The politics of the transnational television: beyond the cultural imperialism question

Austin Ogbe-Ogunsuyi

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THE POLITICS OF TRANSNATIONAL TELEVISION:
BEYOND THE CULTURAL IMPERIALISM
QUESTION.

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE DISSERTATION COMMITTEE CLARK ATLANTA UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

AUSTIN OGBE-OGUNSUJI

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

ATLANTA, GEORGIA
MAY 1994
ABSTRACT

POLITICAL SCIENCE

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THE POLITICS OF TRANSNATIONAL TELEVISION:
BEYOND THE CULTURAL IMPERIALISM QUESTION.

Advisor: Dr. Hashim Gibrill
Dissertation dated May, 1994

Providing an improved basis for articulating the nature of transnational television and its potentials for improving relations among nations, is the central focus of this study.

We are motivated to research this subject because we believe the existing perspectives on it need to be revised in line with present day reality.

Our point of departure is the thorny issue of "cultural imperialism." In re-evaluating this issue, some fundamental questions are raised to determine whether past perspectives fit present day realities. Using the elite theory of power in various societies, aided by Johan Galtung's model of a global communication in "four worlds," we see a pattern of global television that suggests commonalities in underlying reasons for their establishment in various countries. In both developed and developing countries.
We acknowledge with the support of a literature and data existence of a global systemic domination by the technology rich nations over the technology poor ones. But there are also substantial evidence to prove that some of the poorer nations exercise some degree of autonomy. That makes more difficult to try to explain "cultural imperialism" simply as a relationship that sees developed and developing nations as simply a dominant/subordinate association.

Through a strategy of originating intent we are able to show that the elite in various societies acquire television mainly to satisfy either their political, economic or social interests.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study would not have been possible without the guidance and support of many people. Foremost amongst them are my late parents Pa and Mrs. Dominic Ogunsuyi Aimievbiye who taught me to seek knowledge and truth for their true essence. Their kind and loving care bolstered my spirit and fuelled my ambition.

My gratitude and comradeship go out to the numerous scholars who have made enormous contributions to our understanding of the dynamics of global communication and the elite theory in social stratification. My thanks also go to those scholars that have helped to explain the nature of a global systemic world of staggering inequities. Quick to recall are Lee Chin-Chuan, Wilson Dizard, Abner Cohen, C.Wright Mills, Johan Galtung, Frantz Fanon, Walter Rodney, Marvin Haire and Samuel Ubaonnu, among others.

A special thanks go to the members of this dissertation committee without whom this work would not have been completed as it is. They are Dr. Hashim Gibrill, Dr. William Boone and Dr. Hamid Taqi.

I also thank members of my family who have always stood by me and Ms. Edith Gray and Tejan Muata for their special assistance.
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>American Broadcasting Company.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARAMCO</td>
<td>Arabian-American Oil Company.</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CATVN</td>
<td>Central American Television Networks.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBC</td>
<td>Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBS</td>
<td>Columbia Broadcasting Service.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCIR</td>
<td>International Radio Consultative Committee.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLT</td>
<td>Compagnie Libanaise de Television.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTV</td>
<td>Cable Television.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DBS</td>
<td>Direct Broadcast Satellite.</td>
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<tr>
<td>EBU</td>
<td>European Broadcasting Union.</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCC</td>
<td>Federal Communication Commission.</td>
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<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement For Trade and Tariffs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBU</td>
<td>International Broadcasting Union.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTELSAT</td>
<td>International Telecommunication Organization.</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTERPUTNIK</td>
<td>International Organization of Space Communication.</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPDC</td>
<td>International Program For The Development of Communication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITA</td>
<td>Independent Television Authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Trade Organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>National Broadcasting Company.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHK</td>
<td>Nippon Hosni Kyoshi.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NHR</td>
<td>Japan Broadcasting Corporation.</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWDR</td>
<td>Nordwest Deutscher Rundfunk, German Television.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWICO</td>
<td>New World Information and Communication Order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCOAR</td>
<td>France Overseas Television Arm.</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIR</td>
<td>Organization Internationale de Radiffussion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIRT</td>
<td>Communist Radio-Television Organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORTF</td>
<td>L' Office de Radio-diffusion Television Franchaise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTA</td>
<td>Popular Television Authority.</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAI</td>
<td>Italian Government Joint Stock Company.</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCA</td>
<td>Radion Corporation of America.</td>
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<tr>
<td>TV</td>
<td>Television.</td>
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<tr>
<td>TWW</td>
<td>Television West of Wales.</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAR</td>
<td>United Arab Republic.</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S.A</td>
<td>United States of America.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAIA</td>
<td>United States of American Information Agency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCR</td>
<td>Video Cassette Recorder.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOA</td>
<td>Voice of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>WN-TV</td>
<td>Western Nigeria Television.</td>
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Chapter One

Introduction

To most people television remains a medium that educates, informs and entertains. But to many social scientists the medium tends to have a greater effect on society than its generally accepted role. Many scholars will argue for instance, that the medium influences to a large degree, the manner in which members of a society relate to one another.

Somehow the growth of the medium has raised the level of anxiety among those who fear that it has the potential for social mobilization and control. These interpretations of the impact of the medium have not been limited to domestic affairs alone. It has often transcended national boundaries. At some levels television is viewed as that medium which has brought closer, the realities of global interdependence in a systemic world.¹

The realization of the overwhelming influence of the medium in the second half of this century unleashed a natural desire among individuals and groups, to gain a foothold in the industry. This awareness, at the same time, heightened the anxiety of many incumbent governments, who for good reason, feared that to own and/or control the medium is a guarantee for staying in power.

Consequently, several perspectives elaborating the potency of the medium evolved generating a mystique about its unlimited influence and disastrous consequences. In order to determine the truth behind many of these assumptions a flurry of investigations into all related aspects in its entire spectrum, were undertaken. Results of many studies apparently re-enforced existing fears and unleashed a voracious instinct to control the medium for self or group preservation.²

Over the years, it became clear that the drive to own the medium could be associated with an overriding drive by individuals or groups who capitalize on their exceptional positions in their societies. In a largely capitalistic world economy, the privilege to acquire has been largely limited to a group of people, who either through inheritance or personal achievement, have come to be known as members of an elite group.

Elites have come to be understood through different ideological perspectives. In the book, The Politics of Elite Culture, Abner Cohen explains:

According to Marxist or conflict theory, the power mystique is subtle, particularistic ideology developed by a privilege elite to validate and perpetuate their domination and thereby to support their own national interest. The cult consists of various techniques

of mystification, implicit in philosophy, religion, art, drama and life style.  

Contrary to this theoretical assumption Abner Cohen suggests that the liberal school of thought does attempt to offer an opposing view. According to Cohen:

The elitist or consensus theory of stratification, maintains that all social order is necessarily hierarchical, and that leadership is a specialization necessitated by the division of labor in all societies. The theory has long and varied ancestry, it appears in one of its crudest forms in the contract theory of Hobbes, who argue that to escape from the solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short "life in a state of nature", men entered into a contract agreeing to surrender their freedom to a sovereign who represents their general will and who maintains social order in their own interest if necessary against their individual wills.  

An examination of how an elite group uses the media and television industry to shape our perception of society, will invariably go a long way in helping us to understand how the elites everywhere use the medium to maintain their control in societies. We hope to utilize this information in this study for a better understanding of "Politics" and how that can ultimately help us better understand the nature of global television at all levels.

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4 Ibid.
Statement of the Problem

The major problem of this study is to challenge the theoretical premise of existing studies in the field of transnational television. It is the conviction of this study that the theoretical bases of many past studies on television or the related area, were either partially deficient or have become inadequate.

At a glance it seems the difficulty by past studies to adequately address the issues lie in an over-emphasis on purely abstract theoretical concepts as the bases for investigation rather than paying greater attention to the role of "man in the society." Examples of these glaring misconceptions, as we shall show later, pervade the entire spectrum of global communication theory vis-a-vis relations within and between nations.

We shall therefore, in the course of this study, try to present a model that will enable us to determine the most functional means of articulating global communication and in particular television. From the focus of this study "Politics of Transnational Television" we hope to prove that it is only through the study of "the activities of man in society," that we can best explain the nature of institutions that he has put in place. It is therefore inevitable that this study would tend to challenge other existing explanations on the subject, either in part or wholly.
Incidentally, two of the most prominent arguments in the field are adversarial: a situation where the foremost viewpoint has generated an opposition. These viewpoints include those who advocate for a "free flow of information" as the "natural" order which society should follow for the greater good of all, and those who insist that a global communication order based on the "free flow of information doctrine" amounts to "cultural Imperialism". But a major problem which these viewpoints are unable to avoid is in the larger theoretical commitments. The forerunner in this debate, comes out of the western liberal tradition which holds as superior, forms of social, political and cultural arrangements that supports its Liberal conviction. The opposition often regarded as the Radical viewpoint comes out of the Neo-Marxist perspective. Although both viewpoints have their strength and weaknesses they collectively exhibit potential flaws as bases for articulating the entire impact of human institutions such as television among others.

This study hopes to highlight these deficiencies and try to lay a foundation that will reflect the realities of the final decades of the twentieth century, through a more innovative theoretical framework for looking at global communication principles in the years ahead.

Conceptually this problematic is best considered first,

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within a global reality of staggering disparities between the developed and developing countries. Then, we must adequately understand the various facets involved in this research problem conditioned by a global mass communication technology which accepts as normal, a universal system of political and economic inequities. It is necessary at this point to streamline some of the urgent questions motivating this study for the purposes of order and clarity, viz: 1) What necessitates the study of the politics of transnational television? 2) How can the study of politics of transnational television enhance a better understanding of communication between nations? and 3) How can a better understanding of the dynamics of the politics of transnational television bring about global peace and progress?.

The first question "what necessitates the study of the politics of transnational television?" points to a need to re-examine the existing theory and practice in global communication in general and transnational television in particular. There seem to be in existence certain conditions which tend to support the fact that the prevalent global communication process promote conflicts rather than foster harmony. This assumption has as its basis a humanist belief that through the promotion of harmony rather than exacerbating conflicts, nations of the world would be less prone to confrontation or hostilities. To attribute the
entire global conflicts to the nature of communication alone, lest television, could be very misleading. But as previous studies in this area have failed to bring about either a comprehensive theoretical basis for the understanding or the improvement of the politics of transnational television, further studies must be engaged. It is instructive to note that although it has nearly been two decades since the United Nations tried to resolve the question of imbalance in communication between nations, the situation has worsened rather than improve.⁶ Invariably, the inequities in global communication has therefore become another platform for re-evaluating the overall question of inequalities among nations. Apparently, these conditions are more likely to promote environments inimical to peace. But as we are considering the transmission of broadcast materials at one end and the reception of its message at the other, two levels of activities must be in process. It is not unconscionable to speculate at this point, that due to the nature and effect of transnational television, individuals either at the national levels of government or at the corporate or multinational corporation levels in both the developing and the developed countries presently perpetuate conflicts in transnational television. This

aspect in the evaluation of the communication study needs further attention. Consequently, the motivation of such individuals in the process of determining how much or less of transnational television is optimal must be instructive to our overall understanding of the likely effect or defect of cross-cultural television to international relations.

The second question, "how can the study of the politics of transnational television enhance our better understanding of communication between nations?" has as its focus the environment and proclivity of those who determine the nature of transnational television. In the post World War II global realities, states have become, primary actors in studying international relations. To understand the nature and potentials of state therefore, we must seek to study those institutions through which the state functions. As our present concern is "the politics of transnational television," the primary institutions we should be evaluating are those of "governments" represented by leaders in the bureaucracy and ministerial departments among others." Ralph Miliband in The State in Advanced Capitalist Society, warns us against treating one part of the state, usually government, as the state itself. In seeking to

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7Ibid., most studies in this area have emphasized either the "free flow doctrine" or raised the "cultural imperialism question." Both studies are unilateral and therefore need to be enhanced.

understand the nature of politics therefore we must strive to comprehend the various levels of interest groups and institutions that determine the nature of the state and hence transnational television. Here, depending on the outlook of the researcher, a pluralist or elitist paradigm might be espoused. Rather unfortunately, the strength of one of these arguments turns out to be the weakness of the other. However, we hope to give an objective study of the countervailing social and human forces within a state to expose the real nature and motivations of those involved in the decision making process in transnational television.

The third question; how can communication bring about global peace and progress? has as its objective is to satisfy some normative questions which any serious scholastic study must ultimately address. Fortunately, the major focus of international relations, since the world war II, has been on seeking avenues towards promoting peaceful co-existence among nations. This study therefore joins in that aspiration by considering the extent to which international communications can bring about peace and progress. Incidentally, the concept of peace for some nations has been the source of distress for others. For instance what the industrialized nations consider as "free and fair" practice has often turned out to be a root cause of frustration and disability among developing nations. A case in point was when in the early 1970s President Surkano
of Indonesia decried the uncontrolled beaming of television programs from the industrialized nations, to the third world, as potentially dangerous. The explanation given by President Surkano then was that such unbridled transmission from the industrialized nations raised the aspirations of those in the third world beyond the limits which their governments could fulfill.9

By deductive reasoning, one solution to this potential source of distress which might ultimately translate into larger hostilities, might be to effect some measure of control over the manner of transnational transmission, as well as stem the tide of rising imbalance between foreign and local programs in indigenous stations in the developing countries.

But by its very nature, the motivations of transnational television seem located elsewhere beyond the realm of mere humanistic postulations. It thus seems to be propelled by other factors which include political, economic and social interests. Restraining the flow of information would therefore necessitate an appreciation of those variables we must confront. As the global socialization process matures in the 1990s with its growing capacity to prescribe common standard, a picture of "a global village" with a homogenous tendency cannot be ruled out. An image of this evolving global condition leads us to consider among

9Ibid.
other factors, the need or interest of those who subscribe to broadcast materials and the commensurate capacity of the providers to deliver the commodities.

Somehow the problem has not been so much with the inability of entrepreneurs to provide a variety of television services but the growing concern by less endowed nations to compete in the same market of information flow with their richer counterpart. The extent therefore to which capitalist or political or social motivation determines the present manner of communication will be instructive to our better understanding and hence prescription of solution to problems associated with them. Given the complex and interwoven nature of these problems, we cannot help but look beyond these questions into more specific aspects of the problematic; these include; 1) who are those responsible for the production, transmission and reception of transnational television?, 2) what factors contribute to their tendencies towards a conflictual rather than a harmonious relationship?, 3) at what point is this manner of communication likely to enhance cooperation or aggravate conflicts among nations? At the most basic levels communication could be considered dysfunctional where it exacerbates interpersonal and communal conflicts and functional, when it fosters cooperation and progress.

We must not overlook the fact that in the twentieth century, a pertinent global reality is the tendency for most
societies to measure their progress and development by the levels of their growth by how much technology they can boost of. And no other medium brings this reality closer than transnational television. Apparently, this situation has often been most detrimental to less developed societies because television whet their appetite by bringing too their homes the luxuries and benefits of other lands. That feeling of deprivation ultimately reflect on how those in developing societies value their existence and determine the competence of their leaders.

Critics of the "free flow" will therefore argue that unhindered transnational broadcast, would more likely promote disillusionment among those in developing societies, which could lead to a negative assessment of the local leadership, culminating in political instability.

But the developed nations who often support "the free flow of information" doctrine maintain that free access to information is a fundamental right of all human beings.

The core of the two first questions presents an opportunity to further investigate the role of the major actors, individuals and corporate, that manipulate global television. In this regard, Ralph Miliband in *The State In Capitalist Society*\(^\text{10}\) and Abner Cohen in *The Politics of*

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Elite Culture\textsuperscript{11} adequately support the viewpoint that identifiable groups in the society control the realm of politics, economics and socio-cultural environments of the larger society. Johan Galtung, "Social Communication and Global Problems"\textsuperscript{12} elaborates the process of domination of the global communication system first by western societies, followed by regional domination by regional powers and ultimately by the domination of men within national boundaries, by elite groups of industrialists or politicians or military cadre. By deductive reasoning it becomes clearer at this point to appreciate that the process of global domination starts with local ambitions of individuals within state boundaries, which could then expand to the regions and ultimately to the world at large. An appreciation of these facts set off a more balanced and objective outlook for evaluating the process of transnational television because it exposes the true nature of those who determine how it is used. Put quite simply, the affairs of men, through this explanation, are seen to be conducted within, first, the current state structure, where men in positions of authority determine what decisions are made concerning local issues and those with international implications. We can not rule


out the tendency of the majority in most societies to acquiescence to the decisions of the elite group in their society.\textsuperscript{13} Least to say that most human motivations particularly in decision making, are selfish in either economic, social or political terms.

In order to understand the characteristics of individuals and corporate groups within and between states therefore, we must understand their basic motivations. This will ultimately lead to an understanding of the divergent positions in the ongoing debate over transnational television, and the entire mass communication spectrum. Such efforts will help to remove any pretensions where they exist, from the rhetoric of those who govern and their cohorts. The extent to which international conflicts could arise on both the immediate and long term basis and who the casualties of such global hostilities would be, would be instructive in the attempt to calculate the cost and benefits of the present attitudes towards transnational communications and international relations among nations.

**Hypothesis**

Based on the interdisciplinary nature of this scholastic study, a number of hypotheses compete for prominence. Transcendental among them, is that which assumes that through our understanding and perhaps modification of

\textsuperscript{13}Abner, Cohen, *The Politics of Elite Culture*, 11
"the Politics of transnational television" we can better understand the dynamics of transnational television and therefore be more likely to determine how that process can exacerbates relations between nations. Obviously this statement presupposes an existing climate of conflicts between nations which the present mode of communication seems to exacerbate. Incidentally, the "Realist viewpoint" in international relations agrees with this perspective. It maintains that States as major actors in international relations are in perpetual antagonism with each of them motivated by national self interest. This supposedly means that conflict could worsen in the antagonistic relations between nations as a result of the slightest arousal of any perceived threat to national security. Communication or television therefore becomes only one of several factors that could aggravate an already tenuous situation. This hypothesis has as its underlying assumption the belief that since World War II, nations have remained more in perpetual antagonism rather than harmony. A bi-polar world of communism and western liberalism interacted to make things even worse. But this does not rule out the fact that there were certain levels of cooperation between nations. Rather unfortunately, the conflicts have been exacerbated by the inequalities in resources and technology among nations.

Even where attempts at cooperation amongst nations were based on geographical contiguity such efforts have tended to attenuate both far and near regional or global levels of inequalities rather than promote harmony. An example of this is the unification of European countries under the European Economic Community (EEC). While this cooperation augurs well for all those nations involved, it has not reduced the disparities nor the perception of insecurity thereof between those nations. Meanwhile as an economic block, the union serves to alienate other countries that do not belong to it.

Reacting to what they considered as unfair relations and imbalance in global communication, third world countries took their frustrations to the UN General Assembly in 1974. But since then, the situation in the opinion of Herbert Schiller, has worsened. Third world nations have constantly accused the industrialized countries of negative portrayal on their media, but the industrialized nations have ignored these allegations insisting that market forces determine demand and supply of all commodities, and that communication is no exception. They further argue that the dynamics of the market place guarantee individual rights in

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15Sean McBride, Many Voices One World: Communication and Society: Today and Tomorrow, (New York: Unesco unipub 1983), 5. The resolution on the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) was passed.

16Herbert Schiller, Communication and Cultural Domination, (White Plains, New York: M.E. Sharpe Incorporated, 1976), 33
the society. And that these rights include those of personal liberty and the freedom of speech. 17

This hypothesis: that the politics of transnational television could exacerbate hostilities between nations, has as its major assumption the notion that beneath all relations between nations lies the need to communicate. By implication therefore, any manner of communication would yield either negative or positive results depending on both the motivation of those involved and the manner thereof. This hypothesis also takes into consideration the global systemic nature of inequalities and technological disparities between technology-rich and technology-poor states. This dichotomy incidentally becomes only a reflection of the larger differences and disparity between wealthy nations and poor states. That the wealthier nations are the technology rich while the poor nations remain the technology poor becomes only deductively rational. But these relations have not always meant that the poorer states are permanent surrogates of richer ones. Continuously we have started to witness examples around the world of incidents where the less endowed nations display some degree of autonomy from the richer nations. The examples of Cuba and Libya in standing up to the United States are instructive in

this regard. Other questions evoked by the hypothesis include 1) How great a potential has the politics of transnational television to either enhance or exacerbate international relations? 2) who are those engaged in the politics of transnational television at national and international levels? and 3) How does the question of disparities in broadcast materials between nations explain the process of domination and hence conflict in their relations?

Regarding the first question on the potentials for conflict opinions vary from the notion that television is trivial to that which describes it as narcotic. Those who believe that television is trivial do not attribute much to it in terms of what amount of threat it poses to international relations. To the contrary, proponents of the "television is narcotic doctrine" believe it is serious enough to ignite international dispute as well as imperil the present global security. This study acknowledges the differences between both viewpoints and believes that only through an analysis of the ownership/control strategy of transnational television that we can best differentiate the real impetus from the apparent in seeking to develop a balanced theoretical basis for understanding global communication as a whole.

The second question; who are those engaged in the politics of transnational television at national and
international levels?, intends to identify the human forces, individuals in government and corporate bodies, that influence the production and transmission of transnational television. It will in the same process, try to identify the nature of the human forces in the receiving societies that allege unfair transgression of their borders. Through a study of the nature of the decision making bodies on both sides of the interaction we hope to understand and try to determine whether there is an affinity between these two groups, or whether or not these groups can possess a certain level of autonomy which on the long run, could make their decisions purely self motivated.

The third question; how does the question of disparities in scope and volume of broadcast materials between nations help to explain the process of domination and hence conflict in their relations. This question offers us a chance to re-visit the over-all question surrounding "Cultural Imperialism" which this study must look at.

It will be informative to look at the position of past scholars on the question with a view to assessing their strength and weaknesses. It is not unconscionable at this time to say that two decades after the concept: Cultural Imperialism" was first muted, there has been no change in how the world conducts its affairs vis-a-vis relations through communication. On this question (cultural imperialism), rests the contention that through the process
of transnational television more technologically endowed nations impose their culture on people from poorer nations thereby creating social and political disability in those societies. Critics would argue that such a process deprive the receiving nations of evolving an authentic cultural pattern for social mobilization for development. But we must not forget the equally impressive argument of the opposing other side of the debate which stresses the "free flow of information" the global market place can be assured free and fair assess to information and therefore choice.

To give a thorough evaluation to the hypothesis for this study these pertinent aspects, mentioned above, must be carefully explained so as to determine the limits and merits of its overriding assumptions.

Significance of the Study

In the tradition of any scientific study, this research is significant not only to the broad field of social science but specifically to political science, political communication, international communication and international relations.

In respect of contribution to political science this study will provide another forum to test theories of elitism and pluralism. It would achieve this by focusing on the role of individuals in government and corporations that control the mass media organs, and television in particular.
Under political communication, this study will address the dynamics of human forces that determine the limits and extent in communication based on either idiosyncratic or other social, economic and political imperatives. This strategy is commended because only through the proper understanding of the nature and motivation of human forces to communicate, can the effect of communication on human activities best be evaluated and therefore improved.

In a similar vain, this study will help to further understand the dynamics of international relations and inform on how various aspects of human endeavor, such as communication or the media, can exacerbate or ameliorate international disputes. Such knowledge is also invaluable to international communication studies, if we must learn the best models that will enhance peace among nations. In consonance with the overall ethics of international communication, this study will explain the factors which determine the inherent interests that determines the nature and content of communication messages, that are in bad taste or otherwise, so as to understand and adopt the most suitable model of communication for enhancing cooperation among nations.

Also in the area of international relations, this study will seek to address the overall question of relations between nations which according to Viotti and Kauppi in Theories of International Relations, form the basis for
resolving conflict and thereby enhancing cooperation among nations. A study on the politics of transnational television therefore becomes an adequate forum for re-testing some of the controversial issues that confront international relations.

Above all, as a study, we hope this will encourage the furtherance of other research on the specific aspects of the ever-growing universe of technology so as to equip social science with better tools of timely and efficient models for monitoring and determining social events and social forces. It is the conviction of this project that only more specific and detailed study as those related to transnational television instead of the general subject area of "transnational communication," will move the field of international communication further into greater utility and credibility.

Methodology

Based on the multi-disciplinary nature of this study, we intend to adopt the comparative method of research. According to Ronald Chilcote:

The comparative method then, involves qualitative, not quantitative, analysis. The comparative method in this sense is broad, general method, not narrow specialized technique.¹⁸

¹⁸Ronald Chilcote, Theories of Comparative Politics: The Search for a Paradigm, (Colorado, Boulder: Westview Press), 21
As stated earlier this study is concerned with the analysis of transnational television in articulation of particularistic and universalistic functions within a pluralistic, hierarchical system. The ultimate aim is to explore the causal relation between the normative symbols underlying transnational television and the power relationships in which members of an elite are involved. I seek to further demonstrate the view that an analysis of television in conjunction with demands of local power relations can set the tone for understanding the makeup of the conflicts at the transnational levels of broadcasting. Incidentally "transnational television" being an abstract sociological construct can only be comprehended from the symbolic mechanisms that knit one society to the other, thus transforming them from mere categories of people into concrete, cohesive, cooperating, and relatively enduring corporate entities.

The relatively small-scale, concrete, sociocultural role of television into which the more abstract, overarching "transnational" break down are not discrete systems that can be studied on their own. They have to be seen in relation to the wider communication system; but that system cannot be studied apart from its concrete manifestations. Clearly the study of "transnational television" will have to proceed dialectical, from the parts to the whole, and from the whole back to the parts. It has become a matter of expediency that
this study would rely on the findings by other scholars to articulate it various levels.\textsuperscript{19} To establish a coherent pattern for our analysis, particular effort will be made to investigate the major segments involved. We shall examine in details their nature as isolated units and their reaction in combination with other factors. A logical basis of departure must include the evaluation of the dynamics of communication at both the national and international levels, with a view to understanding the controversy in transnational television.

Through a process of literature review; a synthesis of relevant literature couched in historical perspective, we will strive to explicate the nature of political, social and economic ramifications in transnational television and the imperatives of transnational television itself.

As a foundation for the overall perception of the entire facets of this study, a conceptual framework based on comparative politics will be adopted. It will also involve a cross between international relations and international communication which will provide the parameters for our scope of analysis. It is necessary to view this study through this broad spectrum so as to articulate the divergent viewpoints into a more accessible model for easier understanding and utility.

Engaging various theoretical perspectives, which

\textsuperscript{19} Abner Cohen, \textit{The Politics of Elite Culture}, xvii.
include Dependency, Development and Political Economy, we hope to draw similarities and differences to reach logical consistencies in the opposing argument for and against cultural imperialism and the free flow of information debate. The entire study cannot be complete without relating it to the global systemic reality of inequalities in both economic and hence technology among nations. These fundamental differences account for the levels of friendship or hostility or both to which communication or television can only be a factor for its evaluation.

Research Technique

A major thrust of this study is to identify specific and general aspects that determine the nature of transnational television vis-a-vis the power relations of those who control it. We shall therefore seek to look into the findings of other scholars in the field to support our key contentions. To aid us in this effort are theories in elitism and/or class which include the work of Abner Cohen, The Politics of Elite Culture,\(^\text{20}\) and Ralph Miliband, The State in Advanced Capitalist Societies. These writings should support the point of view that political power is concentrated in a few hands. Through these theoretical spectrums we hope to operationalize the activities of

individuals at both state and international levels in the overall politics of cross-cultural broadcasting. It would be necessary to draw similarities and differences between the ruling and governing elites of both developed and developing nations to adequately understand their mutual "sympathetic and/or parallel" affinity. To illuminate the relations between the developed and developing nations we shall rely on the theories of Johan Galtung and Andre Gundre Frank which explain that a parallel exists between the rich and poor in developed states and those in developing states.

