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The Truman doctrine and Greece

Charles P. Mobley

ATLANTA UNIVERSITY

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THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND GREECE

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF ATLANTA UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

BY
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DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

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PREFACE

The Near East has, in the past and present, ranked high among the most critical areas of the world. Greece, which is strategically situated in this area, has been an object of attempted subjugation through the years.

Greece was subdued by the Axis forces in 1941, and was occupied for a period of four years. Following liberation, there arose, among other discouraging factors, an aggressive threat to the integrity and independence of Greece.

The United States, sensing the need of challenging such forces of intimidation existing within the borders of a democratic ally, adopted the program popularly known as the Truman Doctrine.

The writer's purpose for making this study is to point out those conditions conducive to the spread of Communism, and to find out whether the Truman Doctrine has been successful in realizing its major objective - to promote stability and security in Greece. It is hoped that this study will be instrumental in convincing its readers that America, a peace-loving nation, must take the lead in guarding the security of the world.

It might be noted that this study deals primarily with the Greek aid program under the authority of Public Law 75 (80th Congress, first session) which ended at the close of the fiscal year 1948, after which the program was transferred to the Economic Cooperation Administration.

The writer wishes to express his indebtedness to Dr. William M. Boyd, Chairman of the Department of Political Science, Atlanta University, Dr. Robert H. Brisbane, Professor of Political Science, Morehouse College,
and Professor Clarence A. Bacote, Professor of History, Atlanta University, for invaluable assistance in the preparation of this study.

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Atlanta University
Atlanta, Georgia
1952
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The so-called Truman Doctrine, or the Aid to Greece and Turkey Program, was a measure adopted for the purpose of rehabilitating war-torn Greece and guarding the security of both Greece and Turkey against communism. It was hoped that such a measure would, through the restoration of economic stability and the repression of internal strife, diminish those conditions which were conducive to the rapid spread of communist influence in this strategic Mediterranean area.¹

The Truman Doctrine, while considered by many to be a revolutionary change in American foreign policy, was viewed by the administration as the wisest alternative at the moment. As it became more apparent that the policy of the Soviet Union was, without doubt, based on the idea of spreading communist influence through aggressive expansion, the necessity of challenging such a policy became obvious.²

Despite strong public and Congressional denouncements of the doctrine as an imperialistic and irresponsible venture, its advocates were successful in adopting what they termed a measure to assist these free peoples in maintaining their integrity and independence. Exponents of the Truman Doctrine, in refuting the claim that it was inconsistent with the basic objectives of this nation's foreign policy, declared it to be in absolute harmony with it - the preservation of international peace and the security


of the United States. It appeared obvious that such objectives could be attained only through the granting of assistance to free people who were striving to maintain their institutions and their national integrity against forces of aggression. The consideration of the Greek and Turkish situation presented two courses of action to America: one was to revert to our policy of earlier years and disregard the immense changes which had taken place in the world due to the inventions and ingenuity of man. The second course was to recognize the fact that the Communist ideology of the Soviet Union was challenging democracy for the occupancy of the minds and souls of men all over the world, and to counter-act this challenge.

Past experience had taught the United States that a policy of isolationism was obsolete. The United States had come to realize that it could no longer maintain its security by limiting its efforts to its geographical boundaries. There had been an acceptance of the notion that a vigorous and positive course of action in every phase of international affairs was the only solution to the problem of national security. World distrust and insecurity forced the United States to accept the fact that it was compelled to assist her democratic friends in maintaining their freedom and to strengthen them to the point where they would be able to resist forces of aggression.

Background of Greek Crisis

Of the two countries to be directly benefitted by the Truman Doctrine,

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4 Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 3793.

5 Ibid.
the plight of Greece appeared more acute. This war torn country was suffering from internal strife as well as economic instability. Even today, with the exception of Albania, Greece is the poorest country in Europe. In territorial size, Greece ranks with the state of Arizona and has a population of slightly less than eight million people. Despite the fact that it is predominantly an agricultural country, only twenty-two percent of the land is arable.6

The fortunes and misfortunes of Greece have been attributed to its crucial geographic position. It is located at the crossroads of three continents – Europe, Asia, and Africa. From this vantage point, Greece has witnessed the clash of men and ideas; the encounters of armies and cultures; the conflicts, policies and endeavors for world supremacy.7

The birth of the theory and practice of democracy has been attributed to the Greeks. They have always been sensitive to the dangers of despotism and oppression, and through the years this country has stood as a bulwark of democracy.8

In 1940, Greece was again confronted with the forces of despotism and oppression. Despite her courage and determination, she was unable to resist the combined forces of Germany, Italy, and Bulgaria. By April 1941, Greece was overpowered and occupied by Nazi, Fascist, and Bulgarian forces.9

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8 Ibid., p. 2.
9 Ibid., p. 8.
For four years, Greece suffered severely from enemy occupation. The country's population was exposed to cruel and brutal treatment at the hands of the occupation forces. Policies of economic destruction and mass executions were put into effect. Such conditions prevailed until the country was liberated at the end of 1944 by the allied forces.\textsuperscript{10}

The termination of enemy occupation was by no means the complete solution to the Greek problem. Conditions which resulted from the war and occupation gave rise to the emergence of forces which sought to capitalize on the prevailing human misery.\textsuperscript{11} This intimidating force was armed international communism. This new menace further hampered the country in its struggle toward economic rehabilitation and security.\textsuperscript{12} The Greek patriots fought courageously to crush this threat and retain their new freedom. Despite tremendous odds, they chose to fight what appeared to be a losing battle for the cause of democracy.

The Truman Doctrine, urged by the critical situation in Greece, was an attempt on the part of America to play its role in this chaotic world in order that democracy might survive. In as much as the Greek situation was an example of what was taking place in many parts of the world, the necessity of challenging such situations could not be avoided.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., p. 10.

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.

