingly, this problem has forced the Nigerian government to offer expatriate staff extra amenities, such as subsidized, furnished housing, lengthy periods of annual vacation, car allowances and many other benefits under what is designated Federated Superannuation System for African universities. Although there are certain amendments made in some of these amenities, such as providing car allowances to expatriate or

held by expatriates, the former replace the latter and the cycle continues. The 1970's have witnessed a greater increase in the number of qualified Nigerians in all disciplines.

African staff, the majority still exist as parts of conditions of service for the expatriate staff.

Recent developments on the conditions of service in Nigerian universities have attempted to abolish some of the fabulous inducements that helped to retard the financial support of the universities. This effort is credited to the military regimes which have managed to effect certain reforms since they took over the full responsibility of financing the national universities.

Part of the difficulty inherent in staff development is the traditional role of the university environment. Most Nigerian universities inherited their curricula from the British universities, particularly London and Oxford. They are anxious to maintain the so-called "academic standards," without concern for the plight of Nigerian institutional needs and problems.40

During the 1978-79 budget speech, General Obasanjo made it clear that staff development policies were necessary and that "special attention will continue to be paid to high-level manpower which this administration believes is an

40 It is to be recalled that the admission requirements in Nigerian universities have helped to reduce the number of college graduates, as well as weaken efforts on increasing manpower needs of the country.
essential ingredient of national development." He noted that in spite of the tight budget, it was his administration's policy to continue in awarding free tuition to students in the national universities.

Therefore, in the light of Obasanjo's policy, it is evident that through huge scholarship and loan grants which the military regimes have made possible since they seized power in 1966, staff development policies have been implemented successfully. In 1975–76 academic year alone, the Federal Military Government made available the following scholarship and bursary awards to Nigerian students pursuing higher degrees, diplomas and technical courses:

**Nigerian Federal Military Government Scholarship Awards, 1975-76 Academic Year**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of Study</th>
<th>No. of Awards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medicine and Related Areas</td>
<td>808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering and Related Areas</td>
<td>514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and Related Areas</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Studies and Design</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Sciences</td>
<td>389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanities</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Sciences</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountancy and Related Areas</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---


42 Ibid.
(Continued)

(a) Undergraduate Total 3,197
(b) Graduate Total 407
(c) Technical Total 1,900

Grand Total 15,504


The above figure of 15,504 represents the number of awards for one academic year (1975-76). It is estimated that for a ten-year period, this figure will be increased to about 155,040, and enough to offset the present manpower shortages of Nigeria within the next decade.

Although the exact number of expatriate staff in Nigerian universities is not known, it is generally estimated at a higher percentage level than in the 1960's. According to T. M. Yesufu, in spite of "Nigerianization" policy, more expatriates work in Nigeria now than in 1960, as a result of high-level manpower shortages. Normally, one should expect the rising increase in the number of expatriate staff in Nigerian universities. The training of staff takes

---


some time, and in spite of the efforts on the part of the Nigerian military regimes in promoting staff development and training, it is understood that this time lapse must exist, and therefore a normal expectation. The necessity for concern in the initiation and implementation of policies designed to close the gap for manpower demand in Nigeria within the next decade must be recognized as important under the Nigerian military regimes.

**Government Scholarships as a Function of Staff Development and Increase**

The number of Nigerian students studying at home and abroad has increased dramatically since the military took over power in 1966.\(^{45}\) Consequently, the military government has spent much more in financing students' education than previous civilian regimes. Accordingly:

Students' fees represent only a small percentage of the income of a university at any given time. In 1963-64 academic year, for instance, Ibadan collected 8 per cent of its recurrent revenue from students, while Ife collected 14 per cent. As enrolment tripled at Ife (1966-67) the percentage dropped to 13 per cent. The cost per student to each of the universities continues to be relatively high. In 1963-64 the cost at Ibadan was ₦2074 per student, ₦2000 at Lagos, ₦1800 at Ife, ₦3000 at Ahmadu Bello and about ₦1600 at the University of Nigeria. These figures represent recurrent

expenditure only. It is generally agreed that each student place in the average Nigerian university now costs between ₦2000 to ₦2400 per annum and the government pays to each university as a subsidy for each student enrolled, the difference between ₦2000 or ₦2400 and the ₦300 or ₦400 paid by the student. It is also a matter of record that the cost per student in Nigeria is one of the highest if not the highest in Africa and Asia.46

The above statistics do not include the cost per student in overseas universities. However, the annual cost per student in an average American university is $5,000.00 and at times students complain about the insufficiency of this amount for their expenses. The statistics presented by Guy Arnold about the number of Nigerian students abroad may help to explain the position that the military has taken to foster the intellectual capacity of Nigeria:

The overseas argument was an important one:

The Sunday Punch estimated in July 1975 that 8,000 qualified Nigerians were in the USA, over 15,000 in Europe and 3,000 in the Far East, Australia and New Zealand. It suggested they were unwilling to come home because of the environmental and job uncertainties that awaited them in Nigeria. Most such fears, the paper said, were unfounded while it was up to Nigerians to help develop their country, the implication however, was that insufficient care was taken in allaying whatever fears existed. Shortly afterwards the New Nigerian estimated that 12,000 Nigerians would leave for the USA in 1975, of whom half would be students. Such figures give an idea of the number of potentially highly qualified people who leave Nigeria and of the possible

46 Commonwealth Universities Yearbook, 1974, p. 1711.
numbers who ought soon to return to fill the gaps and so reduce dependence upon expatriates.47

If one estimates the amount spent on each of the Nigerian students abroad who carries a government scholarship, loan or grant, the total would be much higher than for those who are studying in Nigerian universities. Arnold indicated further that the Nigerian High Commissioner in London had confirmed the report that most qualified Nigerians there were unwilling to return home and that efforts were being made to encourage them to do so through the establishment of recruitment centers. Later that month, he said, the report from the High Commission's office supported the fact that 200 Nigerians abroad were offered jobs by the federal and state public service commissions, and that the Federal Public Service Commission agreed that those were part of the total of 350 Nigerians who accepted jobs during the joint overseas recruitment tour by the commission. The breakdown of the countries from where the students who accepted those jobs and were returning to Nigeria made an interesting reading: 136 were returning from the USA, 7 from Canada, 14 from West Berlin, 7 from East Berlin, 7 from Bonn, 28 from USSR,

9 from England and 2 from France.\textsuperscript{48} He warned, however, that there was a need for imagination in recruiting to the right job; in using skills at all levels to the full; in ensuring that the trained people now resident abroad were enrichly enticed home because they saw an exciting future for themselves in developing their own country.\textsuperscript{49} In all these, the importance of highly trained and developed manpower is sine qua non to a successful implementation of programs of higher education in the national universities. According to Arnold, on the other hand, it is estimated that during the Third Plan Period, 49,210 extra people in the higher level ranges will be needed. Yet to meet this, university enrolment is only being doubled which means that by 1980—the end of the plan period a total of only 28,000 graduates will actually have been turned out. In addition, it is hoped a further 4,600 graduates trained overseas will return to augment the high-level manpower requirements. Even so, and despite other expedients—4,000 people to be turned out by non-university institutions and 6,000 to be upgraded from intermediate to high level categories—a short fall of 6,340 over the period is expected. Either this figure will not be met, with consequent damage to the actual implementation of

\textsuperscript{48}\textit{Ibid.} \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{49}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 111.
various parts of the plan, or it will be met in whole or in part by the importation of expatriate skills on the usual temporary basis—and that, he said, may present dangers of a different kind.  

As was noted previously, the staffing difficulty in the national universities for the majority of indigenes has been the problem of the 1970's. However, the military role in trying to bridge the gap has been commendable so far before power is transferred to its civilian counterpart in October, 1979. This role is demonstrated very effectively by the increase in the number of Nigerian universities on one hand, and the student intake in all the universities across the country on the other; these are likely to increase or promote manpower development.

**Policy Implementation—Planning of the National Universities**

The program of higher education, like other business investments requires continued planning if the institutions are to grow and meet the needs of the society. Higher educational investment is often a long-term program designed to achieve certain academic, curricular and other goals. The likelihood of institutional growth may depend very much upon

---

50 Ibid.
the quality of policy decisions and implementations that those who are charged with the institutional planning are capable of making.

Symbolic in institutional planning is an ability to identify the problem easily and attempt to solve it. Planning involves a host of human, institutional, social, political and administrative functions. These functions, in turn may be derived from state or national government. In some cases, powers may be delegated to a group of enlightened citizens who are charged with the planning responsibility, while in others direct executive powers may be exercised.

The Meaning of Institutional Planning

The meaning of institutional planning requires particular attention because it forms the backbone of any institutional development or growth. According to Wroe Alderson:

In the simplest terms planning is putting a set of elements in order. The planning process itself is a pretty complicated set of elements which needs to be put in order. One way to do this is to specify the detailed steps required in various types of planning assignments. But first it will be helpful to consider some perspectives on planning process as a whole. . . Planning is one approach to the matching of means and ends. To recognize planning is to concede that there is considerable complexity either in the means or in the ends or in both. . . Planning can be characterized as a process of dealing with groups of interdependent
decisions. It embodies basic economies in decision-making. . . Planning is particularly concerned with the time dimension of the indivisibility of resources. The decision to build a plant or to make a major installation of equipment is equivalent to committing resources for a number of years ahead.51

Similarly, D. Kent Halstead remarked that "to achieve educational objectives in a creative, orderly, and economically sound manner is a task demanding insight into not only the problem of the present but also those of the future, together with creative and intellectual pursuit of solutions and persuasive, persistent effort to implement programs."52 He argued further that "planning is an all-encompassing activity that depends on participation at every level--institutional, state, regional, and national--and involves public and private, and large and small institutions. 'If done well,' he said, 'the result could be a nation educated to a breadth, depth, and quality not previously envisioned.' He held that 'planning is worthy of the higher education community's determination to summon and use all of


its capabilities.'

Planning, therefore, as it is conceptualized by the Nigerian military regimes takes into consideration most of the factors that make up a sound higher educational system. In order to achieve this objective, the military regimes made certain provisions which are embodied in their edicts or decrees, thus granting the development and planning of national universities into the hands of the National Universities Commission.

**National Universities Commission--Its Role in the Planning of Universities**

The National Universities Commission was first appointed by the late Federal Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa in 1962 when the University College, Ibadan, broke its relationship with the University of London, and following the establishment of the Universities of Nigeria, Nsukka and Lagos, which the federal government personally became involved. The initial function of the commission was to act as a liaison or an intermediary between the federal government and the universities through allocation of funds to the latter. In 1962, when the commission came into effect, it consisted of eleven members; its honorary adviser was

---

Ibid.
Sir Eric Ashby, Master of Clark College, Cambridge and the legendary innovator of the 1959 Commission on Higher Education in Nigeria. Before the appointment of this commission, the universities received their funds directly from the regional or federal government.