It will therefore be pertinent to discuss and test the theoretical conviction of pluralism and supporters of the Free Flow of Information debate who maintain that any restriction to the flow of information is a violation of fundamental human rights. Supported by pluralists and contemporary liberal economic scholars this viewpoint is also elucidated by George Quester in *The International Politics of Television*. In the tradition of liberal theorists, a combination of state actors and non-state actors is offered as the best model for understanding international disputes. They have often suggested that a collaboration of state authority, the United Nations, and multinationals, creates the best forum for the resolution of controversy surrounding international disputes.

Opposing viewpoints to these suggestions range from those raised by Herbert Schiller in *Communication and*
Cultural Domination to Marvin Haire's "The Political Economy of The Free Flow of Information."\(^2\) Unlike those suggested by liberal writers, these scholars believe that the best way to reduce any international disputes arising from communication is to reduce or eliminate the degree of interference of third world societies by the developed nations through the bombardment of unhindered broadcast signals. They stress that to evolve an "authentic culture" a dominated people must be given the opportunity to control the means of their education which should include the media and specifically broadcast signals.

Although some scholars (including Haire and Schiller mentioned above) possess convincing argument, they tend to take as a given, the sincerity of purpose of all third world leaders. Such assumptions could lead to sweeping conclusions that tacitly condone the actions of many third world leaders. Such a simplistic conclusion could also preclude their actions from questions in the guise that they are the bonafide representatives of their people. To the contrary, many third world leaders preside over repressive regimes that do not permit popular participation. By simple deduction therefore, these leaders are more likely to represent their own/or perceived interests. How they can

claim the general good of their people without involving those people in the process of social mobilization becomes the paradox reflecting inconsistencies in the political drama of third world countries.

In order to present the nature and potential capacity of transnational television, we must delve into the political economy of television at both the national and international levels. This will be done through a proper evaluation of its economic, political and socio-cultural impact on society. As an economic force due to its gross earnings, in billions of dollars annually, it remains a viable economic means for the survival of millions of people. How this economic reality manifests will be evaluated through an analysis of the evolution of the television industry at the national and international levels. We shall draw from the historical records laid out by Wilson Dizard in *Television: A World View.*

At the political realm, as stated earlier, it would be necessary to explain how economic, political and social factors propel television as a decision-making potential and a viable agent of the capitalist system. Put simply; the sheer volume of economic importance of television and its ability, perceived or real to control and persuade the mass of the people makes it both lucrative as well as sensitive.

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to both developed and developing countries. Whereas in the
developed countries it is utilized to both socialize and
monitor the opinions of the masses regarding government
policies, it is used in most of the developing countries,
with dictatorial regime, as instruments of propaganda and
government control.

In support of our earlier commitment to seeking
similarity and differences in relevant literature, we shall
rely on an extensive scope of literature, statistical data
and other illustrations to explain the nature of politics of
transnational television in different societies as an index
to test its prevailing effect on across cultural boundaries.
Among the texts consulted for this explanation are Unesco,
*International Propaganda and Communications* and Peter
Dunnett, *The World Television Industry: An Economic
Analysis.*

An equally curious aspect of this study that would
require adequate enlightenment is that which raises
questions pertaining to the advantages or disadvantages or
both of technology in modern societies. This controversy
ranging in all other aspects of human endeavor also has its
place in the consideration on the impact of electronic media
on social behavior. Invariably, at the heart of this debate

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is the question that touches on the limitations of technology as an agent of development, change or harmonization of human endeavor and aspirations. It is difficult to reach quick solution on this question hence it would be necessary to carefully outline the components in the study and compare them with either opposing views or concepts to extrapolate what could be used to test our hypothesis. Some of the leading writers in this aspect include Sean McBride, *Many Voices One World* and George Quester, *The International Politics of Television*. An extensive work on the imperatives of technology on culture and transnational television as another manifestation of technology would help to illuminate the relationship between both culture and technology and television either at local or international levels.

**Analytical Framework.**

To effectively communicate the intention of this study, we need to rely on a number of other studies and works that best support or disprove the viewpoints that are presented. In the tradition of a scientific study, we have elected to move through the general areas of the study of mass communication to the specific area of television. This would

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be most valuable if we have accepted that the preponderance of television is only a manifestation of the overall impact of mass communication on any society. To provide clarity and establish the opposing viewpoints on this aspect, we rely on the work of George Quester in *The International Politics of Television* and Donna Woolfolk Cross in *Media Speak: How Television Makes Up Your Mind*, as two contemporary points of view that support the liberal outlook on the necessity and impact of mass communication.

As a reaction to these viewpoints, we offer the works of Herbert Schiller, Samuel Ubaonu and Marvin Haire which challenge the free flow of information doctrine and support the cultural imperialism debate. We will attempt to evaluate the issues surrounding culture by focusing on the role of interest groups that represent the various platforms in their societies. We cannot also overlook the importance of economic, political and socio-cultural imperatives as motivating factors of the cultural advocacy. Through the works of Ralph Miliband and Abner Cohen we hope to impress the predominance of the ruling and governing classes in determining "culture" choices. If "culture" is considered a "commodity" with a price, we must seek to know those that gain or lose by it. Furthermore, we must seek to know how it is transmitted and received, and who are those that make true and false allegations about the entire subject.

To clarify the relationship between the elite class in
the developed and developing countries, we offer the explanations of Johan Galtung and Andre Gundre Frank. The works of Paul Baran, Harry Magdoff, Samin Amin and Mack Jones will also be consulted for more authoritative articulation of the nature of global systemic domination and the possibility for liberation.

We shall suggest some innovation to these viewpoints, to make them more suitable to our present concern. First we need to streamline the concept of "center and periphery" to emphasize the systemic nature of a global political, economic and social realities. But at the same time we must emphasize that the relationship between the "center and periphery" is necessarily a dominant/subordinate one. There are growing evidence in post cold war era, that hitherto "periphery" regions are beginning to exercise a greater sense of autonomy, a factor which should give a new outlook to our perception of the dominate/subordinate dichotomy in formulating a theory in international communication. The nature of autonomy are usually reflected, at one level, by the free hand which many former colonies exercise in their ownership and control of media and television organs. Evidence of their autonomy are seen at other levels including those of politics and economics. We must warn that this notion of autonomy is limited to the realities of the global systemic imperatives of capitalism.

A theoretical framework will help us to further
elucidate the overall dynamics involved in generating a more comprehensive outlook as the basis of this analysis.

Theoretical Framework

A theoretical framework for this study is based on theories in imperialism which emphasize the dynamics in the relations between the "center and periphery" which also contains within them parallel interaction of "center and periphery" at both the "center" and at the "periphery". This study is different from most others for two reasons viz: 1) It goes beyond the simple analysis of "center and periphery" to explain the dynamics in the center and in the periphery and in both combined as components of a common system. 2) It challenges orthodox concepts that postulate that the "center/periphery" relationship is perpetually a dominant/subordinate one.

To give some credence to this "center/periphery" relations we are relying on the work of Johan Galtung who applied this framework to the study of communication.25 Although Galtung, like other colleagues on the subject, moves his analysis from the debate for a new information and communication order, his adoption of a global social stratification strategy brings a new and more utilitarian

outlook for theory formation.

Galtung achieves this goal by dividing the world into four parts; viz: North, South and East, West divisions. The rich countries in the northeast, he calls First World; the Socialist countries in the southwest, he address as Second World; the poor capitalist countries in the Southwest, he labels as the third World, a segment comprising South and Central America, the Caribbean, Africa, western Asia, the Arab world, and southern Asia. He then added a fourth world; in the southeastern Asia, in a sense headed by Japan, which are followed by what he refers to as mini-Japans: South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Also included in this region are the ASEAN countries, the socialist countries of eastern Asia, and the People's Republic of China. He considers as peripheral to this vast section of the world countries like Australia, New Zealand, and Oceania.26

The world so divided gives rise to six sets of relationships delimiting six global problem areas.

The categories are as follows:27

First World-Second World: characterized by a nuclear

\[\text{26This serves as one of several exceptions to the general rule that see territorial proximity as a pertinent factor in cross-cultural communication. As it were, Australia, New Zealand and the Oceania, by way of historical affinity, fall more under the sphere of influence or "periphery" of far away Britain than China.}\]

\[\text{27Ibid., 3.}\]
suicide pact with tremendously serious implications not only for the inhabitants of these two "worlds" but for the rest of humankind as well. The peace/security/disarmament issue is mainly located here.

First World-Third World: characterized by a perennial tendency of the First World to penetrate (sometimes by military intervention) the Third World in order to secure an economic grip on raw materials and inexpensive labor, as well as markets.

First World- Fourth World: characterized by a new phenomenon, although it has been coming for some time: the emergence of Japan and potentially the whole Fourth World as a new player on the world capitalist market. It has shown itself more competent than First World capitalism, beating First World capitalism in general and the United States in particular at its own game for an increasing range of industrial goods and services.

Second World-Third World: characterized by assistance given in the fight for liberation from colonialism and neocolonialism, with certain efforts to extend control-military, politically, and economically-after the struggle is over.

Second World-Fourth World: characterized by, relatively speaking, emptiness; there is little going on. It constitutes a kind of reservation area for world
interaction.²⁸

Third World-Fourth World: characterized by increasingly heavy penetration of the Third World by the Fourth World, particularly by Japan, making many countries of the Third World look like a Japanese display case. In other words, Japan is not only a success, but a successor to the old colonial powers in the First World.

Galtung goes on to explain that the problems of over- and under-development are located above all in the First World-Third World relationship, with the First World being increasingly over-developed and the Third World increasingly under-developed, except for tiny elites that have accepted and propagated exogenous models at the expense of endogenous needs. The center/periphery problem is also usually seen as located between the First and the Third World, although it also has Second World-Third World, Second World-Fourth World, and Third World-Fourth World aspects to it.

At any rate, in all these worlds the exploitation of nature is going on, depleting resources and polluting the environment, and the exploitation of human beings is also going on, subordinating human beings to machines, taking away from human beings any sense of mastery of problems they might have had, exhausting and frustrating them, even if they are materially well-off.²⁹

²⁸This study does not agree with Galtung on his viewpoint; that this zone is empty.

²⁹Ibid 25.
In his conclusion Galtung sees all of these, as being particularly serious with respect to minorities and women, the very young and the very old, and most particularly young and old minority women, all over the world.

No theoretical framework for looking at a dynamic world of multifaceted levels of changes and hence interaction could have stated these relationships better. Before now, many scholars have become guilty of taking a short cut approach to the issues of imperialist relations by seeing only relations between the "center and periphery" alone. These types of analysis have resulted, without necessarily dubious intention, in a simplistic analysis of the relations between the various segments of the world. The implications of such frameworks in political science as a field of study had grievous repercussions. At risk was a large segment, and perhaps the most salient aspects, of the theory building process which is a universal rather local overlook. Secondly, it had the potential of reducing the process of theory formation to the level of unguided sentiments dwelling more on puerile accusations or fault finding, and thereby infusing a bias which cripples the investigations before it even starts.

However in adopting the model of Johan Galtung we have made some modifications or elaboration to remove any doubt as to the relationships between the "center and periphery".

Contrary to popular assumptions that the relationship
between the "center and periphery" is one of dominant/subordinate relationship, this theoretical framework hopes to prove that such is not necessarily the case at all times. A number of countries considered in the "periphery" have continued to show sufficient evidence of autonomous behavior that qualifies the modification of an unrestrained categorization of a direct link between the "center and periphery" that must of necessity have the "center dominating over the periphery" at all times. Through a historical analysis of the development of television in various parts of the world, we hope to show that elites dictate the content and manner of information flow.

But this study is not oblivious of subtle activities of individuals in a systemic post world war II political and economic reality. But to assume one and leave out the other would be comparable to leaving out the wheel from a moving vehicle. We must therefore elaborate the basis of this global systemic nature so as not to leave any room for doubts.

Global Inequities.

A quick and easy way to determine the degree of disparities is through a comparison between the amount of broadcast materials exported or imported among nations. By way of simply logic, a large volume of exports will represent a condition of surplus in production or a strong position, while that of less imports represents a weak
position. We are basing our assumption on an understanding that we live in a world where nations are in perpetual competition.

Lee Chin-Chuan goes directly to the heart of the subject:

Suffice it to say that the United States is the indisputable No 1 exporter, selling 150,000 hours of programs annually. It is then followed by the U.K and France at a far distance, each selling 20,000 hours of programs abroad annually; West Germany comes in fourth with about 6,000 hours. United States thus exports about 3.3 times as many programs as all the next three largest exporting countries combined.\textsuperscript{30}

To the contrary, most third world countries which are mainly at the receiving end differ only as far as the volume of their imports of broadcast materials go. As Lee Chin-Chuan explains the degree of imports could sometimes be as high as 80% of total broadcast materials. Lee Chin-Chuan elaborates:

Specifically importing 50% of television programs are 12 nations (Venezuela, Brazil, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, Algeria, and Nigeria); importing 60% are 10 nations (Peru, the Dominican Republic, Bolivia, Uruguay, Singapore, Iraq, Lebanon, Cyprus, Yemen, and Kenya);...Such small nations as Barbados, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Bermuda, Nicaragua, Quatar, Dubai and Madagascar are the most foreign dependent, importing more than

\textsuperscript{30}Lee Chin-Chuan, \textit{Media Imperialism Reconsidered}, 78.
80% of their television products.\textsuperscript{31}

Again, it will be difficult to make a sweeping
categorization of countries in the third world as belonging
to the same level. Some exceptions exist. Among these are
those that have shown some degrees of self-reliance. They
include India, Taiwan, Syria, Ghana, Tunisia, Uganda,
Argentina, Pakistan and Turkey.

It is only with this understanding that we can best
appreciate the model of Galtung and avoid the mistake of
assuming that all sections of the world are equally endowed
and do function at the same level.

Overview Part One

We have tried in this chapter to articulate the various
viewpoints motivating this study. Through our introduction
we have tried to explain the necessity of this study by
comparing the impact of international communication to that
of international military security.

The statement of the problem tried to deal with the
conflicting viewpoints of "free flow doctrine" and "cultural
imperialism" two doctrines that have dominated the debate
and spectrum of discussions in international communication
in the past two decades. Our concern here is that both
viewpoints fail to adequately represent a realistic
theoretical basis for explaining the dynamics of

\textsuperscript{31}Ibid., 76.
international communication and television. The "free flow doctrine" is guilty of a pretentiousness typical of most capitalist arguments which deliberately overshadows the economic disparities or inequalities between the "providers and consumers" in the market place. Ultimately, its simple solution to a complex world of disparities spells doom for developing nations which lack adequate resources to compete in the world market. It is one-sided, selfish and likely to lead to the advancement of those societies that propagate them especially western societies, to the detriment of developing nations.

Fortunately, social/communist ideas have proposed an alternative which does not wholly thrive on profit maximization of entrepreneurs. Instead, it emphasizes the role of the state in the control of certain resources thus assuring their fair or equitable distribution. Despite the obvious limitations of the egalitarian ideals of the socialist/communist ideology, its place in the debate over how much or less control government should have for social fairness in the distribution of resources cannot be overlooked. Furthermore, it was to this theoretical bias that "cultural imperialism" as a framework to challenge the "free flow doctrine" can be credited.

But the basis of "cultural imperialism" as espoused by the scholars named earlier is no doubt profound but could use some improvement to meet the realities of an ever
changing world. By the very nature of its origin, as mainly an effort to antagonize a perceived global domination by the United States, it remains strapped to its limited agenda, and therefore remains far from being a reliable basis for a full fledged-objective theory. It suffice to say for now that, a theoretical base consumed purely by the instincts for antagonism or condemnation of western societies deprives itself of the necessary impetus to provide the necessary solutions to the problems that it may have initially set out to investigate.

We are offering as an alternative to both frameworks a comprehensive theoretical approach which will locate the core of the problem at both national and international levels.
Chapter Two

Literature Review

Introduction

The major strands of the literature we shall review in order to cover the entire spectrum of this study will include those that concern, 1) the nature of global politics dictated by universal systemic imperatives; 2) the nature of the governing and/or ruling classes; and 3) the New World Information and Communication (NWICO) debate. Through an understanding of the global systemic order we to hope better understand the dynamics of power relations between state. Such a knowledge would confirm the prevalent characteristics that motivate states in determining their preferences and national self interests. Secondly, we hope to through an in-depth understanding of the nature and form of politics vis-a-vis those who determine the choices of their nations, gain a deeper insight into the relations of power within states; a factor which will enable us to comprehend the nature of domestic control of national resources which include television industry or any other media for that matter. Finally, through a re-evaluation of the debate on the New Information and Communication Order, we come to better understand the salient views dominating the controversy on international communication for nearly three decades.

Regrettably, studies on transnational television are not many in the field. Most studies in this area have often
been addressed under the general heading of the media. These scarce and often paltry treatments of television have mainly been in the area of "impact study" either under the disciplines of political communication, or communication studies and media and politics. Predictably, the complexity involved in impact studies have confronted researchers with divergent problems ranging from limitations of reactivity of social groups to media messages, to difficulty in reducing the esoteric processes of communications to empirical cognition.

Our present study, "The Politics of Transnational Television: Beyond the Cultural Imperialism Question" emphasizes the trends and the processes through which individuals, interest groups manipulate institutions in the State, to influence the production and transmission and/or reception of messages in transnational television.

A Threat To National Stability

According to George Quester in The International Politics of Television:

the spread of the television set generates an important new set of issues, issues that are indeed international because the impact to be analyzed or disputed work across boundaries. More narrowly, incumbent governments will quite naturally feel some concern about what this new television medium does to politics and to their chances of remaining in power; even more important, those governments will need to be concerned about what this does to culture, education,
families - indeed, every aspect of life.\textsuperscript{32}

A major factor likely to exacerbate hostility between nation based on this development should be the perceived or lack of control by national governments over the types of information received by their citizens. Immediate consequences of disparaging information flow could lead to overall alienation of a people from their governments. Such a situation it is feared could likely lead to citizens' discontent a valuable premise for political upheaval; hence instability. An equally popular complain about unhindered cross-cultural transmission states that it deprives a people access to an authentic cultural development.\textsuperscript{33} Incidentally, both developed and developing countries have often, under different circumstances, protested against external violation of their borders by external communication signals. But some developing countries have gone further to equate the unhindered proclivity of developed countries to flood developing countries with information, to "cultural imperialism". In consonance with this conviction, one of the founding fathers of the non-aligned movement in the 1950s and 1960s, President Surikano of Indonesia remarked:

\textsuperscript{32} George Quester, The International Politics of Television, 2

\textsuperscript{33} Herbert Schiller, Communication and Cultural Domination, 26.
The motion picture industry has provided a window on the world, and the colonized nations have looked through that window and have seen the things which they have been deprived....(Hollywood) helped to build up the sense of deprivation of man's birthright, and that sense of deprivation has played a large part in the national revolutions of post war Asia.\textsuperscript{34}

The disaffected members of the non-aligned nations made up of mainly developing countries collaborated in 1974 to demand a New World Information and Communication Order (NIWCO) in the United Nations Assembly. That was over two decades ago. Rather than improve, many concerned writers feel that the situation has gone worse.\textsuperscript{35}

\textbf{Impasse on Debate}

In a very fascinating erudition, Herbert Schiller stoutly defended the concept of "cultural imperialism". In Communication and Cultural Domination, Schiller explained in unequivocal terms the pretentious attributes of the "Free Flow Doctrine". His short but highly commendable historical as well as analytical explanation traced the processes through which the "Free Flow of Information doctrine was imposed on the United Nations by the United States of America, soon after World War II. He said the process was


\textsuperscript{35}MacBride, \textit{Many Voices One World}, 88.
effected through a deliberate flooding of American cultural materials overseas and the usurpation of foreign national media systems that were required to disseminate it. Schiller further remarked that as a result of the propaganda strategy of the United States, a new mood concerning the doctrine of "free flow of information" became observable in the international community in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This process of information domination obviously led to the passage in the United Nations' General Assembly of a Resolution for a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) in 1974; sponsored by Third World leaders. Schiller however believes there was more to the allegations of cultural imperialism:

Besides the free flow of information one began to see frequent references to cultural sovereignty, cultural privacy, cultural autonomy, and even admissions of the possibility of cultural imperialism.\(^\text{36}\)

Schiller attributed these developments to major factors that shifted emphasis from the quality of communication to the consequences of free flow of information which changed the nature of the international community itself. About ninety new national entities by 1945 were still in the early stages of economic development. To safeguard their national and cultural sovereignty therefore, became of paramount concern.

But it was difficult to escape the global spread of U.S cultural styles featured in the mass media of films, TV programs, pop records, and slick magazines. Their influence prompted reactions as expressed by the Prime Minister of Guyana: "A nation whose mass media are dominated from the outside is not a nation." This trend which was feared with the emergence in the 50s and 60s of direct satellite broadcasting (DBS) from space into homes without the mediation of nationally controlled ground stations, had become a reality in the 1970s.  

In his Ph.D Dissertation, "The Political Economy of the Free Flow of Information in the NWICO", Marvin Haire stated:

The concept of the "free flow of information has been a convenient ideological weapon employed by the United States to achieve its foreign policy objectives in the area of information and communication both prior to the formation of the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and throughout the thirty-year history of this United Nations agency.  

Haire maintains that the "free flow doctrine" fostered the emergence in the American state of multinational corporate and banking interests who became dominant actors in the arena of international communication and information in the

37Ibid.

post World War II era. This domination, he believed, was achieved at the expense of both Western European and Third World nations.\textsuperscript{39}

Samuel Ubbaoonu writing on "Third World Media Policy in the International Forum: The Struggle for Autonomy, draws essentially the same conclusion as Marvin Haire regarding the ultimate intentions and implications of the "Free Flow Doctrine". Ubbaoonu engaged in a comparative analysis of the NWICO and the International Program for the Development of Communication (IPDC) and concluded that the Free Flow of Information which was strongly advocated and staunchly supported by the United States was a "misnomer and a calculated attempt to monopolize the freedom of information dissemination." He further stated:

\begin{quote}
It also tends to be a successful mechanism for the implementation of the principles of the Darwinian theory of natural selection - the survival of the fittest.\textsuperscript{40}
\end{quote}

Ubbaoonu's overall conclusion was that UNESCO does not seem to be the best arena for correcting this global communication imbalance among nations.

Both writers certainly have more areas of similarities

\textsuperscript{39}Ibid., This writer does not see Western Europe at the same receiving end as developing states but rather closer in relationship to the American hegemony over the rest of the world.

\textsuperscript{40}Samuel Ubbaoonu, "Third World Media Policy In The International Forum: The Struggle for Autonomy", (Atlanta: Clark Atlanta University, Dissertation, 1992), 2.
than differences in both the perception and conclusion on the general disparity between the developed and the developing states in the global communication system. Where Ubbaonu, however sees the "Free Flow Doctrine" as a "misnomer," Haire regards it a deliberate measure to foster the emergence of the American state, multinational corporate and banking interest as dominant actors in the international arena.

Unfortunately, these very impressive viewpoints tend only to scratch the surface. To start with, it would be wrong to blame the United States alone for all the shortcomings of the doctrine of "free flow of information". We must not forget that such the doctrine comes out of a larger liberal concept to which every liberal society has contributed. That the American state has risen to the apex of this ideological tradition does not make any other society in the mix less guilty of complicity. In all human endeavors, the lack of ability does not always reflect directly the lack of a desire to perform or not perform. Such a desire can at best be attributable to the overall theoretical commitment of those likely to convey certain actions.

On the other hand to consider the imperatives of the "free flow doctrine" as a "misnomer" is to ignore the theoretical commitment which a liberal society bestows on capitalism. As long as the free flow of information serves
the interest of those who are at an advantage, it is considered proper, especially in a world largely dominated by the liberal concepts and capitalism. Finally, the position of Herbert Schiller regardless of how much sympathy it professes to have for developing societies does not absolve it of a commitment to a larger philosophical tradition of a liberal viewpoint. It therefore cannot see beyond the confines of that doctrine which could mean that the very notion of "cultural Imperialism" is a best an alert signal to the liberal western societies to prepare against possible future challenges in international communication. As a basis for the formation of a universal theory that can bring about change, it does not seem very reliable.

Technology versus Culture

As in the beginning of most technological discoveries, Direct Broadcasting Service (DBS) met with a flurry of debate and opinions. Criticisms were as divergent as they were divisive. For one, direct broadcast service made transnational television easier and therefore more lucrative to proponents of the "Free Flow Doctrine". This made critics more restive and the proponents of the free flow more combative. According to Schiller:

Reactions in the private communication sector of the United States were predictively hostile and self-serving. Frank Stanton, one of the most influential American media controllers in the era of U.S informational hegemony
wrote... the right of Americans to speak to whomever they please, when they please are being bartered with.41

Frank Stanton was reacting to a UNESCO document which he claimed smacked of censorship by imposing provisions that would compel nations to reach prior agreements, on the character of broadcast, before messages are transmitted across national boundaries. This and other similar reactions have since then formed the basis of the debate in the ongoing controversy over the extent or limitations of cross-boundary broadcast.

Writing on the same subject in his book *The Politics of International Television*, George Quester considers this controversy under a subheading "Technology Support for Choice". Judging by the subhead, the focus of his thesis is that although government may disagree over the desirability of viewers having a choice of television programming, several aspects of the physical situation have favored such choice and the net trend of the technology will be to favor choice even more. If this argument were to stand, contenders of the equally strong movement for cultural identity must be uneasy. Quester however maintains that:

> The mere division of the world into separate sovereign entities has fostered choice, since what is transmitted in one country can leak across the border into another. Even if the governments of two

41 Herbert Schiller, *Communication and Cultural Domination*, 97.
countries like Denmark and Norway each believe that there would be only a single channel of television programming, people living near the Skagerrak would be able to view both. Similarly, where one country favored a single channel and another multiple channels, the result along both sides of the border would be multiple channels.\textsuperscript{42}

Quester believes that it would not always be easy to argue that the states transmitting television signals across a border intend to invade their neighbor's air-space. The leakage of U.S signals across the border into Canada has been something to which the U.S government has been largely oblivious.\textsuperscript{43}

Herbert Schiller, Marvin Haire and Samuel Ubbaanu certainly disagree with Quester on this latter viewpoint as they conclude that the overall strategy for global domination of communication is self-serving to the U.S, multinationals, banking and other financial interests. Undaunted, Quester goes on to state that, West Germany (before the demolition of the Berlin wall) was pleased that their signals were received and watched in East Germany. At the same time Luxembourg was pleased to have a radio and television audience across its borders because they carry advertising aimed at this audience and earn revenues from

\textsuperscript{42}George Quester, \textit{The International Politics of Television}, 78.

\textsuperscript{43}Ibid.
this access. Arab states whose transmission undermined the aversion to television of David Ben-Gurion and other Israeli leaders surely did not originally plan on this impact, i.e. leaking signals inadvertently across the borders. How Quester hopes to convince any reader with an explanation of an occasional value-free model of transnational communication as he describes above, is difficult in a capitalist dominated world. It is unlikely that Canada and Mexico, both neighboring states to the U.S will agree with Quester on his conclusion.

However, Herbert Schiller explains that the maiming cultural after-effects of imperialism would be enough for preoccupation with communication-cultural matters in the former colonial world. Current patterns of domination, he noted, persist in new forms, many in familiar modes. He elaborates:

From nations that were not held in the colonial grip, but for a variety of reasons experience increasing cultural domination, the issues of social integrity and survival are also deeply felt. Canada, for example, a nation of enormous breadth and potential, with a history of independence and development, now exhibits a profound and justifiable concern with preserving its own culture and retaining the opportunity to develop it further.44

This issue was so crucial that of the five basic questions

44Herbert Schiller, Communication and Cultural Domination, 71.
to which a Canadian governmental position paper in 1973 on national communication policy addressed, three were concerned with the issue of external domination.