THE GREEK DILEMMA

The liberation from enemy occupation by no means meant the end of Greek hardships. The country remained in a state of confusion and instability. As a result of uncertain political and economic conditions, faith was lost in the strength and stability of the government. There was a group of Greek inhabitants who strongly contended that Greece was entitled to adequate assistance from the allies since its condition had resulted from the war. There was also a pessimistic group which believed that the Greek problem was so great that individual efforts were futile. The pessimism of a considerable portion of the citizenry, and the lack of confidence on the part of government officials, in addition to other obstructions, rendered recovery quite difficult.¹

The Appeal for American Aid

Early in 1947, the Department of State was informed that due to economic conditions in Great Britain, the British government was no longer able to fulfill its commitments in Greece. The British message asserted that Great Britain could not avoid economic disaster at home and at the same time provide sufficient funds for the maintenance of stability in Greece.²

The urgency of the Greek situation was quite evident in the British


correspondence. Great emphasis was placed on the assumption that without outside assistance the Greek government could not resist the armed communist aggression and regain the country's pre-war stability. The British estimated 320 million dollars in aid as the amount necessary to rehabilitate and stabilize the war-torn country.³

The United Nations Rehabilitation and Relief Association, which had begun a two year program in Greece in 1945, was soon to be withdrawn. The termination of the assistance of this international organization, which had furnished Greece with 362 million dollars in aid, was sure to cause undesirable repercussions.⁴

Upon being notified of the approaching withdrawal of British Aid, the Greeks were quite disturbed. Immediately, the Greek government officials sought means of filling the vacuum to be left by the British withdrawal. An appeal was made to the United States to assume the responsibility at the termination of British assistance. This highly emotional appeal of distress portrayed the Greek problem as one demanding immediate attention if Greece were to survive as a democratic state.⁵

The United States was informed, by Greek officials, of the difficulties encountered in attempting to restore Greece to its pre-war level of stability. These difficulties were declared to be such that they could not be overcome without financial, economic and technical assistance from

³Ibid.


⁵Ibid., p. 827.
The seriousness of the Greek situation was emphasized in the Greek appeal to America, which pointed out the assistance necessary for Greece's survival. The appeal enumerated the necessary assistance as follows:

1. The financial and other assistance which will enable her immediately to resume purchases of the food, clothing, fuel, seeds, and the like that are indispensable for the subsistence of her people and that are obtainable only from abroad.

2. The financial and other assistance necessary to enable the civil and military establishments of the Government to obtain from abroad the means of restoring in the country the tranquillity and feeling of security indispensable to the achievement of economic and political recovery.

3. Aid in obtaining the financial and other assistance that will enable Greece and the Greek people to create the means for self-support in the future. This involves problems which unhappily cannot be solved unless we surmount the crisis immediately confronting us.

4. The aid of experienced American administrative, economic and technical personnel to assure the utilization in an effective up to date manner of the financial and other assistance given to Greece to help to restore a healthy condition in the domestic economy and public administration and to train the young people of Greece to assume their responsibilities in a reconstructed economy.

The American Economic Mission

At the request of the Greek government, the United States Department of State formed and sent the American Economic Mission to investigate the conditions in Greece. The purpose of this mission was to make, on the basis of its investigations, recommendations as to the outside assistance necessary for the recovery of Greece.8

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6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid., p. 898.
A thorough investigation was in process from January 18 to March 22, 1947. The Mission visited practically every section of Greece, interviewing hundreds of people from all walks of life. A thorough study was made of the governmental organization, budget expenditures, revenues, export potentialities and import requirements, monetary and credit policies, reconstruction and development and other related matters. It was through such intensive and extensive investigations that America was able to obtain first hand information on the prevailing conditions in Greece.

The American Economic Mission, upon arrival in Greece, was convinced that the urgency of the Greek situation had hardly been exaggerated. Numerous obstructions stood in the way of security and stability. Despite assistance from the United Nations Rehabilitation Relief Administration and the British government, Greece had been unable to make any noticeable progress toward recovery.

Economic Conditions

The American Economic Mission reported the economic plight of the small and predominantly agricultural Greece as one of destitution. There was a pronounced inadequacy of wearing apparel, food, and housing facilities. The bulk of the diet consisted of bread, olives, homemade wines, milk and cheese, with meat limited to holiday consumption. The farmers, public employees and factory workers suffered to the greatest extent. Their earnings were barely enough for minimum subsistence; therefore there

\[\text{Ibid.}\]

were not sufficient funds for proper clothing, medical expenses and recreation. The destruction of villages by the retreating enemy forces created a critical housing problem. The overpopulated areas suffered tremendously from the lack of adequate housing facilities. Many families were confined to a single room or some other makeshift shelter.\textsuperscript{11}

Although the Greeks were predominantly a poverty-stricken people, there was a small portion of the population which escaped this poverty. There could be found in almost every town, restaurants which served fine foods and wines. There were, also, stores where all types of clothing, tools, and equipment were available. Such establishments, however, were patronized only by those few who lived comfortably despite widespread poverty. The sources of the income of this minority was usually business profits, speculation or inherited property.\textsuperscript{12}

The Greek tax structure was responsible, to a large extent, for the great inequality in the distribution of wealth and income. That small portion of the population which enjoyed the highest standard of living, paid less taxes in proportion to its income. Less than one-fifth of the taxes came from this group, although its members received large incomes and owned great amounts of property. While on the other hand, the poorer classes, which constituted over ninety-five per cent of the Greek population was the source of most of the tax revenues. Over four-fifths of the total revenue came from taxes which reduced the producers' incomes, or raised costs to


\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 22-23.
consumers, thus affecting the farmers and low income groups more than the well-to-do. 13

A transportation breakdown was an obstacle in Greece's path to economic stability. Transportation facilities had suffered tremendously at the hands of the destructive, retreating enemy forces. And as a result of inadequate transportation facilities, freight shipment was unusually expensive. 14

The dimensions of the Greek economic problem were appraised by the American Economic Mission, on the basis of its investigation, in this manner: 15

(1) The tentative estimated Greek budget, including the expanded military establishment, indicates a deficit of 290 million dollars for 1947, or about three times the amount of currency now in circulation;
(2) reserves of unrestricted foreign exchange by the end of 1946 were too meager to insure import of Greece's minimum needs, necessitating a severe restriction of basic imports in the absence of immediate outside assistance;
(3) pressures on the retail price level are severe and further marked increases are indicated unless there are immediate corrective measures;
(4) wage demands are accumulating as a result of the foregoing factors, adding the threat of wage inflation to the prospect of budget inflation.

Guerilla Warfare

Unfortunately, civil war in Greece had not terminated with the signing

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

of the Varkiza Agreement. Guerilla warfare was one of the major factors blocking the approaches to security and stability in Greece. Such a civil disturbance undermined the confidence of the Greek people, thereby impeding the recovery process.

Two different types of guerilla were found in operation in Northern Greece. There was one group taking orders from the Greek Communist Party and a second group which was under the control of the National Liberation Front. The former group was engaged in revolutionary activity in an effort to gain control of the Greek military and civil authority in order to establish a communist system of government. The latter group was a communist dominated organization which was composed of displaced Greeks with headquarters outside of the country.