The commission resembles the University Grants Committee in the United Kingdom. Accordingly, it was charged with the responsibility of effecting "even development among the national universities in terms of manpower needs of the country." 54

By an edict of 1974, the National Universities Commission underwent certain changes. Previously, the commission was directly in the cabinet office to advise the federal government on matters affecting Nigerian universities. Since 1974, it has been functioning in the office of the Federal Commissioner for Education. Its membership now comprises a chairman, seven members from Nigerian universities selected from different academic disciplines. This includes agriculture, forestry, veterinary sciences, basic sciences, engineering, social sciences, medical and other disciplines. Other members are the permanent secretaries of the federal ministries of education, finance, economic development and

54 Commonwealth Universities Yearbook, 1975, p. 1794.
reconstruction, and health; six members are selected on a nation-wide basis to represent commercial, industrial, and professional interests, plus an executive secretary who is an ex-officio member of the commission who does not have the right to vote at meetings. Non-public official members may hold office for three years or for such other period as may be specified in their instruments of appointment. 55

The main functions of the commission include:

a) to advise the head of the federal military government, through the commissioner, on the creation of new universities and other degree-granting institutions in Nigeria.

b) to prepare, after consultation with all the state governments, the universities, the National Manpower Board and such other bodies as it considers appropriate, periodic master plans for the balanced and coordinated development of universities in Nigeria and such plans shall include: (i) the general programmes to be pursued by the universities in order to ensure that they are fully adequate to national needs and objectives; (ii) recommendations for the establishment and location of new universities as and when considered necessary, and (iii) recommendations for the establishment of new faculties or postgraduate institutions in existing universities or the approval or disapproval of proposals to establish such faculties or institutions;

c) to make such other investigations relating to higher education that the commission may consider necessary in the national interest;

d) to make such other recommendations to the federal military government and state governments or to the universities relating to higher education as

55Ibid.
the commission may consider to be in the national interest;

e) to inquire into and advise the federal military government on the financial needs, both recurrent and capital, of university education in Nigeria and, in particular, to investigate and study the financial needs of university research and to ensure that adequate provision is made for this in the universities;

f) to receive block grants from the federal military government and allocate them to universities in accordance with such formula as may be laid down by the federal executive council;

g) to take into account, in advising the federal military government on university finances, such grants as may be made to the universities by state governments and by persons and institutions in and outside Nigeria;

h) to collate, analyse and publish information relating to university education in Nigeria and from other sources where such information is relevant to the discharge of its functions;

i) to undertake periodic reviews of the terms and conditions of service of personnel engaged in the universities and to make recommendations thereon to the federal military government where appropriate;

j) to recommend to the visitor of a university that a visitation be made to such university as and when it considers it necessary;

k) to act as the agency for channelling all external aid to the universities in Nigeria, and

l) to carry out such other activities as are conducive to the discharge of its functions.56

56Ibid.
By examining carefully the above delegated powers, it is apparent that the task of planning, co-ordinating, and control of Nigerian universities is in the Commission's hands. Undoubtedly, it is the Commission that must recognize the growing magnitude of higher education in Nigeria and attempt to cope with the problems arising from this innovation. The necessity for developing the institutional curriculum and research so as to maintain a quality program is one that is demanding. To this end, the Commission has created a basic curriculum of instruction that is common to all universities in Nigeria.

On the other hand, if one examines closely the actual position of the Commission, it becomes apparent that while it is charged with these responsibilities, the implementation of the program goals is in the hands of the faculty members of the specific universities. In essence therefore, the typical role that the Nigerian Federal Military Government requires of the Commission to play under the circumstances may be summarized as follows:

A) Planning, directing and controlling of the institutional activities in such a way that there exists in general a uniform criterion and standard of instruction throughout the national university system
B) Forecasting of short and long-range goals with emphasis on a comprehensive delivery of services and instructions to the public and the students in general

C) Co-ordination and control of institutional equipments and supplies, and

D) Implementation of programs of higher education that encompasses all disciplines and functionally designed to satisfy national manpower needs.

Aside from these administrative functions, the Commission's frame of reference is extended to other subsidiary roles, such as:

1) Periodic evaluation of current and future needs of higher education in state and national governments

2) Effecting certain changes from time to time on the curriculum of higher education so as to enhance the acquisition of knowledge as a necessary part of the national labor force

3) Critical analysis of the objectives of national higher education with special reference to making education responsive to national high-level manpower.57

These are some of the challenges that the National Universities Commission is facing and which must be entertained in an efficient manner by designing goals toward centralizing education. However, it is left to be seen whether or not the Commission will continue to deal with these problems to satisfy the national expectations.

It is a well-known administrative fact that there is no standard or universal model for institutional planning. Usually, each plan must be developed according to local needs. In Nigeria where local differences are as diverse as the individual philosophies of higher education, the role of the Commission in dealing with these problems is significant and likely to work through strategies ranging from negotiations to closed or open debates. Since a university is intended to serve the needs of its environment, and since national resources and policy must control the Commission's decisions, the Commission has a definite commitment to the people, as well as government in addressing itself to specific issues and must recognize the criteria that:

A) The size of any new university to be established must, of necessity depend upon the size of the local or city population and the expected number of out-of-state students across the country who are likely to benefit from this new university.

B) Recognizing the arbitrary demands throughout Nigeria, for the opening of new universities either as prestige symbols or as aspects of modernization, the commission must consider the national interests above local or state needs.

C) The commission must recognize that planned national goals are more productive and dependable than individual selfish goals.

D) The commission must devise some criteria for measurable inputs and outputs into Nigerian higher education, emphasizing, among other things.
the development of intellectual excellence, dynamic and socialized education that is capable of serving the economic, political and social systems of Nigeria.

In the final analysis, we are dealing with a host of "jagons," relating to those specific areas which the Commission must be held responsible. These areas, as we can recall in this discussion, are planning, organizing, staffing, directing, co-ordinating, reporting and financing. All these areas of responsibility are related to the national universities of Nigeria. Since these areas affect the activities of the Commission and Nigerian government, it is important that we attempt to define each of them with clarity:

1) Planning is an execution of all necessary actions and methods that must be applied in working out the desirable goals of an institution or other enterprises

2) Organizing relates to the establishment of formal categories of authority or opening of lines of communications for the purpose of an orderly conduct or operation of an institutional functions or tasks

3) Staffing is the recruitment and placement of qualified citizens who are responsible for imparting knowledge through experience and intellectual know-how to students

4) Directing is the process of guidance of decision-making goals so as to follow the general or particular patterns of events in the traditional institutional environment

5) Co-ordinating is the process of bringing together a set of interrelated elements into harmonious
action

6) Reporting is making known through memoranda, reports or verbal communications the activities or responsible actions of an administrative authority to whom the former is answerable, and

7) Financing goes with all that is authorized through delegated powers by the political authority to an administrative official over the allocation of resources or fiscal planning to institutions or universities. 58

In the final analysis, one must agree that the National Universities Commission has demonstrated a high-level efficiency in the management of the national universities. It is the only agency or group that has not been purged by the military regimes. 59 Perhaps, the reasons behind its excellent service, as well as continued presence in office may be explained by its consistencies in dealing with

58 The above definitions of functions are closely related to the context applicable to Nigerian frame of reference and interpreted in the light of our examination of the subject matter. Moreover, our reference to political authority exemplifies the leadership of the Nigerian military regimes while the use of administrative officials refers to the national universities commission. In other cases, we do refer directly to the military regimes and the national universities commission, respectively.

59 It must be recalled that during late General Mohammed's regime (August, 1975-February, 1976), he is reported to have purged both civilian and army personnel. Practically speaking, about 10,000 civil servants and twelve military governors across the country were "retired" because of various charges of corruption and mismanagement of public institutions and bureaucracies.
the contemporary problems of Nigerian higher education. Undoubtedly, the Commission has lived through intense periods of military regimes without cause for an alarm. It has maintained a record of credibility under three military regimes in Nigeria. Although the new constitution of Nigeria is silent on the definitive role of the Commission during the civilian regime which began on October 1, 1979, it is assumed that its functions will continue to serve the growing needs of higher education in Nigeria. If this happens, it means that the Commission will have another opportunity to deal with the issues and problems of institutional planning, organizing, staffing, directing, co-ordinating, reporting and financing of the national universities.

In summary, this chapter has dealt with the realities of implementation of higher education policies by the Nigerian military regimes, as demonstrated in various aspects of responsibility, such as, financing, planning and staffing of the national universities. In addition, the Nigerian military regimes have, in fact, during their thirteen years in office, designed or initiated and implemented programs of higher

60The Commission was reorganized during General Gowon's regime (August 1, 1966-July 29, 1975), through Generals Mohammed's and Obasanjo's regimes (August, 1975-February, 1976) and (February, 1976-October, 1979), respectively.
education, such as, curriculum development, administrative appointments, agencies for monitoring joint entrance or admission requirements, as well as providing uniform standards for the national universities. Above all, it is the Nigerian military regimes that merit the credit in making provisions for the giant development and training of the nation's manpower requirements through liberal scholarships and bursary grants to Nigerian students and faculty members.

The next chapter is designed to assess the significance of higher education in Nigeria and to analyze the role of the Nigerian military regimes in their efforts to change the original concept of elitist higher education policy in the country. This evaluation includes the differences between "society saturated" education and schooling within the context of higher education in Nigeria.
CHAPTER VII

GENERAL EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS

Chapter six attempted to examine the role of the Nigerian military government in the implementation of higher education policies by financing, staffing and planning of the universities system of Nigeria. The Nigerian military regimes managed successfully to implement higher education policies and programs through national and state channels via the delegation of administrative powers to commissions or appointed representatives whose chief functions were to coordinate and develop programs of higher education to suit manpower demands. Accordingly, statistics from the Second National Development Plan (1970-1974), indicated that "achievement in the field of education during the said period was not only phenomenal but that while university enrolment rose from 14,500 in 1971 to about 25,000 in 1974, government was involved in the establishment of new universities and the take-over of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka and the
University of Benin, Benin City." In the light of this effort, the military government finally decreed in August, 1972, to assume full responsibilities in the overall management of the Nigerian universities. The military achievements in this direction must be examined objectively as one of the major steps toward the implementation of universal higher education policy, as well as the decentralization of educational programs to suit the needs of the nation's manpower requirements. The work of the National Universities Commission began in 1962 but was reinforced by an official edict of 1974 by the Federal Military Government to advise the latter on matters relating to higher education. The commission not only exercised the power to coordinate institutional development of Nigerian universities but its functions included the periodic preparation of master plans for the uniform and efficient development of the universities system of Nigeria and, in addition, the exercise of control over the general development of programs to be pursued by the national universities for purposes of meeting the national economic or manpower objectives. The most important function of the commission, as it may be recalled, is that of chief adviser to the federal military government on financial needs, both

1Nigerian Diary, 1979, pp. 11-12.
recurrent and capital, affecting the national universities.²

While the authority of the commission to exercise a wide spectrum of institutional powers and responsibilities delegated to it by the federal military regimes cannot be questioned, there are yet certain unanswered questions regarding the end products of the contemporary higher educational institutions in Nigeria. In his critical study of "The preparation of teachers for African universities," A. Babs Fafunwa made an argument about the role of contemporary African universities. He indicated that:

The objectives of universities in Africa in this late twentieth century are primarily but not exclusively for an end--not knowledge for its own sake. . . . Consequently university education in Africa should be so structured as to place emphasis on the development of the individual with specific aim of helping him to contribute actively to the social, economic, political and cultural goals of his society and to provide him with the necessary tools that will enable him to perform this role effectively. To this end, African universities should help meet urgent manpower needs, improve the existing manpower and supply their nations with well-qualified graduate teachers and competent professional technical and administrative personnel who are sorely needed in Africa today; help improve the technical and scientific skills of the nation and continuously seek ways and means of assisting their governments in their constant search for satisfactory solutions to their many social, economic, and educational problems.³

²Commonwealth Universities Yearbook, 1975, p. 1794.

A similar study on "Education and Social Development," a book review essay on I. E. Essien's *Education and the Challenge of Quality* (1975), asked the question, "education for what purpose?" and went on to ask other questions, such as "What is the energetic drive for education all about?" "Is this a massive manpower development programme designed to be the motor of the industrial revolution in Nigeria?" "Or are we laying the foundation, through education, for the national unity and consciousness of the new generation?" "Are we educating for culture: in which case, the school becomes a tool for fashioning a modern civilization?" "Or are we simply educating the individual for self-defined purposes of life?"  

In approaching the answers to these critical questions, Opeyemi Ola maintained that "Brilliant and provocative treatment of these questions by Nigerians, either officials or non-officials are rare in journals and books and that it is because of this absence that many scholars have argued that an articulate and unified philosophy of education is absent in Nigeria."  