Similar and more profound change has been occurring in Mexico due to cultural interaction. Joel Garreau in The Washington Post of May 25, 1986 attributed the changing pattern of elections to the cultural transformation of Mexico by the U.S. He states:

This transformation is the unintended consequence of the ways America has almost accidentally exported its culture to Northern Mexico and changed it as profound as the ways Mexico has changed the American Southwest. 45

Although Garreau tacitly equates the mutual capacity of both nations to simultaneously impact their cultures, he cannot settle the issue of who ultimately gains through such a process. Invariably, to dominate is not only to physically assert ones presence over another, but to gain by it. As he struggles with this thorny end of the issue he concludes:

And while there is no reason to think that PAN (the Mexican political party) is anything but home-grown and grassroots, its appeal is a prime example of America's ways having massive influence on that very region of Mexico that is the fastest growing, most rapidly industrializing and has the

45Joel Garreau, "Mexican Counter Revolt: The Americanization of the North Threatens the System", Washington Post, May 26, 1986, c1,c4. Although the "value-free theory" is questionable, it suffice to appreciate the level of transborder communication impact affecting societies.
highest per-capita income.  

An Elite Tool

A re-evaluation of the entire dynamics engaged in the controversy over transnational television therefore reveals a similarity in the motivation of those at the center of the transmitting nations and those at the periphery or receiving end. Furthermore, despite the overall reduction in the prices of televisions and video cassette recorders, due partly to Japanese cost-effectiveness in delivering the product at lower cost, the cost for many especially in the developing countries is still out of reach. If owning a television set for many remains a problem it is only imaginable what owning the television stations would mean. It is largely on the basis of this argument that television either local or international, continues to be regarded as an elite medium. Although the spread of television has exceeded the predictions of most manufacturers' analysts in the past few years, the control and ownership remains with only a few that form the elite core in most societies. Using his "choice" model to explain this phenomenon, George Quester states that:

The boom in VCR sales makes it obvious that a great number of people wish to expand their choice of entertainment. While some of this has taken the form of pornography, much of the longer-lasting

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46Ibid.
interest in television program choice has come in the greater choice this facilitates in ordinary screen entertainment. 47

He believes that some of the biases and attitudes apply to VCRs as well as satellite television reception systems and cable. As long as more affluent Americans can afford such purchases, those who are concerned about the cultural impact in the United States, Canada, or other Western democracies will be less alarmed. When the ordinary consumer has become able to afford such equipment, however, the source of searching begins. 48

Apart from the limited number of those who benefit and control global communication, Howard Frederick in Global Communication and International Relations states that partly, as a result of the growing communication among and between people around the world, another, more ominous, development is taking place. A handful of immense corporations dominate the world's mass media. He elaborates:

If present trends continue, by the turn of the century, five to ten corporate giants will control most of the world's important newspapers, magazines, books, broadcast stations, movies, recordings and video cassettes industries. These "lords" of the global village exert a homogenizing influence over ideas,

47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
Beyond the concentration of media in a few corporations, hence individuals, there exists an overall disparity between and within nations. Within nations wide disparities exist between the rich and the poor, urban and rural, men and women. Although the people that make up "the first world" represent only a quarter of the world's population, they control half its income. The poorest fifth of the world's population earn only two percent of the world's Gross National Products (GNP). Howard Frederick remarks that this gap is twice as large as it was thirty years ago. He states further:

The world of information is also divided into the haves and the have-not, or info-rich and the info-poor. The nation with a huge proportion of info-poor people starts at a great disadvantage in terms of development... This unequal bargaining position will affect all relations whether labeled aid, trade, investment, transfer of technology, technical assistance, or any other.  

The UNESCO in reaction to these staggering disparities in information flow, set basic standards for the numbers of newspapers, radio, and cinema that are ideal for every country. Each country, by UNESCO calculation should have at least 100 newspaper copies, 50 radio receivers, and 20

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49 Howard Frederick, *Global Communication and International Relations*, 8.

50 Ibid., 64.
cinema sets for every 1000 inhabitants. But the latest statistics reveal that only one developing country, Cuba, has met all three minimum standards. In the area of television, for instance, the number of television sets in the global market has increased over fourfold during the period 1975-1988, but in developing countries it increased only by one-half. Above all the developing world's considerable increase in the market was accompanied by rapid population growth. As a result, per capita penetration increased at the same rate in most parts of the world. Howard Frederick states that the developed countries had 77 percent of the television receivers and 84 percent of the television transmitters in the world, while the developing world had only 23 and 16 percent respectively. The number of receivers per 1000 inhabitants was 485 in the developed countries as compared to only 44 in the developing countries; more than a 12-1 ratio. In 1988 North America enjoyed eighteen times more television receivers than the developing world average and more than twice as many as Europe.

To appreciate the magnitude of social forces associated with transnational television, the role of the various groups of elites both with national and international borders must be seen as agents of common interests that act mainly for their self or group interests by dictating or dominating the cultural preferences of their or other
people. Rosten expatiates:

Most intellectuals (elites) do not understand the inherent nature of the mass media. They do not understand the process by which a newspaper or magazine, movies or television show is created. They project their own tastes, yearnings, and values upon the masses - who do not, unfortunately, share them. They attribute over-simplified motivations to those who own or operate the mass media. They assume that changes in ownership or control would necessarily improve the product. They presume the existence of a vast reservoir of talent, competence, and material which does not in fact exist. 52

Ralph Miliband in The State In Capitalist Society, clarifies the nature of dominating classes in advanced capitalist societies while Johan Galtung, in "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," draws a parallel between the nature of domination in the industrialized nations and the developing countries.

Miliband in the analysis of the state system and the state elite cautions against the treatment of one part of the state, usually the government, as the state itself. This introduces major elements of confusion into the discussion of the nature and incidence of state power. He argues that


52Ibid., 47.

although the government speaks and acts on behalf of the state it might not mean that it effectively controls that power.54

Miliband considers next the other element of the state system; the administrative, which now extends far beyond the traditional bureaucracy of the state, to encompass a large variety of bodies, sometimes related to particular ministerial departments, or enjoying a greater or lesser degree of autonomy. These include public corporations, central banks, regulatory commissions among others which are concerned with the management of the economic, social, cultural and other activities in which the state is now directly or indirectly involved.55 Miliband elaborates:

Formally, officialdom is at the service of political executive, its obedient instrument, the tool of its will. In actual fact it is nothing of the kind. Everywhere and inevitably the administrative process is also part of the political process; administration is always political as well as executive, at least at the levels where policy-making is relevant, that is to say in the upper layers of administrative life. That this is so is not necessarily due to administrator's desire that it should be so. On the contrary, many of them may well wish to shun "politics" altogether and leave "political" matters to the politicians.56

54Ralph Miliband, *The State In Advanced Capitalist Society*, 47.

55Ibid.

56Ibid., 50.
Although this has remained the ideal of administrators they cannot divest themselves of all the logical clothing in the advice which they tender to their political markets or in the independent decision which they are in a position to take. In conclusion, Miliband maintains:

These institutions - the government, the administration, the military and the police, the judicial branch, sub-central government and parliamentary assemblies - which make up the "state", and whose interrelationship shapes the form of the state system. It is these institutions in which "state power" lies, and it through them that this power is wielded in its different manifestations by the people who occupy the leading positions in each of the three institutions.\(^{57}\)

Listed among this category are the offices of presidents, prime ministers, and their ministerial colleagues; high civil servants and other state administrators, top military officers; judges of the higher courts; and some at least of the leading members of parliamentary assemblies. These are often the same men as the senior members of the political executive; and a long way behind, particularly in unitary states, the political and administrative leaders of subculture in the state. These are the people who constitute what may be described as the state elite. While the state system is not synonymous with the political system, the latter includes many institutions for instance parties and pressure groups, which are of major importance in the

\(^{57}\text{Ibid.}\)
political process, and which vitally affect the operation of
the state system. And so do many other institutions which
are not "political" at all, for instance, giant
corporations, churches, the mass media (for our present
interest - television) and many others. Ralph Miliband is
convinced that:

..the men who head these institutions
may wield considerable power and
influence, which must be integrated in
the analysis of political power in
advanced capitalist societies.58

The broad assumptions of the Miliband dichotomy of
state, political, and other systems could with adequate
attention to global systemic inequalities and the
imperatives of colonialism be applied to analyzing the
dynamics of power in the Third World countries. Major
contributions to the analysis of the evolution of elite or
"ruling classes" in the Third World countries include Samir
Amin, Frantz Fanon, Immanuel Wallerstein and Walter Rodney.

Johan Galtung draws a correlation between the process of
domination in the developed and developing countries
supporting our thesis of a rather dual or multi-faceted
level of domination rather than a uni-lateral or simplistic
North-South domination alone. Elaborating, Johan Galtung
states:

This theory takes as its point of
departure two of the most glaring facts

58Ibid., 51
about this world: the tremendous inequity, within and between nations, in almost all aspects of human living conditions, including the power to decide over those living conditions; and the resistance of this inequality to change. The world consist of Center and Periphery nations; and each nation, in turn, has its centers and periphery. 59

Part Two Overview

Given the interdisciplinary nature of this study, we have attempted to assemble authoritative opinions on the various facets of the study which would best explain the dynamics in the politics of transnational television as a factor in the evolving complexities of the new media age. Much emphasis in this study is geared towards explaining the position of transnational television in this mosaic of international communications by seeking to unfold the specific roles of interests groups or elites in state, political and informal systems.

George Quester in The International Politics of Television draws attention to the potentials for international politics of television to ferment international disputes among nations. But he sees the main controversy as the contest between monopoly and choice. Monopoly is described as the capacity of one entity or collective to produce television programs overcoming all

market odds while choice is the willingness or conviction of a public or audience to patronize selective productions amid various options. In his words:

Soviet or East German television may thus beat the capitalist product in its production of ballet and opera, or even of certain kinds of drama, and in the amount of time dedicated to education on science and health. Yet these communist system's discussion of public affairs and concurrent events, and the news, are (even with Glasnost) boring, and simpleminded when compared with Western news coverage, still ignoring the bulk of the news that might reflect badly on Marxist regimes of this world. 60

Continuing the investigation for points of conflict and therefore resolution in the debate over transnational television, we turn to the major issues viz; "free flow of information" and "Cultural imperialism". Many nations of the world including Third World nations have alleged that they faced cultural imperialism from the developed or technologically more advanced countries due to what they considered a disproportionate exchange or one-way flow of information from those technologically superior nations. To cast off the yoke of "imperialism" third world nations in 1974 advocated change at the United Nations. Although the United Nations General Assembly passed the resolution for a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO), given the majority of developing states at the UN, the resolution

60 Quester, *The International Politics of Television*, 55
was undermined by the developed nations. The works of Herbert Schiller, Communication and Cultural Domination, Marvin Haire, "The Political Economy of the Free Flow of Information" and Samuel Ubbasou "Third World Media Policy" support the viewpoints raised by many Third World nations.

Herbert Schiller in particular, laid an authoritative background to the historical as well as logical analysis of the genesis of the debate on cultural imperialism, and pointed to the emergence of technological advancement as that factor which made the cultural domination of developed countries possible. The advent of Direct Broadcast Satellite as well as video cassettes and other electronic gadgets accelerated the completion of the process of local and global domination.

Also relying on the work of Schiller we illustrated the nature of the fear of "cultural imperialism" in Canada and Mexico. Joel Garrau of The Washington Post contributed to this understanding.

A plethora of opinions including most of those cited earlier viz; Schiller, Haire, Ubbasou among others, agree that ownership either private or public plays a major role in the content and capacity of the media/television, to either commit or improve relations between nations. Our

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61MacBride, Many Voices One World, 5.

62Philip Lee, Communication For All: New World Information and Communication Order, 29
periscope of how the ownership of the media/television, reflects media content, we focus on the elite in most societies; developed and developing. Ralph Miliband, Abner Cohen, Johan Galtung, Frantz Fanon, Walter Rodney would form the basis of analyzing the evolution of the elite group in both developed and developing societies leading to a better understanding of how these individuals and interest groups can manipulate the state and other political and non-political systems to actualize the transmission and reception of media messages.
Chapter Three

Conceptual Framework

Introduction

In having to formulate the conceptual framework for this study, adequate attention must be paid to the underlying essence of international relations. Viotti and Kauppi in *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism and Globalism*, give some insight into this by asking such questions as: why do wars occur? Is nationalism the primary cause? or ideology? or the lack of world government? or misconception? or are people innately aggressive? How can stability, if not peace, be achieved? Why is there such tremendous social and economic inequality between different regions of the world?\(^6^3\)

As the discipline of international relations tries to address these issues, a prime focus must be on the role of international actors viz: individuals, institutions, governments, non-governmental, multinationals and international organizations. Where the research question transcends the discipline of international relations as in this case into the discipline of international communication our focus should adjust to the role of the specific actors at the same levels enumerated above, striving to determine

the specific from the general. We must seek to investigate
the internal and external proclivity of above all States in
World politics. To gain a comprehensive understanding of the
nature and dynamics of this study, requires a background
evaluation of the processes of the development of Mass
Communication as a precursor to the evolution of television
in the global economic, political and socio-cultural
realities. Through the ideological division of post World
War II global political arena, it would be instructive to
trace the manifestation of television (if not media) through
the prism of the "Four Worlds": First World-the West, Second
World-Former East and Third World-Developing and a Fourth
World South-East Asia.\textsuperscript{64}

Relevant to this study is the overriding notion of an
evolving "global information society" that has gradually
moved faster towards cultural homogeneity from a common or
closely related source of information. What the social,
economic and political ramifications of these developments
augur for a world population of staggering inequalities must
be instructive on the crises potentials of television or

\textsuperscript{64}Johan Galtung, "Social Communication and
Global Problems," Communication For All: New World Information
and Communication Order, 7.
An analysis of the ideological commitment of the former
Eastern or Communist block is neccessary because it formed the
basis of political, economic and socio-cultural relations in
these societies for over half a century. To expect its
complete eradication in a barely four-year sweep of
democratization might be rather unrealistic.
mass communication as a whole, either now or in the near future.

How politics either at the state or international levels shape the nature of trans-boundary communications must be properly articulated. To this end, three levels, the international, national and independent organizations would be properly evaluated to illuminate the interrelationship between the interlocking dimensions in cross-cultural communication.

A Species of Mass Communication

George Quester in The International Politics of Television, traces the evolution of mass communication as a process that went through first, printing, telegraph and telephone, and then, radio and television. He maintains that the attention the television received in modern-day societies is comparable to the preceding epoch of other mass communication media. He also notes that what is regarded as disabling about television was said previously, and perhaps not incorrectly, about radio. The arrival of radio was in many ways more revolutionary. He states:

The number of homes equipped with such receivers in North America and Europe went from none to saturation within the decade of the 1920s, a change considerably more rapid than television.65

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65 George Quester, The International Politics of Television, 15
Such an acknowledgment of the "rise and fall" of radio might tend to dismiss the validity in studying television in the process of formulating a theory in international communication. This position also makes it more difficult to prove that this medium, television, possesses any potential for damaging consequences as advanced by its critics. But in many ways television is different from radio and thus substantially generates different levels of influence on society. Unlike the radio, the television provides pictures and therefore more rational symbols of the screen. It allows total attention for many more casual conversational modes without imposing total attention required by radio. But we cannot ignore the fact that the radio as a precursor to television, held its sway from Hitler's propaganda in the 1920s and 1930s to World War II broadcast in the Arab world. It also helped greatly to spread the image of Gamal Nasser as a Pan-Arabic leader and Fidel Castro's insurrectionary messages in Cuba. The radio was also prominent in spreading culture as the messages of the Voice of America (VOA), the British Broadcasting Service (BBC), Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberty, captured large audiences in former Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries. According to Quester they offered a freer perspective on the news as well as Western Jazz music.\textsuperscript{66} So pervasive were the effects of radios that the Germans during WW II tried to round up all

\textsuperscript{66}Ibid.
radio sets to prevent reception of Voice of America and BBC. But like in every hasty effort to suppress the natural cause of human history, those measures failed and many radios survived while the news from BBC and other transmitters continued to give hope to occupied Europe. Under similar circumstances of control and repression of what is often considered negative information, the credibility of broadcasting grew in Europe and later spread to other parts of the world.

Howard Frederick in a detailed analysis, dates the earliest trends in mass communication to in primitive societies which adopted the crudest forms with bull horns and town criers. Wars, migrations, and travelling pilgrims, brought strange faces into these isolated communities. And from this historical background it appears that despite the advent of new technologies, the fundamental problems of communication between and among peoples and nations remain unchanged:

> Just as before, people today want to inform, they want to be informed, and they want to communicate. The revolution in technology has not changed this. For centuries missionaries were sent to distribute information. Spies were sent to collect information.\(^{67}\)

But none can dispute the fact that the need to inform has since gone beyond its aesthetic values alone. In most

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\(^{67}\)Howard Frederick, *Global Communication and International Relation*, 41
instances, its motivation was deliberate and often intended
to benefit those who control the source of information.68
These vested interests also tended to expand in scope and
ability with every technological advancement. Consequently,
the world became divided into two categories, viz: "info-
rich and info-poor" that is, information rich or information
poor. According to Frederick, in Global Communication and
International Relations, even within a single nation, wide
disparities exist between rich and poor, urban and rural,
men and women. He further states:

The people of the "first world" make up
only a quarter of the world's population
yet they control half its income. The
poorest fifth of the world's population
earns only two percent of the world's
GNP. This gap is over twice as large as
it was thirty years ago.69

It might be too diversionary to enumerate the various levels
of disparity between the various segments of the world in
information technology. But we cannot overlook the
distribution of satellites as a direct manifestation of this
global inequality of resources and means of mass
communication which determine the overall trends of the
information dynamics.

68Oswald Ganley and Gladys Ganley, To Inform or to
Control: The New Communication Networks, (Norwood, New Jersey:

69Howard Frederick, Global Communication and
International Relations, (Belmont, California: Wadsworth
Satellite Network

In the early 1990s, 184 communication satellites were placed in a geosynchronous orbit around the earth. Of these, only seventeen satellites have been launched by developing countries; four by India, three each by Columbia and Indonesia; two each by Brazil, Mexico and a consortium of Arab nations; and one by China. Meanwhile the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States (former USSR) have the largest satellite networks, including domestic, civilian and worldwide military communication. Among their possessions are fifty-four and forty-five geosynchronous satellites, respectively. INTELSAT has twenty-six (including reserves) and INTERPUTNIK three. But the irony of this distribution is that the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States has only fifteen percent of the world's population, but use more than fifty percent of the geostationary orbit. The third world population uses less than ten percent.70

Satellite delivered television services are available only in forty countries. These include twenty countries each from the developing and developed nations. With the exception of India, Indonesia, Brazil and China which have their own satellite broadcasting services in all other developing countries these services are received through

70Howard Frederick, Global Communication and International Relations, 72.
leased satellite services. This category does not include the dozens of countries lying under domestic signals, such as the Caribbean and Central American countries which lie under the United States satellite footprints. With the exception of Mexico, no developing countries broadcast television programs directly to other countries.

Peter Feud in "Satellites, Video, and the News" notes that as a technical means of public observation and verification, satellite monitoring for news has been a "worry" for governments and all the governments in adversarial positions. An incident made these fears real was when the Columbia Broadcast Services (CBS) distorted satellite "pictures" of Iraqi massive build-up along the border during the Iran-Iraqi war. The broadcast was opposite the truth, and opposite to information made available by Ocean Earth as information confirmed several years later, by reports that surfaced in the Iran-contra hearings.

Expatriating on the potential dangers posed by satellites, Herbert Schiller in Information in the Age of the Fortune 500, remarked:

> With the advent of communication satellites, the terrestrial space of the nation - its total environmental

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72 Ibid.
security - becomes problematic. The satellite can be directed to perform remarkably detailed scrutiny of terrestrial and oceanic phenomena. Termed remote sensing, it is defined by a United Nations report "as a system of methods for identifying the nature and/or determine the condition of objects on the earth's surface and of phenomena on below or above it, by means of observation from airborne or space platforms. 73

If satellites therefore make vulnerable the boundaries of neighboring countries where lies the claim to cultural integrity? This question must therefore form the basis for our continuing explanation of the interlocking phenomena in this conceptual framework.

Cultural Integrity

To anatomize the dynamics of cultural integrity would draw us close to the terrain of value judgement with complex implications. Questions at this level range from whether or not Mexico, or any other developing country, should be protected from United States and other broadcast entity, or whether Asians and Africans should be subjected to christian missionary efforts or UNESCO to promote cultural exchanges and contact among intellectuals. It goes further to include whether advertisers should be able to promote their products in foreign countries or if x-rated movies should be exported to countries holding to traditional sex mores. According to Ithiel de Sola Pool, foreign influence, has been a special

73Ibid., 17.
case in the destructive impact of intellectual and cultural media in general. All through history intellectuals have been called subversive and their products attacked as assaults upon the established culture. With reference to accusations and the trial of Socrates, Ithiel de Sola stated that poetry, literature and media are perennially labeled immoral, corrupter of youth and disrespectful of tradition. Elaborating:

These conservative charges have an element of truth. Intellectuals are gadflies. They claim a right to seek truth and evaluate the good by some light of their own other than the wit of established authorities. They also, and always have been, conduits for foreign ideas.

This phenomenon he maintained, has been with us from time immemorial only to be magnified by the emergence of telecommunication and the mass media. Which boils down to a quantitative change so great as to also become a qualitative change. The dent on cultural integrity therefore spread through the political, economic and social fabric of societies as global events penetrate local audiences transforming their view of themselves in relation to their environments. It therefore threatens stability of the status

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75Ibid., 123.
quo as it robs from traditional leaders the hitherto cherished exclusiveness to inform and hence control the thought and working processes of their subjects. This discrepancy, he also argued, opens the flood gates of options and opportunities to individuals and communities. For instance, a peasant who sells his crop in the local marketplace, may ultimately be linked to the world market by a series of trading intermediaries.

But we must not forget that the village headman who established his legitimacy by his ties to local lineages and shrines operates in a very different way from the national politicians who have to formulate issues as abstract platforms planks that will be meaningful in national journals or national broadcasts. But the electronic media as new sources of information or beliefs create counterweights to the established authorities and therefore becomes a source of conflict between the old and the new.

There is no attempt here to attribute the entire process of culture change to the broadcast media or more specifically, television. We do recognize that other channels of communication both inter-personal and mass, contribute to the overall process. But we must perceive the transmission of culture as a multi-dimensional phenomena rather than uni-lateral\textsuperscript{76} or dual-lateral with the more

\textsuperscript{76}The uni-lateral concept correspond to the "Cultural Imperialism" framework which this study considers inadequate in explicating the overall dynamics in the controversy over
traditional societies being subjected to greater changes, hence, disability, than the more sophisticated societies that penetrate developing communities sowing seeds of frustration and discord. Edward Shils in Mass Society and its culture stress that:

The increased wealth, leisure, and literacy of the lower classes, and the flowering of hedonism which these permitted, would undoubtedly have produced the greater expansion in mediocre and brutal – as well as superior – cultural consumption, even without further technological developments of communication in the twentieth century. This technological development did, however, supply a mighty additional impetus. 77

Somehow the number of consumers of superior culture has never been very large; they include, intellectuals, that is, those whose occupations require intellectual skills. This category will include university teachers, scientists, university students, writers, artists, secondary school teachers, members of the learned profession (law, medicine and the church), journalists and higher civil servants, as well as a scattering of businessmen and business women, engineers and army officers. 78

Profound as the analysis by Edward Shils and Sola Pool cross-cultural communication.


78Ibid.
are, in explaining the complicity of intellectuals in cultural transformation, they somehow overlook the immediate motivations in the imperative of cultural diffusion. But the point for any discerning reader, is clear. At the national level, intellectuals consolidate national cultural preferences based on the logic and strength in argument of the most vocal of the dominant interest group or groups. A mere projection of this motivation into the international arena would confirm a similarity in the selfish motivation of the dominant interest group or groups that propagate what becomes officially accepted as permissible culture. Abner Cohen throws some light on the issue:

In stratified societies, power groups seek to validate and sustain their elite status by claiming to possess rare and exclusive qualities essential to the society at large. In some cases these claims are rejected by the rest of the society; in others they are accepted in varying degrees; and in yet others they are developed and bestowed by the society.\(^7^9\)

The extent to which economic or aesthetic values propel this development will for a long time inspire serious argument. Offering some insight into this controversy, George Quester in *The International Politics of Television* notes that in the world of academia, cultural imperialism may refer to the fact that we see more American professors studying India than Indian professors studying Americans. He wonders

whether this one-sidedness is a fair reflection of the relative competencies of the analysts on either sides, or if it is instead reflective of the relative wealth, and the endowment for leisure contemplation in the two societies, as India is too poor, and too beset with other urgent problems, to have the time or money to endow professorship for the study of American history? Turning away from such university imbalance, cultural imperialism may be a reminder that one has far more Indians watching American movies than Americans watching Indian movies. The difference lies mainly in attitudes to the superior contemplates of Hollywood, beating out all the rivals of the rest of the world in the production of screen entertainment.\(^\text{80}\) He elaborates:

> Instead it could reflect the distorting impact of economic power. Hollywood, as a larger economic unit and a portion of a far richer economy, could compound on this to win a stranglehold monopoly position in the entertainment field, might it not be that nothing succeeds like success in much of the economic world?\(^\text{81}\)

It could not have been more eloquently stated, for translated into economic terms, this begins to smack of economics of scale and monopoly which would be resisted by

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\(^{80}\)Quester's views on the "cultural imperialism" must be taken as one extreme in the debate that argues persistently for the domination of American broadcast establishments. Some records maintain that Indian movies attract more audience interms of population than American movies.

\(^{81}\)Ibid., 43.
those who prefer competition and home-grown commodities.