The United Nations and the Guerilla Problem.—On December 3, 1946, Greece appealed to the United Nations for aid in solving the guerilla problem. The Greek government charged that the guerillas were receiving support from, and were permitted to take refuge in, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria. The United Nations, in answer to the Greek appeal, sent a Commission of Investigation to study the situation. This Commission which was composed of representatives of the eleven members of the Security

16 William H. McNeill, The Greek Dilemma (New York, 1947), p. 195: "By terms of the Varkiza Agreement of February 12, 1945, the guerillas agreed to surrender all arms. In return for this concession the Government agreed to uphold civil liberties and to publish an amnesty which would cover all political crimes committed during the civil war."

Council, preceded the American Economic Mission to Greece.\(^{18}\)

The United Nations Commission of Investigation spent seven months studying the situation, and on June 27, 1947, a report was submitted to the Security Council. Eight members of the Commission, a majority, agreed that Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria were supporting guerilla warfare in Greece.\(^{19}\)

In spite of the fact that a majority of the Commission declared that Greece's charges against its northern neighbors were true, United Nations action was impossible due to the Soviet Union's veto in the Security Council. Three times a majority of the Security Council, with only the Soviet Union and Poland dissenting, approved proposals for a solution to the guerilla problem.\(^{20}\)

Guerilla bands, then, continued to terrorize Greece. Communication and transportation facilities and property were destroyed. This guerilla activity made it necessary to increase military expenditures, which threw the domestic budget further off balance. This, in turn, forced the government to suspend its currency stabilization.\(^{21}\)

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19. Ibid., pp. 5-11.

20. Ibid., pp. 27-47.

Possibilities and Recommendations

Despite the acuteness of the Greek dilemma, there remained possibilities of recovery. Greece, at least, had resources and people capable of maintaining a productive level higher than the existing one. There was evidence that an increase in production and national income could be realized through the effective development of irrigation and hydro-electricity, the education of citizens in modern technologies, the development and use of improved agricultural methods, and the expansion of industry in order to absorb the unemployed labor. 22

As was obvious, stability in the Greek government was of paramount consequence. A stable government would regain the confidence and support of the people and make a workable economic program possible. As a result, agriculture and industry would expand, and foreign investors would be encouraged.

In the light of its investigations, the American Economic Mission made certain recommendations affecting the problem of Greek recovery, as those made earlier by the United Nations Commission had failed to materialize. This American Mission recommended that the United States extend immediate financial aid to Greece for relief, reconstruction and military purposes. 23

The Mission maintained that the extension of sufficient United States aid to meet the costs of the military and reconstruction programs through June 1948 would mean notable progress toward recovery. 24

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24 Ibid.
This aid could balance the Greek budget, since sufficient funds for non-military and non-reconstruction purposes were already available. A balanced budget would alleviate the economic crisis. There would then be a restoration of faith in the Greek currency, which would mean an increase in business activity, a decline in prices, and a reduction in wage demands.

The mission was cognizant of the fact that the success of the Greek Aid Program was not possible without unlimited cooperation from Greece. Thus, the Mission recommended certain measures to be taken by Greece for the most effective utilization of Greek resources in the recovery process. Recommendations were advanced for the reformation of the Greek governmental administration, which was hampered by an overexpanded, underpaid and demoralized civil service and disorganization among the various ministeries. Such reforms would be in the nature of reduction in numbers, increase in the pay scale, and in improvement in the caliber of personnel in the civil service system. A reduction in the number of ministeries and the rearrangement of functions was suggested.25 Suggestions were also advanced in the areas of economy controls, public works reconstruction and development, and agriculture.26

The mission felt that the effectiveness of the Aid program would be enhanced by the assistance of experienced American economists, administrators and technicians. Thus, a proposal setting up operational machinery was advanced. This Advisory Mission, as it was to be called, was to consist of

25 Ibid., pp. 903-06.

26 Ibid.
specialists experienced in economics, finance, government administration, engineering, industry and agriculture.27

To insure the most effective use of the American aid, the proposed Advisory Mission was to supervise the funds. It was to have the power to discontinue financial aid should Greece fail to live up to the conditions on which the aid was granted. It was proposed that there be a requirement that quarterly reports be published for the Americans, the Greeks and the United Nations.28

27 Ibid., pp. 906-07.
28 Ibid.
CHAPTER III

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

The feasibility of an Aid Program to Greece and Turkey, with its broad implications, became an issue of utmost importance and consideration in the United States; and recommendations made by President Truman gave rise to several fundamental questions in the United States, such as:\(^1\)

1. Is the United States prepared to take specific action in Greece in opposition to the expansion of Soviet influence in the eastern Mediterranean?
2. Is the United States prepared to assume the risks and expense of bolstering world stability as the British did in the sixteenth century?
3. Can the two major political parties, each in control of one of the arms of the government, agree on a policy of aid to a government supported by the British and violently opposed by the Soviet Union?

The President's Message to Congress

The urgency of the Greek problem provoked President Truman to seek immediate legislative action on a possible solution. On March 12, 1947, the Chief Executive made a speech before a joint session of Congress recommending Aid for both Greece and Turkey. The purpose of this message was to encourage congressional action on a measure which would alleviate the critical situation, which the President declared involved the foreign policy and security of the United States.\(^2\)

Congress was told of the threat upon the territorial and political


integrity of Greece. In an emotional manner, the President explained the
imperativeness of assistance in order that the Greek people might remain
free and retain their democratic form of government. 3

The urgency of the situation, as described by President Truman, was
further substantiated by preliminary reports from the American Ambassador
to Greece as well as by statements from the Greek and British governments.4

Congress was requested to provide $400 million in aid to Greece and
Turkey, $350 million of which was to be earmarked for Greece. The aid
allotted to Greece was to serve the purposes of counteracting the communist
pressure and rehabilitating the war-torn country.5

President Truman endeavored to convince Congress that this aid was a
means by which America could challenge the attempts to intimidate free,
though poverty stricken and disunited, peoples by political infiltration.
He asserted that failure to take positive action in challenging such
intimidation would, without doubt, undermine the foundations of world peace
as well as threaten the security of the United States.6

The President emphasized the fact that the creation of conditions in
which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life, free from
coercion, was the primary objective of the foreign policy of the United

3 Ibid.


5 U. S. Department of State, Recommendations on Greece and Turkey,

6 Ibid.
In support of his case, he went on to correlate such an objective as one of the fundamental issues of the two recent world wars. He believed that a world conflict could be avoided should the United States assist free peoples in working out their destinies. The President urged that the United States should, without hesitation, extend the economic and financial assistance vital to economic stability and orderly political processes.

In addition to the financial aid, Congress was requested to authorize a detail of American administrators. Such a Mission, consisting of civilian and military personnel, which was requested by the countries to be aided, was to assist in the program of reconstruction and to supervise the use of the financial and material aid granted. Congress was, also, asked to provide for the instruction and training of selected Greeks, who would facilitate and speed the country's recovery.

