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NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND POST COLONIAL LINKAGES
IN
MOZAMBIQUE AND GUINEA BISSAU: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF ATLANTA UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY
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DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

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ABSTRACT

POLITICAL SCIENCE

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National Development and Post Colonial Linkages in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau:
An Exploratory Study

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Dissertation dated December, 1983

The major concern of this study is to examine the current process of national development in the two African states of Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. Recognizing the fact that the problem of development is the foremost challenge to all contemporary African nations, the pursuit of an alternative approach to the process of development by the two countries, is certainly a break-away from the change in continuity of the colonial capitalist mode of production, characteristic of Africa today.

Contrary to the general practice in Africa which limits the concept of development to economics, and the enrichment of the petty bourgeoisie, the process of national development in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau has rightfully been conceptualized in terms of its economic, social, political, and ideological complexities, while the uplift of the masses occupies the center of the economic activity.

The study critically examined the economic dimensions of the development process in both Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. The specific concern centered on industrialization and economic integration, the design and character of agriculture, the mechanisms of distribution of national wealth, the alternative measures of unemployment control, and the strategy followed
in an attempt to eliminate post-colonial linkages.

Viewing the role of politics in the overall process of development as an essential one, especially with regard to structural transformation and mobilization, the study examined the political dimensions of development in these countries. The focus was placed on the role of the party, structural transformation and mass participation, the distribution of power and national integration, political consciousness and rural politicization, in addition to their various implications on the development process. The study shows that the political elements have rendered the process of development, creative and complementary, cohesive, as well as dynamic.

With regard to the social dimensions of development, the study examined the particularity of education, the unique innovations in health care and housing, and the progress made so far in the attainment of self-reliance.

Faced with the task of assessing the efficacity of this approach to national development, the study without pretending to provide the cure for all development problems in Africa, concluded by uncovering the commendable merits and uniqueness of the approach, but also cautions against blind copying, while at the same time it encourages others to take a critical look at this experience in an attempt to assess the extent to which it can apply to their concrete conditions.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Finally, I wish to extend my thanks to those who were responsible for the typing; those for whom a pound of flesh never mattered very much. In this regard, I would like to thank Marie Harvey for her time and commendable efforts with regards to the first draft. Secondly, Verona Iriarte, with regard to the first as well as the final draft. It is impossible to express my appreciation to her for her devotion, sense of professionalism, and kindness; especially when it was clear that my "pocket" was anything but "green". She is indeed a sister.

This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, Chief Ofor Ejeh and Mary Ofor, whom out of a mere love, preferred to "go naked" rather than see me deprived of advanced education. All mistakes as I have often been told are admittedly mine.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND SEARCH FOR A STRATEGY OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

National development is a complex of objectives, goals and strategies replete with social, economic, political, and ideological ramifications; and its distinguishing characteristics and results contingent on sustained improvement and general uplift of the conditions of the masses in every national setting. This will be further elaborated in the research. Thus, whatever the strategy utilized, the correct focus must rest squarely and always distinctly predicated on the masses uplift; or as Jan Tinbergen maintains, "provide for individual well-being and dignity".  

The search for a strategy of development suited to the conditions and aspirations of a free Africa was the "principal problem confronting political leaders immediately after establishing the sovereignty of their new nation states" and has since remained the principal pre-occupation and foremost challenge to all contemporary African nations. The attainment of "flag" independence also meant the continuation of the colonial capitalist approaches to national development. These were distorted versions of Western capitalism, drawn from the theoretical postulations of many development economists of the metropoles and applied at will to the former African colonies by metropolitan countries. The colonial capitalist approach has come to highlight several economic, political, and social constraints: the fragility of political structures;

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the lack of a dependable development ideology; the absence of well trained indigenous cadres; unequal distribution of income and the national wealth; a chronic impoverishment rather than progress; starvation, malnutrition, and the underemployment of actual human resources. This gloomy picture is, by and large the most common, despite the fact that some encouraging results could indeed be relatively identified in the first development decade of the 1960's. The realities of the 1970's and the present point towards a general deterioration of the conditions of the masses.

National development strategies in many African countries accompanied by impressive arrays of supportive charts and documentation have proven to be anathema to the very peoples they were designed to develop. The anticipated results have been exactly what was expected: an undeterminable instance of failures that have produced problems of indescribable dimensions.

At any rate, any attempt to assess the success and/or failure of a full decade's effort for national development must be placed in the context of time and space. As a team of U.N. experts noted:

There are many encouraging developments...indeed in many ways the pace and pattern of economic activity in developing Africa in the 1960's stand in sharp contrast to the relatively leisurely fashion in which affairs were managed in the previous 60 years when most African countries were under colonial rule. Nevertheless, the standards by which recent experience is to be judged are not those of the colonial period, but rather those of meeting the present pressing aspirations for economic progress. It is in terms of these

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very exacting standards that disappointment should be felt when reviewing events of the 1960's.  

In addition, this pathetic picture has long given way to a much gloomy one in the decade of the seventies and a promising repetition in the decade of the eighties. As Michael Roemer's summation indicates, even the World Bank in its *World Development Report 1980*, "uncharacteristically" endorsed the melancholy mood by concluding that "on average, (African) people are as badly off at the end of the decade (the 1970's) as they were at the beginning...sub-Saharan Africa...has the most disturbing outlook... during the 1980's."  

Nowadays, it is clear that one of the most frustrating tasks facing Africa as it begins the decade of the eighties is that of defining a more appropriate development strategy. This principal pre-occupation poses the question; how must national development be pursued as to encompass increased productivity in all sectors of the national economy, equitable distribution of income and the national wealth, self-reliance, etc? In brief, how could national development strategy be structured in order to improve the level of living of the masses?  

The United Nations with full recognition of the existing conditions in developing countries, postulated a recent theory of development, namely, the Unified Approach to national development and planning which addresses itself to some of the shortcomings of national development models in

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Africa. First formulated in 1970 and subsequently modified and better focused by 1974, the Unified Approach touches on some of the pertinent questions of development, including the distribution of income and wealth, and the overall improvement of the conditions of the masses as the foremost prerequisite in national development and planning. It sees development not only from the point of view of economics, as has been frequently expressed, but also its social, political, and ideological outcroppings that it maintains, also deserve equal and careful attention. This will merit further elaboration in the body of the research; but it is of crucial importance that we capture its unqualified emphasis on the general well being of all, and the development of human resources.

Prior to independence, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau like many African countries also depended on the colonial capitalist approach for their strategy of national development and have ever since then adopted the new United Nations approach. Thus the Unified Approach to national development wholly or in part has since independence been incorporated to the theoretical foundation of national development in the new revolutionary African states of Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, and has continually informed their development ideology. If the foremost concern of contemporary African nations is that of accomplishing increased productivity in all sectors of the national economy, improved agricultural technology, industrialization, improved social amenities, equitable

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7Ibid. Draft resolution II.
distribution of income and the national wealth, and improving the conditions of the masses; and if its foremost problem is that of finding how its strategy of national development and planning ought to be conducted to achieve these goals, how does the Unified Approach serve as a dependable and prescriptive theory in accomplishing these objectives? What has been the nature and content of national development in these revolutionary African states of Mozambique and Guinea Bissau? How do their experiences and progress provide the way out of the problematic of development engulfing the continent of Africa? To what extent does the Unified Approach to national development and planning as practiced in the newly independent countries address the plight and problems of the masses? How appropriate is the Unified Approach to development as an adequate and efficacious model of development compatible with the aspirations and needs of the people of Africa? If the maintenance of post-colonial linkages, as commonly held is synonymous with the "underdevelopment" of Africa, to what extent can the Unified Approach pave the way for a gradual attainment of self-reliance? What is the nature and posture of national development strategy currently in practice in both Mozambique and Guinea Bissau? Answers to these questions and others are provided in the body of the research.
Statement of the Problem

The major concern of this study is to explore the design and content of national development in these two countries using the Unified Approach.

That the contemporary conditions of the masses of peoples of Africa are to a great extent predicated on a complete absence of an appropriate and dependable strategy of national development and the liquidation of post-colonial linkages, is an unchallenged contention recognized by most students of African political economy.

From a historical perspective, it is clear that the end of the 1950's and beyond witnessed the political ascendancy of the hitherto subjugated populations in many colonial outposts, that finally culminated in the consolidation of national independence for many African countries. Taken as a whole, the new political leadership was essentially an alliance between the elite and petty bourgeoisie of the former colonial social formations, easily distinguished by their higher educational attainment and/or their wealth, a particular reference being made here to the commercial or merchantilist fraction of the petty bourgeoisie. Their actual power was based not on the ownership of the means of production, but rather on their association. Hence, they were therefore appendages of the metropoles. As a consequence, they were a privileged class among the masses of their various countries; thus, the national development strategy reflected their class consciousness and was calculated at protecting their interests as a privileged class. Independence, subsequently has proven to be a curse rather than a blessing to the masses.
But political leaders in these two revolutionary states, Guinea Bissau and Mozambique, whose role as a "class" assumed a different definition in the context of the struggle have adopted the Unified Approach to national development as their guiding light, despite its severe political implications as we shall soon examine in the next chapter. To what extent does this strategy of development address itself to the general aspirations and needs of the masses in these national settings? How does the Unified Approach serve as a genuine gestation of a drive towards national mobilization and self-reliance? In what ways do the design and content of the national development process in these states minimize the severity of the problems of the masses in the African context? These will be further elaborated in the research.

Definition of Concepts

National Development

By this one means, all efforts on the part of a constituted national government calculated at improving the general welfare of all its citizens. It embraces social, political, economic, and ideological implications. Its economic objectives include among others: better and more jobs for its citizens, improved economic opportunities and agricultural technology, industrialization, high productivity, equitable distribution of income and the national wealth, proper economic integration, the political consciousness and mobilization of its citizens, and a full development of its human resources. Socio-ideological outcroppings of national development focus on such things as education, food, health and housing, self-esteem, and self-reliance.
Following a characterization by processes, J.P. Renninger maintains that national development includes, "increasing productivity, the equitable distribution of realized gains among all social, economic, and geographical groups, and the building of appropriate political, economic, and social structures".  

National development in this context includes a full development of the human potential of all strata of the national population. There is also a concomitant stress on self-reliance; a methodological approach to development that lays emphasis on the development of the resources of developing nations themselves in meeting most of their needs to the extent possible.

In other words, national development is conceived not as the increase of aggregate quantities, like the "illusory GNP", but as growth and change in the pattern of complex social, political, ideological, and economic factors, all calculated at improving the general conditions of the population as a whole.

**Unified Approach to Development**

Only a compressed definition would be presented here as a full elaboration is delineated in the second chapter of the research. This is a model for development adopted by the United Nations in the seventies, in full view of the shortcomings of the national development models in the African political landscape. It emphasizes an approach to national

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development that must include the full participation and mobilization of the population at all levels, national as well as local; a constant and steady improvement in the material and spiritual well-being of all members of society, improvement in their living and working conditions, and a comprehensive development of education, health and culture on the basis of dynamic and well balanced economic growth.9 It emphasizes an equitable distribution of income and wealth, the realization of far-reaching and socio-economic changes, including industrialization and the development of the state sector in industry, progressive agrarian reforms and cooperation in agriculture, etc.10 The Unified Approach maintains that any national development strategy must include a committed effort to satisfy the basic needs of the masses. Basic needs is defined to include food, shelter, clothing, and right of access to essential public services.11 These in turn are related to a series of policies - income distribution, rural development, employment creation, popular participation, etc., designed to be of immediate benefit to the deprived poor. Crucial in the Unified Approach, is a high priority over the development of the human potential.

Revolutionary African States

There are many African states that have been associated with this term, for example, Algeria, Angola, Zimbabwe and others. However, this

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10 Ibid., p. 41.
definition is exclusively conceived to refer specifically to the two African states of Mozambique and Guinea Bissau who have not only come to power through organized revolutionary violence, but who have since then embarked on a radical social transformation of their respective societies. This transformation has generated drastic changes in the socio-political relations, identifiable by the "class relationship in that change."\textsuperscript{11} It is one in which the masses and their vanguard have become the main actors on the scene.

Post Colonial Linkages

These are essentially those residual colonial interconnections in the social, economic, political, and ideological context among independent African states, that overtly or covertly tend to exacerbate or sustain neo-colonialism, dependency, and underdevelopment.


Significance of the Study

More than at any other time, the continent of Africa at this moment is engaged in a search for an adequate and dependable strategy of national development. In light of the blunders and repeated blunders in the African development ventures, any significant contribution would not only be of great theoretical value, but also a welcome blessing.

The national development formulations by the alliance of legions of expatriate development strategists from the metropoles and a pool of "homemade" experts, has unfortunately led to the consolidation of the dictatorship of the petty bourgeoisie in Africa, and to the impoverishment of the masses.

This study is an attempt to address the problems engendered by the current conditions in Africa. A study of the ongoing experience in the revolutionary states of Mozambique and Guinea Bissau may turn out to be a major value to other African countries. Since Africa is seriously handicapped by the absence of a good strategy of national development, to what extent does the experience in the revolutionary states help fill this vacuum? The answer to this question is a major concern of this inquiry. The need for such an analysis can be easily ascertained in light of the excessive lament over national development and planning deficiencies. The need for a better strategy is a very urgent one. Its urgency has been universally acclaimed because as Damachi and Tahal critically observed, "at no time have development strategies been subjected to more constant and critical scrutiny, nor goals and objectives, plans and priorities, so
thoroughly questioned, appraised and re-examined as they are today."\textsuperscript{13} Thus it is not presumptuous to assert that Africa's past and present development strategies offer very little as a potential guide for the future. New approaches are definitely required. Indeed, much creative research in this direction by Africanists is unquestionably needed. This research project, by critically examining the national development trends in these newly revolutionary African states, could touch on some of the trends and measures that Africa could subsequently capitalize on, vis-à-vis the whole dimensions of national development. If this research therefore serves in any small way in amplifying an alternative developmental ideology and strategy, then it would have achieved its desired purpose.

\textbf{Method of Study}

In an attempt to study the design and character of national development in the revolutionary African states of Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, we selected the exploratory approach as our main methodological tool.\textsuperscript{14} An exploratory study could be dominated by an intensive analysis of the data and information available, the use of questionnaires, or even valuable interviews.

In this study, we will resort principally to a critical analysis of the data and information available as well as useful and valuable recorded speeches and interviews. More importantly, we will critically


analyze the previous development strategies in order to better assess the achievements of the Unified Approach. Furthermore, the study would attempt to assess in both cases which, if any, is a more efficacious strategy for the enhancement of the conditions of the entire national population.

The exploratory approach we feel is an important and effective way of ferreting out information about issues of development. It becomes even more crucial when the process under investigation is new and the "terrain" generally an uncharted one. It is a valuable and dependable tool of research, because it can generate answers and results that rather approximate reality and could indeed trigger efforts for more meticulous ventures.\textsuperscript{15}

In addition, the exploratory method provides many insights to complex social issues and furnishes answers as to how these complexities could be resolved. As Earl Babbie strongly contends, "...exploratory studies are very valuable in social scientific research. They are essential whenever a researcher is breaking new ground, and they can almost always yield new insights into a topic of research."\textsuperscript{16}

Since our discussion of the national development in the revolutionary states attempts also to assess the extent to which their experiences and the Unified Approach to development serve as a prescriptive strategy of development, we would persistently contrast and compare these two countries (i.e., Guinea Bissau and Mozambique) to Nigeria and Ghana. (Special emphasis on the period of the first decade). This would only be predicated on the fact that it could serve the useful purpose of providing a vivid clarity to our position.

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., p. 85.

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., p. 86.
Working Hypotheses and Testing Procedures

The first major hypothesis of this study is that the economic dimension of national development in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau using the colonial capitalist approach was calculated at perpetuating the underdevelopment of these revolutionary African states. For instance, economic activities following this approach had led only to growth without development. In trying to determine the validity of this claim it is useful to critically examine the conceptual approach to economic development using the colonial capitalist strategy to national development, the role of the state in economic development, the nature of industrialization, and the posture and design of the agricultural sector. The assumption is that the Unified Approach to development and planning that has since the coming of independence become the theoretical foundation of national development in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau is a more efficacious strategy that could enable them to break the so-called vicious cycle of underdevelopment. This study will test the validity of the above assumption.

Secondly, within the economic dimensions of development, this study will test the claim that prior to independence, distribution of income and the national wealth in these countries were characterized by severe inequalities and a gross neglect of any effort to satisfy the basic needs of the average citizen. The study will carefully examine the mechanism of distribution and the various efforts devised to satisfy mass needs and aspirations. The assumption is that the Unified Approach as practiced in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau contains built-in mechanisms of equitable distribution of income and the national wealth, with a committed effort to satisfy the basic needs of the masses. This study will test the validity of the above assumption.
Thirdly, the study will examine the political dimensions of national development in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, prior to independence and after the empowerment of the present regimes. The importance of the political element in national development can never be overemphasized, but it is clear that following the colonial capitalist mode of production, the weapon of politics served the useful role of creating widespread divisions and political disintegration among the inhabitants of these revolutionary African states. It was calculated at controlling the politicization and consciousness of the masses in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. Our contention is that the current development strategies in these states are designed to achieve these objectives.

The fourth hypothesis of this study is that prior to the capture of the state political power education and many other social indicators of national development were essentially calculated at serving the interests of the metropoles. In other words, it was designed to strengthen the colonial linkages between Mozambique and Guinea Bissau on the one hand, and the metropoles on the other. It will therefore be necessary to examine critically the role of the elite and the class that control political power. In addition, an examination of the content and design of education, including the curricula may be very useful indeed. The assumption is that the current approach to development in these two states leads towards a better quality of life. This study intends to test the validity of the above assumption.

Finally, I shall test the basic assumption that the weapon of ideology, so crucial to development was, prior to the capture of state power, calculated only at achieving dependence on the metropoles and hence, stagnating development in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. The
assumption here is that the Unified Approach to development and planning significantly points towards the importance of self-reliance as a motive force of development.

Data Collection and Analysis

An exhaustive use of historical materials, newspapers, magazine reports, scholarly journals, government statistics, United Nations publications on Africa, and other works that are of relevance to our study, will be attempted.

The bulk of the data for this study will be seriously scrutinized and a serious effort will be made to decipher the information at hand. Any attempt to assess the utility of the Unified Approach to national development and planning would be extremely useful, given the importance and urgency of the problem in the African context.

Our purpose in these analyses will rather be geared towards gathering additional information about the character and design of the current national development strategy in Guinea Bissau and Mozambique in the social, ideological, political, and economic components. Most importantly, we will particularly seek to identify its success in relation to the theoretical postulation of the United Nations Unified Approach to national development.

Our study, therefore, will focus on the broad issues of development specified by the United Nations in the Unified Approach. It will examine how these countries have performed in the following characterizations:
Agriculture;
Industrialization;
Distribution of national wealth;
Structure and distribution of power;
Mass participation;
Human resource development and ideology;
Health and housing;
Education and
Self-reliance.

In short, our study centers on an examination of these crucial issues in these two countries. However, as a beginning point, it is important to overview some significant theoretical questions related to national development.
CHAPTER II

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND PLANNING: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS

An assessment of national development and planning in the revolutionary African states could begin with a critical examination of some of the basic synthetic theoretical postulations that have wholly or in part, dominated the African development process and that will serve as a guide to our study.

It is important at this juncture to note that there is virtually no consensus among theorists regarding the whole notion of national development strategy. Nevertheless, from a methodological and conceptual standpoint, two schools of thought could be distinguished. In an attempt to circumvent other semantical entanglements, we have appropriately divided these two schools of thought into the colonial capitalist and Radical/Africanist.17

17 The colonial capitalist approach is a distorted version of Western capitalism drawn from the theoretical postulations of many development economists of the metropoles and applied at will to the former colonies. It could be noted that an important distinguishing characteristic of the colonial capitalist theorists is that their strategy of national development flows directly from a capitalist worldview. Many of the theorists that we shall consider are essentially those whose strategy, in part, as a whole, or combinations of many, have been incorporated into the national development strategies of African nations. They include: J.A. Schumpeter, W.W. Rostow, W. Arthur Lewis, R.F. Harrod, E.D. Domar, B. Higgins, and others. There are also varying options even within the same schools of thought with regard to development strategies. On the other hand, the Radical/Africanist school base their worldviews on a Marxist interpretations. They include: Samir Amin, A.G. Frank, Clive Thomas, Walter Rodney, Immanual Wallerstein, Claude Ake, Paul Baran, and others.
General Characteristics of the Theoretical Frameworks

The general framework of the Radical/Africanist school is founded on a unique and materialist interpretation, that attempts to explain the genesis and causes of underdevelopment in Africa\textsuperscript{18} from a dialectical approach. This school of thought unequivocally denounces the mysticism of the theoretical postulation of the colonial capitalist school, which in their view was calculated at serving the interests of imperialist powers. As Claude Ake summarized it in one of his works, the Radical/Africanist school depends on a method of analysis based on "dialectical materialism" and one which gives "primacy to material conditions".\textsuperscript{19}

They maintain that the colonial capitalist mode of production in the context of Africa is not only a conspiracy designed to perpetuate neo-colonialism and dependency, but one that also fuels and sustains post-colonial linkages. From this conceptual framework, the Radical/Africanist school maintains that such developmental percepts are highly inimical to African development objectives. Thus, the basic concept of development from the Radical/Africanist school, generally implies a rejection of existing power relations that bare directly on development, between the "haves" and the "have nots", classes, as well as nations. Therefore, a reordering of these relationships in favor of the "have nots", and a different configuration of institutions, economic and social structures becomes an important goal.

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\textsuperscript{18} For a detail view of this question, see among others; Samir Amin, The Law of Value and Historical Materialism, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978; Samir Amin, Class and Nation, Chapter 1; Samir Amin, Unequal Development; Claude Ake, A Political Economy of Africa, (1981).

Central to the colonial capitalist general framework, vis-a-vis the process of development, is the primacy of economics and as a corollary, the unqualified reliance on foreign aid and ventures. Economic growth and development are considered perfect euphemisms of national development, while Gross National Product (GNP) is viewed as the indicator and measurer of modernity and national progress. Hence, from the colonial capitalist perspective, national development could only best be interpreted as economics.

According to Folker Frobel et. al. in "The Internationalization of Capital", there is firm belief that development goals would be better achieved if individual economic units act in an optimal way within perfect markets. State intervention, therefore, according to the colonial capitalist approach should be avoided, unless such intervention is necessary to guarantee the conditions of perfect competition; that is, the perfect functioning of the market.  

In addition, the colonial capitalist school upholds the general notion of the existence of a unique path to development which all countries were obliged to follow at all times, beginning from the process of "primitive, traditional, agricultural, low productivity economy, through a set of development stages as those of the capitalist nations of Western Europe and North America." These are also often accompanied by a strong normative commitment to a set of ideas about development that entails movements toward

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\(^{21}\) Ibid., p. 10.
Western democratic systems. In brief, colonial capitalist framework considers development to be gradual and an ongoing process, and often viewed as generally occurring in a relatively smooth and continuous fashion. By extension, and closely related to this ideology of development as a gradual phenomenon, is the view that it is also harmonious, reinforcing and cumulative. Development is also conceived as equally beneficial to all major income groupings in a nation. The falsity of this claim is tested by the impoverished conditions of the African masses. In conclusion therefore, it is our view that an approach to development from the colonial capitalist frame of reference, lacks the grandeur of the Radical/Africanist school of thought from the vantage point of the historical causation factors of African underdevelopment.

Foundations of Colonial Capitalist Strategy

The colonial capitalist approach is a distorted version of Western capitalism drawn from the theories of many development economists of metropolitan countries. A few of these theories will be examined.

Schumpeter is correctly considered an important theorist of national development from this school of thought. His primary conceptual

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strategy of development is well presented in his, Theory of Economic Development, which in our view, is an elaborate analysis of a capitalist development strategy. A more detailed and thorough projection of his view on development which earned him considerable respect among eminent development economists of his days, is contained in his Business Cycles. What then precisely was the backbone of Schumpeter's strategy of development?

In brief, the Schumpeterian approach to development rejects the characterization of development as a gradual harmonious process and rather places great importance on the significant role of the innovator or entrepreneur in development. The innovator as the central figure in the development process is seen essentially as the one who combines the various factors of production for development. In other words, the entrepreneur's activities triggers development, which in turn activates other forces, causing a general spread effect that touches on every important aspect of the country. The nature of this entrepreneurial function reveals the dynamic nature of Schumpeter's conception of development.

According to Gerald M. Meier and Robert E. Baldwin, these functions and/or spread effects include: (1) the introduction of new goods; (2) the use of a new method of production; (3) the opening of a new market;

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24 Ibid., p. 45.
(4) the conquest of new sources of raw material supply; and (5) the reorganization of any industry. Thus, according to Schumpeter, national development could be better realized by the highly motivated and talented role of the entrepreneur, which he considers much beyond ordinary managerial activity. In the same line of thought, Meier and Baldwin state that

the entrepreneur's motivation for profits (the measure of his success) is based...not merely on the desire to raise his consumption standard but also on such non-hedonistic goals as the desire to found a private dynasty, the will to conquer in the competitive battle, and the joy of creating "and developing the nation".28

An obvious question of crucial importance is therefore that, given a society in which there exist a proliferation of entrepreneurs, how can such entrepreneurship spark the process of national development? Schumpeter's answer in our view is virtually an over simplification.29 He assumes as a starting point a purely competitive economy in a stationary state; that is, a situation where there is neither net investment nor population growth, and the prevalence of full employment. In addition, there are great opportunities for new combinations of production inputs. According to Schumpeter, entrepreneurs should recognize these profit opportunities and prepare to exploit them. To secure the necessary resources for the venture, entrepreneurs should form credit-creating banks and "raid


29 The most precise account of this answer is found in J.A. Schumpeter, Business Cycles, Chapter 4.
Higgins has rightfully dismissed Schumpeter's development strategy because it "has large elements of tautology in it, therefore, it makes it difficult to test empirically and...it is not set up as a refutable hypothesis".33

In addition, even Schumpeter's assumption that innovation euphemistically substituted for development is financed from credit-creating banks is highly questionable. For his part, C. Solo insisted in his "Innovation in the Capitalist Process: A Critique of the Schumpeterian Theory", that innovation was merely a normal part of business activity and not development.34

Examined from the perspective of Africa and other developing nations, the Schumpeterian strategy of development through the innovative ventures of the entrepreneur, carries with it a tinge of profound nonsense. Even if it existed, how could it possibly stand up to the condition of intense competition from developed countries? Our views about such a developmental thrust conforms with those of Dr. Emanuel Okwuosa, who had suggested in his New Directions for Economic Development in Africa,(1976), that "its effects will be limited and its ascribed dynamism lessened".35 Thus, when this strategy is critically applied to Africa and other less developed countries, one can quickly notice that it does not fit. In Schumpeter's model, the generating force of development is provided by the entrepreneur, the process is innovation and the goal in our view is not development, but


the circular flow".  

Thus, with this entrepreneurial initiative, a variety of activities are released to the maximum, initiating national development that in turn permeate all sectors of the national economy.

As a summation, the crucial variables in Schumpeter's strategy of development are innovators or entrepreneurs. They are considered important initiators of significant advances in development not necessary by a smooth and continuous process, but by a disharmonious process, "characterized by cyclical swings".

The brief summation above next brings us to an appraisal of the Schumpeterian development strategy. From a general perspective, as we have already noted Schumpeter's concentration lies in the process of innovation as initiated by entrepreneurs. Without any doubt, it is clear that within the context of the historical development of capitalism, his analysis of entrepreneurial innovation as an important phenomenon in development is a highly useful one. However, at the contemporary epoch, there is a recognizable change with regard to the whole process of development. In the past, it is highly acknowledged that many innovational efforts were undertaken by either the innovators themselves, or by the purchase of such rights.  

Today however, it is no longer disputable to claim that the joint act of invention and innovation are frequently undertaken by large corporations, in a continuous and calculable manner without the identification of a single entrepreneur.

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31 Ibid., p. 90.

wealth and power. Popular living stands are not the goals, nor are they likely results.

That Schumpeter's strategy of development does not address itself adequately to the development objectives of Africa and less developed countries is fairly obvious. The entrepreneur is not the main driving force, innovation not the most characteristic process, and private enrichment is not the dominant goal.\(^{36}\) Unlike Schumpeter's postulation, to a greater or lesser extent, the government in African countries is the most conspicuous and dominant agent of development with higher living standards for its population the "proclaimed" goal.

To deny that the entrepreneur could not be the major driving force in the development of Africa and other less developed countries is obvious. In many African countries, weighted heavily by the pressure of revolution and other social, political, and economic forces, where they prevail, they are hardly the heroes of Schumpeter's characterization. As a matter of fact, even if the entrepreneur is considered as a by-product of development in Africa, he is one that could be tolerated only as long as he is useful; one that must be continually watched and curbed because of his greed and selfish propensities. As a final frontal attack on the Schumpeterian strategy, one could rightfully pose the question: What about instances where the presence of the so-called entrepreneurial group, as is typical of many African countries, consists of an exploiting group: Western imperialist dotted all over the African continent, Indians, Ibos in many West African countries? Or even Asians in Obote's Uganda, Jews in

Libya in the 60's, or even Hindus in Bengal. Could they be relied upon to develop their various countries of residence? In good respects therefore, the Schumpeterian strategy of development in the context of Africa, is one that purports the development of nothing, and one that should be layed to rest for its irrelevance.

Other authorities that could be jointly identified with this school of thought are Harrod F. and Domar E.\textsuperscript{37} The Harrod-Domar strategy of development has formed the basis of development in many African and less developed countries. In a nutshell, it is a development strategy based on a "steady growth in conditions under which investment responds readily to capital formation or availability, employing idle labor to achieve full employment".\textsuperscript{38} Like many of these scholars who see the process of development as growth in real national income, Harrod and Domar are preoccupied with determining the conditions for smooth uninterrupted growth.


In their view therefore, capital accumulation is the most crucial variable in the development process.

In an attempt to summarize the Harrod-Domar development strategy based on national income, Professors Gerald M. Meier and Robert Baldwin jointly have this to say:

assuming initially a full employment equilibrium level of income, the maintenance of this equilibrium year after year requires that the volume of spending generated by investment must be sufficient to absorb the increased output made possible by investment. But if the marginal propensity to save is given, then the more capital is accumulated, and the higher national income already is, the greater must be the absolute volume of net investment. Therefore, if full employment is to be maintained, the absolute amount of net investment must never expand. This in turn, requires continuous growth in real national income.39

As a summation, the Harrod-Domar development strategy maintains that development could be more achieved if investment is made the primacy of growth and development because of the special role capital plays in development. Increased capital investment which is increasingly constant, is considered the main force responsible for employment possibilities and other activities that generate and sustain development.

It is clear that the validity of the Harrod-Domar strategy depends on crucial assumptions that attest to its accuracy or weakness as a strategy of development. The strategy is particularly weak to assume that important variables as the propensity to save and capital output is a constancy, whereas they could change on the long run. Moreover, as L.B. Yeager has noted, if the assumption of fixed proportions in production is


For additional views see for example, Gerald M. Meier, "The Problem of Limited Economic Development" in Agarwala and Singh, op.cit., pp. 54-74.
abandoned, and labor can be substituted for capital, then the requirement for steady growth does not appear rigid;\textsuperscript{40} nor does the model even address the effect of price changes on growth or development from the point of view of the theory.

In the context of Africa and many developing countries, the irrelevance of this approach to development could best be revealed by first summarizing the basic characteristics of these countries. Many African and less developed countries as we know are characterized by low per capita income and consequently very low savings. They have severe unemployment rates, narrow output ranges, basically confined to raw materials and agricultural products; the level of technology is extremely low and its corollary, a deficiency of entrepreneurial and managerial skills.\textsuperscript{41} According to the Harrod-Domar approach to development, an increase in capital output should be undertaken as rapidly as possible. But in many African countries there is virtually an absence of a continual flow of capital envisaged by Harrod and Domar, due to low technology and income to ensure a complete emergence of the economy. As a matter of fact, a paradoxical situation could even be triggered in an effort to substitute capital for labor, thus causing severe unemployment in African countries. Furthermore, the average propensity to save is central to the Harrod-Domar strategy of development. The implication is that rich persons would save a great part of their income which in turn could be used to generate capital; hence the average propensity to save is a constancy. However, in Africa

\textsuperscript{40}For additional criticism of this approach, see L.B. Yeager, "Some Questions About Growth Economics", American Economic Review, XLIV, 53-63, (1937)

\textsuperscript{41}Summarized from Henry J. Burton, "Growth Models and Underdeveloped Economies", in op. cit. Agarwala and Singh., pp. 221-241.
where there is virtual absence of a "real capital" owning class, highest individual incomes seem to come from land and house rents, or other commercial merchantile engagements. To crown it all, these individuals do not invest their excess incomes, in our view, in the acquisition of productive capital equipment, but rather indulge in "speculative housing projects - frequently of a luxury type - or conspicuous consumptions". 42

Thus, this approach to development in the context of Africa should be dismissed and laid to rest, because of the unique conditions engulfing African and other developing countries. There, as Okwuosa reiterates, "investment is not readily undertaken in response to capital supply and investment does not absorb much labor. Instead much of the generated income leaks out of the economy in the form of amortization, interest payment and loan repayment. The theory is therefore not relevant to developing countries". 43

Another important theorist that has played a significant role in fashioning a colonial capitalist development strategy for Africa is W. Arthur Lewis. Unlike many others of this group, Arthur Lewis received a special accommodation as an accomplished scholar of development from Ghanaians, fueled by his racial affinity. From this vantage point, Arthur Lewis became the strategic definer of Ghana's development objectives in the Nkrumah era. His success or failure could be well perceived by the state of the Ghanian social, economic, and ideological conditions at the end of the Nkrumah era.

Professor Arthur Lewis's strategy of development is well illustrated

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42 Ibid., p.231.
in several of his works especially: *The Theory of Economic Growth* (1955); *Economic Development With Unlimited Supplies of Labor*, (1954); *Development Planning*, (1966); *Some Aspects of Economic Development*, (1969) and others. Our presentation here is essentially a compressed view of his theoretical postulation. Professor Lewis without delay defines the purpose of his deliberations in *The Theory of Economic Growth*, which he said was to "provide an appropriate framework for studying economic development", and concomitantly, for the purpose of intellectual curiosity and enlightening policymakers. From his framework and conceptual schemes, it is clear that Professor Lewis distinguishes between "proximate" and "remote" causes of growth and development. Proximate causes include, the effort to economize, the increase in knowledge and its application, and the increase of capital and other resources per head. Remote causes include, psychological, religious, political, and other institutional factors.