Technology and Control

To understand transnational media dynamics, we must appreciate the contemporary role of the media functioning in the center of the modern world system in the last century. Emphasis in the United States historical experience, is instructive and may be essential. George Quester notes that one remarkable feature of the entertainment industry is that an American pre-eminence in this field emerged earlier reaching peaks of global saturation immediately after World War I. This has not been matched since, as patterns of Hollywood dominance have largely persisted. Quester sees the advent of the silent movies in the 1920s as the breakthrough by the US in overcoming language barriers capturing a share of the audience around the world. In reaction:

The Weimer Republic found itself adopting restrictive policies on how many American films could be shown in a theater a week, much like contemporary Scandinavian restrictions on how many American television programs can be shown. Despite such restrictions, the American films played to packed houses at times in the 1920s accounting for 70 percent of all movie tickets sold.82

Some explanation on how Hollywood jumped to such a

82George Quester, The International Politics of Television, 21.
commanding lead alleged that the immigrant origins of large faction of ordinary Americans in the years before World War I gave American film makers advantage. Having to provide a silent screen entertainment that would be of interest to people who did not speak English, the American film maker supposedly developed a product that would have just as much appeal for Italians and Germans as for Italian-Americans and German-Americans. In contrast:

European film makers aimed at a higher cultural plane, seeking to bring serious drama to the screen, one perhaps linked to the relevant national tradition. Americans instead came out with a product of mass appeal and major profit potentials.\textsuperscript{83}

According to Herbert Schiller in "Transnational Media and National Development" the generative force behind the consumer culture has been the worldwide expansion of American corporate enterprise through the vehicle of what has come to be called multinational corporation. From 1953 to 1973, the book value of the United States direct foreign private investment ballooned from $16.3 billion to $107.3 billion. The market value of these investments, furthermore, is of the order of $160 billion and the average annual increase over the past three years (1971-1973) has been $10 billion. Schiller elaborates:

Accompanying the massive expansion of U.S private business abroad has been the

\textsuperscript{83}\textit{Ibid.}
internationalization of American advertising. "By 1972, reports one study, "only three of the world's top thirty agencies were not U.S owned (two Japanese and one British). In each European country about half of the top ten billing agencies are U.S owned; for example, in Belgium it is six, Britain eight, Netherlands five, Sweden three, Switzerland two,...." 84

An immediate consequence of the large American owned production complex now operating internationally is the pressure it generates to obtain access to and domination of the local media. Only in this way can it attract and process indigenous audiences into consumerism. Consequently, the manufacture of culture in the advanced capitalist countries, and especially in the United States, has developed along with the general capacity to increase physical output and improve worker productivity. Locally in the U.S, the largest share of the annual production is accounted for by a relatively small number of cultural conglomerates. These include automobiles or steel or chemical output which are concentrated in half a dozen or so giant industrial corporations. Three television networks (ABC, CBS and NBC) a handful of major film companies, and the relative disappearance of the independent publishing house with the evolution of the one-newspaper city, are now among the indicators of contemporary cultural production concentration. Herbert Schiller remarks:

84Ibid., 24.
The production of movies, television programs, games, records, magazines and books is consolidated in a few corporate superstructures and made part of multi product lines of profit-maximizing combines. These culture producing business aggregations, with the acquiescence of the judiciary, confer on themselves the legal status of individuals and take for granted their protection under the U.S constitution's Bill of Rights. They cover their expansionist devices for markets under the principle of "the free flow of information" and more recently, "the right to communicate".\(^{85}\)

Where the American media and the multinational corporations could be solely attributed for the transformation of national media structure into conduits of corporation business system, and the heavy international traffic of commercial media products flowing from the center to the periphery in the 1970s, the 1990s provide new indices for appreciating such assumptions.

**New Trends**

For one, a world wide recession proclaiming the U.S as the highest debtor nation in the world with the European nations tottering under a common economic market arrangement, that is, European Economic Community, in a desperate bid to survive the economic hardships, bring new challenges to international relations vis-a-vis

\(^{85}\text{Herbert Schiller, Communication and Cultural Domination, 76.}\)
international communication by offering some new elements for evaluations. Meanwhile the third world countries bedeviled with debt crisis and sprawling economic stagnation if not deterioration, present a grim picture raising apprehension on the prospects for political stability and hence predictability in future global events. Above all, the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) collapsed under the weight of the economic crunch re-ordering the nature of the contending global ideological platforms that have shaped national alliances over the past fifty years. Efforts by the United Nations to mediate over the crises have often been symbolic at best and inconsequential at the worst. The role of the International Monetary Funds (IMF) and the General Trade and Tariffs Agreement (GATT) two UN agencies have rather than ameliorate growing tensions, especially among developing states, aggravated the situation among disgruntled members. In this seeming perplexed scenario, the special cadre of businessmen and intellectuals, who constitute the various governments continue to profit across the national boundaries to the detriment of the majority of their people. These national and global intellectual circuits of domination give rise to the perpetuity of the "free flow of information doctrine" propagated by the liberal/capitalist elements led by the U.S. Read in Foreign Policy: The High and Low Politics of Telecommunications, states:
After world war II, American transnational flourished because the United States had the political power to keep the international system open to assure freedom of operation and transnational organizations had the necessary means of transportation and communication to pursue (their) strategies abroad. But while technology has offered improved means (jetliners, computers, satellites), the ability of the United States to keep the system open-to enforce the general concept of freedom to operate and the specific principle of free flow of information by any medium- has been challenged. 86

Furthermore, strong allegations that direct satellite television broadcasting present active threats to the integrity of national cultures have constantly been raised. Denouncing these viewpoints Ithiel de Sola Pool in "Direct Broadcast Satellite and the Integrity of National Cultures" state that such allegations are tenuous because there is no imminent prospect of direct satellite television broadcast to countries that do not wish to receive them. It is hard to support the allegation when there are much more significant threat to the integrity of national cultures, in syndicated re-runs of television tapes. Sola Pool elaborates:

A sharp distinction should be made between direct TV broadcasting with the cooperation of the receiving country and direct broadcasting to a country that does not wish it. The former may be

practicable in the visible future; the latter probably not. Any economically rational use of direct broadcasting requires that the receiving country allocated one of the few suitable wave-bands to that purpose and distribute sets and antennas designed appropriately to receive such signals.\footnote{Ithiel de Sola Pool, "Direct Broadcast Satellites and the Integrity of National Cultures," edited Kaarl National Sovereignty and International Communication. (Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1979), 75.}

The logic behind this is that the sender must choose to launch a rather large satellite capable of radiating much more power than is required for broadcasting to sophisticated earth stations.

Without trying to undermine the capacity of the advanced capitalist countries and multinationals to elicit "cooperation" from desirable countries throughout the world, the point must be made that the controversy over Direct Satellite Broadcasting is not a one-way event as some proponents of "cultural imperialism" would have us believe. Like most human activities, it has a source and an end, which makes it at least dual-directional in nature. At the receiving end of any transmission are national leaders or intellectuals who on behalf of their population decide on which broadcast are permissible. And as in the developed countries use the medium to consolidate their positions in office allowing elaborate or discretionary levels of entertainment in the media to entice, socialize and
manipulate the majority.

Numerous scholars have until this moment raised very profound argument in favor of the process and validity in the accusations of "cultural imperialism" but most have often overlooked, deliberately or otherwise, the propensity of local intelligentsia to be self serving and autonomous enough to discharge some levels of domination at the local levels.

Part Three Overview

We have tried to periscope the essential components that best elucidate the conceptual framework to articulate the "Politics of Transnational Television." Key to our discussion is the systemic factors of twentieth century capitalist realities. These systemic factors, demonstrable in political, economic and social ramifications confirm the impetus for international or cross cultural media, particularly the radio, as precursor to transnational television. The basis of comprehending transnational television therefore must start with understanding the dynamics of international communication.

As no human activity, be it, national or international can be value free, we have approached our investigation bearing in mind the opposing debates in the field of political communication and international political economy. The fulcrum of these debates have been between the proponents of cultural imperialism and those that favor the
"free flow of information doctrine."

Incidentally, these viewpoints represent those embedded in ideological perspectives reflecting the push-and-pull motion in both the national and international levels of transnational television. Judging from a synthesis of literature in the field, a convincing premise for the domination of the global economic, political and social, hence international communication is attributable to the Euro-American complex. Evidence of this global control and manipulation is a cadre of individuals and interest groups whose financial base may transcend the typical state boundaries. Their preponderance gives support to critics claim that global communication amounts to cultural imperialism. While maintaining their innocence to this claim, the interest groups do not disguise their preference for the concept of the "free flow of information doctrine" being logically compatible to the principles of free market economy.

It is in this context that we study the ascension of television as the latest model of mass communication following in the tradition of the radio, the telegraph and the telephone; a focal technological device accentuating international politics.

Unlike the one-sided assumptions made by proponents of either cultural imperialism or the free flow of information doctrine, we offer the concept of "a global elite cult" as
the phenomenon that best explains the dual nature of national and international processes of transnational television. We did not overlook the implication of the centrality of culture as the major contention in the overall consideration of any cross-cultural communication. 88

88 Howard Fredrick, Global Communication and International Relations, 35.
Chapter Four

Patterns of Television In Western Societies: An Ideological Stratagem.

Introduction

Television has developed primarily as a commercial medium. This was to be expected in the United States and a few other countries.... Elsewhere, however, broadcasting was a state monopoly without commercial connections. Theoretically, television should have followed in the established pattern; significantly, it did not. 89

Elaborating, Wilson Dizard in *Television: A World View*, suggested that the reasons for these development were complex. Economics played a large role. So did the opinions of politicians who regarded television in its early days as a frivolous experiment that did not merit their attention. By and large, television broadcasting in over fifty countries was controlled in the whole, or in part, by private interests under state supervision. Commercial advertising was carried out by all but a handful of the world's ninety-five television systems. Dizard further stated:

> As a result, a large measure of program control rests with men who instinctively understand the middle class aspirations of their audience and who cater to their desires in programming as well as in

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In trying to understand the basic nature of transnational television and the politics thereof we must first seek to understand the structure and evolution of television as an industry within national boundaries. Fortunately, Wilson Dizard has provided some useful explanations to an understanding of the motivating factors of television but that is not all. It is only in delving into the various forms and structure of television that we can start to perceive its capacity as both a national and an international phenomena that could exacerbating conflicts. It is not unconscionable at this point to state that similarities and differences abound in the industry which have their roots in history, technology, some social responsibilities of broadcasting, its need for revenue and an unavoidable requirement on programming to meet its audiences' taste. A brief review of the reception capabilities will also give some insight into both the limitations and capabilities of individual nations to provide television service to its various audience.

By way of logical progression, we shall first establish the nature of television by looking at its earliest development in those countries where it was first established, to determine its characteristics and therefore its potentials for exacerbating conflicts between nations.

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90Ibid.
The first set of countries we shall be studying here are those often classified as the industrialized nations which include western European countries, eastern European countries and Japan.

**Western Television Patterns.**

A Unesco survey in 1953 attributes the development of television to industrially advanced countries: Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the United States, France, Germany, Japan and others. According to the Unesco report, 1952 was significant for the growth of television because it was then that the initial form of television was questioned in the United States and Britain. The public controversy arose over solving fundamental problems in creating the most constructive television broadcast.\(^9\) In Britain and other parts of Western Europe, the shift away from state owned television broadcasting toward commercialism thus began. The event that triggered the shift was the British government's decision to introduce commercial television in competition with the government chartered British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC. Within a few years, dozens of other countries adopted similar arrangements. From then on the focus of overseas television moved from the measured beat of

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government control to the quick step of commercialism. The change, it was suggested, confirmed the effectiveness of American-style broadcasting both as a revenue producer and as a highly acceptable form of entertainment and propaganda. It must be noted that before the advent of commercialization, television was like radio, a "natural" government monopoly, and like radio was developed under strict government control. In the early 1950s, television was expected to follow the historical pattern of radio. But this did not happen. Only a handful of the more than ninety countries with television operations in 1965 had state-controlled, non-commercial participation. In the remaining countries, television operated either as a wholly commercial operation or as a combination of state commercial operations.

Peter Dunnet with some support from Wilson Dizard, explain that the reasons for the strong upsurge of commercially oriented television varied from country to country, but, in each instance the harsh economic facts of developing and maintaining television operations played an important role. Most governments found that they could not

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afford television as a budgetary item. In a number of cases, they had supported their radio operations from a license fee on each home receiver. But economics would not, it was feared, permit such a simple solution for television unless license fees were raised to the point where television would be permanently restricted to an upper-income audience.

Significantly, the few countries that elected strict state monopoly of their television operations have been those where the medium developed proportionately more slowly. For most other countries, the problem resolved itself into developing a suitable formula for combining government controls over television with some form of commercial operations to sustain the operation. Expatiating further Wilson Dizard notes that:

> The ration between government and private control was determined, in most cases, by the pressure of political and economic forces, guided by men who recognized the high stakes involved in the control of the new medium. This resulted in a wide variety of formulas. They ranged from complete commercialization of television with only nominal government supervision as in Iran, Luxembourg, pre-Castro Cuba and the Philippines to some form of state control with limited use of commercials as in Italy, Finland and Spain.\(^9^4\)

While it seemed many countries were impressed by the American commercial success in television, few of them adopted the American pattern outright. Instead, most

governments took their cue from the European countries whose experiences in state monopoly broadcasting was closer to their own. It was therefore the European rather than the American pattern which set the tone of television administration development in most parts of the world.

Commercial Patterns.

The topsy-like growth had made it the mass media success of the postwar age. It is a story with many facets. These include stunning technical achievements, showmanship, high finance, low politics, all tied in with the phenomenon of a world in rapid social transition.95

If the date and place had to be selected, the date would be probably be November 2, 1936, and the place, the British Broadcasting Corporation's experimental television studio at Alexandra Place on the Northern edge of London. Several commentators provide various dates depending on what most of them consider as priority. But at the Alexandra Place the first public television broadcasting service in Britain was inaugurated. The broadcasters were intended to test two technical systems for transmitting television images. The first system, a mechanical device to record and receive the pictures, had been developed by inventor Johan

Baird, a Scottish inventor. Baird had been working on television developments for over a decade before the Alexandra Place tests. The second system using newly developed electronic methods of transmission and reception, came from the research laboratories of the Marconi-E.M.I Television Company, a subsidiary of two large British electrical companies. For three months, the two systems were tested in transmission from tiny studios.

By February, 1937, the BBC announced that it had dropped the John Baird 240 line system and selected the Marconi-E.M.I system for its future transmissions. It was a tribute to the engineering skills of engineers Isaac Shoenberg and Charles Franklyn, Peter Dunnett notes that:

The Alexandra Place experiments were the culmination of half a century's search for a practical TV system by scientists of a half a dozen nations. They included the German, Paul Nipkov, who developed the first device for mechanical scanning of images in 1884; the Russian, Boris Rosing, designer of the first system using a cathode ray tube as receiver in 1907; and Vladimir Zworykin and Philo Farnsworth of the United States, who brought the potential of all-electronic television to working reality during the early 1930s.  

To a large extent the events at the Alexander Place have come mark a major basis for understanding the nature

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96Ibid., Baird, one of the inventors of the disc scanning systems, first demonstrated his invention at Selfrigde's department store in London on January 27, 1929.

97Ibid., 6.
and forms of western television. At a glance we can see how the roots of commercialism based on the natural desire of those who invested in the series of experiments started to gain roots. But we must now move to another geographical location that played an equally important role in the early beginnings of western television outfits. And that country is the United States of America.

United States of America:

In the summation of many experts, including George Quester and Frederick Howard, the United States of America (USA) was by far, the most active area of experimentation; by 1932, the Federal Radio Commission (FCC) had authorized twenty-five experimental television stations. Earlier, the Bell Telephone Company had demonstrated wire-circuit television by transmitting pictures from Washington to New York. However, television developed slowly, inhibited by the lack of a clear-cut government policy on technical standards. The fiscal setbacks of the Depression and the broadcasting industry's concentration on its profitable radio operations added another dimension to the problems. It was not until 1940, that the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) successor to the Radio Commission, approved a plan for commercial television broadcasting. In July 1941, the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) and Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) began station operations in New
York on a fifteen-hour weekly schedule.\textsuperscript{98} Within a year, eight other commercial stations went on the air; only six of them continued to broadcast throughout the war. By the end of 1944, the three pioneers in broadcasting NBC, CBS and DuMont had stepped up their programming in anticipation of television's post war expansion. Their predictions were right. As Peter Dunnett recalls:

\begin{quote}
In the United States in the 1930s, radio manufacturers such as the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) foresaw a profitable future selling television sets. At the time, a new television set cost $500, as much as a new car. RCA therefore started television networks in order to supply programming for the new products. Fifty years later RCA had made far more from owning a television network than from producing television sets.\textsuperscript{99}
\end{quote}

These commercial initiatives pressured by the commercial interest groups, subsequently influenced the FCC to define its policy on postwar television. This eventually set the tone and pattern of American television and for a good part of many areas of the world. All the channel allocations were to be commercial, with only minor consideration for educational or other public service uses of television. " It took seven years for the FCC to decide

\textsuperscript{98}Although all the cited authorities on this subject do not agree on the exact dates of inauguration or commencement of some of the events, they do substantially agree on the basic facts surrounding these development.

on the allocation of channels for educational stations."

Even at that, Laurence Bergreen thinks that:

A powerful range of economic and political interests were involved in the licensing procedures for the 400 channels initially allocated by FCC. By September, 1948, 106 Stations had begun operations when the Commission declared a "freeze" on the construction of new stations because of technical problems involving signal interference by stations in the same area. The freeze lasted until 1952.\textsuperscript{100}

By that time, the bones and structure of television was formed and has never been fundamentally altered or improved ever since.

There was little doubt that American television would be developed primarily on commercial basis. There was, however, considerable doubt about the nature of this development. The issues centered largely around the question of whether sales from television sets would be broad enough and whether advertising could cover the high cost of television programming. Somehow, at its inception, television was largely considered a medium for the upper and upper middle income classes. This assumption was later changed as television began to attract a mass audience from the middle and lower middle income groups with large segments of the rock-bottom income group represented. David Sarnoff the former Vice President and General Manager of RCA

estimated in the 1950s if his corporation could service the one million families in the United States alone, out of a total population of fifteen million, the equivalent of seven 7 percent of the total families, that would yield at $75 dollars per unit a gross business of about $75 million. And that was a lot of money in those days. But the statistics were even more reassuring:

TV sets production went from 178,000 in 1947 to 6,000,000 in 1952; by the end of 1952, there were over 20,000,000 sets in use. Television had found its first mass market and a highly successful operating formula.\textsuperscript{107}

More importantly, this growth signalled a more potent fact; television had a social dynamic all its own that could develop rapidly under the prodding of commercial interests, and that it would not be denied its role as a revolutionary new mass medium. If America had its peculiar contribution to the advent of commercial television, Britain as alluded to earlier made no less contribution to this trend. We shall now return to a fuller discussion of the British experience to better understand its place in the entire picture.

\textbf{Britain.}

The decision by Britain in 1954 to establish a commercial second network in competition with the venerable BBC, was a turning point in the development of television commercialization. In the opinion of many analysts, the BBC

\textsuperscript{107}Ibid., 24.
was the monumental and certainly the most successful example of the social and political benefits of a government chartered public monopoly in radio and television. It was moreover, the best known broadcasting system in the world at the time. This was due largely as a result of the effectiveness of its wartime short-wave broadcasts. BBC radio subsequently became the model on which the broadcasting systems of a score of countries were organized over a period of thirty years. It was assumed that British television would also be a BBC monopoly after the war, as it had been before 1939. But within a few years, the very ramparts of State-created monopoly television had been breached, thus revolutionizing broadcasting in Britain and in dozens of other countries.102 A new potent argument for commercial television was introduced throughout the world; "if Britain could do it, why can't we?" Elaborating on the genesis of commercial television in Britain Dizard observed:

Commercial television in Britain resulted from a remarkable performance in political lobbying by a small group of conservative members of Parliament, discreetly aided by a coalition of advertising and industrial interests who recognized the economic potential of commercial television. They first advanced their views on commercial broadcasting in hearing before the labor government's commission on broadcast policy during the late 1940s. Predictably, the commission recommended

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that BBC continue its monopoly position in both radio and television.  

Meanwhile, the supporters of the BBC monopoly included all of the labor party leadership and most of the Tory leadership. They dominated the subsequent parliamentary debate on the subject in 1951. Only two conservative backbenchers reportedly spoke in favor of commercial TV during the debate. But the proponents of the commercial television controlled the conservative party's study group. This position proved advantageous when the Conservative party under Winston Churchill's leadership ended Labor's five-year reign in the general elections of October, 1951. The study group prepared a government white paper, issued in May 1952, which suggested that provision should be made to permit some element of competition in British television. This statement cautious as it was, marked the Churchill government's commitment to commercial television. As Asa Briggs reflects:

Thus a political manoeuver permitted less than a dozen conservative MPs (out of a 320 conservatives in Parliament) to commit their party and the government to commercial television. The vote also reflected the general anti-BBC bias of Winston Churchill. Along with other conservatives, Churchill believed that the Labor party victory over his party in 1945 was caused in part by BBC favoritism toward the Laborites in its

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broadcasts and commentaries.  

Long before coming into office Churchill had expressed his support for sponsored BBC programs. He was reported in 1929 as sending a letter to BBC's director, Sir John Ruth, offering to pay one hundred pounds "from my own pocket for the right to speak for half an hour on politics. How ashamed you will all be in a few years for having muzzled the broadcast." Although Churchill was no great proponent of commercial TV (which he characterized as a tu' penny Punch and July show) he was interested in giving the BBC some competition.  

The conservatives surprise decision on commercial television served to rally the defenders of BBC's monopoly to latter-day action. They represented the overwhelming majority of Establishment opinion in Britain. These ranged from archbishops to university dons, in temporary league with commercial groups such as mangers of motion pictures and legitimate-theater enterprises who feared the effects of commercial television on their own enterprises. In 1952, this coalition formed the National Television council as the organizational center for their lobbying efforts.

According to analysts, this became a propitious moment to defend the BBC and to attack the alleged horrors of

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105 Ibid.
commercial television. Not only was the BBC's reputation at an all time high as a result of its excellent coverage of Queen Elizabeth's coronation, there existed a sharp reaction against the manner in which American television had handled the films of the coronation telecast a few hours after the event. British newspapers were filled with sensationalized accounts of how one American station had interrupted the Westminster Abbey communion service to advertise bed sheets, while another network featured the antics of its mascot, a chimpanzee named J. Fred Muggs, during its coronation coverage. In the estimation of Asa Briggs:

While J. Fred Muggs remained a potent if unwilling ally of the proponents of a continued BBC monopoly for many months, this coronation role was no match for the formidable strength of economic forces supporting commercial television. These commercial interests - including advertising agencies, television equipment suppliers and consumer goods manufacturers - provided the financial aid and organizational talent for a mass lobbying organization; the Popular Television Association (PTA) designed to whip up popular support for what they termed "competitive television."  

Thus, the PTA's themes adopted a combination of high-minded warnings about the dangers of BBC's monopoly to freedom of expression in Britain together with promises that commercial television would be more interesting to watch than the BBC. Occasionally their argument was considered by analysts as "specious and sometimes below the belt." For Instance:

106 Ibid., 891.
One PTA lecturer went out of his way to suggest BBC's dullness by noting that its programs were used by mental hospitals to soothe their patients. Another speaker informed church groups that commercial television could spark a religious revival in Britain as it had (he claimed) in the United States. One major C.H Tait reportedly at a PTA sponsored meeting, described BBC as the worst kind of monopoly because "it set out unashamedly to make people think, and feared that it was only a short step to telling them what to think." Perhaps the shrewdest of the arguments advanced by commercial TV advocates was their promise to avoid the alleged excesses of American television. The bill authorizing the TV sought to minimize such excesses by placing the proposed new stations under the control of an Independent Television Authority (ITA), a public corporation. The authority was expected to own and operate the new systems transmitting facilities, renting them to independent program companies. Advertising sold by these companies was to be strictly controlled by ITA regulations; all such advertising was to be limited to short "short" announcements placed between programs.

Supported by more reluctant than enthusiastic votes, the bill creating the Independent Television Authority became law in July, 1954. The first commercial station went on air in September 1955, and immediately captured a lion's

\footnote{Ibid., 904.}

\footnote{Ibid.}
share of TV audience in London area. In the following months, other commercial stations began their transmissions and their commanding audience lead over local BBC stations. It took seven years before the BBC could claim, temporarily, a popularity lead in the weekly "Top Twenty" programs. By 1963, there were fifteen commercial companies sharing the equivalent of a quarter of a billion dollars in revenues from programs that received over 90 percent of British homes. Wilson Dizard remarks that:

Television no longer marked the measured pace set by the Establishment. It now moved forward with a brisk, noisy quick step, piped to the tunes of a thousand commercial jingles. Its program pattern was dominated by light entertainment shows encompassing imported Hollywood cowboys, glint-eyed detectives, quiz programs, vaudeville turns, and soap operas, all eagerly cheered on by the growing numbers of British families who watched the "telly" every night.109

Their frothy TV diet was occasionally made more substantial by the addition of cultural programs that were almost always well produced and sometimes self consciously artistic. A good example of this was the presentation of "Electra in the original Greek." This and other uplift exercises drew predictably small audiences; they did not notably challenge commercial TV's steady hold on at least 60 percent of the British TV audience. As revenues continued to soar, one station proprietor declared that a TV franchise was a

license to print money.

The success of British commercial television had important repercussions at home and abroad. Domestically, it helped to bring to power a new breed of mass media entrepreneurs, wielding enormous influence over public opinion. They included such men as Granada Television's Sidney Bernstein, Associated Television's Lew Grade and Roy Thompson, the Canadian-born press magnate whose Scottish Television station is home base for TV operation in a dozen countries throughout the world.\(^{110}\)

At the international level, the British decision to adopt commercial television helped shift the balance in world-wide television away from strict government management of the medium to a new emphasis on commercial operations under varying forms of government supervision. Although few countries copied the British system directly, it was, in general used to justify the introduction of commercialism in National TV operations. One among several countries affected by the British decision was Canada. We now turn to that country to see the dominating trends of its commercial broadcasting.

Canada.

By 1960, almost all Canadian radio and TV stations were controlled by the government chartered Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC). The CBC differed from the BBC in that

\(^{110}\)Ibid.
over half of its radio and TV network affiliates were privately owned commercial stations. Despite this strong commercial emphasis, about 70 percent of CBC's operating expenses were covered by annual government grants. In 1959, the government agreed to relax its restrictions against more than one competitive station in each Canadian city. This decision led to the formation of an eight-station English-language network, CTV which went on air in 1961. By 1965, sixty stations had emerged in the wake of commercialism. Thirteen of these stations became part of the Canadian network.\textsuperscript{111} In considering the family tree of television using such variables as commercial, non-commercial dichotomy, it immediately becomes clear that the distribution of nations on this bases defy our classical categorization of western, eastern and Asia and Latin American experience. Rather the level of industrialization might some way help to explain this phenomena. But industrialization alone can not explain most of the social, political and economic considerations that propelled certain development in this century. In this regard therefore, we cannot help but include under the consideration of western societies a country in Asia that have developed television as well as other arms of technology in the fashion of western societies. That country is Japan. Above all, where we consider Canada a tutelage of the British influence, the

\textsuperscript{111}Ibid., 37.
United States of America can be said to have directly influenced the establishment and growth of Japanese television.

**Japan:**

The Japanese had developed a television capability before World War II in order to provide coverage of the 1940 Olympic Games scheduled to be held in Tokyo. The games were called off because of the European war and so was the television project, as Japan stepped up her own militarist course. During the late 1940s, a group of Japanese businessmen headed by newspaper publisher Matsutaro Shoriki petitioned American occupation authorities for permission to resume television on a commercial scale. The request was turned down on the grounds that television was inappropriate at a time when the Japanese economy was being guided through a period of austerity. However, in June 1950, American authorities set a new pattern for post war broadcasting in the country by approving a regulation which ended the traditional broadcast monopoly. The ruling permitted commercial stations to compete for the first time against the government-chartered Nippon Hosni Kyoshi (NHK) system. When U.S occupation ended in 1952, the Shoriki group took its television plans to the new government. In July, 1952, the group was authorized to operate Japan's first commercial TV station. Although NHK had started a small television operation of its own earlier, NHK officials did not plan for
a rapid expansion in the medium. At the time, there were only three sets in operation in the Tokyo area.112

The Shoriki group's Nippon Television Network (NTV) decided to deal with the lack of television sets and viewers by creating an audience as quickly as possible. When it began regular broadcasts in August 1953, it made its Tokyo television conspicuous by setting up large screens receivers in hundreds of public places throughout the city. A year later, there were 16,000 sets in Tokyo area. Literally, millions of people had become accustomed to the new medium through the NTV's outdoor receivers. Their appetites were whetted by what they saw, particularly the professional baseball games televised from Karakuen stadium.

Television soon moved form Tokyo's public squares into millions of Japanese homes all over the country. By the end of 1960, over 7,000,000 sets were in operation, served by 128 stations. Through the sixties television rode the crest of a booming consumer economy; it was also encouraged by liberal government broadcasting regulations, and electronic industry capable of turning out inexpensive sets, and, last but not least, the insatiable Japanese urge for self enlightenment. There were as many Educational Television Stations in Japan as there were regular stations in any singly European country.