Public And Editorial Reaction

This new aid program, as recommended by the President, was of immense public concern. The American people, with grim remembrance of the recent world conflict, wanted to be cautious in adopting a policy which might invite war. Many serious-minded and patriotic citizens wrote their Congressmen advising Congress to deal wisely and cautiously with the proposed Greek-Turkish loan. Typical of public reaction is a letter to

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7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
Representative George B. Schwabe (R.-Okla.) from a constituent\textsuperscript{10} which, in part, reads:

The proposal of President Truman with regard to Greece and Turkey confronts the United States with one of the gravest questions in its history....

It is the plain duty of members of Congress to prevent hasty action - to see that the facts are laid before the people in understandable terms - and finally, to take action in the light of the facts and expressed will of the people.

Editorials were very influential in moulding the public's opinion of the proposed policy. Following the President's message, considerable space on the editorial pages of most American newspapers and periodicals were devoted in support of, or in opposition to, the newly proposed policy.

John S. Knight, editor and publisher of the Chicago \textit{Daily Times}, in an editorial of April 12, 1947, stated that we should oppose the Truman Doctrine because it:\textsuperscript{11}

1. Destroys the original and fundamental concept of the United Nations.
2. Commits the United States to the role of world policeman.
3. Misleads the American people into believing that this is another glorious triumph for democracy.
4. Stems from the idea that you can buy goodwill and fight communism with dollars.
5. Issues an open invitation to war.

Frank V. Severne, editor of The \textit{Watkins Express}, Watkins Glen, New York, stated the following in his editorial of April 14, 1947, supporting the Greek-Turkish aid program:\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{10} \textit{Congressional Record}, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. A1212.

\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Chicago Daily Times}, April 12, 1947, p. 18.

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Watkins Express}, April 14, 1947, p. 11.
If we fail Greece, her liberties as a free people are at an end, and our peace and security at home and abroad will become the object of a growing and perpetual menace. The freedom we prize must not be denied to others....

An editorial in the Catholic Review of the Week, dated March 29, 1947, had this to say concerning the proposal:13

The President is not "dragging us into war," but is using the best means available here and now to keep us out of war. On the other hand, if prompt action is not taken to preserve the political independence of Greece and Turkey, and to provide some sort of first aid in an economic sense to Greece, we shall find arrayed against us a rejuvenated military machine....

The preceding examples are indicative of the deep public concern with reference to the President's proposal.

Congressional Consideration

The President's message, with its broad implications, had a startling effect on Congress. This newly proposed course of action, for the most part, appeared to be a revolutionization of the nation's foreign policy. However, the exigency of the Greek situation urged Congress to take immediate action. On March 18, a bill (H.R. 2616) was introduced in the House of Representatives to provide assistance to Greece and Turkey.14 And on the following day an identical bill (S. 938) was introduced in the Senate.15

These bills were subjected to serious consideration, as the

14 Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 2219.
15 Ibid., p. 2230
Congressmen began to re-evaluate the possible alternatives to be faced and their implications.

**Arguments Against Proposed Doctrine.**—There was a strong contingency of Congressmen, which looked upon the proposed Truman Doctrine with disfavor. This faction was not convinced that the proposed policy, with its broad implications, was the most desirable one.

Those who termed the proposed policy a radical change and an irresponsible venture questioned its broad implications. Answers were sought to questions such as: Why should the United States assume British commitments? And if we are successful in Greece, will the program end or must we also assist Egypt, Iran, Korea, India, China, Italy and others? Also, there was serious consideration of the possibility of financial disaster as a result of such a long range program.16

This disapproving faction was very much concerned with the possibility of the Soviet Union challenging the proposed policy with military action. It seemed certain that a major conflict would eventuate should the United States and the Soviet Union meet moving into Greece.

The proposed Truman Doctrine was also criticized on the ground that it implied the loss of faith in the United Nations. It was contended that the Truman Doctrine was a proposal to by-pass the United Nations, and accept the burden of promoting peace and security. There was also the criticism that by protecting Greece and Turkey, the United States was agreeing to zones of world political influence, thereby further obstructing

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the progress of the United Nations.\textsuperscript{17}

Representative George H. Bender (R.-O.), one of those Congressmen opposing the proposed aid program, charged that the British had retarded Greece's recovery, therefore, we should not allow them, at this point, to place their burden upon us. In opposition to the proposal, Representative Bender submitted the following questions to the State Department from the floor of the House:\textsuperscript{18}

1. Why, if the British feels as does our President, that Greece is the key to the world battle against communism, are the British withdrawing from Greece and continuing to pour money and troops into Palestine?
2. Why do the British tell us what we should do in Greece when they themselves refuse to act on their advice to us?
3. Does President Truman and our State Department think that this Congress is going to vote $4,000,000,000 to sustain a corrupt Greek monarchy?

Senator Edwin C. Johnson (D.-Colo.) asserted his position on the President's proposal as follows:\textsuperscript{19}

The Truman Doctrine is a demand on our part for freedom from all international restraints. It is a policy of international anarchy. Under this preposterous theory we assume the responsibility of policing the word by ourselves and denying such a right to all other powers....

The future of the proposed Truman Doctrine appeared dismal as such strong denouncements were advanced.

Arguments Favoring the Proposed Doctrine.– The proposed Doctrine was strongly supported by some of the most influential men in Congress,

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., p. 3197.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., p. 2342.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 2047.
including Representative Charles A. Eaton (R.-N. J.), Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg (R.-Mich.), and Senator Tom Conally (D.-Tex.). These men, and other advocates, declared that the United States was obligated to assist Greece by virtue of our membership in the United Nations. They contended that it was obvious at the time of accepting the Charter that the United States would have to play the leading role since it was the world's strongest power. Upon signing the United Nation's Charter, the United States pledged itself to support action in defense of sovereign nations threatened by aggression. It was declared, by the supporters of the proposal, that should the United States allow changes in the status quo in violation of the United Nations charter through political infiltration, it would help to destroy this international machinery for peace and security.20

The newly proposed policy was strongly supported by those Congressmen who saw the need for a positive and immediate course of action. This faction declared that a policy of isolationism was obsolete and would prove detrimental in this atomic age. And besides, there was a deep sympathy for Greece, a brave ally which had suffered war invasion, four years of occupation and then internal terrorism.

The proposed policy was visualized, by its exponents, as a measure which would terminate the policy of appeasement employed in the past. Many of the Congressmen were convinced that a policy of appeasement in relations with the Soviet Union was, to a large extent, responsible for the Soviet's aggressive actions.