Lewis strategy of development is seen as the absorption of a stagnant subsistence sector whose opportunity cost of labor is negligible. Thus in his view, transfer of labor from the subsistence to the capitalist sectors results in increased output that would eventually trigger overall development. In his approach, the economic system is made up of two distinct sectors - the capitalist and the subsistence. The capitalist sectors, private or state owned include: manufacturing industry, agriculture, and other forms of organized activity. Items such as capital, income and

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45 Ibid., p. 11.

wages, the volume of savings and the degree of technical progress are very high in the agenda of this sector. The subsistence sector on the other hand, is at a very low level, almost stagnant, with negligible investments and technical progress. According to Professor Lewis, development comes about mainly from an increase in the transfer of labor from the subsistence to the capitalist. Consequently, the holiest duty of all African governments and planners of national development must be that of accumulating capital. This means therefore, that the ultimate process of development is initiated and sustained by an increase in the share of the capitalist at the expense of the subsistence sectors even if that means depending on foreign assistance.

The theoretical postulation of Professor Lewis raises several theoretical questions that call for our urgent appraisal. As a starting point, Professor Lewis distinction between the two sectors is too arbitrary. Aside from the fact that small scale agriculture is not stagnant, the emergence of a cash crop economy in many African countries, however short of expectations, has in our view contributed to "development" and in some instance resulted in local capital acquisition that cannot be totally neglected. His illustrative example of stressing the rapid growth of the British economy during the industrial revolution, found throughout his works, is very misleading. In our view, the Professor is totally blind to the fact that by the end of the industrial revolution, Britain had had several centuries of stable growth accompanied virtually by a steady government, with substantial accumulation of skills and capital. In addition, Britain had a firm money economy which was not the case in medieval Africa.47

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47 Eisenstadt, op. cit. Chapter 2, pp. 48-82.
Professor Lewis purportedly showed little concern for valuation, measurement and definition. Although he makes one or two passing statements on the question of measurement and national income, "so that pendantic reviewers shall not be able to say that we are not aware of them". Such an excuse in our view, is not only a gross neglect, but one that weakens his theory greatly. Output as a heterogenous collection of commodities, is meaningless except in the context of a system of valuation, and consequently, to disregard this does a lot of harm to his argument.

Professor Arthur Lewis claims that much of the small volume of savings in the agricultural sector does not result in increased capital formation because it is used to purchase additional land seems mistaken. Nor is it sensible to hold that the volume of savings and investment by agriculturists is negligible.

Aside from a gross disregard for the agricultural sector, this strategy is unhelpful on much wider grounds. It is not clear to us whether the author means that a greater rate of capital acquisition is essentially a characteristic of a more developed economy, or that a greater rate of capital acquisition is one important condition of development with say, technology and skill; or whether it is a casual factor or even an independent variable. Nor is it helpful to consider the rate of capital acquisition as the only principal determinant of development. Lewis strategy fails in its principal purpose, especially its purpose as a basis for policy on development. The failure of


Professor Lewis strategy of development is attested by the critical observation of Bob Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer on the main testing ground of this strategy - Ghana.

Pre - 1961 Ghana had been guided by a development strategy formulated by W. Arthur Lewis. This strategy which emphasized total dependence on foreign capital to industrialize the country, brought nearly complete disaster. During the "Lewis era", Ghana experienced rapid deterioration of her balance of payments position, loss of huge amounts of external reserves, and failure to attract anywhere near the amount of foreign capital which Lewis counted on to assure Ghana's industrial future.50

Another development strategy that influenced the colonial capitalist approach is the Fei and Ranis model.51 The Fei and Ranis strategy of development is rather less significant in importance and magnitude. It's basis is the theoretical foundation of the theory of economic development formulated by Arthur Lewis.52 It assumes an unlimited supply of labor in the agricultural sector which could be withdrawn to swell the industrial sector as capital increases. The rate of withdrawal is based on the accumulation of capital in the industrial sector. Unlike the Lewis model,53 Fei and Ranis strategy do not completely disregard the agricultural sector. It recognizes the contribution to development that

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could come from the agricultural sector. Thus according to this strategy, national development could be much more realized by investment in the capital sector as well as the agricultural sector, creating an agricultural surplus that could trigger and sustain economic development.

Even a subsequent modification of this approach to development as attempted by Jorgenson, does not in any way strengthen its case as an efficacious model by many development theorists, and should not delay us here. 54

Benjamin Higgins is another important scholar of this school of thought. His strategy of development is pretty well presented in his volume Economic Development: Problems, Principles, and Policy (1982). 55

This book discusses a wide range of topics, but its central focus is with development problems in underdeveloped countries. The main themes and their corollaries are clearly distinct. He sees the lack of development in Africa and other less developed areas emanating from the vicious cycle of poverty and stagnation, which in turn stems from the absence of savings due to low income, that precludes the purchase of capital goods. His suggestion for development, therefore, focuses on the need for African countries to mobilize monetary savings, and by consequence, approves of a proliferation of savings


and credit institutions. Since in his view Africa and many underdeveloped countries are presently afflicted by a chronic scarcity of foreign exchange and persistent balance of payment difficulties, Professor Higgins suggests state control of external trade and a restructuring of development priorities in planning, as necessary ingredients of development.

In our view, this and other suggestions of Higgins vis-a-vis development in the African context, is comparable with the literature on development represented in the writings of Rostow, Singer, and many others which we vehemently reject. Furthermore, the central part of his book represents only a fair and convenient summary of the major current ideas on national development, which in our contention, only serves the useful purpose of introduction to the literature on development.

His constant reference to Britain does not rescue the fact that Africa and other underdeveloped countries at the contemporary epoch, face much more difficulties in development than the developed countries in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Professor Higgins does not generally make clear what Africa and other less developed countries should particularly do to accomplish their development objectives. Nor is it clear whether such development need be confined only to the economic parameter, to the neglect of other social, political, and ideological aspects of development, despite his call for a "comprehensive development planning".

In addition, it is not clear why the substitution of government direction for "market direction" of economic activity should necessarily promote the most effective deployment of resources, or serve to accelerate

\[56\text{Ibid., pp. 485-487 (summarized by author).}\]
"their growth". There is no general a priori reason that this should be so. The author sets out a number of equations which embody some macroeconomic variables. He calls them planning equations and suggests that their use would enable the government to promote development. But at best they simply consist of formal statements of optimum conditions and not propositions with substantiative content. Failure to address all these, is a major shortcoming of Higgins strategy of development; barren of any theoretical utility in the African context, and useful only as a convenient and introductory textbook on the current literature of development.

The final development theorist that we shall examine is W.W. Rostow. Rostow's strategy of development is indeed a special case, because it caught up with the aspirations of many African and Third World countries who had been searching for a strategy of development soon after independence. His ideas of the "take-off to self-sustained growth", perfectly fitted the views and expectations of these countries. Its influence was well captured by the distinguished African intellectual, Basil Davidson in Can Africa Survive? Arguments Against Growth Without Development.

57 Ibid., pp. 209-212.

Davidson pointedly states that experts and advisers in newly independent countries; teachers of economics in new established business schools endowed by the United States or other foundations, makers of policy and assorted political prophets, whether inside Africa or not. It ideologized, often brilliantly what was otherwise a habit of thought, a nexus of assumptions, a general approach. It defined where the ex-colonies ought to be going and how they ought to get there.

Rostow himself seems to characterize his whole developmental thrust in the following words;

This book presents an economic historian's way of generalizing the sweep of modern history. The forms of this generalization is a set of stages of growth. I have come gradually to view that it is possible and, for certain limited purposes, it is useful to break down the study of each national economy... according to this set of stages. They constitute, in the end ...a theory about economic growth.  

In The Process of Economic Growth, Rostow holds that the process of economic development passes through five distinctive stages; the traditional society, the pre-conditions for take-off, the drive to maturity, and finally, the age of high mass consumption. Briefly, the traditional society operates within limited production functions because


62 ________, The Process of Economic Growth, (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1954), p. 4. Also see an important article by W. W. Rostow, "The Take-Off Into Self-Sustained Growth," Angarwala and Singh, op.cit., pp. 154-186. Note also that because of the weakness of his arguments, Rostow have been criticized by many well known economists and political scientist. These include among others Simon Kuznets and Basil Davidson. Also see the preceding of the International Economic Association Conference at Koustaniz (1960).
its central feature is the ceiling on the level of attainable output per head? This in turn is followed by a period of transition when the traditional society undergoes a transformation that would enable it...exploit the fruits of modern society...and thus enjoy the blessings and choices opened up by the march of compound interest.\(^{63}\)

After this, follows the take-off, "the great watershed in the life of modern societies...when the old blocks and the resistance to steady growth are finally overcome...growth becomes its normal condition."\(^{64}\) Finally, the take-off is again followed by a thrust towards maturity and its eventual attainment. Professor Rostow maintained in subsequent writings, for example, The Economics of Take-Off Into Self-Sustained Growth,\(^{65}\) that industrialization and development could rightfully be seen as a gradual application of modern science and technology to the economy.

Stripped of all its rhetoric and confined to the African experience, Rostow's theoretical postulation seems to be this: In the process of development every society must pass through several stages as exemplified in the case of Western countries. In other words, African countries must undergo the same path of development as Western countries. By extension, economic "aid" to Africa and other underdeveloped areas should be increased on "humanitarian" grounds and of course political expediency, to accelerate development. Thus, governments in Africa and less developed areas should fashion their development plans in accordance with the past stages of the Western world in the development process.

\(^{63}\)Ibid., p. 6.

\(^{64}\)Ibid., p. 7.

One obvious question that easily comes to mind is, how satisfactory is the explanation of this process of stages that claim to offer a general theory of development? Rostow offers no criteria both from the definition and dating of the stages of growth. In other words, these stages are not defined in terms of a clear cut or specific cultural, scientific, material, or even technical attainment. Such a deficiency creates a potential vacuum that in our view, could only be interpreted as a historical classification based on self will. The need of distinguishing the appearance of pre-conditions for "take-off" in other countries, is left deliberately unaddressed and thus poses a conspicuous conceptual complication. Besides, growth that is as he illuminatingly put it, "self-sustaining growth", can never be self-sustaining in the sense of a continuum even under the best of institutions, pursuing the best of suitable policies.

It seems to us that Rostow's struggle to present his analysis from the point of view of the evolutionary outgrowth of his five stages, mocks very severely, Karl Marx's theory of modern history, especially when the accompanying title, A Non Communist Manifesto, is appropriately isolated and scrutinized. Stages approach to development in our assessment is misleading when it subscribes to a linear concept of history with severe implications that all societies must pass through the same stages. Stages approach ignore the bulk of human history and distorts the dialectical relationship of development and underdevelopment. As Basil Davidson points out;

To argue that Africans were underdeveloped or undeveloped peoples was tantamount to saying that they had no history of their own; whereas, in fact, it lies beyond any serious question that they were in no way undeveloped or underdeveloped in terms of their own frameworks. On the
contrary they had developed their societies from Stone Age simplicity to Iron Age complexity...if these peoples were underdeveloped or... undeveloped in 1960, this could only be in terms of the quite different history of quite different peoples.  

To contend that every economy must always pursue the same course of development with a common past and future, is to oversimplify the complexity of the phenomenon of development. It is not polemical to say that countries may attain later "stages of development" without passing through stipulated earlier stages, because stages could not only be skipped, but also because the existence of a diversity of economies, precludes in our judgement, the sequential evolution of one to another. Such sequential evolution in Rostow's strategy can only be dismissed as blurred, given the proven fact that these same stages are emphatically not mutually exclusive. To crown it all, it could be considered an erroneous concept grounded on the illusion of a "succession of strategic choices" that must confront nations as they surge forward in the development process.

Completely disillusioned in the grip of confusion sparked by the Rostowian strategy, Professor Simon Kuznets remarked that

given the fuzziness in the limiting of the take-off stage and in formulation of its distinctive characteristics; given the distinctiveness only in the statistical level of the rate of productive investment, (and the implicit rate of growth), there is no solid ground upon which to discuss Prof. Rostow's view of the analytical relation between the take-off stage and the preceding and succeeding stages.  

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As a summation, it is interesting to remember that Rostow's account of development especially after the "take-off", concern in its entirety, the very areas of the world, that is much of today's underdeveloped countries, that were historically already ahead of the rest of the world at the very stage of analysis that Rostow's analysis begins. Secondly, his notion of policy proposals of development reflects the contention that differences in levels of development could be eliminated in a short time through the resort to such simple proposals as policies. Indeed, it is deceivingly an oversimplification. Furthermore, Rostow's views are unsubstantiated and clash severely with historical and contemporary evidence. Besides, it is highly improbable to think that all societies can arrive at the same level and path of development as postulated by Professor Rostow, regardless of national resources, historical experience, political, social, and ideological customs and institutions. The irrelevance and shortcomings of his concepts stem from his inability to comprehend these crucial issues in development. His theory as a dependable strategy of development for use in the African context, cannot be accepted or taken seriously.

General Critique of the Theoretical Foundation of the Colonial Capitalist Strategy

From the general literature on the foundation of the colonial capitalist development we have been able to identify certain critical deficiencies. Firstly, the problem of development is often loosely defined and rigor is frequently completely absent with regard to the variables considered. As a consequence, there is therefore, the imposition of restrictive assumptions that set definite and specific boundaries to the solution of development. This is not to challenge the
semantic supremacy of economists in national development, but in the absence of an acceptable general framework much of the discussion has taken place in a "virtual theoretical vacuum" and often unsatisfactory logically or practically.

It is clear that large amounts of theoretical works on development are based on the experience of the more developed nations, while for the less developed countries, available materials has the disadvantage that they are written by scholars whose worldview and aims clash violently with the aspirations and objectives of African and other less developed countries. Granted that theory must be objective, this strategy must remain suspect, unless these scholars can identify themselves with the goals and aspirations of African peoples.

Perhaps a major weakness of this approach stems from its assumptions juxtaposed with the conditions of Africa. Such an approach to development is obviously open to the criticism of being narrow or irrelevant to the African experience. Furthermore, it minimizes the significance for development of changes in such unmeasurable and non-economic variables as the degree of political stability, social classes, and the attitudes of the population.

In addition, by assuming that the process of development operates in a gradual fashion, it implies the existence of an environment where a degree of certainty is not questionable and careful rational calculation

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69 For additional views, see op. cit. Wallich, p. 189.
becomes permanently feasible. The inadequacy of this view in the African context cannot be contested. How correct is the contention that development is harmoniously beneficial to all sectors and demographic groups of a nation? The falsity of this claim is proven by the conditions of the African masses. Okwuosa summarized his views in this way, "the common characteristics of all these theories is their incompleteness either in their formulation or their applicability for all time. None of them fully or adequately explains the causes of the observed economic phenomenon". 70 Such a disappointment also compelled Joan Robinson to conclude that "the best course is just to leave all these awkward problems alone." As a summation therefore, we noticed that these strategies do not provide adequate answers for the enhancement of national development in Africa. Moreover, the basic assumptions from which many of these strategies emerge do not apply to Africa or even many other developing countries. Emphasizing this issue in particular, Professor Simon Kuznets for his part went a long way to provide some pertinent reasons why Africa and other underdevelopment areas could not be expected to follow the same development path as the now developed countries. He maintained that

(1) the present level of per capita product in the underdeveloped countries in the pre-industrial phase (well over $200 at 1952-54 prices) is much lower than it was in the now advanced countries, with the single exception of Japan;
(2) the supply of land per capita is much smaller in developing countries today than it was in the present advanced countries when they began their industrialization;
(3) agricultural productivity in developing countries today is probably lower than it was in advanced countries of the

past; (4) the inequality in the distribution is wider today than in the past, but not in a way that fosters accumulation of productive capital; (5) the social and political structure of the low income countries today is a much greater barrier than it was in the past; (6) most of the present day under-developed countries are launching development after a long period of colonial status, whereas the European countries began industrialization after long periods of political independence.72

To close our views, it is important to add that these strategies, in our view, are largely based on the mechanistic view of man, a view that holds that economic aggrandizement is the sole motivator of man. The colonial capitalist approach to national development in Africa could well be dismissed therefore as undependable, even if it paraded under the captivating banners of "take-off", "stage-off, etc. It undoubtedly minimizes the concrete situation of the African continent from which concrete solutions should emerge. Could it be contested that the current strategy of development in many African countries is the embodiment of sweeping claims and counter claims, which contend that the process of development necessarily means the adoption of a path to development compatible with Western capitalist countries; or that the unique colonial past that froze all efforts at development is considered insignificant? Such an economic interpretation of the process of development misses other important ingredients of development - social, political, ideological, and especially, the development of the human resource as productive agents.

Growth Versus Development

Growth and development are synonymously used in the literature of the colonial capitalist approach. Accordingly, the growth of every national economy is practically referred to as development, while Gross National Product (GNP) is often celebrated as the measure of modernity and development. But it is necessary to draw distinctions among these terms for the sake of clarity.

Growth in our view signifies increased output, increased inputs, and perhaps efficiency, and others. Development, on the other hand, transcends all these and also embodies changes in the structures of output, and also draws attention to changes in the functional capacity of the political, economic, and social character of the nation. By focusing only on growth in national products, it seems to us that theories that have been the foundation of the colonial capitalist mode of production are taking cognizance of only one important end result of the development process.

Development is not about index numbers of national income, as Paul Streeten maintains, "it is not about savings ratios and capital coefficients; it is about and for people". Development must therefore begin by identifying human needs. The objective of development is to raise the level of living of the masses of the people as quickly as is feasible. This implies meeting such needs as continuous employment or, for the self-employed, secure and adequate livelihoods, more and better schooling for their children, better medical services, clean water at hand, cheap

transport and a somewhat higher and growing level of measured income. Much of these can be achieved in ways which do not register a high index for national income and GNP is consistent with leaving these basic needs unsatisfied, or even unaddressed.

Development must be interpreted as something more than just aggregate output. Thus, Gross National Product (GNP), highly revered by the formulators of the colonial capitalist approach is a very inappropriate and inadequate measure of development. A critical examination quickly reveals the following inadequacies:

- The GNP includes the earnings of foreign expatriates which are actually debts to any nation, many of which find employment in several African nations. It includes transfer incomes, while at the same time it excludes a number of non-commercial services as well as certain "social disbenefits" in Africa, especially those arising from increased urbanization. In addition, it masks the crucial question of capital transfer to the metropoles overseas, and directs attention away from crucial issues of development. As we briefly mentioned, the Gross National Product does not include non-commercialized services, like those performed by many African housewives, which are very significant in African and many other less developed countries, while on the other hand, it includes capital gains. However, in African and many developing nations, land is the most significant capital gain arising from an increase in the value of land, which at the

74 Ibid., pp. 3-4.
grassroots is a mere transfer income. It is the opinion of the author that this phenomenon, rather than contributes to, hinders development in the sense that benefactors often spend the money on expensive imported luxuries and consumption goods. Furthermore, the GNP, does not include the regular repatriation of assets in the form of interest payment, amortization, profits and personal income resulting from foreign presence - a process of continual leakages of extreme significance in Africa and many developing nations.

- If GNP is the measure of development, it will certainly be very inadequate given a situation that is characterized by persistent increase in population.

Gross National Product as a measure of development is extremely an inadequate measure because it does not tell us anything about the distribution of income and national wealth among the population, which is a very important variable in national development, especially using the Unified Approach. Furthermore, extreme caution must be exercised in trying to identify an expansion in total output or even per capita output with enrichment or development. This is because of the need to identify the composition of the output. An expansion of total output could sometimes be accompanied by depleting natural resource, or it

75 Agarwala and Singh, op. cit., pp. 54-74.

76 For an analogy of the same situation of emerging Japan and other developing countries, see S. Tsuru, Essays on Economic Development, (Tokyo: Kino-Kuniyo Bookstore Co., Ltd., 1968)

77 Kuznets, op. cit.
could be made up of large stock piles of military equipment, so often the case of many African countries.

Growth, so highly acclaimed by the colonial capitalist approach as the measure of development, cannot be development in any meaningful sense of the word. Consider the special case of Angola and Liberia in the African context for example. Angola, as the first case, had an impressive growth rate as Basil Davidson explained,

Angola's growth of industrial output - the output, that is, of payments salable for cash, rose at an average annual rate of 17 percent during those years of 1962 to 1969. The value of its mineral exports actually doubled between 1965 and 1970, reaching a total of 170 million (about $391 million.78

How could this be considered as development? Could this possibly be defined as development, when the so-called growth occurred with the same colonial framework and structure, virtually confined only within the "modern sectors" of the nation and excluding over 90 percent of the inhabitants? Is a situation in which the role of the majority of the citizenry, was essentially that of providing cheap labor, "confined to the non-modernizing" sector ( i.e. rural areas), be possibly described as development?

In the second case of Liberia, as Basil Davidson shows, it has been well documented that Liberia in the 1950's "expanded at a rate that was higher than that of any other country in the world. Money incomes quadrupled in that time. Government revenues expanded eightfold."79

79 Ibid., p. 84.
The present situation of Liberia today epitomizes the false contention that growth can be development. It is anything but development.

In our view, the theories that are the bases of the colonial or neo-colonial approach to national development are rather part of colonial capitalist approaches by intellectuals and agents of former colonialists, calculated at making these areas an enlarged market for the former colonial powers' export products, or source of supply of raw materials, or even military hardware; with no intention of developing these countries, and clearly inimical to African objectives.

The Radical/Africanist School of Thought

The other important school of thought whose views about national development have been explicit, is the Radical/Africanist group. This group is a constellation of Radicals and African Marxists whose framework is based on a Marxist-Leninist interpretation, and hence see development and underdevelopment from the point of view of their dialectical relationship to one another. The Radical/Africanist group do not have a formal strategy of development, but have subjected previous development strategies of Western development economists to careful examination. Our presentation here will be very limited because of the further elaborations that these views will receive in subsequent chapters.

The group takes as its methodological spring board the Marxist-Leninist framework vis-a-vis the development of Western capitalism and imperialism. Karl Marx was among the early critiques to accuse the
metropolitan countries of plundering the colonies. V.I. Lenin's elaboration of the Marxist paradigm gained enormous audience in many parts of the underdeveloped world including Africa, especially his volume *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*. Thus in later Marxist-Leninist literature, African and other underdeveloped areas of the world are explicitly perceived as victims of exploitation and imperialism. Clive Thomas in *Dependence and Transformation*, (1974), has marshalled overwhelming evidence to establish that, as an observable dynamic, the contradiction which has given rise to the reality of the "development of underdevelopment" in the Third World societies is the dialectical process of internationalization of the capitalist system. Consequently, any strategy of development from Western development economists, is totally and justifiably dismissed as irrelevant by the Radical/Africanist group because of its exploitative character.

The Radical/Africanist school of thought had made its views clear with respect to the question of African development and underdevelopment. As Claude Ake elaborates, they approach development from "a method of analysis which is based on a dialectical materialism....which gives primacy to material conditions, particularly economic factors in

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the explanation of social life". This position has also been eloquently amplified in the various works of Samir Amin, Walter Rodney, Immanuel Wallerstein, Andre G. Frank, and others. The Radical/Africanist group affirms a strong interdependent relationship between development and underdevelopment, that is, a method of thought that sees a mutual interrelation between the so-called developed countries and those classified as underdeveloped. Unlike other approaches, they emphasize the crucial role played by history in the development of the contemporary conditions in Africa.

Furthermore, the Radical/Africanist group unequivocally dismiss the current approach to national development in Africa as essentially a Western capitalist conspiracy calculated at maintaining the present post-colonial linkages and Western economic aggrandizement. There are however, various areas of emphasis within the Radical/Africanist school. In brief, Andre Gunder Frank thinks the underdeveloped state of Third World nations is mainly due to the continuing appropriation of surplus from these nations to the metropolis. In other words, each phase of


imperialism is only a continuity in change resulting in the development of underdevelopment. Frank, however, has been systematically criticized for equating capitalism with money economy; for substituting a focus on class conflict and exploitation, confusing the worldwide expansion of capitalism with economic growth in the periphery, and for mixing developmental and Marxist frameworks.

Others like Emmanuel Arrighi and Samir Amin, in addition to the above, have tended to emphasize the disadvantage of African and other Third World countries due to "unequal exchange", especially in terms of trade with metropolitan countries. The views of Amin and Emmanuel have accordingly been also criticized.

The late Paul Baran blamed the present misery and stagnation of Africa and other underdeveloped areas principally on Western capitalist countries who are also the fabricators of the strategy of development in Africa. He maintains that

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it is the underdeveloped world that the central overriding
fact of our epoch becomes manifest to the naked eye. The
capitalist system, once a mighty engine of economic
development has turned into a no less formidable hurdle to
human development...there (in the underdeveloped world)
the difference is between abysmal squalor and decent
existence, between misery of hopelessness and exhilaration
of progress, between life and death for hundreds of
millions of people. 89

Kwame Nkrumah, who is a well recognized and prolific writer of the
exploitative imperialist strategy, had this to say:

All imperialists, without exception evolved the means
...to satisfy the ends, the exploitation of subject
territories, for the aggrandizement of the metropolitan
countries. They were all rapacious; they all subserved
the needs of the subject lands to their own demands;
...they repressed and despoiled, degraded and oppressed.
They took our lands, our lives, our resources, and our
dignity. Without exceptions, they left us nothing but
our resentment.90

Others like I. Potekhin, after considering the economic conditions
of Africa and the strategy that produced such a condition, based his view
mainly on the "financial hemorrhage". He maintains that "a considerable
part of the national income which is supposed to make up the accumulation
fund and to serve as the material basis of progress, is exported outside
Africa without equivalent."91

Review Press, 1959), pp. 249-250. For similar views see, A. Gunder Frank,
Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution, (New York: Monthly Review
Press, 1967); Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, (Washington,
D.C.: Howard University Press, 1977; Samir Amin, Unequal Development: An
Review Press, 1976; Peter C. W. Gutkind and Immanuel Wallerstein, (eds.),
The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa, (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage

90 Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, (New York: International
Publishers Co., Inc., 1963), p. XIII. For other related views of Nkrumah
see Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism, 1965; Revolutionary Path,
1967; Revolutionary Warfare, 1968.

91 I. Potekhin, Problems of Economic Independence of Africa, (Moscow,
Furthermore, Gunnar Myrdal has alerted us to the widening discrepancy of incomes and living standards between rich and poor countries, all arising because of the strategy of development that has evolved from Western development economists. Myrdal sees the developed countries as having contributed to the predicament of African and many underdeveloped countries, especially through the effect of colonialism, the strategy of development, and the "operation of the international demonstration effect".  

As an alternative, the Radical/Africanist school has made the following general suggestions: (1) an immediate termination of the current relationship of African and Western countries and a total disregard of metropolitan strategy of development, including the overthrow of the present custodians of Western interest in Africa (Rodney); (2) a comprehensive development planning as an indispensable weapon of economic advancement in Africa and other underdeveloped areas (Ake); (3) a complete government control of the national development process in all major spheres of concern (Ake); and (4) greater cooperation among African countries as well as the need for unity on a continental scale (Nkrumah). Some like Paul Baran and A. Gunder Frank have called for the establishment of a socialist type planned economy as an essential, indeed, an indispensable condition for the attainment of economic and social progress in underdeveloped countries.

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Others like Potekhin have suggested nationalization of enterprises belonging to foreign companies, compulsory investment of a part of foreign companies profits; higher taxation of profits; establishment of national banks and insurance companies setting up their own maritime shipping and air fleet; and state control over exports, imports and foreign exchange transactions.94

Overwhelmed by the appropriateness and logical satisfaction of the Radical/Africanist group, the author feels compelled to take sides with the views of Samir Amin, Clive Thomas, Claude Ake, Immanuel Wallerstein, Denis Cohen, Kwame Nkrumah, Gunnar Myrdal, Paul Baran, and others, and subscribe to their framework for the following reasons: (1) it has a methodological superiority over the other approaches, based on a comprehensive understanding of the present conditions of African countries from the point of view of its historical evolution; (2) it examines a phenomena from the point of view of their relationship and interconnections with one another; (3) it gives primacy to "material conditions" in the critical evaluation of the development or underdevelopment of any people; (4) it provides us with the necessary conceptual schemes that Africa and the underdeveloped world are not only poor and stagnant, but that the current strategy of national development in many African countries is essentially a brain child of the West, designed to breed retrogression instead of development; and finally, (5) it clearly shows that the contemporary political independence or freedom is meaningless until Africa takes command of her own destiny.

The Unified Approach to National Development

As previously noted in the introduction, the end result of the colonial capitalist strategy of development was an undeterminable instance of failures that produced problems of tremendous proportions, and in some instances horrors of indescribable dimensions. It has also created a situation in which the masses play no role in development, nor do they share the fruits of the national wealth. These and others call for a renewed search for alternative development strategies.

Thus, it becomes necessary at this juncture to focus our attention on the main theory that we shall use to examine the design and posture of national development in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. The Unified Approach as a theory of national development and planning in the decade of the seventies is a strategy specially designed to address the plight of the masses, due to the shortcomings of the present national development strategies in Africa.

The original text of the Unified Approach to national development and planning is contained in Draft Resolution II and introduced by the Representative of Sweden at the 132nd meeting of the United Nations Committee on Economic and Social Council on behalf of 14 sponsors.95

The Draft Resolution was subsequently revised, amended, expanded, and presented to the General Assembly. It was finally adopted by 100 votes to none, with 10 abstentions (Resolution 2681 XXV).

Over the years the Unified Approach has undergone many more modifications so that it has come to represent an important postulation

of profound theoretical value. It is a comprehensive theory that expresses exclusive concern not only on the question of the overall rate of growth of the national income, but also the rate of capital formation for the postulated growth rate, and the broad division of total investment among the various sectors of the national economy.\textsuperscript{96} Appropriate attention is devoted to the development of the rural sector and ways of reducing unemployment.

As we noted earlier, it lays emphasis over the question that the benefits of development should accrue to the poorest and the most disadvantaged sections of the society...so that those for whom the benefits of development are meant to reach, that is, the deprived sections of society, must participate also; particularly, in the decision-making process as well as in the implementation.\textsuperscript{97}

In brief, this calls for a development strategy focused on the well being of the population as a whole, with an acknowledgement of the crucial role played by popular participation and mobilization of popular support in the efforts of development, particularly women and the youth.

Industrialization is only part of the overall goal of the strategy. Fragmentations of the conventional development strategy nevertheless are embodied in the Unified Approach, but it is an elaborate challenge to the colonial capitalist models aimed at improving the living conditions of the masses of people in Africa and other less developed areas. Its views are also sympathetic to some of the suggestions of the Radical/Africanist school.


\textsuperscript{97}Ibid., p. 20.
By calling for structural reorganization in many national settings for an effective development results, the Unified Approach touches on some of the pertinent political economic and social issues as they relate to national development.

From the standpoint of an elaborate and overall framework for the new strategy, the question of the role of social development is part of a wider view of development balanced with the other economic, political, and ideological dimensions. The Unified Approach recognizes the dynamic nature of the interrelations between education, health and the productivity of labor as an integral contributor to social development. Aside from stressing the importance of satisfying the basic needs of the population, the theory is a strategy of development based on the exploitation of indigenous value and initiative. The implication of this approach to development unlike the colonial capitalist approach, is that even though foreign investment might have some significance, external dependence on such an investment, as a matter of policy are not particularly encouraged.

The Unified Approach\(^98\) recommends a full mobilization of domestic resources as well as the human resource in development. The strategy stresses the need for the development of cooperative endeavors in agriculture as well as a full mobilization and expansion of rural agricultural potentials in developing nations. Furthermore, centralization and planning are considered important instruments for promoting socio-economic development, enhancing the well being of the people and ensuring just distribution of the national wealth and basic commodities for life

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\(^{98}\)UN E/CN.5/566/ and (E/1978/19 and Add.1).
sustenance. Thus, the integration of the national economy is considered a high priority. These and other issues constitute the basic framework of the United Nations Unified Approach to national development, including the important question of "capacitation operations", which encourages planners not to try so much to define and control the future as to establish present conditions or capacities which will permit a given society to meet its problem in the future. The U.N. Report concludes that we define Unified Approach for this study as systematic attempt to deal with the problem of uneven growth and involve the total economy and society in development... allocating planning upon the social services as distinguished from economic growth; it is an emphasis upon the general style of development affecting the various aspects of development and their interrelationships, including participation, cross-sectoral, and spatial aspects. Development is viewed as involving various kinds of structural and institutional change and social and individual transformation which build up the capacity of the society and of its members to realize higher levels of production and welfare.

99 For more and detailed information about the Unified Approach and other related issues, see United Nations Economic and Social Council Publications, A/8203/Add.1; E/CN.14/Cap.6/4; E/CN.5/519; E/1979/243; E/CN.5/582; E/CN.14/RES/218; E/CN.14/SWSA/8; E/Cn.5/510; E/1978/28; E/CN.5/500; E/1978/19; and other related publications.


Socio-Political Implications of the Unified Approach

The theoretical postulation of the Unified Approach especially due to its focus on mass media and mass participation and institutional change, has several political and social implications that are almost coterminous with revolution in the African context. While the utility of the Unified Approach as an alternative development strategy may not be in dispute, given the focus and goals of its thrust, we maintain that those planners and developers, government agents, and policymakers who are supposed to translate this theoretical postulation into practice, are the very group of persons who because of their class positions would rather maintain the status quo. This means that the Unified Approach would be easily adopted in situations where the ruling classes have decided to commit a "class suicide", after which their goals and wishes conform with the aspirations and needs of the masses. This is exactly where the two revolutionary states of Mozambique and Guinea Bissau have a profound advantage because of their path to the capture of state power.