From this point, Ola deviated from the introductory aspects and went on to the review of materials on the

---


5 Ibid.
main topic of Nigerian concept of education and his views about it. Although Essien's book was not consulted at the time of this research, Ola indicated that the book "opened with a provocative but appropriate theme--that the mission of education for man has failed universally and that it is a book about the condition and purpose of education in Black Africa, and a brilliant attempt to give us a philosophy of education." The part that makes the most contribution to this research is his statement that "everywhere there is a quantitative growth in education in terms of increasing the number of students, teachers and schools; but everywhere man has failed to develop qualitatively in intellectual, moral and spiritual terms. Increasing schooling has not resulted in an increasing quality of man." His definition of education as "the creative use of acquired knowledge and skills for the progress of man: Education as the use of acquired knowledge and skills for the purpose of self-transformation and self-development: and the 'self' under reference could be an individual, a race, or a humanity," falls in line with the author's concept of education. Yet the issue at stake is not limited to Nigerian education since the argument concerns

---

6 Ibid., pp. 150-51.  
7 Ibid.
the universal failure of the mission of education for man and the empirically applicable word, "universality" was not operationally defined to enable us to reconcile this argument. However, by examining the argument much further, there are some aspects of persuasion in assuming that education in terms of quantitative increases in student enrollment, faculty members and institutional blocs does not develop a society.

Shelby Lewis has studied educational systems in Africa and in the United States, and come to the conclusion that many have often misconstrued and misunderstood the difference between education and schooling. Dr. Lewis argued that education encompasses a life-long process of character and attitude formation while schooling may be defined as a directed process of learning. What differentiates education from schooling then can be explained by philosophical and theoretical models. In a narrow sense,

---

it is true that many simply view schooling as education and argue that both involve a process of skills acquisition and character formation. After all, knowledge which is the end product of schooling and education is commulative and inseparable from what might be acquired through schooling and education. In a philosophical sense, one may argue that knowledge cannot be subjected to clinical testing and that the acquisition of knowledge through schooling and education are tantamount to the same thing. Furthermore, lack of cardinal measurement of knowledge means that it is equally difficult to separate schooling from education.

Lewis further holds that, from a close examination of the subjects, it becomes apparent that while schooling on one hand may be defined in terms of dimension, that is, it can be expressed mathematically within time limits, education, on the other hand, cannot be expressed in mathematical terms because it is an on-going process. One can think of schooling as governed by time limitations, such as eighth, ninth, or twelfth grades and undergraduate, graduate or post-graduate levels. But one cannot calculate education on that basis because it is a continuous process of character, skill and
attitude formation. Its life-span is as old as human life itself and continues and terminates with the end of human life. Yet schooling only occupies a certain period of one's time and ability to condition one's intellectual capability for the acquisition of knowledge or skill.

For more than a century, scholars, as well as educators interested in the discovery of what constitutes education or schooling have asked some interesting and thought-provoking questions concerning the place of education or schooling in the society. As a result of this constant quest for the understanding of the nature of the problem, diverse theories and philosophies about education and schooling have been developed. Some scholars, such as Gabriel Chanan and Linda Gilchrist have become curious about the role of schooling in the society.

They argued that the whole concept of schools was as an agent of cultural transmission and renewal and that it was the place of schools to "teach what cannot easily be learnt elsewhere."9 The school, they emphasized was to help

produce people who would fit into both industrial and professional fields as useful members of the society into which they were born. "Education," they argued, "should be both formal and informal so that the school could take up the formal aspect while making education less confined to the promotion of middle-class culture and geared to the inculcation of working-class, as well as the institutional element surrounding the school."\(^{10}\)

Some authors, such as N. Konyeason Onuoha have indicated that the role of education in nation building could be categorized into two broad outlines (a) "a statistical study of the contribution of education to the promotion of national integration (that is, an assessment of the degree of ethnocentric feelings among educated people), or (b) a description of the integrative functions of education."\(^{11}\) Onuoha pointed out that certain research studies of the relationship between formal schooling and integration in Africa had generally made poor impressions. He referred to a special study of the

\(^{10}\)Ibid.

causes of emotional stress among Nigerian students in Edinburgh by Amechi Anumonye which showed that Nigerian students abroad were more likely to make friends along ethnic lines. Anumonye's results of his investigations, among others included:

Among the Yoruba students studied for ethnocentrism 63% of females and 42% of males would exclude friendship with the Hausa; and 4% females and 16% males would exclude Igbos. Among Igbos, 33% males and 64% females would exclude Hausa; and 13% males and 17% females excluded Yorubas. Fifty-six per cent male and 69% female Yorubas would exclude Hausas from marriage, and 81% males and 84% females would exclude Ibos. For Ibos, 85% males and 94% females would exclude Hausas from marriage; and 86% males and 91% females would exclude Yorubas.12

Onuoha's conclusions on this subject reflected little or no encouragement because he did not find education as a factor of national integration in Nigeria. However, he suggested certain guidelines for the organization of school curriculum which according to him, must be "around the integrative theme."13 In order for Nigerian education to be meaningful for nation building, Onuoha recommended that "national institutions, for example, should be located throughout the country as much as conditions permit,"14 and that it would encourage spatial mobility and sharing of cultural practices.

He saw no integrative value in the organization of ethnic unions which he suggested should be discouraged. "Finally," he concluded, "the chances of the school to provide integrative experiences will be enhanced if the larger society itself is integrated."\(^{15}\)

There is no doubt that literature on national integration of Nigeria is abundant, so also are diverse theories of integration. Coleman and Rosberg have grappled with political parties as agents of national integration in Nigeria, so did Sklar and several others. Yet, certain practical and relevant approaches are lacking in the analysis of the factors that bring about national integration. It is true that Onuoha has given us the notion of the problem but he failed to supply the framework on which education as an agent of national integration can be functionally useful. The idea of decentralization of national institutions as a function of what he referred to as "spatial mobility and sharing of cultural practices," is a grand one but one is likely to question just how an increasing number of national institutions across the country may provide a remedy for national integration in a country where artificial boundaries

\(^{15}\)Ibid., p. 449.
beg for concrete solutions, the so-called Western educated Nigerians continuously address themselves to their identities in tribal and ethnic terms, and statistics continue to support the escalation of tribal inclinations among a wider spectrum of the population. Onuoha's further recommendation that the Nigerian government institute an official policy to encourage its citizens to share the interests and the festivities of other ethnic groups, is also a special contribution but is somewhat utopian. This is not to doubt that such a policy could not be formulated by Nigerian policy makers, but the crux of the argument lies in its implementation.

Setting aside the old wounds which the civil war has caused between north and east and assuming that there is such a national public policy initiated on the model suggested by Onuoha, would it be possible for the law to change the basic human behavior? For centuries, psychologists and other social or behavioral scientists have attempted to study human behavior and attitudes but the task has not been easy, let alone complete. From Plato to Aristotle, the subject of human behavior has covered a wide range of literature and analysis. "Man," Aristotle once said, "is a political
animal."\textsuperscript{16} Since that statement was made many years ago about man, there have been very little changes, if any, about human behavior. Applying this observation to Nigerian policy makers, we find nothing to convince us that they are not equally, if not worse, political animals in the sense that Aristotle implied many years ago. It is therefore on this basic assumption that utopianism exists in Onuaha's modest and thoughtful suggestions.

If I may deviate from this utopian concept of Nigerian public policy on higher education, I would suggest instead a development of the system of higher education that reflects social understanding and awareness of Nigerian culture. Cultural education by definition is the introduction of an efficient educational program that encompasses all ethnic, tribal and other local boundaries; addressing itself mainly to national origin, with strong emphasis on the development of habits, co-operative behavior, control of mass media, political socialization, political recruitment and leadership. First, Nigerians must be willing to forgo their conservative views about education built around the British colonial structure. Second, they must be willing to

\textsuperscript{16}Sohner, p. 2.
co-operate with the type of changes that ought to be under-
taken in the existing pattern to promote the curriculum that
is representative of Nigerian social order. Third, this
program must be implemented along the lines suggested by
Stella A. Olatunji in her eminent study of this subject.
Olatunji suggests the following goals for Nigerian educa-
tional programs:

(i) a determination of the present status of students
with respect to a particular learning area or
material

(ii) a specification of objectives based on the find-
ings of step (i) above, and in relation to the
learning area

(iii) based on (ii) above, the prescription and guid-
ance of learning activities, or more specifically,
the planning and teaching phase, and

(iv) the evaluation of learning outcomes, matching re-
results against the objectives.

The basic assumptions of the above model are to improve the
learning capabilities and potentials of the student and

(i) determine objectives for Nigerian education

(ii) interpret objectives at state and local levels

(iii) build a functional curriculum

(iv) develop actual learning experiences from a
broadly planned curriculum

(v) evaluate learning experiences, and in the matter
of attitudes:
(i) improve the attitude of observation and awareness

(ii) develop a spirit of inquisitiveness as well as question basic assumptions connected with curriculum formulation and operation

(iii) develop the habit of constant evaluation of goals and results

(iv) lead towards an appreciation of independence

(v) nurture an open but critical mind towards new developments

(vi) improve the willingness to examine ideas and practices for their worth, and with respect to acquisition of knowledge

(i) know attendant terms, such as curriculum, curriculum planning, objective, evaluation, and others

(ii) know about factors that bear on curriculum planning

(iii) know the processes involved in curriculum building

(iv) learn the various curriculum approaches

(v) get acquainted with on-going developments in curriculum building within Nigeria and elsewhere. 17

Based upon this model, Olatunji's conclusions indicated that the experiment in general was positive and the

---

above criteria to determine objectives, knowledge, skills and abilities and attitudes were functional and related to the fact that higher education courses could be confidently or consciously planned, pursued and evaluated beyond the ordinary or well-known models.\textsuperscript{18} The main thrust of this exercise is to plan or structure an educational system to reflect the Nigerian social systems and backgrounds.

The main criticisms of the existing system of higher education under the military regimes,\textsuperscript{19} in spite of its seemingly revolutionary outlook, can be explained by the almost total absence of development criteria for productive evaluation. Without certain devices designed to take account of the productivity of Nigerian higher education, the whole concept of higher education is meaningless.

\textbf{Testing the Hypothesis}

At the beginning of this study, an hypothesis was formulated which in this section is either supported or not supported by the findings of this research. Most research

\textsuperscript{18}Ibid., p. 286.

\textsuperscript{19}\textit{In actual fact, the military pattern of higher education is carried over to the civilian regime. After all, the civilian regime has only been in office for less than six months to be able to effect any significant change from the model set up by its predecessor, the military regimes.}
studies are subject to the authors' conclusions and are often either subjective or objective depending upon the nature of the data and its manipulation.

For this particular study, I have attempted to exercise scholarly commitments to present the true picture of the matter and examine the problem both analytically and objectively. Whatever may turn out to be the results is entirely representative or a reflection of an industrious and painstaking effort to offer the best under the circumstances.

Throughout this study, I have made an effort to examine the role of Nigerian military regimes in a particular sector which is considered important and where very little work has been done in the past. This sector is higher education policy under the Nigerian military regimes and how these regimes managed to implement most of the programs in this section. In this section, this hypothesis is presented and tested. The methods used in testing it are highly analytic and objective.