20 Ibid., p. 3237.
Recent instances of appeasing the Soviet Union were cited as follows:

At Cairo and Tehran we agreed to invade Europe through France and not through the Balkans. At Yalta we agreed to sacrifice Poland, Eastern Europe, and the Balkans to Russian control. At Potsdam we agreed to let Russia take industrial equipment from Germany and now we face a multi-million dollar program of feeding the Germans during our occupation since their buying power has been destroyed.

It was in view of these facts that the advocates of the aid program declared that a policy of appeasement would prove futile.

Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, Chairman of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee, who introduced and led the support of the aid bill in the Senate, made the following statement with reference to President Truman's recommendations on Greece and Turkey:

The President's message faces facts and so must Congress. The independence of Greece and Turkey must be preserved, not only for their own sakes but also in defense of peace and security for all of us. In such a moment the President's hands must be upheld....

Representative Adolph J. Sabath (D.-Ill.) made the following remarks in support of the President's proposal:

...I cannot believe the President's message was intended to involve us in war but to facilitate the adjusting of any and all differences existing or which might exist between our country and Russia. His recommendations for direct American intervention in Greece were only because the United Nations is not mature enough and strong enough to function as the whole world thinks it should.

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21 Ibid., p. A1155.

22 Ibid., p. 2050.

23 Ibid., p. 2147.
In answer to the contention that the United Nations and its specialized agencies should assume the responsibility in Greece, it was asserted that the United Nations was not in a position to solve the problem. The lack of financial resources and an international police force would render the United Nations incompetent. And besides, the Soviet Union, which was interested in subjugating Greece and Turkey, would use its veto power in the Security Council to block action by the United Nations. Thus, the United States was declared to be obligated to assume the responsibility until the United Nations was capable.24

In challenging the claim that the United States, through such a policy, was by-passing the United Nations, the following excerpt was given from a message delivered to the Security Council by Ambassador Austin:25

The program of economic assistance contemplated by the United States is of an emergency and temporary charter. The United States believe that the United Nations and its related agencies should assume the principle responsibility within their capabilities, for the long range task of assistance required for the reconstruction of Greece....The United States is giving momentum to the United Nations by its present policy....we look forward to the time when such burdens may be carried through the United Nations.

Exponents of the proposed doctrine advanced such reasons as follows to justify American aid to Greece:26

(a) in the self interest of our country in this Atomic Age;
(b) to uphold the spiritual values which America has always championed; (c) to come to an understanding with Russia as a means of preventing armed conflicts; (d) as a means of stimulating the United Nations to revitalize itself so that it will be adequate to its responsibilities.

24 Ibid., p. 3197.
25 Ibid., p. 3198.
26 Ibid., p. 3793.
The bill to provide aid to Greece was favored by the existing bi-partisanship in both Houses of Congress. Though the measure was the brain-child of a Democratic executive, its foremost spokesmen were Republicans Arthur Vandenberg, Senator from Michigan and Charles Eaton, Representative from New Jersey.

The Senate's version of the bill providing Aid to Greece and Turkey, which was favored with the leadership of Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R.-Mich.), Chairman of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Tom Connally (D.-Tex.), ranking minority member of that Committee, was passed on April 22 with a 65-23 vote.27

The House of Representatives, having made less progress with its version substituted that of the Senate for its own. The bill, with several amendments, speedily passed the House of Representatives. It was amended to require the approval of the Federal Bureau of Investigation be given before any civilian personnel was appointed to the Economic and Military Mission to Greece and Turkey. It was further amended that no American funds be used to pay off loans previously made by other governments, and that the citizenry of the receiving countries should be informed of the source and expenditures of American aid.28

Disagreement to the amendments of the House of Representatives on the part of the Senate and insistence on the part of the House, resulted in the request for a conference. Each house accepting the request, conferees

27 Ibid., p. 3793.

28 Ibid., p. 4876.
were appointed. Conferees of the House of Representatives were Charles A. Eaton (R.-N. J.), Karl E. Mundt (R.-S. D.), Bartel J. Jonkman, (R.-Mich.), Sol Bloom (D.-N. Y.) and John Kee (D.-W.Va.); \(^{29}\) those of the Senate were Arthur H. Vandenberg (R.-Mich.), Arthur Capper (R.-Kans.), Alexander Wiley (R.-Wis.), Tom Connally (D.-Tex.), and Walter F. George (D.-Ga.)\(^ {30}\)

The Conference Committee hastily reached agreement. The amendment demanding the approval of civilian personnel of the Economic and Military Mission by the Federal Bureau of Investigation was compromised by requiring that such personnel be merely investigated by this agency. The approval of the civilian personnel was to be left to the Mission head, whose appointment would have to be confirmed by the Senate. The Committee agreed that Greece and Turkey should not be permitted to use American credits to pay loans made previously by other governments, and that the citizens should be fully informed of the source and expenditures of American Aid. \(^ {31}\)

Following the report of the Conference Committee, on May 15, 1947, the $400 million authorization to put the Truman Doctrine in operation passed Congress. Both Houses of Congress, on May 15, 1947, rapidly gave unanimous approval to the Conference agreement, which had harmonized the differing versions of the program and rules for its administration. \(^ {32}\)

\(^ {29}\) Ibid., p. 4996.

\(^ {30}\) Ibid., p. 5208.

\(^ {31}\) Ibid., pp. 5348, 5319.

\(^ {32}\) Ibid.
On May 22, President Truman signed the Greek and Turkish Aid Bill, which he declared constituted a vigorous effort to create peace and security in the world. The President stated that, "The conditions of peace include among other things, the ability of nations to maintain order and independence, and to support themselves economically." He declared that the newly approved act was evidence that the United States not only pledged its support to the United Nations, but that it was striving to further the aims and purposes of this international organization for peace and security.33

CHAPTER IV

THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE AID PROGRAM

By virtue of authority vested in him by the act entitled "An Act to Provide for Assistance to Greece and Turkey," the President prescribed regulations for carrying out the provisions of the act. The Secretary of State was authorized, through such departments, agencies, and independent establishments of the government as he may designate, to exercise any power or authority conferred upon the President by the act. ¹

There was a series of communications between the United States and Greece concerning the administration of the newly approved Act. Through such communications, an agreement was reached as to the effective operation of the Aid program.²

In response to a Greek request, a mission was sent to Greece, consisting of about 150 Americans engaged in economic work and 136 military and naval personnel. In addition, there were several hundred representatives of American contracting firms who were responsible for various phases of reconstruction work under the program.³

The functions of this American Mission to Greece was first, to administer the Aid program in such a manner as to encourage the recovery of

¹ Executive Order 9857, 12 Federal Register, 3331.
of Greece. Secondly, the Mission was concerned with the provision of advisory and technical skills to achieve the greatest benefits from the money spent.  