However, the socio-political implication of the Unified Approach is an important and well recognized phenomenon. Its importance was also recognized subsequently by the United Nations, when it said in a report of the U.N. Institute for Social Development in 1974, that

the basic decisions on development policies are largely political decisions, and political ideologies and derived policies are often cited as reasons for uneven patterns of development in various developing countries. Where political regimes reflect power structures based on wealth and inequality, these regimes will not be inclined to legislate out of existence the base of power. Some regimes have sought to build up an urban middle-class as a major instrument of development, to the neglect of the rural poor, while others have
concentrated on promoting the interest of the landed wealth. Political leadership that is oriented towards unified development goals may have limited options if it is to remain in power, and very often has limited effectiveness in executing the policies it does adopt ...the idea of "unified development" with its structural and distributional implications, presents many more difficulties of a political nature than does the idea of development as growth of the national product - growth measured in aggregate terms that conceal distribution and differentiation.102

As a result of the above, it becomes necessary to examine some of the conditions that facilitated the proper adoption of the Unified Approach in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. Here we will attempt to examine the colonial legacies of Guinea Bissau and Mozambique's path to the capture of state political power, and the role and perception of the ruling class vis-a-vis the goals and aspirations of the masses. Other necessary issues in this regard would constitute the concern of the next chapter.

CHAPTER III

FACILITATIVE CONDITIONS FOR THE ADOPTION OF THE UNIFIED APPROACH TO NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

In the last chapter, the major concern was that of ferreting out some of the major synthetic strategies that, in whole or part, have influenced the development process in Africa. The irrelevance and inadequacy of these strategies were appropriately exposed when juxtaposed with the concrete conditions in Africa. Subsequent exposition was furnished by the Radical/Africanist frontal attack from the vantage point of a Marxist-Leninist framework. The final exit in the last chapter was made following a brief discussion of the Unified Approach and the socio-political implications of adopting this strategy of national development.

This chapter focuses on those facilitative conditions that have in our view enhanced the adoption of the Unified Approach to national development in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. The pursuit of the above, therefore, calls for a critical examination of the colonial legacies and the struggle for liberation in both countries. Granted that the structure plays a crucial role in the development process, the design and content of national development, and the adoption of the Unified Approach to development, it becomes necessary to provide a discussion, however brief, on the role and significance of class, as well as, the state in colonial and post-colonial formations. This crucial phenomenon of structure vis-a-vis the development process in Africa cannot be overemphasized, because as Paul Baran states;
the crucial fact rendering the realization of a development programme illusory, is the political and social structure of the government in power. The alliance of property-owning classes controlling the destinies of most underdeveloped countries cannot be expected to design and execute a set of measures running counter to each and all of their immediate vested interest.\textsuperscript{103}

Since the Unified Approach to national development in every sense of its interpretation takes into consideration the plight and aspirations of the forgotten masses, it becomes imperative to examine those peculiar conditions that have enhanced the adoption of this strategy of development in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. From this thrust, a critical assessment will be made of the importance of violence as a cleansing and revolutionary force that culminated in the commitment of "class suicide" in these two revolutionary African states.

The Colonial Legacy

Under the Portuguese Constitution and the Overseas Organic Law\textsuperscript{104} of 1963, Mozambique was considered an overseas province of Portugal with representation in the following central organs of government: the National Assembly, the Overseas Council, and the Corporate Chamber.\textsuperscript{105} These measures were only representations on paper; on the real side, it is clear

\textsuperscript{103}Baran, op. cit., p. 88.


that life for Mozambicans was replete with misery, poverty, disease, oppression and the constant menace, that consequently precipitated several insurrections that were put down with the greatest brutality. For example, James Mittleman, in his Underdevelopment and the Transition to Socialism in Mozambique and Tanzania, 1981, discussed the Mozambican riot of 1848 that resulted in imprisonment and deportation to Sao Tome. Again in 1956, the police killed 49 striking dock workers; and on July 16, 1960, over 500 Mozambicans meeting at Nueda were massacred and many others arrested by the state security police. 106

Thus, the oppressive nature of Portuguese rule provided the necessary impetus for Mozambicans particularly the petty-bourgeois to consider other means of regaining their lost pride, dignity and freedom from the Portuguese. At the moment, preparation for a protracted struggle came to be seen as a most accurate alternative.

With regard to Guinea Bissau, a tremendous body of evidence reveals that the Portuguese carried out several successive campaigns along the Guinean coast that finally culminated in the possession of Guinea Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands. Henceforth, the presence of the Portuguese in Guinea Bissau would inaugurate an unmitigated era of exploitation and degradation. Endemic malaria and other tropical diseases during the early part, strongly militated against any early settlement of a "plantation class" of Portuguese, limiting Guinea Bissau's conceived usefulness only as a source for the supply of slaves. 107


107 Op. cit., Duffy, Chapter I; see also R. Chilcote, Portuguese Africa (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967), Chapters 1, 2 and 3.
Apart from the heinous economic policies, and the absence of any form of political power, the Portuguese deprived the inhabitants of even meager social services. Schools and hospitals wherever they existed were only for the settlers and a few "natives", a situation that makes a mockery of the so-called Portuguese civilizing mission. Economic aggrandizement according to the author was the motive force of the Portuguese mission.

Furthermore, Portuguese rule in Guinea Bissau was characterized by a tightly centralized system under the direct supervision of the colonial Governor and sprinkled with a tinge of the principle of assimilation; a process of gradation that on paper placed the African assimilado above his own kind, and "equal" to the Portuguese. This has long been proven to be a myth which clearly epitomized the subordinate position of the African assimilado.

Furthermore, of all the Portuguese possessions in Africa, Guinea Bissau was the most neglected, because Portugal herself was an under-developed country with a meager scientific, as well as, economic potential. The gravity of the situation could be seen from the fact that in the five centuries of Portuguese rule, Guinea Bissau could only boast of fourteen

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109This position had long been dismissed by many eminent students of Portuguese history. William Winter for his part in Portuguese Africa and the West, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), concluded that "Portugal's role in Africa is a study of contradictions".

university graduates. The oppressive situation like that in Mozambique fueled the need for a retrieval of freedom and dignity and helped lay the grounds for an eventual commotion and commitment to battle. The resort to armed struggle seemed to be based on the concrete conditions in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau; and one that on theoretical grounds is unquestionably justified. Paul Baran provides the rationale for such a venture when he stated;

> the ruling coalition of interest does not abdicate of its own volition, nor does it change its character in response to incantation....the property-owning class as a whole are as a rule grimly determined to hold fast to their political and economic entrenchment. 

Nevertheless, we maintain that these social injustices and political powerlessness are themselves in isolation, inadequate explanations of the brilliant success in the capture of the state political power. Such revolutions as occurred in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau necessitated a second ingredient; that is an important catalyst that could channel and convert the general discontent and hopelessness of the masses, activate its intensity, and eventually create history. The charismatic figures of Eduardo Mondlane and Amilcar Cabral in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau respectively, served as necessary catalysts that made the recapture of the state political power successful. However, before examining the path to political empowerment, it is necessary to outline briefly the social relations in both Mozambique and Guinea Bissau.


Perspectives on the Role and Significance of Class

The primacy of class and class struggle has always, and still remains a central theme in all Marxist discourse. Karl Marx, more than anybody else in his study of political economy, carried out a sophisticated and penetrating analysis of class struggle, a phenomenon that has not only generated fierce polemics in intellectual circles, but also one that has continually remained suspect.

In the Communist Manifesto (1847), Marx maintained that:

the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle. Freeman and slave, Patrician and Plebeian, Lord and Self, guild master and journeyman, in a word oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another.  

The concept of class brings to light many fundamental issues of human existence itself: the control, relationship, and distribution of necessary resources for human sustenance; the exercise of power in all its expressive forms, the boundary between the dominant and submissive groups of a people, and virtually sets the agenda governing the collective destiny of a people. Despite its importance, Bernard Magubane illustrates that "in contemporary bourgeois sociology, class is viewed as a descriptive category of social stratification subject to empirical specification in concrete societies."  

The existence of class and class struggle whether from the point of view of a global caricature, (Ake) or in the context of Africa in the


pre-colonial, colonial, or post-colonial era is an indisputable reality, despite committed efforts to conceal the prevalence of this concept to the contrary.\textsuperscript{115}

The point however that deserves our utmost attention, is that, in both instances, the global as well as the African contexts, those who command the forces of production and/or those who possess state power have an "unlimited" control over the subordinate classes, with all its exploitative interpretations. As E.Z. Brett has reiterated, this concept of class is "of crucial importance in societies undergoing radical transformations of the kind induced by colonial penetration".\textsuperscript{116}

With the above exposition understood, a compressed analysis of the social relations of both the Mozambican and Guinean (Bissau) societies, however brief, becomes in essence the principal focus of our next objective, with due consideration given to the ensuing basic generalities.

A. That in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau like in all societies, the foremost preoccupation of human activities are caged in the production and distribution of necessary commodities crucial to their survival, and hence the mechanisms employed by the social relations and character of production, are unquestionably crucial in precisely determining the nature of these societies.

\textsuperscript{115}Some like Amilcar Cabral insists on the mode of production as the locomotive force in history rather than class. See Amilcar Cabral, Revolution in Guinea. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), pp. 93-94. We must however, add that from a structural standpoint, Cabral is correct, yet conjuncturally examined, the problem of class confrontation can only be better captured through an understanding of the class struggle.

B. That the relations of production and distribution are themselves exclusively, the engenderers and determinants of definitive social classes, characterized by a recognizable polarization of interest, which in turn, have given rise to persistent conflicts and permanent contradictions, emanating from the character of the production process.

C. That these class relationships are on the whole unequal and characterized by the exploitation and the domination of one class by the other.

We must also add, that the perceptions, ideology, values, principles, and conceptions of national development of the dominant class - official pronouncements notwithstanding - using the state as the principal tool of domination, serves the sinister function of becoming the legitimate and triumphant in these societies.

The people of Mozambique and Guinea Bissau could therefore, be briefly divided into five major social classes:

A. The bourgeois, predominantly made up of Portuguese nationals and a handful of other Europeans, could be divided into five distinctive categories: the agricultural, financial, bureaucratic, merchant, and industrial bourgeoisie. Before the capture of state political power by the PAIGC and FRELIMO, in Guinea Bissau and Mozambique respectively, the super-structures in both these countries were virtually controlled by Portuguese nationals drawn from the various social ranking of the metropolitan state in the service of their
country.  

B. The petty-bourgeoisie includes a range of high and middle level public officials, and members of the academic profession. In the colonial days a considerable number of Africans mainly mesticos and assimilados could also be identified within this rank, but their role was essentially "that of paper-pushers and/or 'chien de garde' for the colonial structure." Small farm owners also fall within this group as well as those in trading or commercial ventures.

C. The proletariat, composed mainly of wage earners, are employed in a range of activities: mining, manufacturing, factories, industries, etc. They also include domestic workers, dockworkers, and those engaged in agro-business.

D. The peasantry, and in the context of Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, which constitutes about 90% or more of the national population, are those heavily preoccupied in agricultural production at the level of subsistence.

E. The declasses, which could be divided into two sub-groups constitutes the final social grouping. The first, generally

\[117\] The various ranks of Portuguese nationals greatly depended on their function, and tended to mirror the social stratification of Portugal herself.

\[118\] Makidi-Ku-Ntima, "Class Struggle and the Making of the Revolution in Angola", Contemporary Marxism, No. 6, Spring, 1983.

\[119\] Cabral, op. cit., p. 59.
referred to as lumpenproletariat, is made of such people as prostitutes, beggars, etc. Numerically, this group is less significant. The second which we think should be included (even though arbitrary) is made of people who are affiliated to the petty-bourgeoisie, or working persons in urban centers, and living at their expense and/or engaged in irregular work.

Finally, it is important that we identify the position of these groups vis-a-vis the process of national development, taking into account the designers of such a process, as well the benefactors. These would constitute the core of our discussion after examining the path to the capture of state political power.

**Path to the Capture of State and the Role of Violence**

An important chapter that delineates in a very significant way the dynamics of contemporary African nationalism was epitomized by the role played by the elites of Mozambique and Guinea Bissau in the context of the struggle for national independence. In the three decades prior to independence, a handful of "natives" received advanced education in Portugal and other countries. As elites, these educated "natives" came to realize the large gap between them and the rest of the population. In addition to the frustration engendered by the myth of Portuguese racial harmony, an eventual foundation for an armed struggle was layed. Given the conditions of Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, it became most fitting indeed to develop the necessary strategy and tactics for a successful capture of state political power only after the objective and
subjective factors, including their various manifestations had been scrupulously examined.

Negligence of such an analysis, failure to carry out such exhaustive and creative research, and attempts to confine efforts only to copying the experience of others blindly, not only clashes with the requirements of the revolutionary method, but ignores the objective reality which is always concrete and unique.\(^{120}\)

The importance of violence as a potential weapon of redressing social and political issues and the crucial impact that emerges from such a tussle of strength cannot be overemphasized. Karl Marx, after a critical examination of the socio-political conditions to which the European working class was subjected to, called for the use of violence in redressing the situation. In the African context, Frantz Fanon, a leading authority on African liberation movements maintained in *Black Skin, White Mask* (1952), and *The Wretched of the Earth* (1963), that violence was an important weapon not only in eliminating colonialism, but also in restoring the downtrodden pride of African peoples. He pointedly notes that;

> at the level of the individual, violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction, it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect. Even if armed struggle has been symbolic and the nation is demobilized through a rapid movement of decolonization, the people have the time to see that the leader has no special merit. From thence comes the type of aggressive reticence with regard to the machinery of protocol which young governments quickly show. When the people have taken violent part in the national liberation, they will allow no one to set themselves up as 'liberators'. They show themselves to be jealous of the results of their action and take good care not to place their future, their destiny or the fact of the country in the hands

of a living god. Yesterday they were completely irresponsible; today they mean understanding everything and make all decisions. Illuminated by violence the consciousness of the people rebel against any pacification. From now on the demagogues, the opportunities and the magicians have a different task. The action which has thrown them into a hand-to-hand struggle confers upon the masses a voracious taste for the concrete. The attempt at mystification becomes, in the long run, practically impossible.121

Fanon's prophetic foresight demonstrates in every possible way the impact of violence in the transformation of colonial as well as post-colonial Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, particularly its role in scaling and reinterpreting the class arithmetic, as a cleansing ritual that "expunged people of the colonial heritage of inferiority and submission.122

Amilcar Cabral also gave us additional support to the importance of violence.123

Other important authorities that have contributed to our knowledge on the utility or role of violence in realizing social and political changes include: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Lenin, Mao. Others like George Sorel, Che, Walter Rodney, Claude Ake, lately, have all emphasized the importance of organized violence in reinstating Africa again on the road towards progress.124

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122Ibid., p. 98.


124Fanon's view on violence has also been criticized. Using the experience of Vietnam for example Nguyen Nghe tended to dissent. See for example, Nguyen Nghe, "Frantz Fanon et Les Probleme de l'Independence", La Pensee, No. 107, (February, 1963), pp. 23-36, It must be stated that Nghe's position is essentially a misinterpretation of Fanon and a distortion of Fanon's view on violence. For better clarifications, see Irene L. Genzier-, Frantz Fanon: A Critical Study (New York: Vangage Books, 1973), pp. 195-205.
In the two revolutionary states of Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, because of the nature of the protracted struggle, several important changes that took place effected the national foundations of these two countries. The use of violence in the first instance served the purpose of scaling down the tribal difference. In Mozambique, for example, the formation of FRELIMO from the separate guerilla movements brought together different linguistic groups, ethnic units, and religious differences.\textsuperscript{125} Granted that the struggle was waged for along time and transversed a vast area of the national territories, it necessitated the cooperation of all ethnic groupings. Similarly, in Guinea Bissau, as a result of the struggle, ethnic hostilities between the Fulah and the rest of the population, mainly animist, were greatly curtailed, while "magico-religious" practices, lost much of their control over the people. In addition, the use of violence greatly improved the political education of the masses as well as the ideological - two factors that have been extremely helpful in the national development process of both countries.

Furthermore, the success of these revolutions necessitated the active participation of the peasants, hence these movements had firm roots in the rural areas. Tactical and organizational reasons dictated the resettlement of peasants, that formed a sizeable part of the fighting forces, into protected villages, that in turn, became the foundation of new communities, and hence the development of different lifestyles, that discarded tribal schemishes, obsolete agricultural practices, and layed the common ground for cooperative ventures.\textsuperscript{126}

\textsuperscript{125}Mittleman, op. cit., p. 33.

\textsuperscript{126}Ibid., p. 42.
In Mozambique for example, FRELIMO in a drive to protect the villages from Portuguese air strikes and provide the mechanism to sustain the struggle, created new settlements deep in the bushes, encompassing the participation of people from different areas of the country.\textsuperscript{127} Within this concentrated communities, FRELIMO improved production techniques and introduced new crops, thereby enabling the peasants to produce sufficient food for themselves and the freedom fighters.

Aside from all of the above, the liberation had to receive total cooperation for successful operations, including the secret transmission of messages, and in this way, generated unity among the inhabitants, which in turn rekindled national pride. To crown it all, the struggle did much to influence the leadership rank of the elite in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, transforming their privileged roles as a class, fueled by the heroic performances of the people themselves. This in brief, and according to Cabral means that

\begin{quote}
the armed struggle launched in response to the colonialist oppressor, turns out to be a painful but efficient instrument for developing the cultural level of both the leadership strata in the liberation movement and the various social groups in the struggle.\textsuperscript{128}
\end{quote}

The climax of this exercise on the leadership rank culminated in a "class suicide", and in the context of national development, this would mean that the ruling class would come to see their roles and aspirations as identical with those of the masses. John Saul captured the importance of

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{127}Ibid., pp. 42-43.
\end{flushleft}

\begin{flushleft}
\end{flushleft}
this phenomenon when he stated that

the logic of the struggle...imposes itself upon a growing number of the petty bourgeoisie, who feel no other choice is open to them but to commit "suicide" as a class in order to be reborn as revolutionary workers, completely identified with the deepest aspirations of the people to which they belong.\textsuperscript{129}

What therefore, were the various instrumentations or organizations that were successfully relied upon for the capture of state power? Mozambique as a first case, had had a long history of resistance to Portuguese domination, but the foundation of the modern struggle began with the birth of FRELIMO (Mozambique Liberation Front) in June, 1962 in Dar Es Salaam.\textsuperscript{130}

Independence was the culmination of years of struggle from the tribal ways of resistance (which were only finally crushed in the 1970's), to the modern ten-year war of liberation launched, under the inspired leadership of the martyr-hero, Eduardo Mondlane by the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO).\textsuperscript{131}

James Mittleman in Underdevelopment and the Transition to Socialism in Mozambique and Tanzania, (1981), contends that FRELIMO built on the foundations of various social, religious, and educational associations, in


addition to student organization that provided a framework for clandestine activities, like strikes, labor unrest and other forms of popular protest.\textsuperscript{132} The use of classical guerrilla tactics in confronting the Portuguese, coupled with efficient and flexible fighting units, proved to be a potential weapon for FRELIMO.\textsuperscript{133} Furthermore, FRELIMO developed a strong ideology to demistify the Portuguese doctrine of white supremacy, by the introduction of political education, literacy classes, and others in the liberated areas.

By 1969, FRELIMO forces had gained good military grounds, controlling about one-third of the area of Mozambique, and following the April 1974 Coup in Lisbon. Largely brought about by the colonial wars in Africa the new Portuguese regime conceded to the nationalists demand for independence. Mozambique's independence was established by the Lusaka Agreement negotiated between Portugal and FRELIMO in Zambia on 7 September 1974, which set the date for independence for June 1975.\textsuperscript{134}

In Guinea Bissau, the modern struggle began in 1956 with the birth of the PAIGC, under the leadership of the indomitable and theoretician Amilcar Cabral. The movement which actually began with a handful of the petty-bourgeoisie later gained following as the membership spread from Bissau, the capital, to other towns in guarded secrecy.


\textsuperscript{133}For details about the formative years of FRELIMO, see Eduardo Mondlane, \textit{The Struggle for Mozambique} (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1969)

Following the brutal murder of over 50 striking dockworkers by the Portuguese troops in 1959, the party layed the necessary groundwork for a protracted armed struggle.\textsuperscript{135} Guinea Bissau's example provides us with a classic example of the important and critical studies (what Cabral refers to as taking the "pulse of the population"), that must be carried out based on a concrete situation from which an appropriate liberation drive should be launched. This involved a long period of re-educating the population, thus preparing the ground for an armed confrontation.

From an early beginning of small scale activities in June 1962, the guerrilla campaign had taken its full force by January 1963, and was correctly acknowledged by the Portuguese Defense Minister when he stated that "sizable and well-armed groups, trained in subversive warfare in North Africa and the Communist countries, have made incursion of Guinea territory in a zone comprising fifteen percent of its area".\textsuperscript{136}

By 1966, the PAIGC had gained considerable power to intensify the struggle, inflicting severe losses on Portuguese garrisons and camps.\textsuperscript{137} Thus by 1974, the party obtained her independence from the Portuguese. In addition, the triumph of FRELIMO and PAIGC in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau

\textsuperscript{135} Cabral, op. cit., p. 32.

\textsuperscript{136} Diario de Lisboa, July 18, 1963, Quoted in op. cit. Chaliend, pp. 22-23.

\textsuperscript{137} For details about the guerrilla tactics used by the PAIGC against the Portuguese, see Patrick Chabal, "National Liberation in Portuguese Guinea, 1956-1974", African Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 318, (January, 1981)
respectively, crowned them as the definer and perfecter of the national ideology, the general interest, the custodian of the general will, the incarnation of the collective thought of the people, and the molder of national development in their respective national settings. In the next discussion, we shall focus on the impact of "class suicide" on national development in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. But before that, we shall briefly examine the role of the African petty-bourgeoisie vis-a-vis the process of national development.

National Development as a Reflection of the Bourgeois State and the Process of Class Suicide in Both Mozambique and Guinea Bissau

Without any equivocation, there is a converging view that the dominant classes in any national setting seem always to use the state in dominating and exploiting those outside their own class category. Patankar and Omvedt, pointedly noted that "the government may be called the immediate ruling power, while state power which is ensured by the nature of the state itself, will be that of the exploiting class within the dominant mode of production". 138

Without going into any details, it is important to note the pertinent issue here; that is, in both Mozambique and Guinea Bissau before the capture of state political power, the role of the dominant classes, like in many of today's African countries, served the purpose of using the state in consolidating their own class interests. As Clive Thomas states,

"the existence of the state demands and assumes a political ideology which defines its legitimacy in terms of its function for the whole society while masking the service it performs for the exploiting classes." 139

Thus in many African countries, what is too often called national development is often a disguise strategy that euphemistically purports to perpetuate the dictatorship of the ruling clique, since normative biases related to one's class interest, shape one's perceptions and interpretation of development. According to Claude Ake the petty-bourgeois "pursue the task of economic development in the context of an ideological orientation which essentially accepts the developmental percepts of the metropolitan bourgeoisie". 140

Consequently, national development is often conceived as a move to overcome a blazing trail of technical and mechanical impediments, for example, "low level of savings, achievement motivation, low wages, low propensity to invest, low productivity, inadequate manpower etc", 141 without any sympathy for the wishes and aspirations of the African masses. From these general conceptual schemes, the remedial solutions become entangled on such issues as increased capital, more investment, motivation, and a host of other "development" concepts.


140 Ake, op. cit., p. 66.

141 Ibid., p. 67.
In other words, development is envisaged as occurring only within the framework of the existing capitalist order, and consequently, the process of development is defined as moving towards possessing those resources, attributes and views predominantly common in Western industrialized nations, therefore, accepting the legitimacy of the existing hierarchy of capitalist countries.

Thus, national development as fabricated by the petty-bourgeoisie is essentially a reflection of the bourgeois state formation to the ecstasy of the imperialists. The emanating ideology as Ake explains "offers a status quo oriented approach to development. This is precisely one of the major reasons why Western imperialist, which wants to insulate Africa against socialism is promoting it so zealously". The ruling class sets the national agenda and defines for all what is considered important. They design, control and mold what, in their view, constitutes national development - a euphemism that serves the functions of echoing and strengthening their own class interests and articulating their views. This concept of class in the study of African political economy is crucial indeed, particularly in the context of national development. Due to the alienation of the petty-bourgeoisie from the problems and aspirations of the masses, national development plans have essentially been geared towards the well being of the African petty-bourgeoisie.

However, national development from the point of view of the African petty-bourgeoisie, that legitimized dependency on Western nations and exploitation of the masses, clashes with the theoretical postulation of the

142 Ibid., p. 67.
Unified Approach, which by extension, is overtly sympathetic to the masses, and strongly advocates for the need of countries to depend largely on local efforts in their development endeavors, laying the foundation for a long stride towards self-reliance.

The Unified Approach as a theory of national development, as we stated earlier, focuses on development that takes into consideration the dejected conditions of the masses, and sees development from the point of view of a general uplift of the general well-being of the majority of the population. This as we have noted, clashes with the contemporary structural orientation in many African countries.

In both the two revolutionary states of Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, because of the struggle that culminated in a "class suicide", the petty-bourgeois came to view their progress and aspirations as compatible with those of the masses - unalienated from them. Since the petty-bourgeois in these two states renounced their own class interests, and incarnated as revolutionary workers, it in turn, facilitated the application of this theory of development. This phenomenon is crucial, because as we shall later observe, national development in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, would come to focus heavily on the general well-being of everybody, particularly the forgotten of society - the masses.
Revolutionary Class Suicide in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau: Implications on National Development

The principle of revolutionary "class suicide" that took place in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, whereby, the petty-bourgeoisie of these countries renounced their privileged class position and instead strove to serve the interest of the masses was a direct outgrowth of the protracted armed struggle for independence. In other words, the ruling class "qua petty-bourgeoisie", ceased to exist. The rationale seems to be predicated on the desire to serve the general population, and one that is often found throughout the thought of Amilcar Cabral. "The liberation struggle ultimately would have been in vain if the vast majority of the population did not reap the fruits of long years of sacrifice and bloodshed which entailed the war against Portuguese colonialism". 143

Such an unique phenomenon clearly indicates that the ruling class would come to see their own interests compatible with those of the masses and, hence, would continually strive to meet the aspirations and interests of the masses, unlike others in a typical bourgeois state. Thus, in Mozambique and Guinea Bissu, because of the nature of the contest for state power, during which the peasants and the masses played an unique and risky role to ensure the success of the struggle, the leaders were forced to renounce their class oriented ideology. This unique condition precipitated the need for a thorough rethinking of the whole question of nationhood and the post-colonial national development strategy.

143 Africa, No. 83 (July, 1978), p. 47
The implications of this endeavor is thus easily perceived in the arena of national development. Consequent upon committing the class suicide, the design of national development after the capture of state political power, automatically became particularly focused on improving the conditions of the masses in these countries. Hence, the adoption of the Unified Approach to national development as we had stated earlier.

Henceforth, the main objective of the ruling class, that is, one unalienated from the masses concern, will to a large extent center on formulating a national development strategy that will not only focus on the development of their nation-states, but also one that would ensure that the problems of the neglected will be equally considered. This in brief, is compatible with the intended reasons for the formulation of the United Nations Unified Approach to national development. The practice of this pattern of development remains the focus of the next chapter and beyond.
CHAPTER IV
ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

This chapter intends to examine the magnitude of the economic dimensions in the national development strategies in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. To accomplish this task we wish, in the first instance, to promote a passing view of the development trend prior to independence and, in the second instance, to critically examine the contemporary trend.

In accordance with the theoretical postulations of the Unified Approach, it is expected that the conceptual focus of economic development, which is a conglomeration of normative assumptions, views, and practices that characterize a given developmental strategy, should be one based on improving the well being of the general population, especially the masses.

The specific thrust in this chapter centers on industrialization and economic integration, the content and character of agriculture, the mechanisms of distribution, and the measures of unemployment control. The intended goals presently seem to be the ones directed toward a genuine development of these countries and the eventual elimination of post-colonial linkages, bearing in mind that prior to the capture of state power, the trend was only geared towards growth without development. The remaining chapter is based on the exposition of these crucial issues.

Industrialization and Economic Integration

Mozambique and Guinea Bissau before independence and following the colonial capitalist strategy of development were the depository of some industrial formulations. The importance of industrialization in underdeveloped
countries has received enormous support among many economists. Raul Prebisch in his article "Commercial Policy in Underdeveloped Countries", on discussing industrialization of peripheral countries states that

indeed, industrialization is an inescapable part of the process of change accompanying a gradual improvement in per capita income...industry and technical advance in primary production are thus complementary aspects of the same process. And in this process industry plays a dynamic role, not only in inducing technical progress in primary and other activities, but in the new attitudes fostered by industrial development.  

Others believe that successful industrialization depends upon the attainment of an agricultural surplus, and indeed the pace of industrialization they maintain, could be very well confined to the rate of agricultural progress; hence the primacy of agriculture in development.

Industrial activities in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau before the capture of the state political power were virtually confined to mining and very light industries. Guinea Bissau had practically no industries. The only activities that were closer to this categorization according to Gerald Chaliand were composed of a few "small factories, including three rice husking factories, two groundnut processing factories, one paper pulp factory, and two brick factories".

Recent accounts show a strong agreement not only on the absence of any industrial base in the colonial period, but also the existence of only two industrial plants: a groundnut processing plant (140 workers) and a

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144 Raul Prebisch, "Commercial Policy in Underdeveloped Countries", adapted from op. cit., Meier, pp. 286-287.

145 Ibid., p. 285.

146 Chaliand, op. cit., p. 7.
beer/soft drink plant employing 70 people. This deliberate effort at stagnating industrial or technical progress, could be better perceived in the benign neglect of industrialization in Guinea Bissau's Third National Development Plan, 1968-1973. As Table 1 indicates, only (25.4%) 5.1 million escudos were allocated for industry in 1968, and nothing in 1970 or the subsequent years. (See Table 2)

The allocation of 5.1 million escudos for industry out of a total national budget of 204 million escudos, as Table 1 indicates should not be interpreted as a serious commitment to build a genuine industrial base in Guinea Bissau. The real objective seems to be that of constructing an industrial project that was to meet Portugal's own economic needs. Colonialism and/or neo-colonialism, here like everywhere, had as its foremost goal, the direct and indirect exploitation of the host territory. Hence, in 1969 and again in 1970, as Table 2 shows, virtually nothing was allocated for new industrial projects in the Third National Development Plan. This seems to suggest that there was no real intention on the part of those in charge to build a concrete industrial base.

During this period, and because of the heroism of the guerrillas and the growing recognition accorded the PAIGC by the United Nations, which in turn helped to uncover the atrocities of Portuguese colonialism and dramatized support for the PAIGC, Portugal had to engage in cosmetic projects aimed at reversing her sinking pride in the eyes of the world organization.  

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148 For other cosmetic "reforms" and actions of Portugal, see Cabral, op. cit., p. 25.
### TABLE 1

Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea


(million escudos)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>1969</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, forestry, and livestock</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>72.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processing Industries</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural improvement</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric power</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and communications</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>77.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and research</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parks and urbanization</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>204.6</td>
<td>210.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 2

Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea

**Third National Development Plan: 1968-1973**

Programme of Expenditures for 1970

(million escudos)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agriculture, forestry, and livestock</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of resources</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigation and settlement</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural credit</td>
<td>1,018,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Industry (New)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>72,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rural improvements</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic and social development</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transport, communications, and meteorology</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>4,766,168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ports and navigation</td>
<td>8,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air transport</td>
<td>4,008,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunications</td>
<td>15,065,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meterology</td>
<td>313,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tourism</strong></td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td>5,188,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Research</strong></td>
<td>2,501,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public health</strong></td>
<td>44,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>44,140,168</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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l/ Ibid., para. 50.

Source: (same as previous page)

Therefore, to contend that the allocation of 5.1 million escudos for construction in 1968 was designed to launch a consistent industrialization program in Guinea Bissau is a flagrant mutation of reality. This position finds additional support in the fact that in many years as was the practice before 1968, hardly anything was allocated to industrial development. For example, in 1969 of a total of 210 million escudos as Table 1 indicates, nothing was allocated to a new industrial construction. Furthermore, of the 45 million escudos allocated to the Third National Development Plan, in 1970, as Table 2 indicates, nothing again was assigned to new industrial construction.

The consequences of the neglect to build a firm industrial base can be far reaching, especially if the process of acquiring the necessary funds for this venture is unquestionably a gradual one. Since the process of capital acquisition is slow, the correct approach to industrialization should have become one characterized by a steady and continuous attempt to introduce and expand Guinea Bissau's industrial base. Such a measure would greatly have become the foundation of a gradual production of necessary industrial goods with all the accompanying advantages.

However, such a policy was not pursued by Portugal, because of the impact it could have on her economy, especially when Guinea Bissau was an important colony that was the dumping ground of Portuguese manufactured goods. Hence, the immediate consequence on industrialization with regard to Guinea Bissau, is that it simply delayed or totally strangled the development of a solid industrial base.
Mozambique, on the other hand, had a relatively richer industrial heritage. The major industries were confined to crude oil refining, cement, coal, sugar, beer, etc., as Table 3 below indicates:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>1973</th>
<th>1974</th>
<th>1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crude oil refining</td>
<td>738,615</td>
<td>485,068</td>
<td>433,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement</td>
<td>611,078</td>
<td>465,094</td>
<td>281,276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>394,195</td>
<td>425,841</td>
<td>574,784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel oil</td>
<td>366,672</td>
<td>241,299</td>
<td>172,486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>293,569</td>
<td>265,546</td>
<td>227,823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diesel oil</td>
<td>166,644</td>
<td>126,882</td>
<td>95,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood (cubic metre)</td>
<td>142,644</td>
<td>111,595</td>
<td>92,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petrol</td>
<td>119,964</td>
<td>70,721</td>
<td>62,793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat flour</td>
<td>88,783</td>
<td>81,568</td>
<td>70,569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beer (hectolitres)</td>
<td>770,620</td>
<td>808,170</td>
<td>965,050</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is important to note that those who owned and controlled these industries were essentially Portuguese nationals or immigrants and people of European descent in North America, Europe or South Africa, whose interest was simply sparked by the motive for quick profit.
Mining in Mozambique is also an important industrial arm of the country, concentrated in coal, bauxite, cooper ore, and salt. (See Table 4. The concentration of economic activities by multinational companies in Mozambique were mainly in this sector and this was partly due to the profits it commanded.