It is hypothesized that the Nigerian military regimes gave top priority to the development of higher education policies designed to bridge the gap between educational disparities in the northern and southern sections of the country.
This priority furthermore is demonstrated by significant financial investments in this sector compared to other sectors, such as agriculture, health, communication, and industry. This test takes into account the August 1972 Decree following the Dina Committee recommendations which officially and legally transferred the financing, planning, and staffing responsibilities of the National Universities to the Federal Military Regimes. In addition, it collects statistical data, such as executive orders, announcements, edicts and decrees which constitute the military approaches to decision making or policy formulation. Thirdly, these initial arrangements on the part of Nigerian military regimes to assume the responsibilities of management of all Nigerian higher education institutions are carefully examined and analyzed. This test is positive if evidence from the analysis overwhelmingly supports the fact that the Nigerian military regimes did, in fact, formulate policies towards their total commitments to finance, plan, and staff Nigerian universities. Conversely, in an event of a negative result, it means that an overwhelming evidence failed to support the intents on the part of the military regimes to effectively reach a decision to finance, plan, and staff higher education in Nigeria.
The decision by the Nigerian military regimes to control higher education was first suggested by the Dina Committee, set up in August, 1972, to examine the financial conditions of Nigerian universities. Prior to 1972, only Ibadan University and the University of Lagos were fully financed by the federal government and all other institutions of higher education, such as Nsukka, Ife, and Ahmadu Bello were regionally financed. However, each of the regional institutions received a certain percentage of its annual expenditure from the federal government.

After the Nigerian Civil War in 1970, most of the regional higher educational institutions, particularly those in the regions which were affected by the war—Nsukka in the former Eastern Region and Ahmadu Bello in the former Northern Region experienced financial difficulties. These regions were unable to finance, plan, or staff higher educational institutions as they did before the war. The former Eastern Region first made an appeal to the federal military regimes in 1973 to relieve it of the financial burden. Consequently, the appeal was granted by the federal military regimes and henceforth Nsukka University was included among the Federal universities. In order to give equal opportunities to all regional institutions, the Dina Committee recommended to the
federal military regimes to nationalize all higher educational institutions in the country. This recommendation was perhaps the only one made at the right time and place because sooner or later other regions would have followed the example that was demonstrated by the East.

It must be recalled, however, that the Ashby Commission of 1960 had recommended, among other things, that the federal government give financial assistance to the already existing universities and open one new university in the north and establish a university at Lagos to serve its metropolitan needs. In addition, it was the Commission's feeling that a National Universities Commission be established and charged with the functions of coordinating all higher educational programs with powers extending to matters of finance, planning, and staffing. The Commission was looked upon as an expert and authority on Nigerian higher education whose recommendations were closely followed and systematically implemented during the ensuing years. For example, the Ashby Commission recommended four universities for Nigeria in 1960, but the Nigerian government, acting on its recommendations, built five universities. In fact, the development of higher education in Nigeria has been influenced by various committee or commission reports particularly from London or Oxford
University. The former civilian regime (1960-1966), inherited these directives and surrendered them to the federal military regimes in May, 1966, when the latter seized political power from the former.

Judged from the standpoint of the military decision-making process, its action was a direct result of the Dina Committee recommendations. The main thesis of the Committee was that "all the Nigerian universities should be supported one hundred per cent by the federal military government." Immediately following the Dina Committee's report, the federal military regime officially decreed in August, 1972, as follows: "All the Nigerian universities would be federalised and higher education would be the sole responsibility of the federal government but the existing state or regional universities would retain their character and status."

All of the above sources of evidence point positively in support of the hypothesis. The 1972 Decree was officially pronounced by Gowon, then head of the federal military government, who subsequently re-organized the National Universities Commission to whom the powers to finance, plan,

---

21 Ibid.
and staff the existing universities were delegated. For particular references, the functions of the Commission are enumerated in Chapter VI. Sections (a) - (l) cover the overall functions and powers for which the Commission is responsible.

The Nigerian military regimes gave top priority to the development of university education policy as demonstrated by a statistically significant increase in the implementation of programs in this sector and the increase in the number of universities built, as well as the increase in the student enrolment. The first step in analyzing or testing this point is to examine the difference between the program of studies before and after the military regimes. The second step is to demonstrate the statistical difference between the number of universities before and after the military regimes. In the first place, a glance at the list of faculties in each of the thirteen universities and university colleges throughout Nigeria greets an observer with an increasing number of areas of specialization that now exists than what it was previously.\footnote{For reference purposes, consult Commonwealth Universities Yearbooks, 1965-1978; a section of Nigeria Diary, 1979, entitled "Achievements of the 2nd and 3rd National Development Plans (1970-74) - (1975-80)," respectively.} This is also true of the number of
faculty members, although this estimate includes both indigenous and expatriate. As for estimates on the number of new universities built since the military came into power in 1966, the number greatly supersedes the previous estimate. Statistically, on the evening of January 15, 1966 when the first coup took place, there were five universities in Nigeria. Two of these, Ibadan and Lagos were designated federal and the remaining three, Nsukka, Ife, and Ahmadu Bello belonged to each of the former Eastern, Western, and Northern regional governments.

On October 1, 1975, the federal military government decreed that four new universities and three university colleges would be established. These institutions are at Calabar, Jos, Maiduguri, Sokoto, Ilorin, Kano, and Port Harcourt. In actual fact, the number of new universities and university colleges is seven above the previous total. Equally significant is the dramatic increase in student enrolment. In 1934, the overall number of student enrolment at the University College, Ibadan was 18 and in ten years' time, it was increased to 26 in spite of the fact that about

150 qualified for admission each year. The statistics for 1962 enrolment at Ahmadu Bello University indicated a total of 425 of which 14 were women and the distribution of faculties included: Agriculture 5, architecture 68, arts 159, engineering 133, law 9, public administration 39, and science 12; there was no post-graduate student, and there were eleven students from other countries, such as Cameroon and Sierra Leone. Similarly, at Ibadan in 1962–63, the total student enrolment was 1,778 of which 153 were women and it included 89 engineering students at Ahmadu Bello University; distribution by faculties included: Agriculture 119, arts 594, economics 174, education 68, engineering 89, medicine 292, science 431, library 11; and included in the total were post-graduate students 77 and 66 foreign students mostly from Ghana and Cameroon. At Ife, the 1962 figures included a total of 244 students of which 22 were women, no graduate student, and four students largely from the Cameroon; faculty distribution represented: Agriculture 13, arts 51, economics 36, law 15, pharmacy 64, secretaryship 15, and science 50. The Lagos University had in the same year, a total of 72

24 James Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism.
26 Ibid., p. 850.
students of which 3 were women and about 31 of them were on part-time basis; faculty distribution was: business and social studies 46, law 26, law-evening 31, and the number of foreign students was one from the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{27} The University of Nigeria, Nsukka for 1962-63 academic year enrolled 1,248 of which 121 were women and 22 foreign students; faculty distribution included: arts 264, science 300, social studies 454, technology 230, (including 110 taking R.I.C.S. courses in Estate Management and Land Survey).\textsuperscript{28} The overall total of student enrollment in the five Nigerian universities in 1962-63 academic year was:\textsuperscript{29}

\begin{center}
Student Enrollment in Five Nigerian Universities, 1962-63 Academic Year
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|}
\hline
Universities & Enrollment \\
\hline
Ibadan & 1,778 \\
Lagos & 72 \\
Nigeria & 1,248 \\
Ife & 244 \\
Ahmadu Bello & 425 \\
\hline
Total & 3,767 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

Source: \textit{Commonwealth Universities Yearbooks, 1974-78.}

On the other hand, the figures for 1973-74 academic year reflected the following:\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., p. 855. \textsuperscript{28} Ibid., p. 863. \textsuperscript{29} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Commonwealth Universities Yearbook, 1976.} The cited figures for (1973-74), included 23,275 undergraduates, 1,407 graduate students, and 1,200 enrolled in diploma and certificate courses.
Student Enrollment in Six Nigerian Universities, 1973-74

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Universities</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ibadan</td>
<td>3,222</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>3,795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>2,977</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>3,626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>4,892</td>
<td>936</td>
<td>5,828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ife</td>
<td>4,017</td>
<td>941</td>
<td>4,958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmadu Bello</td>
<td>5,395</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>6,069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>888</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>1,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>25,330</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Commonwealth Universities Yearbooks, 1974-78.

Based upon the statistics of enrolment target for the 1979-80 academic year, the following will result. This figure will reflect the increase in the number of universities and student enrollment. Added to the six previously established universities, are Universities of Calabar, Jos, Maiduguri and Sokoto, and the University Colleges of Ilorin, Kano and Port Harcourt. This brings the total of Nigerian universities to thirteen.

Student Enrollment Targets of Thirteen Nigerian Universities and Colleges, 1979-80 Academic Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Universities</th>
<th>Enrollment Targets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ibadan</td>
<td>8,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>7,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>8,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ife</td>
<td>7,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmadu Bello</td>
<td>9,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>3,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four New Universities and Three University Colleges: Calabar, Jos, Maiduguri, Sokoto, Ilorin, Kano, Port Harcourt</td>
<td>8,795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>53,000 (Approx.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: A Survey of U. S. Business Opportunities.


32 Ibid.
In General, the above student enrolment target and the increasing number of universities explain the seriousness with which the military regimes handle higher education policy. Furthermore, in prosecuting the university program, care is taken to ensure that the pattern of enrolment accords with the manpower needs of the nation and to this end, a University Entrance Committee known as the Joint Admissions and Matriculations Board has been set up; the trend of government policy is clearly in the direction of free education at all levels as soon as it is practicable. The anticipated increase in the number of students, as well as the universities is more than double the 1973-74 figures. Generally speaking, the federal military government is embarking upon a program of enhancing individuals or groups throughout Nigeria to take advantage of the opportunity for the development of both intellectual and potential capabilities. This is demonstrated theoretically in its formulation of higher education policies to suit the manpower requirements of the nation and practically through its implementation of higher education programs, such as financing, staffing, and planning. In spite of the government's emphasis on agriculture and

industry, its statistics indicate increasingly more funds being allocated to education than other investment projects except defense, although these figures include education at lower levels than higher education. Statistical evidence supports the fact that the role of the federal military government towards the development of programs of higher education is tremendous.

Finally, I sought to test the overall potential of these programs of higher education. It does appear that the whole idea of higher education would be meaningless without sufficient amount of rapport in the actual implementation of the financial, planning, and staffing responsibilities. Without funds, it is impossible to plan or staff the universities, and funds without technical or technological planners and staff specialists, the universities cannot function effectively. Therefore, the argument whether the universities can survive without the implementation of one or the other of the three major higher education policies is one that occupies the final analysis of the test of the hypothesis. We began by hypothesizing that the federal military regimes managed successfully to implement higher education policies through appropriate financing, planning, and staffing of the national universities. Then we proceeded to establish statistical
evidence to support or disapprove our hypothesis. Finally, we were interested in the assessment of the goals and objectives of the programs of higher education in Nigeria as the final section of this analysis. Some critical questions might be asked: What is the real nature of change in Nigerian higher education? How different are these new changes from the old ones? Do these new changes amount to sewing new pieces of cloth upon the old ones? An overview of the above and other related issues constitute the final approach to the problem of higher education under the Nigerian military regimes.

The 1975-76 Federal Budget estimates showing sector's allocation of capital and recurrent expenditures, the 1976-77 estimates of sector's allocation of capital and recurrent expenditures and the Third National Development Plan's sectoral allocation of revenues are all primary sources which are in support of the first part of this hypothesis. For particular reference, it is true that following the decisions to finance, plan, and staff the national universities in August 1972, the federal military government reorganized a National Universities Commission and vested in it the powers to finance, plan, and staff the Nigerian institutions of higher education. These powers are spelt out in Chapter VI of this work.
For instance, Sections (a)-(l) are of particular value to our analysis. These are specifically powers to coordinate programs of higher education throughout Nigeria, and plan through preparation of "periodic master plans for the balanced and coordinated development of universities in Nigeria." Other responsibilities of the Commission include "recommendations for the establishment and location of new universities as and when considered necessary, and recommendations for the establishment of new faculties or postgraduate institutions in existing universities, or approval or disapproval of proposals to establish such faculties or institutions." On the financial needs of the universities, it is the Commission's responsibility to "advise the federal military government on both 'recurrent and capital expenditures of university education and in particular, investigate the research opportunities and their expenditures.' The Commission also 'receives block grants from the federal military government and allocates them to universities in accordance with such formula as may be laid down by the federal executive council.' The powers to conduct periodic reviews of the terms and conditions of service of personnel engaged in the universities and to make recommendations thereon to the federal military government where appropriate,
to act as the agency for channeling all external aid to the universities and carry out such other activities as are conducive to the discharge of its functions are the Commission's responsibilities."