The Military Program

The military program was dedicated to the task of suppressing the internal strife of Greece. Its purpose was to provide equipment, supplies, and advice which would facilitate the destruction of the guerilla bands within Greece.  

As of December 31, 1947, the military and naval advisory groups of the American Mission were the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group, the United States Army Group, and the United States Navy Group. The Military Advisory and Planning Group assisted the Greek Army Command and General Staff with strategic and tactical planning of operations against the guerillas. The personnel of the mission supervised the flow of military and naval equipment and supplies into Greece, and gave operational advice to the Greek army. However, they neither participated in combat nor commanded Greek forces.  

The total authorized and actual military and naval personnel of the mission are shown by the following tables. Table 1 shows total personnel
as of March 1948. Table 2 shows that as of June 1948.

### TABLE 1

**STRENGTH OF MILITARY AND NAVAL GROUPS, MARCH 1948**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Advisory and Planning Group</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. S. Army Group</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. S. Navy Group</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Personnel</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>371</strong></td>
<td><strong>282</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 2

**STRENGTH OF MILITARY AND NAVAL GROUPS, JUNE 1948**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U. S. Army Group</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. S. Air Force Group</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. S. Navy Group</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>454</strong></td>
<td><strong>410</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes a total of 29 civilians employed in these groups

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7 *Ibid.*, p. 4

The original program for the first year, as of July 30, 1947, allotted 149 million dollars or fifty per cent for military purposes. But due to the expansion of the Greek army and the organization and equipping of National Defense Corps battalions, a revision of the program was necessary. And as of December 31, the plan for the distribution of funds to aid the Greek armed forces was as follows: 9

**TABLE 3**

**THE DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS TO GREEK ARMED FORCES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service Category</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ground Force</td>
<td>$149,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>9,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>12,850,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$171,850,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The report of expenditures for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1948, revealed that the procurement for military assistance was distributed as shown in Table 4, page 33. 10

In consultation with the American military advisory groups, the Greek government made considerable progress with respect to the size, disposition, equipment and organization of the Greek forces. And as a result of American assistance and advice, the military operations of the Greek forces were more

---


successful.\textsuperscript{11}

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{Military Expenditures for Fiscal Year 1948}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
\hline
Service Category & Amount  \\
\hline
Air Force & $1,700,000  \\
Signal & $5,400,000  \\
Engineer & $2,900,000  \\
Medical, Chemical and Adjutant General & $1,000,000  \\
Navy & $12,850,000  \\
Ordnance & $34,300,000  \\
Transportation & $9,500,000  \\
Quartermaster & $58,200,000  \\
Petroleum products & $2,400,000  \\
United Kingdom* & $35,900,000  \\
Contingency & $3,100,000  \\
Miscellaneous & $4,500,000  \\
\hline
Total & $171,850,000  \\
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

*Items of all services are included in this figure. The Greek forces were originally supplied with British equipment. Replacement and maintenance of this initial supply accounts for the amount expended on British items.

The Economic Program

The economic branch of the American Mission rendered invaluable assistance and advice to the Greek government in its attempts to stabilize the country's economy. Experienced American administrative, economic, and technical personnel assisted the Greek government in the effective utilization of American Aid in restoring a balanced condition in the Greek economy.

The economic branch was organized into functional divisions, each of

\textsuperscript{11}Ibid., pp. 3-7.
which was responsible for a particular part of the economic program. Such specialized functional divisions covered fields of public finance, foreign trade and supply, agricultural, civil government, labor, industry and mining, public health, and relief and welfare.\textsuperscript{12}

The task of encouraging reform in the disorganized and overly centralized Greek government, which was necessary in order for Greece to receive the maximum benefit from the Assistance program, was undertaken by the Mission. A Greek-American Committee on Government Organization, composed of Greek administrative officials and members of the American Mission, formulated and applied new administrative methods and techniques.\textsuperscript{13}

The efforts of the Mission were directed toward the reorganization, simplification and decentralization of the government and the improvement of the civil service system. This was expected to restore the confidence of the citizenry in the government, thereby enhancing the recovery process.\textsuperscript{14}

Serious efforts were made by the Mission to establish a balanced national budget and a sound fiscal policy. The Greek government was encouraged to expand exports and to limit exports to the most essential products. Budgetary and organizational reforms were stimulated within the government. A series of studies were made of proposed expenditures; plans for each ministry were carefully examined; and budget hearings were held to determine where reductions could be made.\textsuperscript{15}


\textsuperscript{13} U. S. Department of State, \textit{The Fourth Report to Congress on Assistance to Greece and Turkey} (Washington, 1948), pp. 12-16.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
The Mission collaborated with various ministries of the Greek government in drafting legislation to facilitate economic recovery. As a result of American legal and technical advice, there was a revision of the Greek tax structure and tax collection system.\(^{16}\)

With reference to the reconstruction program in Greece, the Mission took into account five major groups of projects, namely: the Corinth Canal, ports, highways, railroads and airfields. Such reconstruction work was undertaken by American contracting firms under the supervision of the United States Corps of Engineers.\(^{17}\)

The Mission's program to expand trade and industry covered manufacturing, mining, public utilities and public automotive transportation. Short and long range programs were put into effect in these fields by technicians of the Mission.\(^{18}\)

A great deal of effort was directed toward increasing the agricultural productivity of the country. With the cooperation of the Greek ministry of Agriculture, the Mission put into effect projects of irrigation, drainage, well-drilling and soil conservation. Equipment necessary for agricultural development was made available, and the Greek farmers were instructed in the operation and care of such equipment.\(^{19}\)


\(^{18}\) Ibid., pp. 22-23.

\(^{19}\) Ibid., pp. 23-25.
Effectual advice on the part of the American Mission was applied to the Greek labor situation. Cooperation in the field of labor relations was encouraged between government, industry and labor in achieving economic stability. Under the guidance of the Mission, the Greek Confederation of Labor was reorganized in order to make the maximum contribution toward recovery. Wage negotiations were undertaken in an attempt to increase wages in relation to the rise in the cost of living. And specialists in apprenticeship training served the function of preparing young Greeks to assume their responsibilities in the field of labor.\textsuperscript{20}

Categories of expenditures for economic assistance under the Greek Aid Program, as of June 30, 1948, were as follows:\textsuperscript{21}

\textbf{TABLE 5}

\textbf{EXPENDITURES FOR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE UNDER THE GREEK AID PROGRAM}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct U. S. Government Expenditures:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconstruction projects</td>
<td>$20,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm and Industrial Machinery and Supplies</td>
<td>18,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>30,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Health</td>
<td>1,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Goods and Services</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Mission for Aid to Greece (personnel and administration)</td>
<td>4,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditures Through Normal Channels:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer Goods and Raw Materials</td>
<td>42,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans to Industry</td>
<td>600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans to Agriculture</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitation</td>
<td>600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$122,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., pp. 29-30