**TABLE 4**

**Mining in Mozambique**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MINING</th>
<th>('000 metric tons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>425.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauxite</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper ore (metal content)</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>31</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


As Table 4 indicates, coal production in 1974 stood at over 425,000 metric tons, 574,000 in 1975 and 450,000 metric tons in 1977. Copper ore production in 1974, on the other hand, was 14,000 metric tons, 25,000 in 1975, and by 1977 the total production was 30,000 metric tons. These two examples seem to illustrate the intensity of mining in the colonial economy of Mozambique.
The multiplicity of a good variety of industrial products by inspection, leaves the false impression of a solid industrially based economy. (See Table 5)

**TABLE 5**

**Industry - Selected Products in Mozambique**

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Wheat flour</td>
<td>81.6</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>65*</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw sugar</td>
<td>300*</td>
<td>260*</td>
<td>220*</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
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<td>Tea (made)</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>13.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Margarine</td>
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<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beer</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cigarettes</td>
<td>2696</td>
<td>2800</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>3100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton yarn</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woven cotton fabrics</td>
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<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jute fabrics</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
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<td>Motor spirit (petrol)</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Distillate fuel oils</td>
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<td>94.9</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>90*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Residual fuel oils</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cement</td>
<td>465.1</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>220*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric energy</td>
<td>747*</td>
<td>658*</td>
<td>1911*</td>
<td>4940*</td>
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</table>


It could also have been capitalized on by Portugal in an attempt to justify her "civilizing" mission to Africa in view of mounting criticism from the United Nations and many private humanitarian organizations.
The existence of these industries was not calculated at achieving development, nor were they set up to provide for the needs of the people of Mozambique. The existence of these industries following the colonial capitalist strategy was neither governed by any laws of national concern nor by moral overtones. Industrial activities were designed to help Portugal and other metropoles achieve their aim of economic aggrandizement. These industries in the main, served the interest of the colonial power since Portugal controlled and received a good proportion of the products from these industries. In addition, many of these industries lacked forward linkages beneficial to Mozambique. This would be further elaborated in the course of the discussion. Therefore, whether it was within the confines of industries like crude oil refining, coal diesel oil, and the others, the forward linkages where in Portugal for the benefit of the Portuguese citizens. In addition, mining which is a corollary of industry and highly concentrated in coal, bauxite, copper ore, and salt as Table 4 indicates, was for the same reason geared towards enhancing the economic aggrandizement of the metropoles, which in turn intensified their imperialist voracity in terms of increased "investments" and trade advantages. Information about the various investments made by foreign countries in Mozambique for example, is fragmentary, but available information speaks to the fact that towards the end of the colonial period, South Africa, Portugal, Great Britain, and the United States were the leading countries. These countries are also the major importers of Mozambican goods and dumpers of manufactured goods in Mozambique.

\[149\] Mittleman, op. cit., pp. 24-32.
As Tables 6 and 7 show, the principal trading partners of Mozambique were essentially those countries that were engaged in her total exploitation, stagnation, and domination, especially Portugal. Thus, in both the export and import sectors, Mozambique was principally dominated by the metropolitan countries.

In Table 6, we can see that in 1961 for example, the total exports to Portugal by value was 1048 million escudos, 1151 million escudos in 1965, and 1679 million in 1969, and these accounted for 41%, 37%, and 41% respectively of Mozambique's total exports. The United Kingdom on the other hand, bought 7.7% of Mozambique's total exports in 1961, 4.6% in 1965 and 4.8% in 1969. As Table 6 also shows South Africa was also a major purchaser of Mozambican exports. The total purchase in 1961 amounted to 94 million escudos, and in 1965 the figure stood at 360 million, while in 1969 it had risen to 420 million escudos. Analyzing these figures, the data indicates that they correspond to 3.7%, 10.9%, and 10.4% of Mozambique's total exports, respectively. Other principal countries included the United States, India, and West Germany.

There is also a repetition of this phenomenon in the import sector of the Mozambican economy, in that, the major countries that controlled the export sectors were also the most dominant in the sectors. For example, Portugal's exports to Mozambique in 1961, 1965, and 1969 constituted 30%, 34%, and 31%, respectively of Mozambique's total imports. Indeed from 1961 to 1973 as the data presented show the average range from 29% to 30%. The same is true for Great Britain, the United States, West Germany and other metropolitan countries. The important point that we wish to emphasize again is that following the colonial capitalist approach to development in Mozambique, metropolitan countries were the principal determinants and controllers of Mozambique's economy.
### Mozambique's Trading Partners (Exports Only)

#### Year

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<th>Geographic regions and main countries</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1969</th>
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<td>%</td>
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4368 | 97.6(97.1) | 4438 | 96.2 | 4634 | 97.2 | 5357 |
129 | 2.4(2.9) | 175 | 3.8 | 134 | 2.8 | 184 |

4497 | 100.0 | 4613 | 100.0 | 4768 | 100.0 | 5541 |

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Source: Europa Statistical Record, 1972.
In both the industrial and agricultural sectors, investment interlocked subsidiaries affiliated to a few financial groups. The Anglo-American Corporation which consisted of South African, the British, and American capital led to a complex network of ownership in Mozambique. The high dominance of foreign capital explains the extent to which growth depended on outside forces. Many of the industries set up, had no backward or forward integration within the confines of these economies. Many industries served a functional need of processing raw agricultural materials for use overseas, hence, a form of forward linkage controlled from outside, both in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, to the detriment of these countries. By the same token, backward linkages were hardly developed, for example, in both Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, vegetable products for use in some industries, rather than being developed in these countries, were virtually imported. We shall try to provide the reason for the pursuit of a policy of this kind later in the study. Other items like food, beverages and tobacco, that made up part of the imports of Guinea Bissau could be produced in the country. (See Table 8).

Mozambique's case is even severer. Among her principal imports were animals and aminal products, oil, foodstuffs, beverages, tobacco and others. Like in the case of Guinea Bissau, all these products could indeed be produced in Mozambique. As a matter of fact, even items like shoes, hats, materials for paper production, rubber and other synthetic plastics, could be easily made in Mozambique. (See Table 9).

The advantages that Mozambique could have had in producing these items internally can be easily quantified, especially with regard to its impact on the national economy.
The inability of the Portuguese to pursue a policy that would lead to the production of these items locally, leaves enough grounds for speculation.

**TABLE 8**

**Mozambique: Principal Import Commodities, (1969-1971)**

('000 contos)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPORTS</th>
<th>1969</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food, Beverages, and Tobacco</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetable Products</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mineral Products</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>1010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Products</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles</td>
<td>1069</td>
<td>1080</td>
<td>1011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery</td>
<td>1210</td>
<td>1822</td>
<td>1744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport Equipment</td>
<td>1064</td>
<td>1444</td>
<td>1281</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Europa Statistical Record, 1972.

The nature of such a speculation must take into consideration the fact that the principal concern of Portugal and other metropolitan countries that were engaged in the economic activities of these countries was that of quick profits. This being said it is not difficult then to comprehend the reasons behind the nature of Portuguese strategy vis-a-vis national development, especially with regard to export and import sectors.
Table 9
Guinea Bissau: Principal Import Commodities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1974</th>
<th>1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Animals and animal products</td>
<td>33,706.5</td>
<td>58,629.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetable products</td>
<td>322,132.0</td>
<td>163,212.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal and vegetable fats and oils</td>
<td>7,509.9</td>
<td>4,872.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foodstuffs, beverages, and tobacco</td>
<td>140,228.9</td>
<td>81,195.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mineral products</td>
<td>172,855.9</td>
<td>157,035.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical products</td>
<td>55,948.3</td>
<td>46,015.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synthetic plastics, resins and rubber</td>
<td>9,432.3</td>
<td>7,316.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood, cork, and charcoal and products</td>
<td>4,742.8</td>
<td>2,892.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood materials for paper production and products</td>
<td>1,132.5</td>
<td>9,054.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles and textile products</td>
<td>114,418.3</td>
<td>109,852.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoes, hats, and artificial flowers</td>
<td>11,566.4</td>
<td>12,766.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stone, clay, ceramic, and glassware</td>
<td>9,934.5</td>
<td>3,866.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base metals and products</td>
<td>89,596.3</td>
<td>34,404.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical machinery and appliances</td>
<td>52,394.2</td>
<td>35,055.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport equipment</td>
<td>27,090.1</td>
<td>218,359.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precision instruments</td>
<td>13,822.9</td>
<td>8,705.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art objects and antiquities</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8,925.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>16,981.4</td>
<td>311.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,095,331.3</td>
<td>965,360.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What we see here, is a metropolitan conspiracy to hold Mozambique and Guinea Bissau in a state of permanent dependency. As Table 8 and Table 9 indicate, imports like food, beverages, tobacco, vegetable products, synthetic products, hides and skins, shoes, hats, artificial flowers, stone, clay, and others, in both Mozambique and Guinea Bissau that formed a reasonable proportion of imported items, could be cultivated internally. The necessary climatic conditions exist in cultivating or even raising some of the products that formed a good proportion of the imported items. By producing these products locally, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau would gain substantially from the point of view of expanding economic activities. However, this line of action was never pursued. Importing these basic items from overseas instead became the identified policy since it was to the greater benefit of metropolitan countries.

There was a rudimentary display of disarticulation in these countries; a state of the economy of a nation whose parts or sectors are not complementary. This state of disarticulation was also expressive in the transport system, and the export crop sectors, which in some instances resulted in severe disequilibrium.

The existence and multiplicity of industries in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau following the colonial capitalist approach to development did little to develop these economies. These capital investments were set up to serve the needs of Western capitalist countries and not the people of Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. It was, in other words, an outward directed "development". In addition, the overall profits went into the accounts of the investing

foreign companies and were easily repatriated to the metropoles. They depleted the natural and human resources in the host territory. They promoted regional disparities including industrial growth in the coastal cities, like Beira and Lourenzo Marques in Mozambique, and Bissau in Guinea Bissau, alongside a stagnating interior. These industries wherever they existed, contributed to the disruption of the indigenous patterns of development, helped to foster a comprador class, and further oriented the economies away from domestic consumption needs towards a reliance on production for export. Building a strong local economy and providing for social welfare were of little concern to foreign investors.\textsuperscript{151} This question of import-substitution in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau seemed to create the impression of a stage-like descent to industrialization. The process has been proven wrong from the experience of Latin American countries.\textsuperscript{152}

Our evaluation of Mozambique and Guinea Bissau points towards the fact that industrial activities via import-substitution, virtually controlled by foreigners and characterized by persistent transfers of income, led only to growth and not development. In the view of Philip Ehrensaft, it resulted in an economy whose

\textsuperscript{151}Op. cit., Mittleman, p.47

market was largely restricted within national boundaries. Export still consist of overwhelming raw materials, industry was characterized by high cost and low efficiency, and the majority of the population seemed locked in conditions of low income revenue, illiteracy, and low life expectancy. 153

Such an economy is characterized by heavy dominance by foreign powers essentially Portugal, with a growth process generated and controlled from outside, devoid of any form of chance for internal generation, and one that only resulted in the "development of underdevelopment". That is to say, a country remains in a state of permanent stagnation. Guinea Bissau presents such a case where in a typical year, the total value of imports became ten times larger than the exports. (See Table 10).

Table 10 displays this state of underdevelopment. As we can see in 1974 for example, the total value of exports amounted to 74,377.1 (in '000 escudos), while in the same year the total imports were 1,095,331.5. Again in 1975, the total value of exports amounted to 157,361.2 (in '000 escudos), while for the same year the imports amounted to 965,360.4. If we can extend or rather further analyze the data presented, it means therefore, that in 1974 alone, the imports of Guinea Bissau were about 13 times its exports. For the year 1975, it was about 6 times its exports.

The difficulty that this presents with regard to national development is clearly evident. It is even more aggravating when one considers the fact that the principal imports, as we have already stated, could indeed have

### TABLE 10

**Guinea Bissau: Principal Commodities - Exports and Imports**

('000 escudos)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXPORTS</th>
<th>1974</th>
<th>1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Animal and animal products</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,135.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetable products</td>
<td>58,928.9</td>
<td>129,642.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal and vegetable fats and oils</td>
<td>872.6</td>
<td>1,786.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foodstuffs, beverages, and tobacco</td>
<td>1,583.0</td>
<td>8,618.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mineral products</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>473.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skins and hides</td>
<td>893.2</td>
<td>1,079.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood, cork and charcoal and products</td>
<td>4,696.9</td>
<td>13,304.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles and textile products</td>
<td>1,844.4</td>
<td>212.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base metals and products</td>
<td>1,237.2</td>
<td>172.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical, machinery, and appliances</td>
<td>914.0</td>
<td>246.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport equipment</td>
<td>2,375.4</td>
<td>486.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precision instruments</td>
<td>564.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>393.0</td>
<td>66.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>74,377.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>157,361.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

been produced locally in Guinea Bissau. The major long term consequences of this line of policy is that it puts Guinea Bissau in a state of permanent dependence on Portugal and other metropolitan countries. From this perspective therefore, the ensuing consequence becomes therefore obvious; that is to say, the process of national development would be severely strangled. The pursuit of national development following the Unified Approach would in the main, be our next major concern.
TABLE 10
(Continued)

Guinea Bissau: Principal Commodities - Exports and Imports

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<tr>
<td>Precision instruments</td>
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<td>8,795.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art objects and antiquities</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8,925.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>16,981.4</td>
<td>311.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1,095,331.3  965,360.4

Since the adoption of the Unified Approach, industrialization, in both Mozambique and Guinea Bissau have taken a different turn. But it must be noted from the outset that these two countries face severe economic problems because of the war of independence that brought the economy to a halt; and also the mass exodus of the Portuguese, who were the controllers of economic life in these countries. The extent of the damage could be easily realized from the acts of sabotage that the Portuguese perpetuated to cripple these countries. Secondly, these two revolutionary African states have decided to give priority first, to the proper development of agriculture, and then industry. Official development policies expressed during the Third National Congress of FRELIMO in February 1977, emphasized that first priority must be given to agriculture, followed by efforts to expand industrial production.\textsuperscript{154} In the case of Guinea, as the U.S. 
\textit{Foreign Economic Trends} (1981) correctly stated, "the government of Guinea Bissau continues to place self-sufficiency in agriculture as its top priority".\textsuperscript{155} There is still a continual lag of output figures behind the pre-independence levels (See Tables, 3, 4, 5).

The development of new industries is weighted heavily against the needs and concrete situations confronting these countries. This is not to say that there is a virtual neglect of this aspect of development. Eduardo Mondlane, the first president of FRELIMO, for example, wrote in 1969 that heavy industry and mineral extraction "will not be neglected because of any theory about the primacy of agricultural development".\textsuperscript{156} Even the long range goals of


FRELIMO for example is that of "making the building of heavy industry the decisive factor in the battle to break with misery and imperialist domination".  

In addition, Samora Machel in his closing address to the Third Congress of FRELIMO states that "the Party defines as the fundamental strategy of our development, the setting up of agriculture as the base and industry as the driving force. The construction of heavy industry is the decisive factor in the conquest of our economic independence". In Mozambique, for example, Allen Isaacman reported of extensive industrial reorganization plans by the government, especially the establishment of shop-floor production councils.

However, given the situation at the moment, and granted that this aspect of development involves the use of a large size of the limited incomes in these countries, industrial development has been limited to retaining some old industries and the gradual introduction of new ones. Since the priority of development is given to agriculture, new industries are much channelled to agricultural industries and other basic necessities in these countries.

In Guinea Bissau, for example, African Development stated that "small industrial units are being created in the countryside and projects exist for factories making fruit juice, textiles, shoes, furniture, etc.".

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160 Ibid., p. 62.

Similarly, in Mozambique during the most recent Fourth Party Congress held in April, 1983, it was recommended that the focus of industrialization should be based on small projects instead of heavy industries.\textsuperscript{162} Despite this apparent heavy commitment to agricultural development, a substantial effort is also being made to develop the industrial sector in these two countries. In the case of Guinea Bissau, for example, up to ten percent of the annual budget is given to industrial activities.\textsuperscript{163}

Secondly, unlike before independence, when virtually all the industries were located in the big cities, industrial activities in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau are slowly deviating from this tradition. In Guinea Bissau, for example, Africa Research Bulletin reports about the location of a joint company making footwear in Bolama, as a good example. It began production in 1980 with an initial output of 1,000 pairs of shoes a day.\textsuperscript{164} Others are also found in Bafato, Gabou, etc.

Furthermore, unlike the situation under Portuguese rule, many industries in these countries have been nationalized, and to say the least there is an impressive state control over many industries.\textsuperscript{165} For example, according to Africa Research Bulletin, "the Mozambique Government nationalized six Portuguese companies within a week at the end of August... accused of


\textsuperscript{163}For more information, see Economic Trends, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C., 1980.

\textsuperscript{164}See Africa Research Bulletin, Vol. 16, No. 4, (April 15 - May 14, 1979),

\textsuperscript{165}Africa Research Bulletin, Vol. 16, No. 8, (September, 1979), p. 524A.
economic sabotage incompetence and negligence on the part of the foreign proprietors".166

In addition, these governments have tried to rejuvenate local crafts and industries in rural areas. These are essentially calculated at creating some form of backward linkages to existing industries as well as new ones being built, with the hope of achieving in the long run a firm and integrated economy in both these countries.167 Finally, the organizational character of these industries is now different. Unlike before, workers now play a strong participatory role in the daily affairs of the industries.168 Workers have been given increased control over management and production.169 In Mozambique, for example, an organization known as the Dynamizing Groups, has politicized the workers and instilled in them a sense of collectivity and mutual responsibility that has helped to change work habits. In Guinea Bissau, on the other hand, workers councils exist that help the workers to resolve disputes and other problems, and also create a link between the management and the workers.170 Similarly, in Mozambique there is also a repetition of this practice.171 These governments have also stimulated the

166 Isaacman, op. cit., p. 58.

167 Paul Streeten has demonstrated in "Industrialization in a Unified Development Strategy", that to raise above poverty industrialization means the application of power to production and transport. Output and consumption per head can rise toward the desired modern levels only with the help of mechanical aids. In this sense development including rural development is industrialization. See Paul Streeten, "Industrialization in a Unified Development Strategy", World Development, Vol. 3 (January, 1975), pp. 1-2.

168 Isaacman, op. cit., p. 60.

169 Ibid., pp. 60-61.


171 Isaacman, op. cit., p. 60.
institution of weekend classes for workers, training on the job, and provided free literacy classes.

In addition to all that we have discussed, Production Councils exist in which workers under each council meet on a daily basis to discuss and resolve issues related to technical difficulties, worker relationships, and social problems, including concerns about health, alcoholism and other personal difficulties affecting members of the unit. To say the least, these measures have resulted in a sharp decline in indiscipline, lateness, absenteeism, and on-the-job alcoholism.

This approach is more useful on wider grounds. It means that the failure of individuals to carry out specific tasks or of the production unit to achieve certain stipulated goals is seriously analyzed, and severe pressure placed on those concerned to improve the quality of their work and hence improve their performance. In addition, when indiscipline is involved as Allen Isaacman states,

the particular production unit devotes a great deal of time and energy to reeducating the recalcitrant individual. If unsuccessful, the problem is brought to the Production Council which decides the appropriate action, which typically includes afterwork study meetings with members of the Dynamizing Groups, several days of work with pay, or demotion to a less desirable job.172

All these create a sense of belonging which in the long run will certainly yield positive results. But an important concern is also that of building a strong agricultural foundation. This would constitute the major concern of our next discussion.

172Ibid., pp. 60-61.
Agriculture

Agriculture, including fishing and forestry, has always been the backbone of the economies of Mozambique and Guinea Bissau engaging about 80-90 percent of the population. The importance of developing an early agricultural base in the life of every nation has received a lot of support from many development economists. For instance, Lloyd C. Reynolds in *Agriculture in Development Theory*, (1979), strongly opposed the view and practice of making industry as the focal point of economic development, as is much often practiced in many countries, with agriculture remaining in the shadow of development and playing only the role of resource reservoir.¹⁷³ Arnon I., in *Modernization of Agriculture in Developing Countries: Resources Potentials and Problems*, (1981), seems to support the views of Reynolds about the importance of agriculture in development when he states that agriculture has been largely neglected by policymakers, economists, and planners in many developing countries on the assumption that all, or any way most of their available resources should be devoted to the development of industry. Experience has shown, however that development is not likely to occur if agricultural productivity is not increased as a prelude to industrial growth.¹⁷⁴

The importance of this phenomenon has increasingly called for a genuine effort of integrating real agricultural development into the overall development policy in developing countries. However, it must be made clear that the emphasis should not be one based on the development of export crops,


but rather on expanding basic food crops necessary for the internal consumption in any nation. From this perspective therefore, agriculture plays a very important role in the overall development of nations.\footnote{175}

In Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, prior to independence like in many African countries today, the focus of agricultural practice in these two revolutionary states was remarkable for its dual division: mainly the commercial sector and the rural sector. The commercial sector which was the main area of governmental focus, cultivated mainly export crops for shipment to Portugal and other Western countries,\footnote{176} while the rural was totally neglected despite the fact that it was this sector that was responsible for the livelihood of the population. This indeed constituted the main approach to agricultural development in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau.

Specifically, in the case of Mozambique for example, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, six major agricultural commodities can be identified.\footnote{177} They are cashew, sugar, tobacco, cotton, copra, and sisal. (See Table 11).


\footnotetext[176]{The Economist Intelligence Unit, "Angola, Mozambique", Quarterly Economic Review, (1975), Annual Supplement, pp. 1-20.}

\footnotetext[177]{Chaliand, op. cit., p. 5. See also Mittleman, op. cit., p. 27.}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cotton lint</td>
<td>40,777</td>
<td>344,933</td>
<td>31,564</td>
<td>32,445</td>
<td>31,339</td>
<td>28,164</td>
<td>38,227</td>
<td>38,887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cashew (unshelled)</td>
<td>84,583</td>
<td>80,478</td>
<td>119,210</td>
<td>124,293</td>
<td>98,668</td>
<td>77,235</td>
<td>109,451</td>
<td>131,146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>113,843</td>
<td>129,931</td>
<td>124,896</td>
<td>83,347</td>
<td>94,936</td>
<td>147,069</td>
<td>109,451</td>
<td>131,812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sisal</td>
<td>28,427</td>
<td>29,643</td>
<td>29,680</td>
<td>31,581</td>
<td>31,381</td>
<td>26,694</td>
<td>23,172</td>
<td>25,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea</td>
<td>9,905</td>
<td>8,989</td>
<td>8,438</td>
<td>9,017</td>
<td>10,091</td>
<td>12,950</td>
<td>14,410</td>
<td>14,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copra</td>
<td>60,070</td>
<td>52,794</td>
<td>46,433</td>
<td>43,812</td>
<td>28,574</td>
<td>33,919</td>
<td>42,948</td>
<td>46,776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>6,958</td>
<td>25,412</td>
<td>121,852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cashew nuts</td>
<td>1,058</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>2,685</td>
<td>3,503</td>
<td>4,005</td>
<td>5,729</td>
<td>8,080</td>
<td>10,372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oilseed residues</td>
<td>9,587</td>
<td>7,918</td>
<td>14,963</td>
<td>17,893</td>
<td>20,189</td>
<td>13,571</td>
<td>21,361</td>
<td>26,213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>3,331</td>
<td>7,285</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>1,058</td>
<td>4,036</td>
<td>5,306</td>
<td>4,381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>1,147</td>
<td>1,210</td>
<td>1,017</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>939</td>
<td>933</td>
<td>1,506</td>
<td>1,721</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Taken the above major commodities as a whole, these export crops earned millions of escudos and according to the E.T.U., 70% of all export earning was attributed to these crops.\textsuperscript{178} (See Table 12 for values).

As Table 11 indicates the total output of cashew in 1961 was 84,583 metric tons, and in 1963 119,210 metric tons. By 1968 the total output had reached 131,146 metric tons. Taking sugar as our second example, the data shows that in 1961, the total output was 113,843 metric tons, and progressively, the figure in 1968 stood at 131,812 metric tons. Tobacco also shows the same increases from about 1,147 metric tons in 1961 to 1,721 tons in 1968. These crops constituted a very significant proportion of Mozambique's export. The importance of these crops could even be easily captured by examining the value vis-a-vis Mozambique's export earnings.

As Table 12 shows, the value of Mozambique's export of cashew in 1961 amounted to 315 million escudos. By 1965, it had reached 492 million and in 1968 as the data indicates, it climbed to 695 million escudos. Others like sugar show the same increase. For example in 1961 the total value of exported cotton was 324 million escudos, and by 1968 it climbed to 411 million escudos. In addition, tobacco was 28 million in 1961 and by 1968 the total value of tobacco was 65 million escudos. These figures serve the useful purpose of illustrating the fact that during the colonial capitalist approach the major emphasis on agriculture was essentially in the export of cash crops.

The purpose of this approach to development, specifically in the case of Mozambique, shall be examined later. For now, it is important to continue the practice of agriculture following the colonial capitalist approach.

\textsuperscript{178} Ibid., p. 5.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cotton lint</td>
<td>690.3</td>
<td>607.0</td>
<td>523.2</td>
<td>564.8</td>
<td>553.7</td>
<td>491.9</td>
<td>638.5</td>
<td>635.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cashew (unshelled)</td>
<td>315.0</td>
<td>230.9</td>
<td>404.1</td>
<td>516.9</td>
<td>492.4</td>
<td>436.5</td>
<td>308.6</td>
<td>695.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>324.9</td>
<td>345.1</td>
<td>327.5</td>
<td>245.7</td>
<td>291.8</td>
<td>466.1</td>
<td>329.1</td>
<td>411.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sisal</td>
<td>162.1</td>
<td>166.8</td>
<td>261.6</td>
<td>274.4</td>
<td>174.9</td>
<td>128.9</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>91.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea</td>
<td>235.7</td>
<td>179.6</td>
<td>155.4</td>
<td>163.9</td>
<td>205.5</td>
<td>254.0</td>
<td>259.4</td>
<td>295.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copra</td>
<td>266.9</td>
<td>204.5</td>
<td>204.0</td>
<td>208.3</td>
<td>168.0</td>
<td>168.6</td>
<td>191.4</td>
<td>277.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>180.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cashew nuts</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>91.5</td>
<td>110.8</td>
<td>161.1</td>
<td>222.8</td>
<td>329.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oilseed residues</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>114.8</td>
<td>149.8</td>
<td>190.4</td>
<td>133.0</td>
<td>190.3</td>
<td>237.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>65.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Under the Portuguese rule aside from forced labor, forced cultivation of export crops were imposed on Africans in the traditional sector to meet the needs of Portuguese industries overseas. The main concentration of crops in the traditional sector as Table 13 shows was in the main made up of manioc, maize, sorghum, cashew nuts, rice, bananas, citrus fruits, sugar cane, cotton, tea, copra, and sisal. In certain instances, export crops were taken as tributes by the Portuguese. Therefore, within the traditional sector, both necessary food crops and the cultivation of export crops were very common in Mozambique and in certain instances, peasants were also compelled to enter the export crop production, on the assumption that resulting incomes would create the necessary conditions for some sort of multiplier effect, and begin the spread of development throughout the national economy. The falsity of this claim is easily proven by the poor conditions of the masses of Mozambique.

To say the least, the neglect to focus agriculture also on the production of basic food crops by the government, means that the nutritional needs of the greater part of the population, mainly Africa, would greatly remain unsatisfied. The concentration of agriculture in the production of export crops as we have seen only served the useful purpose of satisfying the economic needs of Portugal and other metropolitan centers to the disadvantage of the inhabitants of Mozambique. That is to say, the basic needs of the people of Mozambique was left unsatisfied and the accompanying consequences meant misery and starvation.

---

179 Gibson, op. cit., pp. 190-191.
TABLE 13

Mozambique: Average Agricultural Production 1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principal crops</th>
<th>Production</th>
<th>Cultivated areas (hectares)</th>
<th>Number of farmers</th>
<th>Own consumption (tons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manioc (dry)</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>650,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorghum</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>275,000</td>
<td>430,000</td>
<td>310,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cashew nuts</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>115,000</td>
<td>520,000</td>
<td>75,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banana</td>
<td>27,000*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citrus fruits</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>230,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar cane</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>1,231</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>450,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cashew (unshelled)</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea (green leaf)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copra</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>230,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sisal</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note also that output production per capita in each sector is not shown, because such data is not available.*
### TABLE 13
(Continued)

**Mozambique: Average Agricultural Production**

1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principal crops</th>
<th>Developed Sector</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Developed Sector</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Production (tons)</td>
<td>Cultivated areas (hectares)</td>
<td>Number of enterprises</td>
<td>Production (tons)</td>
<td>Cultivated areas (hectares)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manioc (dry)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>380,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorghum</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>220,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cashew nuts</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>115,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>65,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banana</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citrus fruits</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar cane</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,615,000</td>
<td>35,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>315,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cashew (unshelled)</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea (green leaf)</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copra</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sisal</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similarly, in Guinea Bissau the principal agricultural concentration was centered on the cultivation of export crops for use in Portugal and the metropolitan countries. Thus, the principal pre-occupation of agriculture to the neglect of basic domestic needs as Table 14 shows, was based on the cultivation of peanuts, cashew, coconuts, palm kernels and others. (See Table 14).

This approach to agricultural development as in the case of Mozambique is wrong. Aside from the neglect of the production of basic staple foods, export crop production, as a strategy of development is highly vulnerable to the persistent fluctuation of prices as well as the conspiracies of Western capitalist countries. Since the domestic nutritional needs of the people must be met, it would mean that a sizeable amount of the national income of the country would be devoted to pay for the import of basic staple foods. The immediate consequences to the masses in Guinea Bissau is clearly evident, and to say the least, it would mean the inauguration of a condition of persistent poverty.

The gravity of the problem could be much more perceived if one considers the fact that those who determined and controlled the prices of the internal market for these export crops in Guinea Bissau, were essentially Portuguese nationals. More often than not, the prices offered were only a small fraction of the actual value of these crops. In the long run it was Portugal and other metropolitan countries that stood to gain from such a policy. For one thing, and like the case of Mozambique, the possibility of quick profits were there and hence the justifications for its continuity.
### TABLE 14
Guinea Bissau Principal Export Crops
(1974-1977)
('000 metric tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1977</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rice (paddy)</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>40*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize*</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millet*</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorghum*</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roots and tubers*</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundnuts (in shell)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>30*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coconuts</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copra*</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palm kernels</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.3*</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palm oil*</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables and melons*</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plantains</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*FAO estimates

**Source:** FAO, Production Yearbook, 1978

Note also that output production per capita is not shown because such data is not available.
Groundnut production for example, was introduced and forced on the natives, therefore, superimposing its production at the expense of traditional subsistence agriculture. In many cases groundnuts had to be delivered to the Portuguese as a kind of forced tribute. Granted that so much emphasis was focused on growing groundnuts and other cash crops for export, the nutritional needs of Guinea Bissau was accordingly neglected. Thus, agriculture during the Portuguese era essentially was geared mainly towards satisfying Portuguese economic needs and aggrandizement.

In addition, the principal export crops, according to Gerald Chaliand, were almost totally sent to Portugal alone, so much so that, it could be said that Guinea Bissau's meager agricultural activities were totally dominated by Portugal, (see Table 15), which was also the depository of its forward linkages, and like the case of Mozambique, "development" increasingly became outward directed.

Using only one example, the case of Guinea Bissau, as Table 15 clearly illustrates, Portugal's dominance, could be judged from the fact that of a total yearly (1960), production of 74,000 tons of groundnuts for example, 99.96% of it was exported to Portugal. Other items like palm oil, hides, rubber, (100%) and others, were equally totally exported and controlled by Portugal. As Table 15 again shows, out of a total yearly output of 270 tons of rubber produced in Guinea Bissau, all of it was exported to Portugal.

181 Chaliand, op. cit., pp. 5-11.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Amount (in tons)</th>
<th>To Portugal (percent)</th>
<th>To colonies (percent)</th>
<th>To other countries (percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Groundnut (in shell)</td>
<td>74,000</td>
<td>99.96</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundnut (shelled)</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palm oil</td>
<td>1,260</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palm-cabbage</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>92.10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>83.30</td>
<td>16.50</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wax</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>95.10</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hides</td>
<td>1,059</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil-cakes</td>
<td>1,480</td>
<td>15.60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>84.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: These figures apply to the peace time period of 1958-60. The pattern also fitted the economy of many African countries under colonial or neo-colonial state.

In the case of hides as the data shows, of the total yearly output of 1,059 tons, all of it again was totally exported to Portugal. With regard to palm oil, 100% of it also went to Portugal, while wax, wood, palm, cabbage indicate that 95%, 83%, and 92% respectively, of the total production was sent to Portugal.
The futility of export led path to economic development via cash crop production and expansion has suffered greatly from the frontal attack of many eminent Radical/Africanist political economists who have always considered it an important shortcoming in African development ventures. Presenting their views in the *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul, considered the concentration of past development efforts in the export and extractive sectors of the African economies as sufficient reason to disengage from international capitalism, because it only leads to severe dependency.\(^{182}\)

Observed results in many African countries demonstrate that reliance on export crop production and expansion has only culminated in stagnation and total dependency.\(^{183}\) Hla Myint, in addition, contends that "the expansion of export production and the spread of the money economy have disrupted in varying degrees the economic self-sufficiency of the traditional subsistence economy".\(^{184}\)

This in other words, implies that African governments should ignore export production and according to Paul Prebish and Gunnar Myrdal, this strategy of development summarily leads to secular deterioration of the terms of trade.\(^{185}\) Furthermore, export crops are highly vulnerable to


persistent fluctuation of the price of these crops on the world market, making its dependence as an important pillar of development a very frustrating experience. Kwame Nkrumah delineated this frustrating result in the context of Ghana in his brilliant book, *Africa Must Unite*.