Substantial evidence of the financial support of the existing universities is derived from the examination of the 1975-80 Federal Budget which allocated the following to each of the six selected economic and institutional sectors:

Sectoral Allocation of Revenue--3rd National Development Plan, 1975-80

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Revenue</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>₦ 7.0 billion</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture (a)</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication (P&amp;T)</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry (b)</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>₦15.0 billion</td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Nigeria Diary, 1979.*

The above data is drawn from one of the primary sources and it is an appropriate indicator to explain the total allocation of revenue to education in relation to other sectors.

The place of education among the five other sectors ranks second only to transport which is ₦7.0 billion while education is 2.5 billion. This means that 47 per cent of the

---

34 *The Nigeria Diary, 1979, pp. 9-18.*
budget is allocated to transport, while 17 per cent goes to education. Agriculture, health, communication, and industry rank less than the two top categories. These are: Agriculture N2.2, health N1.7, communication and industry N1.3 and .5 billion, respectively. In percentage-wise, agriculture is 15 per cent, health 11 per cent, communication 9 per cent, and industry 6 per cent. During the 1975-80 plan period, it is estimated that the national government would spend a total of N42.0 billion and this amount includes both state and the federal governments and both public and private sectors of the nation's economy.

The second source of evidence towards the financial commitments of higher education by the Nigerian military regimes is to compare the old levels of financial support with the new ones and see to what extent both are comparable or non-comparable. In 1964, the National Universities Commission submitted a proposal to the federal government for a partial financial support (about 50 per cent), to the then existing three regional universities—Nsukka, Ahmadu Bello, and Ife and recommended a full support for the two federal universities—Ibadan and Lagos (100 per cent). The Commission's proposal was adopted with some modifications. While the federal government accepted its total commitments to
both Ibadan and Lagos, it agreed to grant fifty per cent (50%), support to Ahmadu Bello University, and thirty per cent (30%), each to both Nsukka and Ife. No one questioned at that time why the proportions of support varied, but the popular argument during the civilian regime was that more funds should be made available to the North for the development of general and higher education in order to bridge the gap of uneven educational development between the North and South.

The new policy was quickly implemented by the National Universities Commission. In 1967, the military regime amended the proportional support which continued until 1966 when the first coup took place. By change of policy, the federal military government made the following available to each of the existing universities:

Sectoral Allocation of Revenue---3rd National Development Plan, 1975-80

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Amount of Federal Support (Per Cent)</th>
<th>Amount of Regional Support (Per Cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ibadan</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nsukka (1973)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ife</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmadu Bello</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin (1970)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Commonwealth Universities Yearbook, 1974.

---

35 Commonwealth Universities Yearbook, 1974, p. 1710.
It must be recalled that in 1973, the former Eastern regional government appealed to the federal military regime for a full financial support of Nsukka University and that was accepted. The change in the policy came at a time when the war-torn region of the East was unable to support any institution of higher learning and only those regions which were not directly affected by the war, particularly the Western and to some extent the Northern and the Mid-Western areas could afford parts of these total financial commitments. As it can be seen, Ife was given 30 per cent while the balance was to be made up by the Western region. While Ahmadu Bello in the North received 75 per cent federal grant, Benin in the Mid-West received 30 per cent and each of those regions was to make up for the balance.

In August, 1972, following the Dina Committee recommendations, the federal military regimes announced their decision to take over all the Nigerian universities and exercise total control of higher education in the country. The new policy transferred all the financial, planning, and staffing responsibilities from the regions to the national government. 36

The implementation of policy in regard to financing the national universities is one of the three major areas which the military regimes have tackled the task of higher education in Nigeria, and by far it is the most important factor in the success or failure of Nigerian higher education. Many have argued that without the booming crude oil economy of the early 1970's, the military regimes would have been unable to successfully implement most of the higher education policies that they managed to initiate. This argument is both reasonable and persuasive. However, it is not accurate or convincing to assume that mere availability of financial resources from oil is a function of the development of higher education in Nigeria. The post-independence civilian government witnessed a similar period of booming trade in palm oil and kernel, cocoa and peanut, but optimum interest in the development of programs designed to promote higher education in Nigeria was not given top priority. Instead, the major portion of the national income was lavished in conflicting interests of party politics by a few politicians whose personal interests surmounted the national goals.\footnote{For information regarding this subject, see Ojiako's 13 Years of Military Rule, 1966-1979, pp. 1-3; First's Power in Africa, pp. 144-69, 278-362.}
During the civilian era, opportunism seemed to have been the name of the political game. Politics, as it is defined by Harold Lasswell, is "who gets what, when and how." paid the Nigerian politicians off because they lived in luxury while the common man was subjected to an abject poverty. If this is the only interpretation of politics, it does appear to individuals or groups in Nigeria that at best it is highly an undesirable element of human exploitation designed to maintain the status quo. This is not to say that the military regimes are innocent of the civilian vices. In fact, the Nigerian military regimes have demonstrated similar tendencies of corruption and malpractice.\(^\text{38}\) The Gowon regime was noted for various acts of both political and official misconducts by the civilian and military personnel. However, the Gowon regime was an asset in the future course of Nigerian political stability. His regime was successful in charting the path of post-war development programs of reconstruction and reconciliation, yet critics are apt to point out that his regime "failed to have resolved pressing internal problems and provoked controversy by its inability to change the state military governors and give itself a new image; to take action on the creation of new states, to work

\(^{38}\)Ibid., pp. 84-88, 144-69, 278-362.
out an acceptable basis for the distribution of federal revenue and to give assurance on the return to civilian rule by 1976."\(^{39}\) Moreover, as it is alleged, "controversies over the 1973 census figures revived memories of 1963-64 and heightened the sense of disillusion with the regime; criticism of the government extended from corruption of its state military governors and civil commissioners to the obvious inefficiency and extravagance of the arrangements for the Second World Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture."\(^{40}\) But these were not all the phony misconceptions of the role of the military as a care-taker of broken constitutional governments, a corrective force or an opponent of corruption and malpractices. The Udoji error of dramatic increases in salaries without an appropriate economic base not only failed but created mounting inflation and human frustration throughout the country. Although Mohammed was able to reverse most of the negative public policies of the Gowon era, Nigeria has many more years to overcome inflation, underdevelopment and poverty in spite of her rich natural and human resources and potentially abundant economic opportunities.

\(^{39}\) *Africa South of the Sahara*, p. 652.

\(^{40}\) Ibid.
The next aspect of testing this hypothesis concerns the development of manpower which for lack of a better word, I decided to refer to as staffing of the national universities. No one would argue against the fact that staffing of the University College at Ibadan in the years following its establishment was one of the most difficult problems of the institution. As it can be recalled from the preceding chapters, the University College was a by-product of the University of London, and from 1948, the year of its establishment, up to 1962 when it deciphered relationships with its metropolitan partner, its teaching or academic staff was dominated and controlled by the British colonial system. Staff recruitment was handled initially by the International University Council for Higher Education in the Colonies at London. Being a part of the colonial institutions, its recruitment policy was designed to eliminate indigenous staff in preference for expatriate personnel. Usually, it was those who were not able to fit into the job market overseas, particularly in Britain, that were sent to teach at the University College. Consequently, all examinations towards certain diploma or degree status were set, graded and results published by an external section of London University and all student entries were treated as external candidates.
Similarly, the diplomas or degrees were awarded as external, carefully inscribed and provided to convey the message that "yours is of a different level from ours." The so-called colonial policy of ethnocentrism—"the belief in the inherent superiority of one's own group and culture accompanied by feeling of contempt for other groups and cultures," was fully implemented. In essence, we are dealing with what Frantz Fanon or Walter Rodney in his eminent description of colonialism would refer to as colonial mentality. Apparently, this was a kind of mental block that was incapable of treatment by any psychiatrist.

At the beginning of the Second World War, most African universities also depended upon the Inter-University Council for staff recruitment purposes and such recruitment was centered around the Western European countries as agents of colonial or neo-colonial staff. They were often induced with certain super-annuity allowances, such as fringe benefits, free furnished housing, lengthy periods of annual vacation paid for by African governments, car allowances, and free medical care for members of their household and all of these were established under what was referred to as

---

Federated Superannuation System for African Universities—another kind of colonial institution external to the indigenous people.

Although there is still dependence on the foreign staff in virtually all Nigerian universities, there are also some significant changes on the recruitment of staff for the existing institutions of higher learning. First, the military regimes have abolished some of those extra or superannuation allowances, such as granting of car allowances and full tenure for foreign staff members. Most of the employments of foreign staff members at present are initiated through yearly or periodic contracts, although they are more heavily paid than indigenous staff members of comparable qualifications. The objectives are that as soon as it is practicable, all foreign staff members are to be replaced by indigenous ones, as a part of what is designated as Nigerianization policy.

In order to implement programs designed to promote Nigerianization policy, the federal military regimes have made it possible for Nigerian students both at home and abroad to study with either state or federal scholarships or loans. This effort on the part of the Nigerian military regimes has been discussed in Chapter VI, under "Government
Scholarships As A Function of Staff Development and Increase." There appears to be a tremendous improvement on the level of quality and quantity of the development of manpower structure of Nigerian institutions of higher learning. The future has more hope and the country's long-term prospects as a major center of higher education in Africa are promising. This is of course given the opportunity for political stability and economic viability.

The last major higher education policy to be tested as a part of this hypothesis is planning of the national universities. Planning as a factor of institutional development and policy implementation has been dealt with in Chapter VI and in this particular section we need only to refer to this innovation as an all-encompassing activity that depends upon various levels of participation--states, institutions, regions, and the national body. In Nigeria, the task of planning the university system is charged or delegated to the National Universities Commission which is to develop, "after consultation with all the state governments, the universities, the National Manpower Board, and such other bodies as it considers appropriate, periodic master plans for the balanced and coordinated development of universities in Nigeria and such plans shall include
(1) the general programmes to be pursued by the universities in order to ensure that they are fully adequate to national needs and objectives, (2) recommendations for the establishment and location of new universities as and when considered necessary, and (3) recommendations for the establishment of new faculties or post-graduate institutions in existing universities or the approval or disapproval of proposals to establish such faculties or institutions."

So far, the role of the Commission in the management of information, as well as the national universities has not been seriously questioned except in a few instances of the students' unrest of the Gowon administration. The students' grievances were addressed to the administration but the main source of the problem was related to some of the harsh treatment of both the faculty members and the students across the campuses of the Nigerian universities. It was alleged that through the advice of the Commission to the federal military regime, the latter imposed certain stringent policies designed to implement the National Youth Service Corps programs. The students were against the poor conditions of service, particularly as they were related to remuneration, length of time of service, and the age limitation. In addition, the students also expressed concerns about the premature
retirements, firing and suspensions of some of the indigen- 
ous faculty members on purely ideological stand-points. 
Section I, Paragraph (a) of the main functions of the 
National Universities Commission gives advisory powers which 
the Commission must exercise through the Commissioner to the 
federal military government. Similarly, Paragraph (i) of 
the same instrument permits the Commission to "undertake 
periodic reviews of the terms and conditions of service of 
personnel engaged in the universities and to make recommenda-
tions thereon to the federal military government where appro-
priate." It is true that the Commission's advisory capacity 
has a tremendous influence on the decision of the federal 
military regimes and it is upon this premise that the former 
may be blamed for some of the outcomes of the latter's higher 
education policies.