The only national network in Japan consists of fifty-

112Ibid., 73.
eight stations operated by NHK, the state-chartered broadcasting company. NHK's administrative structure and operating procedures are roughly comparable to those of the BBC. Like the BBC, its revenue are derived from an annual tax levied on all radio and television receivers. It also shares the BBC's attitude on being prestigious and largely conscious of its independent status and its public enlightenment responsibilities. Typically, NHK operates a research institute which provides it with a more accurate continuing profile of its audience than those available to any other television system in the world.\textsuperscript{113}

Japanese commercial television, comprising forty-six stations was centered around four of Tokyo's "key stations," and to a lesser extent, several other Osaka Stations. Commercial stations were permitted to own more than one station. As a result, commercial network operations involved a complex series of affiliation between the big-city key stations and smaller provincial outlets.

**Non-Commercial Television Patterns.**

Somehow the story of commercial television does not account for the overall trends in the development of television in western societies. There were as a result of either an ominous suspicion that of the damaging effect of the medium in private hands or other equally compelling reasons, a determination by some governments to keep the

\textsuperscript{113}Ibid., 73.
medium entirely in government hands alone. Incidentally this tradition had been set thirty years before the era of television by the radio. Some of the which followed these tradition were: France, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland and the Netherlands adopted the non-commercial pattern of television. While many of these countries have in more recent times modified their approach to the issue by either adopting either partial of complete commercial television preferences, their earliest consideration for the non-commercial preference would enable us to see the ebb and flow of interest groups politics. That it is never solely determined by a common factor is the viewpoint which this analysis seeks to emphasize.

France.

The French took a strong stand in favor of state controlled television during the post war debate parley because of its defeat during the war in 1940. Suggestions and opinions tended to support the view that before the war, private radio stations, and French press, were manipulated by politicians and economic groups to the detriment of national interest. By 1946, political parties, from the communist to the Catholic MRP, supported legislation nationalizing all French radio and television facilities. The initial action to rectify the situation was to purge French broadcasting of its collaborationist taint and to give it a more "national appeal." Somehow French
television's development became hampered by changes and counter charges over the alleged use of nationalized radio and television network for political purposes. The major broadcasting establishment in France, Radio-diffusion Television Franchise was under the direct control of the Ministry of Information. Under successive post war governments, it exercised its rights to guide the content of French broadcasting particularly on sensitive political matters. The French Broadcasting exercised these authorities to the fullest during the French war in Africa. According to critics, it did not carry a single program about the conflict between 1956 and 1959.\textsuperscript{114}

Charges of alleged censorship continued after General Charles de Gaulle became head of state in 1958. With a significant part of the press opposed to his policies; the new President turned to television as a means of projecting his forceful personality and policies to the people. Largely as a result of this decision, French TV was given a new lease on life in the form of expanded technical facilities, a bigger budget for program operations, and a larger audience to serve. By April, 1964, a long-delayed second network was inaugurated. The new role assigned to television by the Gaullist government led to increased criticism that the medium was being used primarily as a political weapon against the opposition. While the government initially

\textsuperscript{114}Ibid., 24.
ignored the charges, it soon took steps in 1963 to reorganize the structure of French Broadcasting. Although this move was made to disarm critics, its main purpose was to give French radio and TV a stronger competitive position in attracting the attention of its audience. Elaborating this intention the French Minister of Information Alain Peyrefitte in his speech to the opening session of the National Assembly debate stated:

that the state-operated radio system had lost half its listening audience in the previous fifteen years to private broadcasting from Luxembourg, Monaco and other nearby areas. Television he warned was threatened with the same competition.115

The government's bill, approved by the Assembly in June, 1964, transferred radio and television activities from direct control of the Ministry of Information to an autonomous organization; L' Office de Radio-diffusion Television Franchise (ORTF). An eighteen-member board of directors, equally divided between government and public members, was given authority to set ORTF broadcasting policy with the Ministry of Information limited to an advisory role. The bill had a number of provisions which indicated the government's willingness to meet the "censorship" charge. Meanwhile Gaullist's broadcasting policies were not completely weakened by the new legislation. Critics

115Ibid., 26.
maintained that the ORTF director general responsible for
day-to-day broadcasting activities was a government-
appointed official whose term of office was not specified.
This, they feared made it possible for the government to
replace him at will.

But despite these criticisms, ORTF represented an
important move away from the traditional French government
control over broadcasting activities. By 1965, another
change in French broadcasting policies was also imminent as
the government officially considered a proposal for
introducing commercial advertising in its television.
Although the number of French television receivers rose
barely above five million mark, the seventeen dollar annual
license fee collected from each set owner was insufficient
to finance the costs of the expanding TV network. ORTF had
inherited a debt equivalent to thirty million dollars when
it assumed control of broadcasting operations a year
earlier.\footnote{Ibid., 29.} As we can imagine the trends of events soon
started to force the development of television in France
into one of less government control and more of commercial
involvement. But the originating impulses that have warned
against full scale commercialization of the medium have
never failed to dampen any initiative for the total support
for commercialization. Where we have for the purpose of this
study considered the French system as a non-commercialized
patterns, we must look to others which are closely comparable to the French patterns but bear slight differences as middle of the road between outright commercial systems and pure non-commercial patterns. These we can safely refer to as mixed patterns.

**Mixed Patterns.**

Outside France and the Scandinavian countries most western European countries, from the earliest beginnings of television, adopted some form of single-state supervised network in which commercial advertising was permitted. This pattern, due to number of competing factor ranging from political to pure commercial interests, was developed successfully in Italy, Finland, Ireland, Austria, Switzerland and Portugal.\(^{117}\) The circumstances and interests that led to this situation can be understood by looking at the evolution of the medium in Switzerland.

**Switzerland.**

In 1957, when the Swiss government was debating how to develop its experimental TV system, a local commercial combine offered to pay for a half-hour's advertising time each day. The Swiss Association of Newspaper Publishers and other interests made a counter offer of two million franc a year for ten years if the proposed TV service would not take

\(^{117}\)Peter Dunnett, *The World Television Industry: An Economic Analysis*, 37, states that the only Two countries in the continent with wholly private TV operations were Luxembourg and Monaco.
advertising at that time. The Newspaper proprietors were understandably worried about TV's effect on their own advertising revenues. After years of debate, the issue was finally resolved in 1965 with the introduction of full fledged commercial advertising in the state network. Another model in this category is the German Television which adopted a self regulating regional stations independent of central government supervision.\textsuperscript{118}

\textit{West Germany.\textsuperscript{119}}

The German policy had its origin in a 1945 Allied occupation order requiring all broadcasting activities in the defeated nation to be organized on a regional basis. The order was designed to prevent the rise of a centralized broadcast service similar to the one Hitler had used so effectively as a propaganda instrument before the war. Although Nazi broadcasting was limited primarily to radio, Hitler was fascinated by television. According to Wilson Dizard:

\begin{quote}
The German dictator had grandiose plans for mass distribution of home receivers and for public "viewing rooms" where the populace could watch government propaganda programs on wall-sized screens. A start toward developing such a system was made in the late 1930's but wartime pressures on the German
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{118}{George Quester, \textit{The International Politics of Television}, 118.}
\footnotetext{119}{West Germany became reunified with East Germany in 1991. Fortunately, its model of television became adopted by the entire country under a democratic German State.}
\end{footnotes}
While the Allied occupation edict on regional broadcasting was ignored in the former Soviet Zone, it set the pattern for post-war radio and television in the rest of Germany. First priority was given to the development of regional radio organizations based largely on new FM techniques. When television's turn came in the early 1950s, it was also developed at land level. (A German land is the rough equivalent of the American State.) The first German television station, Nordwest Deutscher Rundfunk (NWDR), went on air on Christmas Day, 1952. Within two years, television stations were broadcasting in all parts of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The new regional stations were set up under regulations intended to give all segments of German public opinion some voice in their operations. The chief supervisory organ for each station was a broadcasting council (Rundfunkrat or Hamptausschuss) which set general policy administration, fiscal affairs and program operations. The council members generally included representatives of political parties, labor and business groups, cultural educational, religious and professional groups. They selected the station's administrative board (Verwaltungsrat) which supervises

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\(^{120}\) Wilson Dizard, *Television: A World View*, 32.
current administrative operations. This group usually selects station manager (Intendant) who operates the station's day-to-day activities. This unique tripartite control arrangement provided a framework for what was possibly the best example of a national television system responsive to its viewers full needs. Despite criticism of wide dimension, German television managed to steer a middle course between the excess of unbridled commercialism and stifling government control. The most telling criticism in recent years centered around a series of incidents involving alleged political interference in the programs of West German Television stations. In most instances, the cases involved attempts to censor news and commentaries, particularly the popular "Political Cabaret" satire shows.\textsuperscript{121}

As in previous cases mentioned, the safeguard erected against commercial pressures, German television was not completely free from pressure groups seeking to manipulate the medium for their own purposes. Such obstacles were inevitable for a medium as influential as the West Germans had made their television. Another country that followed closely related trends as the German television was Italy.\textit{Italy.}

Somehow, the German television model set the pace for a number of other European countries. Notable among these was

\textsuperscript{121}ibid.
Italy, where medium rapidly grew in popularity since its introduction in 1956. Although there were fewer than six million television sets in Italy in 1965, average nightly listening audiences ran as high as thirty million persons because of the habit of placing sets in bars, coffee houses, town squares and other public places. Italian television and radio was operated by RAI, a private joint-stock company largely owned by the Italian government. RAI operated two television channels; one aimed at popular audiences, the other at a more intellectual level. The popular channel features a full range of what became the international pattern of television viz: quiz, shows, films, American serials, women's and children's programs. The second channel presents an uninhibited, by high-brow schedule a nightly three-hour presentation of recitals, operas, dramatic production and documentaries. According to one source:

one of the illusion - destroying facts about Italian television, is that operatic programs are not particularly popular on either channel\textsuperscript{122}

Italian viewers paid a stiff license fee for the privilege of owning a television set. The revenues were supplemented for RAI by commercial advertising, most of which were lumped together in a short nightly segment called Carosallo ("Carrousel"). Experts can argue that perhaps one of the over-riding factors that has influenced the growth and

\textsuperscript{122}Ibid., 37.
development of television and any other medium for that matter was the question of ideology and political and economic convictions of the nineteenth century. In no region of the world were those convictions as jealously guarded as in what used to be known as Eastern Europe with its center at the former Soviet Union. We now turn to that region to see what elements there support our hypothesis that the human elements in societies above all other factors determine the nature and adoption of technology.

Eastern European Television Pattern.

Non-Commercial Patterns.

Television in Eastern European countries, as in the former Soviet Union was a direct reflection of the political/ideological convictions. Here we see different factors striving to achieve almost the same objectives of social control, by interest groups who certainly had a greater advantage than most citizens, to determine the affairs of those societies. Although an analysis of the pattern of television in Eastern Europe might be considered belated as the dynamics of communist/socialism are rapidly giving way to liberal ideas, it is only by looking at the manner in which those societies adopted the medium to suit their ideological preferences that we can clearly see the extent to which interest groups in those societies determined the nature of the society's medium. Saying for
one therefore would mean saying it for the other.

Unknown to many western scholars the challenge of liberalization remained one of the greatest obstacles to most communist/socialist ideologies especially in the area of television. The revolutionary qualities of the medium through sound and sight made it an obvious challenge to the propagandist proclivity of most communist/socialist countries. Soon after it establishment in the 1950s therefore the medium sought and acquired a level of liberalization, which many experts consider as mere token liberalization. But somehow the so called "liberalization" that took place in the form of political, economic and ideological affairs in the communist government after the death of Stalin, was constantly portrayed on television programs throughout the entire region. Thus the TV in Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia was, by communist standards, became somewhat more relaxed in its approach than was the medium in East Germany and Bulgaria, where Stalinist norms of conduct still persisted. Yugoslavia claimed a non-aligned position between East and West, and was as special as Albania, the only Chinese satellite in the West, where a ramshackle television station in Tirana which offered a rather monotonous schedule of Sino-Albania propaganda shows.123

Eastern Europe television compared directly with the

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123Ibid., 192.
former Soviet model in at least one important aspect. In every century, the medium was operated as direct instruments of the state propaganda machine — whatever forum political "liberalization" that took place in each of these countries. It did not affect television's standing as a state-owned — or was more specifically, party — controlled — medium. Any discussion on the evolution of the medium in eastern Europe therefore must start with the medium in the former Soviet Union.

Former USSR.

Although it could be strongly argued that because the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) no longer exists, it would not be necessary to engaged in any meaningful analysis concerning experience in the development or lack-of, of television in the twentieth century. However, it is our intention in this study to underscore the very point that, only in understanding the originating intentions of most human endeavors which include television, that we can gain a deeper understanding of this medium as a potential source of hostilities among nations. While drastic moves have been made since 1990 to liberalize the former communist bloc a sense of good judgement must caution that it would take more than a few years to dismantle the fabric of communism which took over half a century to inculcate into those societies. A closer look at the structures of those societies would prove that although there have been
fervent moves towards liberalized forms of government, the sensitivity of the populace still tend to reflect nothing comparable to typical western attitudes but a mixture of what is obviously more complex and confusing. In order to understanding the present television patterns in former communist centers would therefore require unveiling the historical fabric of the medium in those societies.

The Soviet television network consisted of over 100 key stations linked to over large relay transmitters and about 250 smaller relay installation. These facilities serve 12.9 million receivers in 1965. The Soviet government had decided that nationwide television was important enough to justify the heavy capital investment involved.¹²⁴

It had like most of the western societies, acquired its television facilities as early as 1939, when experimental transmission began in Moscow, using equipment purchased from the Radio Corporation of America. Television operations were suspended during the World War II, but was resumed on limited scale in 1946. For a number of years thereafter, little was done to expand TV broadcasting facilities, Wilson Dizard states that this was due largely to the low esteem Stalin and his associates placed the medium. That still largely remains a highly debatable subject as a lack of interest cannot always be construed to mean a disregard for

the medium but an inherent fear of its potential to open
society to a wider variety of information and hence
challenge the status quo. However it was commonly said that
even if television was an important medium of communication
in Stalin's days he would have confined its activities to
reproducing daily editorials and articles from 'Pravda.'

But confining it as he did again proves our suspicions
right; that as an interested party, he used or refused to
use the medium in order to gain a certain kind of advantage
in his society.

It was only after Stalin's death in 1953 and the
liberalization of Soviet policies restricting consumer goods
production that television really began to develop in the
USSR as a mass medium. Even when the increased emphasis on
consumer goods was cut back again later, the output of
television sets continued to expand and their increasing
availability became one of the few tangible evidences for
Soviet citizens of the new liberality of the newer regimes.

In the account of Ellen Mickiewicz:

In 1959, when the prices of many luxury
items were raised, the cost of
television sets was actually lowered.
The market is still by no means
saturated, and even in the cities those
who have sets of their own are in the
minority. There are however, enough sets
in workers' clubs, hostels, and other
public places to make television viewing

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125Ibid.
a fairly common experience for the inhabitants of the larger cities.\textsuperscript{126}

By simple deduction, the policy of making television more widely available went alongside a change in Soviet propaganda methods after Stalin's death. It reflected Nikita Khruschev's insistence that the party line must remain inviolate, and that it should be presented to the people in as palatable a form as possible. The result was a noticeable effort to produce livelier propaganda products. Far from being restricted to the transmission of Pravda editorials, Soviet television programming began to emphasize sports and other entertainment subjects during the Khruschev period. Normal precautionary steps were however taken to ensure that the medium did not violate any ideological norms. Little effort was therefore made to exercise control over programming or to exploit television more assiduously as a propaganda weapon. As far as programming went:

There were no news programs on Soviet television until 1957 and then only once daily. By the late 1950s, the regime took a fresh look at the medium and decided to upgrade its propaganda role. Accordingly, the seven-year-plan 1959-1965, called for an expansion of facilities which, if they had been fulfilled, would have given Soviet television a larger daily audience - somewhere in the neighborhood of 125 million - than that of all the other propaganda media combined, exception

\textsuperscript{126}Ibid., 10.
The first detailed definition of television in Soviet society was spelt out in two resolution adopted by the party central committee during 1960. The earlier of those directives, issued in January, ordered changes in the form and content of all party propaganda so as to emphasize the need for greater efforts to build up Soviet world power. The Central Committee outlined the various roles each media would play:

The newspaper were given pride of place among the media, but for the first time television received special mention. Its role was more fully detailed a month later when the Central Committee issued a special resolution defining the functions of television and radio. The resolution opened with a sharp attack on "soft" trends in television programming.\(^{128}\)

The Committee however acknowledged that television presented new opportunities for the daily political, cultural and esthetics education of the population, including those parts of the population seldom reached by mass political work. The party however noted:

that it is far from adequately used to propagandize the achievements of the Soviet people in political, economic and cultural life and to exhibit Soviet man,

\(^{127}\)Ibid., 12.

\(^{128}\)Ibid., 16.
the builder of Communism.\textsuperscript{129}

The Central Committee's litany of complaints about the utilization of television covered a wide field. They noted that programs were "dull" and "unconvincing"; reporting of socialist achievements in the provinces was "rare and generally handled skillfully"; television production was badly organized; and above all, not enough was being done to propagate the party line. The resolution therefore decreed a series of reforms, ranging from a proviso for more "propaganda on healthy living" to the requirement that special children's program be broadcast by every television station at least one hour everyday. The most important effect of the directive was to apprise Soviet television managers that primary assignment was an ideological one.

The Central Committee's comment were addressed principally to the organization responsible for the overall direction of Soviet radio and television; the State Committee for Radio and Television Broadcasting, attached to the USSR council of Ministers.\textsuperscript{130} Responsibility for the bulk of actual television operations was dispersed among local stations, which have considerable autonomy in adapting their programs to regional needs. This practice was explained in Soviet political literature as a reflection of

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{129} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{130} Ibid., 18.
\end{itemize}
the "Leninist policy of equality among the many peoples inhabiting the Soviet Union." However, aside from the desirability of tailoring programs to specific audiences, such as workers in virgin lands and various national groups, another practical reason for allowing local stations substantial operating autonomy was the lack of country-wide relay facilities for transmitting Moscow originated programs.

Local autonomy in television programming however did not mean any relaxation of centralized ideological control, which was a function of the State Committee and the party apparatus. Since the issuance of the 1960 resolutions, party organizations have had a more clearly defined responsibility for overseeing the ideological content of local television programs. Despite this, a relatively small percentage of shows have thus far been directly political in content. At least two-third of any Soviet newspaper was generally devoted to political news and commentary, about a third of radio outputs fell in this category. The proportion of directly political programs on television was somewhat smaller than on radio, although a strong ideological thread ran through most of the broadcast materials, particularly the news.\textsuperscript{131}

The most intriguing aspect of Soviet television was perhaps its increasing important role as link between the

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid., 24.
Soviet rulers and the ruled. The rapid expansion of TV facilities during the early post Stalin era was continued by Nikita Khruschev's successors. When his successor Aleskei Kosygin, returned from an Asian tour early in 1965, his TV report to Soviet citizens was handled like that of Western leaders; with an advanced text of his speech made available to foreign press, and even a tele-propter. Such high-level interest in the medium was not always reflected by lower party official. In the opinion of experts, this was due to the persistence of the Communist belief in the primacy of the press as an ideological and agitation weapon. Lenin laid down this dictum in his classical treatise on propaganda, "What Needs To Be Done," in the early years of this century. There, many Soviet officials saw no reason to challenge a thesis they had grown up with.

We do not intend to spend much time elaborating the development in most other states that were satellites of former USSR. It would suffice to say for now that an analysis of eastern European experience help us to explain both our hypothesis of interest group domination of the medium in any given society. Among those countries that loyally followed the patterns of the former USSR were former Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and Yugoslavia. Somehow of these countries Yugoslavia had a distinct twist under the leadership of President Tito. With an ideology of non-aligned status Tito attempted to break away from the
domination of USSR. It succeeded in so far, by being the only country in the Eastern Bloc to belong to both the Eurovision and the Intervision which the opposing global networks created separately by the eastern bloc (Intervison) and the western nations (Eurovision). From the Yugoslavia experience we first start to catch a glimpse of the future preferences of the audiences in eastern Europe was regardless of what their leaders chose to let them see. In the account of Wilson Dizard:

On the programming side, however, the taste of the country's million viewers does not accurately reflect political non-alignment. Next to local programs, the popular favorites are shows from the United States and other western countries. Production from the Soviet Union and form East European countries usually have a low rating.\(^{132}\)

To show how versatile television could be even under the communist ideology, we shall have a brief discussion on the pattern of former East German television, which by every standard proved to be the most sophisticated television outfit under the satellite of USSR.

\textbf{East Germany}\(^{133}\):

The most extensive TV operations in Eastern Europe were carried by East German regime. Over half of East Germany's seven million households had televised receivers, the

\(^{132}\)Wilson Dizard, \textit{Television A World View}, 197

\(^{133}\)East Germany went along with West Germany in the "new" democratic Germany but its records in the development of television stands unshakable.
highest set-per-family ratio in any communist country, and one of the highest anywhere. The regime's TV organization, Deutscher Fernsehfunk, was the professional equal of any similar organization in the world. Its production of operas, plays and similar programs were often superior to those mounted by West German stations. But the films in East German television was the Pankov's regime's heavy-handed attempts to use it as a propaganda outlet. According to Wilson Dizard:

The program schedule is spotted with indoctrination shows, many of them using the traditional German "political Cabaret" techniques of witty satire on interesting current events. In most cases, the East German versions are neither witty nor interesting; their emphasis is on such themes as West German fascist, NATO warmongering, and American imperialism. The intended audience or these programs is only purely East German. The regime had a lively awareness of the medium's influence on millions of viewers in West Germany and West Berlin.134

Although West German authorities had a similar interest in East German audiences, they did not attempt to tailor their program to East zone viewers. Each side however, sought to discourage its citizens from looking at the other's TV programs. For several years, West German publishers honored an informal agreement not to publish East German TV schedules in their newspapers. The agreement broke

134Ibid., 197.
down in 1964 when several leading publishing firms, including the powerful Springier group, began publishing the schedules. The Springier firms radio and television guide, with 12.5 million weekly circulation, was instrumental in breaking the ban.

East German leaders took some stringent measures to limit the impact of West German TV in the territory. For several years, it was a crime punishable by a jail sentence or a fine, to listen to television for the West. This regulation reportedly was eased in 1964 because of difficulty in enforcing it. For a while after this episode, TV sets owners in East German still stood the risk of being identified as politically unreliable if he kept his set tuned to West German programs. Despite this pressures, such programs continued to be popular in East German, although the non-propagandistic programs in East German television also attracted audiences on both sides of the border.135

The East German experience supports our hypothesis that interests groups; in the form of communist party members determined the growth of the medium. That the East German television out paced that of the USSR also help to support our assumption that a relationship between the center and the periphery is not always total. More than any thing, the experience of the former Eastern bloc adequately prove a bias for state control of the medium, a factor most

135Ibid. 199.
demonstrated by many developing nations of the world. It is to those we now turn for further investigation.

**Overview of Part Four.**

From the earliest beginnings of television in the western societies it seemed clear that the industry was destined to become a commercial venture. In Britain and the United States of America, to suggest that it could have been otherwise was to undermined the interests of those who invested in experiments in the technology that eventually brought about the development of the industry. As some analysts would readily agree, commercializing television was a natural way to go in a capitalist society that thrives on the doctrine and concept of "open market and free flow of information."

We see that in Britain the shift of the state owned BBC to acquiring a second commercial station was precipitated by a number of developments many which were not directly commercial. But with growing American competition in the industry it was only a question of time for the British industry follow in pursuit or be left behind. Another development in the British television experience which cannot go unnoticed was that for once, the propensity for individuals either in government or in the private sector to directly influence the structure and programming content of the broadcast medium was dramatized. The role of the various
pressures groups, pushing for either greater or less
government control of the medium only served to re-enforce
our hypothesis of interests groups politics in the industry.

The American experience was somehow different from that
of the British. From the onset, it made no pretenses as to
its preference to commercialize the industry. Government
officials, leading industrialist and elected officials made
sure that through the FCC the technology was given the
financial boost it needed to compete effectively in the
world market. It is largely to the American experience we
attribute the growth of transnational broadcasting which
subsequently alerted other nations to either expand their
own services or demand the curtailment of the American
influence.

We see that Japan promptly followed the example of the
west by adopting largely commercial stations. Somehow, its
variation of commercial television had to reflect the needs
of its society. Largely a traditional but industrialized
society it could not ignore a need to cater to some cultural
as well as some educational needs of its people. So while
Japan is homed far away in Asia we are compelled by its
trends in the development of television to classify it as a
western nation. But we see how Japan tries to compensate for
commercial television through the establishment of
educational television. That move was to pacify the
agitations of conservative elements who thought outright
commercialization was detrimental to national integrity. But its commercial outfit have since dominated many parts of Asia where some of its cross-cultural broadcasting is effective.

In eastern Europe and particularly in the former USSR, we see that the establishment of the medium was primarily to serve the ideological commitment of the communist ruling party. As the entire means of communication was strictly controlled, television which had a greater advantage of sight and sound than radio was almost a dreaded medium. All the satellite states under the influence of former USSR were naturally under the full beam of the Soviet television. But as the Eastern German experience proved, the capacity of the medium to flourish and attain its objective of social control determined by local authorities, cannot be overemphasized.

From all indications the commercial or non-commercial motivations propelled the growth of television at the local level. Those same instincts accounted for the need to expand the base of coverage to foreign lands because greater spread could readily translate into greater income for all entrepreneurs and other interest groups concerned.
Chapter Five

Television Patterns In Developing Nations.
A Decoy For Advancement.

Introduction.

By all the textbook rules of economic development, television is a luxury that most Asian, African and Latin American countries would be better off without at their present stage of development. However, the textbook rules do not always apply. Not only has television become a significant media factor in dozens of underdeveloped countries, but there is a growing body of evidence to suggest that, although it started off as a luxury, it may develop as a revolutionary force for upgrading educational and informational standards.\textsuperscript{136}

Dizard believes that the promise of future developmental benefits should not obscure the fact that present-day television in Africa, Asia and Latin America is largely an entertainment medium. But that same fact does not undermine the potentials the industry has for developing commercial interests. As in western societies, it is the medium's compelling attractiveness as a leisure-time force rather than its direct educational potential, that has set the pace of its growth.\textsuperscript{137} Unfortunately, this very argument underscores critics allegations that the medium was


\textsuperscript{137}Ibid.
a lure of the unsuspecting audience into a process of indoctrination for the benefit of those who own and manipulate the medium. Peter Dunnet states in *The World Television Industry,*\(^{138}\) that the lack of advertising market for most television outfit in the developing world made it acceptable that governments finance most of its operations. Despite these obvious problems, television expanded quickly throughout the developing world showing some characteristics similar to those in western societies. And we must quickly add, interests groups that had a foothold over governments dictated the pace of its growth and preferences based on what they considered best for the larger society.

In the fifties, television was restricted to a few Latin American countries, primarily, Brazil, Mexico and Cuba. Only Nigeria and Egypt in Africa and Thailand in South East Asia had television in the 1950s. By 1965, nearly every country in the world, except for a few African enclaves, either had television or had announced intentions to get it. A significant hold-out against television on the African continent was the most industrialized country on the continent; South Africa.\(^{139}\)

In the Middle East, the pace was slower. By 1965, every

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\(^{139}\)Ibid. South Africa resisted the establishment of television until 1975, fearing that it could be a threat to its apartheid policies.
country in the area had television either in operation or had plans for it. Television growth was slowest in Southeast Asia, due in large part to political instability in the former French territories in Indo-China and to the delay in introducing television in the area's two largest countries, India and Pakistan. By way of statistical summary, television was already operating in more than sixty to the eighty free countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America in the 1960s the rest areas were expected to be in operation by 1970.