The fall in world prices of raw materials since the end of the Second World War has deprived the less developed countries of the staggering sum of 574,000 million,...fluctuations in primary product prices are one of the insecurities in planning for less developed countries.186

Damachi and Tahal further explains this phenomenon with empirical data when they stated that

in 1958, Ghana produced 255,000 tons of cocoa. In 1961 this had been increased to 432,000 tons. But as a result of the dramatic fall in cocoa prices over the same period, Ghana was receiving as much foreign exchange for 432,000 tons in 1961 as she did for the 255,000 tons in 1958.187

The above quotation indicates the fluctuation in prices of export crops in the world market and therefore, cannot be used as an effective tool of development. For example, the price of cocoa fell from $985.6 per ton to $504 per ton188 between 1958 and 1961. Even conservative economists, as Arthur Lewis on examining the export crop situation of developing countries from 1883-1965, found them considerably inadequate as a base for generating the necessary income for development as opposed to industrial production in developed countries.189


188 Ibid., p. 45.

Even the United Nations seemed to have rejected it. For example, the U.N. states that

the prospects of transforming a country's economy through the growth of the export sector depends to a great extent on the linkages of the export industries with other industries in the economy. The stronger these linkages are, the greater is the effect of a rise in exports of primary commodities in general develop only fairly weak industrial linkages. Increasingly, in addition to the export of primary commodities, it is a growing export trade in manufactures that the African countries have to seek. 190

Therefore, agricultural endeavors and practices in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau following the colonial capitalist strategy, as suggested by Western development economists before the capture of state political power, was not calculated at developing these economies, but instead was designed to satisfy the persistent greed of Portugal and other metropolitan centers, as we have clearly demonstrated. In addition, even the Financial Times made its doubts clear in the case of Mozambique. It pointedly stated that:

How much this sort of development would under present policies filter down to the majority of Mozambicans remains uncertain. For the time being, although reliable statistics are very hard to come by in Mozambique there is no doubt that wealth is held by an elite almost entirely European. 191

Equally, crucial within the domain of agriculture is the peculiar question of land and land utilization. The Unified Approach as a theory of national development maintains that participation by the masses in matters of development as well as structural reforms, to ensure that the


191 Financial Times, 18 August 1969. This series carries an introduction by Dalthazar Rebello de Sonsa, the Governor-General of Mozambique in 1969.
masses became the benefactors of development are very crucial requisites for the attainment of this objective. It is very clear that one of the essential steps in providing at least a meager opportunity lies in the accessibility of land to the masses.

In Guinea Bissau for example, before independence, large parts of the cultivable land was virtually under the control of few large and medium Portuguese agricultural companies. The Portuguese could hold three, or five, to fifty hectares, while the majority of Africans were limited to less than one to two hectares. (See Table 16).

The consequences of this phenomenon could be easily perceived when one considers the fact that agriculture is a major source of livelihood to the majority of Africans in Guinea Bissau, engaging over 90% of the national population. This therefore means that any policy by the government in power which attempts to limit the accessibility of land to the masses would have very severe consequences on them. It would mean that the chances of meeting the daily needs of the masses would be greatly reduced. More importantly, it would place many people out of work and hence, create the foundation of persistent unemployment with all its accompanying consequences. However, since Portuguese nationals essentially controlled political power, they used their power to protect the interest of other Portuguese in Guinea Bissau by placing limitations on the area of cultivable land that Africans could own, while at the same time giving Portuguese nationals the right to own whatever size of land they desired, as the data presented shows.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Cultivated Area of Holdings in Hectares</th>
<th>Number of Holdings Absolute Percent</th>
<th>Area in Hectares Absolute Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 0.5</td>
<td>2,844</td>
<td>1,136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*0.5 - 0.9</td>
<td>8,847</td>
<td>6,974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* 1 - 1.9</td>
<td>25,385</td>
<td>39,316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* 2 - 2.9</td>
<td>20,355</td>
<td>49,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@ 3 - 3.9</td>
<td>11,066</td>
<td>36,761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@ 4 - 4.9</td>
<td>6,777</td>
<td>30,044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@ 5 - 9.9</td>
<td>8,735</td>
<td>56,511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@ 10 - 19.9</td>
<td>2,639</td>
<td>33,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@ 20 - 49.9</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>8,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>86,951</td>
<td>262,570</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note that data showing per capita output is not available.
* Area of land held by Africans.
@ Area of land held by the Portuguese.
As Table 16 seems to indicate a large number of the people, mainly Africans were only allowed to maintain less than three hectares. For example, 2,844 Africans only owned 0.5 hectares of cultivable land, and 8,847 were permitted to hold between 0.5 - 0.9 hectares, while 25,385 and 20,355 were allowed to own only 1 - 1.9 and 2 - 2.9 hectares respectively. By contrast, Europeans mainly Portuguese, could own not only between 5 - 10 hectares, but also between 10 - 19 hectares, 20 - 49.9 hectares and even more. In brief, Europeans had no limit to the area of cultivable land to be acquired, while Africans were restricted to only one or two hectares of land for cultivation.

Similarly, in Mozambique, before independence a larger area of land was virtually under the control of the Portuguese. For example, about one percentage point of the population, essentially Portuguese, controlled almost fifty percent\(^{192}\) of the cultivable land. (See Table 17).

As Table 17 shows Africans could hold from less than one hectare to less than six hectares. This amounts to only fifty percent of cultivable land despite the fact that they made up more than 95% of the farming population. Information about the per capita output is not available. On the other hand, the Portuguese could hold from less than ten hectares to 2,500 hectares or more. Taken as a whole they held nearly 50% of the cultivable land despite the fact that they made up only less than 1% of the farming community.

The main concentration of Portuguese agriculture was in the modern or commercial sector. (See Table 18). In this sector the production of export crops was highly predominant. As Table 18 clearly indicates, Africans were absent from this sector and highly distinguished by the small size of their holdings.

---

### TABLE 17
Mozambique: Size of Holdings,
Number of Holdings and Area in Hectares, 1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Holding in Hectares</th>
<th>Number of Holdings Absolute</th>
<th>Number of Holdings Percent**</th>
<th>Area in Hectares Absolute</th>
<th>Area in Hectares Percent**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>African</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 0.1</td>
<td>18 478</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1 241</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1 - 0.19</td>
<td>53 820</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>8 339</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.2 - 0.49</td>
<td>233 779</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>82 536</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5 - 0.9</td>
<td>412 251</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>307 719</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 1.9</td>
<td>540 615</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>781 308</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - 2.9</td>
<td>232 901</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>561 233</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - 3.9</td>
<td>75 358</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>259 669</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 - 4.9</td>
<td>35 903</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>158 790</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 9.9</td>
<td>38 033</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>244 964</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 - 19.9*</td>
<td>6 996</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>91 212</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 - 49.9*</td>
<td>1 733</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>61 321</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 - 99.9*</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>18 962</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 - 199.9*</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>71 727</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200 - 499.9*</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>225 890</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500 - 999.9*</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>189 538</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 000 - 2 499.9*</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>402 840</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 500 +</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1 513 769</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1 652 328</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>4 981 058</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Holding in Hectares</th>
<th>Number of Holdings Percent</th>
<th>Area Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 2</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - 9.9</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 +</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>51.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 18

Mozambique: Showing Size of the Modern Sector of Agriculture

Number of Holdings and Area in Hectares, 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Holding in Hectares</th>
<th>Number of Holdings</th>
<th>Area in Hectares</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Absolute</td>
<td>Percent**</td>
<td>Absolute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 1.9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - 2.9</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - 3.9</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 - 4.9</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 9.9</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*10 - 19.9</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*20 - 49.9</td>
<td>1733</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>61321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*50 - 99.9</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>18962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*100 - 199.9</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>71727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*200 - 499.9</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>225890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*500 - 999.9</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>189538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*1000 - 2499.9</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>402840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*2500 +</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>1513769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>4626</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2487554</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Holding in Hectares</th>
<th>Number of Holdings</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 200</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200 - 2499.9</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2500 +</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mozambique. Missao de Inquerito Agricola de Mocambique.
Mem HD +2145 +M7 A3 1970

*Portuguese holdings in hectares.
Many Africans, our analysis discovered were concentrated in the traditional sector and despite the fact that they constituted over ninety percent of the farming population, they were only confined to fifty percent of the cultivable land, ranging from less than one to five hectares. (See Table 19).

As in the case of Guinea Bissau, agriculture in Mozambique engages over 90% or more of the national population and concentration is mainly in subsistence production. It is the main source of income for the majority of the masses and the principal source of employment. However, the most crucial variable in subsistence agriculture in Mozambique, like in Guinea Bissau, is availability of land. A policy of easy accessibility to land would mean that those who had been excluded from effective participation in agriculture would now have the opportunity to do. On the other hand, a policy aimed at limiting the accessibility of land to the masses would just do the opposite.

Portuguese agricultural policy with regard to the availability of land was one that stripped the African of his ancestral land. Excessive limitations were placed on the size of land that Mozambicans (African descent) could hold, while on the contrary Portuguese nationals or Mozambicans of Portuguese descent had an unlimited access to cultivable land. As Table 19 shows, up to 18,000 Africans engaged in traditional agriculture held less than one-tenth hectare of cultivable land each. About 412,000 could only hold half to a full hectare of land, while about 540,000 people could hold between one to two hectares of cultivable land. By contrast, as the data shows, Portuguese controlled land ranging from 10 to 19 hectares and beyond.
### TABLE 19
Mozambique: Size of Traditional Agricultural Sector
Number of Holdings and Area in Hectares, 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Holding in Hectares</th>
<th>Number of Holdings</th>
<th>Area in Hectares</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Absolute</td>
<td>Percent**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 0.1</td>
<td>18 478</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*0.1 - 0.19</td>
<td>53 820</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*0.2 - 0.49</td>
<td>233 779</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*0.5 - 0.9</td>
<td>412 245</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*1 - 1.9</td>
<td>540 608</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*2 - 2.9</td>
<td>232 871</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*3 - 3.9</td>
<td>75 313</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*4 - 4.9</td>
<td>35 850</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*5 - 9.9</td>
<td>37 925</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@10 - 19.9</td>
<td>6 813</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL** 1 647 702 100.0 2 493 505 100.0

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Holding in Hectares</th>
<th>Number of Holdings</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Absolute</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Absolute</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 2</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - 4.9</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 +</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL** 100.0 100.0

---

Source: Mozambique. Missao de Inquerito Agrícola de Mocambique.
Mem HD +2145 +M7 A3 1970

* *African holdings in hectares.
@Portuguese holdings in hectares.

Note: Data about per capital output is not available.
Thus, agricultural development with regard to the question of gaining access to cultivable land prior to the capture of state power, in both Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, functioned to the disadvantage of the indigenous inhabitants of these territories. But development was supposed to create the necessary opportunity for the masses to improve their conditions, once that participation in agricultural opportunities were made a central aspect of governmental policy. As we shall see later, the solution was provided after the capture of state political power, and in accordance with the Unified Approach, postulation of greater central control to help provide the necessary opportunity for the masses. All land in these national settings will be nationalized. Summarizing his views on the Portuguese development ventures in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, prior to the attainment of independence, Tetteh A. Kofi had this to say:

The colonial economies of the Lusophone countries presented an extreme case of imperial domination and exploitation. The forced-labour system guaranteed cheap labour for the settler's commercial ventures. The land tenure system which was imposed to the African tenure system led to the inequitable distribution of factors of production. The agricultural policy objectives led to the development of Portuguese and European plantations and to the demise of African peasant agriculture. The forced labour system was instituted, in part, to provide labour for such plantations. Agricultural extension services to the African peasant sector were very limited.\footnote{Tetteh A. Kofi, "Prospects and Problems of the Transition from Agrarianism to Socialism: The Case of Angola, Guinea Bissau, and Mozambique", \textit{World Development}, Vol. 9, No. 9/10, (1981), p. 864.}
The Unified Approach to development, on the other hand, sees agriculture as important in developing countries as a whole. Unlike the colonial capitalist approach, it focuses its attention not on the production of export crops, but essentially on the rural areas and the masses whom it considers the natural benefactors of all development efforts. It emphasizes, implicitly the development of the traditional subsistence sector of food production; one that the masses are fully engaged in, and one that could provide ready employment for many when fully expanded. Under the Unified Approach, the development of the subsistence sector becomes an important issue in the overall national development agenda, and one that ensures to a very high degree mass participation in development. Mass participation is viewed as a broad phenomenon encompassing in its definition the involvement of people in a community or society who pool resources, set goals, and initiate actions together so as to improve their conditions of living, self-esteem, goods, and services.\(^{194}\)

Given the neglect of the agricultural sector in the previous period, the Unified Approach has gained considerable support as Clive Thomas forceful conclusion seemed to indicate that

> the most basic strategic objective is to find a dynamic basis for planning agricultural output in such a way as to orient the economy away from its present export specialization in tropical staples. The alternative dynamic for guiding product specialization is an orientation toward long-run needs of the broad mass of the domestic population.\(^{195}\)


The agricultural development process in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau since independence, shows a gradual attempt to move away from the previous approach wherever possible.  

From a general perspective, when agriculture transcends the confines of primary products to include the full development of the traditional sector, it becomes an important sector in the overall economic development process. As a starting point, unlike before, the land has been nationalized, thereby creating new opportunities for all those who were excluded from active participation under the previous regime. In brief, agricultural transformation according to John Saul, 'takes center stage'.

Our inquiry based on the data in Tables 20 and 21, shows that in many instances there has been a de-emphasis on the production of commercial export crops where necessary, in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. (See Table 20 and 21).

Table 20 shows that in the case of Mozambique, a clear decrease in metric tons almost on a yearly basis in many of the export crops has taken place. For example, the total production of copra shows a gradual decrease from 83,000 metric tons in 1976 to 80,000 metric tons in 1977, and 75,000 in 1978. This is also true of sugar cane, maize, and many other crops. Again as in the case of Mozambique, we see a repetition of the same phenomenon in Guinea Bissau. As Table 21 indicates the total yearly output of palm kernels, in 1976 was 7,300 metric tons and 1977, 7,000 tons and finally in 1978 a constant 7,000. Others like cashew nuts show a total production

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197 Isaacman, op. cit., pp. 49-62.
of 45,000 metric tons in 1976 as opposed to 30,000 in 1977. Taken as a whole, in both Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, these are signs of a gradual de-emphasis on cash crop production as an important factor in the development process.

As we have already noted, the use of export crop production as an important strategy of development is dangerous to any nation. It is not only subject to external control by Western countries, but it is also vulnerable to the persistent fluctuations of prices in the world market. More importantly, it creates a situation of permanent dependence on other nations and thus, it is subject to their modes and dictates. In addition, the concentration of agriculture mainly on the production of export crops engages only a small fraction of the national populations, in both Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, since the main activities are essentially concentrated in the commercial sector of agriculture to the neglect of a large part of the traditional sector. This means that the masses cannot only participate in such agriculture, but are only confined to the fringes of development itself.

Furthermore, the mass exodus of Portuguese after the capture of state political power in both Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, and the inability of these governments to replace the crucial roles that they played helped greatly to replace the production of export crops. Other reasons for a discontinuation of this practice would be provided later in the study, however, it is important that we observe the results of this de-emphasis in the data presented in Tables 20 and 21, for both Mozambique and Guinea Bissau respectively.
### Table 20.

**Mozambique: Principal Crops**

1976-1978

('000 metric tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>1978</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>450*</td>
<td>350*</td>
<td>400*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copra</td>
<td>83*</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar cane</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bananas</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cashew nuts</td>
<td>95*</td>
<td>180*</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton lint</td>
<td>18*</td>
<td>22*</td>
<td>26*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea*</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sisal*</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice (paddy)*</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Unofficial figures and FAO estimates.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crops</th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>1978</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rice (paddy)</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorghum</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roots and tubers*</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cashew (in shell)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>30*</td>
<td>35*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coconut</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copra</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palm kernels</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palm oil*</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables and melons</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plaintains</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millet</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unofficial estimates

*FAO estimates
The major justification for this move, seems to be a drive to build a dependable and genuine agricultural base, which must give increasing attention to the production of food crops for domestic consumption, coupled with the fact that there was a mass exodus of Portuguese after independence, making any return to pre-independence production level virtually impossible.

In certain instances, (i.e. groundnuts) a product which is very important to Guinea Bissau, subsidiary industries have emerged, processing large quantities of peanut products and by-products: peanut butter, peanut oil, etc. This is a sample of forward and "inward looking" linkages.

In conformity with the postulation of the Unified Approach, collective agriculture is widely practiced. Large rural communities are heavily involved in agricultural production, thereby ensuring mass participation in the development process. It is clear that because of the liberation war and the mass exodus of farmers, agriculture was greatly crippled in these countries. Thanks to the Unified Approach, there has been a committed effort to rejuvenate agriculture especially with regard to staples for domestic consumption with encouraging results. (See Tables 22 and 23).

The Unified Approach as we have earlier noted, sees the development of agriculture not only in terms of export crop production, but also the development and cultivation of necessary food crops for domestic consumption. It lays emphasis especially on the development of the rural sector where the majority of the population live, and advocates for greater participation of the masses in the development process. This approach to agriculture in the long run serves the people of Mozambique and Guinea Bissau best, rather than Portugal and other metropolitan centers, unlike the situation following the colonial capitalist approach.
TABLE 22

Guinea Bissau: Production of Staple Food
1969-1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Guinea Bissau</th>
<th>Yield in 1000 HA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cereals</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millet</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables and melons</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bananas</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:

*Note that with regard to the above, per capita output either on a yearly basis or using a certain number of years are not given.
TABLE 23

Mozambique: Production of Staple Food
1969-1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mozambique</th>
<th>Yield in 1000 HA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cereals</td>
<td>729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millet</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetable and melons</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bananas</td>
<td>2400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FAO Production Yearbook, 1979

*Note that with regard to the above per capita output, either on a yearly basis or using a certain number of years, are not given.*
As the data presented reveals, there is a strong commitment in both Mozambique and Guinea Bissau following the Unified Approach to agriculture again not only on export crops, but also on the basic staple foods that are very crucial for the well being of the entire citizenry. In Table 22 for example, in the case of Guinea Bissau we see a gradual increase in yield per thousands of hectares of cereals from say 69,000 (tons) in 1971, following the colonial capitalist strategy to 77,000 (tons) following the new approach; then to 81,000 (tons) in 1978, and an increase to 84,000 in 1979. Rice also shows a continual increase from 30,000 (tons) in 1971 to 40,000 (tons) in 1977 and subsequently to 45,000 (tons) in 1978 and 45,000 (tons) in 1979. Others like wheat, maize, millet, vegetables, etc. show the same increase, indicative of the superiority of this new orthodoxy of development.

In Mozambique as in Guinea Bissau, there is also a repetition of this thrust. For example, the production of cereals as Table 23 reveals, shows a great upward surge from 700,000 (tons) in 1971 to 900,000 (tons) yield in hectares for 1977 and holding steady through subsequent years. Many other staple foods as the data indicate, show either a constancy or an impressive increase in production.

The realized result of the agricultural development since the capture of state political power could indeed have been much more impressive but for the continual visitation of natural disasters, like droughts and floods, that have on certain occasions completely destroyed the rice fields in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. In addition, unlike before, considerable efforts have been made to develop the livestock, virtually under the control of the rural masses. Needless to say, the results are encouraging. (See Tables 24 and 25).
TABLE 24

Mozambique: Showing Livestock Production
1976-1978
('000 head, Year Ending September)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>1978</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asses</td>
<td>20*</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>1,326</td>
<td>1,350</td>
<td>1,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pigs</td>
<td>99*</td>
<td>100*</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goats</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chickens</td>
<td>16,000*</td>
<td>16,500</td>
<td>17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ducks</td>
<td>550*</td>
<td>555*</td>
<td>560</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*estimates

Note that with regard to the above per capita output, either on a yearly basis or using a certain number of years, are not given.
TABLE 25

Guinea Bissau: Showing Livestock Production
1976-1979
('000 head)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pigs</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goats</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poultry</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:
FAO Production Yearbook, 1979

Note that with regard to the above, per capita output either on a yearly basis or using a certain number of years are not given.

This new focus on development in the agricultural sector were unknown in both Guinea Bissau and Mozambique before independence; and its clearly a deviation from past practices following the colonial capitalist approach. The benefactors are certainly the masses in the two countries because it has resulted again in the production of staple crops for domestic consumption.
In Table 24, we see the results of this endeavor in livestock production in Mozambique which has been increasing on an annual basis. For example, in 1976 the total number of cattle was 1,326,000 heads and in 1977, 1,350,000, while in 1978 it was 1,370,000. For pigs, the number in 1976 was 99,000 and 100,000 in 1977, and finally 105,000 in 1978. In the case of chicken it was 16,000,000 in 1976, 16,500,000 in 1977 and 17,000,000 in 1978. Others like bucks, goats, sheep, etc, show the same increases. Our analysis indicates that this new approach to development has undoubtedly produced positive results in both countries. Hence in Guinea Bissau, a steady growth in livestock production can be observed. For example, in 1976 and 1979, as Table 25 indicates, the total number of cattle was 258,000 and 264,000 respectively. Output of poultry, pigs, sheep, and others also reveals very impressive results.

In poultry the total output was 360,000 in 1978, 370,000 in 1977, 380,000 in 1978 and finally 390,000 in 1979. Like the case of livestock, there is a persistent increase in the number of poultry. Similarly, the total output of pigs, as Table 25 shows in 1976 was 170,000 and by 1977 the figure had risen to 172,000. In 1978 it stood at 174,000. In addition, the total number of goats in 1976 was 180,000 and by 1977, it had reached 181,000, and then climbed to 183,000 in 1979.

The only possible conclusion that we can draw from the data is that the results are highly encouraging and that with the progression of time, Guinea Bissau could one day attain national self-sufficiency vis-a-vis, its livestock needs. These indeed are testaments of this new approach to national development.
Furthermore, when actual livestock production before the capture of state political power in the early 70's is compared with the present approach, as Table 26 and Table 27 show, we discover a gradual and steady increase, following this new approach in both Guinea Bissau and Mozambique. (See Table 26 and 27).

| TABLE 26 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Guinea Bissau: Livestock</th>
<th>'000 Heads Effectifs</th>
<th>1969-1979</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pigs</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicken</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beef and Veal</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutton</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goat meat</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pork (pig meat)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cow milk (fresh)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hens</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FAO Production Yearbook, 1979

*Note that with regard to the above, per capita output either on a yearly basis or using a certain number of years are not given.
TABLE 27

Mozambique Livestock
'000 Heads Effectifs
1969-1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>1274</td>
<td>1350</td>
<td>1370</td>
<td>1380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pigs</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicken</td>
<td>13,334</td>
<td>16,500</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>17,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beef and Veal</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutton</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goat meat</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pork (pigmeat)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cow Milk (fresh)</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hens</td>
<td>7033</td>
<td>9200</td>
<td>9000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FAO Production Yearbook, 1979

Note that with regard to the above, per capita output either on a yearly basis or using a certain number of years, are not given.

Also note that the reason given for the missing figures in the table was they were not exactly sure of their accuracies.
For example, the 1969-71 column in Tables 4-26 and 4-27 show the production results of cattle, pigs, chicken, beef and veal, mutton, goat, pork, hens, and others, prior to the capture of state political power, in both Guinea Bissau and Mozambique following the colonial capitalist approach, while the columns for 1977, 1978, and 1979 show the realized results following the adoption of the Unified Approach. We see the yearly increase in output symptomatic of the positive results following the Unified Approach.

Specifically in the case of Guinea Bissau, as Table 26 shows, the average yearly number of cattle between 1969-1971 following the colonial capitalist approach was 243,000 heads. In 1977 following the new approach, it was 280,000 heads; 262,000 heads in 1978 and finally 264,000 in 1979. The figure for pigs in 1969-1971 was 143,000 heads, and in 1977, 172,000 heads, rising to 174,000 and 175,000 in 1978 and 1979, respectively. Even chicken also displays the same pattern as cattle and pigs. For example, the total number of chickens in 1969-1971 was 287,000 heads, while by 1977 the number was 370,000 heads. In 1978, the figure had climbed to 380,000 heads and 390,000 heads in 1979.

Similarly in Mozambique the total heads of cattle in 1969-1971, as Table 27 shows was 1,274,000 following the colonial capitalist approach to agricultural development before independence. Since the adoption of the new approach tremendous results have been realized. Thus in 1977, the figures were 1,370,000 and 1,380,000, respectively. In addition, the number of chickens in 1969-1971 was 13,334,000, but by 1977, 1978, and 1979, the figures had climbed to 16,500,000, 17,000,000 and 17,500,000 respectively. Many other items as Table 27 shows, indicate very impressive increases.
Subsistence agriculture which provides sustenance for many of the people of Guinea Bissau has been greatly revived, unlike before independence, that witnessed a serious neglect of this sector. Governmental intervention seems to have taken both direct as well as indirect forms. Indirect forms like combining a general political policy with the provision of technical assistance is widely practiced. In other words, "political" assistance precedes "technical" assistance, on the grounds that traditional peasants need to be motivated to overcome their resistance to new ways of land use.

It is also important to note that in accordance with the theoretical postulation of the Unified Approach regarding participation, the performance of several tasks is stimulated by grassroots party leaders, only after sufficient consultation with the masses. Consequently, there is considerable mass participation in all major decisions concerning them in the development process.

Additional forms of assistance include direct credit to small producers, the distribution of seeds, and the like. These genuine efforts in agricultural development prompted the American Embassy in Bissau to state that


199 For additional information about the blend of politics and agricultural effort in Guinea Bissau, see for example, Pereira and Moita, "Guinea Bissau", *3 Anos*, (1978), p. 77.
Throughout 1978 and thus far in 1979, the government of Guinea Bissau has continued to emphasize agriculture, it being the policy of the government to become self-sufficient in food production. But uneven weather conditions have drastically affected production of agricultural commodities.  

Unlike before independence when producers were forced to sell their crops at certain defined channels dominated by Portuguese traders and monopolists, with producers receiving only a meager compensation, the state since independence has taken over the marketing of these products, especially through state-run peoples stores. In an attempt to induce incentives in the agricultural sector, prices of certain products have been increased by the state. The correctness of this measure has also been emphasized by Professor Lloyd Reynolds in *Agriculture in Development Theory*, in which an increase in price or even the quantities of products demanded could very well induce farmers to increase output. Thus according to Denis Goulet, prices in 1975 were increased to 420 percent to provide monetary incentives to producers, who for many years had been forced to accept artificially low prices.

In addition, campaigns are regularly launched to educate the peasants about modern agricultural techniques and the need for diversification of their products. A number of cultural values and attitudes antagonistic to

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agricultural development have been altered. It seems to the author that the prime task has been to put the economy on a stable footing, and one that ensures that the urgent needs of the Guinean people are met. Intensive activity is very evident in the countryside where many new fields are being cleared resulting in a massive increase in the area cultivated.\textsuperscript{204}

State farms also flower simultaneously with other agricultural formations. State supported cooperatives as distinct from state farms also exist.\textsuperscript{205} Generally, membership in these cooperatives as Denis Goulet further explains, are essentially voluntary and like the state farms, these cooperatives are intended to reinforce the specified development strategy: to increase and diversify production, multiply the availability of jobs, and serve as breeding ground for technical diffusion in agriculture as well as other necessary innovations.\textsuperscript{206} All these are new developments that were unknown in Guinea Bissau before independence.

Furthermore, the government has launched many supplementary agricultural development endeavors: specific projects to boost rice production and the much more impressive goal for obtaining two crops yearly; the increase in the cultivable area for fruits and hopes to attain self-sufficiency with regard to fruits for immediate consumption, as well as those required to supply the canning and processing factories.\textsuperscript{207} Several

\begin{footnotes}
\item[204] Also see Uma Lele, \textit{The Design of Rural Development}, Published for the World Bank by John Hopkins University Press, 1975.
\item[205] Goulet, op. cit., p. 23.
\item[206] Ibid., p. 25.
\item[207] Ibid., pp. 24-25.
\end{footnotes}
poultry projects, unlike before are in regular operation, while consistent efforts are regularly taken to improve the stock of cattle, pigs, and goats, and as we have shown in the data, with successful results.

Aside from all these, the government of Guinea Bissau has tried to exploit other related areas of investment that could yield very promising results. These have been mainly in the area of fishing and forestry. Faced with the need of improving her fishing operation, three commercial fishing enterprises have been established: Estrela do Mar, the joint company with the Soviet Union, Semapesca, the French-Guinea Bissau joint venture, and GUIALP, the Algerian-Guinean Company. 208 Several thousand tons of fish are caught every year both for domestic needs and for export. (See Table 28). As Table 28 shows, 866 tons of fish were caught in 1975, 1,615 tons in 1976 and 1,911 tons in 1977. As the data indicates, the results are very encouraging.

The joint ventures Guinea Bissau established with the Soviet Union, France, and Algeria has meant the introduction of modern equipments to the fishing sector, and hence modern ways of catching fish also. In addition, the availability of large quantities of fish would go a long way to improve the nutritional needs of the people of Guinea Bissau, especially in terms of the necessary protein intake. Furthermore, Guinea Bissau controls a large share in all these ventures and thus it is able to transmit the gains from these fishing projects directly to the general public by way of price reduction.

TABLE 28
Guinea Bissau: Fishing, 1975-1977
(metric tons, live weight)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1977</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total catch ....</td>
<td>866</td>
<td>1,615</td>
<td>1,911</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1978: Catch as in 1977 (FAO estimate)

Source: FAO Yearbook of Fishery Statistics

The success of this project could be shown by the fact that within a few years of its inauguration as Ladun Anise observed, it "reduced fish prices by 50 percent by May 1976". Its importance could be well seen from the fact that 21.3 percent of the 1979 investment budget went to the fishing sector, while fish exports, mainly shrimp amounted to 28.3 percent of all exports. The efficient exploitation of forestry has also been undertaken to increase the country's revenue. (See Table 29). As Table 29 shows there is a gradual increase in export earning from 1977 to 1979. There is a persistent increase in yearly earnings. For example the total earnings from wood production in 1977 was about 330,000 dollars (U.S.) and by 1979, it had increased to 660,000 dollars (U.S.).


TABLE 29
Guinea Bissau: Export Earnings
1977-1979

All figures are estimates; $1.00 = 35 Pesos (1980) in December 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income (estimates)</th>
<th>GDP (estimates)</th>
<th>GDP (per capita)</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$174 million (1979)</td>
<td>$175</td>
<td>$994,000 (1979)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>10.99</td>
<td>8.82</td>
<td>9.60</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>3.98</td>
<td>76.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood products</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>144.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Exports</td>
<td>14.14</td>
<td>11.56</td>
<td>14.38</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Shares of Total Export Earnings (%)</th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>1978</th>
<th>1979</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>-10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood products</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On exploring the situation in Mozambique, we briefly noted that agriculture is that country's most important economic asset. In the words of President Machel, "agriculture is the base and industry is the dynamizing factor". Thus, agricultural development has been considered the most important aspect of the development objectives, and unlike before, reasonably biased in favor of the masses. As in the case of Guinea Bissau, the government stepped in to arrest the situation in the subsistence sector, beginning with the total nationalization of land to provide opportunities for those who were previously excluded from participation.

Collective agriculture, according to our findings is widely practiced in the communal villages that have been formed (aldeais comunais). The thinking here is that rural development is only possible if peasants were welded into communal villages, where the diffusion of technics and other ingredients of development could be readily put to practice. In a speech made by the President while visiting the United States, Machel stated that:

Collectivization of agriculture in communal villages and cooperative farms embodies FRELIMO's vision of a reorganized countryside. Ideally the communal villages will comprise 1,250 families or about 600 to 700 inhabitants each. As outlined in FRELIMO's proposals, communal villages are intended to raise food and cash production and to provide central facilities for farming, tools, education, health, and social service. Other objectives could be added to it. By providing basic amenities and job opportunities in the

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212 Isaacman, op. cit., p. 52.
villages, FRELIMO wants to reverse the rural flow to the cities, so much a problem in Mozambique and other African countries.\textsuperscript{213}

Cooperatives, similar to those in Guinea Bissau have been set up in several provinces of the nation.\textsuperscript{214} Our analysis reveals that these cooperatives have greatly helped to expand agricultural production, especially with regard to basic food crops. The results are highly encouraging. More importantly, they have helped to reduce the prices of food and other local products in the rural areas as well as the urban centers. (See Tables 30 and 31).

The government in Mozambique had to overcome severe problems resulting from the inability of the masses to comprehend the advantages that accrued to collective methods of farming and distribution. The success of the program hinged on the rapid organization of cooperatives throughout the country and effective transformation of abandoned plantations by fleeing Portuguese nationals. The principles of self-reliance, local initiative, and popular participation were incorporated in the formation of these cooperatives.

Furthermore, within the colonial capitalist approach, many necessary food crops could only be found in the stores in urban centers, while the rural areas severely lacked many of these basic necessities. This phenomenon is

\textsuperscript{213} See President Machel's Speech at the Investiture of Transnational Government. Found in the anthology edited by the Afro-American Information Service, The Task Ahead: Selected Speeches of Samora Machel. (New York: Afro-American Information Service, 1975). We must add that in the recent Fourth Party Congress in May 1983, it was recommended that more assistance in agriculture should be given to small ventures and families. Also, industrialization seems to have taken a high priority, with concentration in small projects. (See Facts and Reports, Vol. 13, No. 5, May 13, 1983, p. 1).

### TABLE 30

**Comparative Prices - Rural Area in Mozambique**

Nampula Region (August 1977)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Cooperative</th>
<th>Canteen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>salt (kilo)</td>
<td>7½ cents</td>
<td>17½ cents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>milk (can)</td>
<td>48 cents</td>
<td>75 cents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rice (kilo)</td>
<td>50 cents</td>
<td>62 cents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tea (kilo)</td>
<td>17½ cents</td>
<td>22½ cents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>biscuits</td>
<td>9 cents</td>
<td>18 cents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>soap</td>
<td>50 cents</td>
<td>60 cents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cooking oil (liter)</td>
<td>$1.00</td>
<td>$1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cloth (meter)</td>
<td>$2.40</td>
<td>$9.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Typical of many African countries. By encouraging peasants to form cooperatives, they would be able to work the land jointly, and share the profits equitably, while at the same time it would ensure the regular supply of basic necessities.

Not only did the cooperatives increase food production, but they enabled the rural population to participate collectively in decision-making processes, instilling a new sense of confidence and growing political consciousness. From a purely pragmatic perspective, the concentration of a
relatively large number of people in a localized area, also helped maximize limited capital and technical resources. As we have already stated, the

**TABLE 31**

Comparative Prices - Urban Area in Mozambique  
Maputo (August, 1977)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Cooperative</th>
<th>Supermarket</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>rice (kilo)</td>
<td>*41 cents</td>
<td>*41 cents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sugar</td>
<td>*27 cents</td>
<td>*27 cents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oil</td>
<td>$1.77</td>
<td>$1.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>soap (bar)</td>
<td>52 cents</td>
<td>57 cents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>egg (dozen)</td>
<td>$1.10</td>
<td>$1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cheese (kilo)</td>
<td>$1.20</td>
<td>$1.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chicken (kilo)</td>
<td>$2.00</td>
<td>$2.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>butter</td>
<td>45 cents</td>
<td>54 cents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>paper towels</td>
<td>42 cents</td>
<td>67 cents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:  
Sede do Cooperativo de Consumo de Bairro de Polana. Quoted in Isaacman, op. cit., p. 121.