Continuation of the Aid Program

On April 3, 1948, Congress passed the Greek-Turkish Assistance Act of 1948 (Public Law 472, 80th Cong., 2nd sess.), which provided for the continuation of the aid program in Greece and Turkey.22 And on July 1, 1948, the economic recovery program of these countries were transferred to the Economic Cooperation Administration, pursuant to Public Law 472.23

**TABLE 6**

VALUE OF AID DELIVERED TO GREECE THROUGH JUNE 1949

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Military</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quarter ending:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>$25,316,888</td>
<td>$25,316,888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>21,797,752</td>
<td>43,067,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>69,075,934</td>
<td>77,244,526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>105,196,401</td>
<td>111,299,628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>113,268,440</td>
<td>165,581,155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>115,150,119</td>
<td>225,990,014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>119,454,805</td>
<td>264,978,939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>118,310,849</td>
<td>854,781,606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>662,254,300</td>
<td>1,768,259,766</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

22 Congressional Record, 80th Cong. 2nd sess., p. 3275.

The Greek Aid Program was administered under the Economic Cooperation Administration in the same manner as it had been in the preceding fiscal year. And at the end of fiscal year 1949, which concluded two years of assistance to Greece, the above report (Table 6) was made with reference to the value of American aid delivered to Greece through June 1949.24

At this point, there was evidence of progress in Greece. But in spite of such progress, Greece was not yet able to survive without assistance. Therefore, the long-range program under the Economic Cooperation Administration was continued.25

Progress to Date

Even today Greece is far from complete recovery. However, conditions today are a great improvement over those prior to American assistance. The confidence of the Greek people has been restored. Faith has been restored in the Greek Government, which has been decentralized with merit as the basis for governmental appointments.26

The reconstruction program has made tremendous progress, particularly with reference to transportation facilities. Bridges, railroads, and highways, which were destroyed by the enemy, have been repaired. An additional one thousand miles of highways and two hundred miles of railroad track have

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26 Ibid.
been provided. The famous Corinth Canal and three important Greek ports have been reopened.27

The strength of the guerilla forces have been greatly reduced, although the menace has not been completely destroyed. The guerillas have lost the support of Yugoslavia, which has begun to cooperate with Greece. Albania and Bulgaria, on the other hand, are still supporting this Communist imperialism.28

In 1951, the Greek national income was eighty-eight percent of the pre-war income, whereas it was only sixty-four percent in 1927.29 A bilateral treaty of friendship, commerce and economic development was concluded between the United States and Greece in 1951. This treaty has encouraged private investments into underdeveloped areas in Greece by insuring fair treatment to foreign investors.30

In spite of the tremendous progress, stability in Greece has not been completely restored. And America continues to assist the Greeks in their struggle toward recovery and security. There have been 182 million dollars in aid allocated to Greece for the year of 1952. The security of Greece will be further guarded by virtue of its membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, into which it was recently admitted.31

27 Ibid., pp. 15-16.
28 Ibid., p. 21.
29 Ibid., p. 15.
31 Ibid., pp. 18-19.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The preceding chapters have discussed the Truman Doctrine and its application to the Greek situation subsequent to the second World War.

This study has shown that the aggressive expansion of Communism is greatly enhanced by the existence of conditions of poverty, injustice, and political and economic disorder. It has further shown that an effectively administered counter-policy can successfully challenge such aggressive movements by eliminating those conditions conducive to their perpetuation.

The United States, with the Truman Doctrine, inaugurated a program which has assisted and encouraged peace-loving peoples in their struggles to deter forces of aggression. Insecurity resulting from the recent conflict imposed upon America the task of developing among free peace-loving peoples the will to work out their own destinies.

In 1947, the United States immediately responded to the Greek people, who were struggling to maintain their freedom and rehabilitate their country. The action of the President and the Congress was, without doubt, in strict accordance with the American tradition. The policy adopted was a typical and traditional American one of rendering effective assistance against forces of aggression and subjugation.

American aid to Greece was, without question, one of the most important factors in the preservation of Greek independence and the progress made toward Greek recovery. As the study revealed, the lack of a continual flow of American aid into Greece would have meant a complete break-down in the Greek economy and a collapse of the resistance by the Greek people to attempts
to impose a Communist regime in Greece.

As fiscal year 1948 neared its end, thoughts were concentrated on the effectiveness of the aid program up to this point and the prospects of its continuation. It could not be denied that the American aid program had been instrumental in preventing the collapse of Greece, and in encouraging Greece to maintain the essentials of democracy. The aid program had increased the effectiveness of Greek military operations and initiated a process of rehabilitation; thereby, restoring the confidence of the Greek people.

A survey of the aid program at this point, also, revealed some disappointments. The major one being the inability to destroy the guerrilla movement by cutting off its foreign support provided by Greece's Communist controlled neighbors. The power of the United Nations to settle this matter has been hampered by the veto of the Soviet Union in the Security Council and the refusal of Greece's northern neighbors to abide by the recommendations of the General Assembly.

It may be concluded that the United States chose the wiser of two major alternatives in reference to the Greek situation. The United States granted Greece the assistance necessary to challenge the forces of aggression and to go forward with economic rehabilitation, rather than leave the weakened country to be subjugated by the Communists. The Truman Doctrine was successful in realizing its major objectives of preventing Communist conquest of Greece, and of encouraging other free peace-loving peoples resisting Communist infiltration by giving them confidence in the determination of the United States to support them.

On the other hand, the denial of assistance to Greece would have dealt
a tremendous blow to the prospect of world peace. From a moral point of view it would have meant a renunciation of the principles on which peace is established. Politically and strategically, it would have inflicted tremendous losses upon the Western democracies, while strengthening Communism throughout the world. The refusal of aid to Greece, on the part of the United States, would have undermined the great effort being made to unite and strengthen the defences of the peace-loving nations of the world.