This study sought also to test or assess the goals 
and objectives of the programs of higher education in Nigeria. 
In this particular section, the concept of change in goals 
and objectives is related to a radical break with all for-
eign, colonial or neo-colonial and capitalist influences in 
the nation's higher education policies. This is directly re-
lated to what Joseph Waller, though addressing himself to the 
internal colonialism in the United States, termed "first and
foremost a struggle to free the people from oppressive and exploitative foreign domination,"\(^{42}\) in our higher educational system. Che Guavara expressed the problem as:

In contrast with the surging growth of the countries in the socialist camp and the development taking place, albeit much more slowly, in the majority of the capitalist countries, is the unquestionable fact that a large proportion of the so-called underdeveloped countries are in total stagnation, and that in some of them the rate of economic growth is lower than that of population increase. These characteristics are not fortuitous; they correspond strictly to the nature of the capitalist system in full expansion, which transfers to the dependent countries the most abusive and bare-faced forms of exploitation. It must be clearly understood that the only way to solve the questions now besetting mankind is to eliminate completely the exploitation of dependent countries by developed capitalist countries, with all the consequences that this implies.\(^{43}\)

Walter Rodney, in his concern with how Europe underdeveloped Africa, made it clear that "A second and even more indispensable component of modern underdevelopment is that it expresses a particular relationship of exploitation: namely, the exploitation of one country by another and that all the countries named as 'underdeveloped' in the world are exploited by others; and the underdevelopment with which the world is


\[^{43}\text{Quoted from Walter Rodney's }\textit{How Europe Underdeveloped Africa}, p. 3.\]
now preoccupied is a product of capitalist, imperialist, and colonialist exploitation." 44 He cited two instances about African and Asian countries which developed independently until they were taken over directly or indirectly by the capitalist powers at which time, exploitation increased and the export of surplus ensued, depriving these people of the benefit of their natural resources and labor. This, he said, "is an integral part of underdevelopment in the contemporary sense." 45 Franz Fanon simply referred to the problem as an injustice which Europe has committed on the Third World. He argued that in a very real sense "Europe is literally the creation of the Third World." 46 He pointed out that "The wealth which smothers Europe is that which was stolen from the underdeveloped peoples, and that the ports of Holland, the docks of Bordeaux and Liverpool were specialized in the Negro slave trade and owe their renown to millions of deported slaves." 47 Finally, it is Fanon's thesis that "The spectacular flight of capital is one of the most constant phenomena of decolonization." 48 Norman Girvan,


47 Ibid. 48 Ibid., p. 103.
though addressing himself directly to the aspects of political economy of race in the Caribbean and the Americas, pointed out that "The principle motive of the colonial operation was the transfer of precious metals (i.e., organized plunder and looting), and that the regime of labor exploitation was devised to that end." He argued that at the time the European mercantile capitalism in the 17th and 18th centuries developed plantation economy in the Americas which encompassed relatively large land areas, producing on a large scale a single tropical commodity for export to Europe, and utilized a large quantity of African slave labor, a corresponding ideology was required to cement and to legitimize a social order based on the absolute subordination of the native to the colonist.

No analysis can be made or perfect conclusions reached on this matter without the examination of the British colonial and capitalist systems in Nigeria. In a very real sense, the colonial situation in Nigeria was both exploitative and demoralizing. The overall objective of the British colonial system in Nigeria was the transfer of the capital to


50 Ibid.
the mother country. The colonial institutions that were established during this period were carefully organized, staffed, and designed to fulfill this objective. At the University College, Ibadan, for instance, the British colonial policy was fully implemented in spite of the dissatisfaction expressed by Nigerians concerning the type of education that was offered to the people. In addition, the educated Nigerians were indoctrinated by the colonial educators to believe that the quality of education given in London universities was superior to the one that was administered to them in the colony. Most of the early agitations by Nigerians in the late 1940's were directed to the philosophy of upgrading the University College or giving it a full status to measure up with the University of London. Apart from the problem of utilizing our natural resources to serve the economic conditions of Europe, the colonial higher education policy was geared to demonstrating beyond reasonable doubts that there was a difference between European superiority and African inferiority. Lord Lugard even made it plain that the European task was to emancipate the subject people throughout the world. His statement, however, was a reverse of what happened because, according to Fanon, "Europe is literally the creation of the Third World," of which Nigeria is one.
Post-Independence Higher Education Philosophy and Colonial Mentality

The higher education philosophy following independence basically followed the legacy of the British colonial mentality. The University College, Ibadan, continued to fulfill the guidelines set for it by the colonial administrators and educated Nigerians did not do too much to reverse what was during the colonial era objectionable to them. As long as the curriculum of higher education at Ibadan was geared to producing an elitist group of educators, those who were lucky either directly or indirectly to be educated, helped to perpetuate the colonial policy. In Fanon's eminent thesis, "from their viewpoint nationalization does not mean placing the whole economy (for our particular purposes here, higher institution of learning--italics mine), at the service of the nation and deciding to satisfy the needs of the nation. 'To them, nationalization,' he emphasized, 'quite simply means the transfer into native hands of those unfair advantages which are a legacy of the colonial period.'"\(^{51}\) The real implications of this dilemma are further explained by saying that the national bourgeoisie stepped into the shoes of the former European settlement: doctors, barristers,

\(^{51}\) Fanon, p. 152.
traders, general agents, and transport agents, and that it considered this transfer rewarding by requiring that thereafter all the big foreign companies pass through its hands, whether or not such companies wished to continue their connections, open up with the country, as long as the national middle class discovered its historic mission: that of an intermediary, he achieved his objective.\(^{52}\)

This is to say that the colonial educators in Nigeria exist only to continue to implement those higher education policies left behind by their predecessors—the colonial masters.

**The Problem of Neocolonialism**

After independence of Nigeria on October 1, 1960, the British colonial administrators transferred political, economic, and social powers to the Nigerian leaders. The importance of the achievement of independence and the transfer of powers would indicate that higher education policies be formulated and implemented by the Nigerian leaders. However, since there was a basic contradiction between the policies pursued by the colonial masters and the new leadership, the ability to influence higher education decisions

\(^{52}\)Ibid.
independently by the latter failed. It should be recalled that:

After independence, the Federal Government had little influence on educational matters at primary and secondary school levels as this was the constitutional responsibility of the regions. This resulted in an increasing diversification in educational policies and varying standards of education from one state to the other.\footnote{Nigeria Handbook, 1975-76, p. 123.}

The inability by the Nigerian educators to formulate appropriate policies and implement them was not limited to primary or secondary levels, but it encompassed all levels of Nigerian higher educational system. The initial problem was, however, that of regionalization of education below the university level but the real issue was the backward-looking curricular, administrative, admission, and personnel practices and policies of the University College, Ibadan, that resisted change following independence. In other words, there was no change in strategy and goal of the post-independence higher educational system. What is this change in strategy and goal? How would it differ from the colonial educational policies? Who would determine or take initiative for this change?

The answers to the above questions can be found in
highly revolutionary terms. This is to say that "change," as it is understood in this research must result in a complete break with the old system. Experience has demonstrated that the colonial educational structure does not serve the best interest of Nigeria. Why continue with the educational system that does not satisfy the national objectives? Nigerian higher education should be a reflection on the social systems, by taking into account the implementation of such policies and the development of strategies that promote mass productive capacity of the nation's vast economic and natural resources. A productive higher education should be designed to train for good citizenship, able leadership, and the development of both national consciousness and awareness.

It is difficult to refer to Nigeria as a nation without leadership and stability. The post-independence civilian regime was characteristic of political conflicts arising from selfish interests among its political power contenders. The apparent results were a total break-down of the so-called colonial democracy and dependency. It was this condition that attracted military intervention in 1966. Even the military with its historic identity for interventionist and corrective roles has changed leadership more than four times within a single decade, thus creating continued instances of
political instability in Nigeria. The answer to Nigeria's existing problems may be found not in the processes of evolutionary change but through "revolutionary" strategies designed wholly to bring to bear on Nigerians as individuals or groups to learn to appreciate and respect the feelings of each other or develop pride for the so-called cultural diversities which now seem to be the source of most of our problems. It is within this context of one Nigeria full of diverse cultures and respect for all, irrespective of tribes, ethnic nationalities, or identities that this revolutionary process must be entertained. This new Nigeria therefore would be built along a peaceful understanding of individuals or groups as parts and parcels of a nation committed to the development of higher education strong enough to address itself to national goals and objectives.

Based upon the above analysis, there is sufficient statistical evidence to support the fact that the Nigerian military regimes managed successfully in developing and implementing policies designed to finance, staff, and plan the national universities. Sources available to the above analysis are in strong support of this hypothesis. The second section of this hypothesis dramatically indicates lack of supportive evidence. It consistently points to the negative
evidence of a continuation of the colonial educational policy which aimed at the fulfillment of the colonial economic and social interests. Higher education in contemporary Nigeria does not yet serve the national economic goals. The major portion of the Nigerian economy, for instance, crude oil and industry is still dominated by foreign economic interests. In virtually all Nigerian higher educational institutions, there are still expatriate faculty or staff members who hold key positions of authority, such as deans, chairpersons, and directors of educational programs. This situation is more pronounced in Northern universities, such as Ahmadu Bello, Kano, Jos, Sokoto and Maiduguri where the people still nurture their so-called "Northernization" policy. At best, the Nigerian higher educational institutions have not yet succeeded in designing programs of education to be commensurate with the manpower requirements of the nation. Most of the technical or technological areas of the national scientific, economic, and agricultural sectors have not fully recovered from foreign domination and exploitation. Statistics indicate that Nigeria is still a country of traders rather than manufacturers. In spite of her implementation of indigenization policy, the industrial sector of Nigerian economy is heavily dominated by foreign or multi-national
corporations of the world's capitalist system.\footnote{The author reaches these conclusions through information collected in 1971 and 1973 on his visits to Nigeria. The author made a general survey of Nigerian universities and interviewed most of the student and faculty members in regard to "change" in the sense described and analyzed above. The majority of responses did not support that there was any sign of revolutionary change, although evidence indicated, however, that some evolutionary changes were taking place across the campuses of the universities system of Nigeria. Of the estimated 2,000 students that I interviewed across the nation, 1,500 did not expect to experience any revolutionary change while the minority of 500 felt that the type of changes taking place under the military regimes were considered revolutionary in nature. Similarly, of the 200 faculty members consulted on this issue, 155 felt that there was no need for revolutionary changes, while 5 were of the opinion that such changes were necessary in our universities.}

In this chapter, an attempt has been made to evaluate the conditions of Nigerian higher education since its inception in the 1940's. This analysis was necessary in order to reconcile most of the assumptions that surround the existing higher education policies in Nigeria. Undoubtedly, at the conclusion of this chapter, it is understood that in spite of the efforts on the part of the Nigerian military regimes in the formulation and implementation of higher education policies designed to enhance educational development, the problems still remain. These are mainly the differences between "evolutionary" and "revolutionary" approaches of change towards goal attainments. It is because of this lack
of real change in higher educational structure that makes Nigeria a country of "traders" rather than one that combines her resources with productive forces.

The next chapter is designed to summarize objectively all of the aforementioned higher education prospects and problems in contemporary Nigeria. It is, in fact, the final chapter that presents analytically the implications, recommendations and contributions of this work.
CHAPTER VIII

GENERAL SUMMARY

The study of public policy is indeed the study of how a government makes important decisions that affect its citizens. On January 16, 1966, Nwafor Orizu, the Acting President of the defunct civilian government of Nigeria, painfully surrendered political power to the Nigerian Armed Forces. Following the resumption of power, the first military regime, headed by the late Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi announced its policy decrees for the interim administration of what came to be recognized as the Nigerian military regime. No sooner did the military take over than it decreed the suspension of the Republican Constitution.