Experts agree that one of the constant themes that run through the various national reasons for developing television was the prestige factor at the political realm and a hope for some economic returns on the long run. As far as many leaders of the developing world were concerned, television ranked high on the list of "proofs" of modernism in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Just as automobiles were a common household necessity than bathtubs, at one stage of American history, so television was expanding in nations where human needs called for new priorities. The mythology of modern times will not be denied, and it applies to television's development in countries which might better spend the money on hospitals or water systems.\footnote{Ibid., 214.} Its influence as a factor in keeping up with the Joneses was evident in such areas as the slums of Buenos Aires where
most of the ramshackle houses had antennas sprouting from their roofs. The poignant fact was that many of these antennas topped houses with no television inside.

Another spur to television's expansion in developing areas was the demand for it by European communities many of whom were colonial officials and other groups of white settlers in these areas. This factor accounts for the inauguration of television in former colonial areas such as Morocco, Kenya, and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). It also explains the development of television in such cities as Beirut and Hong Kong where they had large colonies of well-to-do westerners in most of these instances. However, the audience patterns quickly shifted from reliance on the local "European" population to a broader base in which a native audience was predominant. This became the case in Hong Kong, where television developed as a commercial wired service, that is, transmissions were provided for a fee, to individual homes on a closed circuit system. At first, the audience was drawn largely from British and other European communities. By 1963, however, the balance had swung to Chinese families. The change inevitably led to programming shifts with less reliance on programs form America and British sources. There was a corresponding increase in Chinese programs in Cantonese dialect. Similar changes took place in other "European" stations throughout Asia and Africa. Invariably, European audiences played an important
role during the 1950s in introducing television to these areas and hastening its development in nearby countries.\textsuperscript{141}

Commercial considerations, as stated earlier, were also important in the spread of television. Whatever the prestige or political motivations there was for the medium, in the 1950s, they remained largely unrealistic until someone determined how to turn these dreams into the equivalent of dollars. The stages of the growth of television in developing areas was established by a combination of both prestige and caste. Wilson Dizard remarks:

This growth took place in three stages. The first; 1950 to 1960, involved those countries - mostly in Latin America - where local business interests successfully gamble on television's capabilities as a money-making proposition. They faced the difficulty of high initial investment without hope of large immediate returns. Although it was not a combination which generally attracted the free wheeling investors in these countries, the willingness of some groups to invest in television on a long term basis paid off handsomely. This pattern, pioneered in Latin America, was repeated successfully in other parts of the world, notably in the Philippines, Lebanon, Iran, and Nigeria.\textsuperscript{142}

By 1960, the pattern of local investment in television began to change, and the second stage of expansion began. This started primarily in smaller countries where local

\textsuperscript{141}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{142}Wilson Dizard, \textit{Television: A World View}, 50.
business capital was unwilling or uninterested in television as a commercial enterprise. Foreign investment interests promptly took up this role eagerly; notable amongst them were those from the US, Britain, and Japan. Although the operating techniques of these three countries were different, their motivations were almost identical. In each case, they represented firms from industrially advanced countries where television which had stabilized at a fairly high level and where commercial television companies faced the problem of a slow down in the rapid rate of expansion which had characterized their operations in the 1950s. The only area of expansion for their operations was overseas, and they began moving into this field with an aggressive scramble that has eliminated most of the blank areas of the map of world television. The result was to force the pace of development in areas where, in less competitive circumstances, television would have been merely a hope for the undefined future.

In general, Japanese interests was concentrated on Southeast Asia; The British moved into Africa, while the American companies were aggressive all over the world, with a special interest in Latin America.

The third stage of television expansion in developing areas involved those countries which continued to adopt a wait-and-see attitude regarding the new medium. Their unwillingness to turn over their television operation to
commercial operators, either local or foreign, made the introduction of television less likely, except in experimental "pilot" basis for several years. India was a primary example of a country where this attitude prevailed, although by 1965, the India viewpoint was changing.

We shall now periscope the trends of development of television in the various parts of the developing world to elucidate the social, political and economic forces motivating its operation.

Commercial Patterns

Latin American Television Patterns.

Latin America was the testing ground for the development of television outside the industrialized North Atlantic countries. According to Peter Dunnet, the two largest countries in Latin America, Mexico and Brazil, have highly successful vertically integrated commercial suppliers who produce some of the most interesting and widely followed television in the world. Within a rather short time in 1950 and 1951, television stations in four countries, Mexico, Brazil, Cuba and Argentina went on air. Each of the new stations were operated by commercial interests with no governmental connection except in Argentina. The first Latin American station was Mexico city's XH-TV, which began broadcasting August 31, 1950, as one of the business enterprises of financial Romulo O'Farrill. Although its audience was small XH-TV was successful enough to attract
two competitors within a year. The result was over competition which came close to liquidating all three enterprises before they decided to merge in 1955 to form the nucleus of Mexico's national commercial network, Telesistima Mexicano. Within two years all the stations were out of the red, and Mexican Television began to expand rapidly. By 1965, Telesistima Mexicano had two microwave networks covering 80 percent of the country's population.

The same pattern of commercial television was reported with variations, during the early years in Brazil, Cuba and Argentina. In each case, television's initial success led to a scramble for commercial television outlets which threatened to bankrupt every one concerned. This was particularly true in Cuba where even in pre-Castro days, television coverage was one of the most intensive in the world.\textsuperscript{143} Although it might seem simple enough to refer to television in Latin America as purely of commercial concern, knowing the dominant interests would enable us determine the level of control foreign interests had in their operations. We shall start by first taking a look at television in Brazil.

\textbf{Brazil}

Brazil began commercial telecasting in Sao Paulo in September, 1950. It had 10 transmitters in operation serving 850,000 sets by the end of the decade. It also had a nation-

\textsuperscript{143}Ibid.
wide microwave relay network. The story of television in Brazil in most recent times is literally a story of the evolution of an industrial effort of TV Globo. Newspaper magnate Roberto Marinho scooped a lot of his profit from a booming newspaper business into television. By the mid-eighties, TV Globo was producing sixteen hours of programming each day. It included news, variety shows, children's programming drama, and educational programs. The networks specialty was the production of TV novelas, soap operas, which Globo exports to forty-five countries worldwide, including Kuwait, Iceland and Australia. The novelas are so popular in Brazil that the council of Ministers has been known to take a break in order to catch critical episodes. Of the twenty percent of programs that TV Globo imported in 1986, the majority were films and US television series, which were shown at off-peak hours. In Brazil the home-made product attracted larger audiences than the US programs which are overwhelmingly popular in most developing countries.\textsuperscript{144} The novelas are considered a major cultural experience for a large sector of society. A prime-time telenovela can attract an audience of fifty million to sixty million. They can generate twenty five thousand dollars ($25,000) of revenue for each studio productions, although production costs are usually below ten thousand dollars ($10,000). This means that home-produced

\textsuperscript{144}Ibid., 194.
novelas are cost-competitive with US imports once the cost of dubbing is taken into account. Novelas have been credited with unifying the country by making Portuguese the national language.

There are other commercial television suppliers, although TV Globo is by far the largest. Radio/TV Bandeirantes has a television network with twenty-three stations across Brazil, while TV Manchette operates a station in Rio de Janeiro, and TV Record operates Canal 7 in Sao Paulo.

There is television censorship. The threat or actuality of military rule is ever present, and Globo, which started in 1966, a year after the army seized power, operates at the government's pleasure. The government uses the threat of censorship to control TV Globo so that the television network exercises internal censorship. This extends beyond politics to sexual content and controversial matters of all kinds. In fact TV Globo has been a propaganda vehicle of successive military regimes. In 1984, on behalf of General Joao Figuerdo, TV Globo supported the opposition candidate, Tancred Nevas, for first civilian president because the general did not like the ruling party's nominee. As it were, the Communication Minister in 1987, Antonio Magathaes, was a close friend and business partner of Marinho. He ensured that a new constitution drafted by the congress excluded any mention of broadcasting regulation. When in 1987 there was
public dissatisfaction with President Sarney, Marinho banned the words "direct elections" from his media interests. This helped the public discontent die.\textsuperscript{145}

Yet Marinho is not considered a lackey. The state-broadcasting relationship is a matter of common interest. Marinho wants to tell Brazilians what they should know and think about the world. To that end his own interests accord with those of the right-wing governments of the last twenty-five years. He hires staff who know that they must play down labor unrest and left-wing politics and play up all efforts to strengthen the government and the economy. Reflecting his view of his contribution, in 1984 he said, "We have made television into a true form of popular culture. Our channel is programmed for Brazilians. It is not one of those international pot-pourris with no real identity, as most television networks in the world have become.

As a vehicle of development the government requires that all broadcasting networks transmit educational programs for two hours per day. One channel, TVE mea, was started by the State of Cearas in 1972 to telecolas, television schools. TV mea distributes educational material by microwave and video cassette to remote regions of country. As in much of Latin America, however, telescolas have had only marginal success.\textsuperscript{146} The Brazilian experience was

\textsuperscript{145}Ibid., 196.

\textsuperscript{146}Ibid., 197.
nearly replayed in Argentina with an individual dominating the scene. But somehow the conditions were different. We now take a look at the major trends of the Argentinean experience to see point of differences and similarities.

**Argentina**

Among the larger Latin American countries, development of television was slowest in Argentina which as late as 1960 had only one station; Radio Belgrano-TV, Buenos Aires. Although the station began broadcasting in 1951, ostensibly as a private operation, it was under heavy government pressure from the Peron dictatorship which not only subsidized the station but operated its transmitters from the Ministry of Public Works. In the accounts of Wilson Dizard:

> Political instability in the post-Peron period inhibited any large-scale expansion of television until after 1960 when three private stations began operation in Buenos Aires. A much-postponed schedule for inaugurating television services outside the capital city was also put into effect. The result was a latter-day sprout in television's influence. By 1963, over a million sets were in operation in Buenos Aires, giving that city one of the highest percentages of coverage in the world at the time.\(^{147}\)

The addiction of Argentinean public to television in many ways gave impetus to the nature of development in the industry. In 1962 when the government decided to shut down

all television operations in Buenos Aires because of an electric power shortage, the proposal was withdrawn when the public encouraged by the TV stations, campaigned to take its power cuts in other forms, like the darkening of the city's streets at night, so that television could continue. The later day resurgence of Argentinean television can be credited to two factors: the investment of American capital, and the appearance on the scene of Goar Mestre, the man who controlled a good share of Cuban television before he was forced to flee from Castro in 1958. Less than three years after he arrived Buenos Aires, he was the undisputed leader of the burgeoning Argentinean television industry.

His formula in Argentina was similar to the one he used in Cuba; strong management control together with a programming operation that emphasized "Live" local shows. When his Proartel (Producciones Argentinas de Television) organization began operating its key Buenos Aires station, Channel 13 in 1960, Argentina television programming was dominated by American filmed imports. By the end of 1962, Channel 13 was programming eight hours of live programs daily and taking the lion's share of the audience. (Only one American serial "Route 66" remained in the Argentinean"Top Ten" at that time.) By 1963, Proartel expanded into the international field through the sale of Spanish language program features. A year later, Mestre moved into Venezuela with the opening of a new station in Caracas. Mestre
financed his fast-moving operation with the remnants of his own Cuban fortune, combined with local as well as American capital. The Columbia Broadcasting system was a stockholder in Proatel in 1960. Two years later, Time Incorporated the publisher of Time and Life magazines, joined CBS as a minority stockholder. Both firms also participated in financing Mestre's Venezuela project. In bringing in American capital and mass communication know-how, Mestre was following not only his own fiscal instincts but also the lead set by two other commercial television operations in Buenos Aires. Both the American Broadcasting company and the National Broadcasting company had invested in local stations. This pattern of American investment in Latin American stations was to continue throughout the continent.

By 1965, little more than ten years after television began in Latin America, it was a well established medium in the larger countries. The bumptious optimism and the false starts of the early years had given way to better management and stronger programming efforts. Television was moving out of the capital cities and was expanding rapidly in provincial areas. By the beginning of 1965, Mexico had twenty-four programming stations in operation, Brazil had twenty-three, Venezuela had six and late-starting Argentina had eleven. The parallel development to this was, of course, 148

148 Ibid.
the rise in number of receivers in operation; television was no longer a rich man's luxury. By 1965, there were television operations in every Latin American country except Bolivia and Paraguay.\(^{149}\) Most operations were under private, commercial arrangements. The exceptions were Columbia and Chile. The Columbia television network, which began operation in 1954 was a state broadcasting system. Chilean television was hampered by the country's financial difficulties and government's classification of the medium as a "luxury". Meanwhile, experimental educational television was being transmitted under the auspices of Chilean Universities in Santiago and Valparaiso. Commercial television operation have flourished in such countries as Ecuador, El Salvador Guatamala, Costa Rica, Panama, Nicaragua, Uruguay, Honduras, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Any attempt to discuss the growth of the television industry in Latin America without a mention of Mexico would mean leaving out a major component of this phenomenon. As Peter Dunnet rightly remarks; the two largest countries in Latin America, Mexico and Brazil have highly successful vertically integrated commercial suppliers who produce some of the most interesting and widely followed television in the world. Mexico has a population of around eighty five million people and together with Brazil they make up two-thirds of the population of Latin America. We

\(^{149}\)Ibid., 55.
now turn to the development of the industry in Mexico to see what extent it supports our hypothesis that local individuals as interest groups determine the nature of programming priorities within countries.

**Mexico:**

Since the revolution of 1910 leftist government have favored government control of the industry. Until 1988 Mexico was virtually a one-party authoritarian state, and it might be expected that there would be a state television monopoly. Instead Mexico has a structure similar to that of the United States, with a large private and small public sector, although there is more control and censorship.\(^{150}\)

From most accounts Televisa is the private company that dominates television in Mexico. It was formed in 1973 as a result of a merger between Telesistema Mexicana (TSM) and Independente de Mexico (TIM). This merger brought together four private Mexico City stations and seventy other stations under a single administration. Before 1968, when two independent channels 8 and 13, were started, there had been no competition with TSM. TIM was never profitable and the alternative to a merger between TIM and TSM was the take-over of TIM by one of the state agencies such as SoMex.\(^{151}\)

Between the 1973 merger and 1983 Televisa was run by the former owners of TIM and TSM. In 1983 O'Farrills, a

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\(^{150}\) Peter, Dunnet, *The World Television Industry*, 197.

\(^{151}\) Ibid.
Mexican family which has extensive holdings in many sectors of the country's industry, took control. Televisa was started in the 1920s by Emilio Azcarraja, the father of the current president of the company, Emilio Azcarraja junior. In the 1920s the founder sold records throughout Mexico. He then formed a pro-government radio station and built it into the top radio network. When three television concessions were handed out in 1952 they went the president's family, a newspaper firm, and to Emilio Azcarraja. In 1965 the three television stations merged to form a television monopoly, the forerunner of Televisa. In 1987 a senior Televisa executive was the son of the former President of Mexico, cementing Televisa's close relations with the government.152

The state approved the 1973 merger on the grounds that competition had been a destructive force, reflected in a decrease in the quality of programming as stations attempted to maximize advertiser interests. A merger it was argued meant that a Mexican formula for television could be implemented. With co-operation from Televisa the state could ensure that television was programmed in accord with national objectives. Two Ministries in particular influenced the conduct of Televisa. The Ministry of Communication and Transport is responsible for licensing and technical aspects of broadcasting. The Minister of the Interior regulates

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152 Ibid.
content and authorizes the production of government programming. Government programming is shown over the government own channel and on the free time which is made available to it on the commercial television. These programs are produced by a state agency, Production Nacional de Radio y Television, set up in 1977. Formally the state and the industry interact through a national chamber of Radio and Television Industry, but informal links are more important. Although there is much co-operation there is a basic conflict. The state wants television to help it meet social goals. Televisa wants to make profit from advertising. Nevertheless there has been successful cooperation, not just in programming but also in cable television and satellites for communications.¹⁵³

Televisa if a true multinational that sells soap operas and variety shows to the United States, and to all countries in Latin America and Europe. It controls of the medium enable it to dominate news in a country where few people read newspaper and many are functionally illiterate. The basic truth is that Televisa is so close to the government that it collaborates with the government and ignores the opposition. It gives high priority to the President, denounces demonstrations, plays down bad news. In return the government allows Televisa to function as a sort of ministry of culture, education, and truth in a country where

¹⁵³Ibid., 198.
television is ubiquitous and illiteracy pervasive.¹⁵⁴

Somehow the commercial pattern of television does not account for the complete understanding of television on Latin America. As we remarked earlier in the discussion on Mexico, television in many parts of Latin American started as a state owned non-commercial organizations. We shall now go to Cuba to see what form non-commercial television took in some countries in this region.

Non-Commercial Pattern.

Cuba

Cuba, in the account of some experts was the first country in the world where television was available to the entire population. By the time Castro seized power in 1958, the little Island had twenty-four television stations, six of them in Havana. The entrepreneurial genius behind Cuban TV was a Havana businessman, Goar Mestre, who developed the Island's largest network. While Mestre relied heavily, as did all of his competitors, on filmed programs imported from the United States, he realized that the key to audience and, therefore, commercial success was live entertainment programs featuring local artists. His station explained this concept with a flair that gave pre-Castro television a special niche in the history of international television. All this changed with the 1958 Fidelsta takeover. The Cuba dictator was to demonstrate another aspect of television's

¹⁵⁴Ibid.
possibilities, that is, as a tool for imposing totalitarian rule on a nation.

The stations which had been established in early 1950s in Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela demonstrated both the possibilities and pitfalls of the medium's development in semi-industrialized countries. In each case, TV's popularity was affirmed almost immediately. The problem was seen as that of expanding the medium to the point where it became a significant advertising medium. This also meant increasing the number of sets available among groups below the thin-upper-income crust. In the United States and in Europe, this happened fairly quickly after the initial introduction of television services, primarily because the middle classes were affluent enough to invest in television sets.

The process moved more slowly in Latin American countries where television was first introduced. The problem was complicated by the fact that throughout the 1950s, all television equipment had to be imported, thus creating a "luxury drain" of foreign exchange balances. The expansion of television was often slow, but it was never in danger of being stopped.155

From the foregoing discussions it seems obvious that the motivating factors behind the development of television in Latin America did not differ so from those elsewhere around the world. Interest groups represented by those in government of or powerful individuals who are in most cases

indigenous of the home station determined the content and structure of those stations. We shall now turn to the Asian experience to see whether there are differences or similarities in the patterns of the development of television.

Asian Television Patterns:

Television's greatest expansion outside the North Atlantic area had taken place in Japan. With almost twenty million receivers in the 1960s, serving an audience of ninety million persons, Japanese television was only second to American TV in size and influence. Reflecting on this situation, Wilson Dizard noted that:

In large part, the medium's spectacular growth was considered a natural development for the largest consumer oriented economy in the Eastern world. Another factor which sets Japanese television apart was its relationship to the strong national urge for enlightenment and self-improvement. Although the Japanese television viewer turn to his set for entertainment - complete with singing commercials - in much the same way as his western counterpart, he also has a particular respect for the ability of his television set to educate him.\(^{156}\)

As stated earlier due to the scope and expansion of the Japanese television we decided to group it among those of western societies. However, a brief mention of that industry as a dominant factor in the Asian experience is inevitable.

\(^{156}\text{Ibid. 70.}\)
Experts believe that the success of the Japanese television, and maybe perhaps in other venture was due in part, to an attitude traceable to in-built traditional values in education and an extraordinary push which Japan made in the mass education field during the past fifteen years. Significantly, Japan however developed its educational television system to a far greater extent than any other country in the world. Although Japan played a leading role in Asia it was not alone. There were others who may not have been quite the success story that Japan was, but their experience would certainly lead to our better understanding of the development of the industry in the region. Among these is Philippine.

**Commercial Patterns:**

**Philippines:**

During the 1950s, only two other developing countries both in Asia, the Philippine and Iran, adopted Latin American patterns of privately owned commercial television operations. Television was started in the Philippines in 1953 when Manila's DZAQ-TV went on air. The station was controlled politically and economically by the Lopez brothers, Eugenio and Fernando, who had parlayed a postwar contribution of sugar plantations radio stations and the cement mills into one of the country's biggest business empires. The Lopez interests later added a second station DZXL-TV, to their radio-TV chain. Between 1960 and 1962,
four other television outlets were inaugurated in Manila in competition with the Lopez stations. According to Peter Dunnett:

Television became an important counter in the political game played by high-level interests in the Philippines. This was particularly true after the successful second-term bid in 1961 of President Carlos Garcia, who had been backed by the Lopez brothers. With the development of competitive television in Manila, the groundwork was laid for the medium's expansion throughout the country.¹⁵⁷

Although the number of receiving sets in the country was little more than one hundred by 1965, Philippines entrepreneurs were planning to add eight more stations to supplement the thirteen already in operations. Whether the country can continue to sustain such an extensive transmitting operation depends largely on increasing the number of receiving sets by selling cheaper locally produced receivers.

This brief mention of the Philippine experience is important because here as in some Latin American countries we can establish a trend of private ownership backed-up by the government. That understanding tells us that were the government or those in power are not in agreement or in some way committed to the larger ideals of the stations they could not have been in existence.

¹⁵⁷Peter Dunnett, The World Television Industry: An Economic Analysis, 221.
Another territory we will look at is Taiwan. Though in the direct shadow of China, Taiwan exhibits more liberal or capitalist attributes in such areas as the television industry.

Taiwan:

Taiwan enjoys the highest standard of living of any country in Asia, excluding Japan. Television became part of this system since 1962, when the Island's first channel began transmissions operating as a commercial outfit under government license. Taiwan Television Enterprises lost money during its first two years of operation but by the end of 1965 it attracted sufficient viewers and advertisers to overcome this handicap. As with most other stations in the area, a large percentage of its programming consists of American film serials.\textsuperscript{158}

The Taiwan experience tells us that even die hard communist as in China would not spare an opportunity to make the industry viable. We will elaborate on this later. For now we must turn to some countries in Asia who for equally compelling reasons chose to have non-commercial involvement in television. One of these is India.

Non-Commercial Patterns:

India:

The Indian government was remarkably more reluctant to get deeply involved in television. The subject was debated

\textsuperscript{158}Ibid., 224.
inside and outside the government as early as 1954. The discussion at the time was dominated, particularly within government circles, by the idea that any television broadcasting arrangement would have to come under strict government control, untainted by commercial consideration. Television, was expected to be operated by All-Indian Radio, the national broadcasting network. From the beginning, however, there was pressure in favor of a private television operation. Commercial stations, offering programs and advertising to the upper-class elite in such metropolitan centers as Bombay, Calcutta, and New Delhi, would have undoubtedly been successful even in the 50s when such stations were first proposed. In ruling against them, the government argued that the importation of transmitters and receiving equipment would cause a heavy drain in the nation's foreign exchange reserves. However, the decision against commercial television was not considered merely as rejection of unnecessary luxury but as a challenge to the threat on Indian culture; a belief reinforced by continual reports in Indian newspaper of the medium's alleged excesses in the United States and Europe. A leading Indian newspaper stated in 1962 its fears in clear terms:

Frivolity is all the country is going to get if television is going to pay its way.  

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159 Peter Dunnett, The Television Industry: An Economic Analysis, 206.
But somehow, one of the hurdles that television in India had to overcome in the world's largest free world country was the self-righteous belief of the intellectual elite that the medium somehow or other was inherently wicked. But it finally managed to relegate the question of commercial broadcasting to the indefinite future, the Indian government in the late 1950s opened a small experimental station in New Delhi to test the possibilities of educational television. The United Nations gave a helping hand. In a Unesco report:

The project was sponsored by Indian educational officials working with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (UNESCO) as an adult education project and with Ford Foundation and a school broadcasting project. The foundation was anxious at the time to examine the possibilities of educational television in underdeveloped countries following its experience in helping launch school television projects in the United States.  

However useful the Delhi educational TV project was, it demonstrated only one phase of the medium's potential role in Indian life. By 1965, the Indian government spokesman informed the Indian parliament that the government was considering a proposal submitted by Roy Thompson Organization. While this and other indications pointed towards some form of commercial operation, other Indian officials continued to stress the theme of government—

sponsored educational television. In November, 1964, Mrs Indira Ghandi, then Information Minister, declared that TV would be good for India only if it would be used to expand educational opportunities rather than as an entertainment medium. By June, 1965, the government took a small but significant step in the direction of a state controlled pattern for the medium that would include both educational and entertainment programming when it accepted studio facilities in New Delhi. The new studios supplementing those used for the UNESCO and Ford Foundation projects, reportedly would be equipped to handle both school broadcasting and general entertainment shows when they were finished in September 1966.\textsuperscript{161}

In 1983 India launched the satellite InSat-1B which gave television access to remote areas and created the infrastructure necessary for development.

Despite the fact that India is the world's largest democracy, the ruling Congress Party has resisted all pressure to hand over the broadcasting media over to an autonomous body. Although there is a free press broadcasting remains a monopoly.\textsuperscript{162}

Other nations in Asia following the same argument advanced by leaders in India for preferring non-commercial

\textsuperscript{161}Ibid., 208.

\textsuperscript{162}Peter Dunnett, \textit{The World Television}, 206.
television to commercial ones. In this category are most countries in South East Asia.

**South East Asia.**

Much of what has can be said about Latin America, Africa and India applies to countries of South East Asia. The freedom of the press and the independence of the western media are not found. Rather, governments seek to control television, either directly or indirectly.¹⁶³

**South Korea**

South Korea government control over television is tight. In an attempt to maintain control over the media, South Korea television industry was restructured in 1980. This meant that the government forcing the consolidation of two private companies, TBS and Doug-A, with the state Authority, Korean Broadcasting Corporation (KBS). TBS had been owned by the Samsung Group, which produces television sets and VCRs. Dong-A had been owned by the Dong-A Bilbo newspaper. Another station, Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC), was forced to sell two-thirds of its stock to KBS, whilst the Christian Broadcasting System (CBS) was forced to ceased all non-religious broadcasting.

The motive for the restructure by the military regime of the then President Chun Dwoo Hwan was to create a public network along the lines of the highly respected BBC in Britain and the HNK of Japan. Like the KBS was initially

¹⁶³Ibid., 212.
financed entirely by subscription fees. However, affordable subscription fees in a relatively poor country, with per capita income in 1988 still only US $2,000 per annum, were insufficient to fund a quality network. Within a year, KBS was accepting advertisement in order to generate sufficient revenue. By 1986 only half of all KBS revenues came from subscriptions of US $2:85 per month. Advertising provided the rest.\footnote{164}

In terms of conduct KBS was not criticized for bowing to commercialism but rather because it showed state bias. News and public affairs programs were biased. Reflecting this control, a former president of KBS was appointed Minister of Culture and Information. Newspapers and the opposition party, the NDKP, urged viewers to boycott KBS and to refuse to pay their subscriptions. In the eyes of many South Koreans, license fees had become a quasi-tax. Although they were used to propaganda, they found it particularly aggravating to pay for it.\footnote{165}

**Malaysia:**

Malaysian television went on air in 1963 with stations in Singapore and in the capital city of Kuala Lumpur. There was an increasing heavy budget on local programs including an attempt to utilize television for both child and adult

\footnote{164}{Ibid.}

\footnote{165}{Ibid., 213.}
educational purposes. The Malaysian government had indicated that it saw television as a unifying force in a country of many cultures and languages. But the Malaysian television served the most heterogeneous audiences in the world. Five different scripts are used in the newspaper: Malay, Roman, Chinese modified Arabic, and Indian. On television, this problem was handled by broadcasting programs in one language with subtitles in another and simultaneously commentary on a separate radio frequency in a third. As far as programming preferences went, if producers in Thailand use their television stations to support the royal family, in Malaysia there is special concern to make Bahasa the national language and to promote Islam, the state religion. The authoritarian environment makes broadcasting journalists timid, and state television is reduced to a public-relations operation for the government. Censorship of racial, religious, sexual, and intimate behavior ensures that television follows the governments plans for social and economic development.166

Censorship and regulations are widespread. Shows have frequently been banned because of sexual and race contents. Both the Roots and Holocaust were banned because they dealt with race. All commercials were to be filmed in Malay and made in Malaysia. Commercials dealing with liquor or cosmetics and those involving kissing are forbidden.