The American policy of aiding free peoples to remain free was not, by any means, terminated at the end of the authority of Public Law 75 (80 Cong. 1st sess.), which initiated such a policy in Greece and Turkey. Rather, such a policy has been continued toward Greece and other peace-loving nations under the Economic Cooperation Administration and, more recently, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The continuance of the United States to develop confidence among free peoples that it has assumed full partnership in the effort to preserve world peace has proven a key factor in meeting the economic and political problems of the world.
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Whereas the Governments of Greece and Turkey have sought from the Government of the United States immediate financial and other assistance which is necessary for the maintenance of their national integrity and their survival as free nations; and

Whereas the national integrity and survival of these nations are of importance to the security of the United States and of all freedom-loving peoples and depend upon the receipt at this time of assistance; and

Whereas the Security Council of the United Nations has recognized the seriousness of the unsettled conditions prevailing on the border between Greece on the one hand and Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia on the other, and, if the present emergency is met, may subsequently assume full responsibility for this phase of the problem as a result of the investigation which its commission is currently conducting; and

Whereas the Food and Agriculture Organization mission for Greece recognized the necessity that Greece receive financial and economic assistance and recommended that Greece request such assistance from the appropriate agencies of the United Nations and from the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom; and

Whereas the United Nations is not now in a position to furnish to Greece and Turkey the financial and economic assistance which is immediately required; and

Whereas the furnishing of such assistance to Greece and Turkey by the United States will contribute to the freedom and independence of all members of the United Nations in conformity with the principles and purposes of the Charter; Now, therefore,

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the President may from time to time when he deems it in the interest of the United States furnish assistance to Greece and Turkey, upon request of their governments, and upon terms and conditions determined by him—

(1) by rendering financial aid in the form of loans, credits, grants, or otherwise, to those countries;

(2) by detailing to assist those countries any persons in the employ of the Government of the United States; and the provisions of the Act of May 25, 1938 (52 Stat. 442), as amended, applicable to personnel detailed pursuant to such Act, as amended, shall be applicable to personnel detailed pursuant to this paragraph:

Provided, however, That no civilian personnel shall be assigned to
to Greece or Turkey to administer the purposes of this Act until such personnel have been investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation;

(3) by detailing a limited number of members of the military services of the United States to assist those countries, in an advisory capacity only; and the provisions of the Act of May 19, 1926 (44 Stat. 565), as amended, applicable to personnel detailed pursuant to such Act, as amended, shall be applicable to personnel detailed pursuant to this paragraph;

(4) by providing for (A) the transfer to, and the procurement for by manufacture or otherwise and the transfer to, those countries of any articles, services, and information, and (B) the instruction and training of personnel of those countries; and

(5) by incurring and defraying necessary expenses, including administrative expenses and expenses for compensation of personnel, in connection with the carrying out of the provisions of this Act.

Sec. 2. (a) Sums from advances by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation under section 4 (a) and from the appropriations made under authority of section 4 (b) may be allocated for any of the purposes of this Act to any department, agency, or independent establishment of the Government. Any amount so allocated shall be available as advancement or reimbursement, and shall be credited, at the option of the department, agency, or independent establishment concerned, to appropriate appropriations, funds or accounts existing or established for the purpose.

(b) Whenever the President requires payment in advance by the Government of Greece or of Turkey for assistance to be furnished to such countries in accordance with this Act, such payments when made shall be credited to such countries in accounts established for the purpose. Sums from such accounts shall be allocated to the departments, agencies, or independent establishments of the Government which furnish the assistance for which payment is received, in the same manner, and shall be available and credited in the same manner, as allocations made under subsection (a) of this section. Any portion of such allocation not used as reimbursement shall remain available until expended.

(c) Whenever any portion of an allocation under subsection (a) or subsection (b) is used as reimbursement, the amount of reimbursement shall be available for entering into contracts and other uses during the fiscal year in which the reimbursement is received and the ensuing fiscal year. Where the head of any department, agency, or independent establishment of the Government determines that replacement of any article transferred pursuant to paragraph (4) (A) of section 1 is not necessary, any funds received in payment therefor shall be covered into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.

(d) (1) Payment in advance by the Government of Greece or of Turkey shall be required by the President for any articles or services furnished to such country under paragraph (4) (A) of section 1 if they are not paid for from funds advanced by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation under section 4 (a) or from funds appropriated under authority of section 4 (b).

(2) No department, agency, or independent establishment of the
Government shall furnish any articles or services under paragraph (4) (A) of section 1 to either Greece or Turkey, unless it receives advancements or reimbursements therefor out of allocations under subsection (a) or (b) of this section.

SEC. 3. As a condition precedent to the receipt of any assistance pursuant to this Act, the government requesting such assistance shall agree (a) to permit free access of United States Government officials for the purpose of observing whether such assistance is utilized effectively and in accordance with the undertakings of the recipient government; (b) to permit representatives of the press and radio of the United States to observe freely and to report fully regarding the utilization of such assistance; (c) not to transfer, without the consent of the President of the United States, title to or possession of any article or information transferred pursuant to this Act nor to permit, without such consent, the use of any such article or the use or disclosure of any such information by or to anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of the recipient government; (d) to make such provisions as may be required by the President of the United States for the security of any article, service, or information received pursuant to this Act; (e) not to use any part of the proceeds of any loan, credit, grant, or other form of aid rendered pursuant to this Act for the making of any payment on account of the principal or interest on any loan made to such government by any other foreign government; and (f) to give full and continuous publicity within such country as to the purpose, source, character, scope, amounts, and progress of the United States economic assistance carried on therein pursuant to this Act.

SEC. 4. (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation is authorized and directed, until such times as an appropriation shall be made pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, to make advances, not to exceed in the aggregate $100,000,000, to carry out the provisions of this Act, in such manner and in such amounts as the President shall determine. (b) There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President not to exceed $400,000,000 to carry out the provisions of this Act. From appropriations made under this authority there shall be repaid to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation the advances made by it under subsection (a) of this section.

SEC. 5. The President may from time to time prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper to carry out any of the provisions of this Act; and he may exercise any power or authority conferred upon him pursuant to this Act through such department, agency, independent establishment, or officer of the Government as he shall direct. The President is directed to withdraw any or all aid authorized herein under any of the following circumstances:

(1) If requested by the Government of Greece or Turkey, respectively, representing a majority of the people of either such nation;
(2) If the Security Council finds (with respect to which finding the United Nations makes the continuance of such assistance unnecessary or undesirable;
(3) If the President finds that any purposes of the Act have been substantially accomplished by the action of any other intergovernmental organizations or finds that the purposes of the Act
are incapable of satisfactory accomplishment; and
(4) If the President finds that any of the assurances given pursuant to section 3 are not being carried out.

SEC. 6. Assistance to any country under this Act may, unless sooner terminated by the President, be terminated by concurrent resolution by the two Houses of the Congress.

SEC. 7. The President shall submit to the Congress quarterly reports of expenditures and activities, which shall include uses of funds by the recipient governments, under authority of this Act.

SEC. 8. The chief of any mission to any country receiving assistance under this Act shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall perform such functions relating to the administration of this Act as the President shall prescribe.

Approved May 22, 1947.