Subsequently, General Ironsi outlined some of the major changes in the new government and his effort to maintain law and order in the country. On January 17, 1966, the General implemented some of his public policies which included the formation of the Supreme Military Council as an executive branch of the military government, the administrative
responsibilities of the Permanent Secretariats, and other matters relating to regions and public corporations.

However, the difficulty of maintaining a stable government in Nigeria culminated in subsequent military coups with further changes in the leadership of Nigerian political system. These changes were brought about by differences in political ideology or orientation of the military leadership. Consequently, between 1966 and 1978, there were four different periods of military regimes in Nigeria resulting from internal struggles for power among members of the military hierarchy.

The study of the military higher education policies in Nigeria was motivated by the desire to investigate policy orientations of the military regimes and to prove or disapprove the hypothesis that the Nigerian military regimes gave top priority to higher education than they did to other sectors, such as agriculture, transportation, communication and health. This study has its own unique, as well as common problems. First, it was undertaken practically, though not exclusively in the United States where a disproportionate source of primary data was available. Two, the author depended mostly on secondary and tertiary materials, but utilized a substantial body of primary and empirical sources.
From the primary and empirical standpoint, the author had the opportunity to visit Nigeria twice before this work was undertaken. The author managed to collect important data which have enabled him to complete this work.

The best that can be expected of this research effort lies not in the often voluminous information that must be provided, but in the demonstration of pertinent and relative data in explaining the subject matter. This is not to say that this work is entirely value-free, as it is impossible to complete a work of this volume without resorting to value judgments in several instances. For instance, I selected three major higher education policies which are financing, planning and staffing of the national universities system under the military regimes to be examined in this work. The choice of these areas originated from my personal belief that these are the key factors in the successful accomplishments of the tasks of the universities system. Moreover, if other factors are held constant, the three areas are considered the prima facie necessities for the implementation of programs in the national universities system. Specifically, it is in the magnitude of financial allocation to higher education under the military regimes that can guide us in evaluating the priority concept of higher
education that forms the major hypothesis of this study. Similarly, the planning and staffing functions are derived from the financial status of the universities system which can only be implemented if other factors, in this particular case finances, are equal.

At this stage of the game, it is difficult to foresee what the future holds for higher education programs in Nigeria. What we do know at this moment cannot predict most accurately the future prospects. It is true that the military regimes have managed to be successful in implementing most of the higher education policies, particularly those that concern financing, planning, and staffing. Yet, there are some unique problems which still face Nigeria as a state. The ability to implement most of the higher education policies of the 1970's may be attributed to the availability of revenue derived mainly from the crude oil. Teresa Turner has noted that "during the five years of civilian government, 1960-65, politicians took little interest in oil and civil servants remained on the margins of the industry; no policy was initiated. But after January, 1966, Shell-BP, responsible for most of the oil production, offered the new military regime improved financial terms." ¹ It is this improved

¹Teresa Turner, writing about the triangular
financial availability to the military regimes that has made the task of implementation of higher education policies easier, especially in the areas of financing, planning, and staffing, as well as other personnel services. The resources from oil have made a greater impact on the mentality of the masses. According to Olorunsola, certain quarters in Nigerian society have had the beliefs that "the government had the resources to introduce free university education." ² Whether or not government itself can afford this commitment in spite of the temporary oil boom is open to question. But the reality of Nigerian situation and her political economy would offer only minimal support to the universal free higher education. This reality can be weighed against the level of the country's economy. The implementation of public policy for universal free higher education without more years of building the nation's industrial base would militate against the development of the nation's political economy. This is to say that an attempt to declare an open-door policy in higher education without a similar effort to industrialize relationships of Nigerian crude oil deal, portrayed the underlying factors relating to the politics of oil, in Panter-Brick's Soldiers and Oil (London: Frank Cass, 1975), p. 179.

²Olorunsola, p. 38.
the society so that educational and technological impact may
serve the needs of our industrialized social order would not
satisfy the national goals or objectives.

Since an educational system per se does not change
the society, but its impact is reflected in the social sys-
tems, there is need for us to develop a model and a mean-
ingful methodology to examine the role of higher education
in Nigeria. The importance of revolutionary education has
already been mentioned but it is necessary to re-emphasize
the difference between colonial or elitist education that
was designed mainly to serve the colonial objectives, and
the revolutionary education that should enhance the national
goals.

On the theoretical level, it appears that Nigerian
higher education is geared to the development of the social
systems or that it is designed to serve the needs of an
industrialized society, but by a close examination of the
relationships between the level of the nation's economy and
her educational objectives, there is apparent contradiction

---

3This opinion is held by Professor Shelby Lewis whose
research work on African educational system provided her with
a wealth of information and data to argue convincingly on the
subject. Of particular importance is her argument that
African education can be made more meaningful by an effective
combination of education and economic development.
between theory and practice. The question here is whether or not higher education in Nigeria is carefully structured to produce the necessary combinations of input-output forms. Certainly, the reformist type of higher education would not produce but a combination of directed and society saturated higher education would produce significant results in an integrated educational system geared toward the development of the social structure in Nigeria. This is what amounts to an integration of theory and practice, if education is designed to fulfill or adhere to the economic development of a nation.

The final question is what has this intellectual exercise contributed to knowledge in general and the understanding of a particular political problem in Nigerian political system? It would be difficult to embark upon a particular research without some concrete explanation of its value. This is not to say that all research designs must of necessity produce concrete results. In social sciences, the results are often either descriptive or analytic or both.

Historically, the development of higher education in Nigeria has already been presented. But let me re-emphasize the fact that very little research has been done so far on public policy and Nigerian higher education. The fact
remains, however, that this research is basically exploratory. It has opened several avenues for students, scholars and politicians whose interests in Nigerian military politics may be burning, and who might wish to refer to this source as a guide.

Culturally, most previous studies by Western scholars on Nigerian politics have tended to emphasize either the traditional or structural functionalist approach to the study of the problem. Coleman and Rosberg, for instance, have had the typical notion that the failure of Nigerian political system is a function of the weak political party structure. They argued that national integration would not occur until the party system is highly developed to support the political institutions and processes. Yet, both missed the point by attempting to export American political behavior to the Nigerian political system. Similarly, theories such as those developed by Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., placed too much emphasis on the institutional development of the American political system and they attempted to adopt the same model in dealing with the problem of development in Africa. These efforts may be recognized as initial attempts to study the problem but they are by no means the right approach to deal with the African political development
in general, and certainly not the appropriate tools of analysis of Nigerian political system in particular. In contrast to the aforementioned research efforts, this research has combined the first-hand experience with the primary and secondary data to examine the issues, processes, and political, as well as public policy orientation of the Nigerian military regimes.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books


Articles


**Government Publications**


*The Nigerian Yearbooks, 1966-79.*


**Newspapers**


**Magazines and Periodicals**


Table (a)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field of Study</th>
<th>Benue-Plateau</th>
<th>East-Central</th>
<th>Kano</th>
<th>Kwara</th>
<th>Mid-West</th>
<th>North-Central</th>
<th>Lagos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. applications received</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. applications received</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. applications received</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1448</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>1448</td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. applications received</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. applications received</td>
<td>1439</td>
<td>1632</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>1632</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. applications received</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. applications received</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. applications received</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>1352</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>1352</td>
<td>437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. applications received</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. applications received</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. applications received</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. applications received</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. applications received</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>1423</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>1423</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. applications received</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>1243</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>1243</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. applications received</td>
<td>1302</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. applications received</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. applications received</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>11422</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>11422</td>
<td>453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%age of applications/awards</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%age of applications/awards</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%age of applications/awards</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>North-East</th>
<th>North-West</th>
<th>Rivers</th>
<th>South-East</th>
<th>West</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. applications</td>
<td>No. awards</td>
<td>No. applications</td>
<td>No. awards</td>
<td>No. applications</td>
<td>No. awards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicine and related subjects</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering and related subjects</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and related subjects</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental studies and design</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Sciences</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanities</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Sciences</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountancy and related subjects</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total (undergraduates)</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1088</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postgraduates</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand total</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>1473</td>
<td>442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%age of applications/awards</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field of Study</th>
<th>Non-degree Courses</th>
<th>First Degree Courses</th>
<th>Higher Degree Courses</th>
<th>Other Post-Graduate Courses</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Grand Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M  F</td>
<td>M  F</td>
<td>M  F</td>
<td>M  F</td>
<td></td>
<td>M&amp;F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>248 43</td>
<td>223 20</td>
<td>6 --</td>
<td>9 1</td>
<td>486 64</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>150 12</td>
<td>1374 249</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>1524 261</td>
<td>1785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>118 15</td>
<td>558 182</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>676 197</td>
<td>873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>130 21</td>
<td>203 25</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>333 46</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Science</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>507 40</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>507 40</td>
<td>547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pure Science</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>696 105</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>696 105</td>
<td>801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med., Pharm., Nurs.</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>382 84</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>382 84</td>
<td>466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>500 2</td>
<td>42 2</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>542 4</td>
<td>546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agric., For., Vet.Med.</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>302 8</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>302 8</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>646 91</strong></td>
<td><strong>4745 715</strong></td>
<td><strong>48 2</strong></td>
<td><strong>9 1</strong></td>
<td><strong>5448 809</strong></td>
<td><strong>6257</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Grand total         | **737**            | **5460**             | **50**                | **10**                      | **6257**|

**Source:** Survey of Nigerian Affairs, 1975.
Table 2(b)

Students Enrolled in Universities by Field of Study and Level of Course
University of Benin—1974-5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field of Study</th>
<th>Non-degree Courses</th>
<th>First Degree Courses</th>
<th>Higher Degree Courses</th>
<th>Other Post-Graduate Courses</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Grand Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pure Science</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Science</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med., Pharm., Nurs.</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agric., For., Vet. Med.</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grand Total

|                | 1048 | 1048 |

Table 2(c)

Students Enrolled in Universities by Field of Study and Level of Course
University of Ibadan--1974-5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field of Study</th>
<th>Non-degree Courses</th>
<th>First Degree Courses</th>
<th>Higher Degree Courses</th>
<th>Other Post-Graduate Courses</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Grand Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M  F</td>
<td>M  F</td>
<td>M  F</td>
<td>M  F</td>
<td></td>
<td>M&amp;F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>92  57</td>
<td>514  135</td>
<td>36  8</td>
<td>1  3</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>177  43</td>
<td>362  136</td>
<td>14  2</td>
<td>89  18</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pure Science</td>
<td>2    2</td>
<td>761  191</td>
<td>38  5</td>
<td>4  --</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Science</td>
<td>27   10</td>
<td>553  62</td>
<td>23  6</td>
<td>--  603</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med., Pharm., Nurs.</td>
<td>8    2</td>
<td>799  150</td>
<td>10  3</td>
<td>--  817</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>174  7</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>--  --</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agric., For., Vet. Med. 3</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>652   63</td>
<td>46  4</td>
<td>12  --</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>309  114</td>
<td>3815  744</td>
<td>167  28</td>
<td>106  21</td>
<td>4397</td>
<td>907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Grand Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>423   4559</td>
<td>195   127</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5304</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2(d)