166 Ibid.
In 1984, TV-3, a private station, was started in Kuala Lumpur, to supplement the state-run system. But, its ownership is linked with the establishment. TV-3 is owned by Siestem Televisyen Malaysia, which in turn is part of the Fleet Group, which owns the News Straits Times. Finance Minister Diam Zainviddi had a controlling interest in Fleet Group. Local Banks and the MIC are also owners.

The experience of independent states of Brunei, Sabah, and Sarawak with Malaysia suggest one of domination by the latter. Since 1980, Malaysia has used Indonesia's PALAPA satellite to beam down programs on those countries in English and Bahasa Malaysia.

In Brunei, surrounded by Malaysian transmitters, the Sultan responded to the threat from Malaysia. He started a colored television broadcast to compete with Television Malaysia. Next, for Ibans in very remote areas, he used helicopters to deliver small petrol generators so that they could receive community television in their log-houses. Finally, he instituted a program of interest-free loans for color television sets and aerials. Consequently in Bandar Seri, where most houses are built of mud on stilts in the river, color television aerials can be seen. Since Brunei cannot afford much local programming, viewers watch much the same material seen in New York. The head of the Brunei television commented:

it has grieved me that we have robbed them of their culture overnight.....but
if we took no steps that might be wrong. Economics meant that the choice was not between cultural imperialism and no cultural imperialism but between American and Malaysian imperialism.\textsuperscript{167}

Singapore too has been a victim of leakage from Malaysia. When TV-3 started, aerials to pick up signal began to appear all over Singapore. TV-3 filled consumer demand that state-owned SBC failed to meet.

\textit{Indonesia:}

Indonesian television was inaugurated during the Asian Games in Djakarta in August 1962. Although it had gotten to a slow start, TV in Indonesia began to pick up momentum from 1964 as a result of president Sukarno. According to Wilson Dizard:

A fifty-thousand watt Japanese transmitter was put into operation in Djakarta in 1965; the key apparatus in Indonesian television, however is the mobile unit, which covers almost all of Surkarno's public appearances.\textsuperscript{168}

There was little doubt that the medium would become a major medium in the country the government's elaborate plans for a national network were held up by chaotic economic conditions. Many of the fifty-thousand sets in the country were reportedly smuggled in from Singapore and other nearby port cities. However, Indonesian companies had also began to

\textsuperscript{167}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{168}Wilson Dizard, \textit{Television: A World View}, 58.
assemble sets locally from imported Japanese parts.

Peter Dunnett believes that Indonesia has a history of unusual policies which from an economic standpoint are irrational. He states:

In 1976, at vast expense for such a poor country, Indonesia became the fourth country in the world to launch its own domestic satellite, PALAPA. The policy goal was national unity. Commentators suggested that the major beneficiaries were the government, from propaganda, and the western multinationals who supplied the technology.\(^{169}\)

Indonesia also banned all advertisements in 1981. All television is controlled by the Ministry of Information through the Director General of Radio, Television, and Film. Economic development and national unity are constant themes, and the ban on advertisements was prompted by the effects of commercials. It was believed that they created consumerism and unreasonable expectations, and encouraged migration to the cities.

Government interests was not all that always determined the establishment of television. Sometimes a single issue has brought about it inauguration. Such was the case in South Vietnam.

**South Vietnam:**

The question of introducing television in South Vietnam during the war, centered around the medium's possible value in the country's war effort. Proponents of the medium's use

cited its value as a communication weapon for the central government in Saigon to establish better contact with its citizens in provincial areas. Those skeptical of the proposal emphasized the difficulties the Saigon government had in setting up radio network throughout the country; they also cite the problems involved in distributing and maintaining television sets in outlying areas. Formerly, American officials in Saigon and Washington reacted warily to proposals for extensive U.S assistance in developing a TV system in Vietnam. Late in 1965, the Vietnamese government indicated it was prepared to build a television network with outside help. One of the factors which may have influenced the Saigon leaders was the fact that Communist North Vietnam had announced that it was obtaining a television transmitter from Hungary. ¹⁷⁰

Somehow, other state that started out operating commercial television have in the course of history reverted to non-commercial television because of religious and national interests. Iran is a good example of such.

Iran:

Only one other Asian country, Iran, followed the pattern of locally financed commercial television during the 1950's. In 1958, Teheran financier Habib Sebet was given government permission to open the first TV station in Western Asia. The Teheran station was blessed by good

¹⁷⁰Ibid., 58.
timing; the Iranian economy was booming, in the wake of the 1954 settlement of the oil-nationalization dispute with Britain. Television became one of the symbols of the new affluence. Although most TV sets were limited largely to the well-to-do, the medium was highly popular in working-class cafes where sets were usually perched on a flat form high above the heads of the assemble tea drinkers. But since the Iranian revolution of the 1970s television has reverted to purely government control pursuing mainly religious interests and national unity.

While some countries found it convenient to run either purely commercial or non-commercial stations other felt that a combination of both elements would be most progressive. It is to those countries that we now turn.

Mixed Patterns:

Pakistan:

By most calculations the main television holdout in Asia were India and Pakistan. With a combined population of almost six hundred million, in the 1960s, this position was unavoidable. The Pakistani government gave general support to the idea of a television service in its western and eastern regions in the late 1950s, but it did little to implement the policy. A false start toward introducing the medium was made in the autumn of 1962 when two western

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firms, time-Life Broadcasting of New York and the Dutch electronics firms, Fillips, erected a small TV facility at the annual Pakistan industrial fair in Karachi. With several sets distributed throughout the fair grounds and in other parts of Karachi, the TV demonstration was a riotous success. (It caused in fact, a near riot one evening when Pakistan viewers at the fair angrily swarmed over the facility because the transmissions had been ended for the day).\footnote{Peter Dunnett, The World Television Industry: An Economic analysis, 223}

The initial venture into television had an influence in stepping up the pace of TV development in Pakistan. In November, 1963, the government announced plans for a National Television corporation where stock would be 51 percent government owned with the rest sold to private groups wishing to participate in local television. These groups were to set their pilot stations at their own expense in the largest Pakistani cities for a three-month trial period. The first station under this arrangement was opened in October, 1964, in Lahore, with Japan's Electric Company an the commercial participant. A second station was opened several months later in Dacca, the capital of East Pakistan. Other private competitors including the Roy Thompson Organization, started negotiating in 1965 for similar
participation.\textsuperscript{173} Presently, some private interests in television is running along side government ownership and control.

Another country that has a closely related policy to that of Pakistan is Thailand.

\textbf{Thailand:}

The pattern of television in other parts of Southeast Asia is motley. Two of the largest countries; Thailand and Malaysia, had fully functioning television systems in the 1960s. Indonesia slowly developed the medium, largely as a propaganda outlet for the Sukarno regime. Elsewhere, television also took hold. In the UNESCO report on \textit{International Propaganda and Communications:}

Thailand was the first Mainland Asian country to have a television system. In 1952, the Thai government authorized and experimental station in Bangkok's Chulalongkorn University which was expanded into full operations as Thai-TV two years later. Although run as a nominally civilian venture, the new station had a strong measure of government supervision.\textsuperscript{174}

Later in 1960, a second channel, operated by the Thai army began transmissions. With both stations relying on advertising revenues they became highly competitive. Over and above the perennial local program favorite; boxing

\textsuperscript{173}Ibid., 224.

matches, both channels relied heavily on American filmed serials to attract audiences in Bangkok and in areas North and South of the capital where relay stations transmit their programs over a network that serves an audience of over one million viewers.

From Asia we move to the African continent where social political and economic realities bear similarities at various levels. The history or nature of television is no exception to this rule.

**African Television Patterns**

**Commercial Patterns**

For most of the African countries, commercial operation was the key to TV development. In a significant number of cases, these commercial operations involved the ubiquitous Mr. Roy Thompson who had demonstrated a shrewd knack for providing African government with attractive answers to their two biggest problems - money and program material. Almost all the African states which had rushed forward with promises did so with high-minded assurances that what they wanted was some sort of political independence and economic progress. These intentions soon evaporated under the cold economic facts involved in setting up and operating a non-profit TV system. Many Africans therefore quickly concluded that if television was to come, they would have to settle for the commercial not the educational model. Many soon found themselves talking business with Mr. Roy Thompson's
negotiators form London. The Thompson group had proposed or formed broadcasting services in Ethiopia, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Southern Rhodesia, the Ivory Coast, the Sudan and Mauritius. In each case, the Thompson group arranged a package deal involving the planning, financing and operation of local television stations. The usual Thompson management and fiscal formula was to form a consortium made up of local financial interests together with Thompson's and other outside funds. In return for its management services the Thompson group usually arranged for the right to serve these stations with filmed programs. By 1963, two-thirds of the films supplied by the organization to its overseas affiliates were from British sources; the rest were American programs. The Thompson organization also handled the selling of advertising time on its affiliated stations. By the end of 1962, the organization had established advertising-selling operations in Paris, Dusseldorf, Geneva and other European cities to service among its other interests, television stations in Africa and other parts of the world.175

A specialized form of foreign assistance to African stations was provided by the French government in countries which once formed a part of France's extensive colonial holdings. In an effort to maintain the traditional political

and cultural influence it had in West Africa, France, provided its former colonies with extensive technical and program assistance for their radio and television stations. This was done through a quasi-official government organization, l’Office du Cooperation Radiophonique.

American commercial involvement in African television was relatively limited to Nigeria. Two firms, NBC and Twentieth Century Fox, were minority investors in the consortium which established a television service in Nairobi in November 1951, when Kenya was still a colony preparing for independence. In July, 1964, the new Kenyan government ended foreign participation in local broadcasting by nationalizing radio and television. In 1964, NBC affiliate, the NBC Enterprises, was providing contract technical services for the development of television in Sierra Leone. At a more modest level, several smaller U.S firms successfully worked with new African nations in developing TV systems. Two American organizations were largely responsible for planning and building a national system for Uganda, in East Africa. Thus American - designed network in Uganda was unique in the manner in which it dealt with a key African communication problem - the multiplicity of languages within each country.\(^{176}\)

Uganda television was part of an integrated national

\(^{176}\)Peter Dunnett, *The World Television Industry: An Economic Analysis*, 234.
telecommunication system with a multiples capability that permits each of the four tribal zones to listen to TV in the local language while viewing the same image.

Another country that started television broadcast under similar circumstances as Uganda was Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe:

In the spring of 1960, the Rhodesian Federal Broadcasting Corporation, a BBC-type operation signed a fifteen-year agreement with British, American and local business interest authorizing them to operate a commercial television service. The first station went on air in Salisbury, the capital city in November, 1960, and within a year, the two smaller stations were operating in Bulawayo and Kitwe. The service was intended primarily for Rhodesian ruling white minority although it attracted from the beginning a significant African "beer hall" audience. Programming in the station was largely weighted in favor of American and British filmed material with local coverage limited largely to news coverage and sports. The new Rhodesian station took a significant step in inaugurating the first scheduled educational telecasting services in Africa. In turning over Rhodesian television to commercial interests, the government specifically reserved the right to utilize part of these television services for educational purposes.

During the 1961/62 school year, an experimental schedule of educational
telecasting, totalling three hours a week, was broadcast to secondary school classrooms in the Salisbury area. As with regular television programs, the service was intended primarily for the white European community, although a token number of seventeen sets were placed in African high schools.177

We now move to periscope the nature of non-commercial patterns of television in Africa.

**Non-Commercial Patterns**

**Ghana:**

Ghana took an early lead to develop television authorizing a survey of TV prospects conducted by Canadian engineers, in 1954. Acting on the Canadian recommendations, the Ghanaian government called for bids for the construction of the fourteen-station network in 1961. The project moved slowly; hampered by fiscal and technical difficulties. Technical assistance was provided by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and by the Irish Republic's TV system. Largely because of the leftist orientation of its leadership, Ghana had one of the few non-commercial, government-orientated TV system in independent Africa. Its first stations in Accra opened in July 1965, with considerable fanfare and then settled down to an intermittent programming routine of news, lectures, cultural events, and occasional appearances by President Kwame Nkrumah. Ghana was not the only country in Africa that

177Ibid., 67.
portrayed a strong presence of a charismatic leader. Libya and Tunisia was other examples. But now we will go to South Africa where due to racial sentiments the apartheid government decided against establishing television.

**South Africa:**

Only one country in Africa actively resisted the introduction of television. This was South Africa, where a white minority government viewed the medium as a major political threat to racial policies. In 1964, a group of South African industrialists, led by Harry F. Oppenheimer, Chairman of the powerful Anglo-American Corporation, made plans for a local TV system. This resulted in an unofficial government denial by Dr. Albert Hertzog, Minister of Ports and Telegraph. Dr. Hertzog's statement was hyperbolic and largely intended to attribute the influence of television, Recalling, Wilson Dizard stated:

> The overseas money power has used television to undermine the morale of the whitman and even to destroy great empires that Oppenheimer and his friends will do anything to use it here. They are certain that with this mighty weapon, and with South African television largely independent or British and American films, they will also succeed in a short time in encompassing the destruction of white South Africa.\(^{178}\)

Despite the government's strong statements about television, there were persistent reports from South Africa

\(^{178}\)Ibid., 69.
that local business firms continued to make preparations for producing and marketing television equipment within the country. Licensing arrangements reportedly were signed with British and French firms for local assembly and distribution of TV sets if and when the government relaxed its ban on the medium.

It was not until 1975 that South Africa inaugurated the South Africa Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) based on the model of the BBC in being a public corporation. However, there was much control of news and current affairs programs including censorship of programs that might the contrary to the policy of apartheid. Hence sex and violence are permitted but shows as "Roots" which discussed black heritage were prohibited.

By 1984 the South African government inaugurated the Bophutha Tswana Television (Bop-TV), which was an attempt to introduce apartheid television. This was to form the basis for homeland television stations throughout South Africa.

By the late 1980s and early 1990s the wind of change towards democracy was already bringing about a change of attitude by the government. That would hopefully affect the future of television industry in South Africa.

But we must now turn to other nations who due to the originating intention of their television station bear certain differences with the South African model.
Mixed Patterns:

Nigeria.

This was the first African country where a combination of foreign and local capital was successfully used to inaugurate a commercial television system. The Nigerian taste for television was whetted in 1956 when a closed-circuit television was installed to permit more people to watch the visit of Britain's Queen Elizabeth to the country then a British colony preparing for independence. Nigeria's television began in October, 1959, in Western Nigeria, one of the country's self-governing regions prior to the formation of the unified Nigeria on a federated basis in 1960. The station WN-TV (first in Africa), was controlled by the western Nigerian Radiovision company, with half its stock owned by the regional government and the other half by overseas Rediffusion Company Limited an affiliate of London's Associated Rediffusion Limited. According to Wilson Dizard:

Nigeria may have seemed to be an unlikely place to begin television in Africa; in fact, it was the most likely. One of the problems television faces in Africa is the lack of big cities to provide audience base. Nigeria has some of the continent's largest cities - Lagos, Kano, Kaduna and Ibadan.¹⁷⁹

Among other factors that prompted the establishment of television in Nigeria political and economic played a major

role. Many Nigerians were well aware that with independence in 1960, their country would be the most populous in Africa. Their leaders were also intrigued by TV's potential role in raising educational standards in the new nation.

Nonetheless, television in this country developed primarily as an entertainment medium, with mildly instructional overtones. Its success in Western Nigeria prompted the Eastern and Northern regional governments to inaugurate television, financed in part by British interests. After the country became independent, in December 1960, the federal government set up the Federal Television Service and contracted with the National Broadcasting Company of New York to provide management and program services for its key station in Lagos. By 1965, Nigeria had eight programming and relay stations broadcasting in four cities and serving a total of twenty-five thousand receivers. This was by all odds the most extensive television in Africa. Although the programming emphasis on those station was heavily American, the Nigerians were making a conscious effort to develop their own indigenous forms of television programming. In doing so, they had to compete with the slickness and technical competence of the filmed American shows which dominated the program schedule.\(^{180}\) Despite this, during television's early years, a number of significant attempts were made to utilize the medium for the

\(^{180}\)Ibid,
purpose of telling Nigerians about their new nation and its problems and prospects. Typical of these efforts was a documentary series presented in Enugu's station EN-TV in 1960. Entitled "Customs and Traditions", the series subjects ranged form a documentary on the changes that improved transportation had made in Nigeria to an exposition of the importance of being efficient in business. The leader in developing indigenous programs was Lagos, channel 10, the federal government station. By 1963, 40 percent of its schedule was "local and live" ranging from variety entertainment to special shows for women and children.

Working with American program technicians from NBC-New York, the station developed its news and public affairs staff to the point where it was able to market some of its filmed programs abroad. Elaborating this development, Wilson Dizard noted:

Although the credit for these goes largely to the Nigerian management of the station, it was also a tribute to the work done by NBC-New York's advisers, and in particular their flexibility in guiding their Nigerian colleagues to develop programs which were not carbon copies of American productions, but lively reflections of the Nigeria's own flair for telling a story or reporting a news event. NBC's work in Nigeria is perhaps the best example to date of how American commercial television expertise can be adapted to the needs of underdeveloped countries.181

181Ibid., 66.
Nigeria's success in inaugurating television, set off a lively chain of reaction in the rest of Africa during the 1960 and 1961. Despite the general enthusiasm, only a few of the countries followed. These included Ghana, Egypt, the British controlled Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, now Zimbabwe - had definite plans for television at the time.

Closely related to the Nigerian experience was Egypt.

**Egypt:**

This was the largest TV system North of Africa. It was in part the result of western assistance. In December 1959, the Nasser regime signed an agreement with the US government which made available the equivalent of 12.6 million dollars in American-held Egyptian currency, to pay for the local costs of building an Egyptian TV network. The agreement was and still is the only instance in which the American government was provided large-scale financial assistance for a foreign television system.

The Egyptians began telecast from Cairo in 1960. Alexandra and other cities in the Nile delta region were linked with the Cairo station during the next two years. Television was also inaugurated in Damascus, then capital of the defunct United Arab Republic's (UAR) "Northern region" after Egypt and Syria had agreed to a political union. In the fall of 1961, when a coup d' etat returned the northern region to its original status as independent Syria, Damascus television was reduced to makeshift operations because of
the withdrawal of Egyptian technicians. Since then, Syrian TV has been gradually built up with additional stations in Homs and Tartons. Meanwhile the Egyptian television enjoyed a boom limited only by the shortage of sets. Its popularity became more marked after the original Cairo channel drew up a schedule heavily on American and other western materials. The second channel quickly became the more popular of the two, a situation which led to criticism of the possible negative effects of so much western influence on the concept of "Arab socialism" and positive neutralism in international affairs—two major ideological themes of the UAR's President Gamel Abdel Nasser. The Nasser regime's decision to give major emphasis to television as an instrument of both political propaganda and social mobilization was one of the more fascinating episodes in the early history of international television.

Middle East Television Systems

Television developed unevenly in the Middle East, largely as a result of the area's endemic political instability. The medium was first introduced into the region by British electronic firms who sponsored closed circuit systems at a 1955 trade fair in Baghdad. According to Dizard:

The first programs telecast was an ice show complete with clowns and pretty girls, which had been imported for the occasion. A highlight of the inaugural show was the attempt of one of the attending local notables to run out on
to the ice to get a closer look at the lightly clad chorus line. He slipped and sent skidding across the icy stage, burnoose flying missing his target.\textsuperscript{182}

We will consider first the non-commercial patterns which were by far the most prevalent types of television set-up in the Middle East.

**Non-Commercial Patterns**

**Iraqi**

Iraqi television soon after its establishment settled down to rather moderate programming with the aid of British and American television technicians. The government began regular transmission two years later. The station was in operation only a short time when the ruling monarchy was overthrown and an anti-western revolutionary government installed. Television was turned into a propaganda outlet for the new regime, a development which was given an ironic twist in 1963 when the revolutionary government was overthrown and the bullet-ridden bodies of its leaders were displayed on Baghdad TV as proof that they were indeed deposed. Since then Iraqi television tried to revert to its earlier intention as an educational and entertainment medium.\textsuperscript{183}

Under Saddam Hussein in the past years, Iraqi television has regained its past reputation as a propaganda

\textsuperscript{182}Ibid., 71.

\textsuperscript{183}Ibid., 71.
outlet. It was used effectively by government authorities to defend its policies and enlist the people's support in the war against Iran and the Allied forces operations to rescue Kuwait in 1990.\textsuperscript{184}

Most near Eastern television projects followed the Iraqi pattern of relying on Western assistance for their development. Lebanon's two stations were each financed and managed by consortiums of local and western interests. The first attempt to introduce TV took place in 1956 when the Ford Foundation, working with Beirut' Ecoledes Arts Metiers, tried to set up an educational station. The project foundered and the country turned to commercial sources for its television needs. The first commercial station operated by the Compagnie Libanaise de Television (CLT), began operations in 1959. It management affairs were controlled by Beirut interests who also relied on assistance of ORTF, the French government' broadcasting organization. The ORTF contribution was a part of a long standing interest by French government to maintain cultural influence in Lebanon. The local managers of the other Beirut station opened in 1962, had fiscal and management arrangements with British and American interests. One of these was the Roy Thompson organization; another was the American Broadcasting company. For several years, Time-Life Broadcasting, the radio-TV

decision of Time Incorporated, owned a minority interest in (CLT).  

**Saudi Arabia**

American technical and programming know-how was utilized in the development of the medium in Saudi Arabia. Television was long regarded as an unwanted infidel device by the country's conservative religious leadership. In 1962, Crown Prince (later King) Faisal moved to amend this prohibition. He reportedly was impressed by the medium's effectiveness several years earlier while recovering from an operation at a Boston hospital. Television was not, however, new to this country a station had been operated by the Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) for its employees since the late 1950s. The King requested assistance from the US government which made a corp of engineers available to construct two small stations at Jiddah and Riyadh, the capital. Thereafter, the basic responsibility for developing a planned thirteen-station national network was given by the Saudi government to NBC International of New York. The first station was scheduled to begin operation on April 1 1965, but had to be delayed due to opposition of conservative religious leaders. The King was said to have pointed out to them that the Koran (the sacred book of Moslems), did not specifically ban television and therefore the medium should be allowed. The Ulema (religious leaders) apparently were

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not placated by the argument.¹⁸⁶

American, British, and other interests were involved in television's development in a half-dozen other Middle Eastern countries. Kuwait television, one of the most technically advanced systems in the area, was largely the work of American engineers. The Roy Thompson organization had a major interest in the medium's development in the South Arabian Federation.

Part Five Overview

We have in this chapter tried to periscope the historical evolution and hence the nature of the development of television in developing countries around the world. We are more concerned at the level with the role of governments as the decision making body of the people. Those who govern are considered the elites or intellectuals in this study. This is necessary in order to gain a better understanding of the bias that influence the medium and thereby discard any pretensions, deliberate or otherwise, that it might presently portray.

Given the diverse and complex characteristics of television as an organ of mass communication, pin-pointing its propensity to exacerbate hostility, the thesis of this study, becomes an almost elusive venture. But we have tried to overcome this theoretical difficulty through an analysis of the historical development of television first as an

¹⁸⁶Ibid., 82.
organ of the state in the context of the originating intention for its establishment. We do not claim to suggest by this process that the originating intention is permanent. To claim such would betray obvious historical facts and an unwitty elevation of a social phenomenon to the level of dogma. Adhering to the tenets of the scientific nature of this study therefore, we have tried to determine the nature of television and hence its content by understanding its originating intention only as far as its allows us to perceive the various levels, circumstances and sentiments that have brought about its existence. Through this analysis we hope to provide raw data to confirm or disprove the notion for or against that which either supports or disproves our hypotheses.

Next, we place countries under our review on regional bases to permit us to verify, at first, what impact geographical proximity might have as a factor in transnational television. After-all, the first encounter to foreign signals must be by those who are nearest to the source of transmission than those who are further away from it. We are again mindful of the fact that geographical proximity by itself does not determine the gravity of reaction to trans-boundary transmission alone, although it might help to clarify how nations with common boundaries manage the problem of trans-boundary broadcast.

To give a semblance of consistency to our analysis, we
grouped nations according to their over-riding ideological political, economic and social systems. Thus we have sub-heading such as: Western Television Systems; Eastern Europe Television Systems; Third World Television Systems; Latin American Television Systems; Asia Television Systems; and African Television Systems.

We chose to separate "Third World Television Systems" from its sub-headings in Latin America, Asia, and Africa to emphasize the similarity between all third world nations as subordinate competitors with a common historical similarity of colonialism and hence domination. We however treated each area separately to further illustrate how they transcended due to a number of varying factors, and developed different perspectives to the entire question of trans-boundary transmission. It also affords us an opportunity to see how the third world nations impact on the politics of trans-national television among themselves. The question we preempt by this analysis is whether only technologically superior nations take advantage of less endowed ones or whether at the same time, less endowed nations themselves could prey on themselves or the developed nations, if they were given the opportunity to do so.

To better articulate this propensity of uneven competition we further categorize the nations within the systems into three major levels of commercial outlook as a factor for the establishment of television. These categories
are: Commercial; Non-Commercial; and Mixed Patterns. In the commercial category we have listed those countries which evolved through the development of television purely as a commercial commodity. The Non-Commercial categories represent those countries that may have established television systems for other reasons other than as purely commercial ventures. The last of these categories, Mixed Patterns stand for those nations that have either separately operated or combined both the commercial and non-commercial strategies either at different times or at the same time. We decided to use the Commercial/Non-Commercial Pattern variables as possible measures of the process of formation and predicting the nature of content of trans-national television. This becomes most logical as the fulcrum of the debate on this subject have unfortunately centered around the effect of commercialization of television as a medium. By popular opinion the more commercial the medium, the greater the propensity to satisfy the financial interests of the investors whether or not the "good of the viewers" are satisfied. As stated earlier, equally vocal adherents of the unhindered spread of television and other media, might argue in the opposite. George Quester believes that television expansion and capabilities should be seen purely as the mechanics of "choice" by the viewers.

We have not overlooked the importance of ideology as an important factor in the development of television in the
post-World War II era. In the main, most of those nations who for ideological reasons developed television fall into the category of Non-Commercial Patterns. This study considers it fair to avoid any summary judgement of either good, better or best, to any of these patterns. This necessary for us to arrive at an objective and well-balanced conclusions from this study.

It is within these setting: first national and then regional in the Mixed Pattern framework that we start to perceive the roles of politicians and entrepreneurs in the commercial patterns and politicians and of late military dictators in the non-commercial systems. The Mixed Patterns as the variant would suggest could contain a combination of the preceding components—politicians and entrepreneurs—at varying proportions. We have in many instances not left out the manner through which many of the nations acquired the technology of television as a possible clue to the bases of their ideological leaning which determined their choice of commercialism or otherwise. In some instances the technology was offered as a presumably benevolent gesture by some technologically rich to less endowed nations.
Chapter Six

Summary and Conclusions:

Introduction

We have in the process of this study been confronted by certain realities. One of them is that of the changing nature of international relations in a fast changing world where many avowed beliefs are rapidly giving way to new ideas. Another is the prevalence of a global relations determined largely by superpower domination of major global affairs. But there also exist other levels of domination which earlier analysis have ignored either because they were considered inconsequential or irrelevant. But the demise of the former U.S.S.R and the bloody conflicts in former Yugoslavia must support the argument that it is time that some hitherto ignored potentials for global conflicts must be properly articulated.