*Fixed prices by the state. Note also that any attempt to alter these fixed prices as Allen Isaacman notes is subject to severe punitive measures. Such violations have been extremely rare. formation of cooperatives greatly helped to reduce the prices of many commodities.
As Table 30 and Table 31 show the prices of commodities in the regular supermarkets in both the rural and urban centers are much higher than those in cooperatives, except in cases where the state has established fixed prices. For example, rice, milk, tea, and cooking oil in the supermarkets cost 62 cents, 75 cents, 22½ cents and $1.60, respectively (see Table 30), while in the cooperatives the same items sell for 50 cents, 48 cents, 17½ cents and $1.00, respectively. (See Table 30). Furthermore, big state farms where modern agricultural practices are tested have been established all over the country. Mozambique seems determined to increase food production, especially in the rural sector where the greater part of the masses reside. All these measures are certainly not intended to reduce the significance of individual family endeavors. Samora Machel himself said that:

Along with the construction of communal farms...we should also pay heed to the great importance of family production in agriculture in our present stage of development...we define the communal village as the strategy for rural development and for socialization of the peasants. We define the agricultural cooperatives as the way to destroy the individual spirit, and to join forces to solve problems. But that does not mean abandoning family sector, which continues to have a decisive importance in our agricultural production.215

The results of all these, to say the least, have been encouraging given the extent of the damage resulting from the Portuguese exodus, the war, and persistent natural disasters like droughts and floods. Fundamental problems that lie within the domain of centuries old African customs and traditions, unlike before have been severely attacked and their influence reduced through political education.

215 Dossier Fourth Session of the Central Committee of FRELIMO, elected by the 3rd Congress, Maputo, August, 1976.
In addition, Mozambique like Guinea Bissau has also sought other ways of development through the expansion of its fishing activities and its forestry. (See Table 32 and Table 33). As Table 32 indicates there has been great expansion in metric tons of the quantity of fish caught. For example, in 1976 10.6 tons of fish were caught, while in 1977 there were 14.0 tons and, finally 23.0 tons in 1978. Such expansion is also typical of Mozambique's forestry as Table 33 clearly shows.

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<td></td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>14.0</td>
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Source: FAO Yearbook of Fishery Statistics, 1979

As Table 33 indicates the total output of Mozambique's forest products in 1973 and 1974, following the colonial capitalist approach, were 9,696,000 metres and 9,914,000 metres, respectively. However, thanks to the Unified Approach, since independence there has been a sudden expansion. Thus in 1975, 1976, 1977, and 1978, the total production climbed to 10,137,000 metres, 10,365,000 metres, 15,598,000 metres, and 10,838,000 metres, respectively.
TABLE 33

Mozambique: Forestry
1973-1978
ROUNDWOOD REMOVALS
(FAO estimates, '000 metres, all non-coniferous)

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<tr>
<td>Sawlogs, veneer logs and logs for sleepers</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>325</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other industrial wood</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>614</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fuel wood</td>
<td>8,824</td>
<td>9,029</td>
<td>9,239</td>
<td>9,454</td>
<td>9,673</td>
<td>9,899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9,696</td>
<td>9,914</td>
<td>10,137</td>
<td>10,365</td>
<td>10,598</td>
<td>10,838</td>
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Following this approach to agricultural development, more impressive results with the progression of time are the anticipated long run goals, especially if the droughts and floods cease to haunt the region. The importance of this strategy of development should be judged by its innovation and appropriate foundation of development that it strives to lay. In the long run it will be the gains realized thanks to popular support to the general mobilization of the population in development that would justify this approach to national development.
Distribution of National Wealth

Distribution addresses the whole spectrum of participation as well as benefactors of the fruits of development in any national setting. It focuses on how equitable the extra goods and services produced by development are shared among the various elements of the population. Therefore, the goals for which development strategies are designed must include explicit attention to the equitable distribution of the fruits of the development process.

George Beckford, the reputable West Indian scholar, in Persistent Poverty, (1972) contends that development must be conceived not only in terms of per capita income, but also as a more equitable pattern of income distribution.²¹⁶ In other works of his, George Beckford also re-emphasized parts of the theoretical postulation of the Unified Approach, when he insisted that development of the human resources should be the primacy of all development strategies.²¹⁷

Thus, in the context of a general strategy of development, we maintain that the distribution of the realized fruits of development, however short of expectation, is an indispensable condition of national development. It is an important condition for imparting dynamism to socio-economic development. Justice is however, not a substitute for efficiency and development dynamics. To say the least, the distribution of the realized fruits of development are more a political question than an economic one.

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As the United Nations has stated: "in explaining patterns of distribution, social structures, and access to power, and socio-economic policies seemed to be more decisive factors than the level or rate of economic growth". 218

Following the colonial capitalist approach to development, the question of distribution vis-à-vis the fruits of development was totally dismissed as unnecessary and impossible. The institution of any mechanism of distributing certain necessary goods equitably in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau prior to independence was never at all addressed. The Colonial capitalist strategy of development was characterized by uncontrolled and increasing differences in the living standards of the various social classes to the detriment of the masses in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. Such a design of development, obviously leaves in its trail large areas of stagnation, degradation, poverty, and hunger; it excluded large segments of the population of these countries from the development process and relegated the bulk of the masses to the periphery of progress. 219 It was often argued by the colonial capitalist theorists of Portuguese origin, that such a situation was unavoidable because of the difficulty of founding such a distribution mechanism. In addition, it was widely held that sizeable differences in incomes provided a powerful incentive for hard work. 220

These and other arguments of a general nature were given as reasons for the neglect of distribution as observed in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau.


before independence.

Greater social justice through the distribution of basic necessities within the context of the development process in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau is gradually being achieved not exclusively, or even mainly through the direct instruments of income policy, but by means of the general development policy itself. Denis Goulet reveals that as a beginning point, even at the local levels, the state provides a network for the distribution of agricultural equipments, seeds, and other necessities. 221 This in a sense creates the opportunity of allowing the farmers to produce more and better crops.

Furthermore, in Guinea Bissau, the principle of equitable distribution is explicitly dramatized by the formation of such mechanisms as People's Stores. The People's Stores import and distribute products of primary necessity throughout the nation. These stores are set up to ensure that every part of the nation has access to some of the necessary goods. Lars Rudebeck's observations state that:

They have virtually replaced the Portuguese commercial network. They also supply the population with the goods they could not produce themselves, mostly basic necessities and collected agricultural surpluses for distribution throughout the country and even exports abroad. 222

These stores ensure a permanent supply of these basic needs to many remote areas that would otherwise have been totally neglected. This becomes even more crucial in the African context, where there is great disparity

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between the availability of basic necessities for sustenance in the cities and the countryside. Besides other important governmental policies in Guinea Bissau, as well as Mozambique, directly foster better income distribution and equality through the provision of free medical treatment, education, and many other social amenities.

In Mozambique, on the other hand, this phenomenon has found expression in what they call "Grupo Dynamizadore", that is, Dynamizing Groups. Originally formed during the early years of FRELIMO (1962), the Dynamizing Groups have taken on added responsibilities like political education and participation, organizing economic production, and most especially distribution. Like in Guinea Bissau, this organization provides a network of equal distribution of the necessary needs of sustenance in the rural areas as well as the cities. Their activities and functions cover the entire nation and have a penetrating influence in almost every segment of the nation. According to Mohammed A. El-Khawas, aside from distributing the basic needs to the people, "the dynamizing groups have become the basic political unit linking the masses with the party. They are organized throughout the country in neighborhoods, factories, villages, cooperatives, schools, the universities, and offices". 223

Ensuring the gradual uplift of the masses, especially in regard to the distribution of basic necessities takes center stage in Mozambique; a great contrast to past development approaches. 224

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224 Ibid., p. 25.
Therefore, the crucial lessons emanating from this venture are not necessarily that a total equitable distribution of wealth or income has been achieved at the moment, but that sufficient attention unlike before, has been focused on the progress of the general population. Our contention is that a better distribution of the basic means of sustenance, when fully attained, far from endangering efficiency and development, could indeed energize the whole nation and speed up the development process.

Alternative Mechanisms of Unemployment Control

An infestation of a high and increasing level of urban, as well as, rural unemployment in Africa and many developing countries, have increasingly come to represent an incurable cancer of social advancement in these countries. Unemployment in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau remains a major social problem, especially prior to independence. Following the colonial capitalist approach to development, the phenomenon of unemployment was essentially considered an outgrowth of the forces of certain unseen hands. In other words, unemployment was considered one of the systemic consequences of the capitalist mode of production, and one that could not be firmly controlled or even be eliminated.

The inability of the Portuguese to suggest possible solutions to this problem resulted in increased unemployment in large urban centers in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, creating pauperization in many places, while the under-utilization of the labor force in the rural areas meant persistent socio-economic stagnation. Due to the limited access to land in these countries before independence, the utilization of human resources became indeed constrained. The non-utilization of full human resources
are not only evidence of underdevelopment, but one that often aggravates development. Therefore, a strategy of development that attempts to increase the employment of the general population, or any other way of making the population more productive, in our view, must merit the characterization of a good strategy of national development; and hence, the strategic superiority of the Unified Approach.

The current strategy of national development in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau unlike before, contains built in mechanisms of unemployment control, even though still in its infancy. An important fundamental strategy that has been used in both these African states lies within the domain of agriculture. Agrarian reforms, like the redistribution of land to the people goes in a far reaching way, not only in creating employment to a sizeable population, but also creates opportunities for the socio-economic progress of wide segments of the rural population. It also reduces persistent migration to urban centers. This theoretical approach of emphasizing the full exploitation of the agricultural sector, has a multiplicity of advantages. Clive Thomas maintains that "at best, agriculture will remain primarily a means of subsiding people to remain on the land in order to ease the social and political pressures which follow on rapid population growth, rural/urban migration, and slow rising agricultural incomes".  

Furthermore, through a policy of rural peasantization, the central government deliberately instituted programs, like communal villages, cooperatives, and other new institutions of national development in both of these countries. There is also a net result of developing the rural population into productive human resources that could increase realized productive gains. In addition, there is also the resurrection of the worship of "labor power", a process whereby human labor has increasingly come to be perceived as short run substitutes for machines in certain fundamental functions of the national economy in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. 226 This peculiar phenomenon helps in achieving self-reliance, which by definition is the practice of relying on one's ability based on existing concrete conditions in trying to solve certain problems. A perfect illustration of this phenomenon in the case of Mozambique for example, was well stated by the African Contemporary Record, when it said that:

In the big state farms in the valley, around the town of Chokwe in Gaza province, it turned out that 109 combine harvesters - each of which had been bought for $31,000 from East Germany - were unable because they got bogged down in the paddy fields. To cope with the crisis, Machel ordered the recruitment of 30,000 volunteers to harvest 35,000 tons of rice in the Limpopo farms in 'Chinese style' work brigades. Just two months later Carvalho was purged for underestimating the 'human factor' in economic development. 227

Thus, in the absence of many modern industries to provide jobs for the

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population at large, the Mozambican and Guinean experience points towards a rather effective alternative of trying to reduce the severity of unemployment by the proper development of the rural sector, land reforms, and agricultural expansion in these countries, and hence, enhancing the dynamics of the development process.

Elimination of Post Colonial Linkages

The role and significance of post-colonial linkages in the under-development of African countries is very important. It is now widely acknowledged that post-colonial linkages serve as an impediment in the development process. These are essentially those residual colonial interconnections in the social, economic, and ideological context among independent African states, that overtly or covertly tend to exacerbate or sustain neo-colonialism dependency, and "underdevelopment". Due to the endemic nature of these relationships to the development process in Africa, an immediate and most efficacious move of gradually liquidating or reducing the severity of its impact on development becomes then a very positive contribution to the overall quest for national development.

Mozambique and Guinea Bissau are among few countries, where sincere efforts are being made to eliminate these linkages, thereby enhancing the development process.

Mozambique and Guinea Bissau before independence, like many countries in Africa today, were both the victims of the most vicious

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economic linkage between the metropoles and these countries, to the detriment of the latter. Before the capture of state political power, the Portuguese and a negligible number of "natives", whose interest and worldviews were compatible, formed an important linkage between Portugal and these countries. Granted that their deliberations were essentially calculated at maintaining the status quo, their development strategy very much flowed from the same paradigm - for the economic advantage of the metropoles. This phenomenon is highly predominant in many of today's independent African countries. As Claude Ake skillfully observed, "the ruling classes in Africa are an integral part of the structure of imperialism and the syndrome of imperialist exploitation".\textsuperscript{229}

In the states of Mozambique and Guinea Bissau since independence, an important step in the gradual elimination of these post-colonial linkages could be attributed to the issue of "class suicide", as we have already noted. It was an outgrowth of the protracted struggle for national independence. As we have already seen in the third chapter, the experiences of the leadership class vis-a-vis the revolutionary war had caused them to reconsider the whole question of the development of the state which eventually forced them to see their own interest, in terms of its compatibility with those of the masses. Granted that in many African countries an important requisite for the total maintenance of post-colonial linkages is the existence of an indigenous "bourgeoisie" whose interest, in this phenomenon in

\textsuperscript{229}Ibid., p. 65.
Mozambique and Guinea Bissau has gone very far to minimize the existence of a strong post-colonial linkage. This is attested by the constant confrontations between the regimes in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau with those of Portugal.²³⁰

Furthermore, the two revolutionary states, unlike many African countries have pursued an ideology of development completely unsuitable for the breeding of strong post-colonial linkages, one that is calculated at the general uplift of the masses and not one that serves only the interest of the ruling classes. The colonial capitalist strategy of development that mainly flows from a capitalist framework and worldview, typical of many African countries today, has been unequivocally rejected by these countries. Such ideology of development in many African countries help maintain the status quo, and consequently consolidate post-colonial linkages to the joy of the African petty bourgeoisie.

Thirdly, the process of nationalization that has been undertaken in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau has to a great extent reduced the post-colonial arithmetic. This is not analogous to the indigenization ventures in Kenya, Nigeria, or Tanzania for example, that only resulted to the creation of a "Bourgeoisie, the expansion of a bourgeoisie, and state capitalism, respectively."²³¹ Gavin Williams penetrating summation of this phenomenon in Nigeria states that; "the recent indigenization measures have readjusted the terms of the relations between foreign and


²³¹[231] *Ake*, p. 38
indigenous capital, but in no way challenge the dominance of foreign capital in the Nigerian economy". Nationalization in the two revolutionary African states of Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, unlike limited nationalization which boils down to nationalization of a small percentage of the capital and to the so-called partnership, is rather progressive; that is to say, active nationalization, closely intertwined with progressive social reforms. Nationalization in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau has made decisive changes in economic and social relations and led to the weakening and gradual elimination of foreign control over the economy. Mittleman elaborates that in an effort to place the economy under state control in Mozambique, the government nationalized the main branches of the economy, including private banking in Jan. 1978, and invited foreign concerns to submit claims for compensation. The asset and liabilities of the private banks - Casa Bancaria de Mozambique, Banco de Credito Comerciales Industrial, and Banco de Angola - were transferred to the Bank of Mozambique.

Nationalization has been an important step in the elimination of post-colonial linkages in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, and thus it has helped provide a better chance for total state planning of the economy. Aside from the elimination of post-colonial linkages, other derived objectives of nationalization include the concentration of economic levers

\[^{232}\text{See Gavin Williams, "The Political Economy of Colonialism and Neo-Colonialism in Nigeria", in op. cit. Gutkind and Waterman, p. 284.}\]


in the hands of the state and the establishment of control over individual branches, or over the entire economy. The concentration of key branches of the economy in the state sector in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau unlike when it was controlled by foreigners, facilitates the problem of accumulation and planning, creating the means for solving important economic problems.

Finally, through the policy of self-reliance, both countries, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau in one important sense, are trying to eliminate post-colonial linkages. In addition, within the domain of their trade relationships, these states unlike many African countries import essentially necessary consumption goods and capital goods. Conspicuous consumption and the import of luxurious goods that go in a long way to sustain post-colonial linkages have been greatly reduced or virtually eliminated 235

Furthermore, as the principle of self-reliance continues to mature, the policy of reducing the import of luxurious goods continues to exist, the anticipated long run results should be encouraging. It could be one that might eventually lead to self-sufficiency in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau especially, if the political elements of national development are well infused into it. That would be the principal concern of our discussion in the next chapter.

235 See Tables of Principal Imports in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau.
CHAPTER V

POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

In the last chapter, our concern was centered on examining the current content and focus of the economic dimensions of national development in the states of Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, following the United Nations Unified Approach. But before we examined the contemporary trend, we discussed the development approach, prior to the capture of state political power, when national development was propelled by the colonial capitalist strategy, a common characteristic in many African countries today.

This chapter seeks to examine the political dimensions of national development in these two revolutionary states; granted that national development in any correct sense does not only imply the economic, but also the political. The Unified Approach, as we have already seen, emphasized the importance of politics in development, especially within the domain of structural transformation and mass participation in development. Hence, the role of the political element in successful development, whether in terms of rendering tension resulting from development strategies, creative and complementary, cohesive as well as dynamic; or in terms of rejuvenating political objectives and actions that would greatly mutilate emergent development obstacles; or simply resolving the problems of organization and mobilization, a key in the development process is indeed very crucial. Our focus in this chapter will center first, on the significance of the political element in national development, the role of the party, structure and distribution of power, mass participation and national integration, political consciousness and rural politicization, including its implications on national development. The rest of the chapter is essentially a greater exposition of these crucial issues.
The Significance of the Political Element in National Development

It has increasingly become evident that the role played by the political element in successful national development is a very crucial one indeed. The role of politics in the overall process of national development is one aspect of the development process that even economists of the conventional school have dared to confront fully. National development whether defined as rising per capita income or broadly as rising levels in living, can be very much shaped by events in the political arena. This mutual interconnection between what happens in the economic and political scenes was well perceived by Kwame Nkrumah in his book Revolutionary Warfare.236

The proliferation of trained people, favorable and healthy climatic conditions, access to finance and capital, taken, as a whole, is necessary for enhancing the flowing of a successful national development strategy. However, if within nations endowed with all these important items, there is a virtual absence of a good political machinery to effect social structures, attitudes of passivity in production; cultivate a spirit of national pride, unity, and other variables, genuine development would hardly take place. The converse is also true. As a matter of fact, in certain instances as clearly evident in both Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, where the resources are fairly scanty, with an absence of a pool of well trained personnel, the absence of a vast supply of capital, etc., development is genuinely occurring because of the sincere commitment of the leaders with an impressive popular support.

On the one hand, the weapon of politics could also be employed in a
careful manner to strangle the eventual development of a people. In
Mozambique and Guinea Bissau for example, prior to the attainment of
independence, this element served the purpose of intensifying the imperial
voracity of Portuguese exploitation and the barbarism and oppression that
produced the permanent cloud of humiliation over the people of these two
states. The use of the political element in the underdevelopment of these
nations cannot be overemphasized.\textsuperscript{237} Through it, a systematic and deliberate
cultural obscurantism aimed at uprooting the native citizenry from his
environment was inaugurated. The implantation of racism and its inherent
complexes, the programmed division of the people on the basis of religion,
ethnic and regional origins; the systematization of passivity and submission
to colonialism, were among many other uses of the political element to
asphyxiate the spirit of resistance and the creative capacity of the masses
and to maintain them divided and impotent.\textsuperscript{238}

On the other hand, the political element as a key to successful
development in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau since independence, could be
seen from its role as rendering tension resulting from the development thrust,
creative rather than paralyzing; complementary rather than offsetting; the
mastery of this art rests on a political dialectic which constantly test
reality by striving to transform it. The role of the political "cement" is
to render a development strategy cohesive.\textsuperscript{239}

\textsuperscript{237}See for example, Patric Chabal, "National Liberation in Portuguese

\textsuperscript{238}Samora Machel, "Message of Proclamation of Independence for
Mozambique", \textit{Africa Today}, Vol. 22, No. 3 (July-September, 1975), pp. 5-6.

\textsuperscript{239}Goulet, op. cit., p. 4.
This role has been experimentally proven to be correct in certain instances where gains in the quality of life of the masses have been registered prior to a general economic growth.  

The necessity of the political weapon to provide cohesion as well as dynamism to development plans in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, in our view, attests to the fact that mere charting of an alternative development strategy whatever their heuristic merits is totally inadequate. Economic objectives in these countries are well integrated within the political ones and both are naturally supportive, resulting in realized gains most advantageous to the overall national development objectives. This position is not a purely theoretical argument, we should make clear; it is a deeply rooted reality observed in the states of Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, and predominantly essential to their development strategy.  

Political objectives and actions which severely attempt to strangle the class arithmetic and institutions that serve the useful purpose of a continual watch dog over the masses; that is to say, objectives and actions that evolve mechanisms of unrestricted participation in the political systems through the party and its various organs, that emphasizes relevant and necessary structural changes and distribution of power, that makes a committed and sincere effort to realize national integration and profound political consciousness of the citizenry, and finally, one that emphasizes a total and more effective utilization of its human resource as characteristic  


of the states of Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, creates an atmosphere most congenial to an effective overall national development strategy. Indeed, when the weapon of constructive criticism and self-criticism is infused into the development process, again as typical of these two states, a profound elevation becomes the ultimate result. Through it, authorities concerned become advantageously placed in a situation that enables them to monitor their own mistakes. Criticism and self-criticism, the author maintains, help keep the intended development goals alive and active. Just to mention one occasion, New Africa seemed to have captured the reality of the phenomenon when it said:

The May session of the National People's Assembly of Guinea Bissau provided the occasion for much serious self-criticism. President Luis Cabral, during his opening speech, rapped deputies for not taking their jobs seriously... Cabral said that certain deputies had ceased to interest themselves in regional matters... these deputies who take no part in the activities of the regional councils... Cabral also strongly criticized the work of some functionaries at the administrative levels below that of region.

It is the author's view that to be able to realize substantial progress in the economic, social, ideological, and other aspects of development, the political element has to be infused to effect and realize the necessary national development objectives. It could be called the dowry of national development itself. Since the political factor is of decisive importance for not only enhancing the economic efficiency of these states, but also the overall development, it is crucial therefore that the

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242 New Africa, August, 1979, p. 22.

transformation of the population must become the focal point of concentration in a development strategy. This is also an important peculiarity of the Unified Approach to national development as opposed to other contending strategies. The importance of the political element in development in the African context, as we have already seen has received profound political support. Paul Baran pointedly maintains

for backward countries to enter the road of economic growth and social progress, the political framework of their existence has to be drastically revamped. The alliance between feudal landlords, industrial royalists, and the capitalist middle class has to be broken. The keepers of the past cannot be builders of the future. Such progressive and enterprising elements as exist in backward societies have to obtain the possibility of leading their countries in the direction of economic and social growth.\textsuperscript{244}

The Role of the Party

From a general perspective, any attempt at understanding the process of national development in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau cannot be complete without focusing centrally on the PAIGC and FRELIMO, both of which are the sole political parties that command legal as well as national recognition in Guinea Bissau and Mozambique, respectively. Furthermore, these parties have come to be considered as the arbiters and definers of the national interest, the custodians and controllers of the general aspirations of the masses, and have also been widely acclaimed as the symbol of freedom in these two states. In addition to being architects of the new national identity, these parties serve as the motive force of all national development objectives, especially in the area of mobilization.

\textsuperscript{244} Agarawala and Singh, op. cit., p. 91.
The protracted struggle for independence and the eventual triumph was only viewed by these two parties as the necessary foundation of a long battle that would result in the overall development of the entire population. Thus, the achievement of development is a key issue in the deliberations of these two parties. As we earlier noted, the Unified Approach maintains that the total involvement of the entire population, including the necessity of making important structural changes is crucial if development is the ultimate goal of many developing countries. But genuine development, however simplistically conceived, can never be realized unless the entire population is aroused to desire it and consequently make the necessary sacrifices that it demands. Herein lies the importance of the political element in national development. The difficulty of arousing the populations in achieving a common objective, typical of many African countries is contrary to the observed situation in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. The PAIGC and FRELIMO


246 Our definition of "genuine development" is quoted from Denis Goulet's, "An Ethical Model for the Study of Value", Harvard Education Review, Vol. 41, No. 2, (May, 1971), pp. 206-7. Authentic development aims at the full realization of human capabilities; men and women become makers of their own histories, personal and societal. They free themselves from every servitude imposed by nature or by oppressive systems, they achieve wisdom in their mastery over nature and over their own wants, they create new webs of solidarity based not on domination but on reciprocity among themselves, they achieve a rich symbiosis between contemplation and transforming action, between efficiency and free expression. This total concept of development can perhaps best be expressed as the "human ascent" - the ascent of all men in their integral humanity, including the economic, biological, psychological, social cultural, ideological, spiritual, mystical, and transcendental dimensions.

247 Chabal, op. cit., pp. 94-95. Also see Isaacman, op. cit., p. 24.
here enjoy great success in mobilizing the nation, especially in the domain of agriculture. Attention is drawn here to the character of the parties. The proletarian character of these two parties is evident by its close alliance with the popular sentiments of the masses.248

Taking the case of Guinea Bissau as our first example, the role of the PAIGC as an important force of development had its origin in the struggle of national independence. This struggle inaugurated the marriage between the party and the peasantry.249 According to Aristides Pereira, the original intention of the party at its youthful years was to play the role of involving the rural population in local decision making and development.250 Pereira further elaborates that right from the beginning the PAIGC mobilized the masses around productive work and increased participation.251 In addition, the organs of the party were required to supply the necessary material wants of the liberated areas, while the participation of the rural masses in the discussions and solutions of problems, epitomized the character of the emerging nation. Thus, the foundation was layed for a network of


mutual cooperation between the people and the party vis-a-vis national needs
and development. This "mélange" of the political element with development
or even other national concerns before long had become a common and
acceptable practice that have gone a long way to shape the development of
Guinea Bissau. This practice has remained the seedbed of all development
ventures in Guinea Bissau, mirroring in our view, the experience of China
under Mao Tse-Tung. Even the United Nations mission sent to Guinea Bissau
in 1972 stated that:

Even more remarkable are the PAIGC's efforts to organize
community life and create a new and forward looking society.
The schools operated by the PAIGC provide a complete
education for the children of Guinea Bissau, many of them
were born in the liberated areas...PAIGC has established
various hospitals...carry out preventive campaigns against
diseases endemic to the region and train middle-level
medical personnel to form a new kind of army working for
the people. It has organized popular stores.252

What is crucial here is the commitment of the PAIGC to mobilize the
masses for development; a practice that became crystalized in the early years
of the struggle for independence, and has ever since then become a corner-
stone of all her development endeavors.

Similarly in Mozambique, a tight relationship between the party
(FRELIMO) and the masses exist vis-a-vis all the important facets of
development. Through a network of Dynamizing Groups, the party has
penetrated all the important sectors of development - agriculture, education,
social, ideological, industrial, health, welfare, and others. The nucleus
of this practice stems from the experiences of FRELIMO in the liberated zones
during the protracted struggle for independence, in which the role of the

252See United Nations Office of Public Information, "Mission to
party in organizing the masses for pressing needs and development produced brilliant successes. The party has thus come to be perceived as a vanguard party of the workers/peasants alliance. FRELIMO's own conceptualization of its role as a vanguard party is seen in the documents of the Seventh Thesis of the Third Congress.

As the leading force of the society and the state, the party must guide, mobilize, and organize the broad masses in the task of building the People's Democracy, carry out the construction of our state apparatus which materializes the power of the worker-peasant alliance and serves as an instrument for the construction of the ideological, political, economic, cultural, and social bases of a socialist society.

The challenge of development that brings with it problems of organization and mobilization, requires a sound and dependable organizational unit to disseminate and serve as the driving force of that development. The party is the major instrumentation for accomplishing this objective. In the rural areas, FRELIMO has reorganized productive agricultural units and emphasized the importance of human resource development, in accordance with the theoretical postulation of the Unified Approach. Heavy doses of nationalism and political education by the party accompany the formation of state farms, communal villages, and other institutions of development. Inspired by the experiences of the pre-independence days, in the realm of education, FRELIMO encourages peasants to attend meetings that discuss the colonial

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past, FRELIMO's objectives, as well as, the state of the current national objectives. Fundamental principles of agriculture, economics and other pertinent issues of development are persistently brought to the public view through the efforts of the party. Furthermore, FRELIMO organizes mobilization ventures in more sensitive areas of development, like increasing productivity. The mobilization campaign for development also persistently involves visits to work places and fields by high party officials, while the media continually diffuses the standards, developmental thrust of the party, and the accompanying values. Taken as a whole, these activities are part of FRELIMO's drive to stimulate local initiatives, as well as the intended national goals of increased productivity and the development of greater worker's and peasant's consciousness, typical of the Chinese experience. Furthermore, a policy of special recognition accorded workers council of exemplary individual workers, have been adopted by the party with a covert intent of stimulating production. These and others have made Mozambique the recipient of much attention in recent years. However, one of the foremost factors responsible for the above mentioned practices has been the structural transformation that took place in both

256 Ibid., pp. 459-460.
257 Isaacman, op. cit., pp. 42-54.
259 See Henriksen, op. cit., p. 457.
Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. This in turn, affected the distribution of power, as well as mass participation in development. These issues would therefore constitute the core of our next discussion.

Structure, Distribution of Power, Mass Participation: Implications on National Development

Structural transformation in the context of African and many other developing nations is very important in the process of national development. As we had earlier mentioned, even the United Nations has come to recognize the reality of this phenomenon. The U.N. pointedly states that "development is viewed as involving various kinds of structural and institutional change, and social transformation which build up the capacity of the society and of its members to realize higher levels of production and welfare".  

In many African countries, the question of structural transformation is largely never confronted because of its interconnections with the very question of power, dating back to the end of the colonial era. Furthermore, Frantz Fanon predicted that the African petty bourgeoisie, who would lead the national independence movements would increasingly turn against the masses and ally themselves with the metropolitan bourgeoisie. Fanon states that

the bourgeoisie turns its back more and more on the interim and on the real facts of its underdeveloped country, and tend to look towards the former mother country and the foreign capitalist who count on its obligating compliance. ...it does not share its profits with the people; and in no way allows them to enjoy any of the dues that are paid to

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262 Nkrumah, op. cit., p. 16.
it by foreign companies.263

The summation is that the masses are essentially barred from any
form of effective political participation to enable it to shape the process
of development to its own advantage. In Mozambique and Guinea Bissau,
before independence like in many contemporary African nations, the question
of structural transformation vis-a-vis the accessibility of the masses to
power was greatly neglected.264 Taking Mozambique as an example and using
voting participation as an important variable, the published results of
an election year (1969) by the United Nations illustrates the gravity of
the neglect. (See Table 34). As Table 34 shows, the published results
of the 1969 elections in Mozambique indicate that only about 1.2 percent
of the population was registered to vote. Official detailed illustrations
based on districts are also helpful. However, it is important to note
that the number of the population that actually voted seemed even less than
those registered.265 Official estimates maintain that only 50,000 people
of a total population of about eight million actually voted.266 As late
as 1973, these figures had hardly undergone any significant change.267

263 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, (Harmondsworth: Penguin

264 Chabal, op. cit., p. 77.

265 See United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Supplements
cit., p. 43.

266 For the number of people eligible to vote in other years, see
United Nations General Assembly Record A/AC.109/1.919, pp. 18-19. Note also
that in the 1973 Campaign for the Mozambican Legislature only 99,000 people
voted out of a total estimated population of 8.2 million. Quoted in Isaacman,
op. cit., p. 94.

267 Isaacman, op. cit., p. 94.
### TABLE 34

Mozambique: Voting Results for 1965 and 1969

Elections to the National Assembly

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Number of registered voters a/ 1969</th>
<th>Number of votes 1969</th>
<th>Percent of total b/ population</th>
<th>Number of votes 1965</th>
<th>Percent of total b/ population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cabo Delgado</td>
<td>5,513</td>
<td>5,463</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2,979</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>5,063</td>
<td>4,963</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>5,652</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inhambane</td>
<td>5,364</td>
<td>5,286</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3,982</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lourenco Marques</td>
<td>27,852</td>
<td>26,153</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>17,892</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manica e Sofala</td>
<td>15,156</td>
<td>14,489</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>14,801</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mocambique</td>
<td>11,604</td>
<td>11,284</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>9,016</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niassa</td>
<td>1,577</td>
<td>1,536</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1,512</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tete</td>
<td>2,645</td>
<td>2,534</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2,663</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambezia</td>
<td>7,765</td>
<td>7,626</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>5,546</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>82,539</td>
<td>79,336</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>64,043</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23 (A/6300/Rev.1) Chapter V, para, 147; Diario de Noticias, Lisbon, 27 and 29 October 1969.

**a/** There is no information on the number of registered voters for 1965. See A/6300/Rev. 1, Chapter V, para. 147.

It is fair to assert that both Mozambique and Guinea Bissau have undergone tremendous structural transformations in regard to power distribution and mass participation. As we have already noted, much of these changes owe their currency to the way the leadership saw their role. That is to say, they rejected their predilection towards traditional bourgeois identity, and instead identified with the interest of the masses.

In Guinea Bissau following the Cassaca Congress in 1976, the political structure was reorganized in order to meet the demands of the task of development. New political structures were created under the villages, which quickly developed as local organs of power and administration.268 Village committees, two of which must be women, were elected by the villagers themselves. They in turn gave definition to the functions in various areas of importance, social, economic, political, and others.269 In addition, the right to select their representative to the Popular Assembly was automatically granted to every citizen of voting age. These and many other measures taken are testaments of this new orthodoxy.