Students Enrolled in Universities by Field of Study and Level of Course
University of Ife--1974-5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field of Study</th>
<th>Non-degree Courses</th>
<th>First Degree Courses</th>
<th>Higher Degree Courses</th>
<th>Other Post-Graduate Courses</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Grand Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M  F</td>
<td>M  F</td>
<td>M  F</td>
<td>M  F</td>
<td></td>
<td>M&amp;F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>86 12</td>
<td>--  --</td>
<td>19  --</td>
<td>63  1</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>--  --</td>
<td>341 127</td>
<td>9  3</td>
<td>--  --</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>481 208</td>
<td>459 178</td>
<td>12  --</td>
<td>--  --</td>
<td>952</td>
<td>388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>--  --</td>
<td>173 68</td>
<td>--  --</td>
<td>--  --</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pure Science</td>
<td>--  --</td>
<td>421 72</td>
<td>20  3</td>
<td>--  --</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Science</td>
<td>--  --</td>
<td>342 38</td>
<td>1  --</td>
<td>--  --</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>--  --</td>
<td>494 23</td>
<td>--  --</td>
<td>--  --</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agric., For., Vet.Med.</td>
<td>--  --</td>
<td>207 30</td>
<td>4  --</td>
<td>--  --</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>567 220</td>
<td>2802 664</td>
<td>75  8</td>
<td>63  1</td>
<td>3507</td>
<td>893</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grand Total

| 787 3466 83 64 | 4400 |

## Table 2(e)

Students Enrolled in Universities by Field of Study and Level of Course  
University of Lagos—1974-5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field of Study</th>
<th>Non-degree Courses</th>
<th>First Degree Courses</th>
<th>Higher Degree Courses</th>
<th>Other Post-Graduate Courses</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Grand Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pure Science</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Science</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med., Pham., Nurs.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agric., For., Vet.Med.</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>419</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>2453</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Grand Total**  
594    2882   122    41    3639

*Source: Survey of Nigerian Affairs, 1975.*
Table 2(f)

Students Enrolled in Universities by Field of Study and Level of Course
University of Nigeria (Nsukka)--1974-5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field of Study</th>
<th>Non-degree Courses</th>
<th>First Degree Courses</th>
<th>Higher Degree Courses</th>
<th>Other Post-Graduate Courses</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Grand Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M  F</td>
<td>M  F</td>
<td>M  F</td>
<td>M  F</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>267 32</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>8 10</td>
<td>433 167</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>2 --</td>
<td>438 147</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>173 87</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pure Science</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>958 160</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>958</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Science</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>455 72</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med., Pharm., Nurs.</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>612 136</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>1060 49</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>1060</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agric., For., Vet.Med.</td>
<td>61 9</td>
<td>398 66</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>71 19</td>
<td>4794 916</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>4865</td>
<td>935</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grand Total: 90 5710 5800

Table 3

Final Examination Results by Institution, Faculty and Sex 1974-5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Administration M</th>
<th>Administration F</th>
<th>Arts M</th>
<th>Arts F</th>
<th>Education M</th>
<th>Education F</th>
<th>Law M</th>
<th>Law F</th>
<th>Social Science M</th>
<th>Social Science F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ahmadu Bello</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibadan</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ife</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria (Nsukka)</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>1084</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Faculty Total | 506 | 741 | 1429 | 169 | 601 |
| Faculty %     | 9–6 | 14–0 | 27–0 | 3–2 | 11–4 |

Note: The figures in this table include Post Graduate, First Degree, Ordinary Diploma and certificate awards.

Table 3--Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Pure Science</th>
<th>Medicine, Pharmacy, Nursing</th>
<th>Technology</th>
<th>Agriculture, Forestry, Veterinary Medicine</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Grand Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmadu Bello</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibadan</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ife</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria (Nsukka)</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Faculty Total: 591 | 463 | 446 | 337 | 5283 |
Faculty%: 11-2 | 8-8 | 8-4 | 6-4 | 100%

Note: The figures in this table include Post Graduate, First Degree, Ordinary Diploma and certificate awards.

The 19 States at a Glance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Capital</th>
<th>Military Governor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anambra</td>
<td>Enugu</td>
<td>Lt. Col. John Kpera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauchi</td>
<td>Bauchi</td>
<td>Lt. Col. M. Bello Kalieel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bendel</td>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Col. George Innih</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benue</td>
<td>Makurdi</td>
<td>Lt. Col. Abdullahi Shellung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borno</td>
<td>Maiduguri</td>
<td>Lt. Col. Muhammadu Buhari</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross River</td>
<td>Calabar</td>
<td>Lt. Col. Paul Omu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gongola</td>
<td>Yola</td>
<td>Lt. Col. Mohammed Jega</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imo</td>
<td>Owerri</td>
<td>Lt. Commdr. G. Kanu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaduna</td>
<td>Kaduna</td>
<td>Lt. Col. Usman Jibrin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>Lt. Col. Sani Bello</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwara</td>
<td>Ilorin</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>Ikeja</td>
<td>Capt. Adekunle Lawal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Minna</td>
<td>Commdr. Murtala Nyako</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogun</td>
<td>Abeokuta</td>
<td>Lt. Col. S. A. Balogun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ondo</td>
<td>Akure</td>
<td>Major I. D. Ikpeme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oyo</td>
<td>Ibadan</td>
<td>Col. David Jemibewon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>Jos</td>
<td>Col. Abdullahi Muhammed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivers</td>
<td>Port Harcourt</td>
<td>Lt. Col. Zamani Lekwot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sokoto</td>
<td>Sokoto</td>
<td>Lt. Col. Umaru Mohammed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AFRICA REPORT, SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1973

Source: Africa No. 55, March 1976.
1 Ahmadu Bello University (p. 1773)
2 University of Benin (p. 1784)
3 University of Calabar (p. 1787)
4 University of Ibadan (p. 1788)
5 University of Ife (p. 1799)
6 University College of Ilorin (p. 1806)
7 University of Jos (p. 1806)
8 University College of Kano (p. 1806)
9 University of Lagos (p. 1807)
10 University of Maiduguri (p. 1813)
11 University of Nigeria (p. 1814)
12 University College of Port Harcourt (p. 1825)
13 University of Sokoto (p. 1825)

Source: Commonwealth Universities Yearbook, 1976.
**NIGERIA**

**FINANCE**

100 kobo = 1 naira (₦).  
Coins: 1, 5, 10 and 25 kobo.  
Notes: 50 kobo; 1, 5 and 10 naira.

100 naira = 83.82 = $156.94.

*Note:* The naira was introduced on January 1st, 1973, replacing the Nigerian pound (₦) of 20 shillings (210 pence) at the rate of ₦1 = 2 naira. Between September 1949 and August 1971 the Nigerian pound was valued at U.S. $3.00. In December 1971 the value was revised to $3.04. The value of the naira was consequently fixed at $1.52 (U.S. $1 = 65.70 kobo). Despite the devaluation of the U.S. dollar in February 1973, this exchange rate remained in effect until April 1974, since when the naira has been allowed to “float”. The average value of the naira was $1.568 in 1974 and $1.625 in 1975. The Nigerian pound was at par with the pound sterling until November 1967, after which the exchange rate was £1 = $1.167 sterling until June 1972.

---

### FEDERAL BUDGET ESTIMATES. 1975/76

(Twelve months ending March 31st—₦ million)  
Gross Revenue: 5,252.2

#### Recurrent Expenditure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet office</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and natural resources</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>347.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>239.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External affairs</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal affairs</td>
<td>44.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>54.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>130.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works and housing</td>
<td>83.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,721.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Capital Expenditure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and meteorology</td>
<td>171.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisheries</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining and quarrying</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing and craft</td>
<td>779.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>130.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce and finance</td>
<td>160.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land transport</td>
<td>1,003.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water transport</td>
<td>90.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air transport</td>
<td>102.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>323.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>463.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Capital Expenditure (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>80.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social welfare and sports</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water supply</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewage, drainage and refuse disposal</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>342.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town and country planning</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-operatives and community development</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisons</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>77.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>736.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Administration</td>
<td>132.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,890.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Africa South of the Sahara, 1974-5.
FINANCE

100 kobo = 1 naira (N).  
Coins: 1, 5, 10 and 25 kobo  
Notes: 50 kobo; 1, 5 to, and 20 naira  
Exchange rates (January 1977): £1 sterling = 1.081 naira; U.S. $1 = 63.1 kobo.  
100 naira = £1.47 = $138.44.

Note: The naira was introduced on January 1st, 1973, replacing the Nigerian pound (£N) of 20 shillings (2.40 pence) at the rate of £N1 = 2 naira. Between September 1949 and August 1971 the Nigerian pound was valued at U.S. $2.30. In December 1971 the value was revised to 3.84. The value of the naira was consequently fixed at 3.84 (U.S. $1 = 63.79 kobo). Despite the devaluation of the U.S. dollar in February 1973, this exchange rate remained in effect until April 1974, since when the naira has been allowed to “float.” The average value of the naira was $1.588 in 1974; $1.625 in 1975; $1.596 in 1976. The Nigerian pound was at par with the pound sterling until November 1967, after which the exchange rate was £N1 = £1.107 sterling until June 1972.

FEDERAL BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1976/77  
(Twelve months ending March 31st—N million)  
Gross Revenue: 5,756.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recurrent Expenditure</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet office</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and rural development</td>
<td>64.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>847.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>738.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External affairs</td>
<td>82.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>108.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal affairs</td>
<td>54.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>70.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance, trade and economic development</td>
<td>100.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>168.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works, establishments and housing</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social development, youth and sports</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,414.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capital Expenditure</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>406.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock</td>
<td>50.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisheries</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining and quarrying</td>
<td>590.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing and craft</td>
<td>826.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>168.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce and finance</td>
<td>146.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land transport</td>
<td>1,471.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water transport</td>
<td>192.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air transport</td>
<td>239.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>622.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>590.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>74.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>84.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capital Expenditure (cont.)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social development</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water supply</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>559.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town and country planning</td>
<td>66.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-operatives and community development</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisons</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>694.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Administration</td>
<td>312.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External financial obligation</td>
<td>109.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,378.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Source: Africa South of the Sahara, 1974-5.
NGERIA

STATE BUDGETS
(1975/76 estimates—N million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Total Budget</th>
<th>Capital Expenditure</th>
<th>Recurrent Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benue-Plateau</td>
<td>217.7</td>
<td>131.0</td>
<td>86.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East-Central</td>
<td>355.1</td>
<td>112.9</td>
<td>219.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>373.2</td>
<td>236.0</td>
<td>137.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwara</td>
<td>200.3</td>
<td>104.0</td>
<td>96.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>206.6</td>
<td>171.3</td>
<td>86.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-Western</td>
<td>348.7</td>
<td>121.9</td>
<td>119.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-Central</td>
<td>200.6</td>
<td>133.0</td>
<td>161.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-Eastern</td>
<td>294.3</td>
<td>143.7</td>
<td>145.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-Western</td>
<td>281.0</td>
<td>131.9</td>
<td>111.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivers</td>
<td>243.7</td>
<td>107.7</td>
<td>113.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-Eastern</td>
<td>220.8</td>
<td>145.5</td>
<td>206.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>352.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Africa Research Bulletin, Vol. 12, Nos. 3 and 5.

THIRD NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN*
April 1st, 1975-March 31st, 1980
Investment Programme—N million

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Allocation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Refineries</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquefied Natural Gas Projects</td>
<td>2,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement Plants</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity Distribution</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Electrification</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>4,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>3,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railways</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Transport</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Transport</td>
<td>387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunications</td>
<td>715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postal Services</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Allocation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Training Institutions</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Education</td>
<td>615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Education</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scholarships</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaria Eradication</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour and Social Welfare</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Development</td>
<td>3,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Supply</td>
<td>521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence and Security</td>
<td>2,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Administration</td>
<td>854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Sector Investment</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Governments</td>
<td>6,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector Investment</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Under the Plan, Gross Domestic Product is expected to grow from N13,962 million in 1974-75 to N21,380.9 million in 1979-80 (at 1974-75 prices), giving a compound growth rate of 9.1 per cent per annum.

* Under review by the Government early in 1976.


Source: Africa South of the Sahara, 1974-5.