As far as communication theory goes, many earlier assumptions must be ripe for challenge. Top among them is the question of cultural imperialism. If this question could be determined only by the logic of strong and weak states alone, then we would not have to wonder why the Roman Empire was converted into christianity when they conquered Jerusalem. Nor shall we need explanations for the touch of African culture in American society when English descendants dominated the Africans who were brought to the United States as slaves.
In this concern for details and the need for re-opening old and outdated theories, one is not likely to see our findings in this study, as very shocking or for that matter novel. But to take them for granted as a collective effort for a new beginning is to ignore the place of history in human endeavor. Furthermore they must be taken serious because or senses of right or wrong; serious or not serious have in the main been influenced or distorted by socializing organs which include television and other communication organs. We believe that it is through a re-hatching and adequate articulation of some of these so-called common sense knowledge i.e. general information on our everyday living that we shall be able to gain some insight into the true nature of every human endeavor. As Nicholas Garnham stated in Structures and Television:

Any study of the structures of television must contradict that tradition of romantic individualism expressed by the Economist (Dec. 11, 1971): "Of course in the end it is not the structures which determine the quality of any broadcasting system or service but the people who man it". Such a view flattering as it may be to individual broadcasting executives, bears little relationship to the real situation. 187

Any attempt to overlook the importance of structures in the evaluation and determination of human endeavors therefore

amounts to a deliberate attempt to minimize the role of individuals as active agents in the unfolding of human realities. Nicholas Garnham agrees:

A stress on structure as the ultimate determinant of individual human actions may appear to induce a helpless fatalism, but in fact the opposite is the case. When one stresses the role of the individuals manning the system, one is tempted to await a Messiah who will come over into Macedonia and help transform the system. As Brecht wrote in a different context, "Pity the country that needs heroes," for to await the appearance of such men is to neglect our own responsibilities. 188

Our study of television structures/ownership patterns is not to induce fatalism but activism. It might be too easy to forget that our structures are man made in the first place. By studying their creation and functioning we were able to realize that they could be different, and that if we could, we would change what was originally created. The more we understood the way such structures determine individual actions, the nearer our new structures may be in fulfilling those functions for which they were created. And we dare say that human structures are most adapted to the harmonization rather than destruction of its various societies. One way of articulating the findings of this study is to highlight the major theoretical fabrics that inter-relate to draw broadly based conclusions. We have used the "originating intention"

188Ibid.
as the research strategy to evaluate the historical evolution of television in many parts of the World. We have also categorized the various countries into three main types viz: Commercial, Non-Commercial and Mixed Patterns in order to establish their similarities and differences. A combination of these research strategies along with an analysis of the evolution of networks and governments' international propaganda outfits lead to the following conclusions:

1) That the present mode of communication/television between nations based on the nature of state competition creates a platform for conflicts rather than harmony between and within nations. This can be perceived at two levels, the regional level, where conflicts might generate due to geographical proximity, commercial interests or ideology and farther away due to commercial interests, ideology or other considerations.

2) That in most instances, the manner of communication which include its content and programming is conditioned by local political, economic and socio-cultural realities. These realities are often orchestrated by the local elites who are politicians, businessmen, educators among others, controlling the apparatus of the State.

3) In many instances the bases for the determination of the nature or pattern of a national communication/television outlook lies in the struggle between the ins and outs in government. Usually, the need by the ins to prove their competence at providing the best cultural and overall growth initiatives to the polity are constantly challenged by the outs who by the nature of their existence have to antagonize the ins in
the struggle for their political existence. Even under dictatorships, there is deliberate effort by the status quo to use television as a propaganda instrument to highlight its achievements and gain some measure of legitimacy.

4) That internal struggles at the national levels give rise to the degree of impetus, or lack of, in national communication policies that encourage the strengthening of propaganda instruments to accent the achievements of one regime to gain political clout at the local level, for the sake of its the political life. This propaganda machinery sets the tone for international confrontation and hostilities.

5) The prevalent nature of relations between nations was installed in the post World War II activities that put in place such global systemic instruments as the United Nations and its affiliates. Thus, global inequalities amongst nations have been legitimized with the acknowledgement of the domination of the rich nations over the poor ones.

6) This World Order, i.e. the post-World War II era, is dominated by those nations who possess greater resources than others. These resources usually translates into the possession of more economic materials, which might include television among others, for the purposes of pursuing individual "national self-interests in the form of confrontation through armaments or communication/television.

7) Although the states are recognized as active participants in this world order, individuals and groups who dominate the various governments, serving as policy makers, actually determine the extent and essence of the national outlook based on their own self interest. Ironically, self-interest through a deliberate process of distortion of
realities becomes often translated into national self-interest to deceive the larger polity into endorsing the so-called national self-interest programs.

8) Television and other organs of the media have therefore becomes one of the socializing or reality blinders which are perfected by national elites who disguise their actual political, economic and social needs, to deceive the majority of their compatriots for purely selfish reasons.

9) Attempts to reverse these trends as represented by the United Nations Resolution on a New World Order of Information and Communication (NWICO) have been mainly superficial at best and inconsequential at its worst. Predictably, the United Nations due to its membership contribution priority is more likely to give greater consideration to its members based on their contributions to its coffers. Somehow, it has always done so.

10) As long as these sectional interests prevail, television and the entire communication spectrum will continue to exacerbate conflicts which are posed by the inordinate ambitions of States interpreted by its elites who profess expert knowledge on the socio-cultural, economic and political needs of their people, while pursuing their own selfish interests.

11) The question of cultural imperialism therefore becomes another blinder by the elites to wade off their actual intention of domination over their compatriots for their personal aggrandizement.

We shall now rehash the nature of conflicts at both regional and between individual States to ground our findings in actual historical evidence. We have chosen to
breakdown the conflict areas into various geographical segments to see at a glance that 1) conflicts arising from the need to communicate is not limited to one part of the world alone and 2) it goes beyond a simple arrangement between developed and developing states alone. Developing states also have their share in the potentials for conflicts. We shall therefore see how these conflicts are playing themselves out between societies in West-West, West-East, West-Developing World.

Summary

West-West Conflicts

The major thrust in the West-West conflicts arise over the contending positions on commercialization of television. We see an active debate on this issue in Britain over its choice for a second commercial channel for BBC. We see here, how personal whims and caprice can become the corner stone of a national policy, as Winston Churchill's personal distaste for BBC led to his support for the second BBC commercial channel (page 97). Ironically, the group that moved against commercialism equally did so, not so much for altruistic reasons, but mainly in responds to the threat commercial television posed to their industries. A plausible conclusion deducible from these economic interests is that it tends to pursue its logical goals of profit maximization. Against the hue and cry of public interests advocates, commercial interests tend to determine the mode
of programming and therefore less cautious about what likely disapproval it might receive from critics at home and overseas.

Secondly, governments support for commercial television place them as primordial agencies that would have to defend the activities of commercial interests especially across their national boundaries whether or not those activities was desirable in the first place. As George Quester notes:

> The handling of television may amount to low politics, but it still may be the issue more likely than any other to lead the United States into conflict with Sweden, Canada, West Germany, Australia, France, and any other countries. In the process, the leaders and people on each side may be driven to introspect much more about the core values to which they are responding. 189

Reflecting on these antagonism, over the legitimacy of future direct television broadcasting from satellites, Canada and Sweden have several times joined to take the lead in formulating a free world counter-position to that of the United States. George Quester, considers these development as ironic because these two countries are often considered as the "most Americanized" countries in the World. The Canadian situation is obvious by language, life-style, manner of dress, and attitudes on most other issues of life. Sweden is also often described as the most Americanized

189 George Quester, The International Politics of Television, 61.
country in Europe, ahead of Britain despite the language barrier. Somehow these factors explained by Quester go to further prove that the role of governments in supporting local commercial interests compels them into more confrontational postures with other nations not withstanding the apparent or concealed proclivity of their citizens to prefer certain television programs from elsewhere. As Quester further explains:

The irony of the contradiction is easily enough explained in that each country is quite aware of its degree of Americanization, of its own smallness in face of the model of the United States, and each has had governments concerned with containing the pace and extent of this American influence. If ordinary Swedes had their choice, they would watch almost nothing but American programs on their television. But State authority has long overridden this quite vehemently by narrowing the number of such programs in a week to one or two (always nonetheless the week's favorite program in terms of how many Swedes were tuned in).190

But Sweden and other Western European democracies are hardly monolith in their desire to contain the impact of television or avoid duplicating the experience of the United States. There may be masses of average Europeans viewers who may pay lip-service to criticizing the level of American entertainment television but then watch such Hollywood products at every opportunity and support anyone that adds

190Ibid.
channels of programming to their dials. Somehow, their more thoughtful, rational and far-sighted behavior (as voters) may thus be in favor of the restriction and containment of what can be addictive for low-brow entertainment but their more immediate feeling may be that enlightenment is being over-stressed and that some greater liveliness of the television evening program might be in order.

Beyond the level of voter sentiments there are in each of these countries important commercial interests; advertisers seeking a better means of reaching potential consumers, investors seeking a new way of making profits and others. While other important commercial interests, for example, the newspapers, may be opposed to the diversification, commercialization, and popularization of television, there will thus be new commercial interests in favor of additional commercial channels, cable television systems, new local transmission systems, or direct broadcast satellite systems. Quester maintains that:

Given the polarization of left and right sentiments it is no surprise that the conservatives in Britain and the Christian Democrats in West Germany have been more inclined toward such pluralism in television programming, while the labor party and the West German Social Democrats have been more opposed.¹⁹¹

These alliances are engaged in a struggle against the background of a ratchet effect whereby any additional

¹⁹¹Ibid.
entertainment access delivered when the permissive party is in power is difficult to retract when the more paternalistic party assumes office. As election swings and the pluralists thrust of the technology open the choice slightly from decade to decade, reversal become difficult. In some instances, any outsiders distrust of how incumbents have made political use of narrower ranges of television programming to keep themselves in power, lead to a support for competition and hence commercialization of the medium. Situations like these are often explained for having the French Socialists surprising similarity with British Conservatives and West German Democrats since 1982. Quester further explains:

The government-monopoly of French television programming was defended on grounds of maintaining high cultural standards in France, but was blatantly abused under President de Gaulle and after, for supporting the image and re-election prospects of the Gaullist regimes.\(^{192}\)

Given the rule about civil service tenure that tend to make purges difficult (and given the fact that a major purge of a single-source media operation would look suspiciously like a totalitarian takeover, especially where one was governing, as in France with minority Communists participation), the incoming Socialists government after 1982 become more sympathetic to the idea of greater pluralism in the

\(^{192}\)Ibid.
electronic media, so as to break the monopoly of image building, rather than trying to take over control of this monopoly.

These struggles produced peculiar alliances along commercial and other lines. French newspapers tended to be critical of the Gaullist regimes, giving the French access to a kind of news that kept off television. But the same French newspapers on financial grounds, had also welcomed the television monopoly of the ORTF because it had long declined to run any commercial messages, and then later accepted only a few set as in West Germany, in a constrained part of the daily schedule. The tolerance of the new forms of television media by the Mitterand government thus added some allies to the French press in its perspectives on French politics and on the rest of the world, but it threatened the financial viability of this press if advertisers found cable television or direct broadcast television a more effective way of reaching potential customers.

The climax of what may have escalated into open hostilities within and between nations protecting commercial interests was illustrated dramatically in the operations of totally unlicensed and illegal "pirate stations" around Europe. Europeans first encountered the phenomena of pirate radio before and after World War II, sometimes serving political causes but more often simply offering Jazz music
to European young people and commercial for advertisers. Private television transmissions were later more rampant, occasionally serving the cause of some political dissidents and more often showing scarce Hollywood movies or commercial advertisements. Such operation is most noticeable in Denmark where its provides a serious challenge to the single Danish government television channel.

More recently, pirate transmission of television signals exploited the operation of cable systems utilizing master antennas. By the end of the 1970s, some operations began piping a signal into antennas of Dutch cable system on the wavelengths normally used by various foreign stations as soon as such stations had shut down for the evening. They took advantage of the fact that the cable operators had left their circuits open to relay whatever come in on that frequency, letting out a combination of recent movies and advertisements for local vendors. It took a combination of suits for copyright violations to close down these operations, in the end, by pressuring the cable operators to monitor what their antennas were receiving and to shut down when the legitimate French or German station had gone on air.193

As states and private investors considered sinking their funds into cable systems or satellite transmitters, it became obvious that either of these might undo the economic

193 Ibid.
advantages of the other while also perhaps undoing whatever cultural enrichment policies had been decided in the national capital. Quester also observes that the international issues of television management can become linked to domestic political issues, agreeing with the thesis of this study (refer chapter four page 174). Quester further stated that:

In West Germany, opposition to Luxembourg satellite transmission in German language (with advertisement from West German advertisers), was led primarily by the Social Democratic Party (SDP) of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, it was not shared by the opposition Christian Democratic Party (CDP) or even by Schmidt's coalition partner, the free Democratic Party (FDP). ¹⁹⁴

Equally linked with the issue of opposition to such telecasts or tolerance and support for them, has been the parties divergent stand on the spreading of television cable services within West Germany, with Christian Democrats again being more in favor of this as an early move and the SDP being reluctant to see it proceed. Ironically, local motives are being constantly mixed on both sides of the issue depending on which commercial interest one group considers optimal. Labor Unions supporting the SDP favored a move toward cable because of the employment such a substantial commercial investment might generate in years that were not otherwise economically prosperous. The same Unions would not

¹⁹⁴Ibid., 64
have welcomed Luxembourg satellite transmission. The average German television watcher might, as anywhere else, have been inclined to welcome broader program choices, even if he or she were an SDP supporter.\textsuperscript{195}

The Christian democrats were somewhat influenced by the support they received from the same manufacturers who looked forward to advertising their products on Luxembourg German-Language television or who intended to invest money on the launching and operation of the Luxembourg satellite or the installation of cable systems. as in the case around Western Europe, the political outs tended to distrust and resent the political ins, and thus were not nearly as bothered if a breakdown by restraints on total programming generated some additional sources of news for television viewers. This was much less a problem in West Germany than it was in France, although a few charges of bias in television news coverage had arisen.\textsuperscript{196}

A sticking irony in these shifting position of political parties became manifest when the FDP, (West Germany party) nearest in political ideology to the American belief in liberal free enterprise and laissez faire, was combative with the paternalism and restraint mentality of the socialists. What looks to SDP like the invasion of Hollywood and commercialization by signals form Luxembourg,

\textsuperscript{195}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{196}Ibid., 65
could be seen by the FDP as it might be by some American; as the free flow of ideas.

The breakdown of regulatory legislation for radio and television in Italy came in response to some similar resentments by the outs about (Radiotelevisione Italiana RAI), as well as to a general viewer resentment and boredom with the "stuffy" RAI programming. But the core of the issues as articulated by George Quester remained that:

. . with the models of the United States (or most recently of deregulated Italy) before then, Europeans will hardly be of a single mind in wishing to terminate the old system, and many will wonder whether anything culturally ambitious can survive in a market environment. 197

This notwithstanding, in every political democracy around the globe, there are still serious public officials and political leaders who are bothered by the cultural example of American television programming and have not yet given up the fight to achieve something else for their own countries. Iceland, free of all trans-boundary television competition (once the US armed forces television program at Keflavik air base was confined to cable), could be cited as most illustrative of the old Scandinavian stereotype; heavily committed to local culture, its television until recently was totally off the air one day a week and for one month each summer. Spain, since the establishment of a politically

197 Ibid., 65.
democratic government after the death of Franco, became cautious about any lifting of restrictions on television. Bothered by the American example and by the example of Italian television after the breakdown of governmental regulation, the Spanish government repeatedly "considered" but did not do anything about proposals that the state monopoly television service be complemented by commercial television and/or pay-television service. George Quester elaborates:

Some of this can be brushed off as local pride, disdainful of the allegedly more shallow culture displayed in North America. Some are also a continuation of paternalistic tendencies that many factions in Spain may share. But another part is a reaction to the relative mindlessness of television in the United States, Italy or any other country where viewers are free to indulge themselves. ¹⁹⁸

It is no surprise that Quester concluded that the strongest interest in favor of "choice" are the commercial firms that make profits in such ventures. The majority of the population of viewers, augmented by a few ideological liberals are socialized or coerced to follow through the indoctrination or addiction of the medium.

By the end of 1980s, the prospect of any one firm or another of profit-oriented television channels, after being postponed several times, still loomed for Spain, either in

¹⁹⁸Ibid., 66.
new services with commercial advertising or in services with a monthly service charge. Quester believe that the delays could reflect a mean-spirited bureaucracy - trying to avoid the supposed mistakes of the other West European countries that had given in to the desire of the public to be entertained.

West-East Conflicts

Somehow following the pattern of hostilities after World War II the most predictable conflict was for decades between the American and Soviet approaches to these questions (with each side offering explanations flattering to itself). According to Quester:

Most Americans see liberty as entailing a maximum of choice, especially including a choice of sources of information, and they see the Communist proposal for restrictions on electronic communication as little more than the "right to jam", intended to secure the grip of the soviet dictatorship of the territories it controls.\footnote{Ibid., 58.}

The Communist have instead pointed to the marketing skills of Hollywood, arguing that the monetary investments backing any medium of entertainment or information can make that medium more engrossing. A Marxist at it were, typically stressed material factors: "unless you get adequate supplies and economic power, freedom of the press and freedom of information are meaningless." The liberal answer might be
that "without freedom of the press, you never know what you are getting." Somehow, the East-West conflict over trans-boundary television have been hardly limited to comparative ideology and the setting of example, for the boundary between the Communist and the non-Communist was closed by radio and television signals.

Unable to deliver full array of printed materials past the border checkpoints of these countries, Americans and their governments nonetheless have long felt it right and important that the "facts" be delivered to the people of Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and Cuba and the Communist governed states of Asia. For decades the west strived to reach these audiences through radio transmissions, with the Communist regimes investing substantial resources in cutting off such transmissions, by electronic jamming. Just as they had been on their guard against radio, the Communist regimes vehemently opposed the possibilities of any penetration by trans-boundary television.

The US-Soviet conflict set the basis behind which the allies of both nations fell. This conflict intersected with other state's concerns about American television penetration, the states whose democratic political system of government by consent of the governed is hardly in question (for example, Canada, Sweden and West Germany). Quester emphasizes that, such countries have not been in the
slightest worried that American television programming might bring in news that has been withheld from their people; rather they have been concerned about the entertainment aspects of the television medium; an entertainment product that could become absorbingly addictive. But the Soviet government, while trying to question the legitimacy of any and all television and radio signals reaching its population without first having passed through its censorship, has not failed to exploit similar situations in advanced industrial democracies and in the third world countries. Part of the efforts of Intervision was to satisfy this aspiration.

The development of satellite transmission posed a greater threat to peace as it made it easier for countries to engage in Direct Broadcast transmission. The climax of this sensitivity bordered much on the specialization or rumor, that the former Soviet Union had invested in an A-SAT capability for attacking and shooting down orbiting satellites of the United States. From the standpoint of arms control, the development or use of this capability by either of the superpowers was quite undesirable, since satellites-based reconnaissance devices had been an important means of informing and ensuring each power about the totals of missiles launching facilities built by the order. Such reconnaissance satellites were sometimes referred to as spy satellites. Had the former Soviet Union destroyed some of the U.S. space platforms a definite situation for global
insecurity would have been predictable. The closest point to Soviet threat to use its anti-satellite capability came when an American direct broadcast satellite began beaming down television programming into Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union against the wishes of the Communist regimes. It also at the same time began beaming down programs into places like Sweden, and India.

**North and South Conflicts.**

The conflict between North and South are best expressed as a function of disparities and obvious contradictions espoused by the United Nations and its organ the UNESCO. According to the International Commission for the study of communication the core of the problems stem from certain negative repercussions of principles adopted long ago, which have taken the form of imbalances and inequities. The commission states:

> At the period of the foundation of the UN and UNESCO, the international community set itself a certain objective: to guarantee and to foster freedom and free flow of information. This principal is solemnly proclaimed in various international instruments dealing with human rights and fundamental freedom.201

But the obvious imbalances in communication have

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201 Sean Mac Bride, *Many Voices One World*, 35
supported the view that "free flow" was nothing but "one way-flow" and that the principal on which it was based should be restated so as to guarantee "free and balanced flow".

This imbalance triggered the debate in the 1970s for a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO). The major themes of the debate included the viewpoint that certain powerful and technologically advanced states exploit their advantaged to exercise a form of cultural and ideological domination which jeopardizes the natural identity of their countries. They included in this category the problems raised by the one-way information flow and the existence of a monopolistic and oligopolistic trends in international arena. It was highly debated that since the content of information was largely produced by the developed countries, the image of the developing countries was frequently false and distorted. Other analysts felt there was greater danger in how these images were presented to third world themselves. And anxieties and fears were fuelled by a perceived notion in the 1970s of the proposed direct satellite broadcasting could do to national integrity. The Commission elaborates:

On the other hand, many media professional consider that while the existence of these imbalances and the dangers which they entail cannot be denied, stressing the one-way news flow can lead to further restrictions on freedom of information and to strengthening the hand of those in favor
of reducing the inflow of information; that consequences would be a radical break with the concept of free flow.202

The concern of the latter group was that assuming the diversity of opinions, news, messages and sources was a precondition for truly democratic communication, that "decolonization of information" must not serve as a pretext for bringing information under the exclusive control of government authorities, and thereby allowing them to impose their own image of reality on their people.

It was further argued that transformations in the structures of international communications, were inherent factors in the conceptual foundation of international relations and development. And that a world built on mutual understanding, acceptance of diversity, promotion of detente and coexistence, encouraged trends towards real independence. The Commission noted:

If the conception of development as a linear, quantitative, and exponential process, based on transfers of imported and frequently alienating technology, is beginning to be replaced by that of an endogenous quantitative process focused on man and his vital needs, aimed at eradicating inequalities and based on appropriate technologies which respect the cultural context and generate and foster the active participation of the population concerned, then there can be no doubt that communication between

202Ibid., 38.
people and nations will be different.\footnote{Ibid.}

So much for the debate, an so little for any real change since over two decades of talks.

**Conclusions**

It is certainly still possible, when we come to look at the development of television at the end of this century, to conclude that it did not amount to much. This interpretation would question whether there was much real cause for dispute or whether the impact of television was greater than that of any other technological change. But it is just as possible that the impact will be profound, altering cultural patterns in a manner as baffling for libertarians as it would be for Marxists. The advent of television may thus be much more significant than the invention of ballpoint pen or the diesel locomotive, and it may out stripe the automobile or the computer in its fuller political and social impact. It may surpass radio or films, perhaps combining their impact, and it may well even match the introduction of literacy and printing in how much it can change the parts of life that are political. George Quester among other issues suggests:

> A skeptical interpretation could have been that any dispute would fade because the United States—its governments, its individuals, and its entrepreneurs—would give up on the libertarian principles of unfettered choice in the face of opposition to such principle throughout
the rest of the world and in face of a relative technological impracticability, or commercial unprofitability, of intercontinental commercial television medium.204

Another interpretation by which conflict would diminish could be the reverse, as West Europeans, East Europeans, and others would resign themselves to what had become technologically and culturally inevitable, letting foreign television programming reach their citizens. It is this possible, by either of these interpretations, that all the international disagreements about the handling of this medium will have been settled simply by the dictates of technological trends, trends that by themselves will be final and binding. Any discussion of so commercial an issue as transnational television often produces a "commonsense" attitude in the business-world doubting whether the political conflicts will ever need to become severe. "Of course," the United States will in the face of world objections, rein in its ambitions and not make an attempt to beam out worldwide television signals; "of course," the Europeans will drop their doctrinaire and principled concerns for restricting television programming, as their publics demand access to entertainment and their own industries become adept at producing tele-films, satellites, or space rockets.

204George Quester, The International Politics of Television, 275.
Thus as before, the world will develop in practice a rough-and-ready compromise, avoiding the more serious political problems and international confrontations about which political scientist theorize so much. Yet, that would not remove the potential problem. Unfortunately, the equanimity of businessmen and the engineer have not always been a reliable indicator of what lies ahead. Similar sentiments were once heard about whether there would be any issues of principle, or difficulties of political practice attached to the spread of nuclear power. As George Quester elaborates:

The forward march of the technology of electronic communications, is quite rapid, and this pace of progress is one of the sources of inspiration and encouragement for business. Yet the worst of the political problems we foresee may then loom suddenly larger if there is significant preparatory thought. We cannot yet be so sure that West-West conflicts will become stronger on this issue.\textsuperscript{205}

But were the forward march of technology the only dynamic factor here, this study would simply have been recounting a contest of wills between the threat of cultural domination and other ways of looking at the television medium. But another dynamic factor is what the critics of television in particular and transnational television general, have so talked about: the apparent impact of

\textsuperscript{205}Ibid., 276.
television on academic performance, on family life, culture, reading patterns and violence. There is hardly any assurance yet that the governments of Scandinavia will simply sit back to let the wave of all wash over them or that the communist and the third world countries, for that matter, will let this wave plus the libertarian impact of a window on the world, totally wash over them.

There is thus a sort of cultural war underway between nations that wishes to protect its viewers from foreign television broadcast to either save its local industries or cultivate what it considers an authentic cultural pattern. Without any question, that is almost impossible for the state authorities to reduce public access to television one anything is open to choice. This has been the problem of the Italian authorities ever since 1974 in contemplating reining in the enormous variety of choice that opened after the collapse of regulation. This has also been the problem in other European and third world nations that have found alternatives with television stations or the rise of video cassette recorders VCRs. Cable viewers have for instance become more adept at drawing in satellite signals which spill across national boundaries. But it has been only in a few cases that television access has been reined in, but these have been situations of draconian revolution.
According to George Quester:

Vietnam today has less television choice than when the country was governed by a
non-communist regime in the South, and Cambodian television shrank under the guidance of the Pol Pot regime. Havana had six channels of television broadcasting before Castro and now just two, more monolithically under control today.\textsuperscript{206}

As the Canadian government has guarded itself to despatch the Mounties (unsuccessfully) to close down illegal satellite antennas built to receive U.S pay-television programming, the impression that everything is settled here is not confirmed. The concern about the quality of television, the quality of life, and the how indigenous dramatic entertainment in large part is genuine, even if it at times gets used around the world more as a rationalization and cover for smug bureaucrats or for the reinforcement of incumbent administration.

Yet just as smaller countries may have to worry about a burgeoning impact of television, the United States will have to worry lest, in large part because of this special nature of television, a sentiment for "control over the media" burgeons in direction dangerous to freedom as we know it - dangerous even to radio or to the print media.\textsuperscript{207}

And a host of problems still remain possible between the West and East, between the "free world" led by the United States and what is left of the communist bloc, led by

\textsuperscript{206}Ibid., 278

\textsuperscript{207}Ibid.
China and Cuba, and third world countries. With the demise of Soviet Union, relations seemed to have improved between East-West but with the turmoil in former Yugoslavia and elsewhere, relations could worsen again. As the issue of New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO), for which Third World nations fought fervently in the 1970s, still remains a mere document on paper awaiting implementation. To remove the strictures between nations in the manner of television broadcast, we have to seek ways that would ensure the accommodation of the new technology for the optimal evolution of humanity.

As stated earlier (page 2,3), Howard Frederick in Global Communication and International Relations maintains that today mass communication face the challenge of how to bring peace, build confidence among nations and strengthen international understanding. We therefore offer as solution to the perceived or real notion of conflict between nations a realignment of the Politics of transnational television as a precursor to similar actions in all mass communication organs. This is necessary if the tenuous peace in the world would is to become more assured.
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