There is a committed effort by the party as well as the government to inject as much as possible, local inputs into decisions taken at higher levels; while at the same time the failure of the party and government to live up to their ideal in practice is openly denounced. Participation in the formulation of certain key elements of the greater development process is not necessarily confined to the rich and powerful, but often include the

268 Chabal, op. cit., p. 94.

269 Ibid., p. 94.
workers and peasants representatives. All these measures in summation, help
diffuse not only a sense of belonging to the general populace, but in another
sense is indicative of the fact that the interest of the masses to an
impressive degree are not compromised or even sacrificed. Furthermore, upper-
echelon leaders, too often, are required to be informed of the conditions
of the masses, while criticism and self-criticism remains an important factor
in increasing the adherence of the masses to set development goals.

Thus, structural transformations in these two states have enabled
the masses to utilize their own natural resources, improve their own living
conditions, and operate their own economies with a view to achieving not
only accelerated growth of average income, but also more equitable income
distribution and more jobs for the rapidly growing labor force.\textsuperscript{270}

The attainment of equitable progress is an important goal of Guinea
Bissau's development strategy. This goal finds manifestations in sectoral
priorities, as well as the party's commitment to consult the population in
formulating and shaping the targets.\textsuperscript{271} One time Planning Minister, Vasco
Cabral once said:

\begin{quote}
Participation of the rural population is sought at
various levels. In order to channel information from
the base, and vice versa, the country has been divided
into economic zones, each region having its own
economic variation. Yet there can be no doubt that
special attention must be given to the countryside.
This is our first priority.\textsuperscript{272}
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{271}See Goulet, op. cit., p. 23.

\textsuperscript{272}Interview with Denis Goulet, May 26th 1977. Quoted in Ibid.,
p. 20.
Aside from the usual indices of higher productivity and larger output per capita, and many other important benefits that accrue to developing nations, the importance of participation by the people in the decision-making process of development and the fruits from development, including its implementation, justifies the creation of necessary institutional structure that will make such an exercise possible and fruitful.

In Guinea Bissau, participation takes on a dual interpretation, that is to say, formal as well as informal. Denis Goulet elaborates that formally, villagers elect local political or "tabnaco" committees comprised of five members. They also attend regular meeting with party officials or technicians to discuss the merits of proposed actions of every type. Informally, citizens are often found discussing their views and decisions with government officials and party leaders.\textsuperscript{273} This give-and-take process that has become the normal practice enhances the people's participation in the overall development picture. Generally, workers, peasants, and other individuals seemed quite free to uncover complaints or even request direct audience with high officials in the government as well as the party.\textsuperscript{274} It is not surprising at all to notice that decisions taken at the highest level of government in many cases have "been dusted" by the views of the localities. In brief, there is a continuous interaction between the top and the bottom.

Furthermore, the active involvement of women in societal decisions,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{273}Ibid., pp. 22-23 and p. 17.
  \item \textsuperscript{274}Ibid., p. 23; pp. 16-18.
\end{itemize}
a standard conspicuously followed by the PAIGC since the struggle for independence is indeed very impressive. Stephanie Urdang in a brilliant article, "Fighting Two Colonialisms: The Women's Struggle in Guinea Bissau", and other subsequent works concerning the ideological orientation of the PAIGC, strongly maintained that firmly entrenched in this ideology was the belief that the liberation of women must be an integral part of the overall programme for building a new society, a society without exploitation of any kind.275 Making a brief summation of this important question of development and participation she pointedly states:

since the capture of the state; women have played an active role in all arms of development in Guinea Bissau because women were included in the political leadership at a grassroots level. Up until the politics and decision-making, and hence power...have been the domain of men.276

Local "tabanaca" committees must include at least two female representatives, while party documents encourage women and persistently reprimands men for their contemptuous conception of women as inferiors, a common practice still in open existence in many capitalist countries, the U.S.A. included.

In an elaborate review, Africa reported that,

during the years of armed struggle women not only played a supportive role in PAIGC troops, but also directly participated in local defense units. Women cadres held many important post in the party leadership. The PAIGC has consistently encouraged women to participate in the revolutionary process ...in the new elected Popular National Assembly


about one third of the members are women...on the local level, at least two out of five of the members of the "tabanaca" (village) councils must be women. Finally one regional Governor is a woman.277

In education, agriculture, health and other social matters of importance, considerable degree of participation by the people in decision-making and implementation of the goals of development remains a common practice.

Similarly, there is a repetition of this practice in Mozambique, and one that grew out of the traumatic experience of the independence struggle. Here, as we earlier noted, the leadership has also come to define their interests in terms of those of the general masses. Soon after independence from September to December, 1977, national elections were conducted throughout the entire country. Mozambicans chose representatives to over 1,000 assemblies at the local, city, district, and provincial levels.278 Elections were based on the principle of universal suffrage. All Mozambicans irrespective of their color, race, sex, ethnic origins, place of birth, religion, educational level, social position, can elect or be elected provided that they are at least eighteen years old on election day.279 In the first phase, all adults living in towns, villages, and newly organized cooperatives selected representatives to 894 local assemblies. Taken as a


278 Quoted in Isaacman, op. cit., p. 42.

279 Ibid., p. 43.
whole, they chose over 22,000 men and women.\textsuperscript{280} The significance of this can be easily perceived when contrasted with the final colonial election in which less than one percent of the population could legally vote; of which only 50,000 participated.\textsuperscript{281} These and many other measures reveal the vitality of the new democratic process, especially at the local level. In the final analysis, these elections served both as a school for political education and consciousness raising and ensured the effective participation and representation of the Mozambican people in the political process.\textsuperscript{282}

Furthermore, our inquiry discovered that even the composition of the People's Assemblies bares a telling point of revelation. At the district level 20\% of the deputies elected were workers, and 4\% peasants; at the Popular Assembly, the country's national parliament, 32\% of those elected were workers and 29\% peasants.\textsuperscript{283} Echoing this theme, President Samora Machel once stressed that, "his country was building a new type of state in which power belonged to and was exercised by the broad masses through the People's Assemblies".\textsuperscript{284}


\textsuperscript{281}Ibid., p. 43

\textsuperscript{282}Ibid., p. 45.


The process of mass participation in Mozambique is derivative of the practices established during the struggle for independence, when cooperation was a vital weapon for Portuguese capitulation. New Africa's report seems to capture the continuity of this practice when it noted that:

FRELIMO continued what it had done during the war - mobilizing the people. Ginger groups, workers collectives, production councils, and various other groups were set up to mobilize the workers into taking a more active part in the running of their enterprises. 285

Integral to this outgrowth is the contemporary involvement of the people in matters concerning the overall national development process and the accompanying commonalities of debates, discussions, criticism and self-criticism surrounding the process. Allen Isaacman reveals that the party and its various organs enlivens political consciousness and regularly takes the pulse of the masses on development in weekly meetings in the various ministries, local assemblies, party meetings, etc. Men and women are persistently encouraged to air their views not only on the important issue of development, but also on other things as party speeches, documents, and the implementation of socialism in Mozambique. 286 Again, like the experience in Guinea Bissau, women command a respectable place among party cycles and their representation is impressive. Our findings reveal that on a proportional basis there are more women representatives in Mozambique's


legislative bodies than in the United States House of Representatives. Azinna Nwafor further reveals that at the first level of People's Power, 6,300 women were elected to local assemblies constituting of about 30% of the total membership.

There are several other sectors of development in which the decisions of the people are widely respected and put into practice. In education, agricultural endeavors, workers councils and others, the participatory role of the people in decision-making also breeds the feeling of belonging and harmony: two necessary stimulants of development. This principle of incorporating the people's views and desires into the development process, and allowing them to be responsible in certain matters affecting their own development, contributes effectively to national progress.

The breath of participation by the people in development seems to reveal an important distinguishing objective. This is the classic goal of spreading as widely as possible opportunities in the making of the decisions that determine the direction of the lives of the entire citizenry. Participation in decision-making carries with it a broad connotation in meaning that mere participation in politics in itself is not sufficient

287 Comparison made by Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman, Christian Science Monitor. (December 27, 1979). Of 219 deputies in the Assembly, 28 are women. The presence of women, however, show a heavier weight in local district assemblies (24%).


and must elaborately include the decision-making process governing all institutions, public and private, national as well as local, that affect the lives of the citizens in all spheres of the development process.

The only conclusion that we can draw from the development efforts in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau vis-a-vis participation is that the people share in the decision-making process that affects their lives and the benefits from development, including the constructive and psychological satisfying activities that development comprises. Participation as we have noted, is greatly manifested in several aspects: in communal villages, cooperative formations, regular meetings, the mechanism of criticism and self-criticism, the weighted importance given to local resolutions, etc. This in itself creates a strong feeling of nationalism and belonging; two mutually essential ingredients in development. This approach to development, to say the least, is also one directed in part towards the development of the human resource, and therefore necessary in maximizing opportunities for human creativity and general well being. Herein lies, the importance of structural transformations and mass participation in development.

As we had earlier stated development can never be correctly conceived only in terms of economics and economic statistics as was often the case following the colonial capitalist approach to national development. It must be based on improving the general living conditions of the people in both Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. In addition to the above, through a policy of national integration, political consciousness, and rural politicization, development is gradually being achieved in these two countries. These will constitute the main concern of our next discussion.
National Integration, Political Consciousness, and Rural Politicization: Implications on National Development

Since independence, both Mozambique and Guinea Bissau have been trying to solve the difficult problem of integrating diverse sectors of the population into their new nations. National integration is very significant and relevant because of the existence of diverse contradiction, both antagonistic ones and non-antagonistic ones - tribe, sex, class, religion, race, and others. The prevalence of such phenomena, remains the reservoir of division and confusion, institutional diversities, erroneous perceptions of issues, and other factors that could very well impede or even strangle the development process. The illustrative examples of the destructive potential of these factors can be best perceived by a critical examination of Nkrumah's Ghana or Azikwe's Nigeria.  

Hence, the importance of national integration is one that deserves proper attention if development is to be fully realized.

In Guinea Bissau, several measures have been undertaken to combat this problem. The government has created local committees to act as organs of grassroots political direction and to manage new social institutions. It has set up politico-administrative institutions at all levels-regions, sectors, and fully restructured the party itself to enable it to serve as the catalyst in the process of development. In addition, the continuous mobilization of the people around productive work and their increased

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participation in the development process go a long way to achieve national integration. Through political education which carry a heavy dose of nationalism and revolutionary consciousness, through a commendable organization of the youths and politicization of the rural masses, national integration is gradually being achieved, and the gradual reduction of certain systemic shortcomings of the problematic of development peculiar to Guinea Bissau. More importantly, the commitment by the government to involve women in all societal activities, as we had earlier noted, is another illustration of its determination to achieve national integration.\textsuperscript{292}

Similarly, in Mozambique, the integration of all sectors of the population into one whole, is an important aspect of the national agenda. President Machel at the Independence Day celebrations said:

We do not recognize tribes, regions, races or religious beliefs...we only recognize Mozambicans who are equally exploited and equally desirous of freedom and revolution...to be united it is not enough to state that one is united. It is necessary to wage a constant battle against all divisive situations and tendencies.\textsuperscript{293}

Mozambique has taken numerous steps to assuage latent ethnic anxieties and generate a common sense of national identity. The President and other high-level officials have made repeated trips to every province in the country, emphasizing that the "fulfillment of the giant task that lies ahead, implies achieving and consolidating unity".\textsuperscript{294} Newspapers and daily

\textsuperscript{292}Urdang, op. cit., pp. 29-34.

\textsuperscript{293}Quoted in the \textit{Review of African Political Economy}, 4, 1975, p. 23.

\textsuperscript{294}Ibid., November, 1975, p. 23. Quoted in Isaacman, op. cit., p. 29.
broadcast reiterate the theme "unity". In addition, the government has intensified political education and massive literacy campaign in a drive to bridge the barriers which divide Mozambicans, especially in the rural areas.

Furthermore, grassroots organizations, like the Dynamizing Groups, are found throughout the rural communities, factories, and urban neighborhoods and have also sought to dispel pejorative ethnic stereotypes and instead emphasize the value of national unity.\textsuperscript{295} In cities as well as in rural areas, a national network of cultural centers (casas de cultura) have been set up. All these are bound to hasten the achievement of national integration. Finally, as was evident in the case of Guinea Bissau, the process of emancipating women and incorporating them into the new society is taken seriously. Isaacman maintains that this process was still at a much earlier stage of development in 1977.\textsuperscript{296} However, the integration and participation of women is considered an essential condition for the triumph of the Mozambican revolution.

Even though at the moment, and given the enormity of the task, it is hard to critically gauge the level of success, national integration, political education, and rural politicization, which has been greatly emphasized in the development process of both Mozambique and Guinea Bissau in the long run are bound to render such development, dynamic and practical.

\textsuperscript{295}Ibid., p. 29
\textsuperscript{296}Ibid., p. 32.
CHAPTER VI
SOCIO - IDEOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

In the last chapter we focused on the role of the political element in the national development process of the states of Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. We noted that what happened in the political arena helped greatly in the shaping of the development process. The specific concern of this chapter is to examine one important aspect of development often reduced to secondary importance, but one that has received foremost attention in the Unified Approach. This is essentially the social aspect of development; and we must also add, the ideological outcroppings of this process. Beginning with an examination of the significance of the social and ideological factors in development, we will subsequently review the problem of the human resources. Since education occupies a key position in any social discourse, we shall focus on the nature of education in these states. Finally, health and housing, and the current drive to a long term attainment of self-reliance will be equally examined. More importantly, because of the crucial role education, health, and housing play in the development of the human resource, this study would attempt to assess the unique methods that have been employed by both Mozambique and Guinea Bissau to reduce the gravity of its impact on the masses. The rest of the chapter is essentially an elaboration of these crucial issues.

Significance of Social and Ideological Factors in Development

The perception of development, which until recently, had remained virtually confined to the domain of economics has rapidly acquired social, political, and ideological dimensions as we have already noted in previous discussions. According to the United Nations:

It is...essential to consider simultaneously all the factors involved. This in fact, is the essence of development programming, and underlies nearly all available techniques. The principle of integrated economic, and social development would, then mean that social and economic factors should be all looked at...direct...indirect. 299

National development therefore, is only properly conceived through the examination and assessment of the whole rather than the particular. In the context of Africa, the historical progression from a traditional to a modern society, the movement from stagnation to development; from benign neglect to full development of the human resources, especially when it concerns altering people's behavior, impacting dynamisms and improving the productive capacity, call therefore, for drastic changes in the social and ideological organs of nations. 299 The process of development as we have already noted, must be viewed as one focused towards the improvement of the general conditions of the population. Since this is also a social phenomenon, conditioned by interhuman relations, socio-economic institutions as well as ideological diversities, these factors must be fully understood in formulating a strategy of development. To put it more precisely, these

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298 Ibid., p. 8.

social aspects must constitute the absolutely indispensable integral element of any development strategy.  

Soical outcroppings of development include the continual improvement of the living standard of the whole population, especially the impoverished masses. In both Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, it has meant the expansion of education and health care, including employment opportunities, better housing, and a more equitable distribution of income and the national wealth.

The Unified Approach to national development and planning, as we have seen, emphasized the importance of the social aspect of development when it stated that:

Development is viewed as involving various kinds of structural and institutional change and social and individual transformation which build up the capacity of the society and of its members to realize higher levels of production and welfare.  

An important corollary of the social dimension of development is the ideological element in development. The importance of ideology had long been recognized by thinkers like Frantz Fanon, Kwame Nkrumah, and Cabral, all of whom deployed the absence of any strong ideological foundation in African countries. The importance of ideology cannot be overemphasized. Ideological fermentation of a nation with the views and conditions of the society that would eventually be realized at the peak of the development venture, we maintain is always a very important weapon in national development.

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302 See Ofor, op. cit., p. 15.
Ideology provides a potential driving force in the world of the masses and greatly helps to stimulate critical discussions of the emerging society and its anticipated goals.  

The weapon of ideology could also be used in an evil manner to stagnate the development of a people. For example, prior to the attainment of independence, the ideology fabricated from the metropoles was very helpful in keeping these two states in a permanent state of oppression and stagnation. James Mittleman for example, in the case of Mozambique maintains that:

During the colonial era, the ideology of white supremacy was particularly dispersed to the people by the notorious colonial and neo-colonial agent - the Catholic church - an ideology that had long made a strong impact on the Mozambican mind...in addition to the political machinery, the Catholic church acted as a potent ideological force in anesthetizing the masses and inducing them to accept a life of grinding poverty and subjugation to alien rule.

The predominant ideology in the two states reveals a sincere and committed drive towards the realization of a socialist state. In Mozambique for example, the Third Congress of FRELIMO in 1977, strongly called for the application of scientific socialism to the revolutionary process now underway. There is also recognizably a committed attempt to

303 Ibid., p. 16.  
304 Mittleman, op. cit., p. 36.  
structure the thinking of the working class and peasants on the eventual realization of the dictatorship of the proletariat and an emphasis of their revolution as an integral part of the world proletarian revolution. In addition, both FRELIMO and the PAIGC, the two ruling parties in accordance with Marxist-Leninist teachings, "accord primacy to class struggle, and make the proletarian ideology the dominant factor".  

Such an ideological foundation, greatly contributes to both the reduction and exposure of many contradictions in development, especially the emergence of a powerful "bourgeois or petty bourgeois" class of enormous strength and its foreign interconnections - an important contributing factor to underdevelopment. As Kaplan, et.al., has rightfully stressed regarding development in Mozambique, "the role of ideology in guiding development was heavily stressed. Great emphasis was placed on having what was termed the correct line. Ideological correctness was heavily emphasized", which in itself is an important ingredient of self-reliance. The importance of this phenomenon is better illustrated in many countries where it is absent. Ghana provides a most illustrative example; having gone through the ambivalent experiences of colonialism, the one-party system and middle road socialism, military junta, parliamentary democracy and again military junta. It is fair to say that all these regimes were pregnant with various ideological concepts and creeds, that affected the social, economic, and political institutions of the nation. Hence, according to Damachi and Tahal:


The result of these many ideological experiences is that the Ghanian population has been confused as to what ideology to follow. The frequent change of government which entails a rapid change in ideological positions has therefore helped to retard the development process. In short, it seems that in Ghana development ideology has become a "game of musical chairs".

Furthermore, having a distinct ideology clearly means that at all levels and dimensions of the development process, discussions, and development goals, could easily be understood and transmitted to attain practical reality. This in our view, partly explains the relative success of group and collective endeavors in development in both Mozambique and Guinea Bissau.

Education

As an important weapon of development, education in the states of Mozambique and Guinea Bissau aims at a maximum utilization of the human resource. This interpretation therefore denotes that education in this context is hardly an end, but a secure way of achieving other economic, social, political, and ideological dimensions of national development.

Under the Portuguese rule, before the capture of state political power, education in both Mozambique and Guinea Bissau was essentially reserved for Portuguese settlers and only a handful of "natives". The colonial schools system was hardly geared towards the needs of the people.

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309 Damachi and Tahal, op. cit., p. 78.


311 See Chabal, op. cit., p. 79.
In Guinea Bissau for example, only 14 university graduates were produced in the 500 years of Portuguese rule, and only one secondary school existed as the only highest academic institution in the country. The purpose of such education was of course calculated at the underdevelopment of the colonial territory. According to New Africa:

The objective of the colonial school was to form a small elite of subaltern indigenous civil servants in order to man the colonial administration. The social privileges which this group received from the colonial system was in relation to its assimilation of the colonialist-racist mentality of the Portuguese towards the population. The school system, a source of cultural alienation was entirely cut off from the realities of the country. It was a school system of a minority for a minority and against the majority.

Such a concept of education was instead calculated at strangling the development of the people of Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. The realized intentions of what such an educational system was supposed to accomplish was outlined by Cardinal Ajarjeira, the Patriarch of Lisbon in 1960, he stated that

we need schools in Africa, but schools which demonstrate to the indigenous population the path to human dignity and the glory of the nation that protects them. We want to teach the indigenous population to read, to write, and to count, but not to produce doctors.

However, since the capture of state political power, education in Guinea Bissau, as a beginning point, has taken a different posture. There is recognizable a profound belief that to achieve development, the type of

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312 Ibid., pp. 78-79.


education must be one that would be capable of constructing new values consonant with their vision of the new society. 315 Cabral himself noting the severe damage inflicted on African culture and civilization, insisted that it was necessary to reverse this state of affairs in the younger generation through a totally revamped educational system, including the re-Africanization of the mentalities of the older generation. 316 Consequently, education in accordance with the theoretical postulation of the Unified Approach is assigned a comprehensive role in Guinea Bissau's development strategy. According to Denis Goulet, one fifth of the country's budget is allocated to education, while the ministry of education accounts for the greatest volume of public expenditure. 317

In Guinea Bissau also, education is accompanied by a heavy dose of politicization. This seems to conform with the views of President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, who seems to embrace the view that "when moving a country from embryonic capitalism and capital attitudes towards the growth of socialism, few things are of long term importance than political education." 318 Hence, the importance accorded the political element in the overall development process, finds strong expression also in the domain of education. Denis Goulet states that

316 Ibid., p. 47.
it is not exaggeration to state that for the PAIGC there exist no education which is not political, and no political activity which is not educational. Even in educational domains requiring high degrees of technical discipline, the total context and the social purpose of that discipline are justified in terms of the country's broader political goals.  

Therefore, education in Guinea Bissau is considered a dependable means of improving the human resource, and one whose objectives, both qualitatively and quantitatively, are widely concentrated in the area of literacy campaigns, schooling and professional training.

In the arena of literacy, it is clear that at the time of independence, only about one percent of the total adult population, as we had noted in Guinea Bissau were literate. Consequently, a drive for adult education as well as a remarkable reduction of child illiteracy came to be considered a major objective of government policy, that in the long run would be reflected in the overall development venture. As we have already noted, the question of this drive had its roots in the struggle for national independence in the liberated areas, where despite the difficult conditions, the PAIGC set up schools for adult and children literacy classes. The necessity and importance of such a transformation, especially with regard to populations emerging from oppression has strong theoretical support from the famed Brazilian social scientist and educator Paulo Freire, whose

\[319\] Goulet, op. cit., p. 27

intellectual and practical contribution to the literacy endeavors of Guinea Bissau, remains a very impressive one. Africa notes that:

The cornerstone of Guinea Bissau's new educational policy was a mass literacy drive which was aimed at accelerating the revolutionary cultural process of work in the society. The Ministry of Education invited the well-known Brazilian educator Paulo Freire and his Geneva-based team of the Cultural Action and Development Institute...Freire uses literacy and adult education schemes as political levers whose purpose is to give the population the possibility of acquiring a critical approach to their environment and their social reality.

The colonial system that made education available to only few Africans had only been designed to inculcate into Guineans, how to become obedient "slaves" to the Portuguese rulers. Since the attainment of independence, all the various agencies of education have been revolutionized: their purpose, mode of operation, values, and relationship to the larger society has undergone a radical transformation. The qualitative results so far have been modestly impressive. As a matter of fact, with the progression of time, encompassing efforts have become not only clearly visible, but increasingly satisfactory. Denis Goulet noted that

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324 Ibid., IDAC Document 11/12.
encouraging results are now discernable in several "culture circles" among employees of the People's Stores in the Capital. Efforts among dwellers of rural tabanacas have proved more fruitful, with several thousand adults having been rendered effectively literate. Some thought is now being given to extending the school vocations of secondary school students in conducting a campaign of "cultural animation" designed to prepare rural populations for subsequent educational efforts aimed at literacy. 325

The central thesis underlying this comprehensive literacy efforts seem to be grounded in the belief that the greatest wealth in Guinea and one that would help bring about a quick development of the country, lies in the general population. Hence, the vital need of providing mass education to the citizens. Frederick Harbison seemingly concurs with this assertion, when he wrote that "the wealth of a country is dependent upon more than its natural resources and material capital; it is determined in significant degrees by the knowledge, skill and motivation of its people, i.e., its stock of human capital". 326 Others like Penelope Roach in Political Socialization in the Nations of Africa, (1967), has not only recognized the importance of education in development, but has also found it to be a significant weapon in shaping the masses of the people into the intended ideology of the country. 327 Literacy campaigns in Guinea Bissau also seem to have had other spillover effect, in that, it has contributed

325Goulet, op. cit., p. 28.


greatly in realizing a healthy population. According to the official observation of the Ministry of Education, many sanitation problems in Guinea Bissau are derived from deficient cultural notions or habits, as well as the transmission from one generation to the next of certain views of nature. Consequently, the implementation of this comprehensive approach to education has also helped combat disease and the spread of diseases, essential ingredients in national development.

Another additional spillover advantage relevant to development, is that these literacy programs have integrated training in agriculture or agriculture related areas, especially since agriculture plays an important role in the overall development of the economy. The underlying assumption seemed to be based on the rationale that remarkable gains in development remains possible if those who are taught are involved as much as possible in the process of socio-economic transformation.

Judged from the perspective of its contribution to the effective transformation of society, literacy campaigns blended with a heavy dose of politicization are much more important and capable of achieving even better results than mere "linguistic literacy". The views and theoretical support of the great Brazilian educator, Paulo Freire, attest to the superiority of this approach. Paulo has long expressed his unequivocal satisfaction with this approach to education. Furthermore, according to Guinea Bissau's Commission for Literacy Coordination, in a program

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328 This view is based on a memo of the Ministry of Education which serves as a working manual for literacy workers in Guinea Bissau. There are no dates or titles.

report describing efforts of the literacy program, it recorded that significant progress, in addition, has been made in "cultural animation", marked by the participation of the populace in collective productive tasks, usually agricultural, under the guidance of teachers interested in linking action to learning. 330

In the realm of formal schooling a much more impressive image emerges both in quantitative and qualitative terms. Unlike before independence, several thousands of people attend schools at various levels of the education process. There has been a persistent growth in the number of schools and persons enrolled from year to year. (See Table 35 and 36). As Table 35 shows, the number of schools for first cycle pupils in the 1975/76 school year was 541, while in the 1977/78 school year as Table 36 shows, it had increased to 630. With regard to the number of pupils, Table 35 indicates that the total number in 1975/76 school year was 87,757, while for the 1977/78 school year as Table 36 indicates it was over 100,000.

Furthermore, on examining the data for the two Tables we see that even among the second cycle pupils, the total number for the 1975/76 1976 school year was 5,229, while for the 1977/78 school year the figure climbed to 5,603. (See Table 36). Even the number of teachers show a recognizable increase. For example, the total number of teachers for the 1975/76 school year was 2,565, while for the 1977/78 school year the total

TABLE 35

Guinea Bissau
Education - Schools, Teachers, Pupils
1975-1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Schools</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th>Pupils</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic 1st cycle</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>2,244</td>
<td>79,482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic 2nd cycle</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>5,229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>2,576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher training</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>554</td>
<td>2,565</td>
<td>87,757</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Number was 3,237, indicating an increase of about 662 in a single academic year. These advances are very encouraging, to say the least. In short, there is a gradual yearly increase in the number of schools, pupils, as well as teachers as the data clearly shows. The pursuit of this kind of policy are bound to create a tremendous impact on the general population as a whole in Guinea Bissau.
Furthermore, schools are highly decentralized and accessible to the poor. This practice it must be noted, grew out of the seeds that were sown during the struggle for independence that finally matured at the end of the conflict in which several people had access to education. Many of the teachers are young and admittedly poorly trained, but they enthusiastically are willing to learn and improve themselves. Material supplies are also lacking, notwithstanding the general help from many foreign countries. Even living conditions are crowded and food is neither plentiful or varied, but thanks to better health education, serious efforts are made to improve the conditions.

The Friendship Institute with headquarters in Bissau, and operating within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education, operates fairly independently, but relies heavily on outside help from donors like UNICEF, the World Council of Churches, and many other private foundations in Sweden, Holland, France, Norway, and Canada. The internal organization of the Institute reflect the importance the PAIGC gives to social solidarity and moral incentives among the young. In addition, emphasis is given to collective leadership, regular meetings of a political, didactic, and cultural character; the election of students of the leaders to several executive bodies; and the requirements that directors and professors possess sound political consciousness. The PAIGC wants to keep alive in these youngsters the spark of commitment to national reconstruction.

In several ways the PAIGC is committed to produce a brand of students, who would not only see themselves as elites of society frowning on menial work as typical of many African countries, but elites for whom the building of a society of equal opportunity and justice becomes a primary goal.
### TABLE 36

Guinea Bissau

Education - Schools, Teachers, Pupils

1977-1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Schools</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th>Pupils</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic 1st cycle</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>2,620</td>
<td>76,197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic 1st cycle (adults)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic 2nd cycle</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic 2nd cycle (adults)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensino Geral Polivalente:</td>
<td></td>
<td>540</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liceus (secondary schools)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical school</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher-training colleges</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>665</td>
<td>3,237</td>
<td>100,007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Totals also include 13 Instituto Amizade schools which were attended by 1,779 pupils at all levels.

Unlike before independence, when a handful of students were trained "to be like the Portuguese" in everything but skin color, with a corollary of frowning on manual work, the present curricula combine both study and productive work together.\textsuperscript{331} For example, tasks assigned to students include: weeding fields, planting trees, cleaning up hospitals, accounting in People's Stores and unloading cargoes at the port.\textsuperscript{332} The exigencies of the struggle helped to blend study with work, thereby, overcoming the pernicious dichotomies inherited from colonialism, which is still very visible in many African countries, such as Nigeria, Ivory Coast, and Cameroon, to name just a few. This peculiarity in development, characteristic of Guinea Bissau, has prompted intellectuals like Rosisca and Miguel Dancy de Oliveira in their brilliant article, "Note sur une experience en Guinee Bissau", to say that what is being sought in Guinea Bissau, is a form of development which in certain respects is realized in the very process by which it is being sought.\textsuperscript{333}

Finally, we must also emphasize that despite the focus on literacy education and formal schooling, there is also a heavy emphasis on all kinds of technical and professional training. These include economists and statisticians, to educators, electricians, automobile repair personnel, pilots, agricultural technicians, medical aids, social workers, pharmacists, 

\textsuperscript{331} Goulet, op. cit., p. 52.

\textsuperscript{332} Ibid., p. 52.

accountants and others. Granted that there is a real deficiency of many of these skills, Guinea Bissau has made it part of its policy to send several hundred of its students overseas for university and other specialized training.

Education in Mozambique points towards a common similarity too as in Guinea Bissau, hence, we shall be very brief. Under the settler regime, the purpose of education wherever it existed in Mozambique was intended to inculcate loyalty and gratitude to the settler, and hence it helped to consolidate the Portuguese colonial grip. This is still a common practice even in today's independent African countries. Education in Mozambique was one that strove to create "black Portuguese", pregnant in Portuguese socio-cultural, ideological, and political strands of thought, at the expense of his African identity. The purpose of these schools, wherever they existed, was to produce a set of "go-betweens" between the Portuguese and the "bush" and "primitive" Africans. Education throughout this era was thus calculated at the underdevelopment of the colonial territory. This claim finds additional support when we examine the content of education itself. In brief, education throughout this period was rather calculated at presenting a biological rationalization of the "inferiority of the natives"


335 It is said that 600 students in 1975 were sent overseas to various institutions of higher learning. (See speech by President Louis Cabral to the Popular National Assembly, April 22, 1976).

compared with whites. Consequently, the curricula were carefully planned to reflect this idea including the books chosen. \(^{337}\) In addition, teachers and administrators came to regard it as a holy duty to transplant this evil doctrine of inferiority into the African mind. Thus, education, to say the least, was an important weapon of dehumanization and underdevelopment during the five hundred years of colonial rule in Mozambique. "Schools were based on racism, divisionism, elitism, individualism, obscurantism, and contempt for everything African". \(^{338}\)

Since the capture of state political power, there has been committed efforts to expand educational opportunities, which have found manifestations in literacy campaigns, formal schooling, on the job training, and higher education. Persistent campaigns were undertaken to enroll children in schools while additional encouragement was provided to expand the number of women in vocational schools. \(^{339}\)

In Mozambique, as in Guinea Bissau, education is seen not only as a means of increasing the productive capacity of the people, but also as a tool for purging him of all vestiges of colonial mentality. There is as a consequence, a heavy dose of politicization in the educational process, which aims at exterminating the phenomenon of cultural dependency that had

\(^{337}\)Ibid., p. 12.


\(^{339}\)Isaacman, op. cit., pp. 32-36.
developed in colonial Mozambique, with the result of creating the "new" Mozambican, free from all complexes, and capable of making his scientific knowledge the basis of the new society. 340

Our study reveals that literacy classes have been well established to educate the masses within the rural areas. Aside from reading and writing, lessons are provided in agriculture, health, and other necessary aspects of development. 341 The intended goal seems to be geared toward the creation of a well informed and conscious citizenry, capable of contributing their utmost to the national development process. Formal schooling is also emphasized, ranging from elementary to university education. There is recognizably a substantial growth in student enrollment as shown from the colonial figures of 1972/1973 and those of 1979 after independence. (See Tables 37, 38, and 39). As Table 37 shows, the number of pupils attending school in 1972 was 652,000, while in 1973 the figure was about 633,989 (Table 38). But since independence the increase has been very sharp. Table 39 illustrates this increase in which in 1979 the number of pupils was 1,600,796.

The importance attached to formal schooling in Mozambique is based on its critical role as an instrument for social change and justice, and necessary in providing the knowledge necessary for continuing the revolution. It is also important to note that the emphasis on the centrality of education and its potential as a weapon for social transformation


341 Isaacman, op. cit., p. 77.
is reflected in the vigorous national as well as local campaigns to enroll children in school. The success of this effort is reflected in the number of pupils attending school. (See Table 39 for the figures of 1979).

TABLE 37

Mozambique
Education Showing 1972 Pupils and Teachers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pupils</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>605,000</td>
<td>10,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>652,300</td>
<td>13,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:
Direccao dos Servicos de Estatistica, Lourenco Marques;
Instituto Nacional de Estatistica, Lisbon; Banco Nacional Ultramarion, Lisbon. 1972

Special attention has been placed on expanding the educational opportunities for girls, particularly the young ones. It must be recalled that following the colonial capitalist approach, they suffered double discrimination at the hands of the colonial regime as well as their parents. In many cases, the parents of these girls preferred to keep them at home and used them for the daily labor requirements in the family and also prepared them for early marriages with handsome brideprices. The dramatic increase of students at all levels as Table 39 shows demonstrates the success of this endeavor.
The state has also encouraged young women to enroll in vocational training programs, previously reserved only for males. As one would expect, the dramatic increase in enrollment seriously introduced a new problem to Mozambique given its inadequate educational potential during the colonial period. Many problems such as lack of classrooms and books, were overcome through local interventions and initiatives. Students, teachers, as well as members of the community collectively constructed makeshift schools, while in the evenings teachers prepared handouts which served as substitutes for classroom texts. In certain instances, classes were

TABLE 38

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mozambique Education Showing 1973 Pupils and Teachers</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pupils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source (unless otherwise stated): Direccao Nacional de Estatistica, Maputo 1973
held outdoors, and usually under the shade of trees, and available books shared among participating students. These indeed are great innovations in education in Mozambique that was never the case during the colonial period. As we shall further see, even the school curricula would also

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 39</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Showing Number of Pupils in Primary, Secondary, and Higher Schools, 1979</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pupils</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>1,494,729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>105,263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,600,796</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNESCO. 1979

be greatly effected in an attempt to produce students whose attitude would conform with the intended goals of the revolution. These efforts are great strides in the educational system that was never the case in Guinea Bissau before the capture of state political power.
Unlike in colonial times, education is characterized by study as well as physical work, while a collective group approach to educational orientation is highly emphasized. In addition, there have been drastic changes in the curricula as well as the books utilized in schools, in an attempt to reflect the prevailing ideology and a virtual erosion of any form of religious instruction. A Mozambican delegation to the Conference of Ministers of Education of Africa, had this to say:

Religious instruction was removed from the schools and political instruction and productive manual work introduced to form together the motive force in the mobilization and formation of a new mentality among students...the old textbooks were prohibited because they reflected a way of life and ideas completely alien to our own. 343

Granted that the main objective of education in Mozambique is only one that strives to serve the people, the concept of elitism in the context of this country has now a different meaning. Through the correct "melange" of study and ideological orientation with a heavy dose of politicization, emerging elites unlike the experiences of many African countries, see their role essentially as that of serving the people. 344

The charm of this special focus on education in these two revolutionary states is not only found in their intended long-term

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342 Ibid., p. 72.


development goals and its compatibility with the concrete situation confronting many of today's African countries, but also the rudimentary rediscovery of their black identity, so indispensable in real development in Africa. The politicization of education in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau make this goal possible. As Paul Streeten had emphasized, "development is not about index numbers of national income, it is not about savings ratios and capital coefficients: it is about and for people".  

Health and Housing

Like education, health is another important factor in the social dimension of national development that has received the attention of these two states since the capture of state political power. As *Africa Magazine* observed in the case of Guinea Bissau.

If education is to play the role of the catalyst in the formation of a new Guinean personality, health care is essential to guarantee the nation's future development prospects. Health is our most important wealth...only a healthy population could produce the work effort necessary to feed the population and contribute to building the nation's industrial infrastructure.

In many African countries, today's improvement in the health of the national population has been very limited indeed, even though, it continues to be a permanent theme of the political rhetoric of many governments. This negligence rather stems from the low level attention accorded this factor in the overall development process. The problematic of inadequate

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345 Streeten, op. cit., p. 2.

economic resources for the construction of many hospitals and health centers has become ready justification for the inadequate response to the enormity of the problem in many African countries today. Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, like many contemporary African countries, experienced severe health problems prior to the attainment of independence and are still confronted with serious health issues. In Guinea Bissau for example, there was only one hospital in the capital city Bissau, that essentially served the medical needs of the Portuguese settlers, while in Mozambique there was a seeming repetition of this practice\textsuperscript{347} where available hospitals mainly served the Portuguese.

But the uniqueness of the approach to the question of health in these states since independence, stem from the fact that improvements in the health of the population have been singled out as a very important area of the general policy because of its implications on development. Consequently, there has been a rejuvenation and flowering of a novelle approach to health. Two major characteristics can be identified. First, there is the sincere commitment to uplift the health standards of the general population in both countries and hence, the drive to speed up the construction of new hospitals, numerous health centers, maternity care units, and to make doctors accessible to several medical outposts.\textsuperscript{348} For example, in Mozambique the number of doctors increased from 100 at the end of the colonial era to about 300 just a year later, while in Guinea Bissau, health


\textsuperscript{348}See Goulet, op. cit., p. 20. Also see Isaacman, op. cit., pp. 73-78.
took up to about 12% of the total national budget in 1977, just two years after independence. 349

As a matter of fact, the recognition of the crucial importance of health in the process of national development could be traced back to the time of the struggle for independence, when many remarkable innovations in the improvement of the health conditions of the masses had already been conceived. In Guinea Bissau for example, Patrick Chabal reported that, between 1964 and 1974, the PAIGC developed a relatively extensive health system...by the 1970's the villages were undoubtedly benefiting from better health care and education. By 1969 there were nine hospitals and 117 dispensaries inside the country (3 hospitals outside for long term treatment)...when in 1964 the PAIGC had initiated health care, they did not have a single doctor; by 1971 they had twenty. 350

Secondly, there is recognizably an enormous campaign to adapt preventive medicine practices that have been greatly and successfully diffused by the governments of Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, to the population, using all the available apparatus at its disposal. This in particular, sets these two countries apart from many African countries. Irving Kaplan, et.al., in Area Handbook for Mozambique, for example, seems to have captured this phenomenon, when he stated that.

Data since the takeover by the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique - FRELIMO) are lacking together. The fragmentary material available nevertheless suggest that malaria, tuberculosis, bacterial, and amebic dysentery and other gastroenteric infections, pneumonia, measles, and infectious hepatitis are among the more common diseases. Outbreaks of such


diseases as cholera have occurred from time to time. Some
of these diseases and others can be dealt with by such
direct preventive measures as vaccination or inoculation,
and the FRELIMO government...stated its intention to do
so. 351

Granted that the ability to increase hospitals and the availability
of doctors takes a long time and an enormous slice of the national budget,
these states of Mozambique and Guinea Bissau have chosen the path of
preventive medicine as an important alternative. The underlying rational
seems to be grounded on the fact that, through an organized system of
education and training of health teams, who in turn will teach the masses
preventive methods, the general health of the entire citizenry could be
better improved than reliance on curative measures. 352

Thus, in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, we see that the inadequacy
of conventional medical facilities had generated a different approach to
the overall question of national health. Our study uncovered the existence
of a comprehensive health program in these two countries, covering many
aspects of the health care and promotion, including basic health services
and their associated maternal and child health care; as well as family
planning components. 353 Describing the health efforts in Mozambique,
Irving Kaplan had this to say:

351 Irving Kaplan et.al., Area Handbook for Mozambique. (Washington,

352 Isaacman, op. cit., p. 74. Also see African Contemporary Record,

353 Ibid., p. 74.
First national vaccination campaign...under the overall supervision of the Ministry of Health, logistical support commission in each province were in charge of everything connected with the campaign of their areas...On Saturdays or Sundays teams each consisting of a physician or a medical student, a nurse, a nurse's aid, and a paramedical student were required to participate in tasks related to public health. These might include visiting various districts of the city to give out information on health and hygiene, hearing criticisms of the hospital and suggestions of its improvement, or even taking part in latrine cleaning or the destruction of garbage.  

In Mozambique for example, our findings reveal that at the time of independence, only 50 doctors basically were left to serve a population of 8 million people. Following the current approach to development and the place of health in it, the government recruited several doctors overseas and sent many Mozambicans for training overseas. In addition, the government had allocated (1976) approximately 15% of the national budget to health alone. Mass campaigns of preventive medicine, and mobilized health brigades were assigned to the various local Dynamizing Groups. To crown it all, several health workers have been trained to supplement the shortages of doctors. They essentially teach peasants how to maintain proper health techniques, thereby, preventing and controlling diseases.

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354 Kaplan et. al., op. cit., pp. 76-78.
356 Ibid., p. 74.
357 In 1978, both health and education took up $104 million out of a budget of $390 million. (AIM.120, 1978), adopted from Ibid., p. 112.
There is also the multiplicity of the mother-childcare centers in an effort to strangle the rate of infant mortality, while free medical service remains within the reach of everybody, especially the poor. 358

On theoretical grounds, these measures are certainly not without justification, because according to the standards of the World Health Organization, especially the report of the Expert Committee on Public Health Administration, these measures are highly justified. 359

Furthermore, many endemic and communicative diseases have virtually been eliminated or at least controlled through vaccination plans in both countries. 360 Specifically in the case of Mozambique, more than 90 percent of the total population has been immunized — placing Mozambique far ahead of most Africa. 361

Like health, an improvement in housing as well as other community social facilities is admittedly a contributing factor to the overall social dimension of national development. This element was deliberately overlooked in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, prior to independence. The poor recognition given its importance can be conjunctured from the reluctant allocation of any reasonable fund to it in the national budgets. (See for example the

358bid., pp. 73-78.
361Isaacman, op. cit., p. 76. For additional information on the value of preventive medicine, see Odin Anderson and George Rosen, An Examination of the Concept of Preventive Medicine. (New York: Health Information Foundation Research Series, No. 12, 1979).
### TABLE 40

**Mozambique: Third National Development Plan, 1968-1975**  
Programme of Investments for 1969  
(million escudos)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Programmed expenditure</th>
<th>Authorised</th>
<th>Percentage of programmed expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, forestry and livestock</td>
<td>229.7</td>
<td>239.1</td>
<td>104.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisheries</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing and transforming industries</td>
<td>997.9</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction and public works</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural development</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>89.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>261.1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marketing</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and communications and meteorology</td>
<td>1,411.0</td>
<td>357.1</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>316.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>144.9</td>
<td>220.0</td>
<td>151.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing and urbanization</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>80.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,238.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>927.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>28.6</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the case of Mozambique in Table 40). As Table 40 shows, only 1.8 million escudos were allocated to urbanization and housing in 1969 out of a total actual budget of 927.5 escudos. This in a sense indicates the little importance accorded housing in national development during the Portuguese rule.
Our findings led us to conclude that an adequate provision of good housing for all in these two countries is yet to be a dream come true. Partly due to cost, the attainment of this goal, in our view, would definitely require a long period of collective effort by both the people and the government in these two states. However, it is well noted that low-cost houses are consistently being constructed today, while abandoned houses of fleeing Portuguese have long been nationalized and reconstituted for the masses occupation. 362 For example, in Mozambique up to 120,000 to 150,000 persons have been estimated to have occupied such houses. 363 Mohammed El-Khawas had this to say in the case of Mozambique:

Through the Dynamizing Groups abandoned houses were identified, and occupied by new families. The government allocated millions of dollars to help rejuvenate the construction industry ($40 million dollars between 1970-1980). Several hundreds of abandoned buildings under construction at various stages were completed and given to urban dwellers. Furthermore, groups were encouraged to take the responsibility of formulating a housing plan, while the government would provide reasonable construction materials. 364

To bring the persistent problem to manageable proportions, improvement in housing and community facilities have been rather focused on developing newer communities, within distance from large urban centers. 365

Furthermore, government efforts at exploiting local materials for use in individual house construction ventures have been greatly intensified 366

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362 Isaacman, op. cit., pp. 78-89.
363 African Contemporary Record, 1977/78, P. B337. Also see Ibid., p. 79.
365 Isaacman, op. cit., p. 80.
in an attempt to contain the problem. However, the demand for good and modern housing still far outnumber the supply in these two countries, especially around urban centers.

Self-Reliance

Aside from the different developmental focus that we have discussed, there is also the unique characteristic of development high in the national development agenda of both countries. This is essentially the attempt to practice or implement the principle of self-reliance; a methodological approach to development that rather emphasizes the development of the resources of developing nations by they themselves, and depending practically on their own ability in meeting many of their needs.

The national development process, in these two states reveal that there is great strategic importance attached to self-reliance, both in statements describing their broad development philosophy and in certain actions, but certainly not at the risk of stagnation. That is to say, self-reliance should not be an obstacle to achieving prescribed development goals, given the prevailing underdeveloped nature of these two countries and the severe limitations of available resources.

Self-reliance implies that decisions as to the pace, design and character of development will not be one that would only lead to dependency, or on the formula of limited raw materials shipped to metropolitan markets, or even based on the sinister decisions of powerful multinational corporations.

It is widely accepted in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, that the key to successful development must include emphasis on trying to exploit local abilities to a very considerable degree before resorting to outside assistance. 367 Hence, self-reliance and a nationally integrated and balanced economy characterized by high productivity and high incomes in all sectors of the national economy, are attendant long-term goals in both of these two countries. This principle of self-reliance for example, prompted President Samora Machel of Mozambique in the absence of machine rice harvestors, to fall back to the labor power of the people in Mozambique (50,000) in harvesting a huge rice crop in Mozambique. 368

The need to rely on one's efforts in accomplishing one's goals, a contrived definition of self-reliance, could be said to have had some of its roots in the experience and practice during the struggle for independence in both states. In accordance with prescribed practice, the various communities under the control of freedom fighters were supposed to be self-reliant with reference to many of their basic needs. This principle was also gradually magnified to national proportions and welded to the more definitive concept of self-reliance. Granted that the shortage of capital in these two countries is a perpetual handicap to development, the governments of these countries, in accordance with the principle of self-reliance as postulated in the Unified Approach, have never ceased to emphasize the importance of "people's power" over machines in development. 369

368 Ibid., p. B346.
369 Ibid.
In both countries, several propaganda campaigns undertaken are intended to inculcate into the people the belief that hard work could well be a substitute for dependence on foreign machinery and goodwill. 370

In Mozambique for example, miniature formations like communal villages are a portrait of the national development policy of grassroots self-reliance. Our findings indicate that as of 1978, there were approximately 1,500, and that by 1980, over 1,600 of these villages have been established voluntarily. 371 Major decisions and the rules that govern these villages are openly discussed through democratic means. There is a strong tendency for the community to depend almost entirely on its own efforts for sustenance and other necessities. By extension, peasants for their part and in conformity with the principle of self-reliance, decide what to produce, and how the profits realized should be shared. This indeed, is a great innovation in development, unchallenged perhaps, by no other experience in Africa outside these states.

Granted that external influences in the form of aid, could have severe implications on the overall maturation and practice of self-reliance, the inevitable question becomes one of assessing how far external aid goes to erode this commitment to self-reliance. Such an assessment must certainly in our view, take into consideration that self-reliance does not in anyway imply or mean autarchy.

370 Ibid

371 Isaacman, op. cit., p. 52.
Taking Guinea Bissau as our beginning point, Denis Goulet states that she receives an average aid of more than $50 million annually. Broken down to a more comprehensive analysis, this in turn corresponds to a per capita income of about $50 annually. Major donors among others include Sweden, the United Nations System, the European Economic Community, the U.S.S.R. and Cuba. Other contributors of a lesser magnitude include Norway, Algeria, Holland, France, the United Kingdom, Portugal, Libya, China, Abu-Dhabi, Kuwait, Italy, the United States, East Germany, West Germany, Saudi Arabia, and some non-governmental agencies. The common question of many critics then becomes; could such a dependence on external aid not defeat the overall thrust and practice of self-reliance?

Again Goulet maintains that most of the aid comes in the form of grants and not loans. For example, Sweden's total aid is about $10 million annually and all of it provided in the form of grants (and hardly any loans) to support Guinea Bissau in very essential needs, like food, medicine, and machinery. The United Nations as the second example provides all her aid almost entirely in the form of grants. This principle also mirrors other examples among European countries.

Furthermore, Guinea Bissau's aid receiving strategy is characterized by "diversification of projects and resources". In addition, countries

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373 Ibid., p. 40.
374 Ibid.
like China, U.S., West Germany seemed to be heavily involved in rice projects, while others like Cuba, China, Sweden, and Yugoslavia in medicine, and the U.S.S.R and Holland in fishing. 375 To crown it all, acceptance of any aid, Goulet maintains, seems to be based on the fact that no strings are "attached to them", however weak the proof. 376 We are very sceptical of such claims. It is clear that certain aids have been openly rejected because of political reasons. It is also well known we must recall, that international goodwill toward Guinea Bissau has been very impressive because of the widely publicized struggle for independence that won her the respect and charm of many countries. To say therefore that the danger often associated with these aids is minimal in terms of achieving national self-reliance, is an oversimplification. However, to the extent that a policy of outright rejection of aid in our assessment will be catastrophic to her national development process, Guinea Bissau is compelled to accept these aids. This is indeed understandable, but does not in anyway preclude the attachment of strings.

As in the case of Guinea Bissau, Mozambique also receives aid from several countries. But the most important phenomenon in Mozambique as in Guinea Bissau, is the politicization of the masses in order to cultivate the spirit of national self-reliance. Agricultural projects for example, seemed to have a heavy dose of local and organizational influence. In other words, it is widely understood that for the success of certain

375 Ibid.
376 Ibid.
projects, Mozambican people's efforts are considered the most essential catalyst.

On the other hand, there is a strong economic tie between Mozambique and South Africa, official rhetoric notwithstanding.\textsuperscript{377} The continual dependence for example, on contract labor for an important foreign currency resource, and other economic and trade relations makes a mockery of the whole question of self-reliance, especially an international outcast like South Africa. This in turn influences her policy, however minimal they may be. For example, it regulates the use of railways and ports, including the use of electric power.\textsuperscript{378}

However, it is fair to say that steps are being gradually taken to reduce this dependence that challenges the practical realization of the attainment of self-reliance.\textsuperscript{379}

Finally, self-reliance now in its larva stage of development in these two countries, is nevertheless, considered a very important government strategy of national development that, when eventually realized would deal a humiliating blow to dependency and underdevelopment. Perhaps through this principle of self-reliance, the curse of neo-colonialism and dependency, could with remarkable success be removed. This approach to development to say the least, is therefore, an important strategy of national development.

\textsuperscript{377}Mittleman, op. cit., pp. 55-60.

\textsuperscript{378}Ibid., p. 56.

that deserves greater experimentation in many African countries. It is the only approach, in our view, so far that could translate the masses aspirations of many African countries into reality. In brief, self-reliance is the very dowry of national development at the contemporary epoch in Africa.
CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATION

In summation, we have seen that our principal objective in this study was an examination of the design and content of national development programs in the two revolutionary states of Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. Granted that past and current strategies of development have been unable to adequately address the development needs of many African countries as exemplified by the repeated failures, an examination of the United Nations Unified Approach to national development, that have in part or as a whole, become the theoretical foundation of national development programs in both Mozambique and Guinea Bissau becomes therefore appropriate.

The proposition that every nation ought to pursue the same course of development without proper regard for the uniqueness of prevailing concrete conditions, emanating from severe historical disparities as suggested by many Western development economists, is a barren contention, that in our view, rather oversimplifies the complexity of the process of national development. Such a contention, partially or wholly, reduces the development process to a senseless gymnastics of abstractions and concomitantly, gives it a mechanistic interpretation. The need, thus, to focus development strategies on the concrete conditions of nations rather than static metropolitan models cannot be overemphasized, in view of the observed eulogy of failures in the African context; which is itself an anticipated consequence of these fruitless endeavors.
In chapter two, we examined important theoretical issues. We stated that if one accepts the theoretical postulations of Western development economists, in which the gauge of nation on development is rooted in the omnipotence of the entrepreneur, the incremental surge of mere capital acquisition, expansion of agriculture via cash production for exports, dependence on the magnanimity of capitalist, or even subscriptions to the development paths and percepts of Western capitalist nations, one would be masking the current reality and development needs of today's African countries. Subscription to such a school of development, easily invoked the label Schumpeterian, Rostowian and adherents of Harrod, Domar, Ransi, Fei, or even Arthur Lewis, just to mention a few in the zoo of Western development economists. Taken as a whole, we have seen that they are not only theoretical caricatures of great profundity, but the very antithesis of development in the context of Africa. The inadequacy and irrelevance of these strategies, as we have seen, is proven by the existing conditions of today's African countries and the realized results that have produced an impressive catalogue of failures, which in turn have engendered a series of problems whose gravity cannot be quantified. All these, in our view, have become the permanent scars and critical antics of the illusion of national development.

As we noted earlier, the general literature of Western development economics that engendered colonial capitalist strategies of development, suffer from some serious deficiencies, of which the narrow conceptualization of the development process is easily identifiable. Consequently, there is the inevitable imposition of restrictive assumptions that have set specific
limitations to the solutions, thus far proposed with regard to African economic problems. As a result, the general framework within which most discussion on national development have by and large taken place, is in a "theoretical vacuum". The net effect of this can be measured by the total absence of adequate prescriptions.

Through these few examples, we have seen that the contention according to which the entrepreneur or innovator must remain the moving force, if not the cornerstone of the development process as suggested by Schumpeter is nothing but wishful thinking. Such a view, besides its narrowness, fails to come to grips with the socio-political and economic realities of today's peripheral capitalism. Granted that governments in Africa are the most conspicuous agents and driving force of "development", the irrelevance of the Schumpeterian strategy becomes easily perceived. It is also clear that the intended and observed goals are hardly development, but wealth and power. On the other hand, to base the primacy of national development mainly on the narrow acquisition of capital from saved income does not, in our view, represent a comprehensive approach to the process of development in the context of Africa. As a matter of fact, it is widely acknowledged that a common characteristic of many African economies is their low per capita income, which in turn inhibits the possibility of adequate capital acquisition. We further insisted that even if capital was easily available, the well-known conspiracies of Western capitalist countries of keeping African nations in the shadow of permanent dependency, renders this strategy impotent. The observed realities in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau before the capture of the state political power, as we have seen, as well as the current examples in Ivory Coast or Senegal, attest
to the bankruptcy of this strategy. It hardly uncovers or breaks the neo-colonial entanglements that have engendered, strengthened, and intensified the transfer of funds overseas, and indeed consolidated the dictatorship of the local bourgeoisie in alliance with the metropoles; nor has it uncovered the impotence and inadequacy of import-substitution industries that have again become the "new bastion" of imperialist stronghold.

In addition, to rely on the benevolence of borrowing from Western capitalist nations, as suggested by Arthur Lewis, leads to nowhere. Nor does an emphasis on a production for export strategy, as was the case of Ghana, a viable alternative. Both schools of thought, to say the least, are flagrant negations of the essence of self-reliance, which as we have noted, is the cornerstone of all development endeavors in the two revolutionary states of Mozambique and Guinea Bissau.

These strategies, we maintain, have been rooted on erroneous linear assumptions that have proven inadequate when juxtaposed with the concrete realities of African countries, and consequently must remain permanently suspect. Secondly, they minimize the significance of a comprehensive approach to the process of development that must conceive of development, not only from the point of view of economics or rather "miseconomics", but also its political, social, and ideological outcroppings fully addressed by the Unified Approach. New measures were therefore necessary because as Okwuosa's summation indicates, "the common characteristic of all these theories is their incompleteness or inadequacies; incompleteness either in their formulation or their applicability for all time. None of them fully or adequately explains the...economic phenomenon."\(^{380}\) To this

\(^{380}\) Okwuosa, op. cit., p. 60.
critique was added, the penetrating frontal attack from the Radical/Africanist school, which we have also seen in the second chapter.

Since our analysis of the United Nations Unified Approach to national development carries with it some social and political implications, we summarily devoted the third chapter exploring some of the facilitative conditions that have enhanced the adoption of these strategies in both Mozambique and Guinea Bissau.

In chapter four, we examined the economic dimensions of national development in both Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, following the Unified Approach.

It is our view, that as the practice in both these two states reveal the primary uniqueness of this approach to national development, as we have stated, rightfully begins from its broad categorization and conceptualization of the process of development. Far from the simplistic and narrow portrait of development as essentially "economics" or "growth", as conceived by Western development economists, development to say the least, has correctly been identified as a complex and difficult process, beyond the facile predictions and perceptions of Western academic "soothsayers".

In the domain of agriculture, we stated that, given the current realities in both Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, agriculture has become a major factor in their economic development process. But agriculture unlike before the capture of state power and much in common practice in today's Africa has taken a drastic turn. The data of our study reveals a profound de-emphasis on cash crop production for exports. Expansion of such practices has been at best gradual or confined to maintaining inherited colonial
formations. In addition, severe measures have been taken to diversify agricultural products. This stands in great contrast to the observed practices in both these countries before the capture of state political power, as well as in many African countries today; Ghana, Tanzania, Cameroon, and Nigeria, prior to the enthronement of the deity "petro-dollars" (oil). We have also seen that unlike before, there is a commitment to produce those essential traditional agricultural food crops that have long suffered from the neglect of past strategies. We have also seen the direct and indirect roles of the state in the materialization of this objective - technical assistance, political education, direct credits, mass participation in agriculture and others. Furthermore, state-run farms producing needed food crops have been established and state supported cooperatives and other supplementary agricultural developments were introduced.

The wisdom of these measures could be judged by the fact that in many African countries, where the focus of agriculture has perpetually remained within the confines of cash crop production, the production of essential food crops for domestic consumption has continually lagged behind domestic needs; opening up the levees for large imports of basic food supplies from overseas, with all its accompanying consequences. We have also seen that to achieve better agricultural results, following the Unified Approach, the state in both countries have emphasized national collectivism and land nationalization, that have produced significant results. Although unemployment remains an acute problem in Africa today, we have seen how these countries are using agriculture with a combination of political education to reduce the severity of this phenomenon, by not
only controlling the flow of youths to the large urban centers, but by
instituting communal villages and settlements, infused with the doctrine
of self-reliance. In addition, we noted that the practice of engaging in
conspicuous consumption based on the direct import of luxury goods that
were very prevalent before the adoption of the Unified Approach, which
is still a common practice in today's Africa, has been severely curtailed
or liquidated and in its place, necessary capital goods.

Furthermore, we have also seen that like agriculture, industrialization
has also followed a noticeable sudden twist. It's expansion at the moment
had been limited, for reasons that we have noted in chapter four. Since
many of these industries were essentially constructed to process raw
materials for export to Portugal and the metropoles, and given the
limitation of national funds, there has been a visible de-emphasis of
past trends. In addition, we have also seen that the lack of backward and
forward linkages favorable to Mozambique or Guinea Bissau has provided
further rationalization for its controlled expansion, while agriculture
has become the major area of concentration. Theoretical justification for
this position has already been examined in the study. However, since the
capture of state political power in both Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, as
we observed, there have been serious efforts to develop backward and
forward linkages in certain industries. In addition, unlike before the
capture of the state political power, local crafts have been greatly
encouraged and the production is expected to grow significantly. Our study

381 Note also that this position has been reversed again at least in
theory in Mozambique. It was suggested as part of the new policy in the
last party congress of FRELIMO in May 1983. For details see, Facts and
also reveals that, these industrial set ups are not controlled from "outside", and this is not a common feature in Africa. Many have been appropriately nationalized under the protective umbrella of the state. We have also contrasted these nationalization ventures from the cosmetic nationalization endeavors in Nigeria, Tanzania, or Kenya. In addition, new industrial projects, our study shows, have a tendency to be located far away from urban centers and in rural areas, for example, Bafata, Gabou, Bolama, etc., in Guinea Bissau, just to use one case. These are living testaments to this new orthodoxy.

Indeed, our study further reveals that even the organizational character of these industries unlike before, have been also drastically altered. Workers now are seen to play a strong participatory role in the daily affairs of these industries, and increased control over management and production have also been accorded them. Besides, the new weekend classes for the workers, on the job training, free literacy classes, and others, are additional measures and incentives that are bound to yield impressive results in the future.

However, in light of all these strides at national development, the lack of any mechanism of guaranteeing that the fruits of development trickle down to everybody is still an important problem, especially in many African countries; one that has remained permanently unaddressed in Africa. As we have seen the question of distribution is central to the Unified Approach to national development. This problem has not

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escaped the penetrating thrust of national development in these revolutionary states. The institution of mechanisms like the Dynamizing Group, the People's Shop, the practice of free education, and medical care, etc., are impressive and deliberate measures that have been taken by Mozambique and Guinea Bissau to begin solving this problem and very encouraging results have been observed.

But national development, as we have said in chapter five, in any correct sense does not only imply or rather involve the economic; it is also political. The Unified Approach, as we have seen, emphasized the need and importance of politics in development, especially in the arena of structural transformation. If the realization of the hopes and aspirations of the masses are its intended goals; politics, like economics must take center line of all national objectives. To deny this contention in the African context, as we have noted, would be a futile refutation or flagrant mutation of reality. This dichotomy between the "objective" and "subjective" in development is very crucial and cannot be overemphasized. Therefore, in chapter five, we stated that the role of the political element, a key to successful development in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, since the adoption of the Unified Approach, could be seen as a positive catalyst rendering tensions resulting from development strategies creative rather than paralyzing, and complementary rather than offsetting. The mastery of this act rests strongly on major structural changes undertaken and the politicization of the entire polity. The role of political education, our study reveals in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, has rather rendered the development strategy cohesive as well as dynamic.
Thus, in the political dimension of national development, our analysis reveals that the political element has tended to rejuvenate political objectives and actions in both these two states, that have greatly reduced the class arithmetic and mutilated its emergent institutions. It is one that has evolved new mechanisms of unrestricted mass participation in development issues, as well as in the political system, through the parties and its various organs. It is one that has emphasized and effected relevant structural changes and distributions of power crucial to genuine development; one that has made a committed strife and effort to realize national integration and profound political consciousness of the entire citizenry; and therefore, created an atmosphere most congenial to an effective overall national development. To crown it all, it is as we have seen in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, one that has been able to infuse effectively, the weapon of constructive criticism and self-criticism into the development process. The political elements in these countries, as we have seen, have been very instrumental not only in altering the political attitudes and platitudes of the citizenry, but also in harmonizing the economic, social, and ideological objectives of the process of development.

The challenges of national development, especially in the African context, we noted, brings with it severe problems of organization and mobilization, which in turn require, in our view, a sound and dependable organizational unit to disseminate and serve as the driving force and watch dog of such development. The parties in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, our study reveals, serve as the major instrumentations of foremost importance in accomplishing these objectives. The unique and impressive role played by the PAIGC and FRELIMO, in Guinea Bissau and Mozambique,
respectively, in national development, which in turn has symbolized them as arbiter and definer of the national interest, the controller and custodian of the aspirations and goals of the masses is very crucial to the development process of these countries. Therefore, whether in agricultural production, human resource development, industrialization, distribution, education, or in rural politicization, structural transformation, mass participation, and collectivity in development and others, the organizational function of these parties vis-a-vis national development, has been very essential.

Chapter six examined the socio-ideological dimensions of national development in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. We noted that national development in accordance with the theoretical postulation of the Unified Approach is properly conceived only through the examination of the whole rather than the particular; hence, the process of development must correctly be viewed additionally in terms of its social and ideological transformations. This as we have seen, is a contrast to previous strategies and views which have confined the process of development to economics and economic statistics, crowning them measurers of development, the national progress, and modernity.

As our study reveals, in both states of Guinea Bissau and Mozambique, following the Unified Approach to national development, appropriate attention has been given to human resource development, radical improvements in housing, etc. In other words, social phenomena, unlike before have become an important part of governmental policy. Accordingly, the educational process has been summarily revamped; from the curriculum to
the propensity of pupils attendants. Encapsulated on all these have been a strong ideological fermentation. To say the least, such an ideology in both these states, as we have seen, has provided a potential driving force in the world of the masses and has greatly stimulated critical discussions around the emerging society and its anticipated goals. Such an ideological foundation has greatly contributed both to the reduction and exposure of many contradictions in development, especially the emergence of a powerful petty bourgeois class.

Besides, a strong ideological orientation, our study reveals in both these states, has enhanced party cohesion; facilitated mobilization, especially in the countryside, which in turn means that at all levels and dimensions of the development process, discussions and development goals could be easily understood and transmitted to attain practical reality; and hence, a necessary ingredient in the attainment of self-reliance. In addition, the success of preventive measures vis-a-vis the health needs of these nations, and the efforts to combat the problem posed by housing are very encouraging indeed.

At the base of all these efforts, as we have seen, is the steady drive towards the realization of self-reliance, which in both Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, has become the wisdom and cornerstone of all their development objectives - indeed a revered ritual. We have seen that great strategic importance is attached to self-reliance, both in statements describing their broad development philosophy and practice, but certainly not at the risk of stagnation. Self-reliance has become therefore, the guiding light of these emerging nations.
Finally, as our penetration of Western development economists morbid perversions of development has revealed, thoughts as well as practice within the context of African development have suffered from the poverty of a concrete analysis of concrete African conditions, from which a dependable theory of development could be extrapolated. Observed realities have continually lagged behind the expected results. The process of development, we maintain, can hardly be the simplistic portraits of many of these thinkers and dreamers. The Unified Approach, as we have seen, could be a more efficacious theory that could help redress these shortcomings. This is not to say that it is supposed to solve all the development problems of contemporary African nations. The enormity of the problem cannot be contested.

At the grassroots, the Unified Approach is essentially a profound rejection of previous development paths; that is, the static metropolitan modes of Western industrialized countries. As a result of the colonial capitalist strategy, contemporary national development practices in many African countries, have become the tool of reactionary fetters of the African petty bourgeoisie; hence, inhibiting the emergence of Africa.

In our assessment therefore, given the experiences of both Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, the Unified Approach could be an indispensable contributor to the resolution of many contemporary African development problems.

In brief, it is a fundamental re-ordering of development priorities, often assigning leading roles to the aspirations and goals of the masses, qualitative and profound structural changes, both economic transformations
and integration, the liquidation of regional, social, and "sectoral" disparities, the development of human potential, especially the immense sea of rural backwardness and neglect, equitable distribution of income, unemployment and underemployment reduction, educational revision and expansion, mass popular participation, self-reliance and others.

We consider it a strategy of development that could be very helpful to Africa, especially today, as the experiences in both Mozambique and Guinea Bissau continue to gain currency in the African development landscape. Yet, it is the view of this author that African countries intending to adopt this approach to development, must as a pre-requisite examine their own concrete conditions, first. This theory does not pretend to provide the solutions to all development problems in Africa, and hence blind copying is indeed a risky venture.

Furthermore, it is still a matter of debate how long this process of development, however correct the approach, would continue in view of the persistent menace of powerful Western democracies, because of the challenge it poses to their own mode of living and ideology. Answers to this problem at the contemporary epoch cannot be extrapolated. Even the gravity of the consequence cannot be quantified.

Nevertheless, the strategy is one that could enhance the maturation of the masses' aspirations and goals. The Unified Approach to national development could indeed be, at the moment, the new orthodoxy of African national development; one that could become a significant contributor to the discourse on African development, redeeming it from the long eclipse it has suffered